A Framework For Using Magic To Study The Mind

HYPOTHESIS AND THEORY ARTICLE
published: 02 February 2015

doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2014.01508
A framework for using magic to study the mind

Ronald A. Rensink 1 * and Gustav Kuhn 2 *
1
Departments of Psychology and Computer Science, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, BC, Canada
2
Department of Psychology, Goldsmiths University of London, London, UK
Edited by: Over the centuries, magicians have developed extensive knowledge about the manipulation
Amir Raz, McGill University, Canada of the human mind—knowledge that has been largely ignored by psychology. It has recently
Reviewed by: been argued that this knowledge could help improve our understanding of human cognition
Ilan Goldberg, Montreal Neurological
Institute, Canada
and consciousness. But how might this be done? And how much could it ultimately
Peter Lamont, University of contribute to the exploration of the human mind? We propose here a framework outlining
Edinburgh, UK how knowledge about magic can be used to help us understand the human mind. Various
Max Maven, Independent, USA approaches—both old and new—are surveyed, in terms of four different levels. The first
Hidetaka Ishii, McGill University,
Canada
focuses on the methods in magic, using these to suggest new approaches to existing
*Correspondence:
issues in psychology. The second focuses on the effects that magic can produce, such
Ronald A. Rensink, Departments of as the sense of wonder induced by seeing an apparently impossible event. Third is the
Psychology and Computer Science, consideration of magic tricks—methods and effects together—as phenomena of scientific
University of British Columbia, interest in their own right. Finally, there is the organization of knowledge about magic into
2136 West Mall, Vancouver, BC V6T
1Z4, Canada
an informative whole, including the possibility of a science centered around the experience
e-mail: [email protected]; of wonder.
Gustav Kuhn, Department of
Keywords: attention, cognition, magic, methodology, neuroscience, visual perception, wonder
Psychology, Goldsmiths University of
London, New Cross, London SE14
6NW, UK
e-mail: [email protected]
Magic is among the oldest of the performing arts. Given its con- to memory distortions over time (Wiseman and Lamont, 1996;
cern with “creating illusions of the impossible” (Nelms, 1969/1996, Wiseman and Greening, 2005).
p. 1), its practitioners—magicians—have had considerable oppor- Magic has also been used to investigate higher-level processes,
tunity to explore various ways of manipulating people’s thoughts, such as belief formation and reasoning. For example, Benassi
beliefs and perceptual experiences. The tricks and illusions result- et al. (1980) showed that exposure to magic tricks (portrayed as
ing from this exploration are remarkably powerful, and have demonstrations of psychic powers) increased belief in psychic phe-
baffled audiences all over the world. They have also piqued the nomena (also see Mohr et al., 2014). Subbotsky (2010) used magic
interest of scientists, including some of the earliest pioneers in demonstrations to investigate magical thinking in both children
psychology (see Hyman, 1989; Lamont, 2010). For example, Binet and adults. Magic has even been used to explore the neural basis
(1894) studied the techniques of several eminent magicians via of causality (Parris et al., 2009), the origins of insightful thinking
the most careful measurements possible at that time. Among (Danek et al., 2013, 2014), and the nature of free will (Shalom et al.,
other things, he used the newly developed chronophotographic 2013).
gun to investigate sleight of hand, discovering several of the Yet despite all this, research involving magic has remained
perceptual mechanisms involved (see Lachapelle, 2008). Others, scattered, with little or no attempt to connect the results of var-
such as Triplett (1900), investigated specific magic illusions, and ious studies, compare methodologies, suggest which new lines
showed how just the suggestion of an action can trigger an illusory of research are promising, or determine how magic might best be
percept. used to study the human mind. It has recently been argued that it is
Although scientific interest in magic later waned, it never time for scientists and magicians to study magic in a more scientific
disappeared completely (see Hyman, 1989; Lamont and Wise- way, and develop connections to the other sciences involved with
man, 1999); indeed, a new wave of interest has recently arisen. perception and cognition (Kuhn et al., 2008; Macknik et al., 2008).
For instance, Kuhn and colleagues used eye tracking to explore But how might this be done? And to what extent could magic
our failure to see particular events during magic tricks (e.g., ultimately contribute to our exploration of the human mind?
Kuhn and Tatler, 2005; Kuhn et al., 2009). Others investigated In this paper we propose a framework that describes many of
how misdirection (e.g., curved motion) can result in oculomo- the approaches that have been—or could be—taken to use magic
tor behaviors that alter perception (Otero-Millan et al., 2011). to investigate human perception and cognition. This framework
Tracking of magicians’ eyes has revealed how social cues can drive organizes these approaches into four different levels, ordered by
our attention and perception (Kuhn et al., 2009; Cui et al., 2011). the complexity of the issues involved. The first concerns adaptation
Additionally, investigations into the Indian rope trick have shown of traditional magic techniques to help investigate current research
how memories of apparently impossible events can be related issues. The second involves the nature of those effects that magic
www.frontiersin.org February 2015 | Volume 5 | Article 1508 | 1

Rensink and Kuhn Using magic to study the mind
is uniquely suited for, such as the sense of wonder induced by that this switch wasn’t noticed; participants then defended their
an apparently impossible event. The third considers magic tricks “choice” by confabulating reasons why the switched object was
as phenomena of scientific interest in their own right. The final superior to the originally selected one. The success of this approach
level concerns the possibility of larger-scale patterns among magic relied on the conviction of the participants that the object could
tricks. We show that this framework cannot only collect and orga- not have changed. While conventional techniques could have used
nize virtually all the work to date that has used magic to study images of objects on a computer screen, magic tricks allowed this
the human mind, but also points toward a coherent program of to be done with physical objects, creating a much stronger belief
research that could lead to interesting new avenues of research. that the object did not change, likely because there are far fewer
ways for this to have occurred.
APPLICATION OF MAGIC TECHNIQUES
Magicians have experimented with distorting reality for millen- Visual attention
nia (see Christopher and Christopher, 2006). They are not the Another important aspect of magic is the control of visual atten-
only ones who do so: film directors, for instance, can manip- tion, which determines what an observer consciously sees (Kuhn
ulate our sense of time and space in ways that are often quite et al., 2008, 2014; Rensink, 2010, 2015). Various methods can be
similar (Kinsley, 1993), and pickpockets can manipulate their vic- used for this. For instance, Kuhn et al. (2009) manipulated the
tim’s tactile awareness using techniques that parallel those of the direction of the magician’s gaze, influencing what participants saw.
conjuror. Such convergences suggest that many of the techniques Another study found that individuals with autism were slower to
involved rely on perceptual and cognitive effects that are quite fixate the face of the magician and less likely to follow gaze, sug-
general. gesting that they were less efficient at using social cues (Kuhn
Two aspects of a magic trick are of central importance. The et al., 2010). In both examples, magic provided a natural context
first is the effect—the phenomena consciously experienced by the in which to study these issues, without sacrificing any experimental
spectator (e.g., seeing a deck of cards riffled by a magician; seeing control.
