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Global Lynching And Collective Violence Volume 2 The
Americas And Europe Michael J. Pfeifer Digital Instant
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Author(s): Michael J. Pfeifer
ISBN(s): 9780252041389, 0252041380
Edition: Hardcover
File Details: PDF, 1.44 MB
Year: 2017
Language: english
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Global Lynching and Collective Violence
volume 2
Global Lynching and
Collective Violence
The Americas and Europe
Volume 2
Acknowledgments vii
Introduction 1
Michael J. Pfeifer
1 Collective Violence and Popular Justice
in the Later Middle Ages 12
Hannah Skoda
2 Unofficial Justice and Community
in Rural Russia, 1856–1914 34
Stephen P. Frank
3 “A lei de Lynch”: Reconsidering the View from Brazil
of Lynching in the United States, 1880s–1920s 68
Amy Chazkel
4 Lynching, Religion, and Politics
in Twentieth-Century Puebla 85
Gema Santamaría
5 “Canadians Are Not Proficient in the Art of Lynching”:
Mob Violence, Social Regulation, and National Identity 115
Brent M. S. Campney
6 “Negro and White Unite”: The Communist Party’s Campaign
against Lynching in Indiana and Maryland, 1930–1933 146
Dean J. Kotlowski
7 Bonded in Hate: The Violent Development
of American Skinhead Culture 186
Ryan Shaffer
Contributors 209
Index 213
Acknowledgments
Numerous people helped to make this book possible. Laurie Matheson once
again was a model editor, offering exemplary encouragement and support to
the project. James G. Engelhardt took over the project as editor at a late stage
and lent helpful aid. Amanda Wicks, Brigette M. Brown, Julie R. Laut, and
Jennifer Clark also provided splendid editorial assistance. Nancy Albright was
once again a superlative copy editor. Others supported the research, writing,
and editing in a variety of ways, including Hyunhee Park, Fumihiko Kobayashi,
Sara McDougall, Jürgen Martschukat, David Enos, Ginger and Matti Vehaskari,
George Dansker, Jack Belsom, and Daniel Golebiewski. Margaret Vandiver
and an anonymous reader improved the manuscript with their close reading
and helpful comments. I am also grateful to the University of California Press
for permission to reprint Stephen Frank’s chapter on popular justice and the
Russian peasantry. Frank, Stephen P., “Unofficial Justice in the Village: Defining
Popular Justice, Charivaris, Samosud and Property Crime, Sorcery” in Crime,
Cultural Conflict, and Justice in Rural Russia, 1856–1914 © 1999 by the Regents
of the University of California. Published by the University of California Press.
Global Lynching and Collective Violence
volume 2
Introduction
Michael J. Pfeifer
The word lynching is most likely American in origin but the practice of lynch-
ing, defined by scholars as extralegal group assault and/or murder motivated
by social control concerns,1 can be found in many global cultures and eras.
This collection of essays looks at lynching and related varieties of collective
violence such as vigilantism and rioting across world cultures. Analyzing
lynching and collective violence in Europe and the Americas, the chapters
highlight both the presence of mob violence in a number of cultures and eras
and the crucial role of transnational relationships in shaping the particular
contexts for, and understandings of, extralegal violence.
Scholars have argued that lynching against individuals often deemed so-
cially distant typically occurs in conditions of social flux, for example: in
transitions from homogeneous tribal societies to plural, heterogeneous social
orders; in locales where patterns of racial or ethnic dominance have been
challenged or collapsed; in settings shifting rapidly from rural to urban social
arrangements; in polities where authority has effectively lost legitimacy or
where multiple, contradictory legal regimes contend for popular support;
amid perceptions of a crisis of legal order brought on by rampant criminality;
and in contested or fragile states as opposed to settings where the state is able
to, in Weberian terms, successfully claim a monopoly of violence. But while
lynching violence may occur in many global cultures and eras, it is hardly a
universal phenomenon and it does not occur in other temporal and social
landscapes. To perhaps state the obvious, lynching does not occur where
the conditions stated above are not present, that is, where social, legal, and
political arrangements are by comparison fairly stable and where, at least
in recent times, the state enjoys a monopoly over the use of force and the
2 michael j. pfeifer
southerners turned again to collective murder outside the law amid racial
and political conflict shaped by the depressed cotton economy of the 1890s.
In a contagion of collective murder that was less overtly political and less
systematically organized but even more racial than the collective violence
of Reconstruction, lynching became a prime means of punishing black re-
sistance and criminality for white southerners skeptical of the efficacy of
law and legal processes in the perpetuation of white supremacy in the New
South. Southern urbanization and industrialization at the turn of the twenti-
eth century catalyzed anxieties over racial mixing and in some cases evoked
large-scale spectacle lynchings, but eventually a southern white middle class
coalesced against mob violence. Embarrassed by the increasing spotlight
African American activists and a nationalizing culture shone upon lynching
and fearing the loss of investment that might promote economic growth and
prosperity in the region, middle-class white southerners in the early twentieth
century pressed instead for “legal lynchings,” expedited trials and executions
that merged legal forms with the popular clamor for rough justice. As the
frequency of lynchings in the American South plummeted in the middle
decades of the twentieth century, the practice went underground as lynchers
no longer acted in large public mobs but instead in small, secretive groups
that murdered in an expression of racial intimidation, which—by the late
twentieth century—was more often called a “hate crime” than a “lynching.”5
The American Midwest and the American West were not as directly bur-
dened by the legacy of antebellum racial slavery, and the trajectory of rough
justice and lynching took different forms in those regions. North and west
of Dixie, lynching also persisted into the middle decades of the twentieth
century, surfacing after allegations of particularly heinous crimes and un-
der the influence of events such as African American in-migration and the
heightened racism of the Jim Crow era, the Mexican Revolution (precipitating
the lynching of persons of Mexican descent), World War I (the migrations
and racial leveling of the war inspired the lynching of African Americans in
northern locales, while nativist and antiradical sentiment informed acts of
collective murder in the West and the Midwest), and the social tensions of
the Great Depression. In the Midwest and West, as in the South, legislators
reshaped the death penalty in the early twentieth century to make capital
punishment more efficient and more racial, achieving a compromise between
the observation of legal forms long emphasized by due process advocates and
the lethal, ritualized retribution long sought by rough justice supporters.6
Group assault and killing across global cultures has sometimes, like
American lynching in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, re-
flected ambivalence about alterations in law and social values and rejection
of seemingly ineffectual legal regimes that ostensibly do not offer sufficient
4 michael j. pfeifer
developing notions of “rights” in the United States and other societies (mob
violence invariably abridges the procedural, due process rights of its victims)
without understanding how lynching and collective violence—and the varied
responses of those communities that have been targeted by perpetrators of
group violence—has been shaped by transnational relationships even as it
has punctuated the uneven pathway of the development of the state, notions
of criminal justice, and concepts of civil rights in particular nations.
