Engine Malf Report

07/17/09
Turbofan Engine Malfunction Recognition and Response

Final Report
Foreword
This document summarizes the work done to develop generic text and video training
material on the recognition and appropriate response to turbofan engine malfunctions,
and to develop a simulator upgrade package improving the realism of engine malfunction
simulation. This work was undertaken as a follow-on to the AIA/AECMA report on
Propulsion System Malfunction Plus Inappropriate Crew Response (PSM+ICR),
published in 1998, and implements some of the recommendations made in the PSM+ICR
report. The material developed is closely based upon the PSM+ICR recommendations.
The work was sponsored and co-chaired by the ATA and FAA. The organizations
involved in preparation and review of the material included regulatory authorities,
accident investigation authorities, pilot associations, airline associations, airline
operators, training companies and airplane and engine manufacturers.
The FAA is publishing the text and video material, and will make the simulator upgrade
package available to interested parties. Reproduction and adaptation of the text and video
material to meet the needs of individual operators is anticipated and encouraged. Copies
may be obtained by contacting:
FAA Engine & Propeller Directorate

ANE-110
12 New England Executive Park
Burlington, MA 01803
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Contributing Organizations and Individuals
Note: in order to expedite progress and maximize the participation of US airlines, it was
decided to hold all meetings in North America. European regulators, manufacturers and
operators were both invited to attend and informed of the progress of the work.
Air Canada Capt. E Jokinen

ATA Jim Mckie
AirTran Capt. Robert Stienke
Boeing Commercial Aircraft Van Winters
CAE/ Flight Safety Boeing Capt. Kip Caudrey
Continental Airlines Jackson Seltzer
Delta Airlines Tim Hester
Capt. John Sciera
FAA Ann Azevedo
Ed Cook
Karen Curtis
GEAE Sarah Knife
Paul Mingler
Jack Stopkotte
JAA Laurent Gruz
Northwest Tony Hunt
David James
Ohio State U Jerry Chubb
Purdue University Mark Thom
Pratt & Whitney Dick Parker
Bob Valli
Al Weaver (ret’d)
TSB Canada Bruce McKinnon
Nick Stoss
United Airlines Rick Bobbitt
Pete Delo
Steve Ferro
Erwin Washington
US Airways Ron Thomas
Volpe Center Judith Burki-Cohen
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Introduction
On 13 December 1994 a Jetstream 31 turboprop crashed at Raleigh Durham, resulting in

fatal injuries to 15 passengers and two crew. It was determined by the NTSB that the
pilot had mistakenly assumed that an engine had failed and subsequently failed to
respond appropriately. The AIA, at the request of the FAA, subsequently undertook a
project to identify the issues related to the accident and identify corrective actions. The
results of the AIA/AECMA project were published in 1998 (Reference 1). Key findings
of the AIA/AECMA Project Group included:
• Although the vast majority of propulsion system malfunctions are recognized and
handled appropriately, there is a shortfall in some pilot’s abilities to recognize and
handle propulsion system malfunctions. The shortfall from initial expectation is due
to improved modern engine reliability, changing propulsion system failure
characteristics (symptoms), changes in flight crews’ experience levels, and related
shortcomings in flight crew training practices and training equipment.
• Industry has not provided adequate pilot training processes or material to ensure
pilots are provided with training for powerplant malfunction recognition. This
shortfall needs urgent action to develop suitable text and video training material
which can be used during training and checking of all pilots for both turboprop and
turbofan powered airplanes..
• The training requirements related to “Recognition and correction of in-flight

malfunctions” are found in Appendix C of 14 CFR Part 63 for Flight Engineers. The
disposition of the flight engineers recognition training requirements to pilots of
airplanes where no “Flight Engineer” position exists is not apparent. However, the
expectation does exist that the pilots will perform the duties of the flight engineer.
• The review of simulator capabilities shows that the technology exists to better
produce realistic propulsion system malfunction scenarios. However, at the moment,
realistic scenarios are often not properly defined nor based on airframe or powerplant
manufacturers’ data. Rather, the scenarios are often based on the customers’
perceptions of the failure scenario. There is generally no airframe or powerplant
manufacturers’ input into realistic engine failure/malfunction scenarios as represented
in simulators. Furthermore, the engine failures currently addressed in most training
do not cover loud noises and the onset of heavy vibration. Complete and rapid loss of
thrust is currently being trained and is probably the most critical from an airplane
handling perspective; however, this failure is not necessarily representative of the
malfunctions most likely to be encountered in service. There is also evidence that
this lack of realism in current simulations of turbofan propulsion system malfunctions
can lead to negative training, increasing the likelihood of inappropriate crew
response. Review of current simulators indicates that the tactile and auditory
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representation of airplane response to engine compressor stall/surge is very

misleading.
• A substantial number of the turbofan accidents reviewed are related to propulsion

system malfunctions resulting in high-speed aborts, including above V1 and Vr.
Accordingly, current pilot training may be deficient in addressing the symptoms of
the malfunctions, particularly loud noises and the importance of V1 and Vr speeds.
There was only one RTO-related accident identified on turboprop airplane in the
database.
The AIA/AECMA report included a recommendation that :
The aviation industry should undertake the development of basic generic text and
video training material on turboprop and turbofan propulsion system
malfunctions, recognition, procedures and airplane effects.
The FAA and ATA accordingly sponsored an industry/regulatory team, in September

1999, to develop such training material for turbofans (see Appendix 1). This report
documents the activity of the team and summarizes the training material developed.
The team was divided into two sub-groups, one addressing the development of text and
video material, co-chaired by engine manufacturer representatives, and the other
addressing simulator realism, chaired by UAL and Boeing.
It was recognized that training material also needed to be developed for turboprops, but
given the scarcity of resources available in the turboprop community, this activity was
deferred until the turbofan material was under way. It was hoped that the turboprop
activity would be able to leverage some of the turbofan work.
The training material provided is intentionally confined to description of engine operation

and propulsion system malfunction, and to broad outlines of intended pilot response.
Specific procedures may vary between aircraft models and also between operators; the
training material was intended to avoid conflict with published procedures.
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Definitions and Acronyms
AECMA The European Association of Aerospace Industries

AIA Aerospace Industries Association
ATA Air Transport Association
CVR Cockpit Voice Recorder
FAA Federal Aviation Administration
FADEC Full Authority Digital Electronic Control
LOFT Line Oriented Flight Training
NTSB National Transportation Safety Board
PSM + ICR Propulsion System Malfunction + Inappropriate Crew Response (limited
to those malfunctions which did not inherently render the aircraft not
airworthy)
RTO Rejected takeoff
V1 Takeoff decision speed
Vr Takeoff rotation sped
Inappropriate crew response: A crew response to a malfunction which was other than
the response trained or defined in the AFM, and which led to an accident or serious
incident.
Selection of Malfunctions to be Trained
Before either the text/video group or the simulator group could create training material, it
was essential to agree upon the propulsion system malfunctions that should be addressed.
The accident record shows that almost any malfunction can lead to inappropriate crew
response and a subsequent accident, but that some are more likely to do so than others. It
was decided that the malfunctions should be discussed in terms of the symptoms
presented to the pilot rather than in terms of the detailed hardware failure, since similar
symptoms were likely to prompt similar responses, and since detailed discussion of
hardware would make preparation of generic training material very difficult.
A poll of current simulators conducted by FAA-Flight Standards, in the work of the AIA
PSM+ICR group, showed that a large variety of engine malfunctions are available in the
simulators. There is no current guidance on which are the most valuable to the pilot and
which should be trained. Only a few of these malfunctions are actually used by each
operator, and their selection is at the discretion of the instructor. One of the most
frequently used malfunctions – an engine flameout at V1 – is almost never encountered in
service. Current practice, therefore, was not felt to be a good basis for what should be
trained.
It was recognized that each pilot would only have very limited time available in the
simulator and that only a select few propulsion system malfunctions would be trained in
that environment. A training video offered the opportunity to cover a wider variety of
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engine malfunctions, and the text material could cover as many malfunctions as the team
considered of interest. The constraining factor, therefore, was the simulator time
available to train engine malfunctions, and the requirement that the training footprint in
the simulator not be greatly increased.
Selection criteria
The following considerations were felt important in selection of malfunctions to be

trained in the simulator:
• Observed likelihood of crew error (based on the PSM+ICR database)

• Severity of results of crew error (whether fatalities or significant aircraft damage
resulted)
• Frequency of propulsion system malfunction
• Opportunity for improved training to reduce the likelihood of error
Malfunction Approximate
relative frequency
Bird ingestion/FOD (mostly very minor) 100
Flameout/rollback (generally from low power settings) 50
Fire warning (mostly hot air leaks) 33
Stall (broad spectrum of severity) 38
Severe engine damage 32
Seizure .3
Reverser inadvertent deploy (in flight) .01
Engine separation .01
Selection process
A matrix of propulsion system malfunctions was developed, showing the symptoms,

historical inappropriate crew response, desired crew response and helpful training
activity, by flight phase. This matrix had 49 separate combinations of malfunctions and
flight phases. The malfunctions addressed were engine surge, engine power loss, fire
warning and uncommanded thrust change/non-response to throttle movement. These
were selected because they had caused multiple accidents due to inappropriate crew
response.
The matrix was then summarized by eliminating those conditions (malfunctions at a