a chosen card emerge from the magician’s pocket). The second is Many magic tricks use attentional misdirection to prevent an
the method—the manipulations used by the magician to achieve observer from detecting a visually salient event. This can be har-
the effect (e.g., the particular way the cards are riffled; the placing nessed as well. For example, misdirection prevented participants
of the card in the pocket ahead of time). In general, any effect from noticing a magician dropping a lighter onto his lap (Kuhn
can usually be produced by several different methods; conversely, et al., 2008). The probability of noticing this was a natural mea-
any method can help create different effects (see, e.g., Tarbell, sure of the effectiveness of the misdirection, allowing researchers
1927/1971). Importantly, if a magic trick is to work, its method to determine the effectiveness of different misdirection principles
must be powerful enough to fool virtually an entire audience. in controlling attention. (For a full review see Kuhn and Martinez,
As such, these methods—and their associated effects—could be 2012).
harnessed to empirically investigate issues in perception, cogni- Although several studies have investigated attentional control,
tion, and other aspects of the human mind. Their applications only a small fraction of its potential has been explored to date.
can be readily grouped according to the perceptual and cognitive For example, researchers have largely ignored the influence of
mechanisms involved. linguistic cues, although these can be readily studied (Teszka
et al., 2010). Misdirection principles relating to body language
PERCEPTION and gesture likewise go beyond the issues generally investigated
Object constancy at present. Magicians also misdirect attention by using humor to
Developmental psychologists have long depended on magic meth- create periods of attentional relaxation (e.g., Ortiz, 1994), another
ods for conjuring—making objects seem to disappear and reap- phenomenon apparently not yet investigated.
pear. For example, in the violation-of-expectation paradigm, the The experience of magicians shows that attention can also be
researcher may cover an object with a barrier, and then remove it controlled by factors at even higher levels of processing (Sharpe,
to reveal that the object has disappeared; the assumption is that if 1988; Kuhn and Tatler, 2011; Kuhn and Martinez, 2012; Kuhn
infants have a sense of object constancy (i.e., objects continue to et al., 2014). For example, the principle of naturalness states that
exist when out of sight), they should be surprised by the appar- people are less suspicious of natural than unnatural actions, and
ently impossible event. This paradigm has been used to investigate so take less notice of the former (Sharpe, 1988). People likewise
infants’ understanding of the physical world in general, ranging pay less attention to actions that are justified. Phenomena such as
from the idea that objects cannot occupy the same space (pene- these are likely worth studying in a more rigorous way.
tration effect) to the concept that stable objects need a support
of some kind (see Baillargeon, 1994). Related tricks have similarly Expectation in vision
been used to duplicate objects, allowing researchers to pretend Although attention is an important factor governing what we
they had a magical photocopy machine (Hood and Bloom, 2008). consciously see, it is not the only one; another is expectation
Such techniques have also been used to investigate cognition (e.g., Braun, 2001). This stems from the fact that much of
in adults. For example, in a study on choice blindness (Johansson perception must anticipate what will happen in the immediate
et al., 2005; Hall et al., 2010), participants were shown a pair of future (Hawkins and Blakeslee, 2004), as well as compensate for
objects and asked to select the one they preferred. The selected processing delays (Cavanagh, 1997). Our conscious experience
object was then switched for the other one using a magic trick, so likely reflects the expectations created by these predictions.
Frontiers in Psychology | Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology February 2015 | Volume 5 | Article 1508 | 2
The importance of expectation has been known to magi- Misdirection in the Vanishing Ball creates a hypothesis differing
cians for years. For example, in “The Vanishing Ball” (Figure 1), considerably from reality. It can likewise induce compelling—but
a ball seemingly vanishes while being thrown upward by the untrue—explanations at higher levels (Lamont, 2013). Several
magician. This effect relies on the expectation that the ball interesting issues could be explored here. For example, why
actually is thrown upward (see, e.g., Triplett, 1900; Kuhn is a given explanation initially accepted over others that seem
and Land, 2006); if this expectation exists, the observer will equally suitable? What counts as adequate evidence? Could several
consciously experience the ball, even though no visual stim- hypotheses be considered at the same time? Such methods might
uli exist. Interestingly, the experience of the ball disappears also help us understand phenomena such as confirmation bias, in
while attention is being given to the illusory ball, indicat- which evidence supporting existing beliefs is favored in some way
ing that attention alone cannot keep the underlying perceptual (Nickerson, 1998).
structures active. The methods used to create such vanishes
could likely be adapted to explore these matters further—e.g., Memory
articulating the role played by expectation in visual experi- Conjurors often use suggestion to manipulate the spectator’s
ence, or perhaps mapping out the nature of the expectations memories of a performance. A striking example of this can be
themselves. found in eyewitness reports of the Indian rope trick, in which
a magician levitates a long piece of rope, which an assistant
Visual illusions then climbs. It is extremely unlikely that this trick was ever per-
Magic tricks often rely on illusions of various kinds (e.g., Sharpe, formed the way it is reported; instead, it appears to be a result
1985). Many of these are based on well-known mechanisms, such of false memories (Wiseman and Lamont, 1996). More gener-
as Gestalt laws of grouping, which can enable items to “disappear” ally, memory distortions can prevent observers from recollecting
via incorporation into larger-scale structures (Barnhart, 2010). a true sequence of events, and thus, from discovering the method
However, some tricks use sophisticated methods that are not as behind an effect. This can be done in several ways: subtle details
well known. For instance, the techniques used in Pepper’s ghost could be altered (e.g., forgetting or falsely remembering details
illusion can make an object appear and disappear in full view of that never took place), or the effect itself may be exaggerated
the spectator, or even seem to change into something else entirely (e.g., stating that five rather than three lemons appeared under
(Christopher and Christopher, 2006). Such methods could be the the cup).
basis for new kinds of investigation into visual perception. Wiseman and Greening (2005) investigated how recollection
of an event could be influenced by such suggestions. Partici-
COGNITION pants watched a video of a magician performing a psychoki-
Hypothesis formation netic key-bending trick. After the key-bending was completed
A critical element of any magic trick is misdirection—manipulating and the bent key placed on the table, half the participants
the spectator away from the cause of the effect (e.g., Hugard, 1960; were given an additional suggestion implying that the key
de Ascanio, 1964; Wonder and Minch, 1996; Crone, 1999; Kuhn was still bending. Participants who received this suggestion
and Martinez, 2012; Kuhn et al., 2014). This concept is a broad were more likely to report having seen the key bend on the
one, in that many kinds of mechanisms in the human mind are table.
involved in making sense of incoming information. At the level These kinds of manipulations are extremely powerful; con-
of perception, misdirection often takes the form of attentional trolled investigation based upon them could therefore shed
control (see Perception). But misdirection also applies to higher- interesting new light on the mechanisms underlying memory.
level mechanisms, such as those enabling our understanding or Among other things, they may reveal interesting individual differ-
memory of a situation (see Kuhn et al., 2014). Factors such as ences by which memory distortions occur. As such, they may also
pre-existing knowledge and assumptions clearly play a role in this. have important practical applications—for example, highlighting
Misdirection could help investigate how such factors interact. limitations in the reliability of eyewitness testimonies.