Notes
1. For the history of the term lynching and the rhetoric surrounding it in the United
States, see Christopher Waldrep, The Many Faces of Judge Lynch: Extralegal Violence and
Punishment in America (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002); Christopher Waldrep,
ed., Lynching in America: A History in Documents (New York: New York University Press,
2006). For the spread of the word lynching around the world, see William D. Carrigan
and Christopher Waldrep, eds., Swift to Wrath: Lynching in Global Historical Perspective
(Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2013), 1–9.
2. For efforts at understanding lynching and other forms of collective violence in struc-
tural and theoretical terms across world cultures and eras, see Roberta Senechal de la
Roche, “Collective Violence as Social Control,” Sociological: Forum 11, no. 1 (March 1996),
97–128; Senechal de la Roche, “Why Is Collective Violence Collective?” Sociological Theory
19, no. 2 (July 2001), 126–144; Senechal de la Roche, “Toward a Scientific Theory of Terror-
ism,” Sociological Theory 22, no. 1 (March 2004), 1–4; Donald Black, “Violent Structures,”
in Margaret A. Zahn, Henry H. Brownstein, and Shelly L. Jackson, eds. Violence: From
Theory to Research (Newark: Lexis-Nexis/Anderson Publishing, 2004), 145–158; Mark
Cooney, Is Killing Wrong? A Study of Pure Sociology (Charlottesville: University of Virginia
Press, 2009); Bradley Campbell, “Genocide as Social Control,” Sociological Theory 27, no.
2 (June 2009), 150–172; Charles Tilly, The Politics of Collective Violence (Cambridge, U.K.:
Cambridge University Press, 2003); David Pratten and Atreye Sen, eds., “Global Vigilan-
tes: Perspectives on Justice and Violence,” and Ray Abrahams, “Some Thoughts on the
Comparative Study of Vigilantism,” in Pratten and Sen, eds., Global Vigilantes (New York:
Columbia University Press, 2008), 1–19, 419–442. Senechal de la Roche’s work is especially
useful for distinguishing among categories of collective violence such as lynching, riot-
ing, vigilantism, and terrorism. For a cogent discussion of the issues involved in studying
lynching and collective extralegal punishment from a global perspective, including a useful
problematization of the role of state authority and Max Weber’s conception of the state
monopoly upon violence, see Manfred Berg and Simon Wendt, “Introduction: Lynching
from an International Perspective,” in Berg and Wendt, eds., Globalizing Lynching History
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 1–18, esp. 6–9, 13–15; Max Weber, “Politics as a
Vocation” (1919), reprinted in H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, ed., Max Weber: Essays
in Sociology (London: Routledge, 1970), 77–128. For an interesting effort at a comparative
analysis of lynching across global cultures, albeit one that unnecessarily and erroneously
downplays the significance of race in lynching in the American South, see Robert W.
Thurston, Lynching: American Mob Murder in Global Perspective (Farnham, U.K.: Ashgate,
2011), and Thurston, “Lynching and Legitimacy: Toward a Global Description of Mob
10 michael j. pfeifer
Murder,” in Berg and Wendt, eds., Globalizing Lynching History, 69–86. For collective
violence prior to modern eras, see Scott Morschauer, “‘Vengeance Is Mine’: Lynching
in the Ancient Near East,” and Brian P. Levack, “Witch Lynching Past and Present,” in
Carrigan and Waldrep, eds., Swift to Wrath, 15–49, 49–67; Sara Forsdyke, “Street Theater
and Popular Justice in Ancient Greece: Shaming, Stoning, and Starving Offenders inside
and outside the Courts,” Past & Present no. 201 (November 2008), 3–50; David Nirenberg,
Communities of Violence: Persecution of Minorities during the Middle Ages (Princeton,
N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1998). For extralegal punishments, including collective
murder, in early modern France, see William Beik, “The Violence of the French Crowd
from Charivari to Revolution,” Past & Present no. 197 (November 2007), 75–110. For lin-
chamientos, that is, lynchings, in contemporary Latin America, see Angelina Snodgrass
Godoy, “When ‘Justice’ Is Criminal: Lynchings in Contemporary Latin America,” Theory
and Society 33, no. 6 (December 2004), 621–651; Daniel M. Goldstein, The Spectacular
City: Violence and Performance in Urban Bolivia (Durham: Duke University Press, 2004);
Christopher Krupa, “Histories in Red: Ways of Seeing Lynching in Ecuador,” American
Ethnologist 36, no. 1 (February 2009), 20–39; Jim Handy, “Chicken Thieves, Witches, and
Judges: Vigilante Justice and Customary Law in Guatemala,” Journal of Latin American
Studies 36, no. 3 (August 2004), 533–561. For nonstate violence in recent decades across
the varied regions of sub-Saharan Africa, see Bruce Baker, Taking the Law into Their Own
Hands: Lawless Law Enforcers in Africa (Aldershot, U.K.: Ashgate Publishing, 2002); Tilo
Grätz, “Vigilantism in Africa: Benin and Beyond,” in Berg and Wendt, eds., Globalizing
Lynching History, 207–223.
3. For analyses of transnational discourses surrounding U.S. lynching in, respectively,
the Slovak-American press in the early twentieth century, fin de siècle Britain, Japan
in the Second World War, and the Soviet Union, see Robert Zecker, “‘Let Each Reader
Judge’: Lynching, Race, and Immigrant Newspapers,” Sarah L. Silkey, “British Public
Debates and the ‘Americanization’ of Lynching,” Fumiko Sakashita, “Lynching across the
Pacific: Japanese Views and African American Responses in the Wartime AntiLynching
Campaign,” and Meredith L. Roman, “U.S. Lynch Law and the Fate of the Soviet Union:
the Soviet Uses of American Racial Violence,” in Carrigan and Waldrep, eds., Swift to
Wrath, 137–159, 160–180, 181–214, and 215–236. For a comparison of histories of extralegal
violence and race in the United States and Australia, see Gregory D. Smithers, “Frontier
Justice: Lynching and Racial Violence in the United States and Australia,” in Berg and
Wendt, eds., Globalizing Lynching History, 101–118.
4. For extended treatment of these matters, see Michael J. Pfeifer, The Roots of Rough
Justice: Origins of American Lynching (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2011) and
Pfeifer, “Extralegal Violence and Law in the Early Modern British Isles and the Origins
of American Lynching,” in Berg and Wendt, eds., Globalizing Lynching History, 19–34.
See also Manfred Berg, Popular Justice: A History of Lynching in America (reprint edi-
tion; Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 2015); William D. Carrigan and Clive Webb,
Forgotten Dead: Mob Violence against Mexicans in the United States, 1848–1928 (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2013); Clive Webb, “The Lynching of Sicilian Immigrants in the
American South, 1886–1910,” American Nineteenth Century History 3, no. 1 (Spring 2002),
45–76.
