SIT 6404 57th Ave Report - Final052913

PRINCE GEORGE’S COUNTY
FIRE/EMERGENCY MEDICAL
SERVICES DEPARTMENT
Safety Investigation Team Report

6404 57th Avenue
Riverdale Heights, Maryland
Incident Date: February 24, 2012
House Fire with Significant

Firefighter Injuries
2
INVESTIGATIVE TEAM
Deputy Fire Chief Scott K. Hoglander, Co-Chair
Prince George’s County Fire/EMS Department
Battalion Chief Sayshan L. Conver-White, Co-Chair

Fire Chief Richard R. Bowers, Jr.

Montgomery County Fire and Rescue Service
Deputy Fire Chief William Goldfeder

Loveland-Symmes Fire Department, Ohio
Assistant Fire Chief Michael Nelson

Volunteer Safety Division Chief Stefan C. Gansert

Paramedic Captain Roland D. Berg

Fire Lieutenant Philip Bird, Jr.

International Association of Firefighters, Local 1619
Fire Lieutenant Daniel R. Schrader

Fire Investigator Aaron Tyler

Fire Protection Engineer Lee McCarthy

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms & Explosives
President Charles W. Walker

Prince George’s County Volunteer Fire & Rescue Association
Administrative Aide II Xiomara Lozano-Chevez

3
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The Safety Investigative Team is extremely grateful to all those who participated and
assisted in the development and progress of this report. Their cooperation and
assistance was vital with making this report possible.
Specifically, the Team would like to recognize the following individuals and
organizations for their assistance with this project and thank them for their contributions
and insight.
Prince George’s County Fire/Emergency Medical Services Department

Tyrone Forby, Assistant Fire Chief
Adon Snyder, Assistant Fire Chief (retired)
Prince George’s County Fire Commission

Leslie Garrett, Fire Commissioner
Nancy Roberts, Administrative Aide III
Prince George’s County Public Safety Communications

Charlynn Flaherty, Associate Director
Wayne McBride, Division Chief
Dave Beck, Assistant Operations Manager
Donald Aker, Training Supervisor
Tom Provenza, Radio System Manager
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms & Explosives

Adam St. John, Fire Research Engineer
Colerain Township Fire/EMS Department, Ohio

Bruce Smith, Fire Chief
Loudon County Department of Fire, Rescue, and Emergency Management

W. Keith Brower Jr., Fire-Rescue Chief

Scott Goldstein, Assistant Fire Chief
Michael Bobrow, Master Firefighter
Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus Shop
Montreal Fire Department, Canada

Gordon Routley, Division Chief
Penn Township Fire Department, Indiana

Brian Kazmierzak, Battalion Fire Chief
Underwriters Laboratories
Steve Kerber, Fire Research Engineer
Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission

Tesfai Giorgis, Senior Civil Engineer
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
INVESTIGATIVE TEAM .................................................................................................. 3
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ............................................................................................... 4
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ................................................................................................ 7
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. 9
Organization of this Report ........................................................................................ 13
Methodology .............................................................................................................. 14
Terminology ............................................................................................................... 14
Frequently Used Terms ............................................................................................. 15
PART I
BACKGROUND ............................................................................................................ 19
Prince George’s County, Maryland ............................................................................ 19
Combination Fire and Rescue System ...................................................................... 20
Fire/EMS Department Management .......................................................................... 21
Policy and Governance.............................................................................................. 24
Fire/EMS Battalions ................................................................................................... 25
Fire/EMS Stations and Apparatus.............................................................................. 27
Specifications of Initial Arriving Units ......................................................................... 31
Portable Radios ......................................................................................................... 32
DESCRIPTION OF THE STRUCTURE......................................................................... 34
Topography ............................................................................................................... 34
Building Construction and Features ........................................................................... 35
Windows and Doors................................................................................................... 39
Occupancy and Contents .......................................................................................... 40
Utilities ....................................................................................................................... 40
Exposures .................................................................................................................. 40
ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS ............................................................................... 41
Weather Advisories.................................................................................................... 43
INCIDENT OVERVIEW ................................................................................................. 45
Incident Timeline........................................................................................................ 45
57th Avenue Response .............................................................................................. 51
Unit/Crew Activities .................................................................................................... 51
FIRE BEHAVIOR .......................................................................................................... 58
Compartment Fires .................................................................................................... 58
Prior to Fire Department Arrival ................................................................................. 60
After Fire Department Arrival ..................................................................................... 62
PART II
FIRE OPERATIONS ..................................................................................................... 66
General Order Compliance ........................................................................................ 66
Situational Awareness ............................................................................................... 71
Two-In, Two-Out ........................................................................................................ 76
Rapid Intervention Crew (RIC) ................................................................................... 77
Incident Command..................................................................................................... 78
Acknowledging Task Assignments ............................................................................ 79
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Emergency Evacuation .............................................................................................. 79
Personnel Accountability ........................................................................................... 80
Apparatus and Equipment Standardization ............................................................... 82
EMS OPERATIONS ...................................................................................................... 83
EMS Initial Treatment and Transport of Injured Personnel ........................................ 83
BEHAVIORAL HEALTH ............................................................................................... 88
Available Resources .................................................................................................. 88
COMMUNICATIONS .................................................................................................... 90
Organization and Staffing .......................................................................................... 90
Call Processing and Dispatch .................................................................................... 91
Supplemental Information .......................................................................................... 92
PSC Response on February 24, 2012 ....................................................................... 93
Command Channel .................................................................................................... 95
Response to Emergency Identifier Activations .......................................................... 95
Additional Resource Request .................................................................................... 96
Review of PSC Policies and Procedures .................................................................. 96
Radio Carrying Location ............................................................................................ 97
TRAINING ..................................................................................................................... 98
Training Requirements/Certifications ......................................................................... 98
Training Records ..................................................................................................... 101
Training Enhancement Recommendations .............................................................. 101
UNIFORMS AND PERSONAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT (PPE) ........................... 103
Uniforms .................................................................................................................. 103
Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) ..................................................................... 104
Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus (SCBA) .......................................................... 108
REFERENCES ............................................................................................................ 112
APPENDIX 1 – RECOMMENDATIONS...................................................................... 113
APPENDIX 2 – WEATHER ADVISORIES .................................................................. 121
APPENDIX 3 – FLOOR PLANS ................................................................................. 124
APPENDIX 4 – TRANSCRIBED RADIO TRAFFIC .................................................... 126
APPENDIX 5 – PSC INCIDENT PERFORMANCE RATING REPORT ...................... 168
APPENDIX 6 – EXCERPTS FROM SCBA REPORT ................................................. 172
APPENDIX 7 – PPE REPORT SUMMARY ................................................................ 195
APPENDIX 8 – GENERAL ORDERS ......................................................................... 235
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
On February 24, 2012, at 2111 hours, Prince George’s County Fire/Emergency Medical
Services (EMS) Department personnel responded to a structure fire at 6404 57th
Avenue in Riverdale Heights, Maryland. Upon arrival, Fire/EMS Department personnel
observed flames extending out of a basement window, pressurized smoke on the first
floor, and high winds impacting the rear of the structure.
Shortly after arriving, firefighters forced the front door of the structure, which
immediately changed the fire’s flow path and dynamics by adding a ventilation opening
above the fire. This situation was intensified by weather conditions (high winds
impacting the rear of the structure). Firefighters entered the structure through the front
door, placing themselves above the basement fire and in its outflow path. This exposed
them to high velocity and high temperature gases.
Two (2) firefighters were trapped on the first floor without the protection of a hose line,
when the front door shut behind them and changed the fire’s flow path. The hot smoke
and gases that were coming up the interior stairwell and escaping out the front door
were now contained to the first floor. This dropped the smoke layer to the floor and
temporarily increased the temperatures from floor to ceiling in the front room where the
firefighters were trapped. One (1) firefighter was able to self-rescue through a front
window and the other firefighter was removed through the front door by other
firefighters. The fire in the basement was burning unchecked, until an engine company
entered the basement from the rear of the structure and began putting water on the fire.
Ultimately seven (7) firefighters were injured; the two (2) firefighters that were trapped
on the first floor sustained the most significant injuries. There have been several
documented incidents in the County, as well as nationally, with similar concerning
tactics and operations, that have injured or killed firefighters, such as DCFD Cherry
Road LODD[1], SFFD Diamond Heights LODD[2], and BCoFD Dowling Circle LODD[3].
This makes the recommendations of this report vitally important.
The Safety Investigation Team (Team) visited the scene, reviewed statements,
conducted interviews, and gathered data during the course of the investigation. The
Team identified many factors that contributed to the outcome and injuries to the
firefighters. While the report details all of these factors, the Team identified the
following as most critical:
1. An effective size-up was not completed, including a 360-degree survey walk

around the building, as well as evaluating environmental conditions.
2. No incident action plan was communicated, and firefighters were dangerously

positioned above and in the outflow path of the fire.
7
Executive Summary
3. A firefighter emergency occurred, but no MAYDAY was effectively

communicated.
4. Multiple existing policies and procedures were not followed.
5. Training deficiencies were identified at all levels.
6. Command, control, and accountability deficiencies were identified at all levels.
While the Team analyzed the entire incident, the focus of this investigation was to
determine what happened, what factors led to the injuries and, most importantly, what
recommendations should be made so future incidents do not have similar or worse
outcomes. During the course of the investigation, the Team prepared many
recommendations intended to assist the Prince George's County Fire/EMS Department
in improving the operational safety of personnel, fireground operations, command and
control of fire incidents, as well as training. These recommendations, which are listed
throughout the report, are separated into categories termed: immediate (red – Life
safety & firefighter survival), short term (yellow – Relatively easy to implement), and
long term (green – May require significant planning including fiscal impacts). A
complete list of all recommendations is provided in Appendix 1.
8
INTRODUCTION
On February 24, 2012, at 2111 hours, the Prince George’s County Fire/Emergency
Medical Services (EMS) Department responded to a structure fire at 6404 57th Avenue,
Riverdale Heights, Maryland. During firefighting operations, seven (7) firefighters were
injured. Some of these firefighters received significant burn injuries and were
hospitalized for a long period of time. Given the severity of the injuries and the
magnitude of the event, an investigative team was initiated by Fire Chief Marc S.
Bashoor, in accordance with General Order 08-18: Safety Investigation Team (SIT)
referred to in this report as the “Team.”
Additionally, The Prince George’s County Fire/EMS Department’s Office of the Fire
Marshal conducted its investigation to determine the origin and cause of the fire.
Assisted by members of the Prince George’s County Police Department and Special
Agents from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF), the Fire
Marshal’s Office determined the fire was incendiary in nature. At the time of this writing,
this case remains as an open active criminal investigation.
In an effort to ensure that the safety investigation did not interfere with the criminal
aspects of the case, the two investigations were conducted separately, and under strict
confidentiality. While the Office of the Fire Marshal focused on the origin and cause, the
Team conducted a comprehensive review and analysis of the operational components
of this incident. Specifically, the Team was tasked with reviewing the initial
reporting/dispatch/response to the incident, the incident operations, the firefighter
injuries, and incident mitigation.
The information in this report is factual and was validated by multiple sources prior to
inclusion in this document. The Team had months to examine the incident and develop
recommendations. In contrast, the first arriving crews on the scene had only seconds to
make critical incident decisions and take action.
On behalf of the entire Team, attached is the final report of the 6404 57th Avenue
incident. It provides an overview of the events, the findings associated with the fire
incident, lessons learned, and recommendations.
Here is a brief overview of the critical points that are discussed in depth within the
report.
COMMAND AND CONTROL OF INCIDENT OPERATIONS

Command and control of incident operations is a primary responsibility of unit and
command officers. Command presence and control of the dynamic situations
associated with structure fires is a critical element to safely mitigate an incident. This
incident demonstrated the need to establish one standardized County-wide system of
command documentation, control and management during incident operations. A
standardized fireground tactical command board, sheet, and system needs to be
9
Introduction
established and distributed to all chief officers within the Prince George’s County
Fire/EMS Department. This County-wide tactical command sheet/board must be
required for use in any multi-unit response to ensure command and control of incident
operations.
FIREGROUND SAFETY AND ACCOUNTABILITY

Firefighter safety and accountability are critical to safe fireground operations. Crew
integrity and accountability during incident operations must be maintained at all times to
ensure the safety of the personnel. It is imperative that the Department adopt a culture
of personal safety by the members and embrace fireground operational safety practices
during incident operations.
A life-threatening firefighter emergency occurred during the initial company operations.

A firefighter MAYDAY was not transmitted effectively at the 57th Avenue fire incident.
Company Officers and firefighters need to recognize life-threatening events and
transmit MAYDAYs immediately. There are numerous recommendations that address
improvements to fireground operations, firefighter safety, accountability and lessons
learned from this incident.
PERSONAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT

A firefighter’s Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) is often the last line of defense
against injury in critical situations, such as entrapment. It is imperative that the
Department foster a culture that ensures all personnel wear only Department approved,
NFPA compliant PPE. An evaluation of the PPE worn by the injured firefighters on this
incident revealed that several of them, including those most seriously injured, were
wearing non-approved PPE items. Regular inspections are recommended to ensure
compliance with all policies related to PPE, including the 10-year expiration contained in
current NFPA standards.
STRATEGY AND TACTICAL OPERATIONS

Strategy and tactical decision making are the basic foundations of effective and safe
incident operations. The present fire environment, as well as occupant and firefighter
survivability, are all key factors in strategic and tactical decision making at structure
fires. This incident involved critical strategic and tactical decisions by the initial arriving
unit and command officers. There are many training recommendations in the report that
identify the need to develop and deliver a standardized strategy and tactics training
program for all ranks.
ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS AND WIND-DRIVEN FIRES

Environmental conditions, such as wind, are significant factors that can dramatically
impact fire development and spread. Personnel operating at this incident experienced
significant sustained winds and gusts that impacted fire development and spread.
Firefighter training curriculums must incorporate the impact that environmental
conditions have on fire development and spread at structure fires.
10
Introduction
FIREGROUND COMMUNICATIONS
Effective fireground communications during fireground operations are important
elements of incident command, firefighter safety, and accountability. Structure fires are
complex incidents that require effective communications to ensure the continuity of
operations by the personnel and incident command. There were numerous portable
radio transmission issues during this incident. The report addresses the challenges
associated with radio communications during the incident, identifies the lessons learned
and provides recommendations.
RISK ASSESSMENT AND DECISION MAKING AT STRUCTURE FIRES

Initial arriving company officers at structure fires “make or break” the incident
operations, by their initial decisions. The initial implementation of the strategic and
tactical operations are set by the first arriving company officers. Scene size-up, building
construction, environmental conditions, fire development and spread, as well as
occupant and firefighter survivability are all important components of risk assessment
and decision making for unit and incident command officers. This incident involved
critical decision making by the first arriving unit and command officers. The report
addresses the challenges the officers faced during incident operations at the fire.
COMMAND AND COMPANY OFFICER TRAINING

Training is the foundation of safe fundamental fireground operations at structure fires. A
comprehensive basic training program for command and company officers is an
important component to be successful at structure fires. This incident illustrates the
need for a Department-wide comprehensive basic training program that focuses on the
fundamentals of fireground operations. There are many training recommendations
contained within the 57th Avenue fire incident report. Compliance with all policies and
procedures is critical to ensure personnel operate safely during routine and emergency
situations. The crews operating at this incident did not follow all existing policies and
procedures.
FIRE BEHAVIOR AND SIZE-UP

Size-up by company and command officers is an initial critical task that must be
conducted by first arriving officers. Completing an initial size-up by first arriving officers
provides intelligence for them to develop strategic and tactical decisions at structure
fires. The 57th Avenue fire incident demonstrates the critical need to ensure a complete
360-degree size-up of the fire conditions, building construction, environmental
conditions, and life safety. A thorough understanding of fire behavior, including fire flow
paths and the impact of ventilation and weather conditions, provides essential
knowledge to effectively establish an appropriate incident action plan. The Fire
Behavior Chapter describes the fire behavior related to this basement fire, and explains
the significance entering through the front door on the floor above the fire prior to getting
water on the fire with high winds impacting side Charlie.
EMS TRIAGE, TREATMENT, AND TRANSPORT

Response to structure fires requires the response of Emergency Medical Service (EMS)
units. EMS units provide the necessary resources to triage, treat, and transport
11
Introduction
occupant victims or injured firefighters. EMS units need to assemble the necessary
equipment and standby in a location on the fireground that enables the providers to
access any victims or injured firefighters. This incident illustrated the need to have EMS
resources respond to all structure fires. There were multiple firefighter injuries that
required the use of EMS personnel and units available to triage, treat, and transport the
firefighters.
12
Introduction
ORGANIZATION OF THIS REPORT

This report is organized into two main sections: PART I and PART II. PART I of the
report is intended to provide a detailed description of the facts pertaining to and leading
up to the emergency situation that injured the firefighters. This includes background
information, a description of the structure, the environmental conditions, an incident
overview, and the fire behavior up until the emergency. This section only includes
verifiable facts. PART II of the report is an analysis of the incident, which describes the
factors that led to the outcome, as well as the recommendations. This section includes
an analysis of the fire operations, EMS operations, behavioral health, communications,
training, and personal protective equipment.
This report does not contain the names of the individuals involved in this incident;
therefore, each is identified using their unit designation and riding position. Table 1
identifies the naming scheme of individuals that may be discussed throughout this
report. Riding assignments are not standardized within the Prince George’s County
Fire/EMS Department; therefore, these position descriptions were derived from written
statements, and are based on the individual company riding assignments.
Table 1: Personnel Description (Riding Position)

E807B E809 E801 E812
Engine 807B Officer Engine 809 Officer Engine 801 Officer Engine 812 Officer
Engine 807B Driver Engine 809 Driver Engine 801 Driver Engine 812 Driver
Engine 807B Nozzleman Engine 809 Nozzleman Engine 801 Nozzleman Engine 812 Nozzleman
Engine 807B Forcible Entry Engine 809 Layout Engine 801 Layout Engine 812 Forcible Entry
Engine 807B Layout/Backup Engine 801 Back-up Engine 812 Exterior Assist
Engine 807B 2nd-line Engine 801 Hall
TK809 TK801 SQ801 BC884
Truck 809 Officer Truck 801 Officer Squad 801 Officer Battalion Chief 884
Truck 809 Driver Truck 801 Driver Squad 801 Driver
Truck 809 Forcible Entry Truck 801 Forcible Entry Squad 801 Firefighter 1
Truck 809 Can Truck 801 Hook & Can Squad 801 Firefighter 2
Truck 809 Hook/Ladders Truck 801 Ladders 1 Squad 801 Firefighter 3
Truck 801 Ladders 2 Squad 801 Firefighter 4
Truck 801 Ladders 3 Squad 801 Firefighter 5
Truck 801 Tillerman Squad 801 Firefighter 6
13
Introduction
METHODOLOGY
The Team gathered a wide variety of data and conducted dozens of interviews during
the course of the investigation. Members of the Team obtained statements from and/or
interviewed the majority of personnel who responded to 57th Avenue.
Data gathered included:

 Policies
 Procedures
 Manuals
 Pictures
 Videos
 Written statements from personnel who responded to the incident
 Radio tapes
 Gear worn by injured personnel
 Incident reports
 Fire Marshal’s Office origin and cause investigation
 Training records
 Apparatus and equipment specifications
 Building material information
It should be noted that, over the course of the investigation, the Team determined that
specific medical treatment was outside the scope of this report. Rather, the report
addresses the management and coordination of EMS resources on the scene and the
process by which additional resources were requested and obtained.
TERMINOLOGY
All of the times used in this document are expressed using the 24-hour clock.
The Prince George’s County Fire/EMS Department has adopted the International
Phonetic Alphabet, which assigns a word to each letter of the alphabet, as listed below:
A – Alpha H – Hotel O – Oscar U – Uniform

B – Bravo I – India P – Papa V – Victor
C – Charlie J – John Q – Quebec W – Whiskey
D – Delta K – Kilo R – Romeo X – X-ray
E – Echo L – Lima S – Sierra Y – Yankee
F – Foxtrot M – Mike T – Tango Z – Zulu
G – Golf N – November
These words are used whenever it is necessary to identify any letter of the alphabet
over the 700/800 MHz radio system or refer to the sides and interior quadrants of a
building (see Figure 1). All of the quoted communicated text in the document was taken
directly from recorded radio transmissions or phone calls. As a result, there are
deviations from the phonetic alphabet listed above.
14
Introduction
The term “exposure” refers to a structure that is attached or adjacent to the fire building.
Exposures are commonly identified with a letter corresponding to the side relative to the
fire building.
Figure 1: Terms used to describe Building Sides and Interior Quadrants
FREQUENTLY USED TERMS

Box Alarm – A complement of apparatus dispatched to a fire emergency. Typically
consists of four (4) Engines, two (2) Trucks, one (1) Rescue Squad, and one (1)
Command Officer.
Divisions – Responsible for the operations within a defined geographic area under the
direction of Command or other designated officer (divisions are locations, often referring
to floor number).
Emergency Identifier (EI) – The button and function on a public safety radio, used to
alert other radio users and dispatch of a potential life threatening situation.
EMS Task Force – A special alarm for a specific reason involving predetermined units.
Currently, two (2) Basic Life Support (BLS) ambulances and one (1) Advanced Life
Support (ALS) ambulance shall be dispatched.
Engine – Vehicle designed to carry water and hose, whose task is to extinguish fire.
15
Introduction
Fire Task Force – A special alarm for a specific reason involving pre-determined units.
Currently, two (2) engine companies, one (1) special service, and a breathing air unit
shall be dispatched.
Groups – Responsible for the operations with a specific functional assignment under
the direction of Command or other designated officer. Groups are tasks, i.e., Search
Group, Safety Group.
Immediate Danger to Life and Health (IDLH) – Refers to potential atmospheres that
firefighters can find themselves working in during the course of their duties.
Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) – The ensemble of specialized clothing and

SCBA meant to be worn by firefighters to protect them from the hazards of an IDLH
environment.
Quadrant – Geographic area of structure normally divided into four (Alpha – Delta).
Rescue Squad – A special service vehicle designed to carry equipment and personnel
specializing in rescue situations.
Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus (SCBA) – An atmosphere-supplying respirator

used by firefighters for which the breathing air source is designed to be carried by the
user. An SCBA wearer must be capable of carrying the weight of an air tank.
Side Alpha – Designated front side on a building; usually the street or address side and
continuing clockwise through Delta.
Truck – A special service vehicle designed to carry a complement of ground ladders as

well as a larger aerial ladder.
Working Fire Dispatch – Terminology used by Public Safety Communications (PSC)

and/or the Incident Commander to announce/request the dispatch of additional pre-
determined units to the scene of a confirmed working incident. In effect at the time of
incident, units included a BLS transport unit, ALS transport unit, safety officer, EMS
officer, and an additional command officer (if only one command officer is responding
on the call).
Incident Command System

The Incident Command System (ICS) is a standardized, on-scene, all-hazards incident
management approach that:
 Allows for the integration of facilities, equipment, personnel, procedures, and
communications operating within a common organizational structure
 Enables a coordinated response among various jurisdictions and functional
agencies, both public and private
 Establishes common processes for planning and managing resources
16
Introduction
ICS is flexible and can be used for incidents of any type, scope and complexity. ICS
allows its users to adopt an integrated organizational structure to match the
complexities and demands of single or multiple incidents. To limit the number of
responsibilities and resources being managed by any individual, the ICS requires that
any single person's span of control should be between three (3) and seven (7)
individuals, with five (5) being ideal. In other words, one (1) manager should have no
more than seven (7) people working under them at any given time. If more than seven
(7) resources are being managed by an individual, then that individual is overloaded
and the command structure needs to be expanded by delegating responsibilities (e.g.
by defining new sections, divisions, or task forces - see Figure 2). If there are fewer
than three, then the position's authority can probably be absorbed by the next highest
rank in the chain-of-command.
Figure 2: ICS Command Structure
17
Introduction
Strategy and Tactics

Fire Officers use industry accepted guidelines (i.e., the National Incident Management
System and Prince George’s County Fire/EMS Department General Orders),
collectively known as “strategy and tactics” to mitigate emergency incidents.
“Strategies” are overall objectives, initially determined by the first arriving officer and
subsequent arriving command officers, until the incident is brought to conclusion.
“Tactics” are specific actions that support the overall strategy. An example of a strategy
at a house fire would be to find and extinguish the fire, while an example tactic to
achieve this goal would be a specific method of attacking the fire if it were located in the
basement level of the structure.
18
BACKGROUND
This Chapter provides an overview of Prince George’s County and its combination
(career and volunteer personnel) Fire/Emergency Medical Services (EMS) system.
PRINCE GEORGE’S COUNTY, MARYLAND

Prince George's County is a County located in the State of Maryland, immediately north,
east, and south of Washington, D.C. (see Figure 3). According to the 2010 census, it's
estimated that the County has a population of 871,233. Prince George's County is a
part of the Baltimore-Washington, D.C. Metropolitan Area.
The County has a total area of 498.45 square miles (1,291.0 square kilometers), of
which 485.43 square miles (1,257.3 square kilometers or 97.39 percent) is land and
13.01 square miles (33.7 square kilometers or 2.61 percent) is water. The Patuxent
River forms the County's eastern border with Howard, Anne Arundel, and Calvert
Counties.
Prince George's County was granted a charter form of government in 1970 with the
County Executive elected as the head of the Executive Branch and the County Council
members as the leadership of the Legislative Branch.
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Part 1 Background
Figure 3: Regional Map (Prince George’s County outlined in red)
COMBINATION FIRE AND RESCUE SYSTEM

Prince George's County Fire/EMS Department (PGFD) delivers services through a
network of 44 fire stations strategically positioned throughout the County. Stations are
staffed with 782 career and approximately 1,137 volunteer personnel, which protect a
population of over 871,233 residents. The Department is responsible for all fire
suppression and prevention throughout the County and provides both Basic Life Support
(BLS) and Advanced Life Support (ALS) emergency medical care. In addition, the
Department provides:
• Technical rescue capability in instances of cave-in or collapsed structures
• Hazardous materials containment and mitigation
• Water rescue including swift water and boat operations
• Fire investigations
• Emergency planning
• Community education programs
20
Part 1 Background
The Department has mutual aid and automatic mutual aid agreements with the
surrounding jurisdictions, and it supports regional and national emergency response
operations during disaster situations.
The annual call volume for the Department in 2011 was 129,562 incidents with
emergency medical responses accounting for nearly 80 percent of services. The County
has not yet achieved full build-out. It is anticipated that the population will continue to
grow and overall call volume and support requirements will increase and become more
challenging.
FIRE/EMS DEPARTMENT MANAGEMENT

The Prince George's County Fire/EMS Department is composed of four distinct
commands - Emergency Services Command (ESC), Administrative Services Command
(ASC), Support Services Command (SSC), and Volunteer Services Command (VSC).
Each of these commands is headed by a Deputy Fire Chief who reports directly to the
Fire Chief (see Figure 4). The ESC is responsible for daily operations of all emergency
services, both Fire and EMS, career and volunteer. The ESC incorporates both career
and volunteer Firefighters/Emergency Medical Technicians (EMT).
The Administrative Services Command includes Human Resources, Logistics and

Supply, Fiscal Affairs, Facilities and Resource Planning, and Apparatus Maintenance.
The ASC incorporates both career firefighters and civilian employees.
The Support Services Command includes the Office of the Fire Marshal, Risk
Management and Safety, Professional Standards and Compliance, the Fire/EMS
Training Academy, and Information Management.
The Volunteer Services Command acts as a liaison between the Fire/EMS Department
and the volunteer corporations and handles all issues involving the individual volunteer
companies. Individual station management of the volunteer staffed stations is the
responsibility of the volunteer chiefs for those stations.
Chain-of-Command
General Order 01-03: Chain-of-Command, delineates the Prince George’s County
Fire/EMS Department emergency incident chain-of-command from highest to lowest
rank:
 County Fire Chief
 Career Deputy Fire Chief
 Career/Volunteer Assistant Chief
 Volunteer Division Chief
 First Due Volunteer Company Chief
 First Due Volunteer Company Deputy or Assistant Chief with “A” Chief radio
designation
 Battalion Chief /First Due Volunteer “B” Chief
 Other Volunteer Chief Officers (in order listed on assignment)
21
Part 1 Background
 Battalion Chief (other than dispatched on the assignment)

 Captain (in order listed on assignment)
 Lieutenant (in order listed on assignment)
 Sergeant (in the order listed on the assignment)
 Fire Technician (in order listed on assignment)
 Fire Fighter - Certified Level III, II, I, or Paramedic Certified Level II, I (in order
listed on assignment)
22
Part 1 Background
Figure 4: Organizational Structure of Fire/EMS Department (in affect at time of fire)
23
Part 1 Background
POLICY AND GOVERNANCE

The Department is bound by various local, regional, State, and Federal policies,
procedures, ordinances, and regulations.
Local
Per Subtitle 11, Fire Safety Law, the Fire Chief maintains final approval authority over all
policies and procedures, or General Orders, for the Department. These are developed
and maintained by a cross section of personnel throughout the entire Department.
Regional
Prince George’s County is a member of the Metropolitan Washington Council of
Governments which is a regional organization composed of 21 local governments
surrounding Washington, D.C. Prince George’s County is also a member of the National
Capital Region (NCR), which was established by the National Capital Planning Act of
1952 and includes jurisdictions across the Metro Washington area. Through its
committees, the NCR works to advance preparedness and response in the region.
State
The Maryland Occupational Safety and Health (MOSH) enforces occupational safety
and health laws, standards, and regulations. Prince George’s County must comply with
the rules, regulations, and procedures established by the Maryland Institute for
Emergency Medical Services Systems (MIEMSS) which address the licensure, training,
and certification of Emergency Medical Services providers for the entire State.
Federal
Chapter 29 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), Part 1910 establishes
Occupational Safety and Health Standards, which apply to public and private employers.
Specifically, 29 CFR 1910.134 addresses respiratory protection requirements for
firefighters and others.
24
Part 1 Background
FIRE/EMS BATTALIONS
A breakdown of Battalions (see Figure 5) into communities and stations within the
County is as follows:
Battalion 1 serves all communities in the general vicinity of Capitol Heights, Landover,
Seat Pleasant, and Largo. Battalion 1 includes Stations: 805, 806, 808, 830, 833, 837,
838, 846.
Battalion 2 serves all communities in the general vicinity of New Carrollton, Lanham,
Bowie, and Glenn Dale. Battalion 2 includes Stations: 816, 818, 819, 828, 839, 843,
848.
Battalion 3 serves all communities in the general vicinity of District Heights, Morningside,
Hillcrest Heights, Suitland, and Forestville. Battalion 3 includes Stations: 817, 823, 826,
827, 829.
Battalion 4 serves all communities in the general vicinity of Langley Park, Chillum,
Brentwood, College Park, and Riverdale. Battalion 4 includes Stations: 801, 807, 809,
812, 813, 834, 844, 855.
Battalion 5 serves all communities in the general vicinity of Accokeek, Camp Springs,
and Oxon Hill. Battalion 5 includes Stations: 821, 824, 832, 842, 847.
Battalion 6 serves all communities in the general vicinity of Laurel, Greenbelt,

Beltsville, and Berwyn Heights. Battalion 6 includes Stations: 810, 811, 814, 831, 835,
841, 849.
Battalion 7 serves all communities in the general vicinity of Upper Marlboro, Clinton, and
Brandywine. Battalion 7 includes Stations: 820, 825, 836, 840, 845.
25
Part 1 Background
Figure 5: Prince George’s County Fire/EMS Stations and Battalions
26
Part 1 Background
FIRE/EMS STATIONS AND APPARATUS

Most of the apparatus in Prince George’s County is owned by the Volunteer Fire
Corporations. The Prince George’s County Fire/EMS Department has system-wide
standards for apparatus specifications that meets or exceeds the National Fire
Protection Association (NFPA) Standard #1901, Standards for Automotive Fire
Apparatus. The standards were developed by representatives within the Department to
establish the minimum specifications to add the apparatus to the fleet. The apparatus
listed below meets or exceeds the specifications as outlined in General Order 02-27:
Procedure for Replacement/Additions to Fire/EMS Department Fleet.
Co. 801 - Hyattsville VFD

Engine, Truck, Rescue Squad, Ambulance
Co. 805 - Capitol Heights VFD

Engine, Ambulance
Co. 806 - St. Joseph's Drive Community Fire/EMS Station

Engine, Rescue Squad, Technical Rescue, Ambulance, Paramedic Ambulance
Co. 807 - Riverdale VFD

Engine, Ambulance
Co. 808 - Seat Pleasant VFD

Engine, Ambulance
Co. 809 - Bladensburg VFD

Engine, Truck, Ambulance
Co. 810 - Laurel VFD

Engine, Tower, Ambulance, Medic
Co. 811 - Branchville VFD

Engine, Ambulance
Co. 812 - College Park VFD

Engine, Truck, Ambulance, Foam Unit, Haz-Mat Support, Medic
Co. 813 - Riverdale Heights VFD

Engine, Ambulance
Co. 814 - Berwyn Heights VFD

Truck, Rescue Squad, Ambulance, Rescue Boat
Co. 815 - Fire Investigations Division

Fire Investigation Unit, Bomb Squad
27
Part 1 Background
Co. 816 - Northview Community Fire/EMS Station

Engine, Paramedic Ambulance, Haz-Mat, Breathing Air/Light Unit
Co. 817 - Boulevard Heights VFD

Engine, Ambulance
Co. 818 - Glenn Dale VFA

Engine, Rescue Engine, Rescue Squad, Ambulance, Medic
Co. 819 - Bowie VFD

Co. 820 - Marlboro VFD

Engine, Truck, Rescue Squad, Brush
Co. 821- Oxon Hill VFD

Engine, Tower, Ambulance
Co. 823 - Forestville VFD

Engine, Tanker, Ambulance
Co. 824 - Accokeek VFD

Engine, Tower, Ambulance, Brush, Mini-pumper
Co. 825 - Clinton Volunteer Fire Department, Inc.

Engine, Truck, Ambulance, Water Supply, Medic
Co. 826 - District Heights VFD

Engine, Truck, Ambulance, Medic, 2nd Ambulance
Co. 827 - Morningside VFD

Engine, Rescue Squad, Ambulance, Rescue Engine
Co. 828 - West Lanham Hills VFD

Engine, Truck, Mini-pumper
Co. 829 - Silver Hill VFD

Engine, Truck, Ambulance, Paramedic Ambulance, Medic
Co. 830 - Landover Hills VFD

Paramedic Engine, Ambulance, Medical Ambulance Bus
Co. 831 - Beltsville VFD

Engine, Truck, Ambulance, Brush
28
Part 1 Background
Co. 832 - Allentown Road VFD

Engine, Truck, Ambulance, Brush
Co. 833 - Kentland VFD

Engine, Rescue Engine, Tower, Ambulance, Mini-pumper
Co. 834 - Chillum-Adelphi VFD

Co. 835 - Greenbelt VFD

Engine, Ambulance
Co. 836 - Baden VFD

Engine, Tanker, Ambulance, Brush
Co. 837 - Ritchie VFD

Engine, Truck
Co. 838 - Chapel Oaks VFD

Engine, Quint, Paramedic Ambulance
Co. 839 - Bowie VFD

Engine, Tower, Ambulance, Canteen, Brush, Tanker
Co. 840 - Brandywine VFD

Engine, Rescue Engine, Rescue Squad, Paramedic Ambulance
Co.841 - Beltsville VFD

Paramedic Engine, Ambulance, Multi-Casualty Support Unit
Co. 842 - Oxon Hill VFD

Paramedic Engine, Paramedic Ambulance
Co. 843 - Bowie VFD

Engine, Tower, Ambulance, Brush
Co. 844 - Chillum Fire Station

Paramedic Engine, Medic
Co. 845 - Marlboro VFD

Engine, Tanker, Haz-Mat Support, Breathing Air/Light Unit, Medic
Co. 846 - Kentland VFD

Paramedic Engine, Ambulance, Medic
29
Part 1 Background
Co. 847 - Allentown Road VFD

Engine, Rescue Squad, Ambulance, Medic, Boat, Technical Rescue Support
Co. 848 - West Lanham Hills VFD

Engine, Ambulance
Co. 849 - Laurel Volunteer Rescue Squad

Rescue Engine, Rescue Squad, Ambulance, Dive, Boat
Co. 853 - Special Events Units

Engine, Ambulance, Paramedic Ambulance
Co. 855 - Bunker Hill Fire Station

Co. 856/857 - Water Rescue and Recovery Team
Co. 858 - Fire Boat
Co. 862 - Apparatus Maintenance
Co. 865 - Fire/EMS Training Academy
Apparatus Inspections
There are system-wide requirements for regular apparatus inspections as specified in
General Order 02-17: Monthly Vehicle Inspection Report. Prince George’s County
Fire/EMS has developed procedures that address the regular inspection and
maintenance of Fire/EMS apparatus. The apparatus in Prince George’s County is
subjected to annual Inspection by the Prince George’s County Volunteer Fire and
Rescue Association (PGCVFRA) standards committee. This inspection is done to check
for equipment that is mandated to be carried as per the PGCVFRA by-laws, Section 16,
Appendix A:
 Sub Section 2: Class “A” Pumpers

 Sub Section 6: Ladder Trucks
 Sub Section 7: Rescue Squad Trucks
This is compliant with the standards set forth by the Maryland State Firemen’s
Association (MSFA) standards committee and the NFPA standards for fire apparatus.
30
Part 1 Background
SPECIFICATIONS OF INITIAL ARRIVING UNITS

The three (3) units described below were the initial units on the scene and directly
involved in the firefighter emergency situation.
Engine 807B
Engine 807B is a 1992 Seagrave Pumper that seats eight (8), and has a 1,250 gallon
per minute (gpm) Waterous pump. It carries 750 gallons of water and 15 gallons of
Foam. It has a split hose bed for supply line, which carries 1,000 feet of 3-inch on both
sides. The Engine has six (6) pre-connected hose lines.
The primary attack line on the 57th Avenue incident was a crosslay of 200 feet of 1¾
inch hose. The Team was able to verify, through hose testing records, that the affected
sections of hose passed its annual hose test in 2011. The line was equipped with an
Elkhart Chief, 75 PSI 60-200 GPM Fog Nozzle.
Truck 809
Truck 809 is a 1992 Seagrave that seats six (6) personnel and has a 100 foot medium
duty rear mounted aerial. It carries 150 feet of 3½-inch hose for ladder pipe operations.
Truck 809 is equipped with a complement of ladders that includes:
1 - 10 feet folding ladder
1 - 28 feet extension ladder
1 - 16 feet straight ladder
1 - 35 feet extension ladder
1 - Little Giant
Truck 809 is equipped with the equipment and tools as required by the PGCVFRA
Standards Committee in conjunction with the standards set forth by the MSFA and the
NFPA. Truck 809 also carried an MSA Thermal Imaging Camera Model 5200.
Engine 809
Engine 809 is a 2008 Pierce Arrow that seats seven (7) personnel. It has a 1,250 gpm
Waterous Pump, carries 500 gallons of water and 15 gallons of foam. It has a split hose
bed for supply line and carries 1,000 feet of 4-inch Large Diameter Hose on one side
and 600 feet of 3-inch hose on the other side. The Engine has five (5) pre-connected
attack lines.
31
Part 1 Background
PORTABLE RADIOS
The Department utilizes the Motorola APX 6000XE portable radio. This is a 3-watt radio
capable of multiple programming set up options. They are software programmable
digital radios that meet Federal Communications Commission (FCC) requirements for
narrowband (12.5 kHz) frequency utilization.
Figure 6: Motorola APX 6000XE Portable Radio with Motorola PMMN4065 Remote
Speaker Microphone
32
Part 1 Background
These portable radios are assigned unit identifiers based on the Unit designation and
individual radio ID number. For example:
Truck 809
Truck 809 Driver Truck 809 OIC
Truck 809*3 Truck 809*1
Truck 809*4 Truck 809*2
Engine 809
Engine 809 Driver Engine 809 OIC
Engine 809*4 Engine 809*1
Engine 809*3 Engine 809*2
Engine 807B
Engine 807B Driver Engine 807B OIC
Engine 807B*1 Engine 807B*2
E807B*3 E807B*4 E807*5 E807*6
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DESCRIPTION OF THE STRUCTURE
The structure located at 6404 57th Avenue in Riverdale Heights, Maryland, was a single
family dwelling. Cross streets included Somerset Road to the North and Sheridan Street
to the South. The single-family dwelling, originally built in 1967, had overall dimensions
of 30 feet by 26 feet which was set back 30 feet from 57th Avenue on a 4,007 square
foot lot.
TOPOGRAPHY
The topography of the lot is displayed in Figures 7, 8, and 9. From 57th Avenue to the
front of the structure (Side Alpha), the land was relatively level. There was a grade of
28 percent sloping from the front of the structure (Side Alpha) to the rear (Side Charlie).
Just beyond the rear (Side Charlie) of the structure, the lot dropped off sharply and had
a significant slope to the neighboring property line.
Figure 7: Topography of 6404 57th Avenue (dotted line indicates grade)
34
Part 1 Description of the Structure
Figure 8: Topography of 6404 57th Avenue Pictometry – Orthostatic
Figure 9: Topography of 6404 57th Avenue Pictometry - Oblique from West
BUILDING CONSTRUCTION AND FEATURES

