Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

1. THE ORGANON

Logic is generally given as the first part of Philosophy. This does not mean that Logic
is the easiest branch of Philosophy. It is quite the contrary, because the subject matter that
Logic covers is not material things or physical phenomena, but concepts, propositions and
their inferential relations. Hence, Logic is a study that moves in the sphere of Total
Abstraction, that is, withdrawal from physical things and even from existential beings.

However, Logic is given in the first part of philosophical study because Logic imparts
the knowledge of correct inferential thinking, and Philosophy makes ample use of inferential
partial thinking. In this manner, the student of Philosophy is equipped with the intellectual
means for gauging and appreciating the validity of the philosophical inferences and for
determining the truth of their conclusions with certainty. On the other hand, the knowledge
of Logic empowers the student not only to make valid inferences, but also to establish the
truth of his own conclusions by way of rational demonstrations. This is not of little
importance, considering that Philosophy deals with abstract matters, and that in the realm of
abstract matters. ruth and certainty are rather elusive. (In Abstract matters)

For this reason, Aristotle designated Logic as the Organon, that is to say, the
universal rational instrument for the acquisition of philosophical knowledge. It is also the
main instrumentality for pushing forward the frontiers of philosophical knowledge by
expanding its conclusions. However, it must be noted that, aside from its importance in the
field of Philosophy, Logic is also useful and necessary for equipping the mind with
knowledgeability for making correct inferences and determining the correctness of the
inferences people make regarding abstract things and topics, as freedom, rights, social
justice, the State, politics, poverty, etc. These topics constitute the bulk of human
conversation.

2. INFERENTIAL THINKING

We have said that Logic is concerned with inferential thinking. Now, not every act of
the mind is inferential thinking. Aside from thinking proper, the mind exercises other acts.
For instance, there is the intellectual awareness of a sense perception and/or its object, like
the intellectual awareness of a toothache, or of the sight of a beautiful girl. There is also the
intellectual discrimination between one sense perception and/or one sense percept and
another, like between the pain of a toothache and the hearing of a speech; between a pencil
and a ballpen as objects seen. There is also the intellectual identification of the meaning of a
pictorial image, or of a word image in the imagination.

Taken broadly, thinking covers several kinds of acts of the mind. For our present
purpose we may compare thinking with motion. There is the motion forward, when we learn
new data or information. There is the motion backwards, when we recall, or remember
something, or even recognize someone. There is a motion sidewise, to the left, or to the right,
as when we make an inference from one sequential statement, or from one alternative, to the
other. There is a motion downwards. when we draw conclusions from principles
(Deduction). There is a motion upwards, when we discover general laws and principles from
individual instances (Induction).

There is also the motion diagonalwise, down or up, when the mind from analogous
comparisons of particulars, either draws a probable particular inference, or surmises a
general law. There is the circular motion, when we deliberate or meditate about something.
Finally, there is the stationary stance, when we contemplate and marvel at a truth.

Logic deals primarily with the inferential thinking that is designated as Deduction. It
is the mental process that draws conclusions from premises, not from individual instances.
This is the inferential process that is suitable for dealing with abstract thoughts and percepts,
and for attaining certainty of the conclusions from the nature of the rational process
employed. However, Logic does not teach the correct inferential procedures by grappling the
mind directly in its action. This is not possible. Logic does so indirectly, by showing the
correct patterns of inference, just as Grammar teaches the correct usage of words and literary
expressions, by exhibiting samples of correct patterns that embody the fundamental laws of
Grammar.

Logic does not discuss Induction, that is, the drawing of general laws and scientific
principles from individual instances, primarily, but only for purposes of comparison and by
way of completion. In like manner, Logic has no special interest, in probable demonstration,
which is more the object of Forensic argumentation.

3. WORDS AND CONCEPTS

The Greek term logos means the spoken word or articulated voice bearing meaning.
Inarticulate voices, like the pharyngeal sounds emitted by animals, may commensurate to
express feeling or emotion; but as inarticulated sounds they are not apt to express the ideas of
the mind. For expressing ideas, we make use of the articulated voice, that is, the spoken
word. This is nothing else than the voice that is modified by the use of vowels and
consonants.

Now, although logos means directly the spoken word, nevertheless it means primarily
the concept or mental meaning, because the articulated voice without meaning is worthless.
This is true in any language. The meaning or concept is, therefore, the formal element in the
spoken word. By comparison to the spoken word, the written word is a substitute and a way
to fixate it in order to prevent it from vanishing into thin air. Now, just as in the case of the
spoken word, the formal and important feature of the written word is the concept it carries.
The written word is usually a literary expression of the phonetic sounds of the spoken word.

