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The conceptual metaphor of joy

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DOI: 10.29302/jolie.2019.12.1.10

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 JoLIE 12:1/2019
DOI: https://doi.org/10.29302/jolie.2019.12.1.10

THE CONCEPTUAL METAPHOR OF JOY

Oana-Maria Păstae
Constantin Brâncuși University of Târgu-Jiu, Romania

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to study how ‘joy’, an emotional concept, is metaphorised in
English from a cognitive perspective. It introduces the theoretical framework of Cognitive
Linguistics, then briefly touches upon the definition of metaphor, the different types of
conceptual metaphors and, finally, the conceptual metaphors of ‘joy’.
We think in metaphors, which we learn very early. Our conceptual system, in terms of what
we both think and act, is fundamentally metaphorical in nature (Lakoff, & Johnson 2003:
8).
Lakoff and Johnson’s book Metaphors we live by changed the way linguists thought about
metaphor. Conceptual Metaphor Theory was one of the earliest theoretical frameworks
identified as part of the cognitive semantics enterprise and provided much of the early
theoretical impetus for the cognitive approach. The basic premise of Conceptual Metaphor
Theory is that metaphor is not simply a stylistic feature of language, but that thought itself
is fundamentally metaphorical in nature.
The cognitive model of joy can be described using the example of Lakoff for anger: joy is a
fluid in a container: She was bursting with joy; joy is heat/fire: Fires of joy were kindled by
the birth of her son; joy is a natural force: I was overwhelmed by joy; joy is a social
superior: If I ruled the world by joy; joy is an opponent: She was seized by joy; joy is a
captive animal: All joy broke loose as the kids opened their presents; joy is insanity: The
crowd went crazy with joy; joy is a force dislocating the self: He was beside himself with
joy.

Keywords: Cognition; Joy; Conceptual metaphor; Emotion; Cognitive linguistics.

1 Introduction

Cognitive linguistics deals with the relationship between human language, the
mind and socio-physical experience; it emerged in the 1970s with linguists such as
Charles Fillmore (1975), George Lakoff and Henry Thomson (1975), George
Lakoff (1977), Ronald Langacker (1978) and Leonard Talmy (1975).
Cognitivists outline the three hypotheses:
1. Language is not an autonomous cognitive faculty.
2. Grammar is conceptualisation.
140 Oana-Maria PĂSTAE

3. Knowledge of language emerges from language use.

Geeraerts (2006) argues that the meaning we construct is not separate and
independent of the mind, but reflects our experience as human beings. As it is not
separate from other forms of knowledge of the world, in that sense it is
encyclopaedic and non-autonomous. Meaning is experientially grounded – rooted
in experience. We have to distinguish between the level of language structure and
the level of language use, between langue and parole, to use the terms of Ferdinand
de Saussure. Meaning is dynamic and flexible:

For a theory of language, this means that we cannot just think of language as
a more or less rigid and stable structure – a tendency that is quite outspoken
in twentieth century linguistics. If meaning is the hallmark of linguistic
structure, then we should think of those structures as flexible. (Geeraerts
2006: 4)

