Cognitive Illusions
Cognitive Illusions
Cognitive Illusions
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Cognitive illusions
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From magic to science
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Gustav Kuhn
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Magicians have developed powerful techniques to manipulate our perception
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and awareness. Many of these techniques share similarities with phenomena
typically investigated by psychologists and neuroscientists. Here a novel ap-
proach to the study of consciousness is proposed which utilizes the magician’s
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expertise to complement more traditional experimental laboratory based
research. It is argued that this approach offers new and exciting insights into
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age may exhibit specific cognitive impairments, which provide insights into the
cognitive function of the normal brain. The main interest here is not the lesion
itself, but what it can tell us about the “normal” mind. In contrast, rather than
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we learn to see (e.g. Chase and Simon, 1973). Perhaps the strongest and most
powerful examples of distortions in perception are those produced by magi-
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cians. Magicians have developed ways to distort our perception often resulting
in wonder and disbelief (Parris et al., 2009). Indeed distortions of awareness are
arguably the core definition of magic. Given this close link between magic and
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awareness, it is rather surprising that with few exceptions (e.g. Kuhn and Land,
2006; Kuhn and Tatler, 2005; Triplett, 1900) this relationship has been largely
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ignored by modern science. However, as I will argue here, and have elsewhere
(Kuhn et al., 2008), much can be learnt from the way in which magicians distort
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our perception. In this paper I will demonstrate how magic and science can be
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140 Gustav Kuhn
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combined to form a science of magic. In particular I will argue that this rather
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novel approach promises new and exciting avenues to discovering more about
human consciousness.
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Magicians are not unique in manipulating our awareness. Several “experts”
have learnt to play tricks with our mind. For example, film directors have devel-
oped wonderful techniques to distort our visual perception, many of which share
similarities with those used by magicians (Kinlsey, 1993). Pickpockets manipulate
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their victim’s tactile awareness, using techniques that parallel those of the con-
juror. Advertising agents manipulate our decisions, whilst first-rate sports men/
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women frequently deceive their opponents thorough deceptive movements (e.g.
Jackson et al., 2006). The only difference between the conjurer and these other ex-
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perts is that magicians have made distortions of awareness the centre of their art.
They have experimented with these principles for several millennia (Christopher,
2006) and have built up a solid tradition of distorting reality. The overlap between
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the conjurors’ principles of deception and those used by others demonstrates that
these techniques don’t merely apply to the limited context of the magic perfor-
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translating the conjuror’s language into that of the scientist (Kuhn et al., 2008;
Macknik et al., 2008). For example, conjurors frequently use misdirection to
prevent the audience from detecting their secrets. They define misdirection as a
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“deflection of attention for the purpose of disguise” (Sharpe, 1988). Visual scien-
tists on the other hand would describe misdirection as “attentional modulation of
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visual awareness”. Whilst the languages may differ, the underlying principles are
the same. Rather than processing all of the perceptual information, we only select
the information that is of importance, trough systematic orienting of attention.
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Whilst this attentional selection process is a very efficient way of dealing with vast
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by the change blindness phenomenon, whereby people often fail to see visually
salient changes to a scene when the change occurs with a visual disruption of the
scene. This demonstrates that whilst our conscious experience of the world is one
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of rich sensory detail, our conscious representation is far less complete (Rensink
et al., 1997). What we see is therefore largely determined by what we attend to,
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and this attentional orienting can either take the form of overt eye movements
(overt attention), or allocating additional processing resources in the absence of
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Once this link between magic and science has been established, we can take ad-
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vantage of the magician’s real world experience to investigate questions that are of
scientific interest. Many conjuring techniques, such as misdirection, are complex
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multi-layered principles, which often makes them rather difficult to investigate
scientifically. The second challenge involves finding ways of breaking down some
of these techniques so that they can be studied in a scientifically meaningful way.