5. Michael J. Pfeifer, Rough Justice: Lynching and American Society, 1874–1947 (Urbana:
Introduction 11
University of Illinois Press, 2004), 15, 22–24, 68–86, 139–147. For discussions of the evolu-
tion of the legal and rhetorical context for the racially motivated extralegal violence that
came to be known as “hate crime” in the 1980s, see Waldrep, Many Faces of Judge Lynch,
185–191; Christopher Waldrep, African Americans Confront Lynching: Strategies of Resis-
tance from the Civil War to the Civil Rights Era (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield
Publishers, 2008), 113–127.
6. For treatment of these developments, see Pfeifer, Rough Justice, 122–147.
7. For the emergence of lynching for property transgressions, including horse theft, on
the midwestern and western frontiers of nineteenth-century United States, see Pfeifer,
Roots of Rough Justice, 21–31.
8. For connections between American police violence and the legacy of lynching, see
Pfeifer, Rough Justice, 153.
1 Collective Violence and Popular Justice
in the Later Middle Ages
Hannah Skoda
Introduction
Something akin to lynching was built into medieval law in the form of out-
lawry. Most legal frameworks throughout the period relied upon a system
of banishment or outlawry for dealing with undesirables, who forfeited the
protection of the law: brutal punishment could then be carried out by angry
communities rather than by legal agents.1 Legal mechanisms were implicitly
built on the idea that communities should, and needed to, be involved in
the pursuit of justice: this was not just a top-down or hegemonic process.2
Nevertheless, the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries are often described as a
pivotal moment in European legal history.3 The later Middle Ages are com-
monly represented as the point at which the state seemed to assume an ever
more prominent role in the prosecution of interpersonal violence, to take
upon itself the punishment and resolution of disputes, and to regulate these
matters according to a set of increasingly codified norms.4 The narrative of
the rise of the state, the centralization of legal systems and the monopoliza-
tion of violent punishment, is a deeply problematic one: however, its broad
outlines do shape the late Middle Ages, and certainly appeared to do so to
contemporaries.
Reality was much more fluid. While difficult to enumerate in statistical
terms, high levels of interpersonal violence continued to be perpetrated. 5
More importantly, this was a transitional period in which the law and defini-
tions of legitimate and illegitimate violence were still being hotly contested.
In many ways, it was this very fluidity and the contestations over the right to
carry out and to define violence, which lay at the heart of much of its perpe-
tration: while we find a variety of causes of violence in the period, popular
Collective Violence and Popular Justice in the Later Middle Ages 13
justice was a common trope. Much popular violence arose because of the
overlap between violence and the law; at this liminal phase in European legal
history, the same logic seemed to underpin much of the “legitimate” violence
of the law and “illegitimate” violence of “the people.”6 Both seemed to oper-
ate according to a logic of vendetta, righting wrongs, and negotiating social
relationships. This is encapsulated in Claude Gauvard’s observation that the
trope of the condemned man publicly forgiving his executioner before death
reveals that legal actions were still read as interpersonal messages that could
provoke vengeance.7 And vice versa, many acts of interpersonal violence
continued to be widely acknowledged as a form of popular justice.
If the role of the law is to establish boundaries, categories, and frame-
works of logic, this process was far from complete. It is from the fluidity of
the boundaries between “the law” and interpersonal violence, that popular
justice arises; these were actions that essentially contested the definitions
of violence and justice. But these contestations took very different forms:
contemporaries might object that law was not being properly applied or
that it was inconsistently and abusively carried out; but equally, they might
claim that there was too much law and that it encroached on their personal
freedom; in other cases, it was felt that the law as a set of formalized processes
was simply inadequate to offer the protection and redress required.
Three case studies have been selected here in order to illustrate, for the
later Middle Ages, three distinct forms of popular justice, with distinct log-
ics. They are evidence-rich examples, permitting a kind of “thick descrip-
tion.” Although they are dramatic, even melodramatic, they are not atypical
and comparative evidence will be offered where possible. My focus is upon
northern France and England for two main reasons: the material is readily
accessible; these were areas where the developments of law in relation to the
state were particularly noteworthy (and, indeed, commented upon by con-
temporaries). Common law dominated the picture in England, which became
precociously centralized and included a sophisticated apparatus of profes-
sional lawyers.8 England stood apart from the rest of Europe in this respect.
In France, the ius commune, arising from Roman law, was in the ascendant
by the later Middle Ages, permitting a more centralized state-based approach
to the process of law; however, customary law continued to be of paramount
importance in dealing with and resolving local disputes, to the extent that
Frederic Cheyette has described the system as one of “amoeboid formless-
ness.”9 The interplay between customary and royal law in France is striking
precisely because developments in statecraft lent it a particular dynamic. A
very different picture emerges in Italy, for example, where a multiplicity of
smaller polities were obliged to embed the practices of powerful and violent
local agents in legal developments.10 Legislative growth of statecraft in what
14 hannah skoda
disease, and relations between different social groups were potentially ex-
plosive. But the actions and gestures of the rebels themselves tell a slightly
different story and draw attention to the specifically legal dimension of their
complaints. Chronicle accounts of the revolt, while predictably hostile to
the rebels themselves, when read against the grain, reveal the logic of rebel
violence: rebels focused on the destruction of legal documents, upon the
freeing of prisoners, and the exaction of popular justice upon those who
had abused their positions of legal or governmental authority. Of course, the
rebels claimed their loyalty to the King, famously presenting their demands
to him at Mile End (only to be subjected to terrifying reprisals afterward), but
their point was one about the nature of governance or law broadly speaking.
According to the rebels, the law was the prerogative of the community of the
realm as a whole, in place to protect and empower the common good. When
the corruption of legal officials prevented its just application, they took the
law into their own hands as a community. The rhetoric here, both in gestures
and in words, was about law and the common good.
However, this growing emphasis on the common good could generate an
entirely contrasting logic for popular justice: one generated by a backlash
against both royal power and emphasis on the common good. Powerful
aristocrats could feel marginalized by legal developments: their freedom of
action was deliberately constrained. This kind of popular justice, undertaken
by individuals or private gangs, tended to parody legal developments. There
is little sense of the “common good” here, and the use of popular justice is
not intended to “correct” the law but rather to overturn it entirely because
it is perceived to be detrimental to private interests. The case of the murder
of Nicholas Radford and mock trial of his corpse in 1455 will be considered.
Nicholas Radford was a justice of the peace under Henry VI, during the
stormy period of the early factionalism, which would escalate into the Wars
of the Roses. One night, his godson’s brother, Thomas Courtenay, came to the
gates of his house, demanded that he open them in order to have a discus-
sion, and then broke trust by brutally murdering Radford; his brother, Henry
Courtenay, Radford’s godson, later subjected the corpse to a grotesque mock
trial. There can be no question of community or common good here—this
was the enactment of a private vendetta, but it was carried out in mock
legal terms because the freedom of action of Thomas Courtenay was being
constrained by the perceived expansion of royal justice.