given flight phase) which had not resulted in an accident or serious incident as a result of
inappropriate crew response (see Table 1). The remaining conditions were prioritized
according to the number of accidents/ incidents known to have involved those conditions.
Seven conditions caused 54 of the 79 events in the AIA database (presented in Table 2).
These were considered to be of the highest priority for training in the simulator, although
in some cases the training would be so similar that duplication of a malfunction for all of
the flight phases was not considered essential.
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The remaining 17 conditions accounted for a smaller proportion of the events, and it was
agreed that in most of the cases, emphasis on maintaining control of the aircraft and
verifying the identity of the engine with the problem would address these events, without
the need for simulation.
The malfunctions addressed in the video included all those which had resulted in multiple
accidents or incidents, according to the AIA database. There was a specific concern
relating to engine vibration after an inflight shutdown, which had led one flight crew to
question the structural integrity of the airplane; although this did not lead to any crew
error or to an accident/incident, it was felt to be so unusual and alarming that it should be
addressed in the video.
Since the text material did not have the same constraints as the simulator and video
material, a wider variety of engine malfunctions were addressed. These included many
malfunctions which have not resulted in accidents, but which occur with reasonable
frequency in service on a wide variety of engines.
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Table 1
GROUP 1
PROBLEM SYMPTOM ICR Desired Next Response TRAINING ACTION
FLIGHT PHASE Immediate Failure Mode
Response
SURGE TAKEOFF > V1 LOUD BANG. 8, 12, 14, 17,28,38, Continue Take-off Accomplish stall/surge SURGE, SIMULATE LOUD NOISE, SUDDEN AIRCRAFT
(repetitive) RTO to safe altitude checklist RECOVERABLE, SHUDDER, FLUCTUATION OF ENGINE
N1/N2 Drop, EGT 47 not stabilizing W/PILOT PARAMETERS N1, N2, & EPR DECREASING,
Increase, flight path INTERVENTION EGT INCREASING, TRAIN TO KEEP
AIRCRAFT 51, 58 not CONTROL OF THE AIRCRAFT, CONTINUE
VIBRATION, P0SSIBLE intervening to TAKEOFF, CLIMB TO A SAFE ALTITUE THEN
YAW throttle back on THROTTLE BACK TO CLEAR SURGES AND
dual engine event REAPPLY POWER AND TROUBLESHOOT
69, 70, 72, throttle PER CHECKLISTS
good engine
SURGE TAKEOFF < V1 LOUD BANG (usually 1 68, 57, Shutting RTO Contact Maintenance SURGE, NON- SIMULATE LOUD NOISE, SUDDEN
or 2). down good engine RECOVERABLE AIRCRAFT SHUDDER, FLUCTUATION OF
N1/N2 drop, EGT 54, 29 ENGINE PARAMETERS N1 & N2 & EPR
increase, AIRCRAFT unsuccessful RTO DECREASE WHILE EGT INCREASES, TRAIN
VIBRATION, YAW TO REJECT THE TAKEOFF
SURGE TAKEOFF > V1 LOUD BANG (usually 1 2, 3, 4, 16, 21, 22, Continue Take-off Accomplish stall/surge SURGE, NON- SIMULATE LOUD NOISE, SUDDEN
or 2). 36, 45, 46, 48, 49, to safe altitude checklist RECOVERABLE AIRCRAFT SHUDDER, FLUCTUATION OF
N1/N2 drop, EGT 52, 55,56, 60, 64, ENGINE PARAMETERS N1 & N2 & EPR
increase, AIRCRAFT 76, 78, 80, RTO DECREASE WHILE EGT INCREASES, TRAIN
VIBRATION, YAW 65, 63, 67 KEEP CONTROL OF THE AIRCRAFT AND
shutdown/ throttle CLIMB TO A SAFE ALTITUDE BEFORE
good engine ATTEMPTING TO TROUBLESHOOT.
SURGE INITIAL CLIMB LOUD BANG (usually 1 15, 33, 41 Shutting Continue climb to Accomplish stall/surge SURGE, NON- SIMULATE LOUD NOISE, SUDDEN
or 2). down good engine safe altitude checklist RECOVERABLE AIRCRAFT SHUDDER, FLUCTUATION OF
N1/N2 drop, EGT ENGINE PARAMETERS N1 & N2 & EPR
increase, AIRCRAFT DECREASE WHILE EGT INCREASES, TRAIN
VIBRATION, YAW KEEP CONTROL OF THE AIRCRAFT AND
CLIMB TO A SAFE ALTITUDE BEFORE
ATTEMPTING TO TROUBLESHOOT
SURGE CRUISE Quiet bang (possibly 9, 11, 13, 20,23, Stabilize flight Accomplish stall/surge SURGE, NON- SIMULATE LOUD NOISE, SUDDEN
repetitive PARAMETER shut down good path checklist RECOVERABLE AIRCRAFT SHUDDER, FLUCTUATION OF
FLUCTUATION (may engine ENGINE PARAMETERS N1 & N2 & EPR
be only momentary), DECREASE WHILE EGT INCREASES, TRAIN
AIRCRAFT TO KEEP CONTROL OF THE AIRCRAFT AND
VIBRATION, CLIMB TO A SAFE ALTITUDE BEFORE
ATTEMPTING TO TROUBLESHOOT
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GROUP 1
Response
POWER LOSS INITIAL CLIMB Bang or fire warning or
43, 27 Failure to Continue flight to evaluate, & perform SEVERE SIMULATE LOUD NOISE, SUDDEN AIRCRAFT
single engine very severe vibration,stabilize flight path, achieve minimum appropriate checklist DAMAGE SHUDDER, FLUCTUATION OF ENGINE
aircraft yaw, high EGTShutting down safe altitude PARAMETERS N1 & N2 & EPR DECREASE
good engine WHILE EGT INCREASES, TRAIN TO KEEP
32, 1, Not taking CONTROL OF THE AIRCRAFT AND CLIMB TO
action to secure A SAFE ALTITUDE BEFORE ATTEMPTING
engine TO TROUBLESHOOT
POWER LOSS APPROACH Parameter spool down. 50, 44, 34, 30 Continue to land If go-round, evaluate FLAME OUT SIMULATE AIRCRAFT REACTION TO AND
single engine /LANDING Services (generators) Failing to control OR go-round as and perform FLIGHT DECK PANEL CHANGES FOR LOSS
drop off line yaw or appropriate appropriate checklist OF SINGLE ENGINE. TRAIN RECOGNIZE THE
compensate for SITUATION AND TO MAINTAIN AIRCRAFT
reduced thrust CONTROL DURING LANDING OR GO-
AROUND
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GROUP 2
Response
POWER LOSS GO-AROUND Parameter spool down. 10, 77 Failure to Continue flight to evaluate and perform FLAME OUT SIMULATE AIRCRAFT REACTION TO AND
single engine Yaw. Services recognize/ achieve minimum appropriate checklist FLIGHT DECK PANEL CHANGES FOR LOSS
(generators) drop off compensate for safe altitude OF SINGLE ENGINE. TRAIN RECOGNIZE THE
line power loss, SITUATION AND TO MAINTAIN AIRCRAFT
airspeed too low CONTROL DURING LANDING OR GO-
AROUND
POWER LOSS TAKEOFF < V1 Bang or fire warning or 35 Not completing RTO Perform appropriate SEVERE SIMULATE LOUD NOISE, SUDDEN
single engine very severe vibration, checklist, checklist. Contact DAMAGE AIRCRAFT SHUDDER, FLUCTUATION OF
aircraft yaw, high EGT 81 Continuing Maintenance ENGINE PARAMETERS N1 & N2 & EPR
takeoff, shutting DECREASE WHILE EGT INCREASES, TRAIN
down wrong TO REJECT THE TAKEOFF
engine
SURGE INITIAL CLIMB LOUD BANG. 53, 71 Shutting Continue climb to Accomplish stall/surge SURGE, SIMULATE LOUD NOISE, SUDDEN AIRCRAFT
(repetitive) down good engine safe altitude checklist RECOVERABLE, SHUDDER, FLUCTUATION OF ENGINE
N1/N2 Drop, EGT W/PILOT PARAMETERS N1, N2, & EPR DECREASING,
Increase, INTERVENTION EGT INCREASING, TRAIN TO KEEP
AIRCRAFT CONTROL OF THE AIRCRAFT, CLIMB TO A
VIBRATION, P0SSIBLE SAFE ALTITUE THEN THROTTLE BACK TO
YAW CLEAR SURGES AND REAPPLY POWER AND
TROUBLESHOOT PER CHECKLISTS
SURGE GO-AROUND LOUD BANG (usually 1 19 Failure to Continue go- Accomplish stall/surge SURGE, NON- SIMULATE LOUD NOISE, SUDDEN
or 2). stabilize flight path around to safe checklist RECOVERABLE AIRCRAFT SHUDDER, FLUCTUATION OF
N1/N2 drop, EGT / coordinate crew altitude ENGINE PARAMETERS N1 & N2 & EPR
increase, AIRCRAFT actions DECREASING WHILE EGT INCREASES.
VIBRATION, YAW TRAIN TO KEEP CONTROL OF THE
AIRCRAFT AND KEEP FLYING UNTILL
AIRCRAFT IS AT A SAFE ALTITUDE BEFORE
ATTEMPTING TO TROUBLESHOOT.
POWER LOSS TAKEOFF > V1 Parameter spool-down. 37,6 Failing to Continue Take-off evaluate, & perform FLAME OUT SIMULATE AIRCRAFT REACTION TO AND
single engine Yaw, loss of control yaw/ to safe altitude appropriate checklist FLIGHT DECK DISPLAY FOR SUDDEN LOSS
acceleration Services compensate for OF SINGLE ENGINE THRUST. TRAIN TO
(generators) drop off reduced thrust MAINTAIN CONTROL OF AIRCRAFT
line
POWERLOSS INITIAL CLIMB Parameter spool down. 18 shut down good Continue flight. evaluate, & perform FLAME OUT SIMULATE AIRCRAFT REACTION TO AND
single engine Yaw, reduced climb rate engine Restart engine appropriate checklist FLIGHT DECK DISPLAY FOR SUDDEN LOSS
Services (generators) OF SINGLE ENGINE THRUST. TRAIN TO
drop off line MAINTAIN CONTROL OF AIRCRAFT
POWERLOSS CRUISE Parameter spool down. 39 Failing to Continue flight evaluate, & perform FLAME OUT SIMULATE AIRCRAFT REACTION TO AND
single engine Yaw. Services control yaw, appropriate checklist FLIGHT DECK DISPLAY FOR SUDDEN LOSS
(generators) drop off airplane upset as OF SINGLE ENGINE THRUST. TRAIN TO
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GROUP 2
Response
line result MAINTAIN CONTROL OF AIRCRAFT
SURGE CRUISE Quiet bang , 42 shut down good Stabilize flight Accomplish stall/surge SURGE, SIMULATE LOUD NOISE, SUDDEN
PARAMETER engine path checklist RECOVERABLE, AIRCRAFT SHUDDER, FLUCTUATION OF
FLUCTUATION (may W/PILOT ENGINE PARAMETERS N1 & N2 & EPR
be only momentary), INTERVENTION DECREASING WHILE EGT
AIRCRAFT INCREASES.TRAIN TO KEEP CONTROL OF
VIBRATION, THE AIRCRAFT AND CLIMB TO A SAFE
ALTITUDE BEFORE ATTEMPTING TO
TROUBLESHOOT
SURGE GO-AROUND LOUD BANG. 2 inability to Continue go- Accomplish stall/surge SURGE, SIMULATE LOUD NOISE, SUDDEN
(repetitive) identify engine around to safe checklist RECOVERABLE, AIRCRAFT SHUDDER, FLUCTUATION OF
N1/N2 Drop, EGT involved altitude W/PILOT ENGINE PARAMETERS N1 & N2 & EPR
Increase, INTERVENTION DECREASING WHILE EGT INCREASES.
AIRCRAFT TRAIN TO KEEP CONTROL OF THE
VIBRATION, P0SSIBLE AIRCRAFT AND KEEP FLYING UNTILL
YAW AIRCRAFT IS AT A SAFE ALTITUDE
POWER LOSS CRUISE Bang or fire warning or 24 Shut down good Stabilize flight evaluate, & perform SEVERE SIMULATE LOUD NOISE, SUDDEN
single engine very severe vibration, engine path appropriate checklist DAMAGE AIRCRAFT SHUDDER, SUSTAINED
aircraft yaw, high EGT FLUCTUATION OF ENGINE PARAMETERS N1
& N2 & EPR DECREASING WHILE EGT
INCREASES. TRAIN TO MAINTAIN CONTROL
OF THE AIRCRAFT.
Uncommanded TAKEOFF > V1 Aircraft yaw, engine 26 shut down good Control airplane evaluate, & perform No engine SIMULATE ENGINE PARAMETER
thrust change or parameter difference engine direction. appropriate checklist damage INCREASE INTO WARNING BAND AND
non-response to APPROPRIATE AIRCRAFT REACTION.
throttle TRAIN TO CONTROL AIRCRAFT AND
movement SECURE ENGINE BY FUEL CUTOFF.
ALSO SIMULATE SLOW ROLLBACK OR NON

RESPONSE TO THROTTLE IN IFR
CONDITIONS. TRAIN TO MAINTAIN
AIRCRAFT CONTROL.
Uncommanded INITIAL CLIMB Aircraft yaw, engine 74 Not recognizing Control airplane evaluate, & perform No engine SIMULATE THRUST INCREASE OR SLOW
thrust change or parameter difference thrust direction. appropriate checklist damage ROLL BACK OR NON-RESPONSE TO
non-response to asymmetry/yaw THROTTLE IN IFR CONDITIONS. TRAIN TO
throttle until autopilot RECOGNISE AIRCRAFT SITUATION, FLY
movement disconnect and THE AIRCRAFT, THEN APPRAISE ENGINE
upset CONDITION
73 shut down good
engine
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GROUP 2
Response
Uncommanded CRUISE Aircraft yaw, engine 59 Not recognizing Control airplane evaluate, & perform No engine SIMULATE THRUST INCREASE OR SLOW
thrust change or parameter difference thrust asymmetry direction. appropriate checklist damage ROLL BACK OR NON-RESPONSE TO
non-response to or yaw until THROTTLE IN IFR CONDITIONS TRAIN TO
throttle autopilot RECOGNISE AIRCRAFT SITUATION, FLY
movement disconnect and THE AIRCRAFT, THEN APPRAISE ENGINE
upset CONDITION
31 shut down good
engine
Uncommanded DESCENT Aircraft yaw, engine 61 Not recognizing Control airplane evaluate, & perform No engine SIMULATE THRUST INCREASE OR SLOW
thrust change or parameter difference thrust direction. appropriate checklist damage ROLL BACK OR NON-RESPONSE TO
non-response to asymmetry/yaw THROTTLE IN IFR CONDITIONS. TRAIN TO
throttle until autopilot RECOGNISE AIRCRAFT SITUATION THEN
movement disconnect and FLY THE AIRCRAFT THEN APPRAISE
upset ENGINE CONDITION.
25 shut down good
engine
Uncommanded APPROACH Aircraft yaw, engine 66, 79 shut down Control airplane SIMULATE THRUST INCREASE ON ONE
thrust change or /LANDING parameter difference good engine direction. ENGINE. SIMULATE MAINTAIN
non-response to engine non responsive DIRECTIONAL CONTROL AND SECURE
throttle to PLA. ENGINE PER CHECKLISTS.,
movement
FIRE WARNING TAKEOFF < V1 Fire warning (light, bell) RTO Perform FIRE No engine
checklist. Contact damage
Maintenance
FIRE WARNING TAKEOFF > V1 Fire warning (light,) 40 RTO Continue flight to evaluate, & perform No engine
achieve minimum FIRE checklist damage
safe altitude
FIRE WARNING INITIAL CLIMB Fire warning (light, bell) Shut down good Continue flight to evaluate, & perform No engine
engine achieve minimum appropriate checklist damage
safe altitude
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Table 2
FLIGHT Immediate Failure Mode
PHASE Response
SURGE TAKEOFF < V1 LOUD BANG (usually 1 68, 57 Shutting RTO Contact Maintenance SURGE, NON- SIMULATE LOUD NOISE, SUDDEN
or 2). down good engine RECOVERABLE AIRCRAFT SHUDDER, FLUCTUATION OF
N1/N2 drop, EGT 54, 29 ENGINE PARAMETERS N1 & N2 & EPR
increase, AIRCRAFT unsuccessful RTO SEVERE DECREASE WHILE EGT INCREASES. TRAIN
VIBRATION, YAW 35, Not Completing DAMAGE TO REJECT THE TAKEOFF
checklist,
81 Continuing
takeoff, shutting
down wrong
engine
SURGE TAKEOFF>V1 LOUD BANG. 8, 12, 14, 17, 28, Continue Take- Accomplish stall/surge SURGE, SIMULATE LOUD NOISE, SUDDEN
INITIAL CLIMB (repetitive) N1/1n2 drop, 38 RTO off, climb, go checklist RECOVERABLE, AIRCRAFT SHUDDER, FLUCTUATION OF
CRUISE EGT increase, 47 not stabilizing around to safe W/PILOT ENGINE PARAMETERS N1, N2, & EPR
AIRCRAFT flight path altitude INTERVENTION DECREASING, EGT INCREASING, TRAIN TO
GO AROUND VIBRATION. 51, 58 not KEEP CONTROL OF THE AIRCRAFT,
POSSIBLE YAW intervening to CONTINUE TAKEOFF/GO AROUND, CLIMB
throttle back on TO A SAFE ALTITUE THEN THROTTLE
dual engine event BACK TO CLEAR SURGES AND REAPPLY
69, 70, 72 throttle POWER AND TROUBLESHOOT PER
good engine. CHECKLISTS
42, 53, 71 shutting
down good engine
2 Inability to
identify engine
involved
POWER LOSS TAKEOFF>V1 Bang or fire warning or 43, 27 Failure to Maintain control evaluate, & perform SEVERE SIMULATE LOUD NOISE, AIRCRAFT
single engine INITIAL CLIMB very severe vibration, stabilize flight path, of the aircraft, appropriate checklist DAMAGE SHUDDER, FLUCTUATION OF ENGINE
CRUISE aircraft yaw, high EGT Shutting down Continue takeoff PARAMETERS N1 & N2 & EPR
DESCENT good engine or climb to DECREASING WHILE EGT INCREASES.
APPROACH 32, 1 Not taking achieve or TRAIN TO CONTINUE TO CONTROL THE
action to secure maintain AIRCRAFT AND CLIMB AS NECESSARY TO
engine. minimum safe A SAFE ALTITUDE BEFORE ATTEMPTING
24 Shut down good altitude TO TROUBLESHOOT.
engine.
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FLIGHT Immediate Failure Mode
PHASE Response
POWERLOSS TAKEOFF > V1 Parameter spool down. 37, 6, 50, 44, 34, Continue takeoff, If go-round, evaluate FLAME OUT SIMULATE AIRCRAFT REACTION TO AND
single engine CRUISE Services (generators) 30 Failing to go around, or and perform FLIGHT DECK PANEL CHANGES FOR LOSS
APPROACH drop off line control yaw or landing as appropriate checklist OF SINGLE ENGINE. TRAIN TO MAINTAIN
/LANDING compensate for appropriate CONTROL OF THE AIRCRAFT, THEN
reduced thrust. 39 RECOGNISE SITUATION,
Failing to control
yaw, airplane upset
as result.
Uncommanded TAKEOFF >V1 Aircraft yaw, engine 74, 59, 61 Not Control airplane Evaluate and perform No engine SIMULATE THRUST INCREASE TO
thrust change INITIAL CLIMB parameter difference. recognizing thrust direction appropriate checklist damage WARNING BAND AND APPROPRIATE
or non- CRUISE asymmetry/yaw AIRCRAFT REACTION. TRAIN TO CONTROL
response to DESCENT until autopilot AIRCRAFT AND SECURE ENGINE BY FUEL
throttle disconnect and CUTOFF.
movement aircraft upset
resulted ALSO SIMULATE SLOW ROLL BACK OR
31, 25 Shut down NON-RESPONSE TO THROTTLE IN IFR
good engine. CONDITIONS. TRAIN TO RECOGNISE
AIRCRAFT SITUATION, FLY THE AIRCRAFT,
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Format of training material
It was recognized from the outset that training material should focus on the factual
material to be trained and not on the training methodology. The material also needed to
accommodate the following variables:
• Broad spectrum of pilot experience