However, there are written expressions that do not directly express the spoken word,
but are direct symbols of ideas, and are better known as ideograms, e.g., the Egyptian
hieroglyphs, the Chinese characters, etc. These are less wieldy than written words. Symbolic
Logic is so called, because it makes ample use of the technique of symbols.

4. INFERENTIAL USAGE

Aside from Logic, there are other disciplines that deal with the usage of words and
propositions. Grammar studies the correct usage of words and propositions; Literature
studies their expressive and beautiful usage; Rhetoric studies their beautiful and forceful
usage; and Poetry studies their beautiful, live, and rhythmical usage. Logic studies the
inferential usage of terms and propositions. Hence, Logic discusses terms and propositions
according to their inferential relations.

The latter presupposes the grammatical knowledge of their correct use, but the
distinction should be noted. When therefore, Logic speaks of the Subject and of the Predicate
of the Conclusion, it does not so much mean the subject and predicate of the sentence, as the
Minor and the Major terms, respectively, of the inferential comparison. And, when Logic
speaks of the Subject and of the Predicate of the propositional Premise, it means
respectively, the less extensive and the more extensive terms proper of the proposition.

Chapter 2

INTELLECTUALITY AND ABSTRACT KNOWLEDGE

5. KNOWLEDGE OF THE ABSTRACT

When a dog sees a bitch, it identifies and knows the bitch in the concrete. In other
words, the dog knows what a bitch is in the concrete, and does not confuse it with another
male dog. When a man sees the bitch, he knows it also in the concrete, but he also knows it
in the abstract, as the female of the canine species. This is characteristic and proper to
intellectuality: to know abstract natures, or the formal reasons of concrete and physical
things, as may be expressed through definition or word description.

Rationality is intellectuality that draws inferences about such abstract percepts or

knowables. And reason is the psychical faculty or intellect of man that performs such role.
This inferential function is characteristic of human beings, and hence by definition, men are
said to be rational animals, that is, capable of abstract discoursive knowledge. However, it
would also be true to say that man is an intellectual animal, that is, capable of abstract
knowledge. This is quite different from saying that men are reasonable animals, which quite
often they are not.

6. IDEA VERSUS PICTORIAL AND WORD IMAGES

When I mention woman, mujer, babae, what is understood by an American, a

Spaniard and a Filipino is the female of the human species. The idea is the same, although
the pictorial image in their imaginations and the phonetic words are not the same in any one
of them. In like manner, all the students hearing me say, woman, have the same idea and the
same literary phonetic image of the spoken word, but not the same pictorial image in their
imagination.

Now, although we usually carry a pictorial image in the imagination when we think of
concrete things, this is not always the case in our thinking. For example, when I mention
motherhood, there is no pictorial image in the imagination of the hearers, but just the
phonetic or literary image of the spoken word. Motherhood is the relationship of the female
parent toward its offspring, or the role of the female parent in procreating and rearing up its
offspring. There is no pictorial image of motherhood as expressed in the one sense or the
other, but only the literary-phonetic image of the spoken word. The same may be said of
social justice as meaning the socio-economic balance between the different human groups
and components of society, or of Society as meaning the civil community of men.

7. DO WE THINK ONLY WITH WORDS?

Positive thinkers say that we cannot think without the words of language. Therewith
they wish to convey that only words are involved in our thinking process, and only words
constitute the substance of our thoughts. Now, if by the said assertion is meant that we have
to talk in order to think, this is evidently false. If by the assertion is meant that the human
mind, aside from words has no ideas, but only the literary image of the phonetic word is
necessary in thinking, we beg to disagree. For in this case, the Spaniards would not
intellectually distinguish between the woman and the wife, because they use the same word
for the one and the other, mujer; and the Filipinos would not distinguish between Sunday and
the Week, because they have the same word for the one and the other, linggó; or between
poverty and difficulty, because they use the same word for the one and the other, mahirap.

It would also follow that men could not use code signals, symbols, or ideographic
characters to express their conceptual percepts; nor would they be able to use words in a
metaphorical manner to express a meaning, other than the literal meaning of the words. If,
however, by the aforesaid assertion is meant, that we need the literary image of the phonetic
words for the fixation of our thinking and thoughts, then we concede. That is the usual case.
But, it is not necessarily so. Otherwise, the languages of men would not have historically
augmented in number of words in order to accommodate and express the new conceptual
percepts that men acquired with the progress of their scientific investigations. We have many
scientific terms which were non-existent before, e.g., submarines, jet-planes, television, etc.
A man who has no ideas, has nothing to think, or to speak about.