The front (Side Alpha) of the building faced East toward 57th Avenue. The view of the
structure from 57th Avenue displayed a one story, single-family dwelling (Figure 10).
Due to the nature and slope of the land, much of the basement was above grade and
could be observed from Sides Bravo, Charlie, and Delta. From Side Charlie, the
structure appeared to be two stories.
35
Figure 10: 6404 57th Avenue, Riverdale (Google Street View)
The National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) classifies building construction into five
fundamental construction types. Accordingly, the structure located at 6404 57th Avenue
was classified as a Type V, or wood-frame construction. The structure was built mostly
with nominal 2-inch by 4-inch wood studs in a platform-frame method. That is, the first
floor wood joists (nominal 2-inch by 10-inch - Figure 11) were completely covered with
sub-flooring to form a platform, upon which the exterior walls and interior partitions were
built. The roof of the structure was a low profile gable roof that was constructed with
wood joists (nominal 2-inch by 6-inch - Figure 12), wood decking, tarpaper, and asphalt
shingles. The exterior walls on Side Alpha were finished with metal siding, while Sides
Bravo, Charlie, and Delta were finished with cement-asbestos wall shingles.
36
Figure 11: Floor Joists from Side Charlie Basement Exterior
Figure 12: Roof Joists from Kitchen Area
37
Interior
The interior of the structure had a total of four (4) bedrooms and two (2) full bathrooms.
The first floor had two (2) bedrooms, one (1) full bathroom, and a kitchen with a total
floor space of approximately 708 square feet (Figure 13). The basement of the
structure was renovated in the 1990’s to a completely finished basement with two (2)
bedrooms, a very small kitchen and bathroom (Figure 14). The HVAC unit and water
heater were located in the basement.
The flooring and interior stairs were finished with carpet throughout the structure. All of
the walls and ceilings were finished with standard ½-inch drywall. The heights of the
ceilings were 8 feet on the first floor and roughly 7½ feet in the basement.
Figure 13: First Floor Plan
It was not determined whether the interior door at the top of the basement stairs was
open or closed or even in place at all. All other interior doors on the first floor were
found removed from their hinges and placed near the openings leaning against the wall.
38
Figure 14: Basement Floor Plan
WINDOWS AND DOORS

On the first floor there were a total of nine (9) windows. The windows were vinyl type
double hung except for the large center window in the living room which had two (2)
narrow double hung windows on each side of it. The basement level had a total of six
(6) windows, two (2) on each of the Bravo, Charlie, and Delta sides. The four (4)
basement windows on sides Bravo and Delta were approximately 30-inches wide by 20-
inches tall, while the two (2) basement windows on Side Charlie were much larger
measuring approximately 38-inches wide by 57-inches tall. The front door was locked
at the time of the fire.
39
OCCUPANCY & CONTENTS

The dwelling had been condemned prior to the time of the fire. There was little, if any,
furniture or other contents within the structure. The Prince George’s County
Department of Environmental Resources (DER) issued a violation on January 29, 2010,
for structural issues resulting from poor grading and sloping of the back yard. The last
known occupants to live in the structure vacated the structure in October 2011.
UTILITIES
The structure had water supplied by Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission
(WSSC) and electrical service supplied by Potomac Electric Power Company (PEPCO)
at the time of the fire. The electrical service entrance and meter was located on Side
Delta of the structure. The structure did not have natural gas service at the time of the
incident. The gas meter, which was previously located on Side Bravo of the structure,
had been removed by Washington Gas Company after service was discontinued in
October 2011.
EXPOSURES
Two similar single-family dwellings were located in the lots immediately to the north
exposure (Side Delta) and south exposure (Side Bravo) of 6404 57th Avenue. The
space between the structure fire and the neighboring single-family dwellings were
approximately 9 feet on both Sides (Bravo and Delta). The homes located behind 6404
57th Avenue (Side Charlie), were approximately 125 feet away and down a significant
grade. Intense fire, described by firefighters as “blowing,” was coming out of the Side
Bravo rear basement window so far that it prevented personnel from traveling between
the primary fire structure and the Bravo exposure. While the Bravo and Delta
exposures were relatively close to the structure fire, there was no indication that the
threat of fire extension to the neighboring exposures was considered during operations.
The Charlie exposures were windward and far enough away that they did not influence
operations, and had little impact on the event.
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ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS
Showers and thunderstorms (ahead of a cold front) moved through the region, including
the Riverdale area, during the afternoon and evening of February 24, 2012. Around
1930 hours the cold front moved into the region causing the humidity and dew point to
plummet and the wind direction to change and increase in velocity.
On Friday, February 24, 2012, at 2055 hours the National Weather Service Station at the
College Park Airport (KCGS), which is located approximately 0.98 miles from the incident
scene, reported the following conditions:
Temperature: 51.8 degrees Fahrenheit

Dew Point: 24.8 degrees Fahrenheit
Humidity: 30 percent
Barometric Pressure: 29.57 inches
Wind Speed: 20.7 mph
Direction: NW
Gust Speed: 36.8 mph
Conditions: Clear
At 2115 hours NWS Station KCGS reported the following conditions:
Temperature: 50.0 degrees Fahrenheit

Dew point: 26.6 degrees Fahrenheit
Humidity: 40 percent
Barometric Pressure: 29.60 inches
Wind Speed: 13.8 mph
Direction: NW
Gust Speed: 27.6 mph
Conditions: Clear
Table 2 outlines the wind and temperature conditions at the closest reporting weather station,
College Park – approximately 1 mile away, leading up to the time of the incident (2111 hours).
Figure 15 visually shows the wind direction during the time frame the incident occurred.
Table 2: Wind Conditions

Time Wind Wind Gust
Direction Speed Speed
19:25 Calm Calm -
19:50 WNW 16.1 mph 24.2 mph
20:30 WNW 16.1 mph 33.4 mph
20:55 NW 20.7 mph 36.8 mph
21:15 NW 13.8 mph 27.6 mph
21:55 WNW 12.7 mph 18.4 mph
41
Part 1 Environmental Conditions
Figure 15: Wind Direction
42
The charts below graph the weather indicators for the entire 24 hour period of February 24,
2012. A quick look at the Wind Speed chart shows that the sustained winds reached the 15-20
miles per hour range around 1930 hours and gusts were recorded in the 20-40 miles per hour
range.
WEATHER ADVISORIES
On Thursday, February 23, 2012, at 1241 hours, the Prince George’s County Fire/EMS
Department’s Public Information Officer (PIO) relayed a “Fire Weather Advisory,” to go into
effect on Friday, February 24, 2012, from the National Weather Service (NWS) in Sterling,
Virginia. This advisory was sent via email to the “Fire/EMS Department” distribution list and is
available in Appendix 2.
The alert covered portions of Maryland, Northern Virginia and the Eastern Panhandle of West
Virginia. The NWS alert advised humidity levels of 25-30 percent, winds from the west at 25 to
30 miles per hour (mph) with gusts up to 50 miles per hour, and fuel moisture of 5 to 7 percent.
The Department’s “Fire Weather Advisory” was issued because of similar conditions one year
prior leading to severe brush fires in the County and the Washington Metropolitan Area.
At 0353 hours EST, the NWS issued a Wind Advisory in effect from 1500 hours on February
24, 2012, until midnight EST. This advisory covered the DC Metro Area (including Prince
George’s County). The advisory stated:
43
“The strongest winds will be late this afternoon through this evening. Winds…
Southwest late this afternoon 20 to 30 mph with gusts up to 55 mph… becoming
west this evening.
Precautionary/Preparedness Actions… A wind advisory means that wind gusts over

45 mph are expected. Winds this strong can make driving difficult… Especially for high
profile vehicles. Use extra caution.”
At 0807 hours, on February 24, 2012, the Department’s Operational Safety Officer sent an
email advisory (Appendix 2) to Battalions 1-7, the Duty Chief, the Volunteer Safety Division
Chief, the EMS Duty Officer and the Department’s Call Center. This Safety Report advised
them to expect winds of 30 mph and higher gusts, and to expect severe thunderstorms for late
afternoon. This email was not received by any of the initial unit/command officers.
44
INCIDENT OVERVIEW
INCIDENT TIMELINE
This Chapter describes the sequence of events on the evening of Friday, February 24,
2012, beginning with the initial 911 calls for service and ending when the last units
cleared the scene of 6404 57th Avenue, Riverdale Heights, Maryland. This information
was developed using data gathered from computer aided dispatch printouts and radio
audio recordings.
21:08:26 - 911 Call Reports a House Fire On 57TH Avenue

21:08:26 - The Prince George’s County Public Safety Communications (PSC)
received the first of four separate 911 calls from a neighbor stating that a house
was on fire.
21:09:53 - An additional entry advised that the caller indicated that 6338 was on
fire and that smoke and flames were visible.
21:11:03 - Units Are Dispatched
21:11:03 - PSC dispatched a box alarm assignment for a house fire (Table 3)
with units responding on Talk Group 8 Alpha 3.
Table 3: 57th Avenue Initial Responding Units in order of dispatch

Resource Company Personnel
Engine 807B 6
Engine 809 4
Engine 801 6
Engine 812 4 + 1*
Truck 809 5
Truck 801 8
Rescue Squad 801 8
Command Officer Battalion Chief 884 1
**Volunteer Chief 809A
**Volunteer Chief 812
**Volunteer Chief 812A
*Probationary member
**Responded, but not initially dispatched.
21:11:44 - PSC received an additional call advising that a neighbor’s home at

5401 is on fire.
45
Part 1 Incident Overview
21:12:27 - PSC received a third call advising of a house on fire in the area.
21:12:55 - Units Arrive On the Scene
21:12:55 - Engine 807B Officer gave layout instructions and indicated arriving on
the scene.
21:13:10 - Engine 809 Officer indicated arriving on the scene and picking up
Engine 807B’s supply line. Engine 809 was positioned behind Engine 807B and
Truck 809.
21:13:28 - Engine 807B Officer advised a two-story, single-family structure with

fire showing, requested a Working Fire Dispatch (WFD), and passed command.
21:13:35 - PSC added text advising the wind was spreading the fire to the house
next door.
21:13:56 - Truck 809 indicated arriving on the scene.
21:13:44 - Command Is Established
21:13:44 - Volunteer Chief 809A indicated arriving on the scene and established
incident command.
21:14:05 - A Working Fire Dispatch (WFD) assignment was dispatched (Table 4)
Table 4: Working Fire Dispatch Units

Resource Company
Ambulance 855
Medic 812
Safety Officer Northern Safety Officer
EMS Officer EMS Duty Officer
Citizen Services Unit *890
Citizen Services Unit *891
Ambulance *809
Command Officer *Northern Division Chief
*Responded, but not dispatched
21:14:37 - Incident Command (Volunteer Chief 809A) assigned Squad 801 rapid
intervention duties.
21:14:57 - Truck 801 indicating arriving on the scene.
21:16:27 - Squad 801 indicated arriving on the scene.
46
21:16:35 - Volunteer Chief 812 was assigned Division 1.
21:16:45 - Volunteer Chief 812A was assigned the Basement Division.
21:17:45 - Command Requested Evacuation and A Fire Task Force

21:18:18 - Command requested an EMS Task Force.
21:19:00 - Fire Task Force dispatched (Table 5).
Table 5: Fire Task Force Units

Resource Company Personnel
Engine 855 6
Engine 828 4
Truck 812 4 + 1*
Air Unit 716
*Probationary member
21:19:46 - EMS Task Force was dispatched (Table 6)
Table 6: EMS Task Force Units

Resource Company
Ambulance 812
Ambulance 801
Medic 830
21:20:19 - Command advised there was a downed firefighter behind Engine

807B.
21:21:01 - Engine 828 arrived at staging area.
21:21:49 - Ambulance 809 indicated arriving on the scene.
21:22:02 - Office of the Fire Marshal personnel en route.
21:23:30 - Truck 809 members have been accounted for and unable to make
radio transmissions due to an activated portable radio Emergency Identifier (EI)
on the radio. One injured firefighter being assessed by EMS.
21:24:34 - Per Command, all Truck 809’s crew has been accounted for, having
radio problems with EI, three injured firefighters at this time.
21:24:39 - Medic 812 indicated arriving on the scene.
47
21:25:07 - All units on the fireground switch over to Talk Group 8 Alpha 4.
21:25:10 - Primary on the fire floor is negative.
21:25:51 - Duty Chief requested two additional Medic units and the status of
helicopters for possible patient transport.
21:26:29 - Ambulance 812 staging.
21:26:40 - Duty Chief indicated arriving on the scene and assumed command.
21:27:03 - Engine 855 and Truck 812 assigned as Rapid Intervention Crew.
21:27:28 - Paramedic Engine 830 dispatched.
21:27:39 - Medic 844 dispatched.
21:27:40 - Fire Is Extinguished
21:27:40 - Basement Division advised the fire in the basement is out.
21:27:50 - Basement Division advises of bad spots on the first floor, where it
looks like the fire burned through.
21:29:09 - Squad 801 advised that the first floor primary search was negative.
21:29:15 - Units instructed to standby for personnel accountability check by the

Duty Chief.
21:29:18 - Northern Safety Officer is on the scene.
21:30:42 - Engine 807B stated having four injured firefighters.
21:33:13 - Engine 809 advised that Truck 809 has two injured firefighters. They
advised the injured as Truck 809’s Officer and Forcible Entry.
21:34:01 - Ambulance 809 is en route to MedStar transporting Truck 809’s

Forcible Entry with burns to hands, back, and knees (Priority 2).
21:34:22 - Truck 801 reported the primary in the basement was negative.
21:34:33 - Paramedic Engine 830 indicated arriving on the scene.
21:35:50 - Eagle 2 (US Park Police Medevac helicopter) ten minute ETA landing
at Rittenhouse and Kenilworth Avenue.
48
21:41:00 - 30 Minute Duration

21:42:01 - Office of the Fire Marshal personnel indicated arriving on the scene
(FM1501).
21:42:53 - Per Command, all personnel accounted for and requested an

additional BLS unit, may return Eagle 2.
21:43:37 - Engine 828 will provide the landing zone at Rittenhouse and
Kenilworth Avenue.
21:44:58 - Volunteer Chief 812 reported that the secondary search of the
structure is negative and that the interior stairs are burned out.
21:45:30 - Ambulance 801 with a priority 1 firefighter, Truck 809’s

Officer to the MedStar trauma center.
21:46:26 - Interior advised secondary search was negative, Engine 801 and
Truck 801 are in the basement, Squad 801 on Division 1, Engine 812 on Exterior,
and advised personnel that the interior stairs are out.
21:49:32 - Update from Command: had a 40 feet by 30 feet one-story house; fire
throughout the basement and first floor. Primary negative. Secondary
conducted by Volunteer Chief 812 and Engine 812. Engine 855 and Truck 812
are the Rapid Intervention Crew. The EMS Duty Officer has the EMS group.
Both Safety Officers are on the scene. Volunteer Chief 809A has operations. A
total of eight firefighters were injured. The fire is out at this time.
21:50:03 - The Command post is between Engine 807B and Truck 809.
21:51:24 - Volunteer Chief 807 en route to MedStar to be the Fire Department

contact.
21:55:25 - Canteen to 57th Avenue and request for the Bus (PSC2).
21:56:57 - Northern Operations Commander indicated arriving on the scene.
21:57:25 - Eagle 2 is on the ground.
21:57:49 - Medic 812 with Ambulance 807 to MedStar, with three injured
firefighters from Company 807: two with burns to the face (Priority 3), and one
with fractured rib (Priority 2).
49
21:58:16 - Critical Incident Stress Debriefing Team Leader notified.
21:59:21 - Medic 830 to MedStar with an injured firefighter from Company 807:
Engine 807B Nozzleman with burns to ear (Priority 2).

22:11:18 - Northern Safety Officer en route to MedStar.
22:11:34 - Eagle 2 returned and did not transport.
22:11:58 - Engine 855 & Truck 812 to assume the duties of Engine 801, Truck
801, and Squad 801, who had been operating in Division 1 and in the basement.
22:12:54 - Medic 830 transport completed.
22:18:51 - Citizen’s Services Unit (CSU) 891 cleared.
22:21:13 – Command stated 42 personnel operating, discontinue accountability,

units assisting Fire Investigations.
22:24:01 - Command released Paramedic Engine 830, Medic 844,

and Ambulance 811.
22:24:43 - Northern Safety Officer 861 en route.
22:26:07 - Ambulance 812 en route to Station 809 with five firefighters.
23:02:03 - Command released Truck 801, Squad 801, and Engine 828.
23:04:33 - Fire Chief cleared the scene and headed to MedStar.
01:41:35 - Address corrected from 6334 to 6404 57th Avenue.
02:58:51 - Command Terminated.
04:17:06 - Incident closed.
50
57TH AVENUE RESPONSE

All dispatched units commenced an emergency response (emergency lights and sirens)
to the alerted address and all successfully arrived. In addition, three volunteer chief
officers responded with their respective companies and operated as chief officers on the
scene. All units, except for Engine 807B, Engine 801 and Truck 801, responded from
their quarters upon dispatch. All units arrived in order of assignment, but due to the
location of the structure, the first two engines (Engine 807B and Engine 809), the two
trucks (Truck 809 and Truck 801), and the Chief Officer (Volunteer Chief 809A) all
arrived within seconds of each other. The following sections are accounts of the unit
and personnel activities as each arrived on the scene.
UNIT/CREW ACTIVITIES
The following written accounts of each unit’s activities were derived from the witness
statements provided by all personnel, from those units operating on the incident. Every
effort was made to corroborate both the entire unit’s activities and the individual crew
member’s activities with the other available incident records (CAD data, radio system
recording). The unit’s accounts are listed in order of arrival on the scene. The
information in this report is factual and was validated by multiple sources prior to
inclusion in this document. If it was not verifiable it was not included.
Engine 807B
Engine 807B was on the air, returning from another call, and was approaching their
quarters on Queensbury Road when the initial dispatch was put out. Engine 807B
responded as the first due engine company and arrived on the scene, stopping to lay
out a single 3-inch supply line from the fire hydrant located at 6325 57th Avenue.
Engine 807B Officer placed the unit on the scene and advised of a “two-story” single-
family dwelling with fire showing from Side Bravo. Engine 807B Officer observed
embers and smoke blowing across the street when the engine stopped to lay out.
Engine 807B Officer observed fire showing from the basement level window on Side
Bravo. Engine 807B Officer verbally passed command and requested the “Working Fire
Dispatch.” Engine 807B’s crew pulled a 200 foot 1¾-inch attack line, which was
subsequently charged. The crew from Engine 807B forced entry to the front door on
Side Alpha.
Based on statements and physical evidence, there is no factual indication that any
water was discharged from the attack line prior to or during the emergency that caused
the firefighter injuries. There is no verifiable evidence that Engine 807B’s hose line ever
entered the structure, but it was most certainly not in the structure at the time of the
emergency. Four personnel from Engine 807B were injured, treated, and transported to
MedStar/Washington Hospital Center for treatment.
51
Injured Member Injury Type

Engine 807B Nozzleman Burns
Engine 807B Officer Burns
Engine 807B 2nd-Line Burns & Chest Trauma
Engine 807B Layout/Backup Burns
Truck 809
Truck 809 responded from quarters, as the first due truck company, and arrived on 57th
Avenue right behind Engine 807B. When Truck 809 stopped to let Engine 807B layout,
Truck 809 Can dismounted the truck and had to walk up the street as it pulled away.
Truck 809 Officer observed a lot of smoke moving extremely fast through the front yard
and across the street upon exiting the truck. Truck 809 Officer and Truck 809 Forcible
Entry proceeded directly to the front door on Side Alpha of the structure. Both of them
entered the structure with full PPE, including SCBA, but without the protection of a hose
line. Truck 809 Officer and Truck 809 Forcible Entry began primary searches on the
first floor. At some point during the primary search, as conditions worsened, the front
door closed, trapping Truck 809 Officer and Truck 809 Forcible Entry inside the
structure. This situation could not have occurred if a charged hose line was operating
inside the structure at the time the door slammed shut. They were the only firefighters
operating on the first floor at that time.
Truck 809 Forcible Entry was too large in physical stature to fit through the small
window opening that he found on Side Alpha. Truck 809 Forcible Entry was unable to
self-evacuate, and remained trapped inside. Due to rapidly deteriorating conditions,
Truck 809 Officer was forced to self-rescue through another small window on Side
Alpha.
After exiting the structure, Truck 809 Officer screamed (to those on the exterior) that a
firefighter was trapped inside. Truck 809 Officer then proceeded to the front door (Side
Alpha) in an attempt to search for and rescue Truck 809 Forcible Entry, who was
trapped inside. At this point multiple firefighters on the exterior assisted Truck 809
Officer in the search, rescue, and removal of Truck 809 Forcible Entry. Both Truck 809
Officer and Truck 809 Forcible Entry sustained serious injuries and were transported to
MedStar/Washington Hospital Center.
While the interior operations were occurring, Truck 809 Driver and Truck 809
Hook/Ladders were on the exterior throwing ladders to the structure. Truck 809
Hook/Ladders threw two ladders (Sides Alpha and Bravo), while Truck 809 Driver threw
one ladder (Side Alpha).
Injured Member Injury Type

Truck 809 Officer Burns & Respiratory Burns
Truck 809 Forcible Entry Burns
52
Chief 809A
Volunteer Chief 809A arrived simultaneously with Engine 807B, Truck 809, and Engine 809.
Volunteer Chief 809A established the “57th Avenue Command” and confirmed Engine 807B’s
report of fire showing from Side Bravo of the basement. Volunteer Chief 809A (now in
command) assigned Rescue Squad 801 as the Rapid Intervention Crew and assigned Truck
801 to ladder the rear of the structure and give a report on the conditions. Command assigned
Chief 812A to Basement Division and Chief 812 to Division 1 (first floor).
Command was notified by Communications of Emergency Identifier (EI) activations from Truck
809. Command acknowledged the EI’s from Communications and advised that there were
“people looking for ‘em now, looks like I got fire from three sides, we’re trying to get a line on it
now.”
Figure 16: Emergency Identifier Activation Chart
Duration
Date and Time Event Radio ID Radio Alias Target Alias (seconds) Emergency
02/24/2012 09:17:06 PM Call 2520760 TK 809 *2* A3 (INC 50) 535.00 Yes
Note: Time stamp does not indicate when the EI was activated, only when the system
was capable of recording the event. The radio malfunction of TK 809 *2* may have
caused a delay in the recorded time stamp of TK 809 *1* portable radio EI activation.
Engine 809
Engine 809 was dispatched, as the second due engine company, and responded from
quarters with Truck 809, arriving almost simultaneously with Engine 807B and Truck 809.
Engine 809 stopped at the fire hydrant, located at 6325 57th Avenue, to ensure Engine 807B’s
water supply. Engine 809 arrived, as Engine 807B was still positioning up the street on Side
Alpha of the structure. All personnel assigned to Engine 809, other than Engine 809 Driver,
ran up the street to Engine 807B. Engine 809 personnel pulled a second crosslay (200 feet of
1¾-inch) from Engine 807B.
Engine 809 Officer and crew members indicated in their statements that they noticed
heavy winds blowing from Side Charlie of the structure to Side Alpha. The crew of
Engine 809 stated the wind conditions created zero visibility in the front yard, and they
had to mask up in the driveway of the house before advancing their hose line. Engine
809 Officer ordered this attack line to be deployed down the Delta Side of the structure,
near the Delta exposure, to access the basement on Side Charlie of the dwelling.
Engine 809 Officer observed access into the basement via a rear door. Engine 809
Officer attempted to contact command via radio, but was interrupted due to other radio
traffic. Engine 809 Officer decided to enter the structure with the two crew members,
wearing full PPE including SCBA, to extinguish the fire in the basement. Engine 809’s
personnel continued extinguishment of the basement division until they heard the
Evacuation Tones (apparatus air horns) and exited the structure.
53
Engine 809 Officer walked back to Side Alpha to do a face-to-face with the Incident
Commander. While doing so, he noticed several injured firefighters, and assisted with
patient care. Engine 809 Nozzleman and Engine 809 Layout remained on Side Charlie,
while Engine 809 Officer was on Side Alpha assisting with the EMS care of the injured
personnel. Later, the remaining Engine 809 crewmembers (along with Engine 801 crew
members) re-entered the structure from the Side Charlie basement door, to finish
extinguishing the remaining fire and hot spots. No Engine 809 personnel were injured
during the duration of the incident.
Truck 801
Truck 801 was dispatched, as second due truck company, and responded from
Baltimore Avenue and Queensbury Road (in Company 807’s area). They arrived
seconds behind the units from companies 807 and 809 and positioned at the corner of
Sheridan Street and 57th Avenue. Truck 801 personnel proceeded to the structure to
perform their fireground responsibilities. Truck 801 Driver, Truck 801 Ladders 1, and
Truck 801 Ladders 2, threw a total of four ground ladders to Sides Charlie and Delta.
After hearing commotion on Side Alpha, Truck 801 Forcible Entry and Truck 801 Tiller
became involved in removing the incapacitated Truck 809 Forcible Entry from Side
Alpha of the house. Truck 801’s interior crew operated in the Basement Division and
assisted with utility control and overhaul. No personnel assigned to Truck 801 were
injured during this incident.
Engine 801
Engine 801 was dispatched, as third due engine company, and responded from Toledo
Terrace and Belcrest Road. Engine 801 laid out a single 3-0inch supply hose line from
5715 Sheridan Street and positioned on 57th Avenue behind Truck 809. Crew members
stretched a 400 foot 1¾-inch attack hose line from Engine 801 (as a third attack line).
They ran the line down the Bravo Side of the Bravo Exposure building (see Figure 18)
and ended up on Side Charlie of 6404 57th Avenue. Engine 801’s personnel arrived on
Side Charlie of the structure, where Engine 809 had already commenced an attack on
the fire from the Side Charlie basement door. After the evacuation, Engine 801
personnel were directed to enter the basement from Side Charlie and continue
extinguishing any hot spots. No personnel from Engine 801 were injured during this
incident.
Engine 812
Engine 812 was dispatched, as fourth due engine company, and responded from
quarters. Engine 812 arrived on the scene and ensured the water supply for Engine
801, who laid out their supply line from 5715 Sheridan Street. The crew from Engine
812 stretched a 400 foot attack line from Engine 812 and extended it with another 250
feet of hose line from standpipe packs (fourth attack line). The crew advanced the line
to Side Charlie and stood by awaiting direction from the Incident Commander. Their
attack line was used to extinguish hot spots. No personnel from Engine 812 were
injured during this incident.
54
Rescue Squad 801

Rescue Squad 801 was dispatched, as the third due special service, and responded
from quarters. Rescue Squad 801 positioned two blocks down on Ravenswood Road
and was assigned Rapid Intervention Crew (RIC) duties. Rescue Squad 801 Officer
and crew members placed their RIC equipment at the Side Alpha/Bravo corner of the
property, and Rescue Squad 801 Officer started a survey walk around the house. The
injured firefighters were already out of the structure when Rescue Squad 801 Officer got
up to the Command Post. The Incident Commander ordered Rescue Squad 801 to
perform a search of the first floor (Division 1), to make sure there weren’t any other
firefighters still inside the house. Rescue Squad 801 Officer and crew members entered
the structure and commenced a search and found no additional firefighters. No
personnel assigned to Rescue Squad 801 were injured during this incident.
Note: The seventh injured firefighter, from Station 812, sustained a minor laceration to
the hand, and self-transported to the hospital after the incident.
55
Figure 17: Apparatus Placement
56
Figure 18: Hose and Ladder Diagram
57
FIRE BEHAVIOR
The following Chapter describes the fire growth and development based on information
gathered from witness/firefighters statements, post-incident scene examination,
fireground audio, video from a helmet camera, photos, and weather data. Before
discussing the fire behavior of this particular incident, a general review and discussion
of compartment fire dynamics is provided.
COMPARTMENT FIRES
The term “compartment fire” is used to describe fire behavior within a room, confined
space, or structure. This fire behavior is different from a fire in the open, because the
structure that surrounds the fire controls both the air supply and the thermal
environment. This in turn influences the spread and growth of a fire, its maximum
burning rate, and its duration [4].
Fire is a combustion reaction which requires fuel, oxygen, heat, and a self-sustained
chemical chain reaction. For simplicity in analyzing fire behavior, the self-sustained
chemical chain reaction can often be assumed to occur. The remaining elements
required to sustain combustion are represented by the fire triangle in which each leg of
the triangle represents fuel, oxygen, and heat (Figure 19). If one leg of the fire triangle
is removed or reduced enough, the combustion reaction will stop and the fire will be
extinguished.
Figure 19: Fire Triangle
Compartment fires typically start in a fuel-limited state in which the size and energy
released by the fire is limited by the amount of available fuel to burn (Figure 20). After
some time, the smoke from the fire, which is unburned fuel, will fill the space with more
than enough fuel, but limit the available oxygen (Figure 21). In other words, the fire will
transition from a fuel-limited state (Figure 20) to a ventilation-limited state (Figure 21) in
which the fire size and energy release rate depend on the compartment openings (e.g.,
windows, doors) that allow fresh air into the structure. As depicted in Figure 21 the fire
triangle is only complete at the interface of the air, smoke, and heat. Therefore, when
58
Part 1 Fire Behavior
examining fire behavior of ventilation-limited fires the openings to the structure are
critical.
Figure 20: Compartment fire Figure 21: Compartment fire

dynamics – Early fire growth dynamics – Ventilation limited
In addition to what openings are available, the fire flow path(s) can have a significant
influence on structure fire behavior. The concept of the fire flow path refers to the fluid
dynamics or how a particle will travel within the structure. The flow path can be
influenced by a number of variables including the configuration of the structure (i.e.,
interior rooms, ceiling heights, walls, number of openings, location of openings, etc.),
exterior environmental conditions (i.e. temperature, wind, etc.), and the fire induced
flows. These variables will create pressure differences. When there is a pressure
difference across a crack, gap, or other opening a flow will result from the higher
pressure to the lower pressure [5].
Fire is an exothermic reaction, which means that it releases energy, typically in the form
of heat and light. This release of heat increases the temperature of the gases in the
compartment. The higher temperature gases are less dense than the surrounding,
cooler gases, which induce a buoyancy force, driving the hot gases up (Figure 22). This
concept is analogous to a raft floating on a pool; the raft, or more specifically the air
inside the raft, is less dense than the water in the pool driving the raft to the top of the
pool. These fire-induced, buoyancy forces will generally fill the compartment with
smoke from the top down, creating a positive pressure in the upper layer, a neutral
plane, and a negative pressure below (Figure 22). The neutral plane is the location
where there is no difference in pressure. The location of this plane can be estimated
based on the fire size, the configuration of the structure, and its openings.
59
Figure 22: Compartment fire dynamics – Buoyancy forces and pressure

differences
These principles are based on laws of physics: the conservation of mass, momentum,
and energy. It is important to understand these principles when analyzing fire behavior
and making ventilation decisions during fire department operations. A couple of
important implications are highlighted below:
1. Generally, the location of an opening relative to the neutral plane will determine if
the opening is an outflow (above the neutral plane), an inflow (below the neutral
plane), or a combination of inflow and outflow. It should also be noted that
adding openings will affect the location of the neutral plane.
2. The same amount of mass exiting the structure (smoke) will also enter the
structure (air). From previous discussion on ventilation-limited fires, this addition
of air will increase the size of the fire. In other words, adding openings before
water is being put on the fire will increase the fire size and temperatures within
the structure.
PRIOR TO FIRE DEPARTMENT ARRIVAL

This fire originated in the basement of the condemned structure. Prior to the arrival of
the fire department, the fire had enough fuel (minimal contents), oxygen, heat, and time
to grow to a size sufficient to have smoke and flames exiting at least two windows in the
basement on sides Bravo and Charlie. A conceptual schematic of the early fire growth
is shown in Figure 23, and Figure 24 is a schematic of the conditions observed when
the fire department arrived.
60
Figure 23: Early fire growth Figure 24: Ventilation-limited conditions.
Flames extending out of the windows and observations of smoke throughout the rest of
the structure indicate that the fire had reached a ventilation-limited state. These two
windows were located in the Bravo quadrant of the basement and included the small
window in the bathroom on Side Bravo, and the larger window in the kitchenette on Side
Charlie (Figure 25). These windows, aided by the wind, provided an inflow of air that
supplied oxygen to the fire and supported rapid fire growth in the basement.
Figure 25: Initial flow path (Top view)
61
Figure 26: Initial flow path (Side View)
The exterior basement door of this house was initially intact and closed. The status of
the basement windows outside of the Bravo quadrant is not known. However, the scene
examination indicated that they were intact and closed at the start of the fire. All of the
windows and the door on the first floor were closed. Therefore, the two (2) windows in
the Bravo quadrant of the basement provided the only means of ventilation (Figure 25
and Figure 26) during the initial development of the fire. Based on the size and location
of the windows, the wind, and observations, it is likely that the majority of the inflow was
provided by the larger window on Side Charlie and the smaller window on Side Bravo
was mostly an outflow (this is represented by the size of the arrows in Figure 25).
The interior door to the basement steps was open, which allowed the smoke and hot
gases produced by the fire to fill both the basement level and first floor (Figure 26).
Smoke was initially observed pushing from the eves on the first floor. At this point, the
first floor of the structure was filled with smoke and was at a positive pressure (above
neutral plane), due to both the fire-induced, buoyancy-driven flows and the wind
conditions. Even though the interior door to the basement steps was open, this lack of
available oxygen and positive pressure prevented the spread of fire to the first floor and
kept the fire’s flow path in the basement level. The flow path of the fire was effectively
contained in the Bravo quadrant of the basement.
AFTER FIRE DEPARTMENT ARRIVAL

Approximately 6.5 minutes after the initial 911 call, the firefighters forced the door on the
first floor, Side Alpha of the structure. In the fire service, the term “ventilation” has been
defined as the systematic removal of the products created by a fire (i.e., smoke, hot
gases) and replacing them with cooler, fresh air to facilitate firefighting operations [6].
Historically, forcing the front door of the structure to make entry may not have been
62
thought of as “ventilation” by many firefighters. However, anytime an opening is created

ventilation has occurred.
The action of opening the front door immediately changed the fire’s flow path and
dynamics by adding an opening above the neutral plane. Thick, dark, black smoke
pushed out of the front door filling the front yard with smoke. The open front door added
an outflow on the first floor, which not only allowed the fire in the basement to grow and
increase in size, but also directed much of the hot smoke and gases up the interior
stairwell and out the front door (Figure 27 and Figure 28). This situation, which
occurred due to the natural fire-induced flows, was only intensified by the high winds
impacting side Charlie of the structure. The outflow path of hot smoke was in the same
area where Truck 809 Forcible Entry and Truck 809 Officer began their search. These
firefighters reported seeing only smoke initially, but eventually flames beginning to come
up the interior basement stairs.
Figure 27: Flow paths after front door open (Top view)
63
Figure 28: Flow paths after front door open (Side View)
Approximately 1.5 minutes after forcing the front door, firefighters on the interior of the
structure (first floor) noticed a sudden change in the airflows, which caused the front
door to slam shut. Once the front door was shut, the flow path of the fire once again
changed. The hot smoke that was coming up the interior stairwell and escaping out of
the front door was now trapped on the first floor. This dropped the smoke layer to the
floor and temporarily increased the temperatures from floor to ceiling in the front room.
Soon thereafter (approximately 30 seconds after the front door shut), windows were
broken on the first floor for firefighter self-rescue and exterior ventilation operations.
Prior to firefighters re-opening the front door on Side Alpha to initiate a rescue of Truck
809 Forcible Entry, Engine 809 firefighters on Side Charlie entered the basement and
began putting water on the fire. While the rescue was being completed, these
firefighters were able to extinguish the majority of the fire, improving conditions
throughout. Once rescues were completed, the structure was evacuated by command
and firefighters re-grouped, prior to completely extinguishing the fire.
Conclusions
1. Initial observations indicated that on arrival of the fire department there was a
ventilation-limited basement fire that was aided by high winds from northwest.
These observations included:
a. Flames out two basement windows.
b. Pressurized smoke condition on the first floor.
c. Significant and unusual smoke conditions in the front yard.
d. High winds impacting Side Charlie of the structure.
2. When the front door was opened on the first floor, the fire flow path changed and
the size of the fire increased. The additional ventilation, without the application of
water to the fire, made conditions within the structure worse (i.e., higher
64
temperatures and larger fire size) and drove much of the hot smoke up the
interior stairs and out the front door.
3. While the change in flow path occurred due to the natural fire-induced buoyant
forces, the wind conditions only added to this by driving hot smoke and gases up
the interior stairs and out the front door. This further increased the size and
intensity of the fire, and more rapidly changed the flow path.
4. Truck 809 Officer and Truck 809 Forcible Entry were in the outflow path and
exposed to high velocity and high temperature gases, adding significant
convective heat transfer, which ultimately resulted in serious burn injuries.
65
FIRE OPERATIONS
This Chapter addresses factors that impacted on-scene operations, including the unique
weather pattern at the time of the incident, strategy and tactics, and the incident
command structure. Individual unit actions were derived from Computer Aided Dispatch
(CAD) records, radio traffic recordings, and witness statements.
GENERAL ORDER COMPLIANCE

In the Prince George’s County Fire/EMS Department, all standing rules and regulations
pertaining to Fire/EMS Department operations are titled General Orders. These
documents are divided in to 13 “Divisions” with each General Order called a “Chapter.”
Staffing Requirements
Fire Department General Order 03-11: Standard Response Dispatch Procedure,
dictates the minimum staffing levels of the different types of apparatus responding to
and operating on emergency scenes within Prince George’s County. Below are the
minimum staffing levels for the type of units that operated on this specific incident.
 BLS ambulance/ALS ambulance - 2 personnel

 Engine Company - 3 personnel
 Truck Company - 4 personnel
 Rescue Squad - 4 personnel
At the time of dispatch all units indicated that they met or exceeded the minimum
personnel staffing level requirements.
Fireground Standard Operating Procedure for Structural Fires

General Order 06-01: Fireground Standard Operating Procedure for Structural Fires
contains step by step procedures for responding to and operating on the fire emergency
scene in Prince George’s County.
A summary of the single family dwelling and basement fire procedures, taken from
General Order 06-01, is displayed in Table 7. In addition, General Order 06-01 in its
entirety is provided in Appendix 8.
66
Part 2 Fire Operations
Table 7: Prince George’s County Fire/EMS Department General Order 06-01 Overview (Effective Date: January 2010)
3rd Due
1st Due 2nd Due 3rd Due 4th Due 1st Due 2nd Due BLS ALS
Special Ambo
Engine Engine Engine Engine Truck Truck Service Ambo
Establish a Position on Position to
Position in close proximity to scene and allow a path of exit for emergency transport. Report to
second water Side Alpha. provide
supply from Provide ladders, lights,
Dispatched Units – Position in close proximity. Triage area on Side A with Aid Bag, Oxygen, AED, Back
Establish a Ensure water
different ladders, lights, and vent. to
continuous water supply to 1st
source. OIC vent. Make side Charlie.
supply. Normally Engine. Ensure
size up Side obvious Obvious
pos. side Alpha. rescues made. Ensure water
Charlie (report rescues. rescues.
OIC size-up/radio Est. PASSED to 3rd Engine.
# floors, Ladder sides Ladder sides
return: address, # command. Ensure Establish RIC.
conditions, Alpha & Charlie &
floors, Type Ensure “2 out”. obvious Complete
rescues, Bravo. Delta. Ensure
Single construction, Type Assist 1st engine rescues size-up.
ground level Primary & Primary and
Board and Cot. Report to the IC. Evaluate occupants that escaped or rescued.
occupancy, with line & then made. Unless Assemble
Family basement Sec. search of secondary
Conditions found, advance back- directed, crew tools. Develop
Dwelling access) entire house search (start
Units making up staffing - Report to and operate with assigned company.