Whilst observations and descriptions are important starting points, the true value
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of magic is only unleashed by incorporating conjuring techniques into the scien-
tific paradigm. The approach we propose involves identifying the principles used
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by magicians and then using a more reductionist approach to investigate it scien-
tifically so as to learn more about the underlying mechanism. These findings can
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then be used to guide the more traditional experimental research, thus closing the
gap between magic and science, and thus forming a science of magic.
Over the past five years we have developed several paradigms in which con-
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juring techniques are employed to manipulate people’s visual perception. I will
talk about two of these, namely misdirection and illusions.
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Misdirection
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Findlay, 2009; Kuhn and Tatler, 2005; Kuhn et al., 2009; Kuhn et al., 2008). In one
of these tricks a magician is seen making a lighter disappear, an effect that was
achieved by distracting people’s attention at the moment in which the lighter is
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dropped into the magician’s lap (Figure 1). The simplicity of this trick allows us to
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study misdirection in a scientifically meaning full way, by both identifying the fac-
tors that contribute to its effectiveness, as well as manipulating it experimentally.
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we ensured that the “to-be-concealed” event was fully visible, which means that
participants’ detection of the event (i.e. whether they saw the object drop) pro-
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manipulation at one particular point in time, we can use eye tracking techniques
142 Gustav Kuhn
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Figure 1 shows the sequence of events in the misdirection trick (Kuhn and Findlay,
2009). The effect in this magic trick was the disappearance of a lighter. In this trick the
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magician picks up a lighter with his left hand (a) and lights it (b). He then pretends to
take the flame with his right hand (d), and gradually moves it away from the hand that
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is holding the lighter (d, e). During this maneuver the magician is looking at the right
hand. Once it has reached the other side, he snaps his fingers, waves his hand and reveals
that it is empty (f). At the same time the lighter is dropped into the lap. The drop takes
place in full view. The magician now directs his gaze to his left hand (g), raises it, and
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snaps his fingers to reveal that his left hand is now also empty and the lighter has disap-
peared (h).
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to measure where people are looking through the entire presentation of the trick.
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The eye tracking data therefore provides us with an online measure of where par-
ticipants are attending overtly.
The misdirection paradigm allows us to study aspects of the magician’s misdi-
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a rather novel angle. For example, we have used this paradigm in “real world” situ-
ations in which participants faced a real person performing the misdirection trick
live (Kuhn and Tatler, 2005). Most of the participants who watched the misdirec-
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tion trick for the first time failed to see the dropping object even though the event
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took place right in front of their eyes. The misdirection employed by the magician
was, therefore, effective at preventing people from seeing the event. Importantly,
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participants did not miss the event due to low visibility. For one, when the trick
was repeated, most of the participants immediately saw the item being dropped,
thus demonstrating that it was indeed visible. Moreover, eye movement records
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revealed that participants’ ability to detect the drop was not related to where they
were looking at the moment of the drop, and therefore is not determined by the
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low level visual input received by the visual system. Misdirection is a powerful
demonstration of “inattentional blindness”, in which people who are engaged in
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attentionally demanding distractor tasks frequently fail to see unexpected yet ful-
ly visible events (Mack and Rock, 1998). However, instead of drawing attentional
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Magical insights into consciousness 143
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resources away through the use of an implicit distractor task, misdirection works
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by implicitly orienting attention away from the to-be-concealed event.
In later work we used pre-recoded versions of similar misdirection tricks
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which allowed us to control certain aspects of the stimuli more tightly. Whilst
these pre-recorded versions of the trick were still effective at misdirecting people’s
attention, its effectiveness was somewhat reduced, thus demonstrating that the
engagement in a one-to-one interaction plays an important part in attentional
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orientation (Kuhn et al., 2008). However, many of the participants still failed to
see the visibly dropping object even though it happened in front of their eyes.