8. WORDS, IDEAS AND ABSTRACT PERCEPTS

Behind the spoken word, or its image, is the conceptual percept, which otherwise is
more commonly known as concept or idea. As discoverable or knowable by the mind in
things, this percept is the perceivable abstract meaning or reason embodied in things. As
found in our ideas, it is the conceptual content of the conceptual vehicle dwelling in the
mind. This conceptual percept of the externally perceivable abstract reason found in things is
also known as the objective concept, as distinguished from its conceptual envelope or
framework which is designated as the formal concept. The meaning of the spoken word
coincides with the objective concept.

The said abstract percepts as found in things are known as the knowable abstract
reasons of things. They comprise the objects of study of the different sciences. They are said
abstract because they are immaterial percepts or knowables. The mind that attains them is
said to apprehend or to grasp them, and the act of the mind involved is known as intellectual
apprehension. The act is also metaphorically designated as "abstraction", because therewith
the mind, as it were, "draws" from the said abstract knowables in things, in order to recreate
them as the abstract contents of its ideas.

Now, this is to be noted. The intellectually knowable percepts as found in things are
abstract because they are immaterial reasons. Whereas, the immaterial percepts as found in
the intellect are said abstracted, because they are derived from things. They are also abstract
in the sense that they are immaterial. The mind recreates the distinct percepts found in
things, by way of mental representation of the same in its ideas. Hence, the designation of the
said mental representations as ideas, which is a term that derives from the Greek original
word, which means image (conf. idol). Ideas, therefore, denote the mental representations of
things as conceptual images.

Depending on the capability of the individual mind, the idea formed will be
comprehensive or less expressive, clear or vague. Again, it must be known that, the mind
builds a complex idea not from just a single percept, drawn through a single apprehension,
but from a combination of several partial percepts drawn through several abstractions.
Notwithstanding the aforesaid, the conventional terms of language carry and convey directly
common abstract percepts, so that an individual, listening to a speech, does not need
everytime to abstract them from things; but obtains them directly from the mind of the
speaker.

9. INTELLIGENCE AND THE ABSTRACT PERCEPT

It is a pet theory among Evolutionists to explain, that man attained intelligence,

because he learned to speak. This is evidently not true; because one needs intelligence, in the
first place, in order to be able to learn to speak and make use of language. Before one can
make use of language and speech, one must be able to know the meanings of the words. And
one cannot know the meaning of the words without intelligence. Such meaning is the abstract
percept contained or involved in our ideas.

As different from the sense faculties of the brutes, the intellect of man has the
capability to attain the abstract percepts or knowable reasons found in things. Among such
abstract percepts are the nature and properties of things. Hence the designation of this special
faculty of man as intellect, which etymologically means a faculty that reads inside things,
that is, underneath the material or physical appearances of things (intus-legere).

It is this same intellectual faculty that makes inferences and conclusions about
abstract percepts and knowables. This inferential action is called reasoning. And, in order to
denote the capability of man's intellectual faculty for such kind of inferential action, the
intellect of man is oftentimes designated as Reason or the rational faculty.

Exercises:

1. See of which of the following you can form a pictorial image in your imagination, and of
which you can form only the literary phonetic image of the spoken word:
a) A child; the child.

b) A President; The President.

2. Of which of the foregoing terms must you give these definitions:

a) A small boy or girl.

b) The Head of a Republican State. /

3. In the case of Society:

a) What is your pictorial image in the imagination?

b) What is your idea, as may be expressed in words?

Chapter 3

LOGIC AND PHILOSOPHY

Since Logic is also an integral part of Philosophy, and not just an introductory part, a
brief information about Philosophy, in general, is in order, so as to view Logic in its proper
setting.

10. MEANING OF PHILOSOPHY

The term "Philosophy" is derived from two Greek words, which literally mean "the
love of wisdom". It was coined by Pythagoras, one of the sages of ancient Greece, born about
the year 584. B.C.

In one of his travels through the ancient Greek States he paid a courtesy call on one of
the petty kings. The King asked him whether he was a wise man (sophos), and what his
occupation was. Pythagoras modestly replied that he was not a wise man, but just a "lover of
wisdom". The Sophists were a class of men in ancient Greece who professed to be wise.
Later on, owing to their presumptuousness and pretences they fell in disrepute, and their
argumentations which aimed more at impressing listeners of their learning, rather than at
showing the truth, were later dubbed as "sophisms".

Formerly, Philosophy was considered as a universal science. For the ancient Greeks it
was the sum-total of human knowledge. Nowadays, Philosophy has been narrowed down to
mean the discussion and study about the more profound questions concerning men and
things, that fall outside the scope and discussion of the positive sciences, e.g.,: Is man
essentially different from material things and animals? What is man in this world for? What
is he expected to do? Are physical things the only beings? Is there only matter in things? Is
there a universal First Cause of visible reality? Hence, Philosophy deals with the deeper
reasons and explanations of things.