Level of response. up (higher GPM) should stand rescue plan.
Box Alarm Obvious (start w/ FIRE w/ FLOOR
ESTABLISH or attack line to by. Conduct Monitor radio.
rescues. FLOOR). ABOVE).
PASS command. floor/area above primary Request
Attack line via Force entry, Force entry,
Make obvious (via stairs) or as search of area Resources
Side Charlie Vent, Utility Utilities,
rescues. Attack back-up to initial crew is
for back-up or control, Check Check ext.,
IC. Prepare to administer ALS care without delay.

line to confine hose line. assigned.
confine/ ext., Salvage Salvage &
/control /ext. fire. Primary search
control/ ext. & Overhaul. Overhaul.
Primary search of of assigned
fire extension. OIC has Fire OIC has
fire area. area.
Primary search Floor Division. Above Fire
of assigned Report cond. Division.
area. to IC. Report to IC.
Advance line to
top of steps and
Advance line to
ANNOUNCE
exterior
attack method- Advance back
doorway to
Basement “HOLDING THE up line
basement.
STEPS” or positioned Standby and
Fire Advise IC if no Same as Same as Same as
“DIRECT above fire to await further
Procedures access exists. above above above
ATTACK”. protect 1st Eng direction.
NO ATTACK
Descend steps holding steps.
WITHOUT
and attack fire if
APPROVAL!!
possible.
(Check stairs
integrity!)
67
The following boxes summarize the tasks assigned to each of the respective units,
based on General Order 06-01: Fireground Standard Operating Procedure for Structural
Fires and their dispatched order. If it could be verified that a unit responsibility was
completed, the corresponding box was checked. If a unit completed the majority of their
fireground responsibilities satisfactorily, then they were determined to be in compliance
with General Order 06-01.
1st Due Engine – Engine 807B with 6 Personnel Radio Positions
D O
1 2
3 4 5 6
General Order 06-01 Tasks:

☒ Take steps to establish continuous water supply
☒ Apparatus on side Alpha
☒ Unit OIC shall complete an initial size-up and provide a brief radio return
☐ Advance an attack hose line
☐ Conduct a primary search of the immediate fire area
Complied with General Order 06-01: ☐ Yes ☒ No
2nd Due Engine – Engine 809 with 4 Personnel Radio Positions
D O
4 1
3 2

☒ Completed water supply
☒ OIC shall establish Command
☐ Ensure 1st attack hose line from the 1st Due Engine is advanced
☐ Advance 2nd attack hose line to the area or floor above the fire
68
Per General Order 06-01: Fireground Standard Operating Procedure for Structural
Fires, Engine 809 should have ensured the placement (and/or back-up) of Engine
807B’s attack line. Engine 809 Officer instead ordered the crew to advance the line to
Side Charlie. Engine 809 Officer stated there were attempts to contact the Incident
Commander by radio, but the Officer kept receiving the radio busy signal (bonk) and
was unable to transmit any information. The Engine 809 Officer made a decision to
enter the basement and attack the fire, without the knowledge of the Incident
Commander or crews operating on Division 1. Engine 809 Officer withdrew the crew
from the basement area when the emergency evacuation tone was sounded. Upon
exiting the structure, the Engine 809 Officer left the crew and went to perform face to
face communication with the Incident Commander.
3rd Due Engine – Engine 801 with 6 Personnel Radio Positions
D O
1 3
2 4
☒ Establish secondary water supply
☒ Advance attack line to Side Charlie
☒ Coordinate attack line placement with the IC
Complied with General Order 06-01: ☒ Yes ☐ No
4th Due Engine – Engine 812 with 4 Personnel Radio Positions
D O
1 2
3 4 5 6
☒ Complete secondary water supply
☒ Ensure attack hose line from the 3rd Due Engine is advanced
☐ Advance back-up line to Side Alpha, unless IC direction otherwise
69
1st Due Special Service – Truck 809 with 5 Personnel Radio Positions
D O
3 1
4 2

☒ Position Side Alpha ☐ Ventilation
☒ Ladder Sides Alpha & Bravo ☐ Open up for extension check
☒ Primary Search with 1st due engine ☐ Salvage and overhaul
☒ Force entry ☐ Secondary search
☐ Utility control ☐ OIC assume Division supervision
Truck 809, while primarily compliant with General Order 06-01, the driver operated
independently and without command’s knowledge.
2nd Due Special Service – Truck 801 with 8 Personnel Radio Positions
D O
1 5
2 3 4
☒ Position for Side Charlie ☒ Ventilation T
☒ Ladder Sides Charlie & Delta ☒ Open up for extension check
☒ Primary Search area above ☒ Salvage and overhaul
☒ Force entry ☐ OIC assume Division supervision
☒ Utility Control
70
3rd Due Special Service–Rescue Squad 801 with 8 Personnel Radio Positions
D O
1 2
3 4
5 6
☒ Establish Rapid Intervention Team
As illustrated above, there were multiple instances where units and/or personnel
deviated from existing standard fireground operational procedures. This is not a new
issue, and the Team strongly urges a complete re-evaluation of fireground standard
operating procedures.
Recommendation #1 (Red): The Department must develop a new training program

to better qualify personnel to function in areas of responsibilities particularly in the
areas of command, control, and accountability on the fireground.
As discussed in the Fire Behavior Chapter, personnel on this incident that were above
the fire and in its flow path were the most severely injured. There have been several
similar documented incidents in the County, as well as nationally, that have injured or
killed firefighters while operating in accordance with the previously described basement
fire procedures.
Recommendation #2 (Red): Basement fire tactics must be revised to reflect current

best practices. This should include the importance of getting water on the fire as
quickly as possible and not placing personnel unnecessarily above the fire, or in its
flow path.
The Team feels that this recommendation should be considered as a top priority
and, therefore, should be implemented immediately.
SITUATIONAL AWARENESS
Situational awareness can be described as having knowledge of the surrounding
environment. Personnel must be aware of what is happening around them and
understand how information, events, and their actions or inactions may impact
operations, throughout an emergency incident. The ability to understand these
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relationships, when confronted with complex and multiple factors, is critical in making
decisions during emergency incidents.
Initial On-Scene Weather Conditions

At 2115 hours the weather station at College Park Airport reported winds from the NW at 13.8
miles per hour (mph) gusting to 27.6 mph. The airport is located approximately 0.98 miles NW
of the incident scene.
The structure at 6404 57th Avenue is situated on a high sloping hill with Side Charlie facing
westward. During the initial stages of the incident the National Weather Service (NWS) data
shows winds blowing from the West-Northwest toward the East-Southeast direction.
Hazardous weather had been previously forecast and alerts were issued by both the
NWS and the Prince George’s County Fire/EMS Department to the normal distribution
lists and methods. As indicated previously in the Environmental Conditions Chapter the
Department’s Public Information Officer (PIO) and Operational Safety sent out weather
alerts via email (see Appendix 2). This information did not reach all personnel.
Recommendation #3 (Yellow): Develop and implement a formal process to

disseminate adverse weather advisories/alerts to ensure all personnel are aware of
changing conditions to aid during initial on-scene size-up.
It should be noted that although the weather and high wind were a contributing factor to the
unfortunate outcome of this incident, a similar outcome could have occurred without the high
wind, due to the natural fire-induced flows, with units operating above the fire and in the
outflow path.
Initial Size-up
During the initial size-up of the structure, the officers of Engine 807B, Truck 809, and Engine
809 did not anticipate the impact of the high wind conditions and the effect the sloping
topography on Side Charlie would have on fire conditions. According to the written statements
of on-scene personnel, the first arriving officers did not conduct a 360-degree survey of the
structure. All three unit officers made mention of the wind speed and smoke conditions upon
arrival, but did not factor its effect into their tactical operations.
In post-incident interviews, it is apparent that a full 360-degree scene size-up of the structure
was not completed, prior to initial entry into the structure. Engine 809 Officer stated that radio
transmissions were attempted upon his crew’s arrival on Side Charlie; however, he was unable
to complete this transmission due to radio interference and Emergency Identifier (EI)
activations. There were no radio transmissions from Side Charlie identifying the presence of a
well-developed basement fire and strong prevailing gusting winds. Information was not
relayed to command that there was Side Charlie exterior access to the basement fire.
Command did not have a clear picture of the wind conditions and Side Charlie, to allow it to be
factored into the strategic plan.
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Note: It may not always be feasible, particularly with larger homes, odd lots, and
different types of occupancies (e.g., multi-family, commercial, educational, industrial,
etc.) to perform a complete 360-degree survey. In instances where the first arriving
officer cannot visualize all sides of the structure, it is imperative for other arriving units,
particularly those assigned to the rear, to relay their findings.
Recommendation #4 (Red):
 Incorporate a 360-degree survey and the evaluation of environmental
conditions as part of the strategic and tactical plan development into future
revisions of the General Orders.
 The first arriving officer must make every practical and reasonable effort to
complete a 360-degree survey prior to making entry.
 Emphasize the importance of continuous situational reporting from critical
units, divisions, and groups.
Unit Officers did not recognize the volatile impact that creating openings on Side Alpha
would have on the fire behavior, specifically the fire flow paths.
Recommendation #5 (Yellow): Develop a Department-wide training program that

focuses on understanding fire behavior, fire flow paths, and how to “read” interior and
exterior smoke conditions to identify the location and predicted spread of a fire.
Upon arrival, there were no obvious rescues, or bystanders reporting that anyone was
trapped in the house. Although several 911 callers described the house as “empty” or
“vacant,” this information was never relayed by Public Safety Communications (PSC) to
responding units. The Company Officers on the initial arriving units and the Incident
Commander made the decision to perform a primary search to locate potential victims
solely because of the vehicle parked in the driveway. There was no announcement of
initial strategy and tactics.
Recommendation #6 (Green): Amend the General Orders to require Incident

Commanders to prioritize and announce critical information, including strategy
(defensive/offensive operations) that will impact incident outcomes and tactics, as a
part of the initial size-up report. This should also include classroom and hands-on
command, control, and accountability training.
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Vacant/Abandoned Buildings
On the 57th Avenue incident, the structure had been condemned and abandoned for an
extended period prior to the fire; however, there was no procedure in place to inform
responding firefighters of this important information.
The International Association of Arson Investigators and the United States Fire
Administration developed the “Abandoned Building Project,” [7] in response to the Line
of Duty Deaths of firefighters in Worcester, Massachusetts. It includes a building
marking system, pre-fire inspection, and other components, designed to help identify
structures that may pose increased risk of injury and death to firefighters, as well as,
reduce the number of incendiary fires in vacant structures.
“The objective of the project was the development of materials to assist public officials
in dealing with vacant or abandoned buildings within their jurisdictions. Materials
developed as part of the project were targeted toward the safety of fire suppression
forces involved in fighting fires in vacant or abandoned buildings and the reduction of
incendiary fires involving these properties. Materials developed as part of the project
were to become a ‘Tool Box’ that community leaders could select from to address
vacant and abandoned buildings and the hazards they represent.”
Recommendation #7 (Green): Consider adopting guidelines of the International

Association of Arson Investigators/United States Fire Administration’s, Vacant and
Abandoned Building Project/Toolbox.
Crew Integrity
Crews involved in incident operations within a hazardous environment must operate as
a member of a team of at least two or more qualified personnel. Team members are to
maintain contact with each other at all times by sight, voice, or physical contact,
depending on the conditions in which they are operating.
The Department’s General Order 06-01: Fireground Standard Operating Procedure for
Structural Fires, states that crews shall operate in teams of two or more with a portable
radio.
The Department’s General Order 06-07: Searching for Victims also states a minimum
crew shall be considered two people and a portable radio. It further states that it is
preferred that every member operating in the hazardous environment have a portable
radio, to facilitate contact with their supervisor or other team members.
General Order 06-07 further states that members entering an Immediate Danger to Life
and Health (IDLH) atmosphere will don all Personal Protective Equipment (PPE),
including Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus (SCBA). The officer-in-charge of the
search team is responsible for performing a rescue related size-up, identifying the fire’s
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location, all means of entrance and egress, and communicating the search and rescue
plan to the search team. Companies engaging in search operations will deploy in teams
of at least two personnel. Each search team will be equipped with a minimum of a
Department radio, hand lights, hydraulic forcible entry tool, set of irons, and a rope
(personal or rope bag). Units that are equipped with a Thermal Imaging Camera (TIC)
will utilize the camera while performing searches.
The Unit Officer will be responsible for:

 Ensuring that primary or secondary searches are conducted in a systematic
manner
 Providing the appropriate supervisor with search progress reports
The Incident Commander, Division Supervisor, and Unit Officer will each be responsible
for:
 Supervision and control of personnel under his/her command
 The safety and welfare of personnel under his/her command
Based on individual statements collected during the investigation the following are
deviations from General Orders regulating proper crew integrity practices which directly
and indirectly contributed to negative outcomes on the fireground.
 When Truck 809 stopped to permit Engine 807B to drop their supply line at the
hydrant, Truck 809 Can dismounted the apparatus without the officer’s
knowledge, forcing that firefighter to run up the street, compromising crew
integrity. Truck 809 Can proceeded to operate on Side Alpha.
 After the injured firefighters were out, Truck 809 Driver entered the structure
alone to conduct a search and operated a hose line on Division 1 without
knowledge of command.
 Engine 809 Driver left the pump panel and went to Side Alpha of the structure,
became engaged in patient care, and subsequently left the incident scene by
driving one of the EMS transport units to the hospital.
All of these actions were independent, and were not ordered or known by the unit
officer(s) and/or command.
There was no incident action plan verbalized or coordinated from the Incident
Commander. Fireground activities were independently initiated at the tactical unit or
individual level without coordination, and there was a lack of formal accountability during
or after the significant fireground events. The Incident Commander needs to have
knowledge of what units are assigned to a structure fire, their arriving order, and their
responsibilities as outlined in the General Orders.
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Recommendation #8 (Yellow): In an effort to ensure all fireground activities are

coordinated and prevent freelancing, the Department should consider modifying
General Order 06-01 to control the deployment of units on a fireground; e.g. – First
Engine and Special Service operate and the remaining units stage until directed by
Command.
Not all personnel riding apparatus who had radios available (on the apparatus) took
those radios with them when they dismounted the apparatus, even though portable
radios were available to them.
It is noted that several Department personnel responded from home in their privately
owned vehicles. This contributed to the lack of personnel accountability and safety at
the fire incident scene.
Recommendation #9 (Yellow): The Department should strictly prohibit any

personnel from responding to the scene in their personally owned vehicle.
Two-In, Two-Out
Maryland Occupational Safety and Health (MOSH) establishes requirements for
minimum staffing levels during the initial fireground operations. The term “two-in, two-
out” refers to the minimum number of two (2) qualified firefighters that may enter an
Immediately Dangerous to Life and Health (IDLH) atmosphere, while a minimum
number of two (2) qualified firefighters remain outside. The two (2) firefighters outside
are to function as a standby team for the interior crew. MOSH’s requirements for a
standby team are not abated by the arrival of additional units. The Department currently
has a General Order that addresses its Two-In, Two-Out policy. See Appendix 8 for
General Order 06-03: 2 In, 2 Out and Rapid Intervention.
Currently, there is nothing in the General Order that requires the Two-In/Two-Out
assignment to be verbalized or acknowledged over the radio. Without this verbal
designation or acknowledgement, there is no assurance that the Two-Out
responsibilities have been met.
Two-In, Two-Out Compliance

During the initial phases of the 57th Avenue incident, Engine 807B, Truck 809, Engine
809, and Volunteer Chief 809A (Incident Commander) arrived almost simultaneously.
The Two-In, Two-Out assignment was not communicated by either the first arriving
engine or the Incident Commander.
Upon arrival, the Incident Commander assigned the Rapid Intervention Crew (RIC)
duties to a responding unit (Rescue Squad 801, not yet on the scene); however, interior
operations were initiated prior to the establishment of a designated Two-Out crew or
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RIC. In addition, there was no communication indicating the abatement of the Two-Out
requirement because of “a known life hazard”, as allowed by the General Order.
Recommendation #10 (Yellow): Develop and implement formal, system-wide

policies, procedures and training related to Two-In, Two-Out compliance. Such
policies and procedures should address the following:
• Identify what unit is to assume/assign the Two-In, Two-Out responsibilities.
• Require verbalization of Two-In, Two-Out compliance over the tactical radio
channel.
• Require the Two-Out crew to accept that assignment over the tactical radio
channel.
• Ensure the adherence of the Two-Out regulations of the second-due engine
until the arrival and establishment of the RIC.
• Identify the specific criteria required in order to deviate from this policy.
• Review and modify all current General Orders to ensure there is no conflict with
the newly established policy.
RAPID INTERVENTION CREW (RIC)

The Prince George’s County Fire/EMS Department has implemented the RIC procedure
as a standard practice for all emergency incidents having more than one team operating
in a hazardous or IDLH atmosphere. There is a distinct difference between the Two-In,
Two-Out and the RIC. Regardless of which unit is assigned as the RIC, unless there is
a “known life hazard”, the Two-In, Two-Out requirement must be maintained by the
standby crew (Two-Out) until the RIC is ready to assume the RIC responsibilities.
General Order 06-03 (see Appendix 8) indicates that a RIC is “a crew specifically
designated by the Incident Commander at the scene of an emergency beyond the initial
stages, consisting of a minimum of four personnel, one preferably being a Company
Officer. The RIC shall be available for the rescue of firefighters should the need arise.
Depending on the size and complexity of the incident, the Incident Commander shall
establish one or more RICs. The RIC normally replaces or enhances the standby team,
which is required during the initial stages of the incident”.
General Order 06-03 further states that a RIC shall be established anytime one of the
following conditions exist:
• Structure fire where SCBA and 1½-inch hose line (or larger) will be used
• Personnel are operating inside of an IDLH or potentially IDLH atmosphere
• Incidents with the possibility of collapse or entrapment of personnel
• Incidents where personnel might become lost or disoriented
• When deemed necessary by the Incident Commander
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Rapid Intervention Crew (RIC) Compliance

On the 57th Avenue incident, crews donned SCBA, were operating 1½-inch (or larger)
hose lines, were within an IDLH atmosphere, and had the potential for personnel to
become disoriented, lost and/or entrapped. A functional RIC was required to be
established, but was not yet in place at the time of the firefighter emergency.
General Order 06-01 (See Appendix 8) identifies the third due special service unit as
the RIC. The Incident Commander did indicate that Rescue Squad 801 would be the
RIC upon arrival. Rescue Squad 801 was the third due special service unit and by
policy was rightfully assigned. However, in this particular incident the firefighter
emergency occurred prior to their arrival.
Recommendation #11 (Yellow): Revise the General Order to ensure the RIC
assignment changes from the third due special service to an earlier arriving unit.
INCIDENT COMMAND
Given the rapid nature of the incident, the Incident Commander functioned adequately.
However, it should be noted, that command was established without a clear view of
conditions, which could have given command a better assessment of the immediate
operations. Additionally, when the emergency occurred there were significant break
downs of the overall operations. These break downs are addressed here, as well as in
the Training Chapter of this report. The following areas of concern requiring action have
been identified.
Continuity and Documentation

The command documentation used on this incident could not be produced to the Team.
This document is critical during and after any incident. The command sheet should be
available for review following every incident.
Recommendation #12 (Yellow): A simple and standardized command check list or

guide should be placed in the front seat area of every piece of apparatus within the
County for easy "at a glance" use.
Recommendation #13 (Green): ONE standardized County-wide tactical command

sheet/board must be used in any multi-unit response to ensure command and control
of incident operations. COG/NOVA Chiefs have a standardized sheet that should be
strongly considered due to mutual aid unit fires being common in Prince George's
County.
The current system in place for dispatched career and volunteer battalion chiefs places
no emphasis on obtaining chief's aides to assist in various essential fireground size up
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and command tasks. These tasks include, but are not limited to: driving the command
vehicle so the battalion chief can properly note various staffing levels uninterrupted,
monitor crucial radio transmissions prior to arrival, manage accountability and operate
without distractions, serve as a second set of eyes and ears at the command post,
serving as a scribe when command assigns companies, monitoring the main fire ground
talk group in the event of a MAYDAY and related critical tasks. While later arriving
chiefs assisting at the command post are of value, the ideal situation would be that they
arrive simultaneously, so they can operate as a team.
The goal for the Department should be that any Incident Commander has a qualified
person working with them at the command post to monitor and assist in command,
control, communications, and accountability of the incident.
Recommendation #14 (Green): The Department should consider the use of Chief’s
Aides. This position would most likely be a Captain or a Lieutenant so that there is a
form of mentoring associated with this assignment. This can further enhance the
development of the line officer into the role of a chief officer.
ACKNOWLEDGING TASK ASSIGNMENTS

When fireground tasks are assigned, an acknowledgement echoing the message
ensures that the communication has been received and understood.
During the 57th Avenue incident, tasks were assigned to units, but not acknowledged
over the radio, such as the Incident Commander’s assignment of Rescue Squad 801 as
the RIC. This lack of acknowledgement may cause doubt or miscommunication and
hinder coordination among the units on the fireground.
EMERGENCY EVACUATION
There are two types of firefighter evacuations that can occur on a fireground. One is an
organized retreat of personnel from the building to change operational mode from
offensive to defensive. The other is an emergency evacuation that rapidly removes
firefighters from a structure due to an impending threat of or an occurrence of a
disastrous event.
Through various General Order revisions over the years, the procedure for emergency
evacuation was inadvertently removed. The following is a quote from the previous
General Order:
When the Incident Commander decides an emergency evacuation of a building

or area is necessary, he/she will notify communications. Upon receipt of this
information, the following actions will take place:
 Public Safety Communications will immediately transmit a distinct
audible signal over all radio talk groups, followed by a transmission
79
indicating the location address and that all personnel are to

immediately evacuate the building or area.
 All apparatus operators, upon hearing the evacuation
announcement will immediately sound their audible devices (siren –
air horns) for one (1) continuous minute.
 Upon hearing the warning signal to evacuate, all firefighters and
emergency personnel will immediately and safely exit the building
or area they occupy and report to their immediate supervisor.
Upon discovery of this omission, the Operational Safety Office immediately prepared a
Safety Bulletin, in an attempt to train/remind personnel of this long standing, operational
safety procedure.
During the 57th Ave incident, an emergency evacuation of the structure was ordered by
the Incident Commander. The verbal and radio evacuation order was never transmitted
via the radio talk group because of the activation of multiple Emergency Identifiers of
the portable radios that preempted radio traffic. The radio talk group remained busy,
but the Engine and Truck Company apparatus operators activated their audible warning
devices, alerting personnel to immediately evacuate the structure. According to multiple
statements, upon hearing the air horns crews immediately evacuated the structure.
Therefore, this proved to be an effective method of communicating an emergency
evacuation order, when the radio system was negatively affected by the EI activations.

 Modify General Order 06-01 (see Appendix 8) to include a procedure for
emergency evacuations during fireground operations.
 Develop policies that require the Incident Commander to ensure a Personnel
Accountability Report check is completed when incident conditions change.
 Develop a standardized MAYDAY quick reference guide to be used by all
command officers. The quick reference guide must detail steps to be taken
when a MAYDAY occurs. These quick reference guides should be carried on
every command vehicle.
PERSONNEL ACCOUNTABILITY
The term “personnel accountability” has several meanings in the fire service, which
mirror the levels of the Incident Command System (ICS). At its most basic level,
accountability refers to a unit officer’s responsibility to supervise personnel, provide for
their safety, and maintain communication with Command. At higher levels,
accountability requires Division, Group, and Branch supervisors to keep track of the
units assigned to their area of responsibility. Finally, at a strategic level, the Incident
Commander is responsible for tracking the assignment of units to Divisions, Groups,
and Branches.
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Personnel Accountability Report (PAR) checks are another component of personnel

accountability. PAR checks are radio reports initiated by the Incident Commander at
predetermined points in the incident. The first PAR check is initiated at the 20 minute
mark followed by PAR checks at the 40 and 60 minute marks. However, the Incident
Commander may initiate a PAR check at any time it is deemed necessary, including,
but not limited to the following:
 Report of a member or crew missing or trapped.
 When a unit/crew cannot be contacted in the Hazard Zone.
 Sudden hazardous change on the incident scene.
 Incident conditions deteriorate to a point that evacuation is ordered.
 A change from an offensive to a defensive mode.
During PAR checks, unit officers report the total number and accountability of members
assigned to their unit, the area they are operating in, and indicate the number of people
operating outside of the hazard zone.
Currently Prince George’s County has three levels of accountability:

 Level I which has personnel place their assigned Personal Accountability
Tag (PAT) on the collector ring in the front of the apparatus
 Level II which orders unit drivers to deliver the tags to the command post
 Level III which requires point of entry accountability
The current system of fireground and emergency scene accountability has failed for a
variety of reasons, both behavioral, as well as practical. It is the recommendation of the
Team that a complete replacement of the system be implemented. One inexpensive
and simple system that has proven very effective nationally is the "passport
accountability system", which has been adopted in Northern Virginia, and neighboring
Montgomery County is transitioning to.
Recommendation #16 (Green): Develop and implement system-wide policies and

procedures related to personnel accountability utilizing the Passport System. Such
policies should address the following:
 Requiring personnel verify the Passport and Unit Roster as quickly as possible
after arriving for duty.
 Requiring personnel to drop their Passports off at a predetermined location,
immediately after arriving on the scene of an incident.
 Standardize the location of Unit Rosters and Passports.
APPARATUS AND EQUIPMENT STANDARDIZATION

The Prince George’s County Fire/EMS Department and the individual volunteer
departments own and maintain apparatus and equipment in the system. Each volunteer
department identifies their apparatus and equipment needs, as well as the physical
81
location of apparatus/equipment within their station(s). There are numerous

advantages to system-wide standardized apparatus and equipment. Apparatus and
equipment standardization supports the continuity of operations, training and driver
operator procedures.
Without standardization, incident commanders, unit officers, and other personnel cannot
adequately implement strategy and tactics without knowing the capabilities of the
apparatus and equipment in use on the emergency scene. Since structure fire incident
scenes involve multi-company operations, it is impossible to fully know all the
capabilities and limitations of the wide variety of apparatus and equipment in use in
Prince George’s County. This situation can compromise firefighter safety and delay
tactical operations at emergency incidents. The lack of standardized apparatus and
equipment has a negative impact on the safety, speed and efficiency of firefighters to
carry out actions to support tactical operations.
Standardized fire apparatus and equipment inventories improve the efficiency of

fireground operations and promote personnel safety. Standardized fire apparatus allow
driver/operators to become proficient in apparatus operation, regardless of whether they
are assigned to that unit. Standardized equipment inventories ensure that personnel
are able to locate and retrieve equipment quickly, without having to search through each
compartment, only to find that the apparatus is not equipped with a particular item.
Recommendation #17 (Green): Develop a structured transition and implementation

plan to achieve standardization of apparatus and equipment. The structured
transition and implementation plan must include a process for the removal of non-
standardized apparatus and equipment from the system’s inventory. Consideration
should be given to:
 Standard hose lines (supply and attack lines)
 Standard complement of nozzles (nozzle types, standardized pressure and
gpm flow, etc.)
 Standard hose load configurations
 Standardize appliances to be used (i.e., four way hydrant valves, blitz nozzles)
Recommendation #18 (Green): Develop a system-wide plan that shall identify the
deployment and distribution of all apparatus. This plan should be routinely evaluated
for optimal strategic placement of apparatus and consider emerging technologies.
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EMS OPERATIONS
EMS INITIAL TREATMENT AND TRANSPORT OF INJURED
PERSONNEL
There were a total of seven (7) personnel injured during the course of the incident on
57th Avenue. Six (6) of the seven (7) personnel were transported to Washington
Hospital Center Burn Unit by EMS transport units; and one (1) self-transported himself
to Washington Hospital Center Burn Unit by his assigned Department vehicle.
The specific medical treatment provided to injured personnel is outside the scope of this
Report. This section addresses the management and coordination of EMS resources
on the scene and the process by which additional resources were requested and
obtained.
Initial EMS Response to 57th Avenue

The Working Fire Dispatch (WFD) was dispatched after the first suppression unit arrived
on the scene and reported that they had fire showing from the building. The following
EMS units were dispatched on the WFD – Ambulance 855, Medic 812, and EMS Duty
Officer.
21:14:06 - Dispatch of WFD Units: Ambulance 855 Medic 812 EMS Duty Officer.
Ambulance 809 marked up as responding and Communications removed
Ambulance 855 from the incident.
21:17:45 - Command requested evacuation and a fire task force.
21:21:49 - Ambulance 809 arrived on the scene and positioned their unit on 57th
Avenue away from the scene. They received instruction from Command that
there were injured personnel on the front lawn of the address and proceeded with
their equipment to treat the injured personnel.
21:24:39 - Medic 812 arrived on the scene and positioned their unit at the corner
of 57th Avenue and Ravenswood Road. The unit was backed onto Ravenswood
Road to provide easy access to leave the scene. Medic 812 eventually split their
crew and transported Truck 809 Officer in Ambulance 801 and Truck 809
Forcible Entry in Ambulance 855.
21:17:06 - EMS Duty Officer marked up as responding, but was in the area of
Indian Head Highway and the Capital Beltway. Utilizing MapQuest and the route
reported by the EMS Duty Officer, the distance to the scene was 21.03 miles with
a driving time of 29 minutes. (Note: EMS Duty Officer arrived on scene at
21:48:30)
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Part 2 EMS Operations
Request for Additional EMS Units
21:18:18 - Command requested an EMS Taskforce (ETF) after receiving reports

of multiple injured personnel. The following EMS units were dispatched on the
ETF – Ambulance 855, Ambulance 801, and Medic 830.
21:19:21 - Dispatch of ETF Units: Ambulance 855, Ambulance 801, Medic 830.
Ambulance 812 was replaced on the incident and Ambulance 855 was removed
and transferred to Station 813. No instructions were given to responding units
regarding a location to level 2 stage.
21:20:44 - Ambulance 855 asked Communications whether they are to continue

on the transfer assignment or respond to the 57th Avenue incident.
Communications advised them to respond to the 57th Avenue incident instead of
the transfer. Ambulance 855 responded to the scene.
Avenue just past Ravenswood Road on the left side of the street. Command
instructed the crew to come to Side Alpha and treat injured personnel.
21:25:51 - Command requested two additional ALS units and the availability of a
helicopter.
21:26:29 - Ambulance 812 arrived at the staging area for the Fire Task Force at
Kenilworth Avenue and Riverdale Road. Upon hearing the request for additional
EMS units the crew requested permission to respond to the scene.
21:27:51 - Medic 830 arrived on the scene and positioned their unit on 57th
Avenue before Sheridan Street. Due to the number of injured personnel the crew
decided to split up and treated patients separately, thereby increasing the
number of ALS resources.
21:27 - Communications dispatched Paramedic Engine 830 and Medic 844, as

two additional ALS units, and they were instructed to respond to the scene.
21:34:33 - Paramedic Engine 830 arrived on the scene.
21:34:42 - Ambulance 812 arrived on the scene and positioned their unit at the
corner of 57th Avenue and Rittenhouse Street. Command instructed the crew to
transport the burned members of Company 807 to Washington Hospital Center
Burn Unit. Upon finding the ambulatory injured members of Company 807, the
injured personnel refused transportation by Ambulance 812 and decided that
they were going to go with half of Medic 830’s crew and another severely injured
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firefighter. Ambulance 812 reported back to Command and was instructed to

establish an aid station next to the Command Post.
21:35:50 - Communications advised Command that United States Park Police

Eagle 2 helicopter has an ETA of 10 minutes and will land at Rittenhouse Street
and Kenilworth Avenue.
21:37:11- Medic 844 arrived on scene and positioned their unit at the corner of
Ravenswood Road and 58th Avenue. They were instructed to report to the
Command Post, after arriving at the Command Post, and conferring with
Command, it was determined that all patients had been transported. The crew
remained at the aid station next to the Command Post.
21:42:53 - Command requested an additional two BLS ambulances and ordered

the helicopter cancelled. Communications dispatched Ambulance 811 and
Ambulance 834.
Avenue at the corner of Rittenhouse Street. The crew was asked by a volunteer
firefighter to transport two injured personnel to the hospital, but when they tried to
locate their unit it had been taken by another crew to transport personnel and
they were unable to find a vehicle to use. The two injured personnel walked
away and the crew decided to assist half of Medic 830s crew who was working
alone in the rear of Medic 830 treating an injured firefighter. The crew assisted
the paramedic and then drove Medic 830 to the hospital where they
subsequently located their unit.
21:48:30 – The EMS Duty Officer arrived on the scene and reported to the
Command Post.
21:49:33 - Ambulance 811 arrived on the scene and Command instructed the
crew to stand by at Somerset Road and 57th Avenue.
21:53:56 - Ambulance 834 arrived and staged at Kenilworth Avenue and

Riverdale Road. Command released the unit at 22:15:41.
21:57:25 - Communications is advised by the Fire Marshal Battalion Chief that

the helicopter has landed at the landing zone.
22:12:35 - The Staging Officer (Volunteer Chief 855B) advises Command that
the helicopter has left the scene.
Deployment of EMS Resources on the Scene

The positioning of EMS units on the scene and the subsequent arrival of fire
suppression units blocked several EMS units and made them unusable for transporting
85
patients to the hospital. This forced crews to utilize transport units belonging to other
crews, leading to confusion when trying to locate units for transporting patients.
Several EMS crews stated that there was no triage of patients and no defined treatment
area for assignment of patients to be transported. Due to the distance the EMS Duty
Officer was responding from to the scene, no EMS Group Supervisor was available to
provide direction. Table 8 summarizes all of the injured personnel and the mode of
transportation. All patients were transported to Washington Hospital Center Burn Unit.
Table 8: Injured Personnel by Crews and Mode of Transportation

Crew Treating Injured Vehicle Transporting
Injured Member
Member Injured Member
Engine 807B Nozzleman ½ of Medic 830 and A855 Medic 830
Truck 809 Officer ½ of Medic 812 and A801 Ambulance 801
Engine 807B Officer ½ of Medic 830 and A807 Medic 812
Engine 807B 2nd-Line ½ of Medic 830 and A807 Medic 812
Engine 807B Layout/Backup ½ of Medic 830 and A807 Medic 812
Truck 809 Forcible Entry ½ of Medic 812 and A809 Ambulance 855
Volunteer Chief 812A self-treated Vol. Chief 812A Vehicle
Impact on Incident
Based on the number of injured personnel, the 57th Avenue incident needed to be
handled as a multiple casualty incident (MCI). The first arriving EMS unit needed to
triage all patients and assign a triage category, as per General Order 05-10: Multiple
Casualty Incident Operations. This would have provided the EMS Group Supervisor
and Incident Commander the information needed to determine the resources required to
treat and transport the patients.
Recommendation #19 (Red): All personnel shall review Triage procedures for
handling multiple casualty incidents (MCI) and the various roles required to mitigate
an MCI.
The lack of an EMS Group Supervisor during the early stages of the incident hampered
incoming EMS units, because of a lack of coordination and situational awareness of the
ongoing incident. The Incident Commander needs to ensure that an on-scene EMS
Group Supervisor is assigned early in the incident to coordinate all EMS activities.
Recommendation #20 (Red): The Department should consider placing additional

EMS Supervisors in service in the northern and southern areas of the County to allow
for shorter response times and greater geographical coverage. Multiple EMS Duty
Officers would allow supervision of the various divisions within the EMS Group, such
as Treatment area and Transportation area.
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During the incident, several EMS units became unusable for transporting patients due to
being blocked by arriving fire suppression apparatus. EMS units need to anticipate
additional arriving units and park their vehicles in a location that will allow for egress if
needed for transporting patients. They need to be aware of the possibility that the
incident may increase in scale and that they may be required to reposition to prevent
becoming blocked by additional alarm units. Command officers need to ensure that
staging areas for additional EMS units are identified and relayed to responding units to
ensure that they do not become unusable.
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BEHAVIORAL HEALTH
This Chapter addresses the behavioral and mental health services and counseling
options available to career and volunteer personnel.
AVAILABLE RESOURCES
The following resources are available to members of the Prince George’s County
Fire/Emergency Medical Services (EMS) Department. They include the County’s
Critical Incident Stress Debriefing (CISD) Team, Employee Assistance Program (EAP),
and the Chaplain program.
Critical Incident Stress Debriefing (CISD) Team

The CISD Team is a joint effort between the EAP Coordinator and several members of
the Department who have obtained training and certification through the International
Critical Incident Stress Foundation in group crisis intervention. CISD is activated via cell
phone through the Watch Office or Command Officer. Responders can call the hotline
directly and a confidential voicemail will be sent directly to the CISD cell phone.
The CISD Team provides post-incident peer counseling and group defusing and/or
debriefings. CISD is not designed to replace ongoing professional counseling or
employee assistance programs. Rather, the CISD Team provides immediate, stress
specific, supportive interventions to emergency response personnel who have been
exposed to, or are showing signs of traumatic stress experienced in the line of duty.
The Department has a General Order specifically describing the CISD team and what
types of incidents they are activated on. The Order also describes the required
components for the team. Currently, there is no standard activation plan for team
members when needed on various incidents.
Recommendation #21 (Yellow): Develop a formal call back procedure/activation

plan for the CISD Team, and inform/educate all command officers on this procedure.
The CISD Team is staffed with only one (1) clinical professional and approximately ten
(10) peer members, with only a few being available at any given time. This places an
increased stress level on the few team members and the clinical professional.
Recommendation #22 (Yellow): The Department needs to adequately staff the

CISD Team and should use the latest findings and suggestions available from the
National Fallen Firefighters Foundation as a template. This service should be
available to the Department at all times.
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Part 2 Behavioral Health
The investigation of the 57th Avenue fire incident identified deficiencies with processes,
which contribute to a lack of CISD system efficiency and effectiveness. There were
several Department personnel that were significantly impacted by the severity of events
associated with the 57th Avenue fire incident. This incident impacted not only the
seriously injured firefighters, but other members of the Department. Personnel that
responded to this fire incident may require additional professional behavioral health
counseling to support their efforts in moving forward.
Behavioral Health
Personnel on this incident were exposed to a high physical and mental stress event
involving the injury of several co-workers and substantial personal risk, causing the
need for immediate and long term behavioral health resources.
Behavioral health resources include, but are not limited to, critical incident stress
management, chaplain programs, family support services, counseling, and therapy or
clinical related services. There are voids in the Department’s ability to support the
immediate and long term behavioral health needs of the personnel and their families.
An example is the lack of coordination and cross functionality among the various
independent programs (i.e., EAP, CISD, Chaplain services, etc.). Notification to the
Chaplain may have been delayed, but it is unclear to the Team (SIT) what involvement
or actual role the Chaplain played during this event.
Another example is the lack of behavioral health resources beyond the employee
assistance program for personnel. The employee assistance program is inadequate,
due to limited amount of available visits and lack of clinical specialists in trauma induced
and post-traumatic stress, as experienced in fire and rescue personnel. Although APS
Healthcare® is a behavioral health resource that is available to all Prince George’s
County employees, very few PGFD personnel are aware of this service, and it is not
available to volunteer members (unless they are County employees).
Recommendation #23 (Yellow): The Department needs to develop and implement

a comprehensive Behavioral Health Program with adequate professional behavioral
health staff to support all personnel.
Recommendation #24 (Yellow): The Department needs to provide a

comprehensive in-station refresher training on the behavioral health services that are
available to all career and volunteer personnel.
Recommendation #25 (Yellow): Consider utilizing community clergy to assist in

providing CISD services to members and families in cases of firefighter injuries and
deaths. This would increase the team size and increase the involvement of the
Department with the community.
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COMMUNICATIONS
In November 2011, Prince George’s County Public Safety Communications (PSC)
began operating on a 700/800 MHz TDMA Motorola radio system. This system brings
radio communications interoperability for the five County public safety agencies,
advanced technology, and AVL-Based response capabilities to the Prince George’s
County Fire/EMS Department.
The 700/800 MHz radio system has twenty-one (21) tower sites and built in redundancy.
The Prince George’s County Fire/EMS Department operates on six (6) zones with
ninety-six (96) talk groups available for operations.
ORGANIZATION AND STAFFING

Prince George’s County Public Safety Communications is staffed by civilian personnel.
PSC receives all 911 calls for Prince George’s County and dispatches all Fire/EMS
calls. There are three (3) operational sections: the 911 section, the Fire/EMS dispatch
section, and the Law Enforcement dispatch section (County police, sheriff and municipal
police). Emergency Dispatch Aides (call takers) are trained to process emergency and
non-emergency calls for service and are permanently assigned to the 911 section.
Emergency Dispatchers are trained to perform dual roles, as a 911 call taker in addition
to their duties as a Fire/EMS or Law Enforcement Dispatcher, and may be detailed to
the 911 section as necessary.
Personnel assigned to the Fire/EMS dispatch section of PSC work a rotating shift
schedule of 12-hour shifts; personnel work two 12-hour days (0600-1800 hours) and
two 12-hour nights (1800-0600 hours), followed by four days off. On their first night
shift, personnel must report for duty at 1730 hours for roll-call where policy changes and
communications issues are reviewed.
There are eight (8) personnel assigned to a Fire/EMS Dispatch shift. The shift make-up
is one (1) shift supervisor, one (1) dispatch supervisor, and six (6) dispatchers.
Minimum staffing is five (5), including the supervisor. The personnel are cross-trained
to perform all jobs on the shift. Dispatchers usually rotate positions every three (3) to
four (4) hours. In this section of the report, the terms Public Safety Communications,
Communications, or the Fire/EMS Dispatcher are interchangeable depending on the
specific reference.
Personnel assigned to PSC complete 1,040 hours of initial training and receive National
Academies of Emergency Dispatch certification in Emergency Telecommunication,
Emergency Medical Dispatch, Emergency Fire Dispatch, and Emergency Police
Dispatch. All personnel must also complete continuing education requirements and
other state mandated courses in order to maintain certification.
PSC is under the Office of Homeland Security; the organizational chart (Figure 29)
illustrates the Operational Section of PSC.
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Part 2 Communications
Figure 29: Public Safety Communications Organizational Chart
CALL PROCESSING AND DISPATCHING

The personnel assigned to the 911 Section will answer and process all 911 calls. The
call taker will query the caller to determine the response type warranted. After the call is
entered, it will then be routed to the Fire/EMS Dispatch Supervisor. Once the call is
received, the Fire/EMS Dispatch Supervisor will review and approve the Computer
Aided Dispatch (CAD) recommended dispatch assignment, making any adjustments,
based on current policy and procedure established by the Fire/EMS Department. Once
approved, the call is routed to the dispatcher assigned to Talk Group 1 for dispatch.
Prince George’s County PSC uses an Emergency Fire Dispatch (EFD) program. This
program provides a systematic procedure to determine all call type responses. The
parameters are set by PSC, in conjunction with response plans set forth by the
Emergency Services Command (PGFD). The EFD program also enables call takers to
provide post-dispatch instructions directly to citizens on the scene, to prevent further
harm while the emergency units are en route.
There are a variety of organizations that recommend goals for processing emergency
calls and dispatching responding units. National Fire Protection Association 1221,
Standard for the Installation, Maintenance, and Use of Emergency Services
Communications Systems, states:
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“Ninety-five percent of emergency call processing and dispatching shall be completed

within 60 seconds, and 99 percent of call processing and dispatching shall be
completed within 90 seconds.”
The initial 911 call for 57th Avenue was received at 21:08:26. At 21:09:53 the Dispatch
Supervisor received the call and the call was dispatched at 21:11:03, a call processing
time of 2 minutes and 37 seconds.
Per PSC Directive 2010-08 (Revised) the Supervisor shall review and immediately
approve for dispatch a structure fire within 100 seconds. This call was reviewed and
approved in 70 seconds.
There was a delay in the 911 call getting to the Dispatch Supervisor due to an initial
language barrier between the caller and the 911 Call Taker. The initial caller passed
the phone to another person and then there was some confusion on the actual address.
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
Based on the audio recordings of the 911 call, the initial 911 caller indicated that the
house was vacant. This information was not recorded or relayed to responding units.
Subsequent 911 calls advised that the wind was spreading fire to the house next door;
this information was also not relayed to units.
Public Safety Communications Directive 2010-10: Dispatch of Calls on Operational Talk

Groups (Revised) dated December 7, 2011, states “that the job of the emergency
dispatcher often requires multi-tasking and quick decision making. The following shall
be the dispatch priorities:
a. Answering units on the radio
b. Ensure the Vital Airable Safety Information and Pertinent Information are
relayed to the responding units
c. Ensuring the accuracy of the CAD information”
Pertinent Information is defined in this Directive as any information that would affect
responder safety, and information that would help an emergency responder to
effectively and efficiently do their job.
Vital Airable Safety Information is defined as pertinent information that includes specific
information about the location of a specific responder/citizen safety issues.
The structure at 6404 57th Avenue and the structure on exposure Bravo were posted
condemned by the Department of Environmental Resources (DER), because of extreme
erosion of the hill on Side Charlie of the structure.
This information must be factored into the initial unit officers risk/benefit analysis when
conducting a size-up.
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Recommendation #26 (Red): Establish a work group to review and define Pertinent
and Vital Airable information and when it must be delivered to responding units. This
may be accomplished via Mobile Data Computers when available.
PSC RESPONSE ON FEBRUARY 24, 2012

On the evening of February 24, 2012, the PSC Fire/EMS Dispatch Section was staffed
with seven personnel. There were two (2) Supervisors, four (4) Dispatchers, and one
(1) Dispatcher in training at the time of the incident.
One (1) dispatcher was assigned to the Main Dispatch Talk Group 8 Alpha 1, one (1)
dispatcher was assigned to the Operational Talk Group 8 Alpha 2 and this left two (2)
dispatchers, plus the dispatcher in training, to handle the Alternate Talk Groups.
Public Safety Communications Directive 2010-08: Dispatching of Calls to Alternative

Talk Groups (Revised) dated February 8, 2012, defines the assignment of alternate talk
groups for dispatch assignments.
All North Side Box Alarms shall be assigned to an Incident Group whenever possible.
The matrix in the Directive factors in Mutual Aid Units which may not have all the Prince
George’s County Fire talk groups. The first Incident group assigned is 8 Alpha 3,
consisting of Talk Groups 8 Alpha 3 through 8 Alpha 6. A simultaneous incident
occurring in the North Side Box Alarm area would get the second incident group, which
is Talk Groups 8 Alpha 7 through 8 Alpha 10
The assigned Incident Group for 6404 57th Avenue was 8 Alpha 3, since this was a
North Side Box Alarm, and the first incident requiring an Incident Group.
21:08:26 - PSC receives a 911 call from 6334 57th Avenue. The caller stated
that there is a house on fire. The initial caller hands off the phone to another
person due to a language barrier. Based on the 911 call taker’s entry, the caller
is on-scene, both smoke, and flames are visible, the incident involves a single-
family residential structure, and the caller did not indicate anyone was trapped.
21:08:41 - PSC receives a 911 call from 5401 57th Avenue advising a neighbor’s
house is on fire.
21:09:53 - The 911 call taker sends the call to the Fire/EMS Dispatch Supervisor
for review.
21:10:37 - The call is reviewed and processed for dispatch.
21:11:03 - PSC dispatches the units on the call which sets off the station printer,
station alerting systems, and sends text/email alerts through “Alert Prince
George’s.”
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21:11:32 - PSC dispatches on 8 Alpha 1, a house on fire at 6334 57th Avenue.