These examples draw on different economies of scale: the private, the in-
termediate or institutional, and the public. These different scales generated
different logics of popular justice. In a period in which the reach of the law
was expanding, these instances of popular justice were an important way of
responding to these shifts.
16 hannah skoda
when the pope himself was behind the new building. When prosecuted for
their misdoings, they protested that the archdeacon of Besançon, who was
to conduct the trial, was unlikely to give them a fair hearing since he was a
kinsman of the cardinal patron of the canons of Saint Urbain.25 These women
felt, again and again, that the mechanisms of law were too intimately invested
in, and connected with, local conflicts to represent any form of neutral third
party. This was a common complaint: for example, a series of complaints
from Arras in 1296 drew attention to the conflicts of interest disingenuously
engaged in by the comital official, Jehan de Beauquesne.26 Popular justice was
an effective means of responding to the widely held knowledge that legal of-
ficials could rarely stand apart from the cases in which they were supposed
to intervene.
Interestingly, although their behavior was, for obvious reasons, widely
condemned and they were excommunicated, the excommunication was
lifted in 1274, a move most pressing since they needed reintegration into the
Church in order to elect a new abbess.27 The readiness with which Gregory
X ordered the lifting of the excommunication (applying absolution to all but
the most violent of the nuns) suggests a degree of acceptance of the logic of
their actions: there was not a total disjunction between the self-help of these
women and the protecting function of the law, and even the pope was obliged
to acknowledge this. A similar ambivalence characterizes legal reactions to
other examples of institutional self-help. Medieval students are a notorious
case in point. The students of Paris, or Oxford, for example, engaged in bru-
tal and existential violence against townsmen in 1200 and 1355, respectively,
ostensibly in order to defend their threatened privileges.28 In both cases, the
students were effectively rewarded with the confirmation of their privileges
by papal and royal authorities, respectively. On the other hand, when other
institutional groups engaged in apparently defensive violence against the
corporation of students, they were almost invariably punished. So, in 1278,
the monks of St. Germain, seeing what they deemed to be their land at the
Pré-aux-clercs, routinely used and abused by students, took matters into
their own hands by massacring and mutilating the students en masse. The
monks were punished and their abbey continued to pay reparations for years
to come.29 They had acted violently because they saw that the law itself was
not going to defend their collective interest: any potential legal ambivalence
regarding self-help was, in this case, tempered by a stronger prerogative to
protect the interests of the students deemed essential to the well-being of
the kingdom.
In 1307, violence erupted once again in Troyes, this time against the Do-
minicans, whose influence in the town was much resented by the nuns.
Collective Violence and Popular Justice in the Later Middle Ages 19
idea that an institution might react violently in order to compensate for the
inadequacies of law and to take matters into its own hands, is not so very
unusual in this period. One might compare this incident with numerous
incidents of male religious resorting to violent self-help in order to defend
the jurisdictional integrity of their institution; we might cite the thirteenth-
century canons of Laon violently defending their interests.33 This was violent
self-help on a pragmatic scale: it was functional. Medieval collectivities often
found themselves unprotected by law and mobilized themselves violently to
remedy that.
and of the kingdom”:38 these men articulated their demands in terms not only
of socioeconomic liberties but in terms of what was increasingly perceived as
the tyrannical and often arbitrary nature of legal authority. The question of
taxation was, of course, a legal one, since it relied on the power of law both for
its justification and its enactment. The notion of political discontent and evil
counselors was dwelt on: for example, the chronicler Froissart commented
that the rebels wished to show “how the realm of England hath not been well
governed a great space for the honour of the realm nor for the common profit
by his [Richard II’s] uncles and by the clergy.”39 In this redaction of the rebels’
motivations, the notion of poor governance is foregrounded, an intrinsically
legal issue, and it is blamed on the privileging of personal interest over the
common good.
These “legalistic” concerns played out in the popular justice of the revolt
and have been noticed by several historians, notably Stephen Justice who
has argued specifically that rebels sought to empower themselves through
legal writing and documents.40 These rebels were keen to define themselves
as acting for the common good of the realm, and, in appropriating legal
forms, to claim that they were the true protectors of the community. They
were not attempting to subvert the law, but to remove those who had, to their
minds, subverted it. This was about community, conceived in a more socially
expansive sense than had been previously conceived of. The rebels were con-
testing the fact that a few men had taken it upon themselves to redefine law
and the community of the realm in narrow and self-serving terms. Although
the rebels were not highly educated men, it is surely relevant that this was a
period during which political theory regarding the common good was being
articulated in more sophisticated and more strident terms.41 Unlike, perhaps,
their Italian counterparts, the English rebels were not in a position to draw
upon complex Dominican thinking on the subject of the precise nature and
goal of the political community, but they were able to draw upon a common
discourse that claimed that the law was there for the good of the many and
that this was the true end of good governance.42
And what constituted the law in this period? This was the era of the com-
mon law, matured over the course of the thirteenth century,43 and the point
of the common law, or at least its rhetoric, was that this was a set of legal
practices designed to reinforce central authority precisely by representing
the interests and the customs of the community of the realm.
All the chronicles concur in describing the numerous attacks on property
by the rebels. But they also all concur in noting that the rebels rarely plun-
dered and stole—they just destroyed and confiscated. This was about account-
22 hannah skoda
removed all the prisoners and let them go where they would”;51 “they broke
open Newgate prison, and released all the prisoners”;52 “they opened up
prisons, releasing the prisoners, and then offering the iron chains of Newgate
in the church of the Friars Minor as well as breaking open the Marshalsea.”53
The breaking of prisons was a fairly typical gesture in late medieval revolts;
we find similar incidents, for example, in a revolt in 1307 in Abbeville in
northern France, or a revolt of 1311 in Saint Quentin, or again in Italy with the
Ciompi in 1278 or the rebels in Siena in 1355.54 It was clearly a powerful way of
contesting current structures of authority, since it visualized critiques of legal
corruption in spatial terms:55 the injustice of constraints and boundaries ap-
plied through law could be overturned. The rebels of 1381 went a stage further.
They not only contested the imprisonment of those who were victims of the
law, but equally focused their attentions on those on whom the law had been
unjustly lenient: justice and injustice could clearly cut both ways. Prisoners
whom they felt had been unfairly pardoned were lynched: “They dragged
Richard Lyons, a notable burgess, out of his house and executed him in the
street. Lyons had been convicted in one of Edward III’s Parliaments for seri-
ous fraud towards the king and queen as well as other lords and ladies of the
kingdom in his dealings with precious stones and other jewels. Accordingly
Parliament had sentenced him to perpetual imprisonment . . . afterwards
he was freed by favour but now he was killed.”56 The rebels were making
unambiguous statements of their dissatisfaction not with the law itself, but
with the way in which it had been too “flexibly” or corruptly administered.