11. DEFINITION OF PHILOSOPHY

For our present discussion we may define Philosophy as: the science of things by
their ultimate principles and causes, as known by natural reason alone.

Philosophy is a science. It is not a set of opinions and theories. It is certain knowledge

of things based on evidence and demonstrations, and reduced to a comprehensive rational
system.

Of Things. Philosophy discusses about the things that are found in the existential
world. Aside from material beings, it also discusses, in its different branches, about non-
material beings and principles, e.g., about the specific and the existential principles of things;
about the soul, the intellect and the free will; about the nature of society, its principles and
causes, etc. Nay, Philosophy is said to cover all things in its consideration. It can do so, by
viewing things from a higher vantage point, that is:

By their Ultimate Principles and Causes. By this qualification, Philosophy is

differentiated from the positive and the physical sciences as Biology, Chemistry, etc. These
special sciences study the proximate constituent principles and explanations (causes) of their
subject matter. Biology studies the nature of the cell, protoplasm, tissues, the activities of
anabolism and catabolism. Philosophy studies the nature of the living being as such, of life
and its principle. Chemistry studies the different elements of material substances. Philosophy
studies the ultimate principle of the differences of material things. Positive Psychology
studies human behaviour, its differences and proximate causes. Philosophical Psychology
studies the ultimate principles of human behaviour, reason and will. 1

As known by natural reason alone. Philosophy attains knowledge, not by making use
of the Principles or Articles of Faith, but by the use of the Principles of natural cognition,
which may be obtained from the investigation of Nature and the natural study of things. This
is what we also mean when, at times, we say that Philosophy uses the "light of natural
reason". We take the expression metaphorically, and in the objective manner, to mean the
principles of natural cognition, not in the subjective manner to mean the power of the
intellectual faculty of man. Light is that which manifests objects, and the Principles of a
science manifest the object and the conclusions of the science.

By distinction from Philosophy, Theology is said to make use of the "Light of

Revelation or of Faith" to attain its conclusions. Such light are the articles of Faith obtained
through Divine Revelation. In this manner, Theodicy and Ethics are distinguished from
1
It may also be said that positive sciences consider the physical nature and physical causes of phenomena and
things; whereas Philosophy considers the formal nature and formal causes of things. The latter is also done by
Mathematics, which was originally a branch of Philosophy.

Dogmatic and Moral Theology, which employ revealed principles, Theodicy and Ethics do
not employ revealed principles, but the "light of natural reason".

Another definition of Philosophy is: Human Wisdom. For, whereas science means
knowledge of things by their causes, wisdom adds upon plain science, the knowledge of the
higher or deeper principles and causes of things.

12. METHOD OF PHILOSOPHY

Since Philosophy investigates the ultimate causes of things, it is enough for it to part
from unquestionable experience. It employs rational inference as its main instrumentality.
Hence, it is experiential, but chiefly rational.

The Positive Sciences, on the other hand, seek exact data and, hence, employ chiefly
scientific or highly rationalized methods and instruments to obtain them. They are rational
systems of knowledge, but chiefly experimental in method.

13. PARTS OF PHILOSOPHY

For our present purpose it is enough to enumerate and give a brief description of the
different parts of Philosophy, as commonly done:

Logic: On correct inferential thinking and its principles.

Cosmology or Philosophy of Nature: On the material world. and the ultimate

constituent principles of material beings.

Psychology: On living beings and the principle of life, on the nature of the vital
operations and of the vital powers, and their classification.

Ethics: On human acts and their morality; the Natural Law governing them.

Social Philosophy: On the sociality of man, on the nature of human society and its
principles.

Ontology or General Metaphysics: On beings in general, on the reasons and

principles of the reality of things.

Theodicy or Special Metaphysics: On the First Cause of Continent Beings and of

emergent reality.

Critics or Epistemology: On certain and true knowledge, and its principles.

 Chapter 4

THE NATURE OF LOGIC

14. ETYMOLOGY

The actual name of Logic was introduced by Zeno the Stoic. Coming from the Greek
logike, it would etymologically denote a treatise on matters pertaining to thought.

15. DEFINITION

Logic is commonly
defined as the Philosophical science of correct reasoning or inferential thinking. We can
precise this, saying, it is the science of correct and certain inference. Reasoning and thinking
in the common definition do not refer to the act of the mind proper, but to the mental product
thereof, namely, the syllogistic argument. This syllogistic argument, in its correct and valid
form, engendering certainty is called Demonstration. Hence, we can also say that Logic is
the science of Demonstration.