FIGURE 1 | The Vanishing Ball: (A) The magician is holding a small ball. while, he looks up, following the expected trajectory of the ball. The ball is
(B–E) He throws the ball in the air twice, following its trajectory with his gaze. typically seen as traveling upward and then vanishing. (G) The magician
(F) He pretends to throw the ball, but actually retains it in his hand; mean- pretends that both hands are empty. Figure from Friebertshauser et al. (2014).

Problem solving Motor skills

Although magicians often go to great lengths to prevent people Skilled magicians spend hours practicing methods such as sleight
from discovering a method, this still happens on occasion. When of hand (Rissanen et al., 2013, 2014). This has much in com-
it does, the trick fails. This is often accompanied by an Aha experi- mon with practicing an instrument: countless hours are devoted
ence, a strong feeling that a solution has been found, along with a to rehearsing particular movement patterns. Much of what we
certainty that this solution is correct. This is an example of insight know about skill acquisition is obtained from studying expertise
(Sternberg and Davidson, 1995; Bowden et al., 2005). in domains ranging from sports to chess (Didierjean and Gobet,
Insightful problem solving has typically been investigated 2008). The particular dexterity and motor skills needed for magic
using verbal problems or simple puzzles (Knoblich et al., 1999). would be a natural addition to this list; since these skills differ
However, such tasks are sometimes considered overly restricted from those of other kinds of expert, the results would likely be of
(MacGregor and Cunningham, 2008). A possible way around interest.
this was proposed by Danek et al. (2013, 2014), who developed For example, Cavina-Pratesi et al. (2011) investigated pan-
a battery of magic tricks for which the method could be dis- tomime movements of magicians. While normal people are
covered relatively easily. Participants watched videos of these generally quite poor at faking grasping, the fake movements of
tricks and tried to discover how they were done. Correct solu- magicians were indistinguishable from real ones, suggesting that
tions were accompanied by an Aha experience almost 40% of extensive practice results in different visuomotor—and possibly
the time, suggesting they were found through insightful problem even visuospatial—mechanisms. Another useful skill is control
solving. of hand-eye co-ordination. In everyday life we tend to look
Danek et al. (2013, 2014) argue that this approach offers sev- at whatever we are manipulating (Hayhoe et al., 2003; Land,
eral advantages over traditional ones (see also Demacheva et al., 2006). But because attentional misdirection often depends on the
2012). Among other things, they find that participants in their active manipulation of gaze (Kuhn and Land, 2006; Kuhn et al.,
experiments are highly motivated to find the correct solution— 2009), magicians must learn to decouple eyes and actions. An
once most people have observed a magic trick, they strongly interesting issue is the extent to which such decoupling can be
wish to know how it was done. This motivation may be due to achieved.
the experience of a phenomenon violating expectations about More generally, it would be interesting to explore the motor
how the world works (e.g., seeing an object suddenly vanish), skills of magicians in the same way that skills are studied in
something not characteristic of verbal material or puzzles. It other domains, such as sports (Land and McLeod, 2000) or music
would be interesting to see whether this is also true outside (Furneaux and Land, 1999). Since magicians learn their skills
the lab; according to Ortiz (1994), magic and puzzle-solving in a variety of ways (books, videos, personal training), there is
differ precisely along the dimension of emotional engagement, also potential in examining how the style of learning affects skill
regardless of location. It would also be interesting to see if the development. To date, however, surprisingly few researchers have
attitudes of magicians to puzzle-solving are similar to those of utilized this highly specialized and potentially valuable population.
non-magicians.
Social aspects of expertise
OTHER In a related vein, it may also be worth using magicians to inves-
Agency and free will tigate the social aspects of the development of expertise. Most
We generally feel we have control over the decisions and choices domains—such as sports or music—have formal educational
we make. But the extent to which we actually control our resources in which expertise is developed. Magic is unusual in
behavior has been heavily debated. Studies have shown that that there are few formal ways in which it can be learnt (i.e.,
behavior can be influenced by subliminal (unseen) cues (e.g., few formal magic schools). Although the advent of social media
Lau and Passingham, 2007). But while such findings are reli- has changed things to some extent, magicians are still generally
able, the effects tend to be small, and so they are often reluctant to share their secrets with non-magicians, creating addi-
discounted. tional challenges. However, Rissanen et al. (2013) interviewed over
Meanwhile, influencing choice without the awareness of the a hundred professional magicians about the social network within
influence—an effect known as forcing—is a major part of conjur- which this expertise develops; results showed an interesting set
ing (Sharpe, 1988). For example, a magician may ask you to select of informal, yet intricate master–student relationships. Thus, the
a card. Although you may feel that your selection was a free one study of expertise in magic could provide a useful way to explore
(i.e., a one in 52 chance of selecting that particular card), it was in how specialized and secretive knowledge is shared1 .
fact largely predetermined (see, e.g., Kuhn et al., 2008).
In contrast to the relatively small effects created by subliminal Magic and therapy
cues, effects due to forcing can be quite large. For instance, Olson In recent years there has been considerable interest in using magic
et al. (2013) and Shalom et al. (2013) used a popular forcing tech- techniques as therapeutic tools (see Harte and Spencer, 2014). For
nique based on the duration the cards are shown. Results showed
1 There is an interesting parallel with the scientific community, which is uses a similar
that the choice of card could be strongly affected, even when partic-
mentoring system to train new practitioners, and which—at least in its phases prior
ipants were unaware of the manipulation. These effects are large
to publication—often maintains a degree of secrecy. Both communities also honor
enough to potentially have applications in the real world (e.g., members who make significant contributions (often after years of work), and look
advertising). down upon members who steal ideas.
example, most traditional therapies for children with hemiplegic an apparently impossible event actually occurred but not believe
cerebral palsy require repetitive and laborious actions, reducing the explanation offered for it. It is also worth mentioning that
compliance. But because children are keenly interested in learn- some magicians consider a separation to exist between intellectual
ing magic tricks, therapeutic approaches involving the learning of and emotional belief when seemingly impossible phenomena are
sleight of hand result in significantly improved motor skills (Green encountered (e.g., Ortiz, 1994).
et al., 2013). Magic has likewise been used as a therapeutic tool in The results of such studies may have important clinical impli-
pediatric counseling (Bowman, 1986), mental health (Lyons and cations. For example, correlations appear to exist between magical
Menolotto, 1990), psychotherapy (Moskowitz, 1973), and den- thinking and obsessive-compulsive behavior (Bolton et al., 2002;
tistry (Peretz and Gluck, 2005). A better scientific understanding Evans et al., 2002). And schizophrenic patients similarly appear
of magic techniques might also help develop therapeutic tools in to engage in a greater amount of magical thinking (Tissot and
many other domains (e.g., social phobias, autism). Burnand, 1980).