Taking the law into their own hands, they sought to remind those in power
that, as they believed, its function was to protect the realm as a whole, and
its prerogative was everyone.
Most notoriously, the rebels took upon themselves the violence of the
law and lynched several notable figures. Even the most hostile chroniclers
are clear that they “never killed anyone except by beheading him”57—these
were clearly, in the minds of both the rebels and the observers, quasi-judicial
killings of those deemed to have transgressed and to deserve punishment.
The crime, according to the rebels, was treachery. Those they beheaded,
they accused of treachery, and, in some cases, mini-trials were conducted.
Sir Robert Bealknap, chief justice of the Common Bench, was told by the
commons that he was a traitor and they forced him to swear on the Bible
that he would never again hold such sessions nor act as a justice in such in-
quests. They “proposed to kill all the lawyers, jurors and royal servants they
could find.”58 Again, the targeting of lawyers did not spring from antipathy
to the law as such, but was rather explicitly articulated as defense of the
rightful order and the upholding of the law itself. Lawyers were deemed to
24 hannah skoda
represent legalism for its own sake, pettifogging, and the corrupt and greedy
extraction of money. Such figures were lampooned in popular literature with
growing frequency: Chaucer’s “man of law” is a case in point.59 As Hyams
has pointed out with respect to the Magna Carta of 1215, the great document
presented to their king by his dissatisfied barons at Runnymede, these rebels
sought the opportunity to speak to the king and to critique his policies and
his counselors, because they wanted more law, not less.60 And, whereas the
rhetoric of the common good was still fairly nascent in 1215, by 1381, more
law could explicitly be conceptualized as law exercised justly, systematically,
in the interests of the realm as a whole.
In Canterbury, the rebels apparently “summoned the mayor, bailiffs and
commons of the town and examined them as to whether they would swear
in good will to be faithful and loyal to King Richard and the loyal commons
of England or not.”61 Sudbury, Archbishop of Canterbury, was their highest
target, and although the chronicles do not quite concur on the sequence
of events and on the degree of violence (most being keen to demonize the
rebels as far as possible), the chronicle of Henry Knighton tells us that they
drew him out of the Tower of London, “without the use of any aggression or
force, sword or arrow but only by means of threatening words and disorderly
shouts.”62 Sudbury was then brutally murdered. In the eyes of the rebels,
this was an execution; in the eyes of government, it was clearly murder, a
crime for which the rebels paid later with their lives. Knighton is keen to
portray Sudbury and his colleagues as martyrs but cannot resist describing
the judicial appearance of proceedings: “they went freely to their deaths as if
they were murderers or thieves and deserved this fate.”63 There was nothing
secretive about these acts: the rebels informed the king that “they wanted
to kill traitors and his evil counsellors”:64 they were keen not just to dem-
onstrate their loyalty to the king (with whom they still sought an audience)
but to illustrate their credentials as the upholders of justice and law. This
use of quasi-judicial violence, and the explicit use of judicial motifs in order
to claim legitimacy for their actions and to emphasize their claims about
the nature of the law, again may be found in numerous other late medieval
revolts. During a revolt in Laon in northern France in 1295, the victims of
the rebels were stoned.65 This was not a contemporary judicial practice by
any means, but these were certainly gestures with judicial overtones, which
served rhetorically to visualize the rebels’ claims that they represented the
common good of the urban community in opposition to the corrupt local
mayor and his local aristocratic henchmen. Quasi-judicial executions were
integral to political conflict in early-fifteenth-century Tournai and served a
triple purpose: to dispose of enemies, and to symbolize both the inadequacy
Collective Violence and Popular Justice in the Later Middle Ages 25
per se.68 Some have been therefore tempted to read these ballads in Marxist
terms and as politically subversive polemics; this is problematic, but it is clear
that the poems aim to sustain and correct law. In stark contrast, many of the
real-life bandits resist such romanticization and inspired, instead, widespread
terror. The popularity of the Robin Hood and outlaw literature sprang not
from realism, or from admiration for real outlaws, but rather from its social
commentary on law. Real bandits seem to have had distinctly less elevated
aims and rather to be pursuing private interests in stark contrast to the rebels’
recurrent emphasis on the common good.
Accordingly, the use they made of judicial motifs was very different, in-
volving not just violent appropriation of these motifs, but a kind of topsy-
turvydom in their parodic use. These men (there is, to my knowledge, no
evidence of female bandits) were not using popular justice to sustain or
even restore the system, but rather to subvert it altogether for private, as
opposed to public, interest. The later Middle Ages in England are replete
with examples: famous gangs such as the Folvilles or the Coterels terrorized
local populations.69 They were particularly notorious in England, where the
combination of precociously centralized royal law, and a fragmenting polity,
proved a dangerous mixture.
For our case study, we turn now to the murder of a local Devon lawyer
named Nicholas Radford in 1455 by the men of the eldest son of the Earl of
Devon, Thomas Courtenay. Radford was a local lawyer of distinction and, by
all accounts, great wealth, who lived alone with his invalid wife. At the time
of his death, he was serving as justice of the peace and recorder of the city of
Exeter. He was also a member of Parliament in 1421 and 1435, and served in
what might be described as “central” law courts over the course of his career.
He stands then as a powerful symbol of the law. There are three surviving
accounts of his murder: a petition to Parliament by his cousin and executor,
the indictment of his murderers at sessions held at Exeter, and a letter to
John Paston written by another lawyer expressing his shock at the news.70
The remaining sources are clearly deeply prejudiced against the murderous
gang, but there are a sufficient variety of voices, from legal commentary to
the reaction of a family member, that we can be fairly sure of the details. Sir
Thomas Courtenay was an extremely violent man, already aligning himself
in the very early stages of the so-called Wars of the Roses. He had formed
a large private army, besieged Powderdam Castle and taken over the city of
Exeter.71 He had been involved in the battle of St. Albans in May 1455 on the
defeated Lancastrian side; the ensuing chaos, as the local historian G. H.
Radford put it, provided “an excellent opportunity for gratifying his private
enmities.”72 Oddly, Nicholas Radford was his brother’s godfather, so the mur-
Collective Violence and Popular Justice in the Later Middle Ages 27
the trial and of the punishment—is evoked and so greatly magnified that
its rationale is undermined and the reasonableness of law itself is thrown
into question.77
If these men chose to invoke legal motifs and to carry out a form of popular
justice, the point they were making was one essentially antipathetic to the
implementation and administration of law, namely that they wanted less of
it (when it suited them), and deemed centrally orchestrated law and order
detrimental to their private interests. This kind of popular “justice” responded
to a particular historical moment: it was precipitated both by growing legal-
ism of a centralized and royal nature and fatally compromised by a crown
unable to enforce even its own monopoly on power.