In a more detailed manner we may say that Logic is a science of the Laws and
1
patterns
It may also of correct
be said and
thatcertain
positiveinference. As a science,
sciences consider Logic nature
the physical is a comprehensive systemof of
and physical causes
phenomena and things; whereas Philo sophy considers the formal nature and formal causes of things.
information
The latter is alsoconcerning its subjectwhich
done by Mathematics, matter.
wasAs science
originally in the of
a branch strict sense, Logic demonstrates
Philosophy.
or proves its conclusions, which are the laws and patterns of valid inference. As a
Philosophical science. Logic shows the laws of valid inference by their ultimate causes and
explanations.

16. MATERIAL OBJECT

By the Material Object of a science we understand the items or things that the science
covers in its study, e.g. numbers, in the case of Arithmetic. The Material Object of Logic is
concepts and conceptual structures like propositions and syllogisms, taken as products of the
mind, not as psychical affections or accidental modifications of the mind.

17. FORMAL OBJECT (Correctness of Thinking Process)

By the Formal Object of a science we understand the primary object of its study or
consideration, by reason of which, the science discusses the different items that fall under its
study, e.g., the four operations or functions of numbers, in the case of Arithmetic. In the case
of Logic, the Formal Object is the inferential functions of concepts and propositions.
 Logic views concepts, in their functions as Major, Minor, and Middle Terms; and
propositions as Major, and Minor Premises of an inferential conceptual structure which is the
Syllogism. Such inferential functions are also, rather vaguely, called Relations of Reason,
inasmuch as they properly exist only in the mind that attains and considers them.

They are also, quite imprecisely, designated as second intentions. This expression
when applied to the mind means its second inspections. However, the expression is
metaphorically taken, in the objective sense, to designate the objects attained by the mind in
its second inspection of terms and propositions; because the said inferential functions are
second and posterior to the meaning of the terms and propositions that the mind grasps, in its
first inspection of them.

It is to be noted that the said inferential functions are not actual relations as may be
found in the terms and premises of an existing syllogism; but they are more like the relations
that proper tools and implements have with regard to a thing to be made.

The modern expression Subject Matter does not discriminate between the Material
and the Formal Objects, but covers them both. Thus, in the case of Arithmetic, the subject
matter is numbers and the four fundamental operations or functions. In the case of Logic the
subject matter is Terms and Propositions, and their Inferential Functions.

18. IS LOGIC AN ART? (Know-How)

Properly, Logic is a science, since it is essentially a rational system that demonstrates

its conclusions. It aims to give the "know why" of correct and valid inference, from its
causes. However, virtually, Logic is an art, inasmuch as the laws and patterns of valid
inference, which it establishes, serve to help reason proceed with order, ease and without
error in the act of inferential thinking. Thus, Logic also affords the "know how" to proceed in
the matter of correct and valid inference. As an art, Logic teaches the "mechanics" of correct
and valid inference.

Logic is one of the fundamental Liberal Arts which, in ancient times, constituted the
basis for higher education and was a privilege of free men (liberi); hence, the designation
"liberal". Of Logic, St. Thomas says: "It is an art that is directive of the act of reason,
whereby man in the act itself of reason may proceed with order, ease and without error. This
art is the rational science." (Post. Anal. I. lect. 1.). It is designated rational from the nature of
its subject matter.
19. NECESSITY AND IMPORTANCE OF LOGIC

By distinction from Scientific or Philosophical Logic, we speak of Natural Logic.

Natural Logic is nothing else than the natural aptitude of the mind to reason out correctly. It
is also commonly referred to, in everyday parlance, as "common sense". Without it we could
not have developed the science of Logic. Hence, the mind can reason out correctly, once and
again, on simple and easy matters.

But in difficult and profound matters the mind cannot reason out with certainty as to
the correctness of its inference and procedure, without the science of Logic, that is, without
the precise knowledge of the causes and laws of correct and valid inference. Even in a
particular instance of correct reasoning on an easy matter, the mind does not know the causes
of the legitimacy of the inference, without the science of Logic.

Hence, it is said that scientific knowledge in its perfect form, which includes the
awareness of the causes of the legitimacy of the inferences, is not obtained without the
science of Logic. Hence, the importance of the science of Logic.

20. DIVISION OF LOGIC

Logic is commonly divided according to the three acts of the mind, which provide the
different elements of its subject matter and the different bases of the different inferential
functions.