• Varying levels of interest in subject matter
• Different learning styles
• Variations in training aid technology
• Training footprint available
The material was therefore structured to allow flexibility, as follows:
1. A video, highlighting the malfunctions most frequently causing problems. This could
be viewed as part of recurrent training.
2. Text outlines (flashcards or cheat-sheets) for the malfunctions of greatest concern,
giving a one-line description, symptoms, likely instrument behavior and typical
appropriate pilot response. This could be used by all pilots as a quick reference, but
might be most useful to the experienced pilot reluctant to read the entire text on
malfunctions.
3. Text on a wider variety of engine malfunctions addressing some of the technical
detail, at a high level. This could be used by all pilots as a reference source.
4. Introduction to the fundamentals of engine operation and installation (Engines 101),
intended for use by the entry-level pilot to ensure a basic understanding. This
material was beyond the scope of the PSM+ICR recommendations, but was
specifically requested by airline representatives.
It was noted during the review process that much of the text material is very basic
training. The text is intended to ensure that each pilot has at least a minimum level of
understanding necessary to recognize and respond appropriately to propulsion system
malfunctions; it is not intended for use by Flight Engineers or other propulsion
specialists.
Although it is anticipated that the material will be useful outside North America, no
attempt has been made to offer it in languages other than English. A video script has
been provided to assist foreign operators or other groups with dubbing in other languages.
Preparation of Video
A video on engine surge/stall recognition had been produced by United Airlines and was
made available to the group as the basis for a more comprehensive training video
addressing a broader variety of engine malfunctions. Video clips of engines experiencing
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07/17/09
severe certification tests were provided by the CFMI, GE Aircraft Engines and Pratt &
Whitney. These tests were intentionally selected to be as dramatic as possible, to show
flight crews that engines can produce some very alarming symptoms and still remain
airworthy, and that the flight crew should fly the airplane first, and attend to the engine
problem when time permits. The symptoms shown in these video clips were therefore
more severe than in the great majority of service events. Some service events have been
even more severe, but video clips of such events were not available.
Although the video was prepared primarily with pilot training in mind, it would be
beneficial for cabin crew to view it and to gain familiarity with the symptoms which an
engine in distress may present, whilst still remaining safe.
It was intended that by addressing all of the malfunctions of primary concern in a single
video, the likelihood of pilots seeing the whole package would be maximized. This did
place constraints upon the detail which could be included in the video, since there was a
general consensus that the interest of the audience would be lost after 15 or 20 minutes.
Some material was suggested which could not be incorporated in the allotted time (or
could not be readily located); specifically interviews with crew who had experienced
engine malfunctions, and footage of the instruments as they might appear to the flight
crew during the malfunction.
The script of the video is provided in Appendix 2.
Preparation of text
The team had initially been tasked to prepare generic text addressing engine
malfunctions. However, it became apparent that additional text on basic engine operation
would also be valuable and would avoid misunderstandings when discussing engine
malfunctions.
The requirements of the target audience were difficult to agree upon – some pilots would
want to explore technical details of malfunctions, others would prefer an overview which
could be understood in a few minutes. The text on malfunctions is therefore presented in
two formats; one with a wealth of detail, and the other as high-level summaries for quick
reference.
It was suggested at one point that if pilots were having difficulty distinguishing engine
malfunction symptoms from other events, the text should address such areas of
confusion. This suggestion was not incorporated, since it was difficult to imagine all of
the extraneous events which might present a similar symptom (e.g., a loud noise), and the
value of doing so was not clear.
A copy of the text is provided in Appendix 3.
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07/17/09
Preparation of Simulator Package
One of the major shortfalls observed in many surge simulations was the unrealistic sound
accompanying the engine surge. Considerable difficulty was experienced in obtaining a
realistic recording of the surge sound, due to the high amplitude of the sound and the
potential high cost of forcing an engine to surge. The following approaches were
explored:
• CVR recordings involving engine surges were reviewed. The microphones appeared
to saturate at the beginning of the surge, leading to a complete loss of signal for
several seconds.
• Videos of engine surge events at test facilities were reviewed. These were found to
incorporate significant distortion of the sound caused by echoes from the surrounding
test cell and ground.
• A microphone and seat track accelerometer were installed on a GE flight test airplane
which might experience engine stalls. High power stalls did indeed occur, but the
microphone experienced some degree of signal clipping.
Work on defining the enhancements to the acoustic, engine parameter and airplane tactile
yaw signatures response characteristics of a high power engine surge stall is not yet
complete at the time of publication of this report. The industry team is developing and
validating guidelines/requirements to assist operators in modifying existing "surge"
simulations in order to provide a more realistic effect for training. In the interim, it is
recommended that the acoustic signature be a loud bang, similar to close-range discharge
of a shotgun. It is recognized that practical considerations may limit the volume of sound,
such as distraction to training in neighboring simulators, but the volume used should be
sufficient to "startle" the pilot. Similarly, the yaw input (for engines installed off the
airplane ceneterline) should be a distinct jolt. Currently, the expected completion date is
the end of 3rd quarter of 2001. This report will be revised upon completion of this work.
Human Factors Considerations

Three issues were identified:
a) factors influencing the magnitude of the startle response to a compressor surge
b) the simulator cues that might evoke that response
c) the need for validating the effectiveness of the training pilots receive, both from the
printed and audio/visual materials as well as from any enhanced simulation; e.g.,
LOFT that incorporates more realistic representations of engine malfunctions.
As the video notes, several factors influence the magnitude of the startle response pilots
experience when the encounter a compressor surge or stall: 1) the magnitude of the
impulse noise, 2) the fact that it is unexpected, and 3) that it occurs at a critical time (e.g.,
around V1). Although surges can and do occur at other times, the startle response is
expected to be more disruptive when it occurs during a critical phase of flight when
attention is focused and highly concentrated on a particular task. A true startle response
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results in observable, reflexive (non-voluntary) muscular contractions, and its principal

impact on cognitive behavior is to induce a shift in attention to the noise that evoked the
reaction.
The cues associated with a compressor surge were reviewed using flight test data as well
as pilots' recollections of their own experience. The loud noise and airplane yaw were
observed on the flight test data recording. The simulation group package is intended to
improve the noise and yaw cues in surge simulations.
Vibration was not observed in the flight test data, which does not mean that vibration is
never experienced during an engine surge – the nature of the engine failure would govern
the degree of vibration felt. Previous work reported to the PSM+ICR group indicated
that flight deck warnings could, in some cases, make the startle response more likely. A
compressor surge accompanied by a fire warning was more likely to result in an RTO
above V1 than a compressor surge without a flight deck warning.
Assuming enhanced simulation is incorporated into Level D devices, validating the

effectiveness of training (from test and audio/visual materials developed to date) is a
greater challenge, and one that will need additional effort to define the measures of pilot
behavior that constitute a criterion of success, as well as to develop the scenarios that can
test whether pilots react appropriately when they encounter unexpected engine
malfunctions. Addressing the validation issue is left for proposed follow-on efforts.
The parameters shown on current engine monitoring displays are governed by FAR/JAR
25.1305, which was written with the expectation that a Flight Engineer would be
available for monitoring engine health. As the industry has accrued experience in the
behavior of turbine engines, and the duties of the flight engineer have been assumed by
the pilots, the requirements of FAR/JAR25.1305 appear less appropriate. The concurrent
incorporation of Fully Automated Digital Electronic Control (FADEC) systems on
engines and the interest in health monitoring and prediction of incipient malfunctions has
enabled the collection and processing of information not currently provided to the pilots.
NASA has already conducted a number of studies on how engine monitoring displays
might be improved. There is an opportunity for a significant improvement in the
requirements and implementation of the engine information presented in flight.
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Recommendations
All operators should consider both the use of this video for recurrent training, and
distribution of the text to all pilots, with a particular focus on entry-level pilots and those
transitioning from turboprops.
Similar activity should be initiated to develop generic training materials for turboprop
propulsion system malfunctions.
A review of recent PSM+ICR service experience should be undertaken in 2010, to audit

the effectiveness of the training material and to establish whether further or different
corrective action is required.
Activities to address the outstanding recommendations from the PSM+ICR committee,

including development of human factors methodologies to validate training
improvements, and review of the requirements for propulsion system instrumentation,
should be initiated by the regulatory agencies and industry.
References
1.AIA/AECMA Project Report on Propulsion System Malfunction Plus Inappropriate

Crew Response. 11/1/98
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Appendix 1 – Letter from ATA
20
Draft report for PSM+ICR Phase 2 Turbofan work Appendix 2 07/17/09
Appendix 2 – Video Script
Today’s jet transport engines are the most reliable and powerful aircraft engines ever developed.
Over the past 40 years, technological improvements have increased the amount of thrust,
improved fuel consumption, reduced noise, and reduced unwanted emissions.
To accomplish these advances, internal engine pressure has been greatly increased on today’s
high bypass turbo fan engines.
The reliability of the gas turbine engine has reached a level where severe engine failure is
so unlikely that most pilots will never experience one in their flying career. However
modern turbine engines can still fail. And when they fail, whether with a loud bang and
high vibration, or just quietly decay to zero thrust , the pilot is expected to recognize the
specific engine problem and to then take appropriate action.
Over the last several years, data has indicated some pilots have attempted to diagnose aircraft
malfunctions prior to establishing control of the aircraft. This has occurred despite the fact that
all pilots are taught to fly the aircraft first.
So why does the data indicate that they have not done this?
One of the main reasons is the startle factor. Because of modern aircraft’s high reliability, when a
malfunction occurs it is frequently the first time the flight crew is exposed to the true sensations
of that malfunction. While simulators have greatly improved pilot training,
they have not always realistically simulated the actual noise, vibration and aerodynamic forces
certain engine malfunctions cause. It also appears that the greater the physical sensations the
pilot feels during the malfunction, the greater the startle factor, and the greater the likelihood the
flight crew will try to diagnose the problem immediately instead of fly the aircraft first. When
flight crews are interviewed after engine malfunction events, such as the surge of a large high
bypass engine during initial climb out, they make very similar comments regarding the event.
Pilots will often report that it felt like “a bomb went off” or that “the aircraft was falling apart”.
The severity of the symptoms in some cases caused the flight crew to question the
airworthiness of the aircraft and attempt to reject the take off above the V1 speed.
21
Each time an event occurred, the sound and the feel of the event were different and often much
more intense than indicated by any training the crews had received.
Because of this, the flight crew either did not recognize the engine symptom,or was so concerned
about the engine that they responded without taking time to correctly evaluate the situation.
In each case, additional time spent in stabilizing the airplane’s flight path before responding to
the engine symptom would have avoided a serious event.
Remember, all transport category aircraft are designed and certified to be controllable
with the most critical engine failed. Unlike early turboprops, turbofan powered airplanes
do not require immediate pilot action to the engine in the event of a single engine
malfunction or failure.
Once the flight path is stabilized, the engine malfunction may be safely identified, and the
appropriate checklists executed.
Taking the time to stabilize the flight path may sometimes lead to further engine damage, but
despite that, the airplane still has the capability of safe flight. Engines are tested during initial
certification, to demonstrate ruggedness following bird and ice ingestion. Even after a major
failure, such as loss of an entire fan blade, which is an extremely rare event, the engine shuts
down safely and the airplane is still airworthy.
Service history of fleet aircraft verifies that there are generally no engine failures requiring an
instant engine shutdown in order to maintain airplane safety and that continuing a takeoff after
engine failure at V1 is safer than rejecting the takeoff.
So, the capability to recognize turbine engine malfunctions must be learned.

But how?
The objective of this video is to provide pilots with information to help them recognize
and identify various engine malfunctions that have led to inappropriate crew responses
and accidents in the past. These malfunctions include:
• fire warnings,
• tailpipe fires,
• bird strikes,
22
• vibration,
• engine surge,
• severe engine damage,
• and slow power loss.
In each case, the first priority is to employ the basic stick and rudder inputs necessary to
maintain aerodynamic control of the aircraft. Remember, fly the airplane, and then
identify and respond to the engine malfunction when time permits.
“Fire warnings” result from excessively high temperature in the space between the engine
casings and cowling, or from fire detection system malfunctions.
The heat source may be an actual fire around the engine, an engine failure allowing core air to
escape through a hole in the casings, or a leak of hot air from a bleed duct.
Whenever a fire warning occurs the first priority must be to fly the airplane. Once the airplane is
stabilized, attention should then be directed toward execution of the appropriate checklist. Even
if there is an actual fire, there is adequate isolation between the airplane structure and the nacelle
to ensure sufficient time to establish and maintain airplane control to a safe altitude.
Taking this time may cause further fire damage within the nacelle, but accident reports
consistently show that flight path control must be focused on first, and it must remain a
high priority until landing.
“Engine torching” or “tailpipe fires” mostly occur during an abnormal engine start, but
they may also occur after shutdown, or during other ground operations.
Although there may be no cockpit engine instrument indications, these events can be
very spectacular when viewed from the ramp or cabin, and have been confused with an
actual engine fire. The torching may be of short duration or it may last for several
seconds. Note that the flame is confined to the tailpipe.
Flames may turn upward and threaten the wing if no airflow is maintained through the
engine. And in some cases an EGT increase may be indicated on the flight deck. Simply
cutting fuel flow while continuing to motor the engine normally extinguishes the flames.
The flight crew depends on ground personnel to identify engine torching.
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If you are told of an engine fire without any flight deck indications of a fire, follow the “engine
torching” procedure as outlined in your flight manual. This procedure will direct you to motor
the engine and extinguish the flames; the regular fire procedure will not.
Do not perform the “engine fire” procedure unless a fire warning indication occurs,
Executing the regular fire procedure may disable bleed air to the engine starter and prevent you
from being able to motor the engine to blow out the tailpipe fire.
There have been cases where flight attendants or passengers have initiated evacuations
due to engine torching. These unnecessary evacuations can be minimized by prompt
flight deck and cabin crew coordination to provide passengers with pertinent information
and to alleviate their concerns.
“Bird strike” is a concern for every pilot.