Conclusion
These three case studies have been chosen in order to demonstrate the contin-
gency of the logics underpinning the use of popular justice. The perpetrators
of collective violence in the later Middle Ages often drew upon a repertory of
judicial motifs in order to project a particular set of meanings to spectators.
In the case of popular justice undertaken by a community, this message was
often one of claiming to restore the true rule of law, unadulterated by corrup-
tion and misgovernance. In contrast, private gangs subverted and parodied
judicial motifs in order to pursue their own private interests, apparently
compromised and undermined by the force of royal law. And institutions,
like that of the abbey of Notre-Dame-des-Nonnains, used violent self-help
where they felt that official legal channels had failed to afford them the nec-
essary protection and redress.
These various forms of popular justice were given particular potency and
resonance by the transitional and fluid nature of law and violence in this
period. The boundaries between the two were still being contested, and own-
ership of their definitions was a matter of conflict and antagonism.
Notes
1. See, for example, Paul Dresch, “Outlawry, Exile, and Banishment: Reflections on
Community and Justice,” in Legalism: Community and Justice, eds. Fernanda Pirie and
Judith Scheele (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 97–124; Mark Ormrod, “Law
in the Landscape: Crime, Outlawry, and Regional Identity in Late Medieval England,”
in Anthony Musson, ed. Boundaries of the Law: Geography, Gender and Jurisdiction in
Medieval and Early Modern Europe (Aldershot, U.K.: Ashgate, 2005), 7–20.
2. See, for example, A. Musson, Medieval Law in Context: The Growth of Legal Con-
sciousness from Magna Carta to The Peasants’ Revolt (Manchester: Manchester University
Press, 2001).
30 hannah skoda
3. See, for example, on France, Frederic Cheyette, “Suum cuique tribuere,” French His-
torical Studies 6 (1969), 287–299; Joseph Strayer, The Reign of Philip the Fair (Princeton,
N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1980), 1ff.; Claude Gauvard, De Grace Especial: Crime,
état et société en France à la fin du Moyen Age (Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 1991);
Esther Cohen, The Crossroads of Justice. Law and Culture in Late Medieval France (Leiden:
Brill, 1993). On England, see Musson, Medieval Law in Context; Paul Brand, The Making
of the Common Law (London: Hambledon Press, 1992); Mark Ormrod and Anthony
Musson, The Evolution of English Justice: Law Politics and Society in the Fourteenth Century
(New York: Palgrave, 1998). On Italy, see Andrea Zorzi, “Giustizia criminale e criminalità
nell’Italia del tardo medioevo: studi e prospettive di ricerca,” Società e storia 11 (1989),
923–965.
4. More generally, see Trevor Dean, Crime in Medieval Europe, 1200–1550 (Harlow:
Longman, 2001).
5. For example, Claude Gauvard, Violence et ordre public au Moyen Age (Paris: Picard,
2005), 1ff.; Hannah Skoda, Medieval Violence: Physical Brutality in Northern France, c.
1270–1330 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012); Andrea Zorzi and William Connell,
Florentine Tuscany: Structures and Practices of Power (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2000); Dean, Crime in Medieval Europe.
6. This is one of the main arguments in my book, Medieval Violence (particularly
20–49). For an exploration of the intertwining of increasingly centralized law and com-
munity-based customary approaches, see Cohen, Crossroads of Justice, 15–26.
7. Gauvard, Violence et ordre public, 68–69.
8. Brand, Making of the Common Law, particularly 1–20.
9. Cheyette, “Suum cuique tribuere,” 288.
10. Zorzi, “Giustizia criminale,” 923–965.
11. Len Scales, The Shaping of German Identity: Authority and Crisis, 1245–1414 (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 53–97. The seminal text is Otto Brunner, Land
und Herrschaft: Grundfragen der territorialen Verfassungsgeschichte Südostdeutschlands im
Mittelalter (Baden-bei-Wien: Veröffentlichungen des Instituts für Geschichtsforschung
und Archivwissenschaft in Wien, 1939). Brunner argued that what he labeled “self-help”
by nobles engaging in private war and feuding was quasi-legitimate: there was room
for it within legal frameworks. He distinguished this “Selbsthilfe” from brigandage and
illegitimate coercion. His own political views sit uncomfortably with a historiographical
willingness to take his conclusions very seriously.
12. See Patrick Lantschner, The Logic of Political Conflict in Medieval Cities: Italy and
the Southern Low Countries, 1370–1440 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015); Samuel
Cohn Jr., Lust for Liberty: the Politics of Social Revolt in Medieval Europe, 1200–1425
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2008).
13. This point is made eloquently in Gervase Rosser, The Art of Solidarity in the Middle
Ages: Guilds in England 1250–1550 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 2–36.
14. A short history of the institution can be found in Patrick Geary, “Saint Helen of
Athyra and the Cathedral of Troyes in the Thirteenth Century,” Journal of Medieval and
Renaissance History (1977), 149–175; Penelope Johnson, Equal in Monastic Profession
(Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1994), 65–66, 77, 86–88.
Collective Violence and Popular Justice in the Later Middle Ages 31
15. Elizabeth Malinowski, Canon Law and Cloistered Women: Periculoso and Its Com-
mentators, 1298–1545 (Washington D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1997), 1–24.
16. Anthony Musson with Edward Powell, Crime, Law and Society in the Later Middle
Ages (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2009), 3:2, 77. The nuns at Troyes were
unusual, but not unique: the most famous episode occurred in 589–590 at Poitiers and
is recorded by Gregory of Tours, History of the Franks, trans. Lewis Thorpe (London:
Penguin, 1974), bk. 10: see M. Heinzelmann, Gregory of Tours: History and Society in the
Sixth Century (2001), esp. 72–75. Many thanks to Dr. Katharine Sykes and Dr. Malcolm
Vale for suggesting these examples.
17. The principal sources for the history of the Abbey of Notre-Dame-des-Nonnains
were collated in Abbé Charles Lalore, Documents sur l’abbaye de Notre-Dame aux non-
nains de Troyes (Aube: Vol. 38 of Mémoires de la Société Académique de l’Aube, 1874). The
documents are gathered from the Archives Départementales de l’Aube, and from a copy
of the relevant document made by the Benedictines and bound in MS Lat 11926 in the
Bibliothèque Nationale de France. The appeal to the pope is edited on pp. 94–95.
18. Ibid., 107.
19. Ibid., 108–109.
20. Ibid., 110.
21. Ibid., 113–114. I use the English spelling for the Pope’s name but resort to French
spelling when referring to the place and the saint: this is for the sake of comparability
with other scholarship.