I. Apprehension, Idea, Predicability of ideas.

II. Judgment, Enunciation, Predication of Ideas

III. Reasoning, Argument, Inference of new predication.

Schematic Diagram:

Mental Act Mental Product External Sign Logical Issue

Apprehension Idea Term Predicability

Judgment Enunciation Proposition Predication

Reasoning Argument Syllogism Inference

Remarks. The Mental Product or Expression which falls in between the Mental Act
and the External Sign is often designated with the name of the one or of the other: e.g., the
enunciation is also commonly designated as judgment, or as proposition. 1
 The term syllogism etymologically means connected thought (syn+logos).

21. FORMAL LOGIC AND MATERIAL LOGIC

A good syllogistic argument or demonstration, like a good house, or a good suit, must
not only have good form or pattern, but also good material. Formal Logic discusses the
conceptual patterns or structures needed for correct and valid inference.

This discussion is covered in the part of Logic which deals with correct inference, in
general, and its valid procedures.

Material Logic discusses the kind of matter, that is, the nature of the terms and
premises that are used in the different kinds of Demonstration given in the latter part of
Logic. It is to be noted that the given distinction is not an adequate or perfect one; because it
is not a distinction of two different kinds of Logic, but of two complementary parts.

Another interpretation views Formal Logic as coinciding with our present science on
correct and valid inference; and Material Logic as the Philosophical discussion on matters of
thought and knowledge. This interpretation corresponds to the distinction of Logic into
Minor Logic and Major Logic. Minor Logic would be our present study on correct and valid
inference: and Major Logic would be Critics (Epistemology). However this interpretation
and division cross the border of our present study.

22. FORMAL LOGIC AND DIALECTICS

Some identify Dialectics with our present science of Logic. However, there are others
who divide our present science of Logic into Formal Logic and Dialectics. Apparently this
division is grounded on the etymology of the term Logic, i.e., treatise on matters pertaining
to thought; and Dialectics, i.e., treatise on argumentation or disputation. According to this
division Formal Logic would cover the discussion on Ideas and Propositions; and Dialectics
would cover the discussion on Inference and Syllogisms.

This division may be done for practical purposes. It is analogous and integral in
nature, like the division of a tree into the branches and the trunk. Considering the matter
philosophically, the mentioned division would allot to Formal Logic only the introductory
portion of our inferential science, and leaves out the more important portion concerning
inference as Dialectics. This kind of allotment, when done on a scientific basis, cannot be
1
Some prefer to
admitted, call the it
because internal
leavessentence of the mind as
the introductory "the proposition",
portion and the d'etre",
without "raison expressional
and linguistic
the othervehicle
as "the sentence". In this sense, there can be as many sentences to a logical proposition, as languages there are to
portion on inference without the necessary preliminary foundations.
express it.
 In traditional Logic the name Dialectics was assigned to that part of our inferential
science which deals with debatable or probable matter.

22a. DEDUCTIVE LOGIC AND INDUCTIVE LOGIC

This division is applicable only to the Third Part of Logic. It covers only the
discussion about the inferential process from the Universal to the Particular (Deduction), and
from Individuals to the Universal (Induction). It is also an inadequate division of the whole
science.

23. A BRIEF HISTORY OF LOGIC

Aristotle (384-322 B.C.) is considered as the founder of this science. He wrote six
treatises on logical matters, the collection of which was called the "Organon".

Zeno the Stoic (c.336-264 B.C.) introduced its actual name. The Stoic Logic was
mainly the Prior and Posterior Analytics of Aristotle's logical works, expanded with a longer
treatise on the hypothetical syllogism, and with a treatise on the criterion of truth.

Other successors of Aristotle worthy of mention:

Porphyrius (c.232-304 A.D.), a Neo-Platonist, who wrote a small introduction to the

Categories of Aristotle, called the "Isagoge", the Greek word meaning Introduction.

Severinus Boethius (c.470-524 A.D.), who translated Aristotle's Organon and wrote
commentaries on the Categories and on the Isagoge of Porphyrius.

The Arabian Philosophers Avicenna (Ibn-Sina, 980-1037 A.D.) and Averroes (Ibn-
Rosh, 1126-1198 A.D.) also wrote commentaries on Aristotle's Organon.

The Scholastics of the Middle Ages, particularly St. Thomas, wrote extensive
commentaries on the logical works of Aristotle. From them we received our comprehensive
science of Logic.

With the aim of improving on the Organon of Aristotle, Francis Bacon (1561-1626
A.D.) wrote the "Novum Organon". He introduced the theory of Induction, which John
Stuart Mill (1806-1873 A.D.) developed into a general theory for scientific investigation.