The birds may be observed by the flight crew, or the first indication of bird ingestion may
be an engine surge. Flocking birds are a particular concern since they can affect more
than one engine. It may be difficult to see the birds, and to know how many engines have
ingested birds. Most bird strikes occur close to the ground, at the very time when there is
least opportunity to appraise the situation. Nevertheless, the record shows that
establishing flight path control first before taking action on the engine, is a more
successful strategy than taking immediate action with the engine.
There have been accidents resulting from bird-strike related Rejected Take Off’s above the V1
speed; and in each case, the airplane was in fact safe to fly.
Therefore, rejecting a takeoff due to a bird strike at speeds above V1 is not considered to be
appropriate.
“Bird strike” by an engine may be accompanied by:
• audible thuds,
• vibration,
• engine surge,
• unpleasant odors ,
• and abnormal engine instrument readings such as high EGT.
Throttling back an engine may be needed to clear a stall, after the airplane has been placed on a
stable flight path. If the engine involved cannot be positively identified, do not shut it down. In
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the unlikely event of multiple engines surging, prompt action may be required to clear the stall
on the engines one at a time, to assure that some power is available later.
“Engine vibration” may be caused by a fan unbalance. This can come from ice buildup, fan
blade material loss or aerodynamic excitation from fan blade distortion due to foreign object
damage. Vibration can also come from internal engine failures, such as a bearing failure.
Cross reference of all engine parameters will help to establish whether an engine failure actually
exists. Engine induced vibration felt on the flight deck may not be indicated on instruments.
For some engine failures, severe vibration may be experienced after the engine has been
shut down, to the point where instruments are difficult to read. This vibration is caused
by the unbalanced fan, windmilling at an engine speed close to an airframe’s natural
resonance frequency, which amplifies the vibration. Changing airspeed and/or altitude
will change the fan windmill speed and an airplane speed may be found where there will
be much less vibration. There is no risk of airplane structural failure due to vibratory
engine loads during this windmilling action.
From a flight crew members perspective one of the most startling events is the engine “surge”
or “stall” on takeoff or during flight.
An engine surge is, in the simplest terms, the breakdown of the airflow in a turbine engine.
When the compressor blades stall they are no longer able to force the air through the
engine from front to rear. Now the high pressure air in the middle of the engine can
escape explosively from front and back simultaneously. Usually there are visible flames
from both ends of the engine,
accompanied with one or more very loud bangs. This violent airflow reversal will produce an
instant loss of thrust and an immediate yaw that will literally spill most of the coffee from your
cup. This yaw is accompanied by a vibration that cannot be duplicated in the simulator.
Bird strikes, internal engine failures, engine pneumatic bleed malfunctions, or internal engine
clearance changes can cause a surge. It is usually a problem in the compressor system and so is
often referred to as a “compressor surge” or “compressor stall”. The magnitude of the symptoms,
such as the loudness of the noise, and the severity of the vibration , vary with the power setting
and the type of instability in the compression system. Low altitude and high power settings
produce the loudest bangs with the most violent yaw and vibration. High altitude surges are
25
frequently associated with engine power changes during leveling off or when initiating an
altitude change. High altitude surges generally result in a muffled noise, light vibration, an
increasing EGT, and may require power reduction to clear the condition. Some surges allow the
engine to recover with no flight crew action, others recover after flight crew action to reduce
power. The most severe surges are non recoverable.
When the engine recovers by itself it is best to just fly the airplane and not interfere with the
engine.
Identification of a recoverable compressor surge or stall condition based on engine
parameter fluctuations or changes alone can be difficult, due in part to the fact that the
event is usually over in the blink of an eye. Generally most flight crews identify the
condition as an engine malfunction when the EGT exceeds its limits or the EGT gage
turns red. If EGT continues to rise following a surge the thrust lever should be retarded to
allow the engine to recover. Then after the engine recovers power should be re-applied
slowly. If the engine does not stall again when the power lever is re-advanced the power
can be left high. If the engine stalls again with the re-application of power lever input, the
power setting may need to be left at a low power or idle condition.
Continue to fly the airplane, and ensure the indications return to normal.
If the engine does not recover or the EGT remains out of limits, then a shutdown of the engine
may be the logical choice depending on the operational situation. Your flight manual and
checklists identify the specific procedures to follow.
Remember that an engine at idle still provides power for airplane systems and creates less drag
than if shut down.
There have been numerous occasions where a high power compressor surge has occurred during
the takeoff roll or initial climb out and the flight crew was notified by the tower that an engine
was on fire. As a result the flight crews accomplished the engine fire checklist and shutdown the
engine even though there was no fire warning annunciated in the cockpit. The tower saw fire out
the inlet and tailpipe, and their information regarding seeing flames outside the engine was
correct. But an engine shutdown was not necessary since this was not actually an aircraft fire.
While the likelihood of a high power engine surge is rare, the startle factor associated with loud
bangs and airplane vibration has lead to instances of inappropriate action such as: rejecting the
26
takeoff after the V1 speed, shutting down the wrong engine, improperly executing the engine
failure climb profile, or failing to comply with established ground tracks to clear rising terrain.
Only take action to address the surge after stabilizing the flight path.
Recent interviews with pilots who have experienced high power compressor surges during
takeoff and initial climb have revealed that they initially thought that a bomb had exploded, or
that they had hit a truck, or had a midair collision. Some pilots incorrectly interpreted the noise
or bang as a tire failure.
Remember, no matter how loud the bang, airplane control is always the first priority.
In the event of a major internal engine failure resulting in “severe engine damage”,
there may be a variety of symptoms on the flight deck:
• fire warnings,
• engine surge,
• vibration,
• high EGT,
• fluctuating rpm,
• oil system parameters out of limits,
• and thrust loss.
Any one of these symptoms alone could be from a more benign malfunction but multiple
symptoms are a good indication of severe engine damage, and visual inspection by the cabin
crew can be very helpful in confirming this.
Visual symptoms may include flames, smoke, or visible damage to engine cowlings.
It may not be possible to distinguish initially between an engine surge without damage, and one
accompanying severe damage. The symptoms of the two kinds of events can be very similar and
from an operational standpoint, it is not important to know immediately which of the two has
occurred
When in doubt, perform the surge procedure. If the engine does not recover, then it may
have had severe damage.
If it does become necessary to shut down the engine, wait until you positively identify the engine
you select as actually being the malfunctioning engine. It should be noted that even an engine
which may show signs of visible damage and visible flames, may very well be producing useful
power necessary for initial climb out.
27
Again, the first priority is to fly the airplane, not the engine. After you have positive control of
the aircraft’s flight path, then identify and secure the affected engine when time permits.
Diagnosis of exactly what caused the engine problem is neither necessary nor safe, if it diverts
resources from flying the airplane.
The malfunctions discussed so far have had compelling cues, such as loud bangs, vibration, and
warning or advisory messages. In each case, the challenge is to fly the airplane without being
distracted by very compelling or alarming engine symptoms.
The last type of malfunction to be discussed here is more subtle;
“slow decay of thrust” or “non-response to power lever”. These can be subtle in fact to the
point that it can be completely overlooked, with potentially serious consequences to the airplane.
If an engine slowly reduces power , or when the thrust lever is moved the engine does not
respond,
then the airplane will experience asymmetric thrust. The problems will most likely develop at a
point during the flight when the autopilot is engaged. The autopilot will compensate for the
asymmetrical thrust on its own. It takes an alert flight crew to recognize the situation that is
developing. If the airplane is badly miss trimmed when the autopilot is manually disconnected ,
or when the autopilot reaches the limits of its authority and automatically disconnects, only
seconds remain before an unusual attitude is encountered. If no external visual references are
available, such as flying over the water at night or in IMC, the likelihood of an upset increases.
This condition of low power engine loss with the autopilot on has caused several aircraft upsets,
which were not always recoverable.
Flight control displacement or trim input indicators may be the only obvious indication that the
autopilot is trimming the aircraft away from coordinated flight. Vigilance is required to detect
these stealthy engine malfunctions and to maintain a safe flight attitude while the situation is still
recoverable. But a slowly changing asymmetric thrust problem is not an easy one to detect.
Symptoms may include multiple system problems, such as :
• generators dropping off line,
• low engine oil pressure,
• unexplained airplane attitude changes,
• significant differences between primary parameters from one engine to the next.
28
If asymmetric thrust is suspected the pilot must be prepared to make immediate rudder or
trim inputs to avoid an un-commanded aircraft roll. The first response must be to make
the appropriate rudder input or trim adjustment. Disconnecting the autopilot without
appropriate control input or trim adjustments, may result in a rapid roll maneuver.
Different aircraft from different airframe manufacturers
display different types of indicators to the pilot regarding the amount of trim the autopilot may
be adding to the system. Consult your flight manual and training department to gain a full
understanding of how your particular aircraft provides visual, audible, or tactile indications of
the amount of trim being added by the autopilot.
The sequence of events and severity of symptoms experienced during an engine

malfunction may vary from the events shown in this video, and from those experienced in
a simulator.
Engine malfunctions vary from one event to the next. The failures shown here were selected as
relatively severe, but not the most severe that have ever occurred.
Simulation of failures may be limited by simulator capability, which may not permit realistic
levels of noise and vibration symptoms. Industry is currently addressing these concerns to
enhance the simulation realism for such failures.
This video is intended to provide general information on the characteristics of some high bypass
engine failures and malfunctions. It is not intended to be an in depth study of all possible engine
failure modes. Specific remedial action to be taken in the event of an engine failure is published
in the Airplane Flight or Operating Manual.
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Appendix 3 – Text
Airplane Turbofan Engine Operation and Malfunctions
Basic Familiarization for Flight Crews
Chapter 1
General Principles
Introduction
Propulsion
Today's modern airplanes are powered by
turbofan engines. These engines are quite
reliable, providing years of trouble- free service.
Because of the rarity of turbofan engine
malfunctions and the limitations of simulating
these malfunctions, many flight crews have felt
unprepared to diagnose actual engine
malfunctions that have occurred.
The purpose of this text is to provide

straightforward material to help flight crews
have the basics of airplane engine operational
theory. This text will also provide pertinent
Fig 1 showing balloon with no escape path for
information about malfunctions that may be
the air inside. All forces are balanced.
encountered during the operation of turbofan-
powered airplanes that cannot be simulated well
Propulsion is the net force that results from
and may cause the flight crew to be startled or
unequal pressures. Gas (air) under pressure in a
confused as to what the actual malfunction is.
sealed container exerts equal pressure on all
surfaces of the container; therefore, all the forces
While simulators have greatly improved pilot
are balanced and there are no forces to make the
training, many may not have been programmed
container move.
to simulate the actual noise, vibration and
aerodynamic forces that certain malfunctions
cause. In addition, it appears that the greater the
sensations, the greater the startle factor, along
with greater likelihood the flight crew will try to
diagnose the problem immediately instead of
flying the airplane.
It is not the purpose of this text to supersede or

replace more detailed instructional texts or to
suggest limiting the flight crew's understanding
and working knowledge of airplane turbine
engine operation and malfunctions to the topics Fig 2 showing balloon with released stem.
and depth covered here. Upon completing this Arrow showing forward force has no opposing
material, flight crews should understand that arrow.
some engine malfunctions can feel and sound
more severe than anything they have ever If there is a hole in the container, gas (air) cannot
experienced; however, the airplane is still push against that hole and thus the gas escapes.
flyable, and the first priority of the flight crew While the air is escaping and there is still
should remain "fly the airplane." pressure inside the container, the side of the
container opposite the hole has pressure against
30
it. Therefore, the net pressures are not balanced
and there is a net force available to move the
container. This force is called thrust.
The simplest example of the propulsion principle

is an inflated balloon (container) where the stem
is not closed off. The pressure of the air inside
the balloon exerts forces everywhere inside the
balloon. For every force, there is an opposite
force, on the other side of the balloon, except on Fig 4 showing turbine engine as a cylinder of
the surface of the balloon opposite the stem. turbomachinery with unbalanced forces pushing
This surface has no opposing force since air is forward.
escaping out the stem. This results in a net force
that propels the balloon away from the stem. Components of a turbine engine
The balloon is propelled by the air pushing on
the FRONT of the balloon. The turbomachinery in the engine uses energy
stored chemically as fuel. The basic principle of
The simplest propulsion engine the airplane turbine engine is identical to any and
all engines that extract energy from chemical
The simplest propulsion engine would be a fuel. The basic 4 steps for any internal
container of air (gas) under pressure that is open combustion engine are:
at one end. A diving SCUBA tank would be
such an engine if it fell and the valve was 1) Intake of air (and possibly fuel)
knocked off the top. The practical problem with 2) Compression of the air (and possibly fuel)
such an engine is that, as the air escapes out the 3) Combustion, where fuel is injected (if it was
open end, the pressure inside the container would not drawn in with the intake air) and burned to
rapidly drop. This engine would deliver convert the stored energy-
propulsion for only a limited time. 4) Expansion and exhaust, where the converted
energy is put to use.
The turbine engine
These principles are exactly the same ones that
A turbine engine is a container with a hole in the make your lawn mower or automobile engine go.
back end (tailpipe or nozzle) to let air inside the
container escape, and thus provide propulsion. In the case of a piston engine such as the engine
Inside the container is turbomachinery to keep in your car or lawn mower, the intake,
the container full of air under constant pressure. compression, combustion, and exhaust steps
occur in the same place (cylinder head) at
different times as the piston goes up and down.
In the turbine engine, however, these same four

steps occur at the same time but in different
places. As a result of this fundamental
difference, the turbine has engine sections called:
1) The inlet section