22. Ibid., 120.
23. Ibid., 120–121.
24. Ibid., 123–124.
25. Ibid., 122.
26. Skoda, Medieval Violence, 46.
27. Lalore, Documents, 129.
28. On the 1200 incident in Paris, and the resulting papal statute of 1215, see Stephen
Ferruolo, The Origins of the University: The Schools of Paris and Their Critics (Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 1985), 4; G. Jehel and P. Racinet, Education et cultures dans
l’Occident chrétien du XIIe au XVe siècle (Paris: Editions du temps, 1998), 281. On the
St. Scholastica’s Day massacre in Oxford in 1355, see, for example, Pearl Kibre, Scholarly
Privileges in the Middle Ages: The Rights, Privileges and Immunities of Scholars and Uni-
versities at Bologna, Padua, Paris, and Oxford (Cambridge, Mass.: Medieval Academy of
America, 1962), 304–308; Gordon Leff, Paris and Oxford Universities in the Thirteenth and
Fourteenth Centuries: An Institutional and Intellectual History (New York: Wiley, 1968),
90–92; Alan Cobban, The Medieval English Universities: Oxford and Cambridge to c. 1500
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), 262–263.
29. Antoine Destemberg, “Morts violentes et lieux de mémoire: les réparations faites
à l’université de Paris à la fin du Moyen Age,” Traverse. Zeitschrift für Geschichte, Revue
d’histoire 2 (2008), 37–48.
30. Lalore, Documents, 139.
31. This document is published in full in A. Vallet de Viriville, Les Archives Historiques
du Département de l’Aube et de l’ancien diocèse de Troyes (Troyes: Bourquin, 1841), 404.
32 hannah skoda
32. Charles LaLore, ed., Cartulaire de Montier-la-Celle, Collection des principaux car-
tulaires du diocèse de Troyes 6 (Paris: Thorin, 1882), 319.
33. We might cite the canons of Laon as discussed in Hélène Millet, Les chanoines du
chapitre cathédral de Laon: 1272–1412 (Rome: Ecole française de Rome, 1982), 60–63.
34. For example, Rodney Hilton, Bondmen Made Free: Medieval Peasant Movements
and the English Rising of 1381 (London: Routledge, 1973), 152–154.
35. For example, Hilton, Bondmen Made Free, 150.
36. R. B. Dobson, The Peasants’ Revolt of 1381 (London: Macmillan, 1970), 23.
37. Mark Ormrod, Political Life in Medieval England 1300–1450 (Houndmills: Macmillan,
1995), 116–118.
38. The chronicle accounts referred to here can all be accessed in Dobson, Peasants’
Revolt. After providing the reference to the published edition of each individual chronicle,
I also include the page number in Dobson’s selections. Here, Thomas Walsingham, Histo-
ria Anglicana, edited by H. T. Riley, 2 vols (Rolls Series, 1863–1864), I, 285–288; Dobson,
Peasants’ Revolt, 132.
39. Jean Froissart, Chroniques, trans. Lord Berners, ed. G. C. Macaulay (London: Mac-
millan, 1895), 254; Dobson, Peasants’ Revolt, 141–142.
40. Stephen Justice, Writing and Rebellion: England in 1381 (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1994), 1–12.
41. See Susan Reynolds, Kingdoms and Communities in Western Europe, 900–1300
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), 1ff.; Matthew Kempshall, The Common Good in Late
Medieval Political Thought (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999), 13–14.
42. On northern Italian revolts in the fifteenth century, see Lantschner, Logic of Political
Conflict, 1–17.
43. See Brand, Making of the Common Law, 79–102.
44. Froissart, Chroniques, 254; Dobson, Peasants’ Revolt, 140.
45. C. Babington and J. Lumby, eds., Polychronicon Ranulphi Higden, 9 vols (Rolls Series,
1865–1886), IX, 2; Dobson, Peasants’ Revolt, 200.
46. Skoda, Medieval Violence, 186; Samuel Kline Cohn, Popular Protest in Late Medieval
Europe (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004), 114, 152, 217.
47. V. H. Galbraith, ed., Anonimalle Chronicle (Manchester: Manchester University
Press, 1927), 140; Dobson, Peasants’ Revolt, 155.
48. “Jurors Presentments,” in Dobson, Peasants’ Revolt, 47.
49. Thomas Walsingham, The Chronica Maiora, 1376–1422, trans. David Preest, ed.
James G. Clark (Woodbridge, U.K.: Boydell Press, 2005); Dobson, Peasants’ Revolt, 171.
50. Hilton, Bondmen Made Free, 227.
51. Galbraith, Anonimalle, 141; Dobson, Peasants’ Revolt, 156.
52. Galbraith, Anonimalle, 143; Dobson, Peasants’ Revolt, 158.
53. F. S. Haydon, ed., Eulogium Historiarum sive Temporis, 3 vols. (Rolls Series, 1858–
1863), III, 352; Dobson, Peasants’ Revolt, 206.
54. See Skoda, Medieval Violence, 159–192; Cohn, Popular Protest, 209, 114.
55. Guy Geltner has demonstrated that prisons were far more visible and centrally lo-
cated in the Middle Ages: The Medieval Prison: A Social History (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
University Press, 2014), 1–27.
56. Henry Knighton, Chronicon, ed. J. R. Lumby, 2 vols (Rolls Series, 1889–1895), II,
133; Dobson, Peasants’ Revolt, 183.
Collective Violence and Popular Justice in the Later Middle Ages 33
57. Knighton, Chronicon, II, 134; Dobson, Peasants’ Revolt, 185.
58. Galbraith, Anonimalle, 134; Dobson, Peasants’ Revolt, 125.
59. Geoffrey Chaucer, The Canterbury Tales: General Prologue, ll., ed. Larry Benson
(The Riverside Chaucer) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 3rd edition 2008), 321–322.
60. Paul Hyams, “Orality and Literacy in the Age of the Angevin Law Reforms,” in
Richard Kaeuper, ed., Law, Government and Justice: New Views on Medieval Constitu-
tionalism (Brill: Leiden, 2013), 27–72, 68.
61. Galbraith, Anonimalle, 136; Dobson, Peasants’ Revolt, 127.
62. Knighton, Chronicon, II, 133; Dobson, Peasants’ Revolt, 183.
63. Ibid.
64. Haydon, Eulogium, III, 352; Dobson, Peasants’ Revolt, 207.
65. See Skoda, Medieval Violence, 169–170.
66. See Lantschner, Logic of Political Conflict, 59.
67. Maurice Keen, The Outlaws of Medieval Legend (Toronto: University of Toronto
Press, 1961), 1–8.
68. Some useful reflections on the nature of these ballads may be found in Anthony
Musson with Edward Powell, trans. and ed., Crime, Law and Society in the Later Middle
Ages (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2009), 50, 62, 262.