In recent years a new Logic, known as Symbolic Logic, has gained popularity. It
covers the same subject matter as our standard Logic, but differs as to the mathematical
symbols and language that it uses. Hence, it may be considered as a version and complement
of the same. George Boole is considered as the founder of this new symbolic logic. Its chief
exponents in English speaking countries were A.N. Whitehead and B. Russell.

Symbolic Logic attained full development in just a short time. At present it has lost
much of its earlier popularity and interest, due, most likely, to its limited scope of
application.

Chapter 5

IDEA, ABSTRACTION AND PROPERTIES OF IDEAS

Ideas are the building blocks of knowledge and of inference. They are also the quasi-
subjects of inferential relations.

24. DEFINITION

The Idea is the intellectual "image" or representation of a thing. It is the same as the
concept in the mind. The term idea comes from the original Greek which means image. As
applied to the idea, the term image must be taken only metaphorically, in an analogous sense.

The idea is an abstract representation of things, and may be expressed or defined by

meaningful terms. Thus, e.g., an igorot may intellectually identify and distinguish a watch
from other objects; but if he does not know what it is for, or does not know that it is a
mechanical device for telling time, he has no idea of it.

25. IDEA AND PHANTASM

The Idea must be carefully distinguished from the Phantasm. The latter is a sensible
image existing in the imagination, which is one of the internal sense-faculties located in the
brain. The Phantasm is a sensible representation of the material features of a thing, usually a
kind of pictorial image, bearing a shape or figure. We generally have recourse to the
phantasm of things, by way of substitute, when we are thinking of physical objects that are
not present.

The idea is the meaning of the phantasm. In our present condition a phantasm usually
accompanies the idea. It helps to fixate our thoughts. In the case of abstract things, as
democracy, rights, science, unity, etc., the idea is accompanied by the respective term in the
imagination. Oftentimes, however, we create new phantasms and literary expressions to
respond to our new ideas.

The chief differences between Idea and Phantasm are:

 Idea Phantasm
a) found in the intellect a) found in the imagination
b) universal b) individual
c) constant c) changeable
d) possible of complex and immaterial d) not possible of complex and immaterial
things things: e.g., of 1099 trees, of democracy
We can verify such differences in the case of the idea of mother: "a woman with a
child of her own." Each student has the same idea, but different phantasm.

26. ABSTRACTION

The most important difference, however, between the idea and the phantasm is that the
idea is a universal representation, whereas the phantasm is individual. The idea of a tree is
equally applicable to all trees; the phantasm is not.

The mental process involved in the obtention of the ides is called abstraction.
According to its Latin original, abstraction means the drawing of something from some
source, e.g., of water from a well. It is metaphorically applied to the act of the mind which,
as it were, draws out from the individual things and their phantasms, the essential nature and
other universal reasons that they embody.

The intellect performs such operation simply by attending to and grasping any of the
formal features or immaterial reasons that may be found in things, while leaving behind their
material subjects and particular individual conditions: as when we abstract a geometrical
figure, e.g., the form of a square, from material constructions; or, by attending to and
grasping a universal nature, leaving behind the particular individuals in which it is found,
together with their individual traits: as when we abstract the nature of a living organism from
plants, animals and men. Examples: A circle is a closed plane curve, all of whose points are
equidistant from the center. A tree is a woody plant having a single main stem, commonly
about ten feet high. All the individual differences are left behind.

It is to be noted that abstraction is not exclusive to the intellect. We find it even in the
knowing process of the sense faculties, so that it is somehow allied to perceptual knowledge.
Thus, e.g., sight grasps only the color and shape of things, and leaves behind the other
physical characteristics; hearing perceives the sound made by things, but not their flavor, or
consistency. It is the function of the internal central sense to gather together, and synthesize
the different partial sense percepts into an integral and coherent information about physical
things and physical reality, so that the animal may be properly guided.
 In the higher faculty of the intellect, both functions of abstraction and synthesis are
found with regard to the intelligible percepts and immaterial reasons embodied in things.

27. FORMAL ABSTRACTION, AND TOTAL ABSTRACTION

In connection with the foregoing there are two kinds of Abstraction to consider:
Formal and Total.

a) Formal Abstraction draws conceptually a formal feature from its subject or

subjects, which may be material or not: e.g... quantity from sensible matter, whiteness and
temperature from objects, intellectual virtues from the mind. In this manner, we obtain
"abstract" concepts like justice, liberty, rationality, virtue, etc. In the existential world such
features do not and can not exist by themselves, but in their subject. They are: therefore,
entitatively incomplete.

b) Total Abstraction draws conceptually universal a "whole" or nature from

particulars, or from individuals. Such nature carries all the components that belong to the
nature as such; e.g., the animal nature, conceptually obtained from brutes and men,
comprises the components sentient organism; and the human nature, conceptually obtained
from individuals such as Pedro, Pablo, Juan, etc., comprises the components rational animal.