2) The compressor section
Fig 3 showing our balloon with machinery in 3) The combustion section
front to keep it full as air escapes out the back 4) The exhaust section.
for continuous thrust.
The practical axial flow turbine engine
The turbine engine in an airplane has the various

sections stacked in a line from front to back. As
a result, the engine body presents less drag to the
airplane as it is flying. The air enters the front of
the engine and passes essentially straight through
from front to back. On its way to the back, the
31
air is compressed by the compressor section. airfoils, called blades, set at an angle to the disk
Fuel is added and burned in the combustion rim. Each blade is close to the shape of a
section, then the air is exhausted through the exit miniature propeller blade, and the angle at which
nozzle. it is set on the disk rim is called the angle of
attack. This angle of attack is similar to the pitch
The laws of nature will not let us get something of a propeller blade or an airplane wing in flight.
for nothing. The compressor needs to be driven As the disk with blades is forced to rotate by the
by something in order to work. Just after the turbine, each blade accelerates the air, thus
burner and before the exhaust nozzle, there is a pumping the air behind it. The effect is similar
turbine that uses some of the energy in the to a household window fan.
discharging air to drive the compressor. There is
a long shaft connecting the turbine to the After the air passes through the blades on a disk,
compressor ahead of it. the air will be accelerated rearward and also
forced circumferentially around in the direction
of the rotating
Compressor combustor turbine nozzle
Fig 5 showing basic layout of jet propulsion

system.
Machinery details Fig 6 showing compressor rotor disk.
From an outsider's view, the flight crew and disk. Any tendency for the air to go around in
passengers rarely see the actual engine. What is circles is counterproductive, so this tendency is
seen is a large elliptically-shaped pod hanging corrected by putting another row of airfoils
from the wing or attached to the airplane behind the rotating disk. This row is stationary
fuselage toward the back of the airplane. This and the airfoils are at an opposing angle.
pod structure is called the nacelle or cowling.
The engine is inside this nacelle. What has just been described is a single stage of
compression. Each stage consists of a rotating
The first nacelle component that incoming air disk with many blades on the rim, called a rotor
encounters on its way through an airplane turbine stage, and, behind it, another row of airfoils that
engine is the inlet cowl. The purpose of the inlet is not rotating, called a stator. Air on the
cowl is to direct the incoming air evenly across backside of this rotor/stator pair is accelerated
the inlet stages of the engine. The shape of the rearward, and any tendency for the air to go
interior of the inlet cowl is very carefully around circumferentially is corrected.
designed to guide this air.
The compressor of an airplane turbine engine has

quite a job to do. The compressor has to take in
an enormous volume of air and compress it to
1/10th or 1/15th of the volume it had outside the
engine. This volume of air must be supplied
continuously, not in pulses or periodic bursts.
The compression of this volume of air is

accomplished by a rotating disk containing many
32
Fig 8 showing layout of a dual rotor airplane
turbine engine.
Most of today's turbine engines are dual-rotor

engines, meaning there are two distinct sets of
rotating components. The rear compressor, or
high-pressure compressor, is connected by a
hollow shaft to a high-pressure turbine. This is
the high rotor. In some literature, the rotors are
called spools, such as the "high spool." In this
text, we will use the term rotor. The high rotor is
often referred to as N2 for short.
Fig 7 showing 9 stages of a compressor rotor
assembly. The front compressor, or low-pressure
compressor, is in front of the high-pressure
A single stage of compression can achieve compressor. The turbine that drives the low-
perhaps 1.5:1 or 2.5:1 decrease in the air's pressure compressor is behind the turbine that
volume. In order to achieve the 10:1 to 15:1 drives the high-pressure compressor. The low-
total compression needed for the engine to pressure compressor is connected to the low-
develop adequate power, the engine is built with pressure turbine by a shaft that goes through the
many stages of compressors stacked in a line. hollow shaft of the high rotor. The low-pressure
Depending upon the engine design, there may be rotor is called N1 for short.
10 to 15 stages in the total compressor.
The N1 and N2 rotors are not connected
As the air is compressed through the compressor, mechanically in any way. There is no gearing
the air increases in velocity, temperature, and between them. As the air flows through the
pressure. Air does not behave the same at engine, each rotor is free to operate at its own
elevated temperatures, pressures, and velocities efficient speed. These speeds are all quite
as it does toward the front of the engine before it precise and are carefully calculated by the
is compressed. In particular, this means that the engineers who designed the engine. The speed
speed that the compressor rotors must have at the in RPM of each rotor is often displayed on the
back of the compressor is different than at the engine flight deck and identified by gages or
front of the compressor. If we had only a few readouts labeled N1 RPM and N2 RPM. Both
stages, this difference could be ignored; but, for rotors have their own redline limits.
10 to 15 stages of compressor, it would not be
efficient to have all the stages go at the same The turbofan engine
rotating speed.
The most common solution to this problem is to

break the compressor in two. This way, the front
4 or 5 stages can rotate at one speed, while the
rear 6 or 7 stages can rotate at a different, higher,
speed. To accomplish this, we also need two
separate turbines and two separate shafts.
Fig 9 showing schematic of fan jet engine. In

this sketch, the fan is the low-pressure
compressor. In some engine designs, there will
be a few stages of low-pressure compressor with
the fan. These may be called booster stages.
33
The fan is not like a propeller. On a propeller,
In some engine designs, the N1 and N2 rotors each blade acts like an airplane wing, developing
may rotate in opposite directions, or there may lift as it rotates. The "lift" on a propeller blade
be three rotors instead of two. Whether or not pulls the engine and airplane forward through the
these conditions exist in any particular engine are air.
engineering decisions and are of no consequence
to the pilot. In a turbofan engine, thrust is developed by the
A turbofan engine is simply a turbine engine fan rotor system, which includes the static
where the first stage compressor rotor is larger in structure (fan exit guide vanes) around it. The
diameter than the rest of the engine. This larger fan system acts like the open balloon in our
stage is called the fan. The air that passes example at the start of this discussion, and thus
through the fan near its inner diameter also pushes the engine, and the airplane along with it,
passes through the remaining compressor stages through the air from the unbalanced forces.
in the core of the engine and is further
compressed and processed through the engine What the fan and the propeller have in common
cycle. The air that passes through the outer is that the core engine drives them both.
diameter of the fan rotor does not pass through
the core of the engine, but instead passes along LESSON SUMMARY
the outside of the engine. This air is called
bypass air, and the ratio of bypass air to core air So far we have learned:
is called the bypass ratio.
1) Propulsion is created by the unbalance of
The air accelerated by the fan in a turbofan forces.
engine contributes significantly to the thrust 2) A pressure vessel with an open end delivers
produced by the engine, particularly at low propulsion due to the unbalance of forces.
forward speeds and low altitudes. In large 3) An airplane propulsion system is a pressure
engines such as the engines that power the B747, vessel with a open end in the back.
B757, 4) An airplane engine provides a constant
supply of air for the pressure vessel.
5) An airplane turbine engine operates with the
same 4 basic steps as a lawnmower or
automobile engine.
6) An airplane turbine engine has sections that
perform each of the 4 basic steps of intake,
compression, combustion, and exhaust.
7) Compression is accomplished by successive
stages of rotor/stator pairs.
8) The compressor stages are usually split into
low-pressure and high-pressure compressor
sections.
9) The low-pressure section can be referred to
as N1 and the high-pressure section can be
referred to as N2.
10) A fan is the first stage of compression
where the rotor and its mating stator are
larger in diameter than the rest of the engine.
Fig 10 showing schematic of a turboprop. In
this configuration, there are two stages of
turbine with a shaft that goes through the engine
to a gearbox which reduces the rotor speed of
the propeller.
B767, A300, A310, etc., as much as three-

quarters of the thrust delivered by the engine is
developed by the fan.
34
Chapter 2
Engine systems
From an engineer's point of view, the turbofan The accessory drive gearbox is most often
engine is a finely-tuned piece of mechanical attached directly to the outside cases of the
equipment. In order for the engine to provide engine at or near the bottom. The accessory
adequate power to the airplane at a weight that drive gearbox is driven by a shaft that extends
the airplane can accommodate, the engine must directly into the engine and it is geared to one of
operate at the limit of technical feasibility. At the compressor rotors of the engine. Usually, it
the same time, the engine must provide reliable, is driven by the high-pressure compressor.
safe and economical operation.
Within the engine, there are systems that keep

everything functioning properly. Most of these
systems are transparent to the pilot. For that
reason, this text will not go into deep technical
detail. While such discussion would be
appropriate for mechanics training to take care of
the engine, it is the purpose of this text to
provide information that pilots can use in
understanding the nature of some engine
malfunctions that may be encountered during
flight.
The systems often found associated with the Fig 11 showing typical accessory drive gearbox.
operation of the engine are:
The gearbox has attachment pads on it for
1) The accessory drive gearbox accessories that need to be mechanically driven.
2) The fuel system These accessories include airplane systems, such
3) The lubrication system as generators for airplane and necessary engine
4) The ignition system electrical power, and the hydraulic pump for
5) The bleed system airplane hydraulic systems. Also attached to the
6) The start system gearbox are the starter and the fuel pump/fuel
7) The anti-ice system. control.
In addition, there are airplane systems that are Fuel system

powered or driven by the engine. These systems
may include: The fuel system associated directly with the
propulsion system consists of:
1) Electrical system
2) Pneumatic system 1) A fuel pump
3) Hydraulic system 2) A fuel control
4) Air conditioning system. 3) Fuel manifolds
4) Fuel nozzles
These airplane systems are not associated with 5) A fuel filter
continued function of the engine or any engine 6) Heat exchangers
malfunctions, so they will not be discussed in 7) Drains
this text. The airplane systems may provide cues 8) A pressurizing and dump valve.
for engine malfunctions that will be discussed in
the chapter on engine malfunctions. All are external to the engine except the fuel
nozzles.
Accessory drive gearbox
The airplane fuel system supplies pressurized
fuel from the main tanks. The fuel is pressurized
35
by electrically-driven boost pumps in the tanks Fig 12 characterizing that the fuel control is an
and then flows through the spar valve or LP "intelligent" component that does the work once
shut-off valve to the engine LP fuel pump inlet. the flight crew "tells it what to do."
The fuel pump is physically mounted on the automatically meters the fuel to the fuel nozzles
gearbox. Most engine fuel pumps have two within the engine at the required rate to achieve
stages, or, in some engines, there may actually be the power requested by the flight crew. A fuel
two separate pumps. There is an LP (low- flow meter measures the fuel flow sent to the
pressure) stage that increases fuel pressure so engines by the control.
that fuel can be used for servos. At this stage,
the fuel is filtered to remove any debris from the In older engines, the fuel control is
airplane tanks. Following the LP stage, there is hydromechanical, which is a technical way of
an HP (high-pressure) stage that increases fuel saying that it operates directly from pressure and
pressure above the combustor pressure. The HP mechanical speed physically input into the
pump always provides more fuel than the engine control unit.
needs to the fuel control, and the fuel control
meters the required amount to the engine and On newer airplanes, control of the fuel metering
bypasses the rest back to the pump inlet. is done electronically by a computer device
called by names such as "EEC" or "FADEC."
The fuel delivered from the pump is generally EEC stands for Electronic Engine Control, and
used to cool the engine oil and IDG oil on the FADEC stands for Full Authority Digital Engine
way to the fuel control. Some fuel systems also Control. The net result is the same. Electronic
incorporate fuel heaters to prevent ice crystals controls have the capability of more precisely
accumulating in the fuel control during low- metering the fuel and sensing more engine
temperature operation and valves to bypass those operating parameters to adjust fuel metering.
heat exchangers depending on ambient This results in greater fuel economy and more
temperatures. reliable service.
The fuel control is installed on the engine either The fuel nozzles are deep within the engine in
on the accessory gearbox, or directly to the fuel the combustion section right after the
pump, or, in the case of an electronic control, to compressor. The fuel nozzles provide a
the engine cases. The purpose of the fuel control precisely-defined spray pattern of fuel mist into
is to provide the required amount of fuel to the the combustor for rapid, powerful, and complete
fuel nozzles at the requested time. The rate at combustion. It is easiest to visualize the fuel
which fuel is supplied to the nozzles determines nozzles as being similar to a showerhead.
the acceleration or deceleration of the engine.
The fuel system also includes drains to safely
The flight crew sets the power requirements by dispose of the fuel in the manifolds when the
moving a thrust lever in the flight deck. When engine is shut down, and, in some engines, to
the flight crew adjusts the thrust lever, however, conduct leaked fuel overboard.
they are actually "telling the control" what power
is desired. The fuel control senses what the Lubrication system
engine is doing and
An airplane turbine engine, like any engine, must
be lubricated in order for the rotors to turn easily
without generating excessive heat. Each rotor
system in the engine has, as a minimum, a rear
and front bearing to support the rotor. That
means that the N1 rotor has two bearings and the
N2 rotor has two bearings for a total of 4 main
bearings in the engine. There are some engines
or older engines that have intermediate and/or
special bearings; however, the number of
bearings in a given engine is usually of little
direct interest to a basic understanding of the
engine.
36
The lubrication system of a turbine engine any reason, the loss of power would be serious.
includes: With continuous ignition, combustion will restart
automatically, probably without the pilot even
1) An oil pump noticing that there was an interruption in power.
2) An oil storage tank
3) A delivery system to the bearing Some engines, instead of having continuous
compartments (oil lines) ignition, monitor the combustion process and
4) Lubricating oil jets within the bearing turn the igniters on as required, thus avoiding the
compartments need for continuous ignition.
5) Seals to keep the oil in and air out of the
compartments The ignition system includes:
6) A scavenge system to remove oil from the
bearing compartment after the oil has done its 1) Igniter boxes which transform low-voltage
job. After the oil is scavenged, it is cooled by Alternating Current (AC) from either a gearbox-
heat exchangers, and filtered mounted alternator or from the airplane, into
7) Oil quantity, pressure, temperature, gages and high-voltage Direct Current (DC)
filter bypass indications on the flight deck for 2) Cables to connect the igniter boxes to the
monitoring of the oil system igniter plugs
8) Oil filters 3) Ignitor plugs.
9) Heat exchangers. Often one exchanger serves
as both a fuel heater and an oil cooler For redundancy, the ignition system has two
10) Chip detectors, usually magnetic, to collect igniter boxes and two igniter plugs per engine.
bearing compartment particles as an indication of Only one igniter in each engine is required to
bearing compartment distress. Chip detectors light the fuel in the combustor. Some airplanes
may trigger a flight deck indication or be allow the pilot to select which igniter is to be
visually examined during line maintenance used; others use the engine control to make the
11) Drains to safely dispose of leaked oil selection.
overboard.
Bleed system
The gages in item 7 are the window that the
flight crew has to monitor the health of the Stability bleeds
lubrication system.
The compressors of airplane turbine engines are
Ignition system designed to operate most efficiently at cruise.
Without help, these compressors may operate
The ignition system is a relatively very poorly or not at all during starting, at very
straightforward system. Its purpose is to provide low power, or during rapid transient power
the spark within the combustion section of the changes, conditions when they are not as
engine so that, when fuel is delivered to the fuel efficient. To reduce the workload on the
nozzles, the atomized fuel mist will ignite and compressor during these conditions, engines are
the combustion process will start. equipped with bleeds to discharge large volumes
of air from the compressor before it is fully
Since all 4 steps of the engine cycles in a turbine compressed.
engine are continuous, once the fuel is ignited
the combustion process normally continues until The bleed system usually consists of:
the fuel flow is discontinued during engine
shutdown. This is unlike the situation in a piston 1) Bleed valves
engine, where there must be an ignition spark 2) Solenoids or actuators to open and close the
each time the combustion step occurs in the bleed valves
piston chamber. 3) A control device to signal the valves when to
open and close
Turbine engines are provided with a provision on 4) Lines to connect the control device to the
the flight deck for "continuous ignition." When actuators.
this setting is selected, the ignitor will produce a
spark every few seconds. This provision is In older engines, a control device measures the
included for those operations or flight phases pressure across one of the engine compressors,
where, if the combustion process were to stop for compares it to the inlet pressure of the engine,
37
and directs higher-pressure, high-compressor air
to an air piston-driven actuator at the bleed valve A pneumatic starter is mounted on the accessory
to directly close the valve. In newer engines, the gearbox, and is powered by air originating from
electronic fuel control determines when the bleed another engine, from the APU, or from a ground
valves open and close. cart. A start valve controls the input selection.
The starter drives the accessory gearbox, which
Generally, all the compressor bleed valves are drives the high-compressor rotor via the same
open during engine start. Some of the valves drive shaft normally used to deliver power TO
close after start and some remain open. Those the gearbox.
that remain open then close during engine
acceleration to full power for takeoff. These Fuel flow during starting is carefully scheduled
valves then remain closed for the duration of the to allow for the compressor's poor efficiency at
flight. very low RPM, and bleeds are used to unload the
compressor until it can reach a self-sustaining
If, during in-flight operation, the fuel control speed. During some points in a normal engine
senses instability in the compressors, the control start, it may even look as if the engine is not
may open some of the bleed valves momentarily. accelerating at all. After the engine reaches the
This will probably be completely unnoticed by self-sustaining speed, the starter de-clutches
the flight crew except for an advisory message from the accessory gearbox. This is important,
on the flight deck display for some airplane as starters can be damaged with exposure to
models. extended, high-speed operation. The engine is
able to accelerate up to idle thrust without further
Cooling/clearance control bleeds assistance from the starter.
Air is also extracted from the compressor, or the The starter can also be used to assist during in-
fan airflow, for cooling engine components and flight restart, if an engine must be restarted. At
for accessory cooling in the nacelle. In some higher airspeeds, the engine windmill RPM may
engines, air extracted from the compressor is be enough to allow engine starting without use of
ducted and squirted on the engine cases to the pneumatic starter. The specific Airplane
control the clearance between the rotor blade tips Flight Manual should be consulted regarding the
and the case wall. Cooling the case in this way conditions in which to perform an in-flight
shrinks the case closer to the blade tips, restart.
improving compression efficiency.
Anti-ice system
Service bleeds
An airplane turbine engine needs to have some
The engines are the primary source of protection against the formation of ice in the
pressurized air to the airplane for cabin inlet and some method to remove ice if ice does
pressurization. In some airplanes, engine bleed form. The engine is equipped with the capability
air can be used as an auxiliary power source for to take some compressor air, via a bleed, and
back-up hydraulic power air-motors. Air is duct it to the engine inlet or any other place
taken from the high compressor, before any fuel where anti-ice protection is necessary. Because
is burned in it, so that it is as clean as the outside the compressor bleed air is quite hot, it prevents
air. The air is cooled and filtered before it is the formation of ice and/or removes already-
delivered to the cabins or used for auxiliary formed ice.
power. On the flight deck, the flight crew has the
capability to turn anti-ice on or off. There is
Start system generally no capability to control the amount of
anti-ice delivered; for example, "high,"
When the engine is stationary on the ground, it "medium" or "low." Such control is not
needs an external source of power to start the necessary.
compressor rotating so that it can compress
enough air to get energy from the fuel. If fuel
were lit in the combustor of a completely non-
rotating engine, the fuel would puddle and burn
without producing any significant airflow
rearward.
38
Chapter 3
Engine instrumentation in the flight deck
Airplanes in service today are equipped with
devices available to the flight crew that provide
feedback information about the engine to set
engine power and monitor the condition of the
engine. In older airplanes, these devices were
gages on the panel. In newer airplanes, the
airplane is equipped with electronic screens Rotor RPM. On an airplane equipped with a
which produce computer-generated displays that multiple-rotor turbine engine, there will be a
resemble the gages that used to be on the panel. rotor speed indication for each rotor. The N1
Whether gages or electronic displays are used, gage will provide the rotor speed of the low-
the information given to the flight crew is the pressure rotor and the N2 (or N3 for a 3-rotor
same. engine) gage will provide the rotor speed of the
high-pressure rotor. N1 is a certified thrust-
The gages are most useful when considered in setting parameter.
context with each other, rather than considering
one gage in isolation. The units of rotor speed are Revolutions Per
Minute or RPM, but rotor speed is indicated as a
What follows is a brief description of the gages non-dimensional ratio – that of engine rotor
and what information they provide. speed as compared to some nominal 100% speed
representing a high-power condition (which is
not necessarily the maximum permissible speed).
Engine operating manuals specify a maximum
operational limit RPM or redline RPM that will
generally be greater than 100 percent.
Low N1 may indicate engine rollback or