The incident was assigned to Talk Group 8 Alpha 3.
21:13:46 - Truck 809 status on-scene followed by Engine 807B with layout
instructions.
*21:14:18 - PSC dispatches the Working Fire Dispatch (WFD).

21:14:40 - Volunteer Chief 809A establishes the Command.
21:17:06 - Emergency Identifier (EI) activation from Truck 809*2 with no voice.
21:17:19 - “Communications to Truck 809 verify your EI status.”
21:17:26 - “Communications to Command or Truck 809.”
21:17:47 - “Communications to Command or Truck 809.”
21:17:58 - “Command to Communications I copy and have people looking for

‘em now, looks like we have fire from three sides.”
21:18:11 - “Command verify Truck 809 activation.”
21:18:26 – Truck 809*1 EI activation, you can hear breathing.
21:18:40 - Volunteer Chief 809A “Sound the evacuation and start a task force
stage them at Kenilworth and Rittenhouse Street.”
21:18:53 - Communications gives the evacuation announcement and tells

Command still receiving Truck 809*1 and Truck 809*2 EI.
21:19:24 - The talk group starts locking up and units are unable to communicate
with PSC and PSC is unable to talk with units on the fireground. PSC makes
several attempts to contact units on the scene.
21:22:58 - “Command go ahead we are having radio problems with the EI.”
21:25:07 - All operating on fireground switch over to Talk Group 8 Alpha 4.
21:26:11 – Truck 809*1 EI activation with no voice.
Note: Various sources of time stamps were used when compiling this, and the following
timelines. Every effort was made to synchronize the various sources, but some
variation does exist from the other referenced time stamps contained throughout this
report.
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*Recommendation #27 (Yellow): Evaluate the current Working Fire Dispatch policy
and consider adding additional units. Consideration should be given to adding a
large diameter hose company, an additional rescue squad, an additional truck
company, and additional chief officers.
COMMAND CHANNEL
During the incident at 57th Avenue, radio communications between Command and the
Fire/EMS Dispatcher were interrupted on 8 Alpha 3. During the multiple Emergency
Identifier (EI) activations from Truck 809, the system controller did not allow two-way
communications from the Fire/EMS Dispatcher to the Incident Commander.
The reason for this disruption was the talk group was locked when the portable radio
extension microphone on Truck 809*2 burnt through and the wires fused together
causing an open transmitter.
Establishing a Command Channel between Command and PSC on one of the

secondary talk groups in the Incident Group may have prevented the loss of
communications.
At 21:25:07 Command had all units switch over to 8 Alpha 4 due to communications
issues on 8 Alpha 3.
Recommendation #28 (Yellow): Consider establishing a Command Talk Group

between the Command Post and Communications to provide direct communications,
requests for additional resources, and provide incident updates without interfering
with critical transmissions on the tactical talk group.
RESPONSE TO EMERGENCY IDENTIFIER ACTIVATIONS

The Prince George’s County Fire/EMS Department General Order 03-13: Emergency
Identifier Activation Procedure defines the procedure that dispatchers use when an
Emergency Identifier is activated.
21:17:06 - Emergency Identifier (EI) activation from Truck 809*2 with no voice
21:17:19 - “Communications to Truck 809 verify your EI status”
21:17:26 - “Communications to Command or Truck 809”
21:17:43 – Truck 809*1 EI activation with no voice
21:17:58 - “Command to Communications I copy and have people looking for

‘em now, looks like we have fire from three sides”
21:18:11 - “Command verify Truck 809 activation”
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21:18:26 – Truck 809*1 EI activation, you can hear breathing
21:18:53 - Communications gives the evacuation announcement and tells

Command still receiving Truck 809*1 and Truck 809*2 EI
The Fire/EMS Dispatcher followed the procedures as outlined in General Order 03-13:
Emergency Identifier Activation Procedure. General Order 06-14: MAYDAY Procedures
does not spell out what to do on an incident scene when an EI activation goes
unanswered. This must be considered as a MAYDAY condition.
Recommendation #29 (Red): General Order 03-13: Emergency Identifier Activation

Procedure and General Order 06-14: MAYDAY Procedures (see Appendix 8) need to
be reviewed and tenants of both policies need to be combined. Additionally, revise
the General Orders to include an automatic dispatch of an additional assignment for
any MAYDAY transmission.
ADDITIONAL RESOURCE REQUEST

Command requested a Fire Task Force and an EMS Task Force. Communications
advised they were responding on the tactical Talk Group 8 Alpha 4. These additional
units can cause unwanted communications on the tactical talk group.
Additionally, several units self-dispatched on the EMS Task Force assignment without
advising Communications.
Recommendation #30 (Yellow): Develop a policy that requires a Task Force or

greater assignment to respond on a different talk group from the tactical talk group.
REVIEW OF PSC POLICIES AND PROCEDURES

The Team asked the PSC Management to conduct a quality assurance review of PSC
policies and procedures, 911 call takers, and dispatchers’ actions. See Appendix 5 for
the PSC Incident Performance Rating Report.
Based on the quality assurance review, the following items were identified:
1. The PSC 911 Call Taker for the initial call was compliant with all reviewed task
areas.
2. The PSC 911 Call Taker for the 2nd call was compliant in all categories with the
exception of one question which had no bearing on the incident.
3. The Fire/EMS Dispatcher on 8 Alpha 3 did not ask Engine 807B if they were
establishing command or passing it.
4. The Fire/EMS Dispatcher on 8 Alpha 3 did not repeat information given by
Engine 807B.
5. The Fire/EMS Dispatcher on 8 Alpha 3 did not get a corrected address.
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Recommendation #31 (Red): Ensure that the Fire/EMS Department

Communications Manual for the 700/800 MHz radio system is completed and it
details all functions and operations of the system.
RADIO CARRYING LOCATION

The portable radios assigned to Truck 809 OIC and Truck 809*2 sustained significant
heat damage to the radio body and the portable microphones. These radios were
carried in leather holders and straps that were worn over the PPE. The cord for the
portable microphone on Truck 809*2 melted completely causing the wires to fuse
together and transmitting an open carrier on the tactical talk group disrupting radio
communications.
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) have published a research
paper entitled Testing of Portable Radios in a Fire Fighting Environment (2006)[8]
where they researched the effects of heat on the firefighter’s portable radio. Based on
this study, NIST indicated that the firefighter’s portable radio offers the best protection
during firefighting operations if the radio is carried inside the sewn-on radio pocket of
the turnout coat.
Additional information regarding the NIST study is available at:

http://www.nist.gov/publication-portal.cfm
Recommendation #32 (Green): Work with the radio manufacturer to develop an

extension microphone cable that is better protected from the effects of high heat.
Recommendation #33 (Yellow): Develop a General Order outlining how the

firefighter’s portable is to be carried during firefighting operations to provide the
maximum thermal protection for the radio and enhanced firefighter safety.
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TRAINING
This Chapter addresses entry-level and ongoing training requirements and opportunities
available to career and volunteer members of the Prince George’s County Fire/EMS
Department. The range and scope of services for which the Department is responsible
requires a highly trained, knowledgeable, and diverse workforce.
TRAINING REQUIREMENTS/CERTIFICATIONS
Career personnel undertake an 18-week recruit school which includes Emergency
Medical Technician-Basic (EMT-B), Firefighter I, Firefighter II, Hazardous Materials-
Technician Level, Emergency Vehicle Operator, Firefighter Safety and Survival,
Infectious Control, Trench and Collapse-Awareness Level, Engine and Truck Company
Operations. They continue their education and skill enhancements through a
comprehensive program of in-service training and established career development
requirements.
The Department promotes its career personnel internally through a competitive process
designed to ensure that those who advance through the rank structure have the
appropriate knowledge, skills, and ability to perform successfully.
Volunteer personnel must initially complete a 24-hour Volunteer Recruit School (VRS)
which includes classroom training covering HIPAA, workplace harassment, blood borne
pathogens, and fire department health and safety. The remaining sections are delivered
during in-station training, which includes PPE inspection, SCBA inspection, tools
awareness, portable ladders, hose line awareness, Hazardous Materials awareness, and
ambulance operations.
In addition, volunteer personnel must meet the following requirements (Subtitle 11-335,
Volunteer Firefighters and Volunteer EMS Care Providers):
(1) Not later than twelve (12) months after the month of appointment, each junior or
active firefighter shall either enroll in the Maryland Emergency Medical
Technician course or in the Firefighter I certification course conducted in
accordance with Standard 1001, or any equivalent course of study.
(2) Not later than thirty (30) months after the month of appointment, each junior or
active firefighter shall have satisfactorily completed the Maryland Emergency
Medical Technician course and obtained the Firefighter I certification in
accordance with Standard 1001, or any equivalent course of study.
Volunteer line officers must comply with the requirements set forth in Subtitle 11-336,
Volunteer Fire Line Officers. Volunteer Command Officers must comply with the
requirements set forth in Subtitle 11-337, Deputy and Assistant Volunteer Fire Chiefs,
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Part 2 Training
and 11-338, Volunteer Fire Chiefs. These requirements were last updated in 1994 by
CB-82-1994.
Recommendation #34 (Red): Update Subtitle 11 to include up to date training

certifications and standards.
The following training matrix outlines the certifications of all responders on the first
alarm (in order of arrival). The initial first alarm assignment consisted of all volunteer
personnel.
Legend:
X = Certified
NC = Not Certified
* = Records not provided
Unit Position F/F I EMS CPR Experience in County

Engine 807B OIC X X X 5 years
Engine 807B Driver X X X 7 years
Engine 807B Nozzle X * * 2 years
Engine 807B Layout X * * 8 months
Engine 807B Bar X X NC 2.5 years
Engine 807B Forcible Entry X X NC 2.5 years
Engine 809 OIC X X X 7 years
Engine 809 Driver X X X 4 years
Engine 809 Nozzle X X * 7 months
Engine 809 Layout X X X 4 years
Engine 801 Driver X X X 3 years
Engine 801 Back-up X X X 6 months
Engine 801 Line X X X 6 months
Engine 801 Layout X X X 3 years
Engine 801 Hall X X X 3 years
Engine 812 Driver X X NC 4 years
Engine 812 Line X X X 1 year
Engine 812 Probationary * * * 4 months
Engine 812 Bar X X X 3 years
Truck 809 OIC X X X 3 years
Truck 809 Driver X X X 14 years
Truck 809 Forcible Entry X X X 4 years
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Part 2 Training
Unit Position F/F I EMS CPR Experience in County
Truck 809 Can X X X 1.5 years

Truck 809 Hook/ladders X X X 2 years
Truck 801 Ladders X X X 6 years
Truck 801 Ladders * * * 1 year
Truck 801 Tiller * * * 2 years
Truck 801 Bar * * * 1 year
Truck 801 Hook & Can X X X 2 years
Truck 801 Ladder X X X 1 year
Truck 812 Search X X X 2 years
Truck 812 Firefighter X X X 3 years
Truck 812 Firefighter X X X 7 years
Rescue Squad 801 OIC X X X 4 years
Rescue Squad 801 Driver X X X 5 years
Rescue Squad 801 RIC X X X 8 months
Rescue Squad 801 F/F RIC X X X 2.5 years
Rescue Squad 801 Forcible Entry X X X 2 years
Rescue Squad 801 FF X X X 10 months
Rescue Squad 801 Search X X * 4 years
Rescue Squad 801 Search X X X 3.5 years
Unit Position F/O II EMS CPR Experience in County
Incident
Chief 809A X X X 15 years
Commander
Batt. Chief 884 Interior Division X X X 24 years
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Part 2 Training
TRAINING RECORDS
While reviewing training records, the Team determined that such records are
maintained by multiple offices across the Department including the Fire/EMS
Department Training Academy, the Prince George’s County Fire Commission, and
individual stations to name a few. This made it difficult to determine which personnel
had (or had not) received appropriate training.
Recommendation #35 (Green): Develop and implement a centralized, standardized

system-wide record-keeping system for all training-related records, for both career
and volunteer personnel.
TRAINING ENHANCEMENT RECOMMENDATIONS

This incident tested the knowledge, skills, and abilities of responding personnel. As
discussed previously, environmental conditions and inadequate size-up, combined with
rapid fire spread, posed strategic and tactical challenges. As a result, several areas
have been identified that will require some form of newly developed training curriculum.
Performing Unit Officer Duties

There is currently no minimum training requirement for personnel who are riding the
front (officer) seat that are not officer certified.
Recommendation #36 (Red): Develop and implement an officer development

training program for career and volunteer personnel who are non-officer certified so
that they may act as a Unit Officer. At a minimum, these Programs should address:
• Risk benefit analysis
• Strategy and tactics
• Building construction
• Fire spread and extension (e.g., exterior fires with interior extension)
• Crew integrity
• Crew resource and situational awareness management
• ICS (particularly expansion of the command structure)
• Command level decision making and practices (e.g., escalating incidents, high
risk/low frequency events)
MAYDAY/Firefighter Down
The Department’s MAYDAY Simulator training program consists of classroom and
practical evolutions. Specifically, since 2009, career recruits have been required to
successfully complete the Department’s “MAYDAY/Firefighter Down!” program. The
program has been offered to volunteers since approximately the same time.
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Part 2 Training
The MAYDAY curriculum provides for a two-part training program, which includes both
classroom and practical evolutions:
Part One
 Case Studies
 Provide firefighters with a safe and secure system for MAYDAY training
 Give firefighters an introduction on how to understand where you are and
conditions
 Fireground Hazards
 Building Hazards
 Fire Behavior Hazards
 Self-Rescue Techniques
Part Two
 Self-Rescue Techniques (practical)
 Emergency activations (EI) – (practical)
Recommendation #37 (Red): Require MAYDAY training for all operational

personnel that is taught in compliance with the General Orders, and includes an
annual refresher training component.
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UNIFORMS AND PERSONAL PROTECTIVE
EQUIPMENT (PPE)
This Chapter addresses uniforms and Personal Protective Equipment (PPE), including
Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus (SCBA). The Prince George’s County Fire/EMS
Department issues uniforms for daily wear to its sworn personnel. Some volunteer
corporations provide uniforms for their members, but few require them to be worn on
emergency responses. All operational personnel are issued PPE for emergency
incident response. The SCBA are generally assigned to the unit (station/apparatus);
however, a facepiece and regulator are individually issued to all operational personnel.
UNIFORMS
The Prince George’s County Fire/EMS Department issues station wear (uniforms) to all
of its sworn personnel. This uniform consists of the following: polyester blend, button
down, collared shirt (long and short sleeve); polyester blend, dark blue pants; black
leather belt; badge; name tag; and collar brass. A blue or white T-shirt is required to be
worn under the uniform shirt, but must be obtained by the employee. Plain toed black
shoes/boots and socks are required, and are also the employee’s responsibility. In
accordance with General Order 10-01: Career Uniforms, personnel are allowed the
option of purchasing (at their own cost) Department approved, alternative work
uniforms, made of 100 percent cotton, which may be worn in lieu of the issued uniform.
Each individual volunteer corporation develops its own policies and procedures with
regard to uniform requirements and issuance. Many volunteer corporations do not
require uniforms to be worn in the station or during emergency response. All of those
injured during this incident were volunteer members. An attempt was made to
determine what types of garments were worn by those injured; however, the hospital
was unable to account for, or otherwise provide/return any garments to the two most
significantly injured patients.
Garments made of synthetic fibers may potentially melt and adhere to the skin under
high heat conditions, which, can contribute to thermal injury. For this reason, garments
made of synthetic material are NOT recommended for use by those who may engage in
firefighting activities. Garments made of natural fibers, such as cotton, offer better
protection from thermal injury. With the exception of the Optional Work Uniform shirts,
there are currently no requirements regarding what material(s) the uniform, shirts,
socks, or undergarments should be made of.
Recommendation #38 (Green): Develop a Department-wide policy that requires

personnel to wear 100% cotton garments under uniforms. This should include
verbiage that prohibits the wearing of synthetic “moisture wicking” fitness apparel at
any time while on duty. Combined with properly worn PPE, this will provide better
protection from thermal injury.
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Part 2 Uniforms and Personal Protective Equipment
Recommendation #39 (Green): Provide and require that all newly acquired uniforms
comply with NFPA 1975 – Standard on Station/Work Uniforms for Emergency
Services.
PERSONAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT (PPE)

PPE is issued to personnel (both career and volunteer) through Logistics and Supply,
and is manufactured to the specifications that meet or exceed the NFPA 1971 standard.
Personnel are authorized to purchase and wear alternative PPE items from a specific
“Approved PPE” list.
As part of the investigation, PPE items were sent out for third party evaluation. The
PPE of the two most seriously injured was sent to International Personnel Protection,
Inc. for evaluation. The remaining sets were sent to Maryland Fire Equipment, the
Independent Service Provider (ISP) that provides regular PPE
cleaning/inspection/repair service for the Department. Excerpts from both reports are
included as part of Appendix 7.
PPE Specifications
Although structural firefighting PPE issued by the Department is manufactured to the
same specification, over the years bids have been awarded to various manufacturers.
This has resulted in personnel wearing PPE items from different manufacturers.
Several manufactures stipulate that their designs are intended to work as a dedicated
ensemble. It is not recommended that the coat of one design be used with the pants of
another design, even if the designs are made by the same manufacturer.
During the course of this investigation, it was discovered that several of the injured
personnel were wearing “mixed” ensembles. Wearing PPE outside of the
manufacturers design specifications is not a recommended practice.
Recommendation #40 (Green): A Department-wide policy should be implemented

to ensure that personnel are provided a “matching” ensemble of coat and pants from
the same manufacturer.
Alternative PPE
The Department has established a list of authorized alternative PPE items that may be
worn, in lieu of the Department issued PPE. Items on this “Approved PPE” list not only
meet the NFPA 1971 standard, but have been field tested and approved for operations
within the Department.
An inspection of the PPE worn by those injured reveled that several unapproved items
were being utilized. One (1) helmet was unapproved and non-compliant with NFPA
1971. Two (2) others lacked the appropriate compliance labeling and trim markings and
may have exceeded the ten (10) year service limitation, as outlined in NFPA 1851. One
104
(1) pair of boots being worn, although NFPA compliant, were not on the Department
approved PPE list.
There were two (2) pairs of unapproved gloves being utilized, one of which was not
even NFPA compliant. One of the more seriously injured was wearing gloves, which
had been field tested by the Department, but were NOT approved, due to operational
issues with significant shrinkage when exposed to high heat. Examination revealed that
one (1) glove does in fact show signs of shrinkage when compared to the other. The
most seriously injured was wearing gloves that were manufactured at least fourteen (14)
years ago, since they reference the NFPA 1973 standard, which was replaced by NFPA
1971 in early 1998. This glove lacked any type of moisture barrier, which is an NFPA
1971 requirement for firefighter protective clothing. Use of this unapproved glove could
have been a contributing factor to the severity of the burn injury to the hands.
Recommendation #41 (Red): Develop and deliver a training program to all

personnel that provides instruction on wearing all PPE properly, and emphasizes the
importance of wearing only Department approved items that are NFPA compliant.
PPE Inspection and Cleaning

The Prince George’s County Fire/EMS Department does not currently have a
standardized system in place to track the assignment of issued PPE to individuals.
There is no procedure in place indicating how PPE items should be marked/identified
(specific to the individual they are issued to), or how often they should be
inspected/cleaned.
Any records on specific maintenance (cleaning/inspection/repair) are maintained by the

Independent Service Provider (ISP), and do not include a full inventory of PPE issued
by the Department. Therefore, there is no way to determine what PPE items have been
issued to an individual, or monitor compliance with NFPA 1851, which stipulates that
PPE must be cleaned annually and pulled from service after ten (10) years from date of
manufacture.
As part of the investigation, the cleaning/inspection/repair records were requested for

each of the PPE items (coat and pants) worn by those that were injured. The ISP was
only able to provide service records for four (4) of the twelve (12) PPE items, and only
two (2) accurately listed the individual to which these items were issued. Based on
these records, it is highly probable that a majority of protective clothing items are not
being subjected to an annual advanced cleaning, as required in NFPA 1851. In
addition, at least one (1) pair of pants, possibly two (2) helmets, one (1) set of gloves,
and numerous hoods had exceeded the ten (10) year service life, as outlined in NFPA
1851.
105
Recommendation #42 (Green): Develop and maintain a centralized database to

track the issuance, inspection and maintenance of all PPE items. This information
database should include (but not limited to) the manufacturer, manufacture date,
serial numbers, model, size, last cleaning date, and other pertinent information.
Recommendation #43 (Green): Revise General Order 10-03: Cleaning, Repair,

Replacement and Alteration of Personal Protective Equipment to require an annual
advanced inspection as outlined in NFPA 1851, Standard on Selection, Care, and
Maintenance of Protective Ensembles for Structural Fire Fighting and Proximity Fire
Fighting.
PPE Analysis
As part of the investigation, International Personnel Protection, Inc. (IPP Inc.) was
asked to evaluate and provide a report of findings, related to the condition of the PPE
worn by those injured on this incident. The analysis provided in the report also
incorporates information and observations obtained from the Department’s Safety
Officers and the Independent Service Provider (ISP).
IPP Inc. provided the Team with a comprehensive report detailing their findings. This
report correlates the injuries sustained by the firefighters with physical evidence found
on the PPE. A summary of the report can be found in Appendix 7. The following are
highlights taken from that report:
As the result of this investigation, International Personnel Protection, Inc. recommends

that the Prince George’s County Fire/EMS Department consider the following:
1. A program should be in place that accounts for all of the Department-owned

major items of protective clothing and equipment, which at least includes
protective coats and protective pants.
2. If an item of clothing does not have a readable date of manufacture or serial

number, procedures should be in place to obtain a replacement label from the
manufacturer. This practice may not be practical for hoods, but separate tracking
of these items may assist in ensuring that items can be identified. When new
items are obtained by either the Department or by individuals, the item, its model
number, serial number, and date of manufacture should be separately recorded.
3. All PPE provided to members should have a manufacture date that is ten years
or less as indicated on the product label.
4. The Department should conduct regular inspections of individually owned

firefighter protective clothing to determine that it is consistent with the
Department’s “Approved PPE” list and in a serviceable condition.
106
5. If gear is found to be unserviceable, the Department should designate this gear

as “compromised PPE” consistent with its General Orders and ensure that
item(s) are properly disposed of since they cannot be used in actual incidents or
live fire training.
6. The Department should determine how Truck 809 Forcible Entry acquired the
non-approved and non-compliant gloves he used in the fire incident and inform
the members in the Department on the hazards for wearing gloves that do not
have a moisture barrier. It is important to point out to the members that wearing
of gloves, or other PPE, that is not independently certified may present hazards
to their safety and health. It should be further pointed out that gloves just
meeting Federal OSHA and Cal OSHA alone do not provide protection
commensurate with the NFPA 1971 standard.
7. The SCBA used in this incident by the injured firefighters should be thoroughly
examined. Specific attention should be provided to Truck 809 Officer’s facepiece
and second stage regulator given the complaints about his SCBA provided in his
statement.
8. Instructions on the need and specific procedures for wearing of all personal
protective clothing and equipment should be provided to each member. It is
important to emphasize that all components must be deployed, and that all
elements of the ensemble should be properly closed. If members indicate
problems with any interface that leaves the interface area potentially exposed,
corrections to the ensemble or wearing practices should be implemented for that
individual. The Department should specifically instruct its members on the
correct wearing of helmet ear covers and protective coat collars for structural
firefighting.
9. The Department should include, as part of its training, that all members be aware
of the limitation for the protective capabilities of their protective ensemble, and
how burns may occur without warning under extended exposure conditions
without any apparent damage to the clothing item.
10. The Department should institute, as part of its PPE program, a system for regular
advanced inspections and cleaning of protective clothing at least on an annual
basis. This program should include recordkeeping practices that identify the
item, its serial number, the firefighter to which it is issued, the date of the service,
details of any inspection findings or repairs, and the individual responsible for the
service. If this responsibility is delegated to an independent service provider,
then those same requirements should be applied to the service provider. This
program should be implemented to be consistent with the requirements of NFPA
1851, Standard on Selection, Care, and Maintenance of Protective Ensembles
for Structural Fire Fighting and Proximity Fire Fighting.
107
11. For the clothing directly examined as part of the investigation, these items of
clothing and equipment should be retained by the Department because of its
involvement in a situation where injuries were sustained. We recommend that
the Department retain the clothing and equipment for a period of at least two
years with an appropriate chain of custody. The clothing should be condemned
and destroyed after that period has elapsed.
12. A separate assessment should be made of the protective clothing used by the
other firefighters that were not provided for direct examination as to its continued
serviceability following the conclusion of this investigation. The same retention
and disposal recommendation should apply if it is determined that these items
are no longer serviceable.
SELF-CONTAINED BREATHING APPARATUS (SCBA)

The Prince George’s County Fire/EMS Department uses the Scott Health and Safety Air
Pack 50 4.5, Single EBSS with 45 or 60 minute cylinder and the AV3000 facepiece. The
units meet the NFPA 2002 Standard and are CBRN compliant. These units were
placed in service January 2006. The Department issues personal facepieces and
regulators to its members that are trained and certified in the use of SCBA.
The Prince George’s County Fire/EMS Department’s General Order 08-17: Respiratory
Protection Program (dated January 2010) includes requirements consistent with the
previsions established in OSHA Regulation 29 CFR 1910.134. The policy outlines
provisions for the selection, fit testing, maintenance, repair and safe use of all
components of respiratory protection equipment, and medical evaluations, training
certifications, and record keeping required for the fire and rescue service personnel who
use them.
SCBA Use on the Incident

All the injured firefighters on the incident were using or wearing Department issued
SCBA. Test records that were provided showed that the injured personnel were all in
compliance with General Order 08-17 Respiratory Protection Program requirements for
annual fit testing.
The focus of the SCBA section will concentrate on the SCBA used by Truck 809
Forcible Entry and Truck 809 Officer, who sustained respiratory injuries while using
SCBA.
The SCBA from Truck 809 Officer and Truck 809 Forcible Entry were impounded by the
Safety Officer along with five (5) SCBA from Company 807 and a regulator and
facepiece also from one of the injured firefighters from E807. The seven (7) SCBA’s
were transferred to the Montgomery County Fire and Rescue Service (MCFRS) SCBA
Service and Repair Center for analysis.
108
SCBA Service History

Truck 809 Officer’s SCBA (PGFD 0375) was manufactured by Scott Health and Safety
in 2005: Model Air-Pak 50 with HUD; Reducer Number RED0509013758AB and was
last serviced in April 2011; Regulator EZ Flow CBRN with QD Number
REG0505013835AF was last serviced in July 2011.
Truck 809 Forcible Entry’s SCBA (PGFD 0370) manufactured by Scott Health and
Safety in 2005: Model Air-Pak 50 with HUD; Reducer Number RED0509013686AB and
was last serviced in March 2011; Regulator EZ Flow CBRN with QD Number
REG0509022309AF was last serviced in August 2011.
Montgomery County SCBA Shop Analysis

The Prince George’s County Fire/EMS Department SCBA 0307, 0375, 1288, 0401,
0390, 0400, 0399 along with an additional regulator from Truck 809 Forcible Entry and a
regulator and facepiece from Engine 807B Nozzleman were received at the MCFRS
SCBA Shop on April 16, 2012. The MCFRS SCBA Shop provided a detailed report on
the condition of each SCBA and the issued regulator from Truck 809 Forcible Entry and
the regulator and face piece from Engine 807B Nozzleman. Excerpts and pictures from
the report are included in Appendix 6.
The following is a brief summary of the findings:
Truck 809 Officer SCBA (PGFD #0375)

 The cylinder gauge cover was melted and distorted and was hard to read.
 The cylinder hand wheel lock nut was turned in on the stem eliminating the
designed safety feature that prevents the cylinder from being accidentally turned
off.
 Safeware flow test sticker dated 4/11.
 Regulator was in good condition found label melted on cover.
 Back frame in poor shape.
 Shoulder harness straps show discoloration indicating heat exposure.
 Waist straps were folded back and restrained in the buckles making them
inoperable.
 Stickers on back frame labeled “901” and “Engine 92.”
 Facepiece lens had excessive scratching.
 Facepiece showed no crazing or melting.
 Reducer, Regulator and face piece passed all tests.
Truck 809 Forcible Entry SCBA (PGFD #0370)

 The cylinder gauge cover is melted, distorted and bubbled in several spots on
both sides unable to read pressure.
 1900 PSI found in cylinder.
 The cylinder hand wheel lock nut was turned in on the stem eliminating the
designed safety feature that prevents the cylinder from being accidentally turned
off.
109
 There is peeling of the outer wrap on the cylinder where the factory decals where
applied.
 HUD hose experienced exposure to high heat and impingement at reducer.
 Safeware flow test sticker dated 3/11.
 Regulator that was with unit was assigned to another firefighter.
 The regulator cover and body were intact, held together only by the latch plate
mounting bracket and retaining screws.
 Diaphragm was found in evidence bag.
 The diaphragm exhalation valve seat and post were forcibly removed or torn.
 The regulator had been exposed to high heat.
 Purge knob operated as designed, but shows signs of high heat exposure.
 Shoulder harness straps show complete discoloration indicating heat or flame to
both straps.
 Waist straps were folded back and restrained in the buckles making them
inoperable.
 Two stickers on back frame labeled “Bladensburg” and “902.”
 Facepiece lens was exposed to high heat.
 There is excessive crazing and a few deeper scratches.
 It appears the lens has softened where the crazing occurs.
 On the inside of the lens you see signs of where the melting has occurred with
immediate failure that would probably follow.
 Pak Alert Module appears in good shape with no signs of exposure to heat.
 Placing batteries in Pak Alert causes dead short in console.
 Mask test not performed due to the extensive damage to facepiece.
 The regulator test not performed due to extensive damage.
 The reducer passed all functional tests.
 No other pretests could be performed due to extensive damage.
 Truck 809 Forcible Entry’s issued regulator was not used at the time of the
incident due to it reportedly not working properly after a recent repair. The
regulator was checked by the MCFRS SCBA Shop, tested, and found to be
operating properly.
Remaining SCBA
The remaining SCBA and Regulators sent to the MCFRS SCBA Shop were tested and
passed all tests. The evaluation revealed that the Back frame on PGFD 0399 was in
poor shape. It had the left side support rod sheared from the weld near the left side
latching mechanism.
The evaluation of the SCBA cylinders revealed that several had been painted and
labeled in multiple places with stickers making it hard to check scrapes and gouges in
the cylinders or to find test dates.
The filters in the primary and secondary pressure reducers were found to be dirty and
were replaced. This is attributed to extensive use. Major cleaning was done to these
110
units prior to returning. After cleaning, all components appeared to be in excellent

condition.
Recommendation #44 (Yellow): Standardize the labeling and painting of SCBA and
SCBA cylinders Department-wide.
Recommendation #45 (Red): Check all SCBA cylinder valves Department-wide to

ensure that the cylinder hand wheel lock nut is not turned in on the stem eliminating
the designed safety feature that prevents the cylinder from being accidentally turned
off.
Recommendation #46 (Green): Ensure all filters in the primary and secondary
pressure reducers are changed when flow tested. If third party contractor is used, this
must be specified in the contract.
SCBA Disposition
All SCBA inspected by the Montgomery County SCBA Shop was returned to the Prince
George’s County Fire/EMS Department Breathing Apparatus Shop. The Breathing
Apparatus Shop indicated that all condemned items were replaced and any necessary
repairs were made to the SCBA and they were returned to the assigned stations.
Facepiece Fit Test

The Team requested all fit test records from the Prince George’s County Fire/EMS
Department Breathing Apparatus Shop for the injured personnel. The supplied test
record indicated that all personnel had compliant fit tests at the time of the incident.
SCBA Regulators
Truck 809 Forcible Entry was using a SCBA regulator issued to another firefighter at the
time of the incident. During the interview process, Truck 809 Forcible Entry stated that
there was an issue with the issued regulator. The Prince George’s County Fire/EMS
Department Breathing Apparatus Shop has no record of recent repair requests for the
regulator in question. Truck 809 Forcible Entry’s issued regulator was later found at the
station after the incident; testing confirmed that this issued regulator was operating
properly.
111
REFERENCES
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
1. “Two Fire Fighters Die and Two Are Injured in Townhouse Fire – District of
Columbia”, Report # 99F-21, The National Institute for Occupational Safety and
Health (NIOSH). November 23, 1999.
2. “A Career Lieutenant and Fire Fighter/Paramedic Die in a Hillside Residential
House Fire – California”, Report # F2011-13, The National Institute for
Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH). March 1, 2012.
3. “Volunteer Fire Fighter Caught in a Rapid Fire Event During Unprotected Search,
Dies After Facepiece Lens Melts – Maryland”, Report # F2011-02, The National
Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH). July 3, 2012
FIRE BEHAVIOR
4. Quintiere, J.G., Fundamentals of Fire Phenomena, John Wiley and Sons Inc.,
Hoboken, NJ, 2006, p. 339-370.
5. Klote, J.H., Milke, J.A., Principles of Smoke Management, American Society of
Heating, Refrigeration, and Air-Conditioning Engineers, Inc., 2002.
6. Goodson, C., Murnan, L., Essentials of Fire Fighting, 5th Edition, International
Fire Service Training Association (IFSTA), Board of Regents, Oklahoma State
University, 2008
FIRE OPERATIONS
7. International Association of Arson Investigators and the United States Fire
Administration, (2006). Managing vacant and abandoned properties in your
community. Retrieved from website:
http://firearson.com/firearson/media/files/Abandoned Building
Toolbox/Background-Paper.pdf
COMMUNICATIONS
8. W. D. Davis, M. K. Donnelly, M. J. Selepak, Testing of Portable Radios in a Fire
Fighting Environment, NIST Technical Note 1477, August 2006
112
APPENDIX 1 – RECOMMENDATIONS
The compilation of SIT recommendations is grouped by priority type where Red is
immediate (Life safety & firefighter survival), Yellow is short term (Relatively easy to
implement), and Green is long term (May require significant planning including fiscal
impacts). In addition to being separated by priority type, they are listed in order of
appearance in this report and the numbering should not be misconstrued as an indicator
of further importance.
Recommendation #1 (Red): The Department must develop a new training program

to better qualify personnel to function in areas of responsibilities particularly in the
areas of command, control, and accountability on the fireground.
Recommendation #2 (Red): Basement fire tactics must be revised to reflect current

best practices. This should include the importance of getting water on the fire as
quickly as possible and not placing personnel unnecessarily above the fire, or in its
flow path.
 Incorporate a 360-degree survey and the evaluation of environmental
conditions as part of the strategic and tactical plan development into future
revisions of the General Orders.
 The first arriving officer must make every practical and reasonable effort to
complete a 360-degree survey prior to making entry.
 Emphasize the importance of continuous situational reporting from critical
units, divisions, and groups.