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Rather surprisingly, again detection of the event was independent of where par-
ticipants were looking thus demonstrating a striking dissociation between covert
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and overt attention. Whilst it is clear that under experimental conditions overt
and covert attention can be dissociated, it is generally thought that under free
viewing the main purpose of covert attention is to plan the next saccade, and does
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not seem to serve any additional role (Findlay, 2005). However, the current results
demonstrate that covert attention is instrumental in determining what we see or
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miss. It illustrates how what we see is not necessarily determined by what we look
at, but by what we attend to covertly, and thus demonstrates the important role
that covert attention plays in visual awareness. The effectiveness of the misdirec-
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tion and the high consistency in eye movements also demonstrate that misdirec-
tion is very effective at orienting peoples’ overt and covert attention.
Given these strong and reliable effects we can then move to ask which aspect
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rather larger than those typically observed in more standard laboratory attention
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paradigms (e.g. Friesen and Kingstone, 1998), it suggests that we may be under-
estimating the importance that social cues play in the real world. This real world
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systematic orchestration of spatial attention, and thus relatively “low” level sen-
sory information. However, the magician’s concept of misdirection also relates to
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manipulating attention directed towards thoughts, and thus involves higher levels
of awareness. By identifying some of these principles, and developing paradigms
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analogous to the misdirection trick we may learn much more about the mecha-
nisms of this type of misdirection and gain new insights into consciousness.
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144 Gustav Kuhn
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Illusions
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Our conscious perception of the world requires a transformation of the light that
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falls onto the retina into recognizable objects. Our visual experience is largely de-
termined by the way in which these signals are interpreted by the brain (Gregory,
1968). However, there are certain situations that present specific difficulties in
interpreting this information which then give rise to systematic errors. Most of
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the time, these errors are unnoticed. However, when we do become aware of them
they are experienced as visual illusions. Systematic errors in perception can serve
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as clues as to how the brain generally solves perceptual problems. For example
much of what we have learnt about depth perception comes from investigating
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our susceptibility towards visual illusions (Gregory, 1968). Illusions lie at the heart
of magic. Many of the illusions employed by magicians do not necessarily differ
from the tricks the mind plays on us in everyday life. What makes them special are
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the theatrical ways in which they are presented. Moreover, magicians have learnt
to maximize their effectiveness by stage-managing the context in which they are
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viewed. The systematic investigation into these illusions and particularly the way
in which conjurors enhance their effectiveness could therefore provide valuable
insights into how the visual system solves some of these perceptual problems.
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An illusion that ticks all of the above boxes is the vanishing ball illusion (Kuhn
and Land, 2006; Triplett, 1900). In this illusion a magician is seen throwing a
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ball up and down a couple of times. On the final throw, he merely pretends to
throw the ball when instead it remains secretly concealed in his hand (Figure 2).
Rather surprisingly, people often claim to see a ball leave the magicians hand,
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even though it remained in the hand. This illusion is simple (i.e. merely involves
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someone pretending to throw a ball in the air), but very effective. Moreover, par-
ticipants’ experience of the illusion (i.e. whether they saw the imaginary ball or
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it move towards the top of the screen (Kuhn and Land, 2006). This finding dem-
onstrates how people’s perception of an event is based on the expected outcome,
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rather than the low level sensory input. Perceptual processes that are based on ex-
pectations or prediction have their advantage, as they allow for rapid action, which
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illusory percepts. Whilst illusory percepts during a magic show can be rather fun,
Magical insights into consciousness 145
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Figure 2 shows the sequence of events in the vanishing ball illusion. In the Social Cues
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Pro-illusion condition (top panel) the magician’s gaze followed the trajectory of the
imaginary ball (final pretend throw). In Social Cues Anti-Illusion condition the magi-
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cian looked at his hand, rather than the illusory trajectory. Figure taken from Kuhn et
al. (2008).