69. See, for example, J. G. Bellamy, “The Coterel Gang: An Anatomy of a Band of
Fourteenth-Century Criminals,” English Historical Review 79 (1964): 698–717; Barbara
Hanawalt, “Fur-Collar Crime: The Pattern of Crime among the Fourteenth-Century
English Nobility,” Journal of Social History 8/4 (1975), 1–17; S. K. Walker, “Lordship and
Lawlessness in the Palatinate of Lancaster, 1370–1400,” Journal of British Studies 28/4
(1989), 325–348.
70. The petition is in The National Archives (henceforth TNA) SC 8/138/6864; the
indictment of his murderers is in TNA KB 9/16; the letter to John Paston is included in
N. Davis, ed., Paston Letters and Papers of the Fifteenth Century, 2 vols (Oxford: Claren-
don Press, 1971–1976), vol. 1, no. 257; these documents are listed in Musson with Powell,
Crime, 86. The incident is detailed in G. H. Radford, “Nicholas Radford, c. 1385–1455,”
Transactions of the Devonshire Association 35 (1903), 251–278, and “The Fight at Clyst in
1455,” Transactions of the Devonshire Association, 44 (1912), 252–265. This is also cited in
Musson with Powell, Crime, 86.
71. Radford, “The Fight,” 253.
72. Ibid., 257.
73. Ibid., 253–260.
74. The case is particularly striking, since Radford had previously been a loyal servant
of the Courtenays and had stewarded their estates and represented them at law.
75. TNA SC 8/138/6864: translations are from Musson with Powell, Crime, 87–90.
76. See Alexander Murray, Suicide in the Middle Ages. Volume I: The Violent against
Themselves (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 120–125.
77. For interesting comparative material on the spectacular nature of medieval legalism
and the rhetoric underlying this from a literary perspective, see Jodie Enders, The Medieval
Theater of Cruelty: Rhetoric, Memory, Violence (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998),
1ff. Incidentally, despite the pardons for the Radford murders in the 1450s, they were later
executed by the Yorkists (Thomas in 1461 and Henry in 1469).
2 Unofficial Justice and Community
in Rural Russia, 1856–1914
Stephen P. Frank
Almost daily the telegraph brings news about cases of vigilante
justice against thieves, robbers, hooligans, and other criminal
elements. . . . One might think that Russia has been brought
temporarily to the American prairie and that Lynch law has been
granted citizenship by us.
—The Jurist, August 7, 1905
Author: Larin-Kyösti
Language: Finnish
KULKURIN LAULUJA
Kirj.
I.
Lähtö.
Ulos maailmaan!
Kulkurin kannel.
Itkisit joskus illoin.
Mustalaistaikoja.
Suvisia suruja.
Keinulaulu.
Kulkijaneito.
Synnyinmaja.
Pilviä kaitsemassa.
Mustalaislaulu.
Elon kulku.
Keväisiä sointuja.
Ne pitkän matkan kulkijat.
Arpasilla.
Hän kulkee niinkuin kuningas.
Juomalaulu.
Maantiellä.
Maailman turulla.
Sua etsin.
Maailman-Matti.
Laivat ne seilaa.
Pahajärven pitäjäss.
Lemmen oksalla.
Majan ma tahtoisin rakentaa.
Voi, tahdotko rannalle tulla.
Villivarsat.
Houreissa.
Kirkon varjossa.
Ota se kaunis kannel taas.
Pois on mennyt laulajaneito.
Epätoivo.
Jouten.
Soitan pillillä.
Jääpylväät.
Eksyksissä.
Pakosalla.
Ristitiessä.
II.
Koskelle tulo.
Myllärin neito.
Limokujassa.
Häitä kuokkimassa.
Huumeessa.
Myllärin rengin laulu.
Hääpolska.
Unelmissa.
Pöytälaulu.
Hän riisti piiristä morsiamen.
Häistä palaaja.
III.
Silkkisiteissä.
Naamiosalissa.
Silmästä silmään.
Sinä olet kuin kiiltävä perhonen.
Voi, muistatko.
Itke ihana!
Ma tahdon heittää sen naamarin.
Aiheen haltija.
Kuin nuoren ruovon sun notkistan.
Keskellä karkeloa.
Sua suojaisin.
Narrin kannel.
Narrin lauluja.
Viuhkain liehuessa.
Voi, olisiko surua silmissäs.
Kuvastimen edessä.
Sinä aiot mun hyljätä.
Miksi viivyn?
IV.
Hyypiö.
Laululaaksossa.
Hämärän ääniä.
Paistaa se päivä kiville.
Pensas varjossa.
Satu.
Näky.
Ilokivellä.
Unen liepeillä.
Kuutamossa.
Kulkurin lankeemus.
Kulkurin virsi.
Äiti.
Unen unhola.
Tuutulaulu.
Astui tietä vanha vaari.
Kun maa pyörii.
Onnen tupa.
Kullan kahleissa.
Manan majoilta.
Maineen siivillä.
Oravan jäljillä.
Vieraalla maalla.
Tähtien lentäessä.
Kotimatkalla.
Tulo kotikylään.
Onnen ovella.
Rakkauden ha'ussa.
Kotona.
I.
Lähtö.
Äiti.
Kulkuripoika.
Äiti.
Kulkuripoika.
Äiti.
Poika.
Äiti.
Poika.
Äiti.
Hyvästi poikani!
Poika.
Hyvästi äitini!
Ulos maailmaan!
Kulkurin kannel.
Mustalaistaikoja.
Suvisia suruja.
Keinulaulu..
Kulkijaneito.
Ken olet sinä outo neitonen, sinä neito tumma, tuima, sun
silmäsi kaiho kaunis on ja kulkusi on niin huima?
Synnyinmaja.
Pilviä kaitsemassa..
Mustalaislaulu..
Elon kulku.
Keväisiä sointuja.
1.
2.
Ne etsijät ne ehtivät,
ne salasanojen hyräilijät
ne tulevat kaikilta teiltä.
Arpasilla.
Istu helkanurmelle ja nojaa sammalseinään, tuoss' on
kortta kymmenen ja sido nyt arpaheinää!
Ja aatoksista koottu on
sen nuori, suora kansa
ja päivä paistaa yllänsä
ja kultaa kiharansa.
Hän käy kuin käy vaan kuningas, ei huomaa arkilasta, voi,
köyhän narrikaapua, voi, köyhää kuningasta!
Juomalaulu.
Poika.
Tyttö.
Poika.
Tyttö.
Maaliman turulla.
Kadunkulmassa rumpali rummuttaa: "minä kuulutan kaikille
julki, mies — veitikka Iloksi kutsutaan —, on karannut
vankilatornistaan, johon pyöveli eilen sen sulki, se mies on
valkea-otsainen ja kiertää pitkin maita ja silmä sillä on sininen
ja punanen on sen paita!"
Sua etsin.
Maaliman-Matti.
Laivat ne seilaa.