Instead of viewing meaning in terms of worldwide models, some scholars view it

in terms of mental space. Cognitive semantics is one of the areas of cognitive
linguistics that is concerned with investigating the relationship between experience,
the conceptual system and the semantic structure. One of the central tenets of
cognitive semantics is that the meaning of words is encyclopaedic: everything that
someone knows about the concept is a part of its meaning (Langacker 1987: 157).
From this, it follows that there is no essential difference between semantic
representation and knowledge representation.
Cognitive Linguistics is about achieving an adequate level of knowledge
and not just describing concepts and categories by means of an abstract definition.
Take birds as an example: we can define birds as a type of animal with certain
characteristics (e.g. having wings, being able to fly, being born from eggs).
However, if we want to get a good cognitive grip on what birds are, we must look
at some typical birds like robins and sparrows and doves, and then maybe also at
some less typical ones, like chickens and ostriches (Geeraerts 2006: 1).
Given the standard theory or the traditional view, concepts are defined by
sets of necessary and sufficient conditions that strictly delineate between what is
inside and what is outside the category rather than requiring all necessary and
sufficient qualities for membership in a category. Membership in a category can be
determined by resemblance to an exemplar or by possession of a sufficient number
of the typical features of the category. A significant revision of the prototype view
appears in George Lakoff’s book Women, fire, and dangerous things where he
explains the cognitive phenomena as ‘prototype effects’, which include ‘atypical’
items (e.g. Is a penguin a bird?; Is a priest a bachelor?).
In standard accounts of cognitive semantics it is assumed that humans
structure their knowledge in the form of idealised cognitive models (ICMs), a
category constituted by a large number of members, with some members being
central (Lakoff 1987: 68). The mental representation of such central members can
be given in the form of prototypical cognitive models. An ICM is a cognitive
structure, which is idealised for the purpose of understanding and reasoning, and
 The conceptual metaphor of joy …141

whose function is to present reality from a certain perspective. Such cognitive

models can be metaphoric or metonymic.
Following my introduction of the theoretical framework of Cognitive
Linguistics, I will examine the meaning of ‘metaphor’ and the conceptualization of
its behaviour.

2 What is a Metaphor?

We think in terms of metaphors, which we learn very early and which pervade our
everyday lives, not just in language but in thought and action. Our ordinary
conceptual system, in terms of which we both think and act, is fundamentally
metaphorical in nature (Lakoff, & Johnson 1980: 8).
Metaphor was originally studied within rhetoric, focused on how to
persuade others by using rhetorical devices. Metaphor has been identified since the
time of Aristotle with implicit comparison: Achilles is a lion. Grady (1999) uses the
term of resemblance metaphors to describe the comparison. Achilles does not
actually look like a lion but our cultural knowledge, which holds that lions are
courageous, helps us associate Achilles with the lion’s qualities of courage and
ferocity. Lakoff and Turner (1989) call resemblance metaphors, based on physical
resemblance, image metaphors. Resemblance metaphors have received
considerable attention within conceptual metaphor theory, particularly within the
approach now known as Cognitive Poetics. Moreover, as Lakoff and Johnson state:

[o]ur concepts structure what we perceive, how we get around in the world,
and how we relate to other people. Our conceptual system thus plays a central
role in defining our everyday realities. If we are right in suggesting that our
conceptual system is largely metaphorical, then the way we think, what we
experience, and what we do every day is very much a matter of metaphor.
(2003: 14)

Conceptual Metaphor Theory was identified as part of cognitive semantics and has
as a basic premise that metaphor is not simply a stylistic feature of language, but
that thought itself is fundamentally metaphorical in nature. In cognitive linguistics,
conceptual metaphor, or cognitive metaphor, refers to the understanding of one
idea in terms of another.

2.1 Conceptual Metaphor Theory

This section provides an overview of figurative language and the assumption of

this theory, which is that metaphor is not just a matter of language, but of thought
and reason. George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, the proponents of conceptual
metaphor theory, argue that figurative language is a consequence of the existence
of a universal set of pre-linguistic primary metaphors and a language-specific set
of conceptual metaphors, both of which map structure from source domains to
142 Oana-Maria PĂSTAE

target domains. According to CMT, source concepts are often experientially

concrete and possess some kind of ‘bodily basis’ (Johnson 1987), while target
concepts are often abstract and cannot be directly experienced or perceived.
For example, when speakers discuss love in terms of a journey, they are
mapping the source domain (journey) onto the target domain (love). Evans (2007:
136) notes that the conceptual metaphor LOVE IS A JOURNEY works by
mapping roles from the source onto the target: LOVERS become TRAVELLERS
(We’re at a crossroads), who travel by a particular MEANS OF TRANSPORT
(We’re spinning our wheels), proceeding along a particular ROUTE (Our
relationship went off course), impeded by obstacles (Our marriage is on the rocks).
He considers that the travellers from the domain of journey are conventionally
mapped onto that of lovers in the domain of love; the notion of vehicle is mapped
onto that of the love relationship and so on, as illustrated below:

Source: journey → Target: love

- the travellers → the lovers
- the vehicle → the love relationship
- the journey → events in the relationship
- the distance covered → the progress made
-the obstacles encountered → the difficulties experienced
-decisions about which way to go → choices about what to do
- destination of the journey → goals of the relationship. (Evans 2007: 137)

Lakoff (1993: 206) writes that there are everyday expressions that are based on a
conceptualization of love as a journey and they are used not only to discuss love
but to reason with it. They are not poetic, nor are they necessarily used for special
rhetorical effect:

Our relationship has hit a dead-end street.

Things cannot keep going the way they’ve been.
Look how far we’ve come.
It’s been a long, bumpy road.
We can’t turn back now.
We’re at a crossroads.
We may have to go our separate ways.
The relationship isn’t going anywhere.
We’re spinning our wheels.
Our relationship is off the track.
The marriage is on the rocks.
We may have to bail out of this relationship.

In the case of the metaphor ARGUMENT IS WAR: the argumentation is the fight,
the persons who argue are the fighters, and the words are the weapons of attack or
defence (Lakoff, & Johnson 2003: 3-4).
 The conceptual metaphor of joy …143

Your claims are indefensible.

He attacked every weak point in my argument. His criticisms were right on
target.
I demolished his argument.
I’ve never won an argument with him.
You disagree? Okay, shoot!
If you use that strategy, he’ll wipe you out. He shot down all of my
arguments.

Source: war → Target: argument

- the persons with whom we are arguing → the opponents
- the argument → the war
- the verbal battle → the physical battle
- attack his points of view → attack his positions
- gain and lose ground → gain and lose position

The person or persons with whom we are arguing is an opponent and we attack
their positions and defend ours. We gain and lose ground. Many of the things we
do in arguing are partially structured by the concept of war: strategies, attack,
defence, counterattack, etc.
So far we have defined structural metaphors, cases where one concept is
metaphorically structured in terms of another. The following section presents
conceptual metaphors.

2.2 Types of Conceptual Metaphors

Masako K. Hiraga (1991c: 151-161) compares concepts in English and Japanese

and provides the following classification of conceptual metaphors:

- Similar metaphorical concepts and similar metaphorical expressions (TIME IS

MONEY).
- Similar metaphorical concepts but different metaphorical expressions (example by
Hiraga: LIFE IS A BASEBALL GAME in American English, LIFE IS A SUMO
GAME in Japanese – in both languages LIFE IS A SPORT).
- Different metaphorical concepts but similar metaphorical expressions (example by
Hiraga: SWEETNESS IS GOOD in English, SWEETNESS IS BAD in Japanese)
- Different metaphorical concepts and different metaphorical expressions (example
by Hiraga: IDEAS ARE IN THE MIND in English, IDEAS ARE IN THE BELLY
in Japanese).

Lakoff and Johnson (1980) identified three types of conceptual metaphors:

structural metaphors, orientation metaphors and ontological metaphors. In a
structural metaphor, one concept is metaphorically structured in terms of another
(e.g. TIME is MONEY):

In our culture TIME IS MONEY in many ways: telephone message units,

hourly wages, hotel room rates, yearly budgets, interest on loans, and paying
144 Oana-Maria PĂSTAE

your debt to society by ‘serving time.’ These practices are relatively new in
the history of the human race, and by no means do they exist in all cultures.
They have arisen in modern industrialized societies and structure our basic
everyday activities in a very profound way. Corresponding to the fact that we
act as if time is a valuable commodity—a limited resource, even money—we
conceive of time that way. Thus we understand and experience time as the
kind of thing that can be spent, wasted, budgeted, invested wisely or poorly,
saved, or squandered. (Lakoff, & Johnson 1980: 8)

Lakoff and Johnson (2003) also consider time, depending on culture, as a limited
resource used to accomplish goals. For example, let us analyse the metaphorical
concept TIME IS MONEY, which is culturally grounded and drawn from a
collective cultural understanding to explain clusters such as:

You are wasting my time.