NATURE OF MAGIC EFFECTS THE EXPERIENCE OF WONDER

Another set of approaches focuses not on the use of magic to A central part of magic is the experience of wonder stemming
study other phenomena, but on the nature of the magic effects from perceiving an event that is apparently impossible. Such phe-
themselves. Many effects can be produced only—or at least, far nomena can lead to humor, amazement, and surprise; they can
more effectively—via magic; as such, these could lead to issues even generate a sense of the laws of physics or logic being defied.
of various kinds. Since these effects often push our perceptual Experiential states of this kind are difficult or even impossible to
and cognitive processes to their limits, the results could be highly create in any other way.
illuminating. It may be worth emphasizing that a magical experience does
not occur simply from everyday reality being distorted. In a film,
MAGICAL THINKING for example, a superhero can appear to fly across the sky. But
An important part of magic is that its effects appear inexplica- when watching the film an explanation is readily available: special
ble; indeed, magic is sometimes defined as “creating illusions effects. Thus, although such effects are interesting, they are not
of the impossible” (Nelms, 1969/1996, p. 1). Such inexplicabil- inexplicable2 . Indeed, if the spectator has an explanation for a
ity could help us understand various aspects of cognition, such trick—regardless of whether this explanation is true or not—the
as the formation of belief systems. Whereas adults are generally sense of wonder diminishes to some extent. Seeing a good magic
skeptical, children tend to have a rich fantasy life with many magi- trick creates a dilemma, a conflict between what the spectator
cal elements—e.g., a belief in supernatural beings (Rosengren and thinks of as possible and the event that has been experienced. The
Hickling, 1994). Such magical thinking is thought to play an impor- more convinced the spectator is that the event cannot happen, the
tant role in the development of cognition, in which“precausal”and more powerful the effect, and the stronger the sense of wonder.
magical explanations of the world are gradually replaced by causal Even if the observer does not believe in magic, there is still a split
ones (Piaget, 1927; Laurendeau and Pinard, 1962). second in which reality is suspended, and wonder exists.
Although work on this issue has traditionally been based Experiential states such as wonder likely relate to our ability
on the spontaneous explanation of everyday events, Subbotsky to distinguish between the possible and the impossible; this in
(2010) used a “magical box” that allowed the experimenter— turn may relate to how we learn to understand reality. Parris et al.
unbeknownst to the observer—to switch objects (e.g., a stamp (2009) had participants watch magic tricks while their brain activi-
becoming a driver’s license). Most older children deny that magic ties were measured using fMRI. The areas activated were similar to
can happen in the real world. However, when presented with the those activated when experiencing impossible events such as viola-
magical box they were just as likely to use magical as well as physical tions in causality. Given that the failure to recognize the impossible
explanations (Subbotsky, 1997). is a likely foundation of psychotic disorders such as schizophrenia,
Most adults likewise deny the existence of real magic (Zusne and such results might also lead to insights into the neurobiology of
Jones, 1982). However, one study presented adults with a magical psychotic experiences.
box into which the experimenter placed a plastic card; after cast- Another potentially important contribution involves individ-
ing a spell, the card was shown to have become badly scratched. ual differences. Although magic is a universal art form, responses
Participants did not believe the scratches were caused by the spell. to it vary considerably. Some find it thrilling and exciting; oth-
However, when asked to put their own hand in the device, most ers, irritating or even terrifying. Some are highly susceptible to
asked the experimenter not to cast the spell (Subbotsky, 2001). magic; others, highly resistant. Individual differences exist in mag-
In another study, simple conjuring tricks portrayed as a demon- ical thinking (Subbotsky, 2004; Subbotsky and Quinteros, 2002),
stration of genuine psychic ability were found to enhance people’s and it would be worth exploring whether similar differences exist
beliefs in the paranormal (Mohr et al., 2014; see also Benassi et al., in regards to other aspects of magic; they might reveal interesting
1980). Such experiments are wonderful examples of how magic personality traits, or cognitive or perceptual styles. For example,
tricks can help study the formation of beliefs, and possibly super- Kuhn et al. (2010) found that individuals with autism were more
stitions. Indeed, such studies might even help distinguish between
2 The earliest audiences of the cinema often reported feelings of astonishment and
different kinds (or levels) of believability. For example, Lam-
wonder, similar to those experienced in magic, likely because no explanation was
ont (2013) showed that people can believe in some apparently readily available for the amazing transformations they saw (Gunning, 1989). As
impossible things while not believing in others, or believe that audiences began to understand the mechanisms involved, such reports vanished.

susceptible to the Vanishing Ball illusion, and had more problems viewing the sequence). The second component involves seeing
in using gaze cues to allocate attention quickly enough to partic- external reality align with the spectator’s choice—what might
ular locations. Another interesting possibility is that—given the be called an alignment effect—followed by the sense of wonder
association of wonder with a child-like state of mind—a person’s evoked by that alignment. Each component might be consid-
childhood may affect the extent to which they experience wonder ered as a minimal magic phenomenon. Indeed, such components
in a magic performance. might often be better candidates for investigation that complete
Finally, there is the possibility of better understanding wonder tricks.
itself. Are different types of wonder created by different kinds of Decomposition simplifies analysis, and allows effort to be
tricks? (e.g., viewing an apparent violation of object constancy vs. focused on those phenomena of greatest interest. But finding an
a mind-reading trick.) Is the sense of wonder created by an appar- appropriate decomposition is something of an art, requiring a
ently inexplicable event comparable to that created by viewing a “feel” for the matter at hand. The knowledge and experience of
beautiful natural vista? All of these are interesting and important magicians would therefore be of great assistance here.
directions for future research.