 Modify General Order 06-01 (see Appendix 8) to include a procedure for
emergency evacuations during fireground operations.
 Develop policies that require the Incident Commander to ensure a Personnel
Accountability Report check is completed when incident conditions change.
 Develop a standardized MAYDAY quick reference guide to be used by all
command officers. The quick reference guide must detail steps to be taken
when a MAYDAY occurs. These quick reference guides should be carried on
every command vehicle.
Recommendation #19 (Red): All personnel shall review Triage procedures for
handling multiple casualty incidents (MCI) and the various roles required to mitigate
an MCI.
113
Appendix 1
Recommendation #20 (Red): The Department should consider placing additional

EMS Supervisors in service in the northern and southern areas of the County to allow
for shorter response times and greater geographical coverage. Multiple EMS Duty
Officers would allow supervision of the various divisions within the EMS Group, such
as Treatment area and Transportation area.
Recommendation #26 (Red): Establish a work group to review and define Pertinent
and Vital Airable information and when it must be delivered to responding units. This
may be accomplished via Mobile Data Computers when available.
Recommendation #29 (Red): General Order 03-13: Emergency Identifier Activation

Procedure and General Order 06-14: MAYDAY Procedures (see Appendix 8) need to
be reviewed and tenants of both policies need to be combined. Additionally, revise
the General Orders to include an automatic dispatch of an additional assignment for
any MAYDAY transmission.
Recommendation #31 (Red): Ensure that the Fire/EMS Department

Communications Manual for the 700/800 MHz radio system is completed and it
details all functions and operations of the system.
Recommendation #34 (Red): Update Subtitle 11 to include up to date training

certifications and standards.
Recommendation #36 (Red): Develop and implement an officer development

training program for career and volunteer personnel who are non-officer certified so
that they may act as a Unit Officer. At a minimum, these Programs should address:
• Risk benefit analysis
• Strategy and tactics
• Building construction
• Fire spread and extension (e.g., exterior fires with interior extension)
• Crew integrity
• Crew resource and situational awareness management
• ICS (particularly expansion of the command structure)
• Command level decision making and practices (e.g., escalating incidents, high
risk/low frequency events)
Recommendation #37 (Red): Require MAYDAY training for all operational

personnel that is taught in compliance with the General Orders, and includes an
annual refresher training component.
114
Appendix 1
Recommendation #41 (Red): Develop and deliver a training program to all

personnel that provides instruction on wearing all PPE properly, and emphasizes the
importance of wearing only Department approved items that are NFPA compliant.
Recommendation #45 (Red): Check all SCBA cylinder valves Department-wide to

ensure that the cylinder hand wheel lock nut is not turned in on the stem eliminating
the designed safety feature that prevents the cylinder from being accidentally turned
off.
115
Appendix 1
Recommendation #3 (Yellow): Develop and implement a formal process to

disseminate adverse weather advisories/alerts to ensure all personnel are aware of
changing conditions to aid during initial on-scene size-up.
Recommendation #5 (Yellow): Develop a Department-wide training program that

focuses on understanding fire behavior, fire flow paths, and how to “read” interior
and exterior smoke conditions to identify the location and predicted spread of a fire.
Recommendation #8 (Yellow): In an effort to ensure all fireground activities are

coordinated and prevent freelancing, the Department should consider modifying
General Order 06-01 to control the deployment of units on a fireground; e.g. – First
Engine and Special Service operate and the remaining units stage until directed by
Command.
Recommendation #9 (Yellow): The Department should strictly prohibit any

personnel from responding to the scene in their personally owned vehicle.
Recommendation #10 (Yellow): Develop and implement formal, system-wide

policies, procedures and training related to Two-In, Two-Out compliance. Such
policies and procedures should address the following:
• Identify what unit is to assume/assign the Two-In, Two-Out responsibilities.
• Require verbalization of Two-In, Two-Out compliance over the tactical radio
channel.
• Require the Two-Out crew to accept that assignment over the tactical radio
channel.
• Ensure the adherence of the Two-Out regulations of the second-due engine
until the arrival and establishment of the RIC.
• Identify the specific criteria required in order to deviate from this policy.
• Review and modify all current General Orders to ensure there is no conflict with
the newly established policy.
Recommendation #11 (Yellow): Revise the General Order to ensure the RIC
assignment changes from the third due special service to an earlier arriving unit.
Recommendation #12 (Yellow): A simple and standardized command check list or

guide should be placed in the front seat area of every piece of apparatus within the
County for easy "at a glance" use.
116
Appendix 1
Recommendation #21 (Yellow): Develop a formal call back procedure/activation

plan for the CISD Team, and inform/educate all command officers on this procedure.
Recommendation #22 (Yellow): The Department needs to adequately staff the

CISD Team and should use the latest findings and suggestions available from the
National Fallen Firefighters Foundation as a template. This service should be
available to the Department at all times.
Recommendation #23 (Yellow): The Department needs to develop and implement

a comprehensive Behavioral Health Program with adequate professional behavioral
health staff to support all personnel.
Recommendation #24 (Yellow): The Department needs to provide a

comprehensive in-station refresher training on the behavioral health services that are
available to all career and volunteer personnel.
Recommendation #25 (Yellow): Consider utilizing community clergy to assist in

providing CISD services to members and families in cases of firefighter injuries and
deaths. This would increase the team size and increase the involvement of the
Department with the community.
*Recommendation #27 (Yellow): Evaluate the current Working Fire Dispatch policy
and consider adding additional units. Consideration should be given to adding a
large diameter hose company, an additional rescue squad, an additional truck
company, and additional chief officers.
Recommendation #28 (Yellow): Consider establishing a Command Talk Group

between the Command Post and Communications to provide direct communications,
requests for additional resources, and provide incident updates without interfering
with critical transmissions on the tactical talk group.
Recommendation #30 (Yellow): Develop a policy that requires a Task Force or

greater assignment to respond on a different talk group from the tactical talk group.
Recommendation #33 (Yellow): Develop a General Order outlining how the

firefighter’s portable is to be carried during firefighting operations to provide the
maximum thermal protection for the radio and enhanced firefighter safety.
117
Appendix 1
Recommendation #44 (Yellow): Standardize the labeling and painting of SCBA and
SCBA cylinders Department-wide.
118
Appendix 1
Recommendation #6 (Green): Amend the General Orders to require Incident

Commanders to prioritize and announce critical information, including strategy
(defensive/offensive operations) that will impact incident outcomes and tactics, as a
part of the initial size-up report. This should also include classroom and hands-on
command, control, and accountability training.
Recommendation #7 (Green): Consider adopting guidelines of the International

Association of Arson Investigators/United States Fire Administration’s, Vacant and
Abandoned Building Project/Toolbox.
Recommendation #13 (Green): ONE standardized County-wide tactical command

sheet/board must be used in any multi-unit response to ensure command and control
of incident operations. COG/NOVA Chiefs have a standardized sheet that should be
strongly considered due to mutual aid unit fires being common in Prince George's
County.
Recommendation #14 (Green): The Department should consider the use of Chief’s
Aides. This position would most likely be a Captain or a Lieutenant so that there is a
form of mentoring associated with this assignment. This can further enhance the
development of the line officer into the role of a chief officer.
Recommendation #16 (Green): Develop and implement system-wide policies and

procedures related to personnel accountability utilizing the Passport System. Such
policies should address the following:
 Requiring personnel verify the Passport and Unit Roster as quickly as possible
after arriving for duty.
 Requiring personnel to drop their Passports off at a predetermined location,
immediately after arriving on the scene of an incident.
 Standardize the location of Unit Rosters and Passports.
Recommendation #17 (Green): Develop a structured transition and implementation

plan to achieve standardization of apparatus and equipment. The structured
transition and implementation plan must include a process for the removal of non-
standardized apparatus and equipment from the system’s inventory. Consideration
should be given to:
 Standard hose lines (supply and attack lines)
 Standard complement of nozzles (nozzle types, standardized pressure and
gpm flow, etc.)
 Standard hose load configurations
 Standardize appliances to be used (i.e., four way hydrant valves, blitz nozzles)
119
Appendix 1
Recommendation #18 (Green): Develop a system-wide plan that shall identify the
deployment and distribution of all apparatus. This plan should be routinely evaluated
for optimal strategic placement of apparatus and consider emerging technologies.
Recommendation #32 (Green): Work with the radio manufacturer to develop an

extension microphone cable that is better protected from the effects of high heat.
Recommendation #35 (Green): Develop and implement a centralized, standardized

system-wide record-keeping system for all training-related records, for both career
and volunteer personnel.
Recommendation #38 (Green): Develop a Department-wide policy that requires

personnel to wear 100% cotton garments under uniforms. This should include
verbiage that prohibits the wearing of synthetic “moisture wicking” fitness apparel at
any time while on duty. Combined with properly worn PPE, this will provide better
protection from thermal injury.
Recommendation #39 (Green): Provide and require that all newly acquired uniforms
comply with NFPA 1975 – Standard on Station/Work Uniforms for Emergency
Services.
Recommendation #40 (Green): A Department-wide policy should be implemented

to ensure that personnel are provided a “matching” ensemble of coat and pants from
the same manufacturer.
Recommendation #42 (Green): Develop and maintain a centralized database to

track the issuance, inspection and maintenance of all PPE items. This information
database should include (but not limited to) the manufacturer, manufacture date,
serial numbers, model, size, last cleaning date, and other pertinent information.
Recommendation #43 (Green): Revise General Order 10-03: Cleaning, Repair,

Replacement and Alteration of Personal Protective Equipment to require an annual
advanced inspection as outlined in NFPA 1851, Standard on Selection, Care, and
Maintenance of Protective Ensembles for Structural Fire Fighting and Proximity Fire
Fighting.
Recommendation #46 (Green): Ensure all filters in the primary and secondary
pressure reducers are changed when flow tested. If third party contractor is used, this
must be specified in the contract.
120
APPENDIX 2 – WEATHER ADVISORIES
From: Brady, Mark E.
Sent: Thursday, February 23, 2012 12:41 PM
To: Fire/EMS Department; Prince George's County Media
Subject: "FIRE WEATHER WATCH" Posted for Friday Afternoon
For Immediate Release: February 23, 2012

Contact: Mark E. Brady, Chief Spokesperson, 240-508-7930
www.princegeorgescountymd.gov/FireEMS/ (Homepage)
www.pgfireems.com (Newsroom)
"FIRE WEATHER WATCH" Posted for Friday Afternoon
It is my belief that the majority of citizens and residents of Prince George's County practice
good common sense fire safety habits throughout the course of their day. I also believe
that at some point we must pay the price for sunny and warm weather conditions we have
enjoyed not only this week but for this entire winter. So it is that I advise you that
the National Weather Service has posted a seldom used "Fire Weather Watch" for Prince
George's County and other surrounding jurisdictions for Friday afternoon. We ask
everyone to heed the watch and follow our advice to keep everyone safe.
FROM THE NATIONAL WEATHER SERVICE
Event: Fire Weather Watch
Alert: ...FIRE WEATHER WATCH IN EFFECT FRIDAY AFTERNOON FOR PORTIONS OF

MARYLAND...NORTHERN VIRGINIA AND THE EASTERN WEST VIRGINIA PANHANDLE...
THE NATIONAL WEATHER SERVICE IN STERLING VIRGINIA HAS ISSUED A
FIRE WEATHER WATCH...IN EFFECT FRIDAY AFTERNOON.
* HUMIDITY...25 TO 30 PERCENT.
* WINDS...WEST 25 TO 30 MPH WITH GUSTS UP TO 50 MPH.
* FUEL MOISTURE...5 TO 7 PERCENT.
Instructions: A FIRE WEATHER WATCH MEANS THAT CRITICAL FIRE WEATHER CONDITIONS ARE FORECAST TO OCCUR.
LISTEN FOR LATER FORECASTS AND POSSIBLE RED FLAG WARNINGS.
It was just over a year ago when similar weather condition existed and a warning
issued. February 19, 2011, was the busiest brush fire day in the history of the Prince
George's County Fire/EMS Department. See the recap of that story here.
121
Appendix 2
Citizens, residents and visitors are asked to exercise additional fire safety measures during
these warnings.
 Dispose of smoking materials in an appropriate container and ensure they are

completely extinguished. Do not discard these items into any open area as they
may start a fire that will spread rapidly. Do not dispose of smoking materials out of
your vehicle when traveling.
 Business owners and property managers should have appropriate disposable
containers in areas where smoking occurs outside.
 Do not park your vehicle on top of piles of debris or accumulated items such as
leaves, brush, etc.
 Do not burn brush or trash ever without appropriate approval.
 We request that you not use outside grills or cooking equipment during these
times. If you must, ensure you have some type of extinguishing agent nearby (water
hose, bucket of sand, fire extinguisher, etc.)
 If you have fireplace ashes; you must put them into a sealed metal container placed
on a concrete surface away from any structures. If possible - wait to clean your
fireplace until this weather event is over.
 Use common sense and practice sound fire safety habits.
You can follow additional updates and breaking news about the Fire Weather Watch
by following PGFDPIO on Twitter.
122
Appendix 2
From: PGFD Operational Safety

Sent: Friday, February 24, 2012 8:07 AM
To: Battalion 1; Battalion 2; Battalion 3; Battalion 4; Battalion 5; Battalion 6; Battalion 7;
Battalion 8; McSwain, Kenneth D; '[email protected]'; EMS 1;
Emergency Operations Center
Cc: George, Erroll W.; Jenkins, Phyllis
Subject: Safety Report
Temp: 70s for daytime high.

40s overnight.
Winds: 30 MPH, gusts may be higher.
Precip: Expect severe T-Storms late afternoon.
Primary Hazards:
• Very High Winds may bring down trees, so watch for blocked roadways.
• Expect RAPID fire spread; crews should communicate changing interior conditions.
• Wet Roadways & Lightning.
Daytime Safety Officer: Stefan Gansert 240-393-8015

Prince George's Co. Fire/EMS Dept.
Risk Management & Safety Office
Cell: 240-508-7661
Office: 301-583-1881
123
APPENDIX 3 – FLOOR PLANS
124
Appendix 3
125
APPENDIX 4 – TRANSCRIBED RADIO TRAFFIC
PSC Recording Transcript – Talk Group 8 Alpha 3
Elapsed Actual Time Unit Message
Time
21:11:00 Start time 21:11Hrs
00:00.0 21:11:00 E807B "Engine 8-0-7-B to Communications ,numbers one more time"
00:10.0 21:11:10 FED "Engine 8-0-7-B , Six Three Three Four"
00:21.0 21:11:21 "Battalion 8-84"
00:28.0 21:11:28 FED "Battalion Chief 8-84"
00:35.0 21:11:35 FED "BEEP, BEEP, BEEP At 63-34, 6-3-3-4 57th Avenue Near Ravenswood
Road and Sheridan Street, Reported House Fire Box 13-0-4, Engine 8-
0-7-B, Engine 8-0-9, Engine 8-0-1, Engine 8-12, Truck 8-0-9, Truck 8-
0-1, Rescue Squad 8-0-1, Battalion Chief 8-84 have been alerted to
respond"
00:36.0 21:11:36 VC809A "Chief 8-0-9-A as well"
01:07.0 21:12:07 FED "Engine 8-0-7-B re(inaudible) your staffing"
01:27.0 21:12:27 electronic garble
01:34.0 21:12:34 FED "And Communications to Battalion Chief 8-84 All units are up and
staffed"
01:45.0 21:12:45 Female FED voice "Go ahead"
01:49.0 21:12:49 FED "Numbers are 6-3-3-4, 63-34 57th Avenue"
01:55.0 21:12:55 E807B "Engine 8-0-7-B to Communications, Dropping it at 63-25, Have the
next due company pick it up"
02:05.0 21:13:05 FED "Ok 63-25, Engine 8-0-9 Are you direct?"
02:10.0 21:13:10 E809 "Yeah, We're on the scene, we got the line"
02:12.0 21:13:12 FED "OK"
02:17.0 21:13:17 inaudible electronic garble
02:21.0 21:13:21 VC812 "Chief 812"
126
Appendix 4
02:24.0 21:13:24 FED Female FED voice "K"

02:28.0 21:13:28 E807B "Engine 8-0-7-B to Communications, 2 story Single family fire showing
Side Bravo, Basement level. Start the working fire dispatch."
02:26.0 21:13:26 FED "Copy, On the scene Engine 807B 2 story single family with fire
evident. 2114"
02:44.0 21:13:44 VC809A "9-A is on the scene. I'll take it til the arrival of BC4"
02:48.0 21:13:48 FED "On the scene with command, Chief 809A"
02:54.0 21:13:54 NSO "Northern Safety Officers responding"
02:57.0 21:13:57 FED "Northern Safety Officer"
03:00.0 21:14:00 "Northern Division Chief"
03:01.0 21:14:01 FED "Northern Division Chief"
03:04.0 21:14:04 VC809A "Command give me a quick rundown"
03:11.0 21:14:11 FED "You have Engine 8-0-7-B with 5, Engine 8-0-9 with 4, Engine 8-0-1
with 5, Engine 8-12 with 4, Truck 8-0-9 has 6, Truck 8-0-1 with 8,
Rescue Squad 8-0-1 also with 8"
03:37.0 21:14:37 VC809A "Command copies. Squad 1 Rapid Intervention. Truck 1 ladder the
back side and give a report from side charlie"
03:39.0 21:14:39 VC809A "Squad 1 acknowledge"
04:00.0 21:15:00 VC812A "Chief 8-12-A to command, I'm on the scene, I'll take the interior if
that's okay with you"
04:06.0 21:15:06 VC809A "Basement division… ah… Command to Communications, Any other
Chief officers responding?"
04:13.0 21:15:13 FED "You have Chief 8-12, Chief 8-12-A, Battalion Chief 8-84, pause,
Northern Division Chief"
04:23.0 21:15:23 E809 "Engine 8-0-9 Command"
04:25.0 21:15:25 VC809A "8-0-9 Go ahead"
04:28.0 21:15:28 Open Mic inaudible echos
04:33.0 21:15:33 E807B Engine 8-0-7-B to Engine 8-0-9 Let it go when you got it baby!"
04:42.0 21:15:42 VC809A "Engine 8-0-9 let the water go for the attack line and for Engine 7.
Command to Chief 8-12, when you arrive on the scene can you take
Division 1 for me"
127
Appendix 4
04:52.0 21:15:52 VC812 "Copy Chief"

04:55.0 21:15:55 TK801 "Truck 8-0-1 to Command, is 9 in the basement or the first floor?"
05:00.0 21:16:00 VC809A "Should have made their way down to the basement. Give me a
primary on number 1 and number 2 then open it up."
05:06.0 21:16:06 E801 "Engine 801 laying out 57-15 Sheridan"
05:14.0 21:16:14 FED "Communications to Truck 8-0-9 verify your E.I. Status"
05:24.0 21:16:24 FED "Communications to Command"
05:32.0 21:16:32 FED "Communications to Command or Truck 8-0-9"
05:49.0 21:16:49 Open Mic
05:52.0 21:16:52 FED "Communications to Truck 8-0-9 or Command"
05:56.0 21:16:56 Open Mic inaudible low voice
06:01.0 21:17:01 VC809A "Command to Communications, I copy, I got people looking for 'em
right now. Looks like I got fire from three sides. We're trying to get a
line on it now."
06:11.0 21:17:11 Open Mic electronic garble
06:16.0 21:17:16 VC809A "Verify Truck 8-0-9's E.I."
06:32.0 21:17:32 Open Mic garbled then BA breathing Sounds
06:45.0 21:17:45 VC809A "Command to Communications, go ahead and sound the evacuations
tones and start a task force and stage them at Kenilworth and
Riverdale for now"
06:52.0 21:17:52 FED EVACUATION TONES SOUNDING
06:56.0 21:17:56 FED TONES ENDED.
06:58.0 21:17:58 FED "Attention all units, Attention all units 63-34 57th Avenue, evacuate the
building. Attention all units 63-34 57th Avenue, evacuate the building.
(Open Mic electronic garble)And command still receiving Truck 809 E.I.
from portable 1 and 2."
128
Appendix 4
07:18.0 21:18:18 VC809A "Command. I copy. I need the working fire dispatch ambulances to side
A. I got confirmed firemen from engine company 7 it looks like. And
give me an EMS taskforce."
07:28.0 21:18:28 FED "Copy fire task force (Open Mic electronic garble)as well as an EMS
task force. EMS units on the working fire dispatch continue to the fire
scene, injured firefighter."
07:42.0 21:18:42 SSO "Southern Safety Officer, Hold me enroute to uh..." (Open mic
electronic garble)
08:03.0 21:19:03 FED "Communications to Command (open mic electronic garble)Which Talk
Group would you like the task force on?"
08:05.0 21:19:05 (Interrupted above message)"Chief 12, Chief 12, come over to the
buggy for a second"
08:12.0 21:19:12 "8-0-1 let the water go!"
08:13.0 21:19:13 inaudible voice
08:21.0 21:19:21 (Open Mic electronic garble) "...to command"
08:26.0 21:19:26 (Open Mic electronic garble) "...command"
08:33.0 21:19:33 (Open Mic electronic garble) "…go ahead" (low volume and muffled)
09:00.0 21:20:00 inaudible muffled voice mixed with open mic
09:03.0 21:20:03 FED "Duty Chief, Go ahead"
09:06.0 21:20:06 DC800 (Open Mic electronic garble)"Check on the 2 units that uhh..activated
their E.I."
129
Appendix 4
09:11.0 21:20:11 FED "Okay Duty Chief , (inaudible) Truck 8-0-9s E.I. from portable 1.
acknowledge. We have not had any acknowledgment from them"
09:22.0 21:20:22 Garbled voice
09:41.0 21:20:41 FED "Ambulance 8-0-9 status enroute"
10:17.0 21:21:17 FED "Communications to Command or Chief 8-12-A, interior or basement"
10:22.0 21:21:22 (Unidentified female voice)"...Berwyn Heights 1-0-9"
10:24.0 21:21:24 (unidentified male voice) " Chief (inaudible)"
10:37.0 21:21:37 FED "Communica….Communications to the Duty Chief"
10:40.0 21:21:40 (Female Communications voice)"Three George Seven"
10:45.0 21:21:45 (unidentified male voice)"Can you turn on the call text, we didn't copy
that"
11:01.0 21:22:01 VC809a "Command. Go ahead. We're having radio problems here with the E.I."
11:04.0 21:22:04 FED "Okay. Just be advised we are still receiving the E.I. from Truck 8-0-9"
11:10.0 21:22:10 VC809A "I'm aware of that. Everyone should be out. We're trying to get it reset
at this time. Squad 1 is going back in to do a primary to make sure all
the firemen are out. Looks like a bulk of the fire is knocked down"
11:20.0 21:22:20 FED "I copy Command. The task force units are dispatched on Alpha 4 so
you're aware"
11:34.0 21:22:34 FED "Engine 8-55 or Ambulance 8-55 status enroute"
130
Appendix 4

11:57.0 21:22:57 RS801 "Squad 1 to command, the primary on the first floor is negative"
(muffled behind SCBA)
12:01.0 21:23:01 inaudible voice
13:17.0 21:24:17 FED "Communications to all units, all units on Talk Group 8-alpha-3, all
units switch over to Talk Group 8-alpha-4, 8-alpha-4."
13:51.0 21:24:51 FED (Long tone)
13:56.0 21:24:56 FED (Tone ended)
13:57.0 21:24:57 FED "Attention all units, all units on 57th Avenue switch over to Talk Group
8-alpha-4. 8-alpha-4"
14:12.0 21:25:12 (inaudible 4 syllables of muffled male voice)
14:14.0 21:25:14 DC800 "Duty Chief to Communications"
14:18.0 21:25:18 FED "Duty Chief"
14:21.0 21:25:21 DC800 "Give me a ahh… list of the units that you have coming on the EMS
task force"
14:33.0 21:25:33 FED "ok, the EMS task force was ambulance 8-55, ambulance 8-0-1, and
medic 8-30"
14:41.0 21:25:41 DC800 "Ok, ambulance 8-55, medic 30 and what else?"
14:46.0 21:25:46 FED "and ambulance 8-0-1. Those units should be on Alpha 4"
14:51.0 21:25:51 DC800 "Ok. I need all them to the scene. 2 more medic units and umm..
Check the status on the helicopters"
15:01.0 21:26:01 FED "Copy. 2 additional medic units"
131
Appendix 4
15:40.0 21:26:40 DC800 "and Duty Chief to Communications"

15:43.0 21:26:43 FED "Go ahead"
15:45.0 21:26:45 DC800 "I'm going to be assuming the ah.. 57th Avenue command."
15:51.0 21:26:51 FED "Copy, Assuming command at 21-27"
15:56.0 21:26:56 DC800 "I'll get back to you with umm… sector and group assignments"
16:03.0 21:27:03 FED "okay and your medics are going to be paramedic engine 830, medic
8-44"
16:34.0 21:27:34 "Command post to command"
16:38.0 21:27:38 DC800 "The unit calling command?"
16:40.0 21:27:40 "It's the basement. The fire in the basements out." (Muffled behind
SCBA)
16:47.0 21:27:47 "okay"
16:50.0 21:27:50 "Advise units on the first floor there are going to be some bad spots in
the floor where it looks like it’s gonna' burn through." (Muffled behind
SCBA)
16:59.0 21:27:59 DC800 "okay, there shouldn't be any units on the first floor"
17:06.0 21:28:06 DC800 "Communications to rescue squad 1"
17:15.0 21:28:15 "Basement to command… I'm looking at units on the first floor"
(Muffled behind SCBA)
17:22.0 21:28:22 DC800 "Okay I was just told that should be rescue squad 1. Communications
to rescue squad 1"
17:33.0 21:28:33 DC800 "Communications to rescue squad 8-0-1"
17:44.0 21:28:44 FED? "Communications to res…"
17:50.0 21:28:50 RS801 "Rescue Squad 1. Copy" (Muffled behind SCBA)
17:55.0 21:28:55 DC800 "Rescue Squad 8-0-1 what's your location?"
18:01.0 21:29:01 RS801 "First floor Sir" (Muffled behind SCBA)
18:04.0 21:29:04 DC800 "Okay, what’s the status on the primary?"
18:09.0 21:29:09 RS801 "The primary on the first floor is negative" (Muffled behind SCBA)
18:11.0 21:29:11 FED (short tone)
132
Appendix 4
18:15.0 21:29:15 DC800 "I copy the primary on the first floor is negative. Command to all units
on the fireground standby for a par check."
18:24.0 21:29:24 DC800 "Command to engine 8-0-7, engine 8-0-7 come in"
18:35.0 21:29:35 DC800 "Command to engine 8-0-7"
18:45.0 21:29:45 FED "Command, 8-0-7 is on alpha 4 switching over"
18:50.0 21:29:50 DC800 "I copy. Com…Command to engine 8-0-9"
18:55.0 21:29:55 "message" (low volume)
18:57.0 21:29:57 DC800 "Are you par?"
19:01.0 21:30:01 E809 "We are par. We're not inside"
19:06.0 21:30:06 DC800 "Copy you negative on your par. Didn't hear anything else. What was
your last transmission?"
19:11.0 21:30:11 E809 "everybody’s out (inaudible) …the side"
19:27.0 21:30:27 DC800 "Everyone is accounted for, you just have 2 injured, correct?"
19:31.0 21:30:31 E807 "engine 8-0-7 , we were wrong channel"
19:39.0 21:30:39 E807 "approximately ahh... 4 firefighters"
19:42.0 21:30:42 DC800 "I copy 4 firefighters injured"
19:47.0 21:30:47 DC800 "Command to engine 8-0-9, engine 8-0-9 come in"
19:51.0 21:30:51 E809 "Engine 8-0-9 go ahead"
19:52.0 21:30:52 DC800 "Are you par?"
19:55.0 21:30:55 E809 "yeah, we're par operating off our truck"
20:00.0 21:31:00 DC800 "Any injuries?"
20:02.0 21:31:02 E809 "negative"
20:04.0 21:31:04 DC800 "Command to engine 8-0-1"
20:08.0 21:31:08 E801 "par side charlie"
20:11.0 21:31:11 DC800 "Okay, any injuries?"
20:14.0 21:31:14 E801 "no sir"
20:17.0 21:31:17 DC800 "Copy. Command to Engine 8-12, 8-12 come in"
20:23.0 21:31:23 E812 "Engine 8-12, I'm par side charlie"
20:28.0 21:31:28 DC800 "Okay, no injuries, correct?"
20:31.0 21:31:31 E812 "That’s correct. No injuries"
133
Appendix 4
20:35.0 21:31:35 DC800 "Okay. Command to Truck 8-0-9"

20:42.0 21:31:42 E809 "Engine 8-0-9 to command I don't know if you're aware but a couple of
the members from truck 8-0-9 were the ones that were injured. I don't
know if the officer was one. Correction, the officer was one"
20:55.0 21:31:55 DC800 "Okay, I copy your par and you got 2 injured correct?"
21:04.0 21:32:04 E809 "This is engine 8-0-9 relaying the information to you, but yes, as far as
I'm aware. The officer and barman"
21:10.0 21:32:10 DC800 "I need truck 8-0-9, truck 8-0-9 but the message I copy was everyone
was par and you had 2 injuries, is that correct?"
21:32.0 21:32:32 E809 "That's correct, 2 off the truck"
21:36.0 21:32:36 DC800 "I copy. Command to truck 8-0-1"
21:41.0 21:32:41 TK801 "Truck 8-0-1 is par with 8 operating in the basement"
21:47.0 21:32:47 DC800 "Okay. You have primary down there?"
21:50.0 21:32:50 TK801 "That's negative, primary is negative"
21:53.0 21:32:53 DC800 "Okay, give me a status on the primary in the basement. Command to
rescue squad 8-0-1"
21:59.0 21:32:59 RS801 "Go ahead sir. I'm par, first floor"
22:07.0 21:33:07 DC800 "I copy"
22:11.0 21:33:11 A809 "A809, We'll be transporting the one firefighter barman from truck 9 to
Medstar. We're gonna go ahead and switch to alpha 2"
22:25.0 21:33:25 FED "ok"
22:28.0 21:33:28 TK801 "truck 8-0-1 to command, primary in the basement is negative"
22:44.0 21:33:44 C807 "engine 8-0-7 call chief 8-0-7 on his cell phone"
22:48.0 21:33:48 "I'll do that momentarily"
22:55.0 21:33:55 DC800 "command to communications"
22:57.0 21:33:57 FED "Command go ahead"
23:00.0 21:34:00 DC800 "I got medic 30, medic 12 on the scene. Has paramedic engine 830
marked on the scene yet?"
23:14.0 21:34:14 FED "that's correct"
23:14.0 21:34:14 PE830 "paramedic engine 830 I'm here"
134
Appendix 4
23:18.0 21:34:18 DC800 "okay, I need them side alpha, and command to medic 8-44"
23:24.0 21:34:24 MD844 "go ahead command"
23:26.0 21:34:26 DC800 "Have you arrived on the scene yet?"
23:29.0 21:34:29 MD844 "Negative, we're approaching Kenilworth from east west"
23:34.0 21:34:34 FED "tell you we advised them of the"
24:00.0 21:35:00 FED "and communications to command, can you advise the number of
helicopters that are needed"
24:07.0 21:35:07 DC800 "standby… command to the uhh…EMS supervisor"
24:54.0 21:35:54 FED "communications to command"
24:58.0 21:35:58 DC800 "standby"
25:05.0 21:36:05 E807B "Engine 8-0-7-B to command"
25:39.0 21:36:39 FED "go ahead command"
25:40.0 21:36:40 DC800 "do you have a message"
25:44.0 21:36:44 FED "That’s correct. The EMS duty officer is still over on alpha 4 if you need
to contact him. Advise Eagle 2 is enroute with a ten minute ETA,
landing at Rittenhouse and Kenilworth"
26:00.0 21:37:00 DC800 "okay"
26:03.0 21:37:03 DC800 "Medic 8-44 are you on the scene yet?"
26:14.0 21:37:14 MD844 "side alpha"
26:21.0 21:37:21 DC800 "okay, I need you to side alpha"
26:25.0 21:37:25 VC812A "chief 8-12-A to medic engine 8-30"
26:40.0 21:37:40 VC812A "chief 8-12-a to command"
26:52.0 21:37:52 DC800 "command go ahead"
26:56.0 21:37:56 VC812A "There’s a medic asking for his drug box in the ambulance behind
engine company 9. I think medic engine 30 is up there"
27:07.0 21:38:07 DC800 "okay, give me that one more time"
27:10.0 21:38:10 VC812A "a medic needs a drug box in the ambulance behind engine company
9"
27:19.0 21:38:19 DC800 "You said you need a medic with a drug box?"
135
Appendix 4
27:22.0 21:38:22 VC812A "a drug box…drug"

28:42.0 21:39:42 "side alpha"
28:46.0 21:39:46 "…send your officers over to the command post"
28:58.0 21:39:58 "ambulance 8-0-1 turn your running lights on"
29:25.0 21:40:25 DC800 "off the EMS task force ahh... whichever ambulance hasn’t made it to
the scene and committed yet I need them to position at 57th and
Rittenhouse and meet 7s ambulance . They are blocked in and can't
get out… with a patient"
29:43.0 21:40:43 FED "Okay… I believe all EMS units are apparently on the scene"
29:57.0 21:40:57 FED "Copy. Additional EMS, 57th and Rittenhouse"
30:02.0 21:41:02 DC800 "correct"
30:05.0 21:41:05 DC800 "Right now all of, umm…personnel are accounted for. We're doing a
secondary search of the uhh… occupancy now and I'll get to you on
total number of firefighters we have injured"
30:17.0 21:41:17 FED "Okay. Are all injured firefighters being transported by ground?"
30:25.0 21:41:25 DC800 "as of right now correct so we may be turning Eagle 2 around"
30:31.0 21:41:31 FED "okay"
31:02.0 21:42:02 BA716 "air 7-16 is enroute"
31:07.0 21:42:07 FED "air unit 7-16"
31:19.0 21:42:19 VC855B "855B to command"
31:24.0 21:42:24 DC800 "go ahead"
31:26.0 21:42:26 VC855B "Okay, be advised ambulance 8-12 is on the scene. They are
uncommitted. They are going over to ambulance 8-0-7 to get that
patient to ahh... get him outta here"
31:38.0 21:42:38 DC800 "I copy"
31:40.0 21:42:40 VC855B "Also, umm… using engine 8-28 for the landing zone. That'll be at the
uh…Autozone parking lot at Rittenhouse and Kenilworth"
32:18.0 21:43:18 VC809A "command to communications, I need a total of 2 more BLS units to
the scene"
136
Appendix 4

32:41.0 21:43:41 VC809A "Command go ahead"
32:31.0 21:43:31 FED "communications command"
32:47.0 21:43:47 FED "Is ambulance 8-0-7 on the scene? We just sent them as your
additional BLS request. We didn’t have them on the scene prior to us
dispatching them. Can you let us know" (next transmission cut this one
off)
32:54.0 21:43:54 VC809A "Ambulance 7 is (inaudible) but they're blocked in by the units.
Ambulance 12's taking that patient. I still got 2 more firefighters up
here"
33:04.0 21:44:04 FED "Okay. we were not aware that 7 made it to the scene undispatched.
We'll start you 2 more BLS units"
33:15.0 21:44:15 NSO "northern safety to command"
33:27.0 21:44:27 NSO "northern safety officer to command"
33:33.0 21:44:33 VC809A "go ahead"
33:36.0 21:44:36 NSO "medic 8-30 at this point needs a driver… they'll be on their way to
Medstar"
33:42.0 21:44:42 VC809A "alright"
33:51.0 21:44:51 VC812 "interior to command"
33:58.0 21:44:58 VC809A "go ahead"
33:58.0 21:44:58 VC812 "Secondary search of the structure is negative. I have engine 8-0-1,
truck 8-0-1 operating in the basement. Squad 8-0-1 operating on
division 1. engine 8-12 is outside charlie working on some exterior fire.
All members are accounted for and let everybody know; they're pretty
much aware of it inside, but if we rotate crews, the interior stairs are
burned out"
34:24.0 21:45:24 VC809A "I copy. We'll advise them if we have to rotate out"
34:32.0 21:45:32 VC812 "and command, if you have a fresh truck company that has the ability
to run some lights to side charlie. There's a very steep drop back there
and it’s not lit up right now"
137
Appendix 4
34:51.0 21:45:51 VC855B "855B to command"

35:10.0 21:46:10 VC809A "Unit calling command go ahead"
35:12.0 21:46:12 VC855B "Yeah its 855B…ummm…just to let you know. Communications let me
know on alpha 4 that Trooper 3 has a 20 minute ETA as well. I do
have the Eagle overhead now.
35:32.0 21:46:32 VC809A "Command to 55B you can cancel the second helicopter for now.
We're still getting a determination for (inaudible)"
35:41.0 21:46:41 VC855B "I'm okay"
35:45.0 21:46:45 VC809A "command to the EMS supervisor"
35:55.0 21:46:55 (short inaudible sound)
35:58.0 21:46:58 (inaudible 3 syllables)
37:32.0 21:48:32 FC "Fire Chief to command, what’s the exact location of the command
post?"
37:37.0 21:48:37 VC809A "Side alpha between engine 7-2 and truck 9. Black Tahoe"
37:44.0 21:48:44 FC "copy"
38:15.0 21:49:15 (inaudible 1 syllable possibly "Four")
38:25.0 21:49:25 DC800 "I copy at 11 and 8-34 and I'll give you an update"
38:31.0 21:49:31 FED "K"
38:32.0 21:49:32 DC800 "6334 57th was a, uh... approximately 40 by 30 one story with a
basement fire throughout the first floor and the basement. Uhh...
Steps had burned away. Primary uhh...search was negative.
Secondary searches are underway. They're being conducted by Chief
12 and engine 8-12. Engine 8-55, truck 12 with the RIC group. EMS
uh... supervisor has the EMS group. I have both.... both safety officers
that I have on the scene, northern (inaudible)... I'm sorry, northern
safety and southern safety and numerous other command officers I
have not assigned them umm...an assignment as of yet. Fire is out,
under control. We're checking for umm...extension now and then the
secondary searches are underway. Duty chief is in command, chief 9-a
is operations"
138
Appendix 4
39:30.0 21:50:30 FED "I copy command at 21-51. Just wanna hold this as your thirty minute
duration?"
39:35.0 21:50:35 DC800 "and right now it looks like a total of 7 firefighters have uh… that are
injured and have been transport...transported"
39:43.0 21:50:43 FED "copy command"
39:48.0 21:50:48 DC800 "Uh… Correct that to 8"
39:50.0 21:50:50 FED "copy, 8"
40:34.0 21:51:34 DC800 "though I have my chart right, give me every ems resource that you
have on the call assigned"
40:43.0 21:51:43 FED "Okay. All your ems units paramedic engine 8-30, medic 8-44, medic
8-30, medic 8-12, the ems duty officer, ambulance 8-55, ambulance 8-
34, ambulance 8-12, ambulance 8-11, ambulance 8-0-9, ambulance 8-
0-7, ambulance 8-0-1.
41:14.0 21:52:14 DC800 "44,30, and 12 are the only medic units?"
41:23.0 21:52:23 FED "and medic 8-30 as well as paramedic engine 8-30 as ALS resource"
41:28.0 21:52:28 DC800 "ok"
41:45.0 21:52:45 FED "copy, they're en route"
42:24.0 21:53:24 A834 "Ambulance 8-34 to communications"
42:29.0 21:53:29 FED "Ambulance 8-34"
42:33.0 21:53:33 A834 "Do you have anything for us right now? We're on the scene"
42:38.0 21:53:38 FED "Go direct with command"
42:55.0 21:53:55 FED "Communications to command"
43:01.0 21:54:01 "Command go ahead"
43:03.0 21:54:03 FED "Any need for the canteen unit?"
43:12.0 21:54:12 VC809A "That's correct and after they get here 57th and Somerset and also the
command bus if available"
43:23.0 21:54:23 FED "Ok, you wish that the canteen stage at 57th and Somerset?"
139
Appendix 4
43:35.0 21:54:35 VC809A "Yeah, I don't have a map in front of me but looking ahead at Somerset
and 57th they should be able to get that way"
43:41.0 21:54:41 FED "Ok"
44:40.0 21:55:40 MD812 "Medic 8-12 to communications"
44:44.0 21:55:44 FED "Medic 8-12"
44:47.0 21:55:47 MD812 "Myself and ambulance 8-0-7's crew will be transporting 3 injured
firefighters from company 8-0-7. 2 at this time superficial burns to the
face, 1 possible broken rib. So I'm gonna' call 2 priority threes and 1
priority 2. We'll be going to uh… Medstar.
45:12.0 21:56:12 FED "ok"
45:29.0 21:56:29 VC855B "55B to command"
45:37.0 21:56:37 DC800 "Go ahead'
45:39.0 21:56:39 VC855B "The Eagle is on the ground
45:45.0 21:56:45 DC800 "ok"
45:46.0 21:56:46 End recording at 21:57hrs
140
Appendix 4
Radio System Data A3

Time Type Unit TG Duration E.I. Description
02/24/2012 09:11:08 PM Failed Call BO 885 *P* Audio Interrupt
02/24/2012 09:11:54 PM PTT ENGINE 807 B A3 (INC 50) 6.2 No 1375616
02/24/2012 09:12:03 PM PTT PSCC FED 08 A3 (INC 50) 1.3 No 1375625
02/24/2012 09:12:05 PM PTT CHIEF 809 A A3 (INC 50) 2.7 No 1375625
02/24/2012 09:12:16 PM PTT CHIEF 807 A3 (INC 50) 3.9 No 1375647
02/24/2012 09:12:20 PM PTT TK 809 *3* A3 (INC 50) 2 No 1375647
02/24/2012 09:12:22 PM PTT PSCC FED 08 A3 (INC 50) 2 No 1375647
02/24/2012 09:12:53 PM PTT TK 809 *2* A3 (INC 50) 6.7 No 1375674
02/24/2012 09:13:18 PM Failed Call POL V 4559 Audio Interrupt
02/24/2012 09:13:19 PM PTT TK 809 *2* A3 (INC 50) 8.7 No 1375690
02/24/2012 09:13:20 PM Failed Call TRUCK 828 Audio Interrupt
02/24/2012 09:13:37 PM PTT CHIEF 807 A3 (INC 50) 3.2 No 1375728
02/24/2012 09:13:39 PM Failed Call SQ 801 *6* Audio Interrupt
02/24/2012 09:13:40 PM PTT ENGINE 801 A3 (INC 50) 3.4 No 1375728
02/24/2012 09:13:42 PM Failed Call TK 809 *2* Audio Interrupt
02/24/2012 09:14:13 PM PTT CHIEF 812 A/B F A3 (INC 50) 2.7 No 1375767
02/24/2012 09:14:14 PM Failed Call E 807 B *4* Audio Interrupt
02/24/2012 09:14:16 PM PTT E 807 B *4* A3 (INC 50) 0.2 No 1375767
141
Appendix 4

02/24/2012 09:14:18 PM PTT E 807 B *4* A3 (INC 50) 4.1 No 1375767
02/24/2012 09:14:18 PM Failed Call ENGINE 807 B Stealth Reject
02/24/2012 09:14:20 PM Failed Call ENGINE 807 B Audio Interrupt
02/24/2012 09:14:20 PM Failed Call CHIEF 812 F Audio Interrupt
02/24/2012 09:14:24 PM Failed Call ID$2530379 Requestor Not Affiliated to TG
02/24/2012 09:14:38 PM Failed Call VC 810 A *P* Audio Interrupt
02/24/2012 09:14:44 PM PTT TK 801 *5* A3 (INC 50) 3.5 No 1375767
02/24/2012 09:14:49 PM PTT VC 810 A *P* A3 (INC 50) 2.8 No 1375767
02/24/2012 09:14:50 PM Failed Call E 809 *2* Audio Interrupt
02/24/2012 09:14:50 PM Failed Call VC 809 *P* Audio Interrupt
02/24/2012 09:14:53 PM PTT VC 809 *P* A3 (INC 50) 2.6 No 1375767
02/24/2012 09:14:58 PM Failed Call OEM P CSU 890 Audio Interrupt
02/24/2012 09:15:10 PM PTT E 809 OIC A3 (INC 50) 4 No 1375793
02/24/2012 09:15:14 PM PTT TK 809 *1* A3 (INC 50) 2 No 1375793
02/24/2012 09:15:16 PM Failed Call E 809 OIC Audio Interrupt
02/24/2012 09:15:19 PM PTT E 809 OIC A3 (INC 50) 7.2 No 1375793
02/24/2012 09:15:26 PM PTT TK 809 *3* A3 (INC 50) 3.4 No 1375793
142
Appendix 4

02/24/2012 09:15:32 PM Failed Call RESCUE SQ 801 Audio Interrupt
02/24/2012 09:15:46 PM Failed Call CHIEF 809 A Stealth Reject
02/24/2012 09:15:46 PM PTT E 809 *2* A3 (INC 50) 4.5 No 1375861
02/24/2012 09:15:48 PM Failed Call SQ 801 OIC Audio Interrupt
02/24/2012 09:15:50 PM PTT TK 801 *5* A3 (INC 50) 3.9 No 1375861
02/24/2012 09:15:51 PM Failed Call E 809 *2* Stealth Reject
02/24/2012 09:15:54 PM PTT CHIEF 812 F A3 (INC 50) 5.1 No 1375861
02/24/2012 09:16:12 PM PTT TK 812 *4* A3 (INC 50) 0.6 No 1375861
02/24/2012 09:16:12 PM PTT TK 812 *4* A3 (INC 50) 1.6 No 1375861
02/24/2012 09:16:13 PM Failed Call CHIEF 809 A Audio Interrupt
02/24/2012 09:16:17 PM Failed Call E 809 DR Audio Interrupt
02/24/2012 09:16:21 PM Failed Call TK 809 OIC Audio Interrupt
02/24/2012 09:16:22 PM PTT TK 809 OIC A3 (INC 50) 5.1 No 1375861
02/24/2012 09:16:22 PM Failed Call E 809 OIC Stealth Reject
143
Appendix 4