This gadget will save you hours.
I don’t have the time to give you.
How do you spend your time these days?
That flat tire cost me an hour.
I’ve invested a lot of time in her.
I don’t have enough time to spare for that.
You’re running out of time.
You need to budget your time.
Put aside some time for ping pong.
Is that worth your while?
Do you have much time left?
He’s living on borrowed time.
You don’t use your time profitably.
I lost a lot of time when I got sick.
Thank you for your time. (Lakoff & Johnson 1980: 7)

Orientation metaphors have to do with spatial orientation; they organize a whole

system of concepts with respect to one another (HAPPY is UP). Most of our basic
concepts are organised in the conceptual frame of one or more spatially-oriented
metaphors which can vary from culture to culture. The major metaphor embedded
in our culture is:

HAPPY is UP SAD is DOWN

I’m feeling up. Thinking about her always
That boosted my spirits. gives me a lift.
My spirits rose. I’m feeling down.
You’re in high spirits. I’m depressed.
He’s really low these days.
I fell into a depression.
My spirits sank.

Further, a drooping or stooped posture typically is associated with sadness and

depression; an erect posture with a positive emotional state.
 The conceptual metaphor of joy …145

CONSCIOUS is UP UNCONSCIOUS is DOWN

Get up. He fell asleep.
Wake up. He dropped off to sleep.
I’m up already. He’s under hypnosis.
He rises early in the morning. He sank into a coma.

For Lakoff and Johnson, humans and most other mammals sleep lying down and
stand up when they awaken. Just as the basic experiences of human spatial
orientations give rise to orientation metaphors, so our experiences with physical
objects provide ontological metaphors.
Ontological metaphors treat abstract things as entities. We barely notice
them as metaphors because they are so naturally imprinted in our conceptual
system that we take them to be the direct descriptions of mental phenomena. We
use them to understand events, actions and states. Events are metaphorically
conceptualised as objects, actions as substances and states as containers (Lakoff, &
Johnson 1980: 40-45). Lakoff and Johnson discuss understanding experiences in
terms of objects and substances: we can take parts of our experience and treat them
as discrete entities or substances and in this way we can apply categories and
reason to them.
Let’s take the examples of rising prices given by Lakoff and Johnson (2003:
24-28), which can be metaphorically viewed as an entity via the noun inflation and that
of the mind as a machine:

INFLATION is an ENTITY THE MIND is a MACHINE

Inflation is lowering our standard of living. We’re still trying to grind out the solution
If there’s much more inflation, we’ll never to this equation.
survive. My mind just isn’t operating today.
We need to combat inflation. Boy, the wheels are turning now!
Inflation is backing us into a corner. I’m a little rusty today.
Inflation is taking its toll at the checkout We’ve been working on this problem all
counter and the gas pump. day and now we’re running out of steam.
Buying land is the best way of dealing with
inflation.
Inflation makes me sick.