ABSTRACTION
INVESTIGATION OF MAGIC TRICKS For a magician, an adequate description of a trick must con-
Although the two main aspects of magic tricks—methods and tain enough detail about the method to enable its effect to
effects—are individually useful for studying the human mind, be reproduced. Ideally, such a concrete description would also
additional insights can sometimes be obtained by considering be enough to distinguish it from others, and give some idea
them together—i.e., considering magic tricks as objects of sci- about the particular circumstances—including theatrical setup—
entific investigation in their own right. Any given trick involves under which it is most effective. However, controlled inves-
various perceptual and cognitive mechanisms, in a context that tigation requires a version of the trick less concerned with
includes factors such as the emotions of the spectator and the per- the circumstances of a particular performance, and more with
sonality exhibited by the magician (see, e.g., Fitzkee, 1943/1988; the general factors that influence the observer’s perceptual and
Ortiz, 1994). Its study—usually in the form of a controlled cognitive mechanisms. For such an abstract trick (or compo-
experiment—therefore cuts across interesting issues in an inter- nent), the effect must be complex enough to still be interesting,
esting way. When controlled appropriately, such studies can while simple enough to allow behavior to be mapped out and
rigorously establish that an effect exists (e.g., that forcing works explanations tested in a rigorous way. Interestingly, studies by
under a given set of conditions) or that particular properties of the magicians into principles of magic also involve considerable
performance are relevant (and to what extent). With a bit of luck, abstraction (e.g., de Ascanio, 1964; Sharpe, 1988); this would
these may even enable the underlying mechanisms to be mapped be another natural point of connection between scientists and
out. magicians.
To see how abstraction might proceed, consider the forcing
DECOMPOSITION component of the Materializing Card. When a magician does this,
To explain a particular trick, magicians typically use informal prin- various factors are at play, including the particular cards used, the
ciples of various kinds (e.g., Sharpe, 1988; Maskelyne and Devant, story told, and the physical characteristics of the magician’s hands.
1911/1992; Lamont and Wiseman, 1999). But more rigorous forms But by focusing, say, only on the duration the cards are shown
of investigation are also possible. Since a given magic trick has only and their visibility, other details can be discarded, or at least made
one effect and one method, it is possible to focus on their interac- irrelevant. The result is a simpler, more abstract method (or pro-
tion with some hope that relatively few mechanisms are involved. cedure) involving just a few key basefactors that can be controlled
In addition, it is often possible to focus on just one component of in a straightforward way (Olson et al., 2013).
a trick, and to simplify it so as to reduce the number of factors Ideally, the description of a procedure would include not
involved. only the key factors, but also a specification of how their val-
Decomposing a phenomenon of interest into simpler parts ues influence the strength of the effect. Mapping out such a
is an important part of scientific investigation. To see how this specification would of course take work, but could be done in
might proceed for a magic trick, consider what will be called principle. For example, each of the 52 playing cards commonly
here “The Materializing Card,” a variation of a commonly used used in magic tricks has been carefully measured in terms of
trick based on forcing (Erdnase, 1902/1995). Here, the specta- properties such as visibility, memorability, and likeability (Olson
tor is shown a deck of cards riffled quickly in front of them; et al., 2012). Subsequent studies on forcing, say, could deter-
they are asked to name a card as these cards flip by, after which mine whether or not these properties capture all the relevant
the magician produces this card from a pocket, amazing the attributes of a card, and how the value of each property (e.g., the
spectator (and the rest of the audience). This trick can there- level of visibility of the target card) affects the degree of forcing
fore be decomposed into a sequence of components—seeing found.
the card riffle and having a particular card come to mind, fol- Careful—and often quantitative—descriptive techniques were
lowed by seeing it in the magician’s pocket and experiencing essential to the development of a scientific approach to areas
a feeling of wonder. The first of these involves issues familiar such as chemistry (Dear, 2006, chap. 3). Similar considerations
to researchers in vision science (the actual seeing of the rif- may apply here. For instance, the careful measurement of per-
fle), but also the forcing of a particular target card (caused by ceptual and cognitive characteristics of cards resulted not only
in groupings that were known to magicians, but also in some in terms of the hardware used. Such reduction is rarely a single-
that were not (Olson et al., 2012). Careful measurement based on step endeavor. An important step—and worthwhile goal in its own
abstract tricks has likewise revealed previously unknown factors right—is redescription: establishing a non-causal link between a
influencing susceptibility to the Vanishing Ball illusion (Triplett, given trick and a set of neural mechanisms (i.e., neural corre-
1900; Kuhn and Land, 2006), and the inability to perceive rotary lates). For example, Parris et al. (2009) investigated the neural
motion in the paddle move (Hergovich et al., 2011). basis of seeing violations of causality in a magic effect. Here, cir-
Finally, it may be worth pointing out that the abstract nature cuits in the left dorso-lateral prefrontal and left anterior cingulate
of a procedure provides an important middle way to connect the cortices were strongly activated, consistent with previous findings
study of magic with its practice. The particular details of a perfor- that these structures are recruited in situations involving cogni-
mance are not critical for scientific purposes: what is important are tive conflict. A new discovery was that the activations associated
the key factors manipulated, not the particular ways they are con- with the violations were located in the left hemisphere, point-
trolled. A practitioner’s technique can therefore inform scientific ing to that hemisphere’s role in perceiving complex actions and
study while remaining secret, just as knowledge about an indus- events.
trial process can be published in a useful abstract form (a patent, Although such results are important, it should be noted that the
say) while hiding the proprietary details about its operation. finding of neural mechanisms is only part of a much larger enter-
prise. It has been argued that “the perception of magic tricks will
EXPLANATION be best understood from a neurobiological perspective” (Macknik
As in the case of other phenomena involving perception or cogni- and Martinez-Condé, 2009, p. 241). In this view, a trick must be
tion, the explanation of a magic trick can be sought at three distinct explained primarily in terms of neural mechanisms: psycholog-
levels of analysis: (a) the psychological mechanisms involved, (b) ical considerations have lower status3 . But problems can arise if
the neural implementation of these, and (c) the functional consid- the search for neural mechanisms is considered the primary goal
erations (or computational theory) as to why these mechanisms of scientific activity. As has been learned by other sciences con-
are as they are. Only when explanation is achieved at all three lev- cerned with human experience, a direct “jump” from consciously
els can such a phenomenon be considered completely understood experienced effect to neural mechanism not only ignores impor-
(Marr, 1982; Dennett, 1994; Glennerster, 2002). tant aspects of the processes involved, but also stands in danger of
going astray, in that no checks are available from other levels of
Psychological mechanisms explanation.