flameout, or severe damage such as LP turbine
Engine Pressure Ratio or EPR. Engine failure. Rapid N1 fluctuations may be caused by
pressure ratio is a measure of thrust provided by engine operational instability such as surge.
the engine. EPR indicators provide the ratio of Higher rotor speeds will be required at high
the pressure of the air as it comes out of the altitudes to achieve takeoff-rated thrust.
turbine to the pressure of the air as it enters the Unexpectedly high N1 may indicate a fuel
compressor. EPR is a certified thrust-setting control malfunction.
parameter. Some engine manufacturers
recommend that engine power management be N2 is used for limit monitoring and condition
performed by reference to EPR. monitoring. On older engines, it is also used to
monitor the progress of engine starting and to
Low EPR reading may be caused by engine select the appropriate time to start fuel flow to
rollback or flameout, or internal damage such as the engine.
an LP turbine failure. Rapid EPR fluctuations
may be caused by engine operational instability
such as surge, or rapidly-changing external
conditions such as inclement weather or bird
ingestion. Unexpectedly high EPR may indicate
a fuel control malfunction, or malfunction or
clogging of the inlet air pressure probes.
Exhaust Gas Temperature or EGT. Exhaust

gas temperature is a measure of the temperature
of the gas exiting the rear of the engine. It is
measured at some location in the turbine. Since
39
the exact location varies according to engine reading reflects the actual pressure of the oil as it
model, EGT should not be compared between is delivered to the bearing compartments. Oil
engine models. Often, there are many sensors at system parameters historically give false
the exit of the turbine to monitor EGT. The indications of a problem as frequently as the oil
indicator on the flight deck displays the average system has a genuine problem, so crosschecking
of all the sensors. with the other oil system indications is advisable.
High EGT can be an indication of degraded Low oil pressure may result from pump failure,
engine performance. Deteriorated engines will from a leak allowing the oil system to run dry,
be especially likely to have high EGT during from a bearing or gearbox failure, or from an
takeoff. indication system failure. High oil pressure may
be observed during extremely low temperature
EGT is also used to monitor engine health and operations, when oil viscosity is at a maximum.
mechanical integrity. Excessive EGT is a key
indicator of engine stall, of difficulty in engine Low Oil Pressure Caution. Generally, if the oil
starting, of a major bleed air leak, and of any pressure falls below a given threshold level, an
other situation where the turbine is not extracting indication light or message is provided to draw
enough work from the air as it moves aft (such as attention to the situation.
severe engine damage).
There is an operational limit for EGT, since

excessive EGT will result in turbine damage.
Operational limits for EGT are often classified as
time-at-temperature.
Oil Temperature Indicator. The Oil

temperature indicator shows the oil temperature
at some point in the lubrication circuit, although
this point differs between engine models.
Elevated oil temperatures indicate some

Fuel Flow indicator. The fuel flow indicator unwanted source of heat in the system, such as a
shows the fuel flow in pounds (or kilograms) per bearing failure, sump fire or unintended leakage
hour as supplied to the fuel nozzles. Fuel flow is of high temperature air into the scavenge system.
of fundamental interest for monitoring in-flight High oil temperature may also result from a
fuel consumption, for checking engine malfunction of the engine oil cooler, or of the
performance, and for in-flight cruise control. valves scheduling fluid flow through the cooler.
High fuel flow may indicate a significant leak Oil Quantity Indicator. The oil quantity
between the fuel control and fuel nozzles, indication monitors the amount of oil in the tank.
particularly if rotor speeds or EPR appear normal This can be expected to vary with power setting,
or low. since the amount of oil in the sumps is a function
of rotor speed.
A steady decrease in oil quantity may indicate an

oil leak. There is likely to still be some usable
oil in the tank even after the oil quantity gage
reads zero, but the oil supply will be near
exhaustion and a low pressure indication will
soon be seen. A large increase in the oil quantity
Oil Pressure Indicator. The oil pressure may be due to fuel leaking into the oil system,
indicator shows the pressure of the oil as it and should be investigated before the next flight.
comes out of the oil pump. In some cases, the Flight crews should be especially vigilant to
oil pressure reading system takes the bearing check other oil system indications before taking
compartment background pressure, called action on an engine in-flight solely on the basis
breather pressure, into account so that the gage of low oil quantity.
40
Oil Filter Bypass Indication. If the oil filter Fire Warning Indicators. Each engine has a
becomes clogged with debris (either from dedicated fire warning indication, which may
contamination by foreign material or debris from cover multiple fire zones and may address lesser
a bearing failure), the pressure drop across the degrees of high undercowl temperature (using
filter will rise to the point where the oil bypasses messages such as “Engine Overheat”).
the filter. This is announced to the pilot via the
oil filter impending bypass indication. This
indication may go away if thrust is reduced
(because oil flow through the filter and pressure
drop across the filter are reduced).
Fuel Filter Impending Bypass. If the fuel filter

at the engine fuel inlet becomes clogged, an Fuel Inlet Pressure Indicator. The fuel inlet
impending bypass indication will alert the crew pressure indicator measures the pressure at the
for a short while before the filter actually goes inlet to the engine-driven fuel pump. This
into bypass. pressure will be the pressure of the fuel supplied
from the airplane.
Fuel Heat Indication. The fuel heat indicator
registers when the fuel heat is on. Fuel heat
indicators are not needed for engines where fuel
heating is passively combined with oil cooling,
and no valves or controls are involved.
Engine Starter Indication. During assisted

starting, the start valve will be indicated open
until starter disconnect. The position of the start Air Temperature Indicator. This gage is not
switch shows the starter status (running or an actual engine gage, but rather is an airplane
disconnected). If the starter does not disconnect gage. The air temperature indicator provides the
once the engine reaches idle, or if it disconnects temperature of the air outside the airplane. This
but the starter air valve remains open, the starter temperature may be recorded from specific
will fail when the engine is at high power, locations and, therefore, the actual value may
potentially damaging other systems. More mean different things depending upon the
recent engine installations may also have particular airplane. This temperature typically is
advisory or status messages associated with used to help select EPR in those engines where
engine starting. thrust is set by EPR.
Vibration Indication. A vibration gage In addition to the above indications, recently-

indicates the amount of vibration measured on designed airplanes have a wide variety of
the engine LP rotor and/or HP rotor. Vibration is caution, advisory and status messages that may
displayed in non-dimensional units, and is used be displayed in the event of an engine
for condition monitoring, identification of the malfunction or abnormal operation. Since these
affected engine after foreign object ingestion, are specific to each particular airplane design,
and detection of fan unbalance due to icing. The they cannot be addressed here; reference to the
level of vibration will change with engine speed. appropriate Airplane Flight or Operations
Manual will provide further information.
Powerplant Ice Protection Indication. If anti-
icing is selected, an indication is provided (such
as wing anti-ice or nacelle anti-ice).
Thrust Reverser Indication. Typically,

dedicated thrust reverser indications are provided
to show thrust reverser state: deployed, in
transit, and/or fault indications and messages.
The exact indications are installation-specific
and further details may be obtained from the
Airplane Flight or Operations Manual.
41
Chapter 4
Engine Malfunctions
To provide effective understanding of and simultaneously in different places in the engine.

preparation for the correct responses to engine The part of the cycle susceptible to instability is
in-flight malfunctions, this chapter will describe the compression phase.
turbofan engine malfunctions and their
consequences in a manner that is applicable to In a turbine engine, compression is accomplished
almost all modern airplane turbofan-powered aerodynamically as the air passes through the
aircraft. These descriptions, however, do not stages of the compressor, rather than by
supersede or replace the specific instructions that confinement, as is the case in a piston engine.
are provided in the Airplane Flight Manual and The air flowing over the compressor airfoils can
appropriate checklists. stall just as the air over the wing of an airplane
can. When this airfoil stall occurs, the passage
Compressor surge of air through the compressor becomes unstable
and the compressor can no longer compress the
It is most important to provide an understanding incoming air. The high-pressure air behind the
of compressor surge. In modern turbofan stall further back in the engine escapes forward
engines, compressor surge is a rare event. If a through the compressor and out the inlet.
compressor surge (sometimes called a
compressor stall) occurs during high power at
takeoff, the flight crew will hear a very loud
bang, accompanied by yaw and vibration. The
bang will likely be far beyond any engine noise,
or other sound, the crew may have previously
experienced in service.
Compressor surge has been mistaken for blown