It is this kind of universal nature which, upon referring back to the particulars, or
individuals, from which it has been drawn, the mind erects into a positive or logical universal
in the form of Genus (e.g., animal) containing Species (brutes and men), or in the form of
Species (e.g., rational-animal) containing individuals (individual men). Before such
comparison and erection into Genus or Species are made, the universal nature is universal
only in the negative sense, that is, in the sense that it is not an individual nature.

By way of total abstraction we also abstract "concrete" universal concepts as e.g., a

philosopher, a virtuous man, a Filipino, etc. We also obtain in this manner a universal
individual, e.g.: a dog, i.e., an individual of the canine species; a carpenter, i.e., a man skilled
in furniture making; a man, i.e., an individual having human nature.

Total abstraction is used largely in Logic; whereas formal abstraction is used largely
in Metaphysics and in the other branches of Philosophy. As including the one kind and the
other, we may define abstraction as, the act by which the mind draws a universal nature, or a
formal feature from things. leaving behind, respectively, their individual traits, or subjects.

28. APPREHENSION
 Apprehension is the act of the mind by which it "grasps" or knows the nature or
essence of a thing, without affirming or denying anything about it. It is an act that is
associated with conceptual abstraction and presupposes it.

We have termed this act of the mind apprehension, without qualifying it as simple, as
commonly done. The act of the mind grasping a complex idea cannot be said to be a simple
apprehension, although it is an apprehension. Likewise, ideas that are expressed through
elaborate definitions are the results of several partial simple apprehensions, several mental
comparisons and even possibly of inferences. But, the understanding thereof is a mental
apprehension.

29. "THAT BY WHICH WE KNOW"

The idea or concept is not the terminus proper of our mental cognition; but that by
which we know things as to their nature, or the formal reasons of things. This is so, because
the concept is a formal sign, namely, something that reveals another thing from its likeness
or resemblance to the latter. E.g., a picture is a formal sign of the physical appearance of a
person, because it resembles the said physical appearance. Let us suppose, I wish to know
how your mother looks. You show to me her picture; and when I see her visiting you
afterwards, I know that she is your mother. On seeing her picture my act of cognition ended
in knowing your mother's physical appearance.

Our cognition ends in the concept as a kind of object. e.g., as a kind of product of the
mind, or as an accidental species inhering in the mind, or in general, as a mental
representation of an object, through a reflexive consideration of it. We have been doing this
in our present study.

30. FORMAL, AND OBJECTIVE CONCEPT

a) Formal Concept is the idea taken as an accidental form or species existing in, and
inhering in the mind. As such, it is the object of Psychology. However, despite the
designation "formal concept", this consideration does not take the idea formally, that is, as a
conceptual representation of something. It is an accident of the mind and is, therefore, an
existential and real thing.

b) Objective Concept is the conceptual content or the thought element, or elements,

contained in the idea (formal concept). It is through this conceptual element, that the idea is a
mental representation of something. This aspect of the idea has been the object of our study.
It is the logical element.

31. PROPERTIES OF THE IDEA

The idea has two important logical properties: Comprehension and Extension.

a) Comprehension is the set of thought elements or conceptual features contained in

an idea, Thus, e.g., the com prehension of the concept man is: Being that is substantial,
bodily, living, sentient and rational. Animal is a being that is substantial, bodily, living and
sentient.

A concept when viewed according to its comprehension is considered as a

metaphysical whole made up of so many conceptual component features. Comprehension is
also referred to as the implication, or connotation of the idea.

b) Extension is the range or scope of individuals and classes to which an idea may be
applied. The idea "rational animal" is applicable to every individual man; the idea "living
organism" is applicable to plants, animals, and men. Extension is also referred to as
denotation, application.

Viewed in its extension, the concept rational-animal is considered as a logical whole,

of which men taken distributively. or individually are the subjective or logical parts. The
Logical Whole is also called the Superior, and the logical parts are also called the inferiors.

32. GENERAL LAW ON COMPREHENSION AND EXTENSION OF IDEAS

The comprehension and extension of one and the same concept vary inversely, that is:
the greater the comprehension. the less the extension; and vice-versa, This principle is also
applicable to Terms.

Comprehension Extension
Substance Spirits, minerals, plants, brutes, men
Material Substance minerals, plants, brutes, men
Living material substance plants, brutes, men
Sentient living material substance brutes, men
Rational sentient living material substance men

A concept is of greater or less comprehension in proportion to the number of

conceptual features it includes.
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