A natural place to begin the explanation of a trick (or com-
ponent) is with the psychological mechanisms involved—i.e., the Functional/computational considerations
functional mechanisms (perceptual and cognitive) that give rise to Explanation in terms of mechanisms—both psychological and
the observed behavior and subjective experience. There is no need neural—can help us understand a given magic trick. But such
here to specify how these mechanisms are grounded in the human understanding may still be incomplete. For instance, why do
nervous system, although neural plausibility is always welcome. we even have a sense of wonder in the first place? Which cir-
Because of its involvement with known psychological mech- cumstances invoke it? What kinds of violations give rise to what
anisms, this level of analysis can sometimes enable new per- kinds of wonder? What—if anything—does this experience enable
spectives on old issues. For example, connections have been us to do?
drawn between attentional misdirection and inattentional blind- Such issues are the concern of a functional (or computational)
ness (e.g., Kuhn and Tatler, 2005; Kuhn and Findlay, 2010), level of analysis, which focuses not only on describing the function
and between misdirection and change blindness (e.g., Rensink, carried out, but also on justifying why it has the form it has. In
2000); indeed, strong links seem to exist between misdirec- the case of wonder, for example, this experience may motivate
tion and attention research generally (Memmert, 2010; Mem- the observer to think more about events that cannot be accounted
mert and Furley, 2010; Moran and Brady, 2010; Kuhn and for by the existing set of beliefs. An important observation in this
Tatler, 2011). Such links have been used to support the three- regard is that spectators generally wish to see a trick repeated—
network model of attention (Demacheva et al., 2012). They have not just to experience the effect again (which could be done via
even led to new perspectives—e.g., the proposal of two differ- a different method), but to see how it was created in the first
ent types of inattentional blindness (Most, 2010). Interestingly, place. This points to the sense of wonder being connected to a
such developments have only become possible in the context of strong need to understand what is going on. If so, the interesting
recent theories of visual perception, which emphasize the atten- possibility arises that the sense of wonder so essential to magic
tional factors involved in conscious visual experience (see, e.g., may also have been essential to the development of science.
Rensink, 2010, 2015). In summary, then, explanation of magic tricks at all three levels
of analysis could lead to interesting new insights into the nature
Neural mechanisms of the human mind. Such analysis may not always be possible. But
In addition to psychological mechanisms, explanation can also given the power of this approach even when it is only partially
appeal to the neural systems involved (see also Macknik and
3 To be sure, Macknik et al. (2008) do mention behavior on occasion. But consider: in
Martinez-Condé, 2009). This involves a reduction to elements of
the main body of Macknik et al. (2008), the word “neural” is used 30 times, whereas
an entirely different kind—an explanation not in terms of the the word “behavioral” is used only twice—once at the beginning of the article and
information-processing strategies of particular mechanisms, but once at the end, both uses being simple glosses.

applicable (Dennett, 1994; Glennerster, 2002), it would appear the many-to-many relationships between effects and methods
worthwhile to at least attempt it in this domain. should be maintained. One way of doing so is to have sepa-
rate (although related) inventories centered on each aspect: one
ORGANIZATION OF KNOWLEDGE for the methods associated with each effect, and the other for
In addition to studying individual tricks and components, the effects associated with each method (Figure 2). In the inter-
important insights might also be found by studying the rela- ests of simplicity, discussion here will focus on effect-centered
tionships between them—e.g., natural groupings of tricks, or inventories.
the set of methods that can create an effect. The study of Such inventories could be of two kinds. A concrete inventory
such relationships is currently the least-developed way of using describes concrete tricks; it is essentially a record of magic prac-
magic to study the human mind. However, if it can be suffi- tice, ensuring that all known effects and methods are accessible to
ciently developed, it may become an important area of study the community of practitioners. An example of this is the website
that could connect in a productive way with other areas of “Ask Alexander,”4 an on-line library containing descriptions of lit-
research. erally millions of concrete magic tricks. An abstract inventory could
likewise describe all known abstract tricks (or components)—i.e.,
INVENTORY abstract effects along with the procedures for producing them (see
When organizing knowledge, a foundational issue is that of Abstraction). Such an inventory could form much of the basis for
description. Although often linked to explanation (if only to clar- scientific work.
ify what is involved), description can proceed independently of
this. Indeed, in sciences such as biology, structures are often TAXONOMY
described to a considerable extent without any real commitment Although usually considered part of an inventory, a distinct level of
to underlying causes (Mayr, 1982). description can be separated out: that of taxonomy. Its main goal
In many areas of study, description takes the form of an is to organize tricks via particular kinds of relationships, includ-
inventory—a complete listing of the entities under consideration ing a set of “pattern elements” that could generate any patterns
(e.g., the set of known animals, or known songs). In the case of found among these relationships. Taxonomic developments have
magic, such entities are clearly individual tricks, either concrete been critical to the scientific development of several fields—e.g.,
or abstract. Books that teach magic (e.g., Hay, 1947/1975; Nelms, biology, chemistry, and mineralogy (see, e.g., Dear, 2006). They
1969/1996) generally contain partial inventories, describing var- would likely play a similar role here. As in the case of inventories,
ious tricks of interest. Early attempts toward a comprehensive taxonomies could be concrete or abstract, and effect-centered or
set include that of Triplett (1900), who compiled a listing of method-centered. Since each has different perspectives, all these
many of the better-known tricks; these were described from the kinds would likely be useful in supporting scientific study.
point of the performer and were loosely grouped, e.g., tricks Various taxonomies have been proposed over the years (e.g.,
involving optical illusions, or tricks involving unusual abilities. Triplett, 1900; Wright, 1924; Bruno, 1978; Lamont and Wiseman,
Later attempts include the work of Wright (1924), the collec- 1999). None, however, has received overwhelming acceptance
tions of Fitzkee (1943/1988, 1945/1987), and Ortiz (1994), as (Lamont et al., 2010). These schemes are largely folk taxonomies,
well as the tricks in the taxonomies of Sharpe (1985, 1988) and similar to the groupings used by naturalists in early classifi-
Lamont and Wiseman (1999). cations of animals, or the tables of chemical affinities used
Strictly speaking, no particular organizational scheme (taxon-
omy) is required for an inventory. But what is required is that 4 http://askalexander.org/
FIGURE 2 | Inventories centered on different aspects of magic tricks. (A) Effect-centered inventory. Here, effects are primary, with each effect—or
component—linked to the various methods able to create it. (B) Method-centered inventory. Here, each method—or component—is primary, and is linked to
the set of effects that it helps create.
prior to modern chemistry5 . Interestingly, doubt also existed more than one mechanism. But this could be handled by mak-
long ago as to whether natural—or even adequate—taxonomies ing the component—rather than the complete trick—the basic
could exist in those domains (e.g., Dear, 2006, chap. 2). But element of the taxonomy6 . Indeed, this approach would have the
just as folk taxonomies in those areas eventually gave way to added benefit that the variations of a trick would not need to
natural taxonomies, a similar development might be possible be considered as separate entities in the taxonomy, but as related
here. Note that although more knowledge always helps, a com- combinations of similar components (cf. molecules vs. atoms in
plete understanding of magic is not necessary for this—for chemistry7 ).
example, new taxonomies continue to appear in various sub-
domains of vision science (Changizi, 2009; Gregory, 2009) even A SCIENCE OF MAGIC?
though our scientific understanding of visual perception remains Given that different kinds of knowledge about magic can help
incomplete. investigate the human mind, questions arise about the extent
One way of developing better-founded taxonomies might be to to which this could be done. Could the study of magic be
start with the magician’s language and conceptual schemes, and carried out in a coherent way that encompasses most magic
make these clearer and more rigorous (Kuhn et al., 2008; Kuhn, tricks? Could it eventually become an area of research akin
2010). This would likely involve various subtle distinctions. Con- to, say, vision science, resulting in a better understanding
sider, for instance, the term“misdirection.” This is a broad concept, of known effects, and perhaps even the prediction of new
referring to any manipulation that directs the spectator away from ones?