tires or a bomb in the airplane. The flight crew
may be quite startled by the bang, and, in many
cases, this has led to a rejected takeoff above V1.
These high-speed rejected takeoffs have
sometimes resulted in injuries, loss of the
airplane and even passenger fatalities.
The actual cause of the loud bang should make This escape is sudden, rapid and often quite
no difference to the flight crew’s first response, audible as a loud bang similar to an explosion.
which should be to maintain control of the Engine surge can be accompanied by visible
airplane and, in particular, continue the takeoff if flames forward out the inlet and rearward out the
the event occurs after V1. Continuing the tailpipe. Instruments may show high EGT and
takeoff is the proper response to a tire failure EPR or rotor speed changes, but, in many stalls,
occurring after V1, and history has shown that the event is over so quickly that the instruments
bombs are not a threat during the takeoff roll – do not have time to respond.
they are generally set to detonate at altitude.
Once the air from within the engine escapes, the
A surge from a turbofan engine is the result of reason (reasons) for the instability may self-
instability of the engine's operating cycle. correct and the compression process may re-
Compressor surge may be caused by engine establish itself. A single surge and recovery will
deterioration, it may be the result of ingestion of occur quite rapidly, usually within fractions of a
birds or ice, or it may be the final sound from a second. Depending on the reason for the cause
“severe engine damage” type of failure. As we of the compressor instability, an engine might
learned in Chapter 1, the operating cycle of the experience:
turbine engine consists of intake, compression,
ignition, and exhaust, which occur 1) A single self-recovering surge
42
2) Multiple surges prior to self-recovery The flight crew hears a very loud bang
3) Multiple surges requiring pilot action in order or double bang. The instruments will
to recover
4) A non-recoverable surge.
fluctuate quickly, but, unless someone
was looking at the engine gage at the
For complete, detailed procedures, flight crews time of the surge, the fluctuation might
must follow the appropriate checklists and not be noticed.
emergency procedures detailed in their specific
Airplane Flight Manual. In general, however,
during a single self-recovering surge, the cockpit
For example: During the surge event,
engine indications may fluctuate slightly and Engine Pressure Ratio (EPR) can drop
briefly. The flight crew may not notice the from takeoff (T/O) to 1.05 in 0.2
fluctuation. (Some of the more recent engines seconds. EPR can then vary from 1.1 to
may even have fuel-flow logic that helps the 1.05 at 0.2-second intervals two or three
engine self-recover from a surge without crew
intervention. The stall may go completely
times. The low rotor speed (N1) can
unnoticed, or it may be annunciated to the crew – drop 16% in the first 0.2 seconds, then
for information only – via EICAS messages.) another 15% in the next 0.3 seconds.
Alternatively, the engine may surge two or three After recovery, EPR and N1 should
times before full self-recovery. When this return to pre-surge values along the
happens, there is likely to be cockpit engine
instrumentation shifts of sufficient magnitude
normal acceleration schedule for the
and duration to be noticed by the flight crew. If engine.
the engine does not recover automatically from
the surge, it may surge continually until the pilot Multiple surge followed by self-recovery
takes action to stop the process. The desired
pilot action is to retard the thrust lever until the Depending on the cause and conditions,
engine recovers. The flight crew should then
SLOWLY re-advance the thrust lever.
the engine may surge multiple times,
Occasionally, an engine may surge only once but with each bang being separated by a
still not self-recover. couple of seconds. Since each bang
usually represents a surge event as
The actual cause for the compressor surge is described above, the flight crew may
often complex and may or may not result from
severe engine damage. Rarely does a single
detect the "single surge" described above
compressor surge CAUSE severe engine for two seconds, then the engine will
damage, but sustained surging will eventually return to 98% of the pre-surge power for
over-heat the turbine, as too much fuel is being a few seconds. This cycle may repeat
provided for the volume of air that is reaching two or three times. During the surge and
the combustor. Compressor blades may also be
damaged and fail as a result of repeated violent
recovery process, there will likely be
surges; this will rapidly result in an engine which some rise in EGT.
cannot run at any power setting.
For example: EPR may fluctuate between 1.6
Additional information is provided below and 1.3, Exhaust Gas Temperature (EGT) may
regarding single recoverable surge, self- rise 5 degrees C/second, N1 may fluctuate
recoverable after multiple surges, surge requiring between 103% and 95%, and fuel flow may drop
flight crew action, and non- recoverable surge. 2% with no change in thrust lever position.
In severe cases, the noise, vibration and After 10 seconds, the engine gages should return
aerodynamic forces can be very distracting. It to pre-surge values.
may be difficult for the flight crew to remember
that their most important task is to fly the Surge recoverable after flight crew action
airplane.
When surges occur as described in the last
Single self-recoverable surge paragraph, but do not stop, flight crew action is
required to stabilize the engine. The flight crew
will notice the fluctuations described in
43
“recoverable after two or three bangs,” but the wide variety of flight deck symptoms as engine
fluctuations and bangs will continue until the inputs are lost from electrical, pneumatic and
flight crew retards the thrust lever to idle. After hydraulic systems. These situations have
the flight crew retards the thrust lever to idle, the resulted in pilots troubleshooting the airplane
engine parameters should decay to match thrust systems without recognizing and fixing the root
lever position. After the engine reaches idle, it cause – no engine power. Some airplanes have
may be re-accelerated back to power. If, upon dedicated EICAS/ECAM messages to alert the
re-advancing to high power, the engine surges flight crew to an engine rolling back below idle
again, the engine may be left at idle, or left at speed in flight; generally, an ENG FAIL or ENG
some intermediate power, or shutdown, THRUST message.
according to the checklists applicable for the
airplane. If the flight crew takes no action to A flameout at take-off power is unusual – only
stabilize the engine under these circumstances, about 10% of flameouts are at takeoff power.
the engine will continue to surge and may Flameouts occur most frequently from
experience progressive secondary damage to the intermediate or low power settings such as cruise
point where it fails completely. and descent. During these flight regimes, it is
likely that the autopilot is in use. The autopilot
Non-recoverable surge will compensate for the asymmetrical thrust up
to its limits and may then disconnect. Autopilot
When a compressor surge is not disconnect must then be accompanied by
recoverable, there will be a single bang prompt, appropriate control inputs from the
flight crew if the airplane is to maintain a normal
and the engine will decelerate to zero attitude. If no external visual references are
power as if the fuel had been chopped. available, such as when flying over the ocean at
This type of compressor surge can night or in IMC, the likelihood of an upset
accompany a severe engine damage increases. This condition of low-power engine
malfunction. It can also occur without loss with the autopilot on has caused several
aircraft upsets, some of which were not
any engine damage at all. recoverable. Flight control displacement may be
the only obvious indication. Vigilance is
EPR can drop at a rate of .34/sec and EGT rise at required to detect these stealthy engine failures
a rate of 15 degrees C/sec, continuing for 8 and to maintain a safe flight attitude while the
seconds (peaking) after the thrust lever is pulled situation is still recoverable.
back to idle. N1 and N2 should decay at a rate
consistent with shutting off the fuel, with fuel
flow dropping to 25% of its pre-surge value in 2
seconds, tapering to 10% over the next 6
seconds.
Flame out
A flameout is a condition where the combustion

process within the burner has stopped. A
flameout will be accompanied by a drop in EGT,
in engine core speed and in engine pressure ratio.
Once the engine speed drops below idle, there
Once the fuel supply has been restored to the
may be other symptoms such as low oil pressure
engine, the engine may be restarted in the
warnings and electrical generators dropping off
manner prescribed by the applicable Airplane
line – in fact, many flameouts from low initial
Flight or Operating Manual. Satisfactory engine
power settings are first noticed when the
restart should be confirmed by reference to all
generators drop off line and may be initially
primary parameters – using only N1, for
mistaken for electrical problems. The flameout
instance, has led to confusion during some in-
may result from the engine running out of fuel,
flight restarts. At some flight conditions, N1
severe inclement weather, a volcanic ash
may be very similar for a windmilling engine
encounter, a control system malfunction or
and an engine running at flight idle.
unstable engine operation (such as a compressor
stall). Multiple engine flameouts may result in a
44
Fire disconnected or isolated from the airplane
systems to prevent any fire from spreading to or
contaminating associated airplane systems. This
is accomplished by one common engine "fire
handle." This controls the fire by greatly
reducing the fuel available for combustion, by
reducing the availability of pressurized air to any
sump fire, by temporarily denying air to the fire
through the discharge of fire extinguishant and
by removing sources of re-ignition such as live
electrical wiring and hot casings. It should be
Engine fire almost always refers to a fire outside noted that some of these control measures may
the engine but within the nacelle. A fire in the be less effective if the fire is the result of severe
vicinity of the engine should be annunciated to damage – the fire may take slightly longer to be
the flight crew by a fire warning in the flight extinguished in these circumstances. In the
deck. It is unlikely that the flight crew will see, event of a shut down after an in-flight engine
hear, or immediately smell an engine fire. fire, there should be no attempt to restart the
Sometimes flight crews are advised of a fire by engine unless it is critical for continued safe
communication with the control tower. flight – as the fire is likely to re-ignite once the
engine is restarted.
It is important to know that, given a fire in the
nacelle, there is adequate time to make the first
priority "fly the airplane" before attending to the
fire. It has been shown that, even in incidents of Tailpipe Fires
fire indication immediately after takeoff, there is
adequate time to continue climb to a safe altitude One of the most alarming events for passengers,
before attending to the engine. There may be flight attendants, ground personnel and even air
economic damage to the nacelle, but the first traffic control (ATC) to witness is a tailpipe fire.
priority of the flight crew should be to ensure the Fuel may puddle in the turbine casings and
airplane continues in safe flight. exhaust during start-up or shutdown, and then
ignite. This can result in a highly-visible jet of
Flight crews should regard any fire warning as a flame out of the back of the engine, which may
fire, even if the indication goes away when the be tens of feet long. Passengers have initiated
thrust lever is retarded to idle. The indication emergency evacuations in these instances,
might be the result of pneumatic leaks of hot air leading to serious injuries.
into the nacelle. The fire indication could also
be from a fire that is small or sheltered from the There may be no indication of an anomaly to the
detector so that the fire is not apparent at low flight crew until the cabin crew or control tower
power. Fire indications may also result from draws attention to the problem. They are likely
faulty detection systems. Some fire detectors to describe it as an “Engine Fire,” but a tailpipe
allow identification of a false indication (testing fire will NOT result in a fire warning on the
the fire loops), which may avoid the need for an flight deck.
IFSD. There have been times when the control
tower has mistakenly reported the flames If notified of an engine fire without any
associated with a compressor surge as an engine indications in the cockpit, the flight crew should
"fire." accomplish the tailpipe fire procedure. It will
include motoring the engine to help extinguish
In the event of a fire warning annunciation, the the flames, while most other engine abnormal
flight crew must refer to the checklists and procedures will not.
procedures specific to the airplane being flown.
In general, once the decision is made that a fire Since the fire is burning within the turbine casing
exists and the aircraft is stabilized, engine and exhaust nozzle, pulling the fire handle to
shutdown should be immediately accomplished discharge extinguishant to the space between
by shutting off fuel to the engine, both at the casings and cowls will be ineffective. Pulling
engine fuel control shutoff and the wing/pylon the fire handle may also make it impossible to
spar valve. All bleed air, electrical, and dry motor the engine, which is the quickest way
hydraulics from the affected engine will be of extinguishing most tailpipe fires.
45
Hot starts
During engine start, the compressor is very
inefficient, as already discussed. If the engine
experiences more than the usual difficulty
accelerating (due to such problems as early
starter cut-out, fuel mis-scheduling, or strong
tailwinds), the engine may spend a considerable
time at very low RPM (sub-idle). Normal engine
cooling flows will not be effective during sub-
idle operation, and turbine temperatures may Fig 13 showing fan blades bent by encounter
appear relatively high. This is known as a hot with a bird.
start (or, if the engine completely stops
accelerating toward idle, a hung start). The Bird ingestion can also result in an engine surge.
AFM indicates acceptable time/temperature The surge may have any of the characteristics
limits for EGT during a hot start. More recent, listed in the surge section. The engine may surge
FADEC-controlled engines may incorporate once and recover; it may surge continuously
auto-start logic to detect and manage a hot start. until the flight crew takes action; or it may surge
once and not recover, resulting in the loss of
Bird ingestion/FOD power from that engine. Bird ingestion can
result in the fracture of one or more fan blades,
Airplane engines ingest birds most often in the in which case, the engine will likely surge once
vicinity of airports, either during takeoff or and not recover.
during landing. Encounters with birds occur
during both daytime and nighttime flights. Regardless of the fact that a bird ingestion has
By far, most bird encounters do not affect the resulted in an engine surge, the first priority task
safe outcome of a flight. In more than half of the of the flight crew is to "fly the airplane." Once
bird ingestions into engines, the flight crew is the airplane is in stable flight at a safe altitude,
not even aware that the ingestion took place. the appropriate procedures in the applicable
Airplane Flight Manual can be accomplished.
When an ingestion involves a larger bird, the
flight crew may notice a thud, bang or vibration. In rare cases, multiple engines can ingest
If the bird enters the engine core, there may be a medium or large birds. In the event of suspected
smell of burnt flesh in the flight deck or multiple-engine damage, taking action to
passenger cabin from the bleed air. stabilize the engines becomes a much higher
priority than if only one engine is involved – but
Bird strikes can damage an engine. The photo it is still essential to control the airplane first.
below shows fan blades bent due to the ingestion
of a bird. The engine continued to produce
thrust with this level of damage. Foreign Object
Damage (FOD) from other sources, such as tire
fragments, runway debris or animals, may also
be encountered, with similar results. Severe engine damage
46
engine– the fan has too much inertia, and the
rotor is being pushed around by ram air too
forcefully to be stopped by the static structure.
The HP rotor is more likely to seize after an in-
flight shutdown if the nature of the engine
malfunction is mechanical damage within the HP
system. Should the LP rotor seize, there will be
some perceptible drag for which the flight crew
must compensate; however, if the HP rotor
seizes there will be negligible effect upon
airplane handling
Seizure cannot occur without being caused by

Severe engine damage may be difficult to define. very severe engine damage, to the point where
From the viewpoint of the flight crew, severe the vanes and blades of the compressor and
engine damage is mechanical damage to the turbine are mostly destroyed. This is not an
engine that looks "bad and ugly." To the instantaneous process – there is a great deal of
manufacturers of the engine and the airplane, inertia in the turning rotor, compared to the
severe engine damage may involve symptoms as energy needed to break interlocking rotating and
obvious as large holes in the engine cases and static components.
nacelle or as subtle as the non-response of the
engine to thrust lever movement. Once the airplane has landed, and the rotor is no
longer being driven by ram air, seizure is
It is important for flight crews to know that frequently observed after severe damage.
severe engine damage may be accompanied by
symptoms such as fire warning (from leaked hot Symptoms of engine seizure in flight may
air) or engine surge because the compressor include vibration, zero rotor speed, mild airplane
stages that hold back the pressure may not be yaw, and possibly unusual noises in the event of
intact or in working order due to the engine fan seizure. There may be an increased fuel flow
damage. in the remaining engines due to aircraft
automatic compensations; no special action is
In this case, the symptoms of severe engine needed other than that which is appropriate to the
damage will be the same as a surge without severe engine damage type failure.
recovery. There will be a loud noise. EPR will
drop quickly; N1, N2 and fuel flow will drop.
EGT may rise momentarily. There will be a loss
of power to the airplane as a result of the severe
Engine Separation
engine damage. It is not important to initially
distinguish between a non-recoverable surge Engine separation is an extremely rare event. It
with or without severe engine damage, or will be accompanied by loss of all primary and
between a fire and a fire warning with severe secondary parameters for the affected engine,
engine damage. The priority of the flight crew noises, and airplane yaw (especially at high
still remains "fly the airplane." Once the power settings). Separation is most likely to
airplane is stabilized, the flight crew can occur during take-off/climb-out or the landing
diagnose the situation. roll. Airplane handling may be affected. It is
important to use the fire handle to close the spar
valve and prevent a massive overboard fuel leak;
refer to the Airplane Flight or Operations Manual
Engine Seizure for specific procedures.
Engine seizure describes a situation where the

engine rotors stop turning in flight, perhaps very
Fuel System Problems
suddenly. The static and rotating parts lock up
against each other, bringing the rotor to a halt.
In practice, this is only likely to occur at low Leaks
rotor RPM after an engine shutdown, and
virtually never occurs for the fan of a large
47
Major leaks in the fuel system are a concern to system, the engine fuel control may no longer
the flight crew because they may result in engine operate as intended. There is a potential for
fire, or, eventually, in fuel exhaustion. A very multiple-engine flameout. The Airplane Flight
large leak can produce engine flameout. or Operating Manual provides the necessary
guidance.
Engine instruments will only indicate a leak if it
is downstream of the fuel flowmeter. A leak
between the tanks and the fuel flowmeter can Oil System Problems
only be recognized by comparing fuel usage
between engines, or by comparing actual usage
to planned usage, or by visual inspection for fuel The engine oil system has a relatively large
flowing out of the pylon or cowlings. number of indicated parameters required by the
Eventually, the leak may result in tank regulations (pressure, temperature, quantity,
imbalance. filter clogging). Many of the sensors used are
subject to giving false indications, especially on
In the event of a major leak, the crew should earlier engine models. Multiple abnormal
consider whether the leak needs to be isolated to system indications confirm a genuine failure; a
prevent fuel exhaustion. single abnormal indication may or may not be a
valid indication of failure.
It should be noted that the likelihood of fire
resulting from such a leak is greater at low There is considerable variation between failure
altitude and when the airplane is stationary; even progressions in the oil system, so the symptoms
if no fire is observed in flight, it is advisable for given below may vary from case to case.
emergency services to be available upon landing.
Oil system problems may appear at any flight
phase, and generally progress gradually. They
may lead eventually to severe engine damage if
Inability to shutdown Engine the engine is not shut down.
If the engine fuel shut-off valve malfunctions, it