02/24/2012 09:16:36 PM PTT CHIEF 809 A A3 (INC 50) 11 No 1375861
02/24/2012 09:16:41 PM Failed Call POL P 3430 Audio Interrupt
02/24/2012 09:16:47 PM PTT CHIEF 812 A/B F A3 (INC 50) 2 No 1375861
02/24/2012 09:16:47 PM Failed Call ENGINE 801 Audio Interrupt
02/24/2012 09:16:48 PM Failed Call SHF V 0730 Audio Interrupt
02/24/2012 09:16:49 PM PTT TK 801 OIC A3 (INC 50) 5.7 No 1375861
144
Appendix 4
02/24/2012 09:17:06 PM PTT E 809 OIC A3 (INC 50) 1 No 1375861

02/24/2012 09:17:06 PM PTT TK 809 *2* A3 (INC 50) 2.2 Yes 1376214
02/24/2012 09:17:07 PM Failed Call E 820 B OIC Audio Interrupt
02/24/2012 09:17:08 PM PTT PSCC FED 08 A3 (INC 50) 35.1 Yes 1376214
02/24/2012 09:17:43 PM PTT TK 809 *1* A3 (INC 50) 2.7 Yes 1376214
02/24/2012 09:17:55 PM PTT CHIEF 809 A A3 (INC 50) 0.2 Yes 1376214
02/24/2012 09:18:06 PM PTT TK 809 OIC A3 (INC 50) 1.1 Yes 1376214
02/24/2012 09:18:07 PM PTT E 809 OIC A3 (INC 50) 4.1 Yes 1376214
02/24/2012 09:18:09 PM Failed Call CHIEF 809 Audio Interrupt
02/24/2012 09:18:11 PM PTT CHIEF 809 A3 (INC 50) 5.8 Yes 1376214
02/24/2012 09:18:17 PM PTT TK 801 *5* A3 (INC 50) 4.1 Yes 1376214
145
Appendix 4

02/24/2012 09:18:21 PM PTT E 807 B OIC A3 (INC 50) 4.1 Yes 1376214
02/24/2012 09:18:26 PM PTT TK 809 *1* A3 (INC 50) 11.4 Yes 1376214
02/24/2012 09:18:46 PM PTT PSCC FED 08 A3 (INC 50) 0 Yes 1376214
02/24/2012 09:18:46 PM PTT TK 801 *5* A3 (INC 50) 5.6 Yes 1376214
02/24/2012 09:19:24 PM PTT TK 801 OIC A3 (INC 50) 4.2 Yes 1376214
02/24/2012 09:19:28 PM PTT TK 809 *1* A3 (INC 50) 5.3 Yes 1376214
02/24/2012 09:19:33 PM Failed Call E 807 B OIC Stealth Reject
02/24/2012 09:19:37 PM Failed Call CO AMB M30622 Audio Interrupt
146
Appendix 4

02/24/2012 09:19:55 PM Failed Call STP P 9381 Audio Interrupt
02/24/2012 09:20:02 PM PTT TK 809 *1* A3 (INC 50) 1.2 Yes 1376214
02/24/2012 09:20:03 PM PTT TK 809 *1* A3 (INC 50) 0.5 Yes 1376214
02/24/2012 09:20:03 PM PTT TW 833 *2* A3 (INC 50) 1.9 Yes 1376214
02/24/2012 09:20:07 PM PTT DC 800 A *P* A3 (INC 50) 4.1 Yes 1376214
02/24/2012 09:20:14 PM Failed Call DC 800 A *P* Audio Interrupt
02/24/2012 09:20:18 PM Failed Call DC 800 A *P* Stealth Reject
02/24/2012 09:20:19 PM Failed Call VC 812 A *P* Stealth Reject
147
Appendix 4

02/24/2012 09:20:31 PM PTT DC 800 A *P* A3 (INC 50) 12.8 Yes 1376214
02/24/2012 09:20:40 PM Failed Call MSP CS L Base Audio Interrupt
02/24/2012 09:20:44 PM PTT E 809 OIC A3 (INC 50) 7 Yes 1376214
02/24/2012 09:20:44 PM Failed Call TRUCK 828 Stealth Reject
02/24/2012 09:20:45 PM Failed Call VC 855 B *P* Stealth Reject
02/24/2012 09:20:51 PM PTT E 812 DR A3 (INC 50) 3.8 Yes 1376214
02/24/2012 09:20:55 PM PTT NORTH DIV CMDR A3 (INC 50) 2.7 Yes 1376214
02/24/2012 09:21:20 PM PTT VC 809 *P* A3 (INC 50) 3.4 Yes 1376214
02/24/2012 09:21:24 PM PTT E 812 *4* A3 (INC 50) 1.1 Yes 1376214
02/24/2012 09:21:25 PM PTT VC 809 *P* A3 (INC 50) 9.4 Yes 1376214
148
Appendix 4
02/24/2012 09:22:02 PM PTT SQ 801 *5* A3 (INC 50) 9.2 Yes 1376214
02/24/2012 09:22:04 PM Failed Call VC 809 *P* TG Request on Regrouped TG
02/24/2012 09:22:21 PM PTT E 812 *4* A3 (INC 50) 0.6 Yes 1376214
02/24/2012 09:22:21 PM PTT E 812 *4* A3 (INC 50) 0.1 Yes 1376214
02/24/2012 09:22:21 PM PTT E 812 *4* A3 (INC 50) 10.1 Yes 1376214
02/24/2012 09:22:37 PM Failed Call NORTH DIV CMDR Audio Interrupt
149
Appendix 4
150
Appendix 4
PSC Recording Transcript – Talk Group 8 Alpha 4

Elapsed Actual Unit Message
Time Time
21:21:00 Start
00:00.0 21:21:00 VC855B
"Chief 8-55-B"
00:00.0 21:21:00 FED "Ambulance 8-5-5, status enroute"
00:03.0 21:21:03 FED "medic 8-30 status enroute"
00:10.0 21:21:10 FED "engine 8-55 status enroute"
00:22.0 21:21:22 FED "engine 8-5-5 status enroute"
01:37.0 21:22:37 FED "engine or ambulance 8-5-5 on alpha 4"
02:08.0 21:23:08 FED "engine 8-5-5 status enroute"
02:14.0 21:23:14 A801 "Ambulance 8-0-1, engine 8-55 is responding in front of me"
02:19.0 21:23:19 FED "okay, ambulance 8-5-5, you're dedicated to the EMS taskforce,
acknowledge"
02:28.0 21:23:28 A801 "This is ambulance 8-0-1, engine 8-55 is ahead of me, am I dedicated to the
EMS taskforce as well?"
02:35.0 21:23:35 FED "engine 8-5-5 is part of the fire taskforce, ambulance 8-5-5 is part of the…
EMS taskforce"
02:48.0 21:23:48 E855 "engine 8-5-5 to communications, we're staging at Kenilworth and Riverdale
correct?"
02:53.0 21:23:53 FED "that's correct"
02:56.0 21:23:56 E828 "Engine 8-28, I'm staging as well"
02:59.0 21:23:59 ? (inaudible male voice)
03:05.0 21:24:05 TK812 "truck 8-12 staging as well
03:07.0 21:24:07 FED "truck 8-12"
03:33.0 21:24:33 VC809A "command to communications, do you have a second medic unit on the uh…
ems taskforce? I need them to the scene"
03:41.0 21:24:41 FED "yeah, okay, medic 8-30, medic 8-30, alpha 3 and report to the scene. Medic
8-3-0?"
151
Appendix 4
03:49.0 21:24:49 VC809A "command to communications A3 is tied up with the E.I. Need everyone on
A-4 and you're gonna’ have to make a notification on A3, I can't get through"
03:58.0 21:24:58 FED "okay"
04:00.0 21:25:00 VC809A "also have the first engine and first special uhh, special service on the
taskforce report to side A for rapid intervention. I got squad 1 operating on
the inside now"
04:14.0 21:25:14 FED "engine 8-5-5, truck 8-12, engine 8-5-5, truck 8-12, side A rapid intervention.
Engine 8-5-5?"
04:25.0 21:25:25 E855 "copy"
04:27.0 21:25:27 FED "truck 8-12 acknowledge"
04:32.0 21:25:32 TK812 "copy"
04:35.0 21:25:35 FED "truck 8-28 this channel?"
04:38.0 21:25:38 TK828 "that's correct"
04:40.0 21:25:40 FED "alright, you're not due on this assignment, you can take the transfer to
station 13. acknowledge and go to Talk Group 1"
04:47.0 21:25:47 TK828 "copy"
04:59.0 21:25:59 ? (half second of inaudible open mic)
05:17.0 21:26:17 MD830 "medic 8-30 to communications"
05:20.0 21:26:20 FED "medic 8-30 you can remain on this channel and report to side alpha for
injured firefighters, acknowledge"
05:30.0 21:26:30 FED "Ambulance 8-5-5 to the scene. Ambulance 8-5-5?"
05:38.0 21:26:38 A855 "ambulance 8-55"
05:42.0 21:26:42 FED "okay I need you to go to the scene for injured firefighters"
05:50.0 21:26:50 A855 "direct"
05:57.0 21:26:57 FED "communications to command on alpha 4"
05:58.0 21:26:58 TK809 "truck 8-0-9 to command, want the roof opened up?"
06:12.0 21:27:12 VC855B "chief 8-55-B staging"
152
Appendix 4
06:17.0 21:27:17 FED "chief 8-55-B, I'll put you on the assignment. Also engine 8-5-5, truck 8-12,
they're going to side alpha as your RIC team and ambulance 8-5-5, medic 8-
30 are also enroute. Your additional medic units if you can relay to command
are paramedic engine 8-30, medic 8-44... the engine from 30 is going to be
ALS"
07:26.0 21:28:26 ? (inaudible muffled 3 or 4 syllables)
07:36.0 21:28:36 RS801 "rescue squad 1 go ahead" (muffled behind SCBA)
07:45.0 21:28:45 NSO "northern safety officer's on scene"
07:59.0 21:28:59 DC800 "communications to rescue squad 8-0-1 on 4"
08:10.0 21:29:10 FED "command, they're back on alpha 3. they keep bouncing back and forth"
08:56.0 21:29:56 ? "8-0-7"
08:59.0 21:29:59 FED "8-0-7, alpha 3 now, alpha 3"
09:21.0 21:30:21 FED START TONE
09:24.0 21:30:24 FED END TONE
09:25.0 21:30:25 FED "all units involved in firefighting operations, alpha 3. all units involved in
firefighting operations, 8 alpha 3"
10:41.0 21:31:41 PE830 "paramedic engine 8-30 to communications, do we have a staging location
for the taskforce and am I on the fire or the EMS taskforce?
10:47.0 21:31:47 FED "you're part of the EMS taskforce and you are to go to the scene. They have
uh..4 downed firefighters"
10:53.0 21:31:53 PE830 "okay"
10:55.0 21:31:55 FED "medic 8-44, medic 8-44, likewise, you are to go to the scene for the downed
firefighters"
11:02.0 21:32:02 MD844 "we copy"
12:05.0 21:33:05 FED "communications to chief 8-55-b"
12:08.0 21:33:08 VC855B "go ahead communications"
12:11.0 21:33:11 FED "Okay, are you at the command post...by any chance?"
12:15.0 21:33:15 VC855B "that's negative. I'm in…I'm in the staging area right now at, ahh...
Rittenhouse and Kenilworth"
153
Appendix 4
12:21.0 21:33:21 FED "okay, I’m gonna’ start you an engine, the eagle is on the way and I'm just
going to have them land at Riverdale and Kenilworth in the uh.. Shopping
center parking lot... for right now"
12:33.0 21:33:33 VC855b "ahh…actually, if you want to put them closer, why don't you put them at
the… in the parking lot of the ahh… the Advanced Autoparts which is right at
Rittenhouse and Kenilworth"
12:44.0 21:33:44 FED "okay"
12:49.0 21:33:49 VC855B "also, I do have uh… engine 8-28 right here in the staging area. I can use
them for the landing zone if you want"
12:57.0 21:33:57 FED "okay, that will work and we can back fill staging"
13:08.0 21:34:08 FED "okay, and you can switch to alpha 3 now"
15:02.0 21:36:02 FED "communications to EMS duty officer"
15:08.0 21:36:08 EMSDO "EMS duty officer"
15:12.0 21:36:12 ? (inaudible male voice)
15:18.0 21:36:18 EMSDO "...command enroute, ETA should be less than 7 minutes"
16:57.0 21:37:57 FED "communications to the EMS duty officer"
17:10.0 21:38:10 FED "EMS duty officer channel 4"
17:24.0 21:38:24 FED "communications to the EMS duty officer, you copy command calling you?"
17:38.0 21:38:38 NSO "northern safety officer to EMS duty officer, channel 4"
17:49.0 21:38:49 FED "communications to EMS duty officer, you co..., you copy the northern safety
officer?"
17:56.0 21:38:56 SOC "Southern operations commander to the EMS duty officer"
18:08.0 21:39:08 SOC "southern operations commander to communications"
18:12.0 21:39:12 FED "southern operations commander"
18:15.0 21:39:15 SOC "I'm on the scene of Riverdale, duty chief was asking me to get a total
number of firefighters transported. Ahh… I'm assuming they're all going to the
burn center."
18:25.0 21:39:25 FED "just a second… communications to the EMS duty officer"
154
Appendix 4
18:37.0 21:39:37 VC807 "northern division commander this is chief 8-0-7, when you get a chance can
you give me an update or should I just go to Medstar"
18:48.0 21:39:48 NDC "Go to Medstar, Communications... ah… when you get that number I'll be
waiting for it, we're trying to ah...get the PAR straightened out, make sure we
don't have anybody else missing
18:58.0 21:39:58 FED "communications copy"
19:09.0 21:40:09 FED "EMS duty officer, they need a number of the firefighters injured and how
many are being flown"
19:16.0 21:40:16 FED "Command is requesting the number of injured firefighters, how many are
being flown and where they are going"
19:24.0 21:40:24 EMSDO "oka.."
19:25.0 21:40:25 ? open mic electronic garble
19:29.0 21:40:29 ? "Seargeant Harper Lee with Chief 7…(inaudible)"
19:35.0 21:40:35 FED "copy you're 5 minutes out. Communications to the taskforce commander"
20:11.0 21:41:11 FED "communications to chief 8-55-b"
20:17.0 21:41:17 FED "did you copy commands request? They need a number of injured
firefighters, how many are being flown, and where they're going"
20:28.0 21:41:28 DC800 "can I get back to you on the total number of firefighters that we have injured"
20:33.0 21:41:33 VC855B "okay, yeah, I just ahh… I copied them on alpha 3 and they're gonna get a
total here in a minute. Umm.. Who's my lan… the unit coming for the landing
zone? I don't believe that the crew from engine 8-28 are with the piece. They
may be already committed to the scene"
21:02.0 21:42:02 A812 "ambulance 8-12, we're at 58th and Rittenhouse, would you like us to take
that patient with ambulance 8-0-7?"
21:16.0 21:42:16 VC855B 8-55-B, is that ambulance 8-12?"
21:21.0 21:42:21 A812 "that's correct"
21:24.0 21:42:24 VC855B "yeah, that’s correct, go over to ambulance 8-0-7 and rendezvous with them if
you can get out cause they're uh…they're uh blocked in"
155
Appendix 4
21:32.0 21:42:32 A812 "ah..right, we're on our way"

21:35.0 21:42:35 A801 "ambulance 8-0-1 to EMS command"
21:50.0 21:42:50 A801 "ok, ambulance 8-0-1 to EMS command"
22:04.0 21:43:04 A807 "ambulance 8-0-7 to command"
22:12.0 21:43:12 FED "communications to ambulance 8-11"
22:15.0 21:43:15 VC807 "Tony, call me on my cell phone"
22:25.0 21:43:25 FED "communications to ambulance 8-11"
23:23.0 21:44:23 SOC "southern operations commander to EMS duty officer, come in"
23:33.0 21:44:33 SOC "we're trying to get the PAR straight, I think we have 4 from station 7 that
were transported, and 2 from station 9, and you have chief 12-a who's burned
and working his way to you. Does that account for everybody that you have?"
23:53.0 21:44:53 ? (female voice)"ummm… standby, I can try an…
24:20.0 21:45:20 FED "communications to chief 8-55-B"
24:26.0 21:45:26 FED "ahh... Landline with Syscom now, they're advising the Eagle is overhead, do
you have visual?"
24:31.0 21:45:31 VC855B "umm…I do ha… I can hear 'em. Ahh.. I got engine 8-28…ummm… taking
care of the landing zone now…over at the…ahhh… Advanced Autoparts
parking lot"
24:44.0 21:45:44 FED "copy by the Advanced Autoparts parking lot"
24:52.0 21:45:52 FED okay,chief 8-55-B, if you're gonna' need a second uh… helicopter…uhh… let
us know, they advised trooper 3 has a, about 20 minute ETA if you need
them"
25:03.0 21:46:03 VC855B "I'm okay"
25:32.0 21:46:32 FED "okay, chief 855B, they're advising ca.. They don't have any alpha
channels..umm.. They can pick up charlie 3, but they don't have any alpha
channels"
25:40.0 21:46:40 FED "and also if you have 28 shine a spot light"
25:59.0 21:46:59 VC855B "55-B to communications, you can go ahead and cancel Trooper 3"
156
Appendix 4
26:12.0 21:47:12 FED "ok, I copy negative, you do not need trooper 3 and I just confirm umm… they
advise they can't… they don't have radio contact with you. Are you confirming
that they are landing at the parking lot?"
26:24.0 21:47:24 VC855B "advise we will not need trooper 3"
26:30.0 21:47:30 ? (female voice 1 syllable inaudible)
26:37.0 21:47:37 FED "copy that"
26:41.0 21:47:41 DC800 "command to the EMS supervisor"
26:50.0 21:47:50 ? "go ahead" (female voice nearly inaudible)
26:51.0 21:47:51 EMSDO "EMS duty officer…"
26:56.0 21:47:56 DC800 "ok, you're aware we turned Trooper 3 around correct?"
27:18.0 21:48:18 EMSDO "EMS duty officer.."
27:23.0 21:48:23 DC800 "okay… you are aware we turned trooper 3 around correct?"
27:30.0 21:48:30 EMSDO "Im just pulling up on the scene. I’m just uhh…getting into position right,
going to command"
27:38.0 21:48:38 DC800 "okay"
27:40.0 21:48:40 DC800 "command to the unit at the L-Z with uhh… Eagle 2"
27:45.0 21:48:45 VC855B "8-55-B, go ahead"
27:49.0 21:48:49 DC800 "which unit do you have there with you?"
27:52.0 21:48:52 VC855B "right now I have engine 8-28 with the landing zone. I do believe I just have
ahh…it looks like ambulance 8-11 just pulled up… as well."
28:04.0 21:49:04 DC800 "ok"
28:10.0 21:49:10 E828 "engine 8-28 to whatever officer is running this L-Z, I got cars and foot traffic
coming out of these stores here. someone can give me a hand so we can get
this bird down . I don’t have any way to contact them to let them know there's
wires running right down the center of this parking lot... splits it"
28:49.0 21:49:49 VC855B "command to communications"
28:52.0 21:49:52 FED "command go ahead"
157
Appendix 4
28:55.0 21:49:55 VC855B "uh..yeah.. See if you can get ahold of the Eagle and let them know that
umm..that this parking lot may not be a good area. We got, ah.. Wires looks
like its running down the middle of the lot itself…and if you could give me an
additional unit to assist with umm...the foot traffic in this parking lot.. if they
determine they can land here, we may need an additional units to assist with
uhh.. the landing zone. "
29:21.0 21:50:21 FED "command, I’m landline with Syscom now, the message is delivered, do not
land in the parking lot, wires running down the middle of the parking lot. Uh…
can you advise an alternate L-Z?"
29:30.0 21:50:30 VC855B "standby…we'll uhh… let me see if we can figure one out"
29:49.0 21:50:49 A811 "ambulance 8-11"
30:24.0 21:51:24 FED "communications to engine 8-2-8"
30:26.0 21:51:26 E828 "go"
30:28.0 21:51:28 FED "ah.. You're at the landing site, correct?"
30:31.0 21:51:31 E828 "correct, I went store to store stopped the foot traffic I believe for now… They
can set it down here, but they have to put it in the area of advanced auto.
There's uh… 2 light posts and wires running between them from a bar
heading towards Kenilworth Avenue. There's enough room for the bird but
they gotta put it right there. we have a guy in the middle with a flashlight
showing them where they can set it."
30:56.0 21:51:56 FED "okay , they advised they do not have any of the alpha channels, advised
they do have charlie channels..uh.. If we could try..uhh.. 8 charlie 3. See if
you can get them on that"
31:10.0 21:52:10 E828 "ok. We're walking where the wires are right now. What charlie channel can
they go to? I didn't hear you, Iwas talking to an investigator"
31:18.0 21:52:18 FED "I'm advising them to try 8 charlie 3."
31:22.0 21:52:22 E828 "ok, it's Eagle 1?"
34:48.0 21:55:48 FED "Communications to chief 8-55-B"
34:51.0 21:55:51 VC855B "go ahead"
34:52.0 21:55:52 FED "uh.. Can you confirm that the Eagle is on the ground..uh…"
158
Appendix 4
34:56.0 21:55:56 VC855B "okay, yeah, he's..uh…he's making an attempt right now… also umm...if you
could put a call in to the County P.D. We're gonna' need more police down in
this intersection… and to uh… to help with the uh…the parking lot as well
once the Eagle is on the ground"
35:13.0 21:56:13 FED "I copy, need County police, additional County police for the uh…block the
parking lot for traffic and if you can let me know uh...when they're on the
ground I'm on the phone now with Syscom I can coordinate
35:31.0 21:56:31 FMBC "F.M. battalion chief to communications"
35:34.0 21:56:34 FED "F.M. battalion chief"
35:37.0 21:56:37 FMBC "I'm at the landing site. They're on the ground"
35:41.0 21:56:41 FED "copy, helicopter is on the ground"
36:47.0 21:57:47 FED "communications to chief 8-55-B"
36:54.0 21:57:54 FED "uh.. Medic 8-30's status...ah…transport…ah.. Didn't advise where , do you
know which hospital, what the transport info is?"
37:02.0 21:58:02 VC855B "ah.. That's negative. I just saw 'em pass me. They were coming off of
Rittenhouse… I do believe they are probably headed towards Medstar"
37:12.0 21:58:12 FED "okay, I'll see if I can get them…uhh... Communications to medic 8-30"
end recording at 21:58:00
159
Appendix 4
Radio System Activity A4

Time Type Unit TG Duration E.I. Description
02/24/2012 09:10:09 PM Site Affiliation CHIEF 845 B
02/24/2012 09:11:08 PM Failed Call BO 885 *P* Audio Interrupt
02/24/2012 09:11:35 PM Site Affiliation POL P 2773
02/24/2012 09:11:40 PM Group Affiliation VC 809 *P* A4 (INC 51)
02/24/2012 09:11:44 PM Site Affiliation SZ$DEF
02/24/2012 09:11:45 PM Site Affiliation BFRO STAFF *4*
02/24/2012 09:11:51 PM Site Affiliation MNC P 338
02/24/2012 09:12:06 PM Site Affiliation VC 827 *P*
02/24/2012 09:12:08 PM Site Affiliation FM 1503 *P*
02/24/2012 09:12:15 PM Group Affiliation TK 809 *2* A4 (INC 51)
02/24/2012 09:12:25 PM Site Affiliation A 826 DR
02/24/2012 09:12:50 PM Site Affiliation DC FD 1100748
02/24/2012 09:12:54 PM Site Affiliation SQ 827 *2*
02/24/2012 09:13:00 PM Site Affiliation EMS DO *P*
02/24/2012 09:13:08 PM Site Affiliation TK 825 OIC
02/24/2012 09:13:20 PM Failed Call TRUCK 828 Audio Interrupt
02/24/2012 09:13:42 PM Site Affiliation CHIEF 837
02/24/2012 09:14:07 PM Site Affiliation MO FD 2500321
02/24/2012 09:14:24 PM Failed Call ID$2530379 Requestor Not Affiliated to TG
160
Appendix 4

02/24/2012 09:14:42 PM Site Affiliation E 845 OIC
02/24/2012 09:14:52 PM Site Affiliation E 845 OIC
02/24/2012 09:14:58 PM Failed Call OEM P CSU 890 Audio Interrupt
02/24/2012 09:15:06 PM Site Affiliation MNC V P076
02/24/2012 09:15:32 PM Failed Call RESCUE SQ 801 Audio Interrupt
02/24/2012 09:16:12 PM Site Affiliation AX FD 3104190
161
Appendix 4

02/24/2012 09:16:35 PM Site Affiliation VC 846 B *P*
02/24/2012 09:16:48 PM Failed Call SHF V 0730 Audio Interrupt
162
Appendix 4

02/24/2012 09:17:58 PM Group Affiliation E 801 DR A4 (INC 51)
163
Appendix 4

02/24/2012 09:18:54 PM Group Affiliation E 809 *2* A4 (INC 51)
02/24/2012 09:19:37 PM Failed Call CO AMB M30622 Audio Interrupt
02/24/2012 09:19:52 PM Site Affiliation SPT VEH M50604
02/24/2012 09:19:55 PM Failed Call STP P 9381 Audio Interrupt
02/24/2012 09:19:58 PM Site Affiliation SPT VEH M50604
164
Appendix 4

02/24/2012 09:20:28 PM Site Affiliation VC 845 A *P*
02/24/2012 09:20:32 PM Site Affiliation E 829 *1*
02/24/2012 09:20:40 PM Failed Call MSP CS L Base Audio Interrupt
02/24/2012 09:20:44 PM Failed Call TRUCK 828 Stealth Reject
02/24/2012 09:20:45 PM Failed Call VC 855 B *P* Stealth Reject
02/24/2012 09:20:46 PM Group Affiliation A 807 OIC A4 (INC 51)
02/24/2012 09:20:50 PM Group Affiliation A 808 DR A4 (INC 51)
02/24/2012 09:20:51 PM Site Affiliation CHIEF 838
02/24/2012 09:20:59 PM Group Affiliation AMBULANCE 812 A4 (INC 51)
02/24/2012 09:20:59 PM Group Affiliation A 801 B DR A4 (INC 51)
02/24/2012 09:21:01 PM Group Affiliation E 833 *4* A4 (INC 51)
02/24/2012 09:21:03 PM Site Affiliation FM VEH M51101
02/24/2012 09:21:22 PM Site Affiliation TRUCK 825
02/24/2012 09:21:25 PM Call PSCC FES 02 A4 (INC 51) 7.90 No 1376018
02/24/2012 09:21:25 PM PTT PSCC FES 02 A4 (INC 51) 7.90 No 1376018
165
Appendix 4

02/24/2012 09:21:34 PM Group Affiliation A 806 OIC A4 (INC 51)
02/24/2012 09:21:35 PM Group Affiliation CHIEF 855 B A4 (INC 51)
02/24/2012 09:21:37 PM Site Affiliation EXEC LIAS OFC
02/24/2012 09:21:38 PM Group Affiliation CO AMB M30632 A4 (INC 51)
02/24/2012 09:21:38 PM Call CHIEF 855 B A4 (INC 51) 8.10 No 1376029
02/24/2012 09:21:38 PM PTT CHIEF 855 B A4 (INC 51) 0.00 No 1376029
02/24/2012 09:21:59 PM Group Affiliation BATT CHIEF 884 R A4 (INC 51)
02/24/2012 09:22:04 PM Failed Call VC 809 *P* TG Request on Regrouped TG
166
Appendix 4

02/24/2012 09:22:51 PM Site Affiliation A 809 DR
02/24/2012 09:22:57 PM Group Affiliation TW 833 *2* A4 (INC 51)
167
APPENDIX 5 - PSC INCIDENT PERFORMANCE
RATING REPORT
168
Appendix 5
169
Appendix 5
170
Appendix 5
171
APPENDIX 6 – EXCERPTS FROM SCBA REPORT
SCBA Service & Repair Center
8653 Grovemont Circle
Gaithersburg, MD 20872
240-777-2221
SCBA Evaluation Report for Personal Injury or SCBA Performance Investigation
1 Date of Evaluation 05/08/2012

2 Submitted by [Name Redacted]
3 Primary 1 [Name Redacted]
Evaluators 2
List any additional evaluators at the end of the report
4 Date of Incident / Event 02/24/2012
5 Incident Number / Address 6404 57th Ave.
12-055-0321
6 Brief Description of Incident The SCBA being evaluated was worn by Truck 809 Forcible Entry
or Event PGFD ID: xxxx9. He was injured during this incident involving a
structure fire. He was operating on the scene with this SCBA.
Was the User "On Air" at the time of the

7 incident? Yes
Identification / Service & Testing History /
Equipment being Evaluated
8 Condition
Manufacturer: Luxfer Year: June-05

Model / Type 4500 PSI Carbon Fiber
Serial Number: Ixxxxxx9
Other ID: Bladensburg Label Engine ** unreadable due to heat
Cylinder Latest Hydrostatic test date: Month May Year 2010
Condition / appearance on scene or upon arrival at air shop:
Amount of air remaining in cylinder
1900
(PSI)
172
Appendix 6
Cylinder received shows 1900 PSI by using an external 7500 PSI calibrated
Scott gauge. Hand wheel has fresh scrapes and some missing paint where it
has been dragged. Rubber bumper is distorted and melted from exposure to
high heat or flame. Hanger is intact. Gauge pressure cannot be seen on both
sides of gauge. The gauge cover is melted and distorted and is bubbled in
several spots on both sides. Note: The cylinder hand wheel lock nut has been
turned in on the stem eliminating the designed safety feature that prevents the
cylinder from being accidentally turned off. There are a few gouges and
scrapes in the carbon fiber wrap especially around neck of cylinder. Hydrostatic
test date of 05/10 set in epoxy on cylinder. There is peeling to the outer wrap
where the factory decals where applied. This only occurs on the exposed
portion of the Cylinder (the part of the cylinder not resting against the SCBA
harness).
Manufacturer: Scott Health Year: 2005

Model / Type Air Pack 50 with HUD
Serial Number: RxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxB
Reducer / Hoses
HUD Driver Other ID: PGFD 0370
Last inspection / test / service Month March Year 2011
173
Appendix 6
High pressure hose intact, UAC/RIC boot intact. Missing rubber bumper on
back of UAC/RIC assembly. EBSS hose intact with boot missing. Outside
jacket of EBSS coupling has cut exposing inner cord of hose at Reducer. The
boot from the EBSS hose was found in the evidence bag. It has been torn from
the hose. The connector for the hose is still intact showing melting and
bubbling. Gauge strap missing. Side of Reducer is stamped PG 0370. HUD
driver has Energizer Industrial AA batteries with Exp. date of 03/18. Batteries
were good when tested on battery tester. HUD Hose experienced exposure to
high heat and impingement at Reducer. The pigtail for the HUD Hose has
melted at the heat shrink wrap exposing all wires. The pigtail is also very brittle.
The driver and hose are intact, but still appear to be operational. There is a
Safeware flow test sticker on the underside of the Reducer over the primary and
secondary seats marked 03/11. There is also another flow test sticker under
the front of the reducer marked 04/06.
Equipment being Evaluated / Service & Testing History

8
cont
Model / Type EZ Flow CBRN with QD
Serial Number: RxxxxxxxxxxxxxF
Other ID: Serial Number engraved on outside of CBRN cover PGFD ID: xxxx5
Regulator engraved on CBRN Regulator cover near air saver switch.
Last inspection / test / service Month August Year 2011
174
Appendix 6
This Regulator belongs to another firefighter. It was used on Face piece

PGFD ID: xxxx9. The CBRN cover and body are intact, held together by only
the latch plate mounting bracket and retaining screws. It has separated at the
Regulator body retainer tab exposing the lever assembly. The diaphragm was
in an evidence bag when the pack was delivered to me. The diaphragm
exhalation valve seat and post has been forcibly removed or torn by some
means and is missing. The Regulator has been exposed to high heat and was
still attached to the lens and low pressure airline. The entire part of the CBRN
cover is distorted and melted from exposure to high heat, but all components
of the cover are intact. The CBRN and EZ-FLO label melted and bubbled.
Purge knob operates as designed, but shows signs of heat exposure and is
smoke stained. HUD visor torn on top side. Air saver boot is intact without
tears. Regulator gasket has no cuts, but shows normal wear. Latch operates
properly with some wearing along the edge, and melting. Latch is distorted
due to heat. Low pressure hose is in good condition except the HUD quick
disconnect, which shows signs of melting at the connector. Retaining ring is
intact still located in CBRN Regulator.

Model / Type Air Pak 50
Serial Number:
Back frame / Other ID: Bladensburg Scotchlite sticker on back frame marked "902"
Straps Last inspection / service Month March Year 2011
The shoulder harness straps both show complete discoloration indicating heat
exposure or flame to both straps. The Scotchlite on the shoulder pads are both
175
Appendix 6
melted and blistered indicating exposure to high heat. Waist to shoulder strap
have no discoloration, blistering, or melting but have been cut by a knife in two
places. Waist pad shows discoloration for the entire length. Cylinder release
latch still operates freely without issue but is missing the nylon tab. All buckles
operate freely. The Cylinder retention assembly is blistered and distorted but
was still operational. The adjusting buckle is also blistered and is intact. The
locking tab is also blistered. The frame itself is in fairly good condition with no
cracks but has some discoloration. Backside of frame has two Scotchlite labels
with "Bladensburg" and "902" on different labels. Back frame rubber gasket
intact in frame. Note: All waist straps were folded back and restrained in the
buckles. It appears that the waist belt was not used.
Manufacturer: Scott Health Year:

Model / Type AV-3000 Large w/Standard Large Harness
Serial Number:
Other ID: xxxx9 engraved on top bezel
Mask
Last inspection / service Month Year
PGFD ID: xxxx9 engraved on top bezel. Upper and lower bezels are
undamaged. The face piece lens has been exposed to very high heat. There is
176
Appendix 6
excessive crazing and a few deeper scratches across the full lens. There is a
deep scrape on the lens near the face piece opening. It appears that the lens
has softened where the deep crazing occurs. On the inside of the lens you see
signs of where the melting has occurred with immediate failure which would
probably follow. The temple and neck straps are in place and not stretched.
Right side neck strap has been torn away from the face seal. Nose cup and
retaining ring in place. Voicemitters and voicemitter ducts intact. Right side
Voicemitter is pushed in where it appears it has been hit. Both Inhalation valves
in place. All sizing dots in place. One of the four sizing dots is missing. Fit test
done 08/22/11.

Model / Type Pak Alert SE+, Integrated P.A.S.S.
Serial Number: xxxxx0
P.A.S.S / Other ID: Console: Serial Number worn off.
Console Last inspection / service Month March Year 2011
Pak Alert Module appears in good shape with no signs of exposure to heat.
Placing batteries in Pak Alert module causes a dead short in console. The Pak
177
Appendix 6
Alert activates after receiving supplying power but cannot be reset. It appears
to have a short to the resister board. Manual activation of Pak Alert does not
work nor reset. Both 9v Energizer Industrial batteries Exp. 03/14 were checked
and were good. Pak Alert wire harness and gauge line appear to be
undamaged and have smoke stain throughout. The console shows signs of
high heat exposure. Gauge lens is distorted and blistered. The gauge is not
visible. Cover for indicator lights is distorted and melted. The red and yellow
buttons for the emergency and reset are visible. The areas around the
emergency and reset button are melted and distorted. The back of the Pak
Alert has plastic that has melted and adhered completely covering most of the
rear cover. Serial Number unreadable. Gauge strap is missing. Seal appears
to be intact.

8
cont
Manufacturer: Year:
Model / Type
Serial Number:
Other ID:
Comm. Equip Last inspection / service Month Year
N/A
Manufacturer: Year:
Model / Type
Other Equip
Serial Number:
Other ID:
178
Appendix 6

N/A
9 Method of Delivery to Air Shop

Delivered by PGFD [Name Redacted] 04/16/2012
10 List chain of custody

Date Action Name Position
Delivered to
04/16/2012 MOCO [Name Redacted] Battalion Chief
04/16/2012 Received by [Name Redacted] MOCO Supervisor
05/08/2012 Evaluated by [Name Redacted] MOCO Supervisor
06/05/2012 Returned [Name Redacted] PGFD ID: xxx1
11 Name of facility MOCO Service & Repair Center

Street address 8653 Grovemont Circle
City / State /Zip Gaithersburg MD 20877
Pre Test Evaluation Visual

damage should have already been noted above during initial check in
12 Perform Daily Check on all equipment being evaluated / enter comments

Cylinder note PSI Reading 1900
that visual Any damage" requiring repair" prior to bench test
damage was
Cylinder opened fully connected to PGFD 0370 Reducer and MOCOTEST
previously
Regulator without air leaks. No repairs at this time but cylinder will need gauge
mentioned during
cover, and bumper. Used MOCOTEST Regulator due to original Regulator not
check in
in a condition to perform daily check.
Evaluators
MB
initials
Any damage" requiring repair" prior to bench test

Reducer / Hoses Cylinder opened fully connected to PGFD 0370 Reducer and MOCOTEST
HUD Regulator without air leaks. No repairs at this time but SCBA will need EBSS
179
Appendix 6
hose and boot assembly, HUD Regulator Hose. Used MOCOTEST Regulator
Evaluators due to original regulator not in a condition to perform daily check. HUD lights
MB
initials operated intermittently indicating that the HUD driver was OK and HUD Hose
was at fault.
Regulator
Regulator not in a condition to perform a daily check. It will need CBRN cover,
Evaluators diaphragm, visor, and a latch.
MB
initials
Back frame /
Straps No repairs needed at this time. Condition of back frame and straps noted
earlier in report. Parts needed will be shoulder straps, waist to shoulder straps,
Evaluators waist pad, and a nylon tab.
MB
initials
Mask
Condition of mask noted earlier in report. PGFD ID: xxxx9 will need a new face
piece. The condition of this Face piece will not allow for a Mask test to be
Evaluators performed.
MB
initials
P.A.S.S / Console Manual activation and reset of Pak Alert failed due to short in resister board. It
also failed while on air. All lights failed manual and emergency functions.
Motion sensor operating as it should. Batteries read good on battery tester.
Note: used another resister board to check operation of Pak Alert and all
Evaluators
MB functions operated properly. Batteries read good on Battery tester.
initials

Communications
Equipment
N/A
Evaluators
MB
initials
Other / Misc
Equipment
N/A
Evaluators
MB
initials
Pre Test SCBA: Test SCBA in condition it was received
If any repairs were required for Pre-testing equipment on PosiChek, comment on the repairs
13
and list parts used.
Replaced cut EBSS Socket & Hose Assembly, Dust boot and HUD Regulator hose.
180
Appendix 6
14 Test SCBA on PosiChek /did all components pass / comment on results / attach test sheets
The Mask test was not performed due to the extensive damage with Face piece PGFD ID: xxxx9.
The Regulator test was not performed due to the extensive damage to PGFD ID: xxxx5 regulator.
This Regulator was used with reducer PG 0370 while on Incident 12-055-0321. Functional test was
performed using MOCOTEST Face piece with MOCOTEST Regulator with PGFD ID: xxxx9 (PG
0370) Reducer. The reducer passed all functional tests. No other pre tests could be performed due
to extensive damage to the Face piece and the Regulator. See attached results.
Attach Initial PosiChek test sheets to this page
Post Test Evaluation
Disassemble reducer and regulator AS NEEDED to complete evaluation. At minimum, do a

normal annual inspection, checking filters and replacing batteries. Note findings as
15 equipment is disassembled, conditions of filters, gaskets, pistons, etc. Note any repairs to
back frame or straps. Inspect and repair mask. If replacement parts are used, list parts
replaced and KEEP USED PARTS!
Equipment Comments
Reducer Primary and secondary seats and filters checked. All filters changed.
Removed cover and inspected low cylinder transfer and auto transfer valve.
Removed cover and checked piston heads, low cylinder transfer, and auto
transfer valve. Batteries were changed in Pak Alert. Replaced HUD Regulator
Reducer / Pak
Hose, EBSS Hose & Socket Assembly, complete PASS Console assembly
Alert / Console
including resister board, gauge lens, Module cover, cover for indicator lights,
and replaced 9V batteries in Pak Alert. Note: Resister board had build up of
corrosion on it from water leaking into console causing the short in Pak Alert
module.
Disassembled, inspected and cleaned all parts. Lubricated demand piston and
Regulator / HUD adjusted lever assembly. Replaced CBRN Regulator cover, Diaphragm, latch,
and purge knob, and replaced AA batteries in HUD driver.
Mask Mask PGFD ID: xxxx9 was not in condition to test.
181
Appendix 6
Cleaned and inspected. The back frame will need new shoulder straps, waist
pad, waist to shoulder straps. The Cylinder Retention Assembly will also need
Back frame /
to be replaced. These parts were not replaced by MCFRS. Cylinder parts
Straps /Other
replaced were the Gage cover and the cylinder bumper guard. Note: I did not
Miscellaneous
reset the ratchet on the hand wheel of the cylinder. It is in the same position as
received.
Cleaning
Process: Note
16 Major cleaning was required. The whole unit was cleaned then re-inspected.
what cleaning
was done if any.
Post Testing: Test SCBA after inspection and repairs completed.
Post testing of Reducer PGFD ID: xxxx9 (PG 0370) passed functional testing. Regulator ID: xxxx5
passed HP Regulator testing after parts were replaced after disassembly and inspection.
Components were not tested as a complete unit but separately. I used PGFD ID: xxxx9 (PG 0370)
Reducer with the MOCOTEST Regulator to check operation of HUD driver only, which passed. I
then attached the PGFD ID: xxxx5 Regulator to MOCOTEST reducer and checked the HUD
Regulator hose and lights which also passed. I then connected the PGFD ID: xxxx 9 (PG 0370)
Reducer with the PGFD ID: xxxx5 Regulator together and the HUD works fine.
Attach Post PosiChek test sheets to page 8
Attach Post PosiChek test sheets to this page
18 Is any of the equipment being evaluated unable to be returned to service?