the cause of an effect (see Cognition). In the case of visual atten- In what follows, we present a few—admittedly incomplete—
tion, it might be defined as a “deflection of attention for the suggestions about how this issue might be approached. These
purpose of disguise” (Sharpe, 1988, p. 47), which would seem proposals are necessarily tentative. But our intent here is to show
sufficient for most purposes. But various issues still remain. For that there does exist some possibility of organizing a study of magic
example, it has been suggested (Lamont et al., 2010) that distrac- as a scientific discipline, one that could enable a better under-
tion of the type typically used in scientific experiments has little standing of magic tricks, and ultimately, a better understanding of
to do with the misdirection used in magic. But while misdirection human perception and cognition.
is indeed more than distraction, it nevertheless is still related—for
example, the use of gaze by magicians to direct attention away Scope
from a method is similar to the use of gaze to control attention Sciences of many kinds exist. Some, such as physics, have consid-
in scientific studies (e.g., Friesen and Kingstone, 1998; Kuhn and erable theoretical structure; others, such as meteorology, far less.
Kingstone, 2009). A final resolution of this issue will probably be Some, such as biochemistry, have a strong experimental compo-
difficult, but the outcome may well improve our understanding of nent; others, such as geology, rely on natural observation. But all
the issues involved. This will likely be the case for other terms as involve a process of inquiry, a particular way of thinking about
well. issues. In particular, all sciences have a clearly defined set of enti-
A somewhat related approach would be to reconsider the fea- ties in the world considered relevant, and a set of issues concerning
tures used as the basis of classification: a wider range of features these entities. The set of entities selected—the scope—is critical for
might be used, say, or more quantitative measures. The princi- the success of this enterprise: if too broad, the discipline will lose
ples of organization might also be made more quantitative and coherence—e.g., the original science of vision in Hellenistic times,
methodical—e.g., assigning different weights to different proper- which included mathematical geometry, physical optics, and phys-
ties. (For an interesting account of this approach in biology, see iological considerations. If too narrow, the result will be a set of
Yoon, 2009). unnatural divisions or an insufficient “critical mass” of basic con-
Another way of developing more natural taxonomies might cepts. Given these considerations, what might be the proper scope
be to base them on established psychological mechanisms and for a possible science of magic?
principles. For example, a taxonomy of misdirection (and thus, One choice might simply be the set of effects and methods
much of magic) can be created via two objective taxonomic currently used by magicians. But the particular tricks in current
principles: (i) base it as much as possible on known psycho- use is only a partial set of those possible; their selection is largely
logical mechanisms, and (ii) have the highest levels be based due to arbitrary factors such as prevailing fashion. Consequently,
on the mechanisms affected, followed by the mechanisms that systematic connections may not always exist between them. More-
control them (Kuhn et al., 2014). Such a taxonomy relies on over, this set is time-bound: it is not the same as what was used in
the nature of these mechanisms—and their relationships to each the past, nor will it likely be the same as what will be used in the
other—to lessen the subjective element in its organization. A future (Lamont, 2013).
possible complication could arise if a particular trick affects
6 If misdirection is viewed as the component of a trick that hides the method gen-
5 The term “folk” does not imply that a taxonomy is inaccurate—for example, the erating the “main” effect experienced, this is exactly what is done in the taxonomy
traditional folk taxonomy for animals (as developed in the West, anyway) is often of Kuhn et al. (2014). If this applies more generally, magic tricks might best be
not far from the scientifically based Linnaean one. Rather, it simply describes how described via a set of such taxonomies, each pertaining to a particular component.
the taxonomy was created: via utilitarian principles generated on the basis of social 7 Interestingly, the magician Fitzkee (1944/1989) proposed that all effects could be
knowledge, vs. the more context-free approach typical of science. Although valuable, constructed out of 19 “basic effects,” and proposed a formula by which new effects
traditional magic taxonomies don’t have a scientific basis—it is difficult, for example, could be generated. It might be worth revisiting this, given the better understanding
to imagine a discovery that could make such a taxonomy change its structure. of perceptual and cognitive mechanisms than was available in 1944.

Another choice might be the ways that humans can be deceived. wonder—an experience that has not received much serious inves-
This avoids a direct dependence on the tricks in current use while tigation to date—and makes it the central concern, which then
still capturing much of what happens in a magic performance; lends coherence to the entire enterprise.
indeed, magic is sometimes characterized this way (e.g., Hyman,
1989; Triplett, 1900). But deception can take a very wide variety Framework
of forms, ranging from fiction to advertising to counterfeiting to A clearly defined scope is necessary for any area of science. But
psychological warfare to simple everyday lying. As such, it risks it is also helpful to have a research framework—a coherent set of
incoherence. Even more importantly, it misses the main point of characterizations, issues, and practices to help guide research and
magic: people do not attend magic shows simply to be deceived. assess how a given work contributes to it (cf. Lakatos, 1978). What
What to do? We propose that a more natural focus is the expe- might this look like for the case of magic?
rience of wonder generated by perceiving an apparently impossible One possibility is shown in Figure 3, which largely incorporates
phenomenon (cf. see The Experience of Wonder). This experience suggestions made earlier in this paper. It can be divided into two
appears to be common to all effects considered “magical,” no mat- groups of issues: those concerning description (issues of inven-
ter what they involve, or when or where they occur. Moreover, this tory and taxonomy), and those concerning explanation (analysis
characterization is a positive one, with magic defined not in terms in terms of psychological mechanisms, neural mechanisms, and
of the failure of a mechanism (as occurs in deception), but in computational theory). The descriptive parts would supply mate-
terms of a positive experience. In this view, the scope of scientific rial for explanation; these could be developed as sketched in
investigation into magic would be any aspect of any phenomenon sections “Inventory” and “Taxonomy.” Explanation of these would
associated with this experience. This focus is not limited to the proceed along the lines sketched in section “Explanation,” with
set of magic tricks in current use; instead it concerns the resulting analysis carried out at three different levels (psychological, neural,
experiential state and any possible technique that could produce and functional).