3 Research Methodology

3.1 Materials and Methods

The approach to metaphor adopted in this paper is the one presented by Lakoff and
Johnson in their well-known book Metaphors we live by. The cognitive scenarios
are inspired by Wierzbicka’s book Talking about emotions: Semantics, culture and
cognition.
146 Oana-Maria PĂSTAE

3.2 The Conceptual Metaphors of Joy

In this section, I will examine some issues concerning the conceptual theory of
metaphor that have led to the elaboration of the cognitive model. My second
objective is to provide an account of the meaning construction processes
responsible for the figurative language phenomena.
The terms used in CMT are concept or domain. Concepts, or conceptual
categories, are cognitive models into which our knowledge is structured (e.g. the
abstract category FEELINGS, which includes sub-categories such as joy,
happiness, excitement, euphoria). We organize our knowledge by these idealised
cognitive models (ICMs) and emotions are conceptually represented as cognitive
models. An ICM is a cognitive structure, which is idealised for the purpose of
understanding and reasoning, and whose function is to present reality from a
certain perspective. ICMs can be of four different types:
1. Propositional structure, as in Fillmore’s frame semantics (1982).
2. Image schematic structure, as in Johnson (1987).
3. Metaphoric mappings, as described by Lakoff and Johnson (1980).
4. Metonymic mappings, as described by Lakoff and Johnson (1980).

In order to better understand an ICM, a short explanation of Fillmore’s frame will

suffice. Take the example Tuesday. In the idealised model, the week has seven
parts organised in a linear sequence; each part is called a day, and the third is
Tuesday. This model of a week is idealised because seven-day weeks do not exist
in nature; they were created by human beings. Not all cultures have the same kinds
of weeks. For example, the Balinese have two calendars: the lunar-solar and the
permutational. Another example of an ICM is the category: mother.

The concept mother is not clearly defined, once and for all, in terms of
common necessary and sufficient conditions. There need be no necessary and
sufficient conditions for motherhood shared by normal biological mothers,
donor mothers (who donate an egg), surrogate mothers (who bear the' child,
but may not have donated the egg), adoptive mothers, unwed mothers who
give their children up for adoption, and stepmothers. They are all mothers by
virtue of their relation to the ideal case, where the models converge. That
ideal case is one of the many kinds of cases that give rise to prototype effects.
(Lakoff 1987: 76)

The concepts bachelor and pope give us a clear example of reasoning according to
the theory of ICMs. The members of the category bachelor are humans, males,
adults and unmarried. So the ICM of bachelor is an unmarried adult man. The
bachelor-ICM does not tell us about couples who have lived together for a long
time without getting married, eunuchs, priests who are not allowed to marry,
homosexuals or the pope. The ICM of pope has the features male, adult, unmarried,
but it differs greatly from bachelor. Our knowledge about the pope is that he is the
head of the Roman-Catholic church and he is not allowed to marry. This means
 The conceptual metaphor of joy …147

that our knowledge is not truth conditional, so meaning is embodied, and human
knowledge is based on human perception.
We will focus only on the metaphoric mappings, the concept of joy being
characterised by a large number and various types of conceptual metaphors.
Emotions like joy are, in developmental terms, among the earliest human
experiences. Despite this, the way we conceptualize and describe this concept is
highly metaphorical in nature.
According to a common folk theory, joy has physiological impacts. Joy is
thus understood as having the effect of increasing body heat, internal blood
pressure, laughter and exuberant body movements. These physiological effects
increase with the intensity of joy, but only to a certain degree. The physiological
effect that emphasizes heat forms the most pervasive metaphor for joy: JOY is
HEAT. This metaphorical construction applies heat to fluids and solids, and
respectively leads to another metaphor: JOY is FIRE. In Metaphors we live by,
Lakoff and Johnson (1980) argue that if we have a general metaphor for
understanding emotions in our conceptual system, then the body is a container for
emotions.
The following approach is based on Kövecses’s (2006) concepts of
emotion:

Joy is a fluid in a container: She was bursting with joy.

Joy is heat/fire: Fires of joy were kindled by the birth of her son.
Joy is a natural force: I was overwhelmed by joy.
Joy is an adversary: She was seized by joy.
Joy is a captive animal: All joy broke loose as the kids opened their presents.
Joy is insanity: The crowd went crazy with joy.
Joy is a force dislocating the self: He was beside himself with joy.
Joy is a rapture/high: I was drunk with joy.
Joy is light: He was beaming with joy.