Yes
List the equipment unable to return to service and reason
Damage from heat to face piece. See previous comments. All straps including shoulder, waist, and
waist to shoulder strap on back frame need replacing, and Cylinder retention Strap Assembly.
19 Cost to replace
equipment not N/A
repairable
182
Appendix 6
20
Parts Replaced: 1 - HUD Regulator Hose 200016-01, 1 - HUD regulator Hose
200017-01, 1 - CBRN cover 804110-03, 1 - Diaphragm 200083-01, 1 - purge
Cost of any
knob 10005218, 1 - Latch 10008532, 1 - PASS Alert Assembly 805191-03, 1 -
repairs that were
Hose & Socket Assembly 804335-04, 1 - Dust cap 10008531, 2 - Filters
made to
10005250, 1 - Gage cover 36750-01, 1 - Cylinder bumper 804113-01, 2 -
equipment
Bumper Screws 10007775, 2 - Duracell Procell PC - 1500 AA batteries, 2 -
Duracell Procell PC - 1604 9v batteries,
Evaluators Comments or notes

21
It appears that this SCBA and face piece was exposed to significant heat and flame. After being
disassembled, inspected, reassembled, and parts replaced the Reducer and the Regulator passed
all functional tests. Parts were replaced on cylinder and that is also in good shape. Note: The
cylinder hand wheel lock nut has been turned in on the stem eliminating the designed safety feature
that prevents the cylinder from being accidentally turned off, it is still in that position. All parts that
were replaced were bagged and will be returned. The reducer was removed from the Back frame
and is being returned not reattached to the frame.
22 Additional 1
Evaluators 2
Primary Evaluators #1 Date

Signature 07/05/2012
Signature
Additional Evaluators #3 Date
Signature
Signature
183
Appendix 6

SCBA Service & Repair Center
8653 Grovemont Circle
Gaithersburg, MD 20872
240-777-2221
SCBA Evaluation Report for Personal Injury or SCBA Performance Investigation
1 Date of Evaluation 05/04/2012

2 Submitted by [Name Redacted]
3 1 [Name Redacted]
Primary Evaluators
2
List any additional evaluators at the end of the report
4 Date of Incident / Event 02/24/2012
5 Incident Number / Address 6404 57th Ave.
12-055-0321
6 Brief Description of Incident or The SCBA being evaluated was worn by Truck 809 Officer PGFD
Event ID: xxxx2. He was injured during this incident involving a
structure fire. He was operating on the scene with this SCBA.
7 Was the User "On Air" at the time of the incident? Yes
Identification / Service & Testing History /
Equipment being Evaluated
8 Condition
Manufacturer: Luxfer Year: 2005

Model / Type 4500 PSI Carbon Fiber
Serial Number: Ixxxxxx7
Other
ID:
Cylinder
Latest Hydrostatic test date: Month May Year 2010
Amount of air remaining in cylinder
3200
(PSI)
184
Appendix 6
Cylinder received shows 3200 PSI by using an external 7500 PSI calibrated
Scott gauge. Hand wheel has scrapes and some missing paint. Rubber
bumper intact but is torn from the mounting bracket. The bumper has red
paint painted on the inside of the bumper. Hanger intact but severely bent.
Gauge shows cylinder pressure but is hard to read on both sides, and shows
signs of heat. The gauge cover is melted and distorted and is hard to read.
Note: The cylinder hand wheel lock nut has been turned in on the stem
eliminating the designed safety feature that prevents the cylinder from being
accidentally turned off. There are some gouges and scrapes in the carbon
fiber wrap especially around neck of cylinder. Hydrostatic test date of 05/10
set in epoxy on cylinder. No visible heat, nor blistering as seen on the
cylinder. Cylinder appears to be in pretty good shape. Most labels are
intact. No paint or stickers added to cylinder.

Model / Type Air Pack 50 with HUD
Serial Number: RxxxxxxxxxxxxxB
Reducer / Hoses Other
HUD Driver ID: PGFD 0375
Last inspection / test /
service Month April Year 2011
185
Appendix 6
High pressure hose intact, UAC/RIC boot intact, EBSS hose intact with boot
missing, gauge strap intact. Side of Reducer is stamped PG 0375. HUD
driver has Energizer Industrial AA batteries with Exp. date of 3/18. HUD
Hose shows no damage or areas of heat impingement. Both batteries were
tested on battery tester and both were good. The driver and hoses are
intact, and appear to be operational. The UAC/RIC is intact and is missing a
rubber bumper on back side. There is a Safeware flow test sticker on the
underside of the Reducer marked 4/11.

8
cont
Model / Type EZ Flow CBRN with QD
Serial Number: RxxxxxxxxxxxxxF
Other
ID:
Regulator
Last inspection / test /
service Month July Year 2011
PGFD ID: 18472 engraved on Regulator CBRN cover. Regulator
186
Appendix 6
PGFD ID: xxxx2 engraved on Regulator CBRN cover. Regulator

appears to be in good condition. CBRN cover and body intact. CBRN
label melted and bubbled but visible. Purge knob operates freely, not
distorted but has minor melting. Visor torn on top side. Air saver boot
is torn at left side. Reg. gasket no cuts or torn. Latch operates properly
with some wearing along the edge and some minor melting. Low
pressure hose and connector good condition. Diaphragm extremely
dirty. Retaining ring intact. EZ Flow regulator label melted.
Manufacturer: Scott Health Year: June -05

Model / Type Air Pak 50
Serial Number: None
Other
ID:
Last inspection / service Month April Year 2011
Back frame is in poor shape. The cylinder latching assembly is twisted and
shifted left. The shoulder harness straps both show discoloration indicating
heat exposure to both straps. The right shoulder strap is torn near the top.
The Scotchlite on the shoulder pads are both melted and torn. Waist and
the waist to shoulder strap have no discoloration, blistering, or melting and
are in good shape. Cylinder release latch still operates freely without
issue. All buckles operate freely. Cylinder retention strap has normal wear
Back frame / Straps but shows signs of heat exposure to the locking tab. Backside of frame has
two Scotchlite labels with "901" and "Engine 92. Back frame rubber gasket
loose and not sealing in frame. Note: All waist straps were folded back and
restrained in the buckles. It appears that the waist belt was not used.
Manufacturer: Scott Health Year:

Mask
Model / Type AV-3000 Medium w/Standard Harness
187
Appendix 6
Serial Number:
Other
ID: xxxx2 engraved on top bezel
Last inspection / service Month July Year 2011
PGFD ID: xxxx2 engraved on top bezel and is also marked in Magic Marker
on head net. Lens has excessive scratching and a few deeper scratches all
across the lens. There is no crazing nor melting. Temple and Neck straps
in place and not stretched. Nose cup and retaining ring in place. Upper and
lower bezels are undamaged. Voicemitters and Voicemitters ducts intact.
Both Inhalation valves in place. Face seal appears in good shape without
issue. All sizing dots in place. Three of the four sizing dots are missing. Fit
test done 07/13/11.

Model / Type Pak Alert SE+, Integrated P.A.S.S.
Serial Number: xxxxxx1
Other
P.A.S.S / Console ID: Console: Serial Number worn off.
Last inspection / service Month April Year 2011
Both appear in good shape without apparent damage. Gauge lens has
slight haze that could have been caused by exposure to some heat but is
188
Appendix 6
still readable. Both items do not show any real effects of heat damage.
Gauge retaining strap present. Battery indicator flashes green when battery
checked. Under Manual activation Pak Alert worked and reset. Both 9v
Energizer Industrial batteries Exp. 03/14 were checked and were good. Pak
Alert wire harness and gauge line are undamaged and have some smoke
stain. Console has just wear and tear scratches from general use. Seal
appears to be intact.

8
cont
Manufacturer: Year:
Model / Type
Serial Number:
Other
ID:
Comm. Equip
N/A
Manufacturer: Year:
Model / Type
Serial Number:
Other
ID:
Other Equip
N/A
9 Method of Delivery to Air Shop

Delivered by PGFD [Name Redacted] 04/16/2012
189
Appendix 6
10 List chain of custody

Date Action Name Position
Delivered to
04/16/2012 MOCO [Name Redacted] Battalion Chief
04/16/2012 Received by [Name Redacted] MOCO Supervisor
05/04/2012 Evaluated by [Name Redacted] MOCO Supervisor
06/05/2012 Returned [Name Redacted] PGFD ID: xxx1
11 Name of facility MOCO Service & Repair Center

Street address 8653 Grovemont Circle
City / State /Zip Gaithersburg MD 20877
Pre Test Evaluation Visual

damage should have already been noted above during initial check in
12 Perform Daily Check on all equipment being evaluated / enter comments

Cylinder note that PSI Reading 3200
visual damage was Any damage" requiring repair" prior to bench test
previously mentioned
during check in
Cylinder opened fully connected to Reducer and Regulator without air leaks.
Evaluators No repairs at this time but will need gauge cover, hanger, and bumper.
MB
initials
Reducer / Hoses
HUD
Everything appears operational, Vibralert activated, HUD lights operated
Evaluators correctly, no air leaks detected.
MB
initials
Regulator
No repairs required at this time but will need air saver boot and visor.
Vibralert, HUD lights, purge, and no air leaks detected, all appeared to be in
Evaluators normal operating condition.
MB
initials
Back frame / Straps
No repairs needed at this time. Condition of back frame noted earlier in
Evaluators report. Note: It will need a new frame.
MB
initials
Mask
190
Appendix 6
Condition of mask noted earlier in report. It appears that it will not need any
Evaluators parts for the pre test but should receive a new lens.
MB
initials
P.A.S.S / Console
Manual activation and reset of Pak Alert worked properly and also on air. All
lights working properly. Motion sensor operating as it should. Alarm
Evaluators activated when cylinder turned on. Batteries read good on battery tester.
MB
initials
Communications
Equipment
N/A
Evaluators
MB
initials
Other / Misc
Equipment
N/A
Evaluators
MB
initials
Pre Test SCBA: Test SCBA in condition it was received
If any repairs were required for Pre-testing equipment on PosiChek, comment on the repairs
13
and list parts used.
No repairs needed to perform pre test.
A number of tests were performed. The first test was the Mask test, using PGFD ID:xxxx2 with
MOCOTEST Reducer and MOCOTEST Regulator. The mask passed all tests. The second was the
Regulator test, using PGFD ID: xxxx2 Regulator with MOCOTEST Face piece and MOCOTEST
Reducer. The third test was the Functional test for PGFD ID: xxxx2 Reducer with MOCOTEST
Regulator and MOCOTEST Face piece. All tests passed. The final test was with all PGFD
components PGFD ID: xxxx5 Reducer/ Regulator/ Face piece. All tests passed Functional tests.
See attached test results.
191
Appendix 6
Attach Initial PosiChek test sheets to this page
Post Test Evaluation
Disassemble reducer and regulator AS NEEDED to complete evaluation. At minimum, do a

normal annual inspection, checking filters and replacing batteries. Note findings as
15 equipment is disassembled, conditions of filters, gaskets, pistons, etc. Note any repairs to
back frame or straps. Inspect and repair mask. If replacement parts are used, list parts
replaced and KEEP USED PARTS!
Equipment Comments
Reducer Primary and secondary seats and filters checked. All filters
changed #10009250. Removed cover and checked piston heads, low
Reducer / Pak Alert /
cylinder transfer, and auto transfer valve. Batteries were changed in Pak
Console
Alert. Replaced gauge cover in Pak Alert 10011202, replaced 9V batteries
in Pak Alert Module PC-1604.
Disassembled, inspected and cleaned all parts. Lubricated demand piston

and adjusted lever assembly. Replaced Air Saver boot 804194-01, replaced
Regulator / HUD
CBRN label 31000073, replaced AA batteries in HUD PC-1500, replaced
HUD Visor 10012602.
Cleaned and inspected inhalation valves. Did not replace lens. It will have
Mask
to be replaced by PGFD shop.
Cleaned and inspected. Frame was not replaced by MCFRS due to cylinder
latching assembly bent and twisted. Replaced EBSS hose and socket
Back frame / Straps assembly 804335-04 and Dust cap 10008531. Cylinder parts replaced were
/Other Miscellaneous Bumper guard 804113-01, Gage cover 36550-01, Screw 10007775, and
Cylinder hanger 10006289. Note: I did not reset the ratchet on the hand
wheel of the cylinder. It is in the same position as received.
Cleaning Process:
Major cleaning was required. The whole unit was cleaned then re-
16 Note what cleaning
inspected.
was done if any.
192
Appendix 6
Post Testing: Test SCBA after inspection and repairs completed.
All post testing of components passed functional testing. Components were tested as a unit. I used
PGFD ID: xxxx2 Reducer with MOCOTEST Regulator to check operation of HUD driver only, which
passed. I then attached PGFD ID: xxxx2 Regulator to the MOCOTEST Reducer and checked the
HUD regulator hose and lights which also passed. I then connected both the PGFD ID: xxxx2
Reducer and regulator together and the HUD works fine.
Attach Post PosiChek test sheets to page 8
Attach Post PosiChek test sheets to this page
18 Is any of the equipment being evaluated unable to be returned to service?

Yes
List the equipment unable to return to service and reason
PGFD ID: xxx5 Back frame needs replacing. PGFD ID: xxxx2 Face piece lens needs replacing. See
prior notes concerning both items.
19
Cost to replace
equipment not N/A
repairable
20
Parts replaced: 2 - Duracell Procell PC - 1500 AA batteries, 2 - Duracell
Cost of any repairs Procell PC - 1604 9v batteries, 1- Air Saver Button 804194-01, 2 - 10005250
that were made to Filters, 1 - Gage cover 36550-01, 1 - Visor 10012602, 1 - Cylinder hanger
equipment 10006289, 1 - Gage cover 36750-01, 1 - Bumper guard 804113-01, 1 -
Screw 10007775, 1 - CBRN label 31000073.
Evaluators Comments or notes

21
Passed post functional test. Major cleaning was done prior to returning. The cylinder needs a new
Hydrostatic test before being returned to the field. There are some gouges near neck of cylinder as
being noted previously. Initial inspection indicated that the SCBA had been exposed to moderate
193
Appendix 6
heat conditions at some point within the Cylinder, Regulator, and Face piece. However once cleaned
up all components appeared in fairly good condition and passed all tests with some minor heat
damage observed. All parts that were replaced were bagged and will be returned.
22 1
Additional Evaluators
2

Signature 7/5/2012
Signature
Signature
Signature
194
APPENDIX 7 – PPE REPORT SUMMARY
EXAMINATION OF SELECTED
FIREFIGHTER PPE WORN BY FIREFIGHTERS
DURING FEBRUARY 24, 2012 STRUCTURE FIRE
AT 6404 57TH AVENUE, RIVERDALE HEIGHTS, MD
Safety Investigation Team

9201 Basil Court, Suite 452
Largo, MD 20774
JEFFREY O. STULL / GRACE G. STULL

INTERNATIONAL PERSONNEL PROTECTION, INC.
P. O. BOX 92493
Austin, TX 78709
10 JULY 2012
Updated 31 October 2012
195
Appendix 7
Table of Contents
Summary ......................................................................................................................... 1
Objective ......................................................................................................................... 2
Equipment and Information Provided for Examination .................................................... 2
Overview of the Incident .................................................................................................. 2
Description of the Firefighter Injuries and Items Made Available for Examination ............... 3
Specific Description of Firefighter Injuries ....................................................................... 6
Methodology Used in Evaluation ..................................................................................... 6
The Fireground Environment and its Effects on the Protective Clothing ......................... 8
Identification of PPE Items Worn by Injured Firefighters ................................................. 9
Observations for Condition of Examined PPE Items ..................................................... 11

Truck 809 Forcible Entry .......................................................................................... 11
Truck 809 Officer ..................................................................................................... 17
Observations for Other Firefighters .......................................................................... 18
Review of Standard Operating Procedures and PPE Cleaning/Maintenance History ... 22
Findings and Conclusions .................................................................................................... 22

Characterization of the Exposure Environment ........................................................ 22
Causes of Firefighter Injuries ................................................................................... 25
Impact of Clothing Selection and Use ...................................................................... 26
Care and Maintenance Issues ................................................................................. 29
Recommendations ............................................................................................................... 29
Appendices
A – Inspection/Tracking Forms and Photograph Contact Sheets for Injured Firefighters

B – Prince George’s County Fire/EMS Department Approved PPE List
C – Photographs of Examined Protective Clothing Items for Truck 809 Forcible Entry
D – Photographs of Examined Protective Clothing Items for Truck 809 Officer
196
Appendix 7
List of Figures and Tables

Figure 1 – Photograph of Fire Scene at 6404 57th Avenue Fire Scene at 6404 on
2/24/2012 3
Figure 2 – Floor Plans for Structure at 6404 57th Avenue, Riverdale Heights, MD .......... 4
Figure 3 – Classification of Fireground Exposures .......................................................... 8
Figure 4 – Differences in Levels of Charring and Trim Degradation for Truck 809 Officer
and Truck 809 Forcible Entry Protective Coats ................................................ 23
Figure 5 – Differences in Charring Penetration to Liner for Truck 809 Officer and
Truck 809 Forcible Entry Coats ......................................................................... 24
Figure 6 – Comparison for Condition of Moisture Barrier Degradation for Truck 809
Officer and Truck 809 Forcible Entry Protective Coats.................................... 25
Figure 7 – Examples of Melting inside Truck 809 Forcible Entry’s Protective Coat ....... 25
Figure 8 – Photographs of Protective Helmet Ear Covers ................................................. 27
Figure 9 – Soiling on Protective Coat When Collar Not Raised .......................................... 27
Figure 10 – Content of Label inside Non-Compliant Gloves Worn by Truck 809 Forcible
Entry 28
List of Figures and Tables

Table 1 – General Identification of Clothing and Equipment Items for Six Injured
Fighters.......................................................................................................................... 10
Table 2 – Specific Identification of Clothing and Equipment Items for Truck 809
Forcible Entry and Truck 809 Officer........................................................... 12-13
Table 3 – Overview of Clothing and Equipment Item Condition for Truck 809 Forcible
Entry and Truck 809 Officer ........................................................................... 13-14
Table 4 – General Observations on Condition of Firefighter Clothing and Equipment
Items ..................................................................................................................................... 19
Table 5 – External Examination Findings for Other Firefighter Gear ......................... 20-21
Table 6 – Findings for Causes of Burn Injuries and Contributing PPE Factors ......... 25-26
197
Appendix 7
EXAMINATION OF SELECTED
FIREFIGHTER PPE WORN BY FIREFIGHTERS
DURING FEBRUARY 24, 2012 STRUCTURE FIRE
AT 6404 57TH AVENUE, RIVERDALE HEIGHTS,
MD
July 10, 2012
Summary
This report describes our examination of the personal protective equipment items worn by
two different firefighters, who sustained burn injuries in the structure fire at 6404 57th
Avenue, Maryland on February 24, 2012. It also includes our analysis of information
provided for other personal protective equipment that was worn by other firefighters that
sustained lesser injuries. A detailed review was conducted for the types of injuries
sustained by each firefighter, the condition of the PPE items that were provided for
examination directly or through photographs/external comments, the individual statements
of the firefighters involved in the incident, and other information provided by the Prince
George’s County Fire/EMS Department.
The incident involved several firefighters responding to a fire in a small residential structure
with a basement. The fire was described as producing heavy smoke that significantly
reduced visibility at the fire scene. A truck company initiated a search of the first floor while
one engine company also entered the first floor through the front door to begin fire
suppression. A second engine company entered the basement from the rear of the
structure. A shift in the already heavy winds caused an escalation of the fire conditions
forcing all firefighters to retreat; however, two truck company firefighters remained trapped
on the first floor. One of these firefighters was able to escape and assist in retrieving the
other trapped firefighter.
Six firefighters sustained injuries with the longest trapped truck company firefighter
incurring burns to approximately 40% of his body. The truck company officer received
inhalation burns upon reentering the structure without his SCBA facepiece in place. Three
of the first floor engine company firefighters received burns to their head, face, and ears,
while a fourth firefighter suffered fractured ribs when the truck company officer escaped
through a window and landed on him.
Causes of injuries for each of the firefighters were identified and linked to the fireground
conditions and/or their use of PPE. The improper deployment of the helmet ear covers and
coat collars contributed to the ear and face burns. The most severely injured firefighter
198
Appendix 7
suffered burns because of his prolonged exposure exceeded the capabilities of his
clothing; however, he also wore a non-compliant, non-department set of gloves that
contributed to his hand burns.
A number of recommendations were made for better tracking of the gear, periodic
inspections to ensure that individual-owned gear meets department requirements and is
serviceable, informing members in the proper wearing of firefighter protective clothing, and
in better instituting a care and maintenance program for PPE. Non-compliant PPE should
not be tolerated. Specific emphasis is recommended for instructing members in the proper
deployment of ear covers and coat collars and recognizing the need for wearing
department approved protective clothing and equipment.
Objective
We were asked by Safety Investigation Team of the Prince George’s County Fire/EMS
Department to determine if there were any defects or other factors related to the personal
protective equipment items worn by different firefighters that may have contributed to their
burn or physical injuries sustained while engaged in a structural fire at 6404 57th Avenue in
Riverdale, Maryland on February 24, 2012.
Equipment and Information Provided for Examination

Inspection/Tracking Forms were provided for six different firefighters that were injured in
the course of the structural fire. These documents identified each item, the manufacturer,
the serial number, and the date of manufacture (in some cases). The protective clothing
and equipment of two firefighters – Truck 809 Forcible Entry and Truck 809 Officer – were
provided for direct examination. For each firefighter, this clothing and equipment included
their protective coat, pants, helmet, hood, gloves, and footwear. Additional items provided
for Truck 809 Forcible Entry included his flashlight and radio leather harness. Additional
items for Truck 809 Officer included his radio leather harness and a thermal imaging
camera. Photographs were provided of selected gear items for Engine 807B Nozzleman,
Engine 807B Officer, Engine 807B 2nd-line, and Engine 807B Layout/Backup. A second
set of Inspection/Tracking Forms described the SCBA worn by these firefighters.
Additional information included:
 A roster of the firefighters responding to the incident

 Statements of firefighters from the specific incident
 The floor plans for the first floor and basement level of the structure
 Photographs of the fire scene during the investigation
 Photographs of radios used at the fire scene
 Photographs of tools recovered from the fire scene
 Reports on the weather conditions on the day of the fire
 Specifications for the PG County Fire/EMS Department coat and pants (2000)
 Maintenance records on selection gear items
 A list of approved PPE for PG County Fire/EMS Department dated April 2008
199
Appendix 7
Overview of the Incident

According to the information released by the media contact person of the Prince
George’s County Fire/EMS Department, the following account was given:
Seven firefighters were injured as they battled a house fire in Riverdale. At about
9:11 pm on Friday, February 24, firefighters were alerted to a house fire in the
6400 block of 57th Avenue. An engine company from Riverdale and a truck
company from Bladensburg were the first to arrive and encountered a 1-story,
with basement, single family home with fire on both levels.
Preliminary reports indicated that firefighters had initiated an interior attack on the
fire when a sudden rush of air, fanned by high winds, entered from the rear of the
house either from a door or window being opened or broken out. The sudden
addition of a large amount of fresh air into the fire environment created a “fire
ball” inside the structure engulfing those firefighters engaged in interior
operations. Those firefighters inside the structure existed or attempted to escape
the structure interior as conditions escalated.
Incident commanders immediately called for additional resources by requesting

an EMS Task Force and a Fire Task Force in addition to sounding evacuation
tones. There were ultimately about 65 firefighters, paramedics and incident
commanders on the scene.
Firefighters and EMS personnel went to the aid of the injured firefighters and
prepared them for transport to the Burn Unit at the Washington Hospital Center.
The injuries included burns, fractures and lacerations. Of the seven firefighters
transported; four (3 from Riverdale and 1 from College Park) will be released and
sent home tonight. The most seriously injured firefighters were Truck 809 Officer
and Truck 809 Forcible Entry from the Bladensburg Fire/EMS Station #809 that
were part of the first arriving truck company.
Another team of firefighters regrouped outside and re-entered the structure and
had the fire extinguished in about 25 minutes after arrival.
The cause of the fire is currently under investigation and fire loss estimates are
not yet available. This is a vacant structure although firefighters believed the
house may have been occupied as a car was parked in the driveway.
200
Appendix 7
Figure 1 – Press Photograph of Fire Scene at 6404 57th Avenue,

Riverdale Heights, MD on 24 February 2012
201
Appendix 7
First Floor
Basement
Figure 2 – Floor Plans for Structure at 6404 57th Avenue, Riverdale Heights, MD
202
Appendix 7
A review of the post-incident statements taken of the incident firefighters provided

additional details for the specific activity by each of the firefighters:
At approximately 9:10 pm on Friday February 24, 2012 units of the Prince Georges
County Fire Department were alerted to respond to a reported house fire at 6404 57th
Avenue in Riverdale Heights. Engine Company 807B, Engine Company 809 and Truck
Company 809 arrived on the scene within minutes and reported a 2-story single family
dwelling with fire showing from the basement window and requested the working fire
dispatch. Firefighters arriving at the scene reported the fire with thick, black billowing
smoke in front of the structure blowing to the alpha side of the structure and across the
road due to high winds.
Engine 807B advanced an attack line to the front door and awaited forced entry from
Truck 809. Truck 809 Officer and Truck 809 Forcible Entry went to the structure’s front
door on side Alpha. Truck 809 Officer went right and Truck 809 Forcible Entry went right
in conducting a search of the structure interior. Truck 809 Officer noted fire coming
across the ceiling on the Bravo-Charlie corner of the living room and went to locate
Truck 809 Forcible Entry. Upon reaching Truck 809 Forcible Entry, Truck 809 Officer
noted a rush of cold air through his clothing followed by immediate intense heat with the
visibility being reduced from 5 feet to nothing. Truck 809 Officer instructed Truck 809
Forcible Entry to find a window and leave the structure. Truck 809 Forcible Entry
dropped his ax and found a window on the Alpha side using his halligan tool to break
the window but could not fit through even with Truck 809 Officer trying to push from
behind. Both firefighters crawled along the Alpha side of the structure but could not get
the door open. Truck 809 Forcible Entry attempted to transmit a Mayday. Truck 809
Officer reported laying on the floor with Truck 809 Forcible Entry and watching the flame
front moving down from the ceiling toward them. He then found a window and went
through it landing on another firefighter (Engine 807B 2nd-line). Truck 809 Officer stated
that upon exiting, he pulled off his SCBA facepiece and reentered the structure to find
Truck 809 Forcible Entry assisting in carrying him out of the structure before collapsing.
A hose line was brought into the structure by E807B as first arriving engine. The crew
on the line consisted of Engine 807B Nozzleman, Engine 807B Forcible Entry, and
Engine 807B Layout/Backup, and Engine 807B Officer. The crew was only able to
advance 5 to 10 feet inside the structure when the then entire first floor erupted in
flames forcing all firefighters to evacuate. Water was never applied from the hose line
and the door shut after last crewman from Engine 807B exited the structure.
Engine 809 Officer and Engine 809 Nozzleman were part of the second-in engine crew.
Equipped with a hose line from Engine 807B, they entered the basement level through
the lower level exterior entrance (side Charlie) and encountered heavy fire conditions
throughout. Beginning at the doorway, they swept their hose line right, and then
continued down the hallway sweeping the hose line left and up the stairs to the first
floor, proceeding straight into the basement’s front room (on side Alpha). By the time
they reached the front room, they had knocked down the majority of the fire and were
focusing on hot spots when the evacuation tone sounded and they exited the structure
203
Appendix 7
from the same door they entered. Engine 809 Nozzleman reported heavy smoke
conditions in going around the house to the lower floor exterior door that required him to
don his SCBA facepiece and reduced visibility to less than two feet. He also reported
that when the wind changed direction, the fire observed in the basement windows on
the Charlie side of the structure blew in. Both Engine 809 Officer and Engine 809
Nozzleman reported that the door came off the hinges upon entering the basement.
When the Emergency Identifier from Truck 809 Forcible Entry was activated, the
Incident Commander ordered all personnel to leave the building. The Incident
Commander also requested the working fire task force and an EMS task force due to
the report of injured firefighters. While other firefighter at the scene crews were tending
to the injured firefighters, crews from the remaining units on the call contained and
extinguished the fire.
In total, seven firefighters were injured including 4 firefighter from Engine 807B and 2
firefighters from Truck 809. One firefighter from Engine 812 had an injury to his hand.
The firefighters were transported to the hospital for evaluation and treatment.
Specific Description of Firefighter Injuries

The following burn injury descriptions and estimates were provided by the Prince
George’s County Fire/EMS Department:
 Truck 809 Forcible Entry sustained second and third degree burns to both
hands and wrists, first and second degree burns to most of chest and back, and
most of both legs and arms. Estimates were provided that he sustained burn
injuries over 40% of his body. He was transported to and treated by the
Washington Hospital Center’s Burn Unit.
 Truck 809 Officer sustained first degree burns to both upper arms, chest, and
back and second degree burns to upper back; had singed hair on top of heat and
possible inhalation burns to throat and upper airways. He was transported to and
treated by the Washington Hospital Center’s Burn Unit.
 Engine 807B Officer sustained first degree burn injuries to both ears.
 Engine 807B Layout/Backup sustained first degree burns to the left side of
face.
 Engine 807B 2nd-line suffered separated ribs and small burns to the top
knuckles on both hands.
 Engine 807BNozzleman sustained second degree burns to both ears.
Methodology Used in Evaluation
204
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The primary approach in evaluating the provided items of personal protective equipment
(PPE) was through a detailed inspection. Clothing and equipment were specifically
evaluated for:
 Compliance with the relevant editions of NFPA 1971 standards at the time the
item was indicated as being manufactured
 Conformity of the product design to the relevant design requirements of the

NFPA 1971
 The general condition of the clothing in terms of its levels of soiling and wear
 Specific areas of physical damage and contamination
 The types, location, and severity of the thermal damage that may be linked to
burn injuries sustained by the wearer
 Evidence of how the clothing item was worn and exposed
 Indications of prior care and maintenance
Knowledge of the general thermal environment conditions faced by the respective

firefighters is used to assist in the characterization of the thermal damage sustained by
the clothing. Particular attention is given to examining areas of the clothing or
equipment that covered or was adjacent to areas of personal injury. This information is
used to assist in establishing findings that can determine whether the PPE item
contributed to or otherwise affected how the injury may have been sustained. In several
cases, patterns of soiling and damage may be indicative of whether the clothing or
equipment item was properly worn.
Observations for the types of damage found on different parts of the clothing and
equipment items can provide clues as to the severity of the thermal exposures
encountered by the respective firefighter. Many materials provide thermal signatures,
i.e., telltale signs of specific damage that can be linked to certain exposure temperature
or energies. For example, some dyed outer shell materials are known to release the dye
through a process call dye sublimination (evaporation of the dye chemicals) at known
temperatures. In addition, particular components of the clothing, such as trim, will tend
to degrade at lower temperatures than the base materials used in the clothing’s
construction.
Where possible, assessments are made on interior layers and surfaces to determine the
level of heat penetration that can be used to assess the propensity of heat transfer that
led to burn injury. The relative susceptibility of each clothing or equipment layer and
component is taken into account for judging the overall exposure levels and how the
clothing or equipment item performed in the exposure environment.
The Fireground Environment and its Effects on the Protective Clothing

One approach to analyze the burn injuries to the respective firefighters and the damage
to their protective clothing is to examine industry information that shows the range of
fireground conditions that can be experienced and relate these conditions to the types
of damage that can occur to clothing and equipment. The relationship between
205
Appendix 7
increasing thermal radiation (expressed in cal/cm2s) and the resulting rise in air
temperature (expressed in degrees Celsius and degrees Fahrenheit) is presented in the
figure below. Possible structural fire fighting situations are illustrated in this figure:1,2
Figure 3 – Classification of Fireground Exposures

Figure 50. Range of Thermal Conditions Faced by Firefighters
1000
1832o
571oF
Emergency
Air Temperature (oC)
100
140oF
Ordinary
67o
Routine
10
0.01 0.10 1.00 10.00
Thermal Radiation (cal/cm2s)
 The Routine region describes conditions where one or two objects, such as a
bed or waste basket, are burning in a room. The thermal radiation and the air
temperatures are virtually the same as those encountered on a hot summer day.
As shown in Figure 17, Routine conditions are accompanied by a thermal
radiation range of 0.025 to 0.05 cal/cm2s and by air temperatures ranging from
68 to 140oF. Protective clothing for firefighters typically provides protection for
tens of minutes under these conditions, but excessively long exposure times may
create a burn injury situation.
 The Ordinary region describes temperatures encountered in fighting a more

serious fire or being next to a "flash-over" room. Ordinary conditions are defined
by a thermal range of 0.05 to 0.6 cal/cm2s, representing an air temperature range
of 140 to 571oF. Under these conditions, protective clothing may allow sufficient
1
N. J. Abbott and S. Schulman, "Protection from Fire: Nonflammable Fabrics and Coatings,
Journal of Coated Fabrics, Vol. 6, July 1976, pp. 48-64.
2
H. P. Utech, "High Temperatures vs. Fire Equipment," International Fire Chief, Vol. 39, 1973, pp.
26-27.
206
Appendix 7
time to extinguish the fire or to fight the fire until the nominal air supply is
exhausted (usually at period limited to minutes).
 The Emergency region describes conditions in a severe and unusual exposure,

such as those caused inside a "flash-over" room or next to a flame front. In
Emergency conditions, the thermal load exceeds 0.6 cal/cm2s and temperatures
exceed 571oF. In such conditions, the function of firefighters' clothing and
equipment is simply to provide protection during the short time needed for an
escape without serious injury.
In the incident description provided by the Prince George’s County Fire/EMS

Department, the injured firefighters were initially exposed to what presumably would be
characterized as ordinary conditions that developed into emergency conditions on the
first (main) floor of the structure after the wind changed direction that forced their
immediate evacuation. The specific patterns of thermal damage to the clothing worn by
Truck 809 Forcible Entry and Truck 809 Officer noted in the sections below corroborate
this observation, as the most damaged areas involve degradation of multiple layers of
the respective firefighters’ clothing.
Identification of PPE Items Worn by Injured Firefighters

Table 1 provides an overview of the different personal protective equipment items worn
by the six firefighters with identifying information as provided in the Inspection/Tracking
Forms. Copies of these forms are provided in Appendix A. It is presumed that the label
information present enabled the determination of the manufacturer, model, serial
number and manufacturing date for the individual items. In a few cases, labels were
indicated as missing or the item was not available to the department. Where serial
numbers were not reported, it is assumed that the “write in” information on the printed
label was not discernible or sufficiently legible to permit a complete identification of the
item.
The Inspection/Tracking Forms made the distinction as to whether the items were
owned by the Prince George’s County Fire/EMS Department or individually owned.
When individually owned, the item was compared against the list of approved PPE for
PG County Fire/EMS Department dated April 2008 (Appendix B). In addition, these items
were evaluated on the basis of the 10-year service life requirement stated in NFPA
1851, Standard for the Selection, Care, and Maintenance of Protective Ensembles for
Structural and Proximity Fire Fighting.
General observations from the clothing and equipment for the six firefighters include:
 Protective coats and pants were provided by two different manufacturers – Globe
Manufacturing Company and Sperian Protective Apparel. One of the older
Sperian coats was identified as “Securitex,” which is the former name of the
same company. As the clothing was owned by the county, those items not
examined were expected to have complied with the PG County Fire/EMS
Department clothing specifications at the time of purchase. However, there was one
207
Appendix 7
set of pants that appeared to be over 10 years old. In addition, there was one
firefighter (Engine 807B 2nd-line) that had a set of pants from one manufacturer and
a coat from a different manufacturer. This can sometimes create an issue since the
overlap between coat and pants may not be properly maintained if completely
different pant and coat designs are utilized.
 All of the listed helmets were leather styles owned by each individual firefighter.
Of the two helmets directly examined, one did not have a label and the other
helmet label indicated compliance only with the OSHA regulations. The helmets
appear to the Cairns N6A but neither helmet appeared to have had trim. Of the
helmets for the other firefighters, one was a style was not on the “approved” list and
was also not compliant with NFPA 1971, Standard on Protective Ensembles for
Structural Fire Fighting and Proximity Fire Fighting.
208
Appendix 7
Table 1 – General Identification of Clothing and Equipment Items for Six Injured Fighters
Clothing or Truck 809 Truck 809 Engine 807B Engine 807B Engine 807B Engine 807B
Equipment Forcible Entry Officer Officer Layout/Backup 2nd-Line Nozzleman
Item
Protective Globe G-Xtreme Globe G-Xtreme Securitex Sperian Securitex Sperian
coat Ser. No. 2904942 Ser. No. 2904864 Ser. No. Ser. No. Ser. No. Ser. No.
June 2005 June 2005 20369602 39483203 25695910 37751815
November 2004 May 2011 June 2006 September 2010
Protective Globe G-Xtreme Globe Sperian Sperian Globe G-Xtreme Sperian
pants Ser. No. 2904089 Label unreadable Ser. No. Ser. No. No provided Ser. No.
June 2005 Mfg. date 36764306 30080804 July 2009 37798005
unknown April 2010 April 2007 September 2010
Protective Cairns Houston Cairns Houston Cairns Houston Cairns New Cairns Houston Cairns Houston
helmet Label unreadable No label Ser. No. Yorker Not provided Ser. No.
Mfg. date Mfg. date 6009080 Ser. No. November 2004 101260133
unknown unknown October 2010 101879068 Individually July 2007
Individually Individually Individually May 2010 owned Individually
owned owned owned Individually owned
owned
Unauthorized
Not compliant
with NFPA 1971
Protective Lifeliners Lifeliners Lifeliners Lifeliners Lifeliners Not obtained
hood (Nomex) (Nomex) (Nomex?) (Nomex?) (Nomex?)
Label info Label info Not obtained Information not Information not
unreadable unreadable provided provided
Mfg. date Mfg. date
unknown unknown
Protective Tempo Dragon Alpha NX American American American American
gloves Individually Label unreadable Firewear Firewear Firewear Firewear
owned Mfg. date Not obtained Sleevemate Sleevemate Sleevemate
Unauthorized unknown Information not Information not Ser. No. 168897
Not compliant Individually provided provided February 2011
with NFPA 1971 owned Individually Individually
Unauthorized owned owned
209
Appendix 7
Clothing or Truck 809 Truck 809 Engine 807B Engine 807B Engine 807B Engine 807B
Equipment Forcible Entry Officer Officer Layout/Backup 2nd-Line Nozzleman
Item
Protective Globe Structural Pro 9020 Globe Structural Weinbrenner Pro Pro
footwear 14 HP310767604 14 Ser. No. WP310216812 WP310795829
Ser. No. 1201400 August 2010 Ser. No. 65000010 May 2003 May 2007
July 2008 Individually 1201400 March 2007 Individually Individually
Individually owned August 2009 Individually owned owned
owned Individually owned
owned Unauthorized
210
Appendix 7
 All hoods were reported as being from Lifeliners and appeared to be 100%
Nomex. No serial numbers or manufacturer dates were reported because it was
likely that the information no longer appeared on the label as the label style uses
hand written information to indicate the fabric content, style, lot number, and date
of manufacture. Of the two Lifeliners hoods directly examined, none of this
information was readable from the labels. However, the label for Truck 809
Officer’s hood indicated that the hoods were compliant with the 2000 edition of
NFPA 1971, making the hood was at least 5 years old from their date of
manufacture (since the current edition is 2007).
 The gloves for both firefighters that were directly examined were not gloves
approved by PG County Fire/EMS Department. One set of these gloves (Truck 809
Officer) were compliant with the 2007 edition of NFPA 1971, but was not listed as
gloves approved by the PG County Fire/EMS Department. The other pair of gloves
was manufactured by Tempo Gloves and did not comply with NFPA 1971. In fact,
the gloves are not certified and cite a long-discontinued standard. Additional
information on this product is given in the subsequent sections. All other firefighters
wore the approved American Firewear “Sleevemate” gloves.
 All footwear was indicated as being owned by the individual. With the exception
of the footwear worn by Engine 807B Layout/Backup, the protective footwear
worn by each firefighter was from the approved list for the PG County Fire/EMS
Department.
The personal protective equipment items for two firefighters that had the most severe
exposures were directly examined as part of this investigation.
Observations for Condition of Examined PPE Items

Table 2 provides a detailed description for the identification of the protective clothing
and equipment items worn by Truck 809 Forcible Entry and Truck 809 Officer that were
examined. Table 3 lists specific observations on the condition for each of these items. A
more detailed description of the individual item condition is provided in the following
narratives for each firefighter, which are accompanied by photographs that are included
in separate appendices.
Truck 809 Forcible Entry

Photographs from the examination of the protective clothing and equipment items worn
by Truck 809 Forcible Entry are provided in Appendix C. The protective helmet worn by
Truck 809 Forcible Entry sustained severe heat damage as shown in the front, back,
and side views (Figures C-1 through C-4). These photographs show significant heat
charring and distortion to the helmet leather surfaces, ribs, and front edge beading.
Bubbling of the painted surface appears on some parts of the helmet shell. There is dry
wall or other white substance on the front of the helmet and parts of the helmet. Any
reflective markings that may have been present are missing and the front shield is
curled and charred. The helmet ear covers shown in Figure C-5 do not appear as soiled
was the rest of the helmet and were likely not deployed. The chin strap was dirty but not
211
Appendix 7
soiled and there was no heat damage to the hook and loop closure tape or plastic
hardware.
Table 2 – Specific Identification of Clothing and Equipment Items for Truck 809
Forcible Entry and Truck 809 Officer
Protective Truck 809 Forcible Entry Truck 809 Officer