it, both of which are timeless8 . It also emphasizes the experience of An important application of this would be to find deep patterns
or principles underlying the explanation of many magic tricks (or
8 In classical antiquity, several forms of entertainment were reported as creating a components). Such commonalities could point to mechanisms
sense of wonder and delight, via mechanical devices that appeared to start (and con- that are not apparent when investigating individual tricks or the
tinue) on their own. Central to this was ensuring that the causes of the movements
relatively superficial patterns in the taxonomy. A search for gen-
could not be readily determined, and that the effects violated the expectations of the
spectator (Berryman, 2009, pp. 140–142, 175–176). Although these might not be eral principles common to individual mechanical devices appears
considered as forms of magic according to traditional views, they would be so here. to have helped create the science of mechanics (Berryman, 2009),
FIGURE 3 | Framework for a possible science of magic. Each part concerns and eventually organized into a concrete or abstract taxonomy (see
a particular set of related issues. The arrow indicates that investigation would Taxonomy). Analysis of the individual tricks (or components) in the inventories
begin with the collection of individual tricks the concrete inventory; these and the patterns of relationships in the taxonomies would proceed in terms of
could be abstracted and collected into an abstract inventory (see Inventory), their psychological, neural, and computational mechanisms (see Explanation).
which was then able to connect to other sciences; if mechani- The prospects for this enterprise appear to be good. Magicians
cal techniques and effects have parallels to magical ones, some can manipulate our perception and cognition in powerful and con-
possibility exists of a similar development here. sistent ways, and have noticed enough structure and systematicity
The ultimate argument for or against a possible science of to propose various categorizations. Our role as scientists is to ask
magic, however, will be the extent to which it can uncover new the right questions and use the right methods to investigate this
knowledge and produce interesting new effects. We do not claim further, and make this area as rigorous and systematic as possible.
that this enterprise will necessarily succeed; there may well be Similar attempts are underway for other performing arts: work has
obstacles of which we are currently unaware. But at the moment started on a psychology of music with comparable goals (see, e.g.,
nothing appears to stand in its way. And nothing ventured, nothing Levitin, 2007), and similar efforts are also being attempted for film
gained. (e.g., Shimamura, 2013; Smith, 2014). It will be interesting to see
the extent to which the developments in these domains converge
APPLICATIONS TO MAGIC PRACTICE with those for magic.
As many magicians have pointed out over the years (e.g., Houdin, In this context, it should be mentioned that many aspects
1868/2006; Wonder and Minch, 1996), a better understanding of magic not discussed here are also worthy of scientific
of the perceptual and cognitive mechanisms underlying various investigation—e.g., the character of the magician (Fitzkee,
aspects of magic could well inform the design of better magic 1943/1988; Ortiz, 1994), the use of ritual (Sorensen, 2006), or the
tricks, and perhaps even presentation techniques. The relation use of conjuring principles by psychic mediums (Marks, 2000).
between applied and basic science is a reciprocal one: just as the These issues are clearly beyond the scope of what is proposed here.
insights obtained in an applied area can provide subject matter Our goal in this paper is a more modest one: simply to deter-
for the corresponding basic science, so can the lessons learned in mine the viability of a “core” area of study, including some of the
an abstract science be applied to concrete concerns (Stokes, 1997). steps needed to carry it out in practice. The success of this will
Such transfer has long been the case in various domains (e.g., ultimately depend on the willingness of researchers from a wide
using knowledge of biochemistry to help design more effective range of disciplines to link some of their own investigations to this
medications). There appear to be no a priori reasons why such endeavor.
transfer could not also occur here. The eventual identity of this area of inquiry is difficult to ascer-
This need not be limited to human performance. Interaction tain. It might become a loose network of related results in various
with computers can be an important part of various magic tricks fields. It might become part of an existing science—e.g., an area
(Marshall et al., 2010). And given the complexities involved in of “magic perception” in vision science similar to, say, scene per-
human-computer interaction, knowledge of particular effects or ception, or it might become part of the psychology of emotion.
methods could inform the design of more effective computer If valued for its insights into connections that cut across various
interfaces, creating a more compelling “user illusion” (Tognazzini, issues, it might develop a more autonomous identity—e.g., a “psy-
1993). Such knowledge might even suggest ways to enable the com- chology of wonder” or “psychology of magic” similar in status to
puter itself to control a user’s expectations or attention, leading to say, social psychology, with connections to the study of percep-
the development of “magical displays” that could capture some tion and cognition, but keeping its own traditions and set of core
aspects of the performance of a human magician (Rensink, 2002). research issues. Only time will tell. But, however, events unfold, it
There may also be interesting connections with special effects. For appears that the study of magic has sufficient focus and coherence
example, the creation of pixie dust that is perceived as “magical” to prevent it from dissolving into a set of disconnected studies in
is extremely difficult to achieve using computer graphics; it seems disconnected fields.
to rely in part on the dust appearing natural, but still not ordinary Magic is an ancient art form centered around wonder and sur-
(Gilland, 2009). Knowledge about what makes something appear prise. As such, its practice relies on a level of secrecy that needs to
magical (and why) would be most helpful in creating effects of this be respected. In recent years, the possibility of a science of magic
kind. has received public as well as scientific attention. Part of the rea-
son for this is that magic offers an engaging and entertaining way
CONCLUSION to illustrate and discuss complex psychological theories, thereby
We have proposed here a framework describing various ways in providing a valuable educational tool. Although public interest
which knowledge of magic can help contribute to the under- is valuable for science, there is also danger of revealing sensitive
standing of the human mind. These are grouped into four details, and thus damaging this wonderful art. As we have argued
distinct levels: (i) using known methods as the basis of new above, there exists a “middle way” that keeps secret the details of
methodologies, (ii) using known effects to explore new aspects concrete implementations but still allows public and scientific dis-
of the mind, (iii) investigating how particular tricks (suitably cussion of general principles. We strongly encourage researchers
abstracted) relate to psychological and neural mechanisms, and in this field to use such an approach, and so maximize the likeli-
(iv) studying the patterns of relationships between individual hood that people will continue to experience all the wonder and
tricks (and perhaps their components). Among other things, this amazement that magic offers.
framework suggests the possibility of an organized body of study—
perhaps even a science—centered around the sense of wonder ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
that is experienced when encountering an apparently impossible We would like to thank Emily Cramer, Thomas Fraps, Minjung
event. Kim, Jay Olson, Teller, Robert Teszka, Ben Shear, and several

anonymous reviewers for their help on earlier versions of this Fitzkee, D. (1944/1989). The Trick Brain, 4th Edn. Pomeroy, OH: Lee Jacobs
paper. This work was supported by the Natural Sciences and Engi- Productions.
Fitzkee, D. (1945/1987). Magic by Misdirection. Pomeroy, OH: Lee Jacobs
neering Research Council of Canada, via a grant to Ronald A.
Productions.
Rensink. The authors and Editor thank David Ben for his helpful Friebertshauser, A., Teszka, R., and Kuhn, G. (2014). Eyetracking Magic Video
comments on the manuscript. Stimuli Summaries. figshare doi: 10.6084/m9.figshare.1183468
Friesen, C. K., and Kingstone, A. (1998). The eyes have it! Reflexive orient-
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HYPOTHESIS AND THEORY ARTICLE

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Problem solving Motor skills

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