may not be possible to shut the engine down by Leaks
the normal procedure, since the engine continues
to run after the fuel switch is moved to the cutoff
position. Closing the spar valve by pulling the Leaks will produce a sustained reduction in oil
fire handle will ensure that the engine shuts quantity, down to zero (though there will still be
down as soon as it has used the fuel in the line some usable oil in the system at this point).
from the spar valve to the fuel pump inlet. This Once the oil is completely exhausted, oil
may take a couple of minutes. pressure will drop to zero, followed by the low
oil pressure light. There have been cases where
maintenance error caused leaks on multiple
engines; it is therefore advisable to monitor oil
Fuel filter Clogging quantity carefully on the good engines as well.
Rapid change in the oil quantity after thrust lever
Fuel filter clogging can result from the failure of movement may not indicate a leak – it may be
one of the fuel tank boost pumps (the pump due to oil “gulping” or “hiding” as more oil
generates debris which is swept downstream to flows into the sumps.
the fuel filter), from severe contamination of the
fuel tanks during maintenance (scraps of rag,
sealant, etc., that are swept downstream to the Bearing failures
fuel filter), or, more seriously, from gross
contamination of the fuel. Fuel filter clogging
will usually be seen at high power settings, when Bearing failures will be accompanied by an
the fuel flow through the filter (and the sensed increase in oil temperature and indicated
pressure drop across the filter) is greatest. If vibration. Audible noises and filter clog
multiple fuel filter bypass indications are seen, messages may follow; if the failure progresses to
the fuel may be heavily contaminated with water, severe engine damage, it may be accompanied
rust, algae, etc. Once the filters bypass and the by low oil quantity and pressure indications.
contaminant goes straight into the engine fuel
48
Oil pump failures • Significant differences between primary
parameters from one engine to the next.
Oil pump failure will be accompanied by low
indicated oil pressure and a low oil pressure If asymmetric thrust is suspected, the first
light, or by an oil filter clog message. response must be to make the appropriate trim or
rudder input. Disconnecting the autopilot
without first performing the appropriate control
input or trim may result in a rapid roll maneuver.
Contamination
Contamination of the oil system – by carbon

deposits, cotton waste, improper fluids, etc. –
Reverser malfunctions
will generally lead to an oil filter clog indication
or an impending bypass indication. This Generally, thrust reverser malfunctions are
indication may disappear if thrust is reduced, limited to failure conditions where the reverser
since the oil flow and pressure drop across the system fails to deploy when commanded and
filter will also drop. fails to stow when commanded. Failure to
deploy or to stow during the landing roll will
result in significant asymmetric thrust, and may
require a rapid response to maintain directional
No Thrust Lever Response control of the airplane. Uncommanded
deployments of modern thrust reverser systems
A “no Thrust Lever Response” type of have occurred and have led to Airworthiness
malfunction is more subtle than the other Directives to add additional locking systems to
malfunctions previously discussed, so subtle that the reverser. As a consequence of this action, the
it can be completely overlooked, with potentially probability of inadvertent deployment is
serious consequences to the airplane. extremely low. The Airplane Flight or
Operations Manual provides the necessary
If an engine slowly loses power – or if, when the system information and type of annunciations
thrust lever is moved, the engine does not provided by the airplane type.
respond – the airplane will experience
asymmetric thrust. This may be partly concealed
by the autopilot’s efforts to maintain the required
flight condition.
No Starter Cutout
If no external visual references are available, Generally, this condition exists when the start
such as when flying over the ocean at night or in selector remains in the start position or the
IMC, asymmetric thrust may persist for some engine start valve is open when commanded
time without the flight crew recognizing or closed. Since the starter is intended only to
correcting it. In several cases, this has led to operate at low speeds for a few minutes at a time,
airplane upset, which was not always the starter may fail completely (burst) and cause
recoverable. Vigilance is required to detect these further engine damage if the starter does not cut
stealthy engine failures and to maintain a safe out.
flight attitude while the situation is still
recoverable. As stated, this condition is subtle
and not easy to detect. Vibration
Symptoms may include:
Vibration is a symptom of a wide variety of
• Multiple system problems such as
engine conditions, ranging from very benign to
generators dropping off-line or low engine
serious. The following are some causes of tactile
oil pressure
or indicated vibration:
• Unexplained airplane attitude changes
• Fan unbalance at assembly
• Large unexplained flight control surface
• Fan blade friction or shingling
deflections (autopilot on) or the need for
• Water accumulation in the fan rotor
large flight control inputs without apparent
cause (autopilot off) • Blade icing
• Bird ingestion/FOD
49
• Bearing failure parameters will help to establish whether a
• Blade distortion or failure failure exists.
• Excessive fan rotor system tip clearances.
Vibration felt on the flight deck may not be
It is not easy to identify the cause of the indicated on instruments. For some engine
vibration in the absence of other unusual failures, severe vibration may be experienced on
indications. Although the vibration from some the flight deck either during an engine failure
failures may feel very severe on the flight deck, and possibly after the engine has been shut
it will not damage the airplane. There is no need down, to the point where instruments are
to take action based on vibration indication difficult to read. This large amplitude vibration
alone, but it can be very valuable in confirming a is caused by the unbalanced fan windmilling
problem identified by other means. close to the airframe natural frequency, which
may amplify the vibration. Changing airspeed
Engine vibration may be caused by fan and/or altitude will change the fan windmill
unbalance (ice buildup, fan blade material loss speed, and an airplane speed may be found
due to ingested material, or fan blade distortion where there will be much less vibration.
due to foreign object damage) or by an internal Meanwhile, there is no risk of airplane structural
engine failure. Reference to other engine failure due to vibratory engine loads.
50
Wrap-up
The tabulation of engine conditions and their symptoms below shows

that many failures have similar symptoms and that it may not be
practicable to diagnose the nature of the engine problem from flight
deck instrumentation. However, it is not necessary to understand
exactly what is wrong with the engine – selecting the “wrong”
checklist may cause some further economic damage to the engine,
but, provided action is taken with the correct engine, and airplane
control is kept as the first priority, the airplane will still be safe.
51
Reverser inadvertent
Bird ingestion/FOD
Engine separation
Severe damage
Tailpipe fires
Fuel control
Flameout
Fuel leak
problems
Hot start
Seizure
deploy
Surge
Icing
Fire
Bang O X X O O O
Fire Warning O O O X
Visible flame O O O O O X O
Vibration X O X O X X
Yaw O O O O O O O X
High EGT X X O O X O X O
N1 change X O O O X X X X
N2 change X O O O X X X X
Fuel flow change X O O O X O O X
Oil indication X O O O? X O
change
Visible cowl X X O X
damage
Smoke/odor in O O O
cabin bleed air
EPR change X X X O X X X X
52
X = Symptom very likely
O = Symptom possible
Note: blank fields mean that the symptom is unlikely
53
Appendix
Attached are flash card style summary descriptions of many of the

malfunctions discussed in this text.
54
Engine Stall/Surge
Event Description Symptoms

Engine Stall or Surge is a momentary reversal of the High power: Loud
bang and yaw (may
compressor airflow so that high-pressure air escapes be repetitive).
out of the engine inlet. Flames from inlet and
tailpipe. Vibration.
High EGT/TGT.
Corrective action Parameter fluctuation
After stabilizing airplane flight path, observe engine Low power: Quiet
bang/pop or rumble.
instruments for anomalies. Stall/surge may be self-
correcting, may require the engine to be throttled back,
or may require engine shutdown, if the engine can be
positively identified and the stall will not clear.
POSSIBLE MESSAGES
EPR
ENG STALL
EGT OVERLIMIT
EGT
ENG FAIL
N1
FLUX N2
55
Flameout

Engine Flameout is a condition where the combustor is Single engine: Core
speed, EGT, EPR all
no longer burning fuel. decay. Electrical
generator drops off
line; low oil pressure
Corrective action warning as core
speed drops below
After stabilizing airplane flight path, verify fuel supply to idle.
engine. Re-start engine according to AFM. Multiple engines:
As above, but also
hydraulic, pneumatic
and electrical system
problems.
POSSIBLE MESSAGES
EPR
ENG FAIL
OIL LO PR
EGT
GEN OFF
BLD OFF
N1 ALL ENG FLAMEOUT
LOW N2
56
Fire

Engine fire is a fuel, oil or hydraulic fluid fire between Fire warning. Flame
or smoke may be
the engine casing and the cowlings (or occasionally a observed.
metal fire). It could result from severe damage. Hot air
leaks can also give a fire warning.
Corrective action
After stabilizing airplane flight path, shut the engine
down and discharge extinguishant. Avoid restarting the
engine.
POSSIBLE MESSAGES
EPR
ENG FIRE
EGT
N1
NORMAL N2
PARAMETERS MAY LOOK NORMAL
57
Tailpipe fire

Fuel puddles in the tailpipe and ignites on hot surfaces. Observed flames and
smoke. No fire
warning.
Corrective action
Shut off fuel to the engine and dry motor it.
POSSIBLE MESSAGES
EPR
START FAULT
EGT
N1
LOW N2
58
Bird Ingestion

A bird (or other creature) is sucked into the engine inlet. Thud, bang, vibration.
Odor in cabin. Surge
Note; ingestion of ice slabs, blown tires, etc., will may result from bird
produce similar, more severe symptoms. ingestion.
Corrective action
After stabilizing airplane flight path, watch engine
instruments for anomalies. If the engine surges, throttle
back or shut down as necessary. If multiple engines are
affected, operate engines free of surge/stall to maintain
desired flight profile.
POSSIBLE MESSAGES
EPR
ENG STALL
EGT OVERLIMIT
EGT
VIB
N1
NORMAL N2
PARAMETERS MAY LOOK NORMAL

59
Severe Engine Damage

The engine hardware is damaged to the point where the Depending on nature
of damage –
engine is in no condition to run – such as bearing surge/stall, vibration,
failure, major fan damage from ingestion of foreign fire warning, high
EGT, oil system
objects, blade or rotor disk failures, etc. parameters out of
limits, rotor speed
Corrective action and EPR decay, yaw.
After stabilizing airplane flight path, observe engine
instruments for anomalies. Shut down engine.
POSSIBLE MESSAGES
EPR
ENG FAIL
EGT OVERLIMIT
EGT
ENG STALL
VIB
OIL LO PR
N1
LOW N2
60
Engine Seizure

Engine seizure is the locking up of one or more rotors. After shut down, zero
speed on one of the
It only happens after engines are shut down for severe rotors. Minor
damage. increase in required
thrust for flight
Corrective action conditions.
Trim and adjust power for increased drag.
POSSIBLE MESSAGES
EPR
ENG SHUT DOWN
EGT
N1
LOW N2
61
Engine Separation

Engine Separation is the departure of the engine from Loss of all engine
parameters.
the airplane due to mount or pylon failure. Hydraulic, pneumatic
and electrical system
Corrective action problems
After stabilizing airplane flight path, observe engine
instruments for anomalies. Turn off fuel to appropriate
engine.
POSSIBLE MESSAGES
EPR
ENG FIRE
HYD OFF
EGT
GEN OFF
BLD OFF
N1
ZERO N2
62

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07/17/09

Turbofan Engine Malfunction Recognition and Response

FAA Engine & Propeller Directorate

Contributing Organizations and Individuals

Air Canada Capt. E Jokinen

On 13 December 1994 a Jetstream 31 turboprop crashed at Raleigh Durham, resulting in

• The training requirements related to “Recognition and correction of in-flight

representation of airplane response to engine compressor stall/surge is very

• A substantial number of the turbofan accidents reviewed are related to propulsion

The AIA/AECMA report included a recommendation that :

The FAA and ATA accordingly sponsored an industry/regulatory team, in September

The training material provided is intentionally confined to description of engine operation

Definitions and Acronyms

AECMA The European Association of Aerospace Industries

Selection of Malfunctions to be Trained

The following considerations were felt important in selection of malfunctions to be

• Observed likelihood of crew error (based on the PSM+ICR database)

A matrix of propulsion system malfunctions was developed, showing the symptoms,

The matrix was then summarized by eliminating those conditions (malfunctions at a

ALSO SIMULATE SLOW ROLLBACK OR NON

PROBLEM SYMPTOM ICR Desired Next Response TRAINING ACTION

Format of training material

• Broad spectrum of pilot experience

The material was therefore structured to allow flexibility, as follows:

The script of the video is provided in Appendix 2.

A copy of the text is provided in Appendix 3.

Preparation of Simulator Package

Human Factors Considerations

results in observable, reflexive (non-voluntary) muscular contractions, and its principal

Assuming enhanced simulation is incorporated into Level D devices, validating the

A review of recent PSM+ICR service experience should be undertaken in 2010, to audit

Activities to address the outstanding recommendations from the PSM+ICR committee,

1.AIA/AECMA Project Report on Propulsion System Malfunction Plus Inappropriate

Appendix 1 – Letter from ATA

Appendix 2 – Video Script

So, the capability to recognize turbine engine malfunctions must be learned.

“Bird strike” is a concern for every pilot.

The sequence of events and severity of symptoms experienced during an engine

The purpose of this text is to provide

It is not the purpose of this text to supersede or

The simplest example of the propulsion principle

In the turbine engine, however, these same four

1) The inlet section

The turbine engine in an airplane has the various

Fig 5 showing basic layout of jet propulsion

Machinery details Fig 6 showing compressor rotor disk.

The compressor of an airplane turbine engine has

The compression of this volume of air is

Most of today's turbine engines are dual-rotor

The most common solution to this problem is to

Fig 9 showing schematic of fan jet engine. In

B767, A300, A310, etc., as much as three-

Within the engine, there are systems that keep

In addition, there are airplane systems that are Fuel system

Low N1 may indicate engine rollback or

Exhaust Gas Temperature or EGT. Exhaust

There is an operational limit for EGT, since

Oil Temperature Indicator. The Oil

Elevated oil temperatures indicate some