Clothing or
Equipment Item
Protective coat Globe Firefighting Suits Globe Firefighting Suits
GXtreme Jacket GXtreme Jacket
7.2 oz PBI Matrix Gold outer shell; 7.2 oz PBI Matrix Gold outer shell;
Crosstech on PJ moisture barrier; Crosstech on PJ moisture barrier;
Caldura Aralite quilt thermal barrier; Caldura Aralite quilt thermal barrier;
Interior shoulder thermal barrier Interior shoulder thermal barrier
reinforcements reinforcements
Style # 31184410 Style # 31184410
Serial # 2904942 Serial # 2904864
Cut # 51116C Cut # 51116C
48 chest; 35 length 46 chest; 35 length
Mfr date: 6/2005 Mfr date: 6/2005
NFPA 1971-2000 compliant NFPA 1971-2000 compliant
Protective pants Globe Firefighter Suits Globe Firefighter Suits
GXtreme Trouser Model name not discernible
7.2 oz PBI Matrix Gold outer shell; PBI/Kevlar outer shell;
Crosstech on PJ moisture barrier; Crosstech PJ moisture barrier;
Caldura Aralite quilt thermal barrier; Caldura Aralite quilt thermal barrier;
Leather reinforced knees with Leather reinforced knees with no
interior liner moisture barrier layer; interior lining;
Style # 41184410 Style # not readable
Serial # 2904089/Cut # 51116P Serial # not readable/Cut # not
36 waist; 30 inseam readable
Mfr date: 6/2005 36 waist; inseam not readable
NFPA 1971-2000 compliant Mfr date: unknown
NFPA 1971-2000 compliant
Protective helmet MSA Cairns Leather MSA Cairns Houston
No label present OSHA 1910.156 compliance label
NFPA certification status unknown NFPA certification status unknown
Lacks required trim Lacks required trim
Protective hood LifeLiners LifeLiners
Beige color Beige color
Label information not readable Label information not readable
Appears to be 100% Nomex Appears to be 100% Nomex
NFPA 1971-2007 compliant NFPA 1971-2000 compliant
212
Appendix 7
Protective Truck 809 Forcible Entry Truck 809 Officer

Clothing or
Equipment Item
Protective gloves Tempo Max Dragon Fire
Leather shell, wool lining, no Alpha NX
moisture barrier; Compliance Leather outershell
indicates 1988 edition of NFPA Polyurethane moisture barrier
Modacrylic/cotton liner (Kovenex)
1973 with exception of water
penetration and Fed OSHA and
Cal OSHA, no manufacture
date.
Protective Globe Firefighting Suits Warrrington Pro
footwear 14” Structural Pull-on Boot Style # 9020
Model # 3916-2 Serial # HP310767604
Style # 1201400 Manufacture date 8/10
Size 10 E
Serial # 60051168
Manufacture date 7/08
Size 10-1/2 extra wide
213
Appendix 7
Table 3 – Overview of Clothing and Equipment Item Condition for Truck 809
Forcible Entry and Truck 809 Officer
Item Truck 809 Forcible Entry Truck 809 Officer

Protective Shell – Severely soiled with Shell – Heavily soiled coat; residue
coat thermal damage; trim destroyed in different places, trim damage on
throughout coat; charring shoulders and arms (some portions
extensive on front and back of unaffected); closure flap not secured
coat; collar was not deployed as properly; tar residue along places
evidenced by soiling pattern; bottom of coat; small hole on shell
melted residue on front shoulder; left side mid torso; collar was not
back of coat shows less charring deployed, appears to be re-lettered
and strap pattern due to SCBA; (belonged to another fire department
water wells cut open on left and or fire fighter).
right sleeves; shell label melted Liner - Moderate soling on moisture
onto liner. barrier side; minor scorch marks
Liner – Moisture barrier melted to underneath left arm; soiling of
lining on long seams on back; thermal barrier side predominately
bottom of interior lining heavily front torso; condition of liner interior
soiled; thermal damage to both appears to be worn with some
arms and shoulders, and mid soiling but seams are intact.
front torso; wristlets cut; damage
most extensive to right side;
melted material on right wristlet;
thermal damage extends to
thermal barrier at shoulders;
small burn hole on thermal
barrier at mid chest next to front
closure (likely due to ember
entering coat).
214
Appendix 7
Item Truck 809 Forcible Entry Truck 809 Officer

Protective Shell – Heavy fireground soiling Shell – Heavily soiled; moderate to
pants and some thermal damage; heavy wear; tar residue on various
carpet debris on knees and locations; damage to leather patch
lower legs; tar residue on on right cargo pocket; some charring
various portion on front; on lower legs; pants have been
moderate charring to front and patched and repaired previously on
back of legs; physical damage back of pants and lower side, tears
on left and right cargo pockets; and worn through areas in right leg;
trim is totally degraded; interior face fabric in fly area
significant wear to bottom of severely degraded; no label of shell
cuffs; interior condition of shell (before practice of having shell
shows minor wear. label); appears to be beyond service
Lining - Moderately soiled, life.
primarily bottom of legs; mild Liner – Moderate to heavy soiling;
wear, provided with inspection soiling heaviest at bottom of pants
opening’ moisture barrier slight near cuffs; multiple areas of quilt
wear with seams intact; thermal stitching are broken; minor tears in
barrier has slight wear in crotch thermal barrier face cloth.
area.
Protective Heavy soiling and thermal Heavily soiled; no reflective
helmet damage over entire shell shown markings to begin with; missing
by charring and distortion of leather edging on front right brim;
leather; front shield severely cracked and warped primarily on
distorted; some bubbling of paint; sides and front; paint chipped across
trim either disintegrated or never most crown ridges; ear covers
present; ear covers soiled but appear to be deployed and heavily
show pattern of not being soiled; very mild thermal damage to
deployed; chin strap soiled but ear covers; chin strap soiled but
still functional. functional.
Protective Moderate to heavy soiling around Heavily soiled around face opening;
hood face opening; small rips on both tears on lower bib on both sides;
left and right bibs. heavily worn.
Protective Shell severely soiled (originally Moderately soiled mild damage to
gloves tan in color); melted residue on the fingertips; right glove has some
palm on both gloves; appear to white residue at the base at the
have shrunk from original size; wrist; mild thermal shrinkage.
liner intact.
Protective Overall moderate wear and tear; moderate soiling over exterior;
footwear no significant thermal damage; moderate wear on outsole; no
toes soiled and scraped, apparent thermal damage.
moderate wear on upper and
outsole; moderate soiling on
exterior.
215
Appendix 7
There was no label on the interior of Truck 809 Forcible Entry’s helmet and it is likely
that the label was removed (Figure C-6). In addition there does not appear that visibility
markings were ever present on the helmet shell or that there was evidence of a
compliance label. The helmet has indications of being the Sam Houston, which was
certified to NFPA 1971; however, it is possible the visibility markings may have been
removed.
Truck 809 Forcible Entry’s protective hood was a Lifeliner knit hood. The write-in
information on the hood was not discernible. Figure C-7 provides a front view of the
hood while side views are provided in Figures C-8 and C-9. These pictures show
fireground soiling and charring around face opening. There are also small tears at the
bottom of the bib on the left and right sides (Figures C-10 and C-11). These tears may
have been created in the urgency of removing Truck 809 Forcible Entry’s hood after
being pulled out of the structure. The hood label is shown in Figure C-12. The hood
appears to be a 100% Nomex that was compliant to the 2007 edition of NFPA 1971 at
the time of manufacture (the date of manufacture is also unreadable).
The front and back of Truck 809 Forcible Entry’s protective coat are shown in Figures
C-13 and C-14. The coat appears to have been heavily worn (prior to the fire incident)
but also shows significant fireground soiling and thermal damage. Portions of the outer
shell are charred, primarily on the front and along the sides. The trim is heavily
damaged on the front of the coat and arms and the lower band on the back (see Figure
C-15). The collar soiling patterns shows that the collar was never properly extended as
seen in Figure C-16. The hook and loop tape is severely melted as apparent in Figure
C-17 meaning that the collar closure was also not secured. The soiling and char pattern
on the back of the coat shows where part of the clothing was shielded by the straps and
mass of the self-contained breathing apparatus (Figure C-18). Some of the same white
debris on Truck 809 Forcible Entry’s helmet is also present on the upper right front of
his protective coat (Figure C-19). The water wells in the coat sleeves had been cut
(Figure C-20), presumably to rapidly remove the coat from Truck 809 Forcible Entry
when he was brought out of the structure.
The interior views of the outer shell provided in Figures C-21 and C-22 show the
contrasting appearance for the inside of the coat. While the char damage can be seen
in some portions of the clothing (example shown in Figure C-23), the most telling sign of
thermal damage is the label that is positioned on the upper interior back of the shell
(Figure C-24). Portions of the label are missing because it melted onto the lining.
The liner was separately examined on both the moisture barrier and thermal barrier
sides. The front and back of the liner moisture barrier side appear in Figures C-25 and
C-26. Charring is most evident on the upper shoulder areas on both left and right sides
(Figures C-27 and C-28). As previously indicated, the shell product label melted onto
the liner (as shown in Figure C-29). Both wristlets, which are attached to the liner, show
heavy soiling and were cut in removing the coat from Truck 809 Forcible Entry. The
right sleeve wristlet (Figure C-30) shows a white solid residue melted to it.
216
Appendix 7
The liner was provided with an inspection opening that permitted viewing the liner
interior; however, several portions of the moisture barrier seam tape were melted onto
the thermal barrier preventing its full inversion (Figures C-31 and C-32). The shoulder
areas showed extensive moisture barrier film damage and dye sublimination of the
interior shoulder reinforcement, which is normally a light blue color (Figure C-33).
Similar damage occurred at the left shoulder but to a lesser degree (Figure C-34).
The thermal barrier side of the liner shows much less damage (Figures C-35 and C-36);
however, there is a small burn hole on the right front side of the coat halfway up the
front opening that may have been caused by a small ember that penetrated the front
closure (C-37). The coat liner label appears in Figure C-38.
The protective pants worn by Truck 809 Forcible Entry are pictured in Figures C-39 and
C-40. These pants show heavy soiling, particularly in the knee region (Figure C-41) and
some physical damage particularly to the pockets (Figure C-42). There were deposits of
a dark tar-like substance and carpet fibers embedded in melted residue particularly
along the knees. The trim is heavily degraded though the retroreflective portion of the
trim still seems functional (Figure C-43). The interior of the pants on the shell side show
little damage but some soiling (Figures C-44 and C-45). The product label on the pants
shell is shown in Figure C-46.
The interior of the pants show little damage but moderate to heavy soiling, particularly in
the lower area near the pant cuffs on both the moisture barrier and thermal barrier sides
(Figures C-47 through C-50). An inspection of the liner interior shows little damage. The
moisture barrier tape appeared intact (Figure C-51) and there was some mild pilling of
the batting side of the thermal barrier in the crotch area indicative of normal wear in
bunker clothing (Figure C-52). The interior knee reinforcement is shown in Figure C-53,
and the pants liner product label appears in Figure C-54.
The gloves were heavily soiled from the normal gold color on both the back and palm
sides (Figure C-55 and C-56). One of the gloves had already been cut open showing
the interior glove construction to consist of only a wool thermal barrier with no moisture
barrier (Figure C-57). The product label for the glove provided in the glove interior
appears in Figure 5-58. The backside of this label indicated compliance of the product
to NFPA 1973, an older standard for gloves that had been discontinued in 1997 (Figure
C-59). Yet the gloves did not appear to be over 15 years old. The specific product label
language indicated compliance to the 1988 edition of the NFPA 1973 standard and
stated there was an exclusion to one specific requirement that was part of the standard
(Section 2-5.5 addressed water penetration resistance).
There was nothing unusual about the condition of the protective footwear worn by Truck
809 Forcible Entry. Various views of the footwear are presented in Figures C-60 through
C-64 showing some wear and tear and fireground soiling, but no obvious or significant
thermal damage. The product labels which are laminated to the liner in the footwear
upper shaft are shown in Figures C-65 and C-66.
217
Appendix 7
A number of other items that were worn or used by Truck 809 Forcible Entry were also
presented for examination. These included a radio case and harness (Figure C-67), a
large hand carrying flashlight (Figure C-68), and a small coat-mounted flashlight
(Figures C-69 and C-70). There was no remarkable damage to the radio case and
harness leather. However, there was some melting and deformation of the plastic
components for both flashlights.
Truck 809 Officer

Photographs from the examination of the protective clothing and equipment items worn
by Truck 809 Officer are provided in Appendix D.
The protective helmet worn by Truck 809 Officer has a similar appearance to the helmet
worn by Truck 809 Forcible Entry, in the extent of fireground soiling and thermal
damage, as seen in the various views provided in Figures D-1 through D-4. The front of
the helmet shows deterioration of the front edge of the brim with the loss of material
from severe deterioration. However, the exterior of the ear covers are moderately soiled
indicating their deployment during the fire response (Figure D-5). The condition of the
helmet interior is also similar, showing thermal damage and bubbling of the paint on the
underside of the brim, but with the headgear and chin strip intact and functional (Figure
D-6). Only an OSHA compliance label was found on the helmet interior and it is doubtful
that this helmet complied with NFPA 1971 due to the lack of reflective markings. A
charred number 9 appears in a location where a reflective marking should have
appeared (Figure D-7).
The protective hood is likewise similarly soiled with the same appearance as the hood
worn by Truck 809 Forcible Entry (Figures D-8 through D-10); however, soiling on the
lower front bib of the hood that suggests that the hood bib was pulled out during his
reentry into the structure. There is a tear on the right middle portion of the bib (Figure D-
11). Yet, the hood worn by Truck 809 Officer predates the 2007 edition standard and
has a label indicating compliance with the 2000 edition of NFPA 1971 (Figure D-12). A
second hood was provided with Truck 809 Officer’s gear that was a newer American
Firewear hood of the same material but a different design. While worn and soiled, it did
not appear to have been used during the fire incident.
Truck 809 Officer’s protective coat showed signs of heavy wear and thermal
degradation. The front and the back of the coat exterior, pictured in Figure D-13 and D-
14, show soiling over the majority of the coat, melted/thermally-degraded trim and some
physical damage. A close-up of the left shoulder shows the heavily soiling and thermal
damage (Figure D-15). It is further apparent that the collar was not properly deployed
when the normal extended side of the collar is examined (Figure D-16). Small burn
holes are noted on the back and the front of the coat with the front hole shown in Figure
D-17. The opposite side of the same hole is seen in Figure D-18 as visible from the
interior shell side. The contrast in soiling condition can be observed for the shell interior
in Figures D-19 and D-20. The outer shell label is provided in Figure D-21.
218
Appendix 7
The inspection of Truck 809 Officer’s protective coat liner showed that it was in
relatively good condition. Photographs of the front and back of the liner are provided in
Figures D-22 and D-23. A small light char mark is visible on the front left side of the liner
consistent with the outer shell hole (Figure D-24). An examination of the lining interior
showed the moisture barrier to be undamaged and the seams intact (Figure D-25).
Similarly, there is very little soiling present and no indication of thermal damage on the
thermal barrier side of the ling (Figure D-26 and D-27). A small tear was noted in a side
seam, which may have occurred during manufacturer or during strain placed on the
garment during use (Figure D-28). The product label that is affixed to the lining is shown
in Figure D-29.
It was impossible to determine the age of Truck 809 Officer’s pants as there was no
label on the outer shell and portions of the liner product label was unreadable. It could
be discerned that the product was manufactured to the 2000 edition of NFPS 1971, but
the pants appears to be of an older generation of manufacturer’s current pants styling.
Figures D-30 and D-31 show well-worn pants that had been patched and repaired
several times. Figure D-32 is a close-up of the top back of the pants showing multiple
stitched and patched areas. Similar patches are shown on the top portion of the left
cargo pocket (Figure D-33), while the bottom leather pocket reinforcement is badly
damaged (Figure D-34). There is some trim deterioration from the exposure primarily in
the form of soiling, though it appears that the trim was previously replaced (Figure D-
35). The patches and wear were also evident on the interior of the lining (Figures D-36
and D-37); however, the facing (barrier) material in the pants fly is deteriorated from age
(not heat) as shown in Figure D-38. There is heavy soiling on the interior lower legs of
the pants shell (Figure D-39).
Much of the soiling shows up on the moisture barrier side of the lining (Figures D-40
and D-41). While this is lighter levels of soiling on the thermal barrier side of the lining
(Figures D-42 and D-43), it is apparent that the lining is well worn by the wear holes and
missing quilt stitching (Figure D-44). The product labels are positioned on the front of
the pants liner instead of the back indicating that the pants are relatively old and likely
more than 10 years old.
The protective gloves worn by Truck 809 Officer are heavily soiled but show only minor
thermal damage (Figures D-45 and D-46). The product label on the glove interior
indicates compliance with the 2007 edition of NFPA 1971 (Figure D-47), but the write-in
language indicating the date of manufacture and lot number is un-readable (Figure D-
48).
The protective footwear used by Truck 809 Officer during the fire incident appeared to
be in reasonable condition (Figures D-49 through D-51). The footwear showed some
fireground soiling but no thermal damage. The label for the footwear appears in Figure
D-52.
Also provided with the gear for Truck 809 Officer was a thermal imaging camera. The
left and right sides of this camera are shown in Figures D-53 and D-54. While there is
219
Appendix 7
some slight thermal degradation of the camera on some plastic parts of the viewing
area, the camera was primarily soiled with fireground contaminants.
Observations for Other Firefighters

Contact sheets with photographs for Engine 807B Officer, Engine 807B Layout/Backup,
Engine 807B 2nd-Line, and Engine 807B Nozzleman were provided and examined for
attributes that may have been cause for their injuries. Copies of these contract sheets
are provided along with the Inspection/Tracking Forms in Appendix A. Observations
were made on the condition of the protective clothing and equipment item on the basis
of photographs and are provided in Table 4. Detailed observations were not possible
since these items were not made available for direct examination. For example, except
where significant charring occurred, it was not possible to distinguish soiling from
charring of the textile components for these items.
A summary of these observations include:
 The protective helmets were much less soiled and did not exhibit the charring as
observed for the helmets worn by Truck 809 Forcible Entry and Truck 809
Officer. With the exception of Engine 807B 2nd-Line (who sustained separated
ribs and minor burn injuries to his hands), there were clear indications that the
ear flaps had not been deployed.
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Appendix 7
Table 4 – General Observations on Condition of Firefighter Clothing and Equipment Items

Protective Clothing Engine 807B Officer Engine 807B Engine 807B 2nd- Engine 807B
or Equipment Item Layout/Backup Line Nozzleman
Protective helmet Helmet soiled, but Helmet soiled, but Helmet lightly soiled; Helmet soiled, but
paint appears intact; paint appears intact; not possible to paint appears intact;
ear covers do not ear covers do not determine if ear ear covers do not
appear to have been appear to have been covers were deployed appear to have been
deployed deployed deployed
Protective hood Soiling pattern Soiling pattern Soiling around face Soiling pattern
consistent with consistent with opening extending to consistent with
fireground use with fireground use with back of head fireground use with
lack of ear cover use lack of ear cover use lack of ear cover use
and collar extension and collar extension and collar extension
Protective coat – shell Moderate fireground Moderate fireground Moderate fireground Moderate fireground
soiling; collar not soiling; collar not soiling; collar not soiling; collar not
extended during use; extended during use; extended during use; extended during use;
trim still functional trim still functional trim still functional trim still functional
Protective coat – liner Soiling penetrating Soil penetration to Soiling penetrating Very little soiling on
shell to moisture moisture barrier side shell to moisture moisture barrier side
barrier side of liner of liner at shoulder barrier side of liner of liner
areas
Protective pants – Moderate fireground Light to moderate Moderate fireground Light to moderate
shell soiling fireground soiling soiling fireground soiling
Protective pants – Soiling penetrating Some soil penetration Soiling penetrating Very little soiling on
liner shell to moisture to moisture barrier shell to moisture moisture barrier side
barrier side of liner side of liner barrier side of liner of liner
Protective gloves Gloves show Gloves show Gloves show Gloves show light to
moderate to heavy moderate to heavy moderate to heavy moderate soiling
soiling, some loss of soiling soiling
reflectivity on trim
band
Protective footwear No specific levels of Moderate fireground No specific levels of No specific levels of
soiling or damage soiling soiling or damage soiling or damage
was discernible was discernible was discernible
221
 The protective hoods all showed significant soiling around the face opening, but
in many cases the soiling extended to the sides and back indicating that the
helmet ear covers were not deployed and the collars were not full extended and
secured with the closure flap.
 The protective coats and pants showed significantly lower soiling levels than
those worn by Truck 809 Forcible Entry and Truck 809 Officer. In particular, the
trim appears to be functional over the majority of the clothing item.
 In many cases, it was difficult to determine with any level of certainty, if the
collars for each of the firefighter protective coats were extended. The collar for
each firefighter appeared not to have been worn upward for each of the
firefighters.
 No remarkable levels of soiling or damage were noted to the gloves or footwear

worn by each of the firefighters.
Additional observations for the condition of the gear were provided from a
representative of the independent service provider. These observations are summarized
in Table 5.
Table 5 – External Examination Findings for Other Firefighter Gear*
Item ID
Firefighter Comments and Recommendations
Provided
Engine Coat-Sperian  Excessive dirt/smoke/soot contamination
807B #20369602  Storm flap Velcro compromised/thermal exposure
Officer 11/2004 40T  Right hand/wrist guard has several holes
 Thermal liner has evidence of fraying around bottom
 No other immediate signs of damage to thermal liner
and moisture barrier
Pant-Sperian  Excessive dirt/smoke/soot contamination
#36764306  Bottom of legs on outer shell has holes and is worn in
4/2010 34x30 back from walking on
 material/possibly cut out
 Seams on lower legs of outer shells are
compromised/fraying and loss of seam strength
 Scotchlite material on legs has holes and loose
stitches
 No other immediate signs of damage to thermal liner
222
Appendix 7
Item ID
Provided
Hood-White  Excessive dirt/smoke/soot contamination-
Nomex- concentration around face opening/top/sides
Lifeliner  No evidence of physical damage, however possible
thermal exposure evident
 **Condemn Hood** Due to FF Injury/compromised
integrity
Engine Coat-Sperian  Excessive amount of dirt/smoke/soot contamination
807B 2nd- #25695910  Several areas of scotchlite has stitches missing/loose
Line 6/2006 42T  No other immediate signs of damage to shell, thermal
liner, or moisture barrier
Pant-Globe  Excessive amounts of dirt/smoke/soot contamination
#31026823  Holes in bottom of legs
7/2000 Size  Loose, missing stitches in scotchlite
Unreadable  Missing suspender buttons
Possible  **Condemn Pants**Due to age (12 yrs old & cost to
34x30 repair)
Hood-White  Excessive amount of dirt/smoke/soot contamination
Nomex- w/concentration around face opening
Lifeliner  Possible thermal exposure
 **Condemn Hood**Due to possible thermal exposure
Engine Coat -  Excessive amount of dirt/smoke/soot contamination
807B Sperian  No other immediate signs of damage to shell, thermal
Nozzleman #37751815 liner, or moisture barrier
9/2010 42T
Pant -Sperian  Excessive amount of dirt/smoke/soot contamination
#37798005  No other immediate signs of damage to shell, thermal
9/2010 36x30 liner, or moisture barrier
Nomex- w/concentration around face opening
Lifeliner  Evidence of thermal exposure and damage around
face opening
 **Condemn Hood**Due to FF injury & damage to
hood
Engine Coat-Sperian  Excessive amount of dirt/smoke/soot contamination
807B #39483203  No other immediate signs of damage to shell. thermal
Layout/ 5/2011 54T liner, or moisture barrier
Backup Pant-Sperian  Excessive amount of dirt/smoke/soot contamination
#.30080804  Damage to bottom of legs in back
11/2007  Scotchlite damaged, torn
50x32  No other immediate signs of damage to thermal liner
223
Appendix 7
Item ID
Provided
Nomex- w/concentration around
Lifeliner  face opening
 Evidence of thermal exposure around face
opening/sides
 **Condemn Hood**Due to FF injury & damage to
hood
* Information provided by Don H. Peete, Manager PPE Center, Uniform Sales, Maryland
Fire & Rescue
Review of Standard Operating Procedures and PPE Cleaning/Maintenance History

Three different fireground standard operating procedures (SOPs) for the PG County
Fire/EMS Department were reviewed, including:
 General Order Number 06-01: Fireground Standard Operating Procedure for

Structural Fires
 General Order Number 06-03: 2 In, 2 Out and Rapid Intervention
 General Order Number 06-04: Mayday Procedure
None of these standard operating procedures provides any specific instructions for the
wearing of protective clothing other than the General Order Number 06-03 stating that
the initial and standby teams be equipped with full protective clothing.
In addition, PG County Fire/EMS Department General Orders, Chapter 03 – Cleaning,

Repair, Replacement and Alterations of Personal Protective Equipment, was provided.
This document gives specific procedures for member responsibilities and logistical
arrangements for the cleaning and care of PPE. It also provides the disposition for gear
that has been contaminated or compromised, and includes procedures for the handling
of gear involved in incidents where burns or other injuries have occurred. The provisions
in this chapter are generally consistent with the requirements of NFPA 1851, Standard
on Selection, Care, and Maintenance of Protective Ensembles for Structural Fire
Fighting and Proximity Fire Fighting, but there are no specific requirements for regular
inspections and cleaning of the gear on an annual basis.
Care and maintenance records for the subject protective coats and pants were
requested for the each of the injured firefighters by Safety Investigation Team. The
independent service provider (ISP), Maryland Fire Equipment Corporation, was only
able to locate records identify 4 of 12 clothing items (coat and pants) by serial number
or other identifying information. In one case, the provided serial number for Truck 809
Officer’s coat was shown as being issued to a different firefighter. The records for
protective pants were found for Truck 809 Forcible Entry and the records for both the
coat and pants for Engine 807B Nozzleman were located. The records produced by
Maryland Fire Equipment Corporation listed the individual as “Logistics” for several
items, were relatively vague on the description of the repairs and did not indicate a date
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Appendix 7
or person responsible for the repairs. It did not appear that these clothing items had
been subjected to the once a year advanced cleaning as required by NFPA 1851. It
does not appear that all protective clothing items subject to routine care and
maintenance (protective coat and pants) are identified in the system or are being
subject to advanced cleaning, which is required annually.
Findings and Conclusions
Characterization of the Exposure Environment – The combination of the descriptions

provided for the incident and the observed extent of damage noted for some clothing
items indicates a wide range of exposure temperatures and levels of radiant heat. As
previously described, the initial response would have taken place at the high end of
ordinary fireground conditions. The fire present in the structure would have produced
exposure temperatures in the range of 200 to 300oF depending on the location of the
firefighters. Under these conditions, the firefighters inside the structure were able to
carry out fire suppression duties, but when the wind direction changed and blew directly
through opening(s) in the structure, the fire conditions dramatically changed with both
air temperatures and radiant heat levels rising to over 400oF and beyond 0.25 cal/cm2s.
The protective clothing ensemble can adequately provide protection under these
conditions for a couple of minutes and show very little evidence of thermal damage. Yet,
there are some clothing components, notably trim and helmet faceshields or Borque
eyeshields that start to degrade at these temperatures. However, for the engine and
truck company firefighter teams inside these structures, prolonged exposure with
dynamically changing conditions can produce burn injuries to the less protected portions
of the body. These were the conditions that were faced by Engine 807B Officer and the
three other firefighters that accompanied him as part of the Engine 807B hose team.
The further escalation of interior temperature and radiant heat levels occurred as Truck
809 Forcible Entry and Truck 809 Officer found themselves trapped in the structure.
These conditions approached temperatures of approximately 600oF and radiant energy
levels near 0.5 cal/cm2s and caused full charring of the helmet exterior, full degradation
of portions of trim, and some charring of the exterior portions of their clothing. Since
Truck 809 Officer was able to escape, the degradation of his clothing was substantially
less, because Truck 809 Forcible Entry experienced a sustained exposure inside the
structure. Therefore, the principal differences in how the gear for each firefighter
appeared are primarily due to difference in exposure times as evidenced by the
following observations:
 Truck 809 Forcible Entry’s coat shows more charring over the surface of the
clothing and a greater portion of degraded trim. A comparison is made in Figure
4.
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Appendix 7
Back of Truck 809 Officer Coat Back of Truck 809 Forcible Entry Coat
Figure 4 – Differences in Levels of Charring and Trim Degradation for

Truck 809 Officer and Truck 809 Forcible Entry Protective Coats
 The internal damage of the clothing liner, in particular, the moisture barrier is
significantly more extensive for Truck 809 Forcible Entry as compared to Truck
809 Officer (see photographs in Figures 5 and 6).
Back of Truck 809 Officer Coat Liner Back of Truck 809 Forcible Entry Coat
Liner
Figure 5 – Differences in Charring Penetration to Liner for

 Certain components of Truck 809 Forcible Entry’s clothing showed melting that
were not observed for Truck 809 Officer. The best examples of this observation
is the penetration of heat through the shell causing melting of both moisture
226
Appendix 7
barrier seam tape (melts slightly above 500oF) and the label on the shell interior
as shown in Figure 7. The label is heat laminated to the shell material at a similar
temperature.
Truck 809 Officer Coat Truck 809 Forcible Entry Coat
Figure 6 – Comparison for Condition of Moisture Barrier Degradation for

Moisture Barrier Seam Tape to Liner Outer Shell Label to Liner
Figure 7 – Examples of Melting inside Truck 809 Forcible Entry’s Protective Coat
This comparison illustrates the how an extended exposure to relatively harsh thermal
exposure conditions can result in greater heat penetration and damage to the clothing
and exceed the capabilities of the clothing element to provide protection to the individual
firefighter.
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Appendix 7
Causes of Firefighter Injuries – Explanations can be provided on the location and

cause of the different injuries sustained by each firefighter. This analysis is based on
both a review of the firefighter statements and the examination of the firefighter clothing
or equipment (and/or provided photographs). This information is presented in Table 6.
Table 6 – Findings for Causes of Burn Injuries and Contributing PPE Factors
Firefighter Explanation for Injuries Contributing PPE Factors

Truck 809 Truck 809 Forcible Entry was caught Much of the PPE was simply
Forcible inside the structure and was unable overwhelmed in the sustained
Entry to escape as the fireground emergency condition exposure;
worsened to emergency conditions; however, the gloves were not
prolonged exposure to these NFPA 1971 compliant and
conditions resulted in multiple burn lacked a moisture barrier
injuries over his body. Poorly lessening their protective
insulated gloves have a large amount qualities and contributing to the
of exposed surface areas that is severity of the hand injuries as
susceptible to rapid heat transfer to compared to other parts of the
the hands.. body.
Truck 809 Truck 809 Officer reentered the The absence of a SCBA
Officer structure after removing SCBA facepiece left a large portion of
facepiece (due to damage sustained the face unprotected and
to the facepiece when originally resulted in Truck 809 Officer
caught in the structure). breathing superheated air and
fire gases.
Engine As part of the first arriving engine Engine 807B Officer did not
807B company, Engine 807B Officer led a deploy ear covers and did not
Officer hose line into the structure but had to properly extend and secure
retreat when the fire conditions collar.
worsened and the team was unable
to apply water. Engine 807B Officer
was burned on ears and face when
exposed to excess heat during exit
from the structure.
Engine As part of the first arriving engine Engine 807B Layout/Backup did
807B company, Engine 807B not deploy ear covers and did
Layout/ Layout/Backup was part of team on a not properly extend and secure
Backup hose line that went into the structure collar.
but had to retreat when the fire
conditions worsened and the team
was unable to apply water. Engine
807B Layout/Backup was burned on
the side of face when exposed to
excess heat during exit from the
structure.
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Appendix 7
Firefighter Explanation for Injuries Contributing PPE Factors

Engine In exiting through a window on the Engine 807B 2nd-line believes
807B 2nd- first floor, Truck 809 Officer fell on top hands were burned when
line of Engine 807B 2nd-line separating pressed down against structure
his ribs; Engine 807B 2nd-line was when Truck Officer fell on time
burned on knuckles on top of hands. of him.
Engine As part of the first arriving engine Engine 807B Nozzleman did not
807B company, Engine 807B Nozzleman deploy his ear covers and did
Nozzleman was part of team on a hose line that not properly extend and secure
went into the structure but had to collar.
retreat when the fire conditions
worsened and the team was unable
to apply water. Engine 807B
Nozzleman was burned on his ears
when exposed to excess heat during
his exit from the structure.
Impact of Clothing Selection and Use – At least one helmet was unapproved and
non-compliant with NFPA 1971. Even though the helmets worn by Truck 809 Officer
and Truck 809 Forcible Entry appear to be NFPA 1971-compliant models of leather
helmets, the absence of compliance labels and lack of trim suggest that these helmets
may have not been compliant. There were also two sets of gloves worn by firefighters
that were not approved, where one glove style was not compliant with NFPA 1971.
Lastly, there was one set of footwear that was not approved, but it was still compliant
with NFPA 1971.
With the exception of the set of gloves worn by Truck 809 Forcible Entry, none of the
protective clothing and equipment items were found to be defective or contributory to
the firefighter injuries. The NFPA 1971 non-compliant helmets did not contribute to any
of the burn injuries. Rather, the failure to correctly wear the helmet, by fully deploying
the ear covers, and fully extend the collars of their protective coats directly contributed
to their face and ear injuries. Truck 809 Officer deployed his ear covers whereas Truck
809 Forcible Entry did not, seen in Figure 8.
229
Appendix 7
Truck 809 Officer’s Helmet Truck 809 Forcible Entry’s Helmet
Figure 8 – Photographs of Protective Helmet Ear Covers
It did not appear that any of the firefighters wore their collars extended and closed. This
fact is readily apparent because the soiling appears on the wrong side of the collar (see
Figure 9).
Collar Not Raised – Soiling on Interior Collar Raised – No Soiling
Figure 9 – Soiling on Protective Coat When Collar Not Raised

It is also possible to note incorrect helmet ear cover and coat collar deployment by the
soiling patterns present on the protective hood. In general, most fireground soiling
should occur around the face opening where the hood is against the sides of the SCBA
facepiece. However, if soiling is noted extending down the sides and back of the hood in
a plane around the head, adjacent to the face opening, this observation is an indication
of an incorrectly deployed ear cover or collar.
One of the most vulnerable parts of the firefighter’s body can be the head and neck area
because this area relies on the overlap of several ensemble elements to provide full
230
Appendix 7
protection. The protective hood is only an interface device and consists of a limited
number of layers with significantly less insulation than the rest of the clothing. To make
up for this shortcoming, additional insulation is provided by the helmet ear covers and
the collar being both raised and secured. These overlaps protect the sides of the
wearer’s face including their ears and portions of their neck that are not covered by the
protective coat, helmet, and SCBA facepiece. Failure to properly deploy helmet ear
covers and coat collars is one of the most frequent causes of firefighter head, face, and
ear burns.
Of greatest concern were the gloves used by Truck 809 Forcible Entry. Not only were
these gloves not on the “Approved PPE” list for the PG County Fire/EMS Department,
but they were not even certified to any viable NFPA standard. The gloves, pictured in
Figure 10, included a label stating that the gloves met Fed OSHA, Cal OSHA, and
NFPA 1973 (1988 edition). The Fed OSHA and Cal OSHA requirements were written in
the early 1980s and have been supplanted by the NFPA standards on protective
clothing. While voluntary, the NFPA standards set more rigorous requirements that
reflect the modern safety and protection needs of firefighters. Gloves that are designed
only to meet the Fed OSHA and Cal OSHA requirements cannot meet current NFPA
design and performance criteria for firefighter protective gloves. On the other hand, the
labeling of these gloves as complying with NFPA 1973 is problematic for several
reasons:
Identification Label Compliance Statement
Figure 10 – Content of Label inside Non-Compliant Gloves Worn by

Truck 809 Forcible Entry
 NFPA 1973 (1988) edition was replaced by 1997 edition of NFPA 1971 in early
1998. The standard is no longer valid.
 NFPA 1973-1988 had no requirements for third party certification as they exist
today and since 1991, third party certification has been required for firefighter
protective clothing indicated as compliant by a manufacturer to NFPA standards.
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Appendix 7
 The manufacturer for the gloves takes an exception to the NFPA 1973 standard
by excluding the water penetration resistance requirement. This permitted the
gloves to be made without a moisture barrier as is required in every other major
element of firefighter protective clothing by the NFPA 1971 standard.
It is uncertain how such gloves would have been obtained, but it appears that similarly
appearing gloves are currently offered on the manufacturer’s website, though it is
unknown what type of label is provided with the products identified on the website.
Without knowing the exact details of the third degree burns sustained by Truck 809
Forcible Entry on his hands, it is believed that the absence of the moisture barrier and
the related non-compliant nature of these gloves were contributory to Truck 809
Forcible Entry’s hand burns. The appendix for the last several editions of NFPA 1971
provides a detailed explanation for the importance of a moisture barrier for firefighter
gloves based on federally funded scientific research and other work provided in peer-
review journals.
Cleaning and Maintenance Issues – The review of care and maintenance records for
the subject gear also reveals that consistent procedures for the identification,
inspection, cleaning, and repair are not in place for the PG County Fire/EMS
Department. Specific instances were found where gear was not accounted for in the
department’s PPE tracking program as maintained by its independent service provider
(for inspection, cleaning, and repair). While the cleanliness of the gear prior to the fire
incident cannot be ascertained, it does not appear that the items owned by the
department are subject to a program of regular inspection, cleaning, and repair as
needed. The provided general orders on this subject do not institute specific frequencies
for conducting inspections and cleaning, though these procedures may be found in
other department SOPs.
The SCBA facepiece and other SCBA worn by the firefighters were not presented for
inspection. Each of the firefighters complained about the levels of visibility on the
fireground and some remarked of the particularly black, thick smoke emanating around
the structure. Some of the photographs provided for the SCBA facepieces worn by the
injured firefighters in this incident appeared to be heavily soiled, and this soiling would
have contributed to poor visibility. Truck 809 Officer specifically complained that his
facepiece failed, as he indicated that the regulator fell off as he tried to remove it
following his escape. He claimed it deformed and stuck to his gloved hand when he
went to take it off. It was for this reason that he stated that he did not wear his SCBA
facepiece in reentering the structure. It is presumed that a separate examination of the
SCBA involved in this incident is being conducted.
232
Appendix 7
Recommendations
As the result of this investigation, we recommend that the Prince George’s Fire/EMS
Department consider the following:
1. A program should be in place that accounts for all of the department-owned major
items of protective clothing and equipment, which at least includes protective coats
and protective pants.
2. If an item of clothing does not have a readable date of manufacture or serial

number, procedures should be in place to obtain a replacement label from the
manufacturer. This practice may not be practical for hoods, but separate tracking of
these items may assist in ensuring that items can be identified. When new items
are obtained by either the department or by individuals, the item, its model number,
serial number, and date of manufacture should be separately recorded.
3. All PPE provided to members should have a manufacture date that is 10 years or
less as indicated on the product label.
4. The department should conduct regular inspections of individually owned firefighter

protective clothing to determine that it is consistent with the department’s
“Approved PPE” list and in a serviceable condition.
5. If gear is found to be unserviceable, the department should designate this gear as

“compromised PPE” consistent with its general orders and ensure that item(s) are
properly disposed of such they cannot be used in actual incidents or live fire
training.
6. The department should determine how Truck 809 Forcible Entry acquired the non-
approved and non-compliant gloves he used in the fire incident and inform the
members in the department on the hazards for wearing gloves that do not have a
moisture barrier. It is important to point out to the members that wearing of gloves,
or other PPE, that is not independently certified may present hazards to their safety
and health. It should be further pointed out that gloves just meeting Federal OSHA
and Cal OSHA alone do not provide protection commensurate with the NFPA 1971
standard.
7. The SCBA used in this incident by the injured firefighters should be thoroughly
examined. Specific attention should be provided to Truck 809 Officer’s facepiece
and second stage regulator given the complaints about his SCBA provided in his
statement.
8. Instructions on the need and specific procedures for wearing of all personal
protective clothing and equipment should be provided to each member. It is
important to emphasize that all components must be deployed, and that all
elements of the ensemble should be properly closed. If members indicate problems
with any interface that leaves the interface area potentially exposed, corrections to
the ensemble or wearing practices should be implemented for that individual. The
233
Appendix 7
department should specifically instruct its members on the correct wearing of

helmet ear covers and protective coat collars for structural firefighting.
9. The department should include as part of its training that all members be aware of
the limitation for the protective capabilities of their protective ensemble, and how
burns may occur without warning under extended exposure conditions without any
apparent damage to the clothing item.
10. The department should institute as part of its PPE program, a system for regular
advanced inspections and cleaning of protective clothing at least on an annual
basis. This program should include recordkeeping practices that identify the item,
its serial number, the firefighter to which it is issued, the date of the service, details
of any inspection findings or repairs, and the individual responsible for the service.
If this responsibility is delegated to an independent service provider, then those
same requirements should be applied to the service provider. This program should
be implemented to be consistent with the requirements of NFPA 1851, Standard
on Selection, Care, and Maintenance of Protective Ensembles for Structural Fire
Fighting and Proximity Fire Fighting.
11. For the clothing directly examined as part of the investigation, these items of
clothing and equipment should be retained by the department because of its
involvement in a situation where injuries were sustained. We recommend that the
department retain the clothing and equipment for a period of at least 2 years with
an appropriate chain of custody. The clothing should be condemned and destroyed
after that period has elapsed.
12. A separate assessment should be made of the protective clothing used by the other
firefighters that were not provided for direct examination as to its continued
serviceability following the conclusion of this investigation. The same retention and
disposal recommendation should apply if it is determined that these items are no
longer serviceable.
Please contact us if you have any specific questions on this report.

Respectfully submitted,
Jeffrey O