In the conceptual metaphor of joy, the target domain is JOY and the source domain is
HEAT OF A FLUID IN A CONTAINER. The metaphorical source domains include:
CONTAINER, FIRE, NATURAL FORCE, ADVERSARY, CAPTIVE ANIMAL,
INSANITY, FORCE, RAPTURE and LIGHT. Given such examples the following set
of correspondences or mappings can be proposed:

 the cause of fire the cause of joy

 causing the fire causing the joy
 the thing on fire the joyful person
 the fire the joy
 the intensity of fire the intensity of joy

This set of mappings is systematic in the sense that it captures a coherent view of fire
that is mapped onto joy: there is a thing that is not burning; an event happens that
causes the fire to come into existence; now the thing is burning. The fire can burn at
148 Oana-Maria PĂSTAE

various degrees of intensity, similarly to joy: there is a person who is not joyful;
an event happens that causes the person to become joyful; the person is now in a
state of joy.
Like fire, the intensity of the joy is variable. The joy metaphor system is a
hierarchical system of concepts corresponding to objects and entities in the world
such as animals, natural force, humans and so on. The conceptual metaphors above
are mappings, that is sets of conceptual correspondences that can apply to some or
most emotional concepts, not only to joy:

JOY IS AN OPPONENT (an internal psychological struggle): we conceive of

joy as a psychological opponent to the way we wish to behave.
JOY IS A CAPTIVE ANIMAL: the behaviour of the captive animal is the
behaviour of the person who feels the joy.
JOY IS LIGHT as initiated in the examples: beaming with joy, bright
disposition, and sunny disposition. These features of light are appropriate of
this metaphor.

Wierzbicka considers that there are two crucial cognitive components in the joy
scenario, an evaluative one: ‘something very good is happening’, and a valuative
one: ‘I want this to be happening’. The cognitive scenario encoded in the English
word joy is:

Joy (X felt joy)

(a) X felt something because X thought something
(b) sometimes a person thinks
(c) something very good is happening
(d) I want this to be happening
(e) when this person thinks this, this person feels something very good
(f) X felt something like this
(g) because X thought something like this

Joy is an intense thrilling and short-term emotion caused by something. For

example, one thinks about something that finally happens. When thinking about
this, one feels something good (existence of joy), bringing satisfaction. This leads
to external feelings like brightness of the eyes and smiling and some milder
physiological responses like body warmth and increased heart rate. One feels in
harmony with the world.
Since we do not mean the words (e.g. bursting, overwhelmed, seized, went
crazy, drunk with joy, beaming with joy) literally, we deal with figurative
meanings. Fires of joy were kindled by the birth of her son is a conceptual
metaphor. Fire is used figuratively to represent joy. Joy in terms of fire, this
conceptual structure is metaphorical structuring what we feel when we are joyful.
The essence of metaphor is understanding and experiencing one kind of thing in
terms of another.
 The conceptual metaphor of joy …149

4 Conclusions

This study emphasised the role played by metaphors in structuring abstract

concepts with cognitive models projected from more concrete source domains to
target domains. CMT will continue to play a key role in the development of
cognitive linguistics due to its contribution to connecting mind, body, language and
culture. Metaphor is a mechanism through which we comprehend abstract things
and perform abstract reasoning (Lakoff 1993: 202). We have seen how it can be
said that cognitive models, as Lakoff thinks of them, structure the content in mental
spaces or cognitive models used to structure our encyclopaedic knowledge. Part of
our charge was to show that the conceptual structure of joy can be usefully
described in terms of conceptual metaphors: Joy is a fluid in a container; Joy is
heat/fire; Joy is a natural force; Joy is an adversary; Joy is a captive animal; Joy is
insanity; Joy is a force dislocating the self; Joy is a rapture/high; Joy is light.

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