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their effects could have detrimental consequences in other situations such as driv-
ing. Thus understanding how we distinguish between illusion and reality may have
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that drive these expectations. Conjuring illusions often rely on manipulating ex-
pectations, and magicians have learnt to identify situations in which our percep-
tion is particularly sensitive to anticipation, and developed ways of manipulating
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these expectations. The magic literature tells us that social cues (i.e. where the ma-
gician is looking ) are particularly important in manipulating people’s attention as
well as intention (i.e. expected outcome) (Sharpe, 1988). Indeed Kuhn and Land
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(2006) showed that if the magician looked at his hand, rather than the trajectory of
the imaginary ball, the illusion’s effectiveness is greatly reduced, implying that the
social cues did indeed influence expectations, and therefore what was perceived.
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Moreover, unbeknown to the observers, the eye movement records revealed that
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participants strategically utilized the social cues to predict the final location of the
ball. Rather than merely keeping an eye on the ball, participants glanced at the face
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prior to fixating on the ball once in the air. The use of adaptive heuristics to solve
complex perceptual problems has also been reported in other everyday domains,
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such as driving (Land and Lee, 1994) or cricket (Land and McLeod, 2000). It is
indeed thought that vision in general involves a complex set of problem solving
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strategies, and the way in which magicians trick these processes may provide im-
portant insights into how these strategies work.
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be a shame to ignore this enormous expertise. Luckily the first steps towards
146 Gustav Kuhn
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recognizing the link between science and magic, as well as the development of
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paradigms that allow us to test these principles scientifically have been made
(Kuhn et al., 2008; Lamont and Wiseman, 1999; Macknik et al., 2008). Whilst
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the science of magic is indeed a rather novel approach, the concept of using real
world expertise to study aspects of the mind is far from new. For example, artists’
experimentation with perceptual effects has taught us much about the percep-
tion of colour and perspective (Pinna, 2008). Similarly magicians may enlighten
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us about aspects of attention and awareness. Conjurors are in no way unique, in
that they have expertise that could be of scientific interest. However, what makes
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them special is the dedication that they have given to understand and perfect
these perceptual distortions.
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Our aim as cognitive scientists is to explain and predict human behaviour in
the real world. In cognitive psychology as well as in neuroscience, the trend has
been to simplify the issue of investigation by making the experimental context
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both impoverished and controlled, so as to discover the causal relationships be-
tween one factor and the other. The idea that we can learn things about the mind
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by isolating it in a box and bombarding it with artificial stimuli has however been
challenged (Kingstone et al., 2008). In particular, the cognitive ethology frame-
work suggests “that it is by starting with real-world observations and individual
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variation that one is most likely to generate subsequent research questions for
investigation that may lead to general principles of cognition that have relevance
to naturally occurring phenomena” (Kingstone et al., 2008). According to this
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approach, “the initial job of the researcher is simply to observe, describe, and
measure what people do and experience in the situation of interest” (Kingstone et
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al., 2008). In many ways this “job” of observing, describing and measuring human
behaviour is something magicians have already done. By utilizing the experience
developed by magicians we may, therefore, shortcut this initial, often difficult task
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are incredibly robust and effective, which means that they are an ideal starting
point for scientific explorations. Moreover, many of the techniques and theories
are well documented which makes them an ideal starting point for scientific ex-
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ploration (e.g. Sharpe, 1988). Most of the principles used by magicians have been
tried and tested in front of live audiences, which means they are likely to hold
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up in the real world, which has major practical applications. Finally, this field
of research is still very much in its infancy, but by identifying and investigating
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some of the techniques used by magicians that may not necessarily be known to
the scientific community, this approach has the potential to result in discoveries
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of new principles.
Magical insights into consciousness 147
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Much of what we have learnt about consciousness comes from identifying
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the types of tricks that the mind plays on us. For example, our susceptibility to-
wards change blindness, and inattentional blindness has taught us about the lim-
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ited conscious visual representation. Similarly investigations into visual illusions
such as the hollow mask illusion are powerful demonstrations of how top down
information influences our conscious perception. The ease with which magicians
can distort our perception is a stark reminder of just how subjective our con-
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scious perception truly is. However, more importantly, by developing a science of
magic, which investigates these distortions scientifically, we may gain novel and
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important insights into some of the factors that are responsible for this conscious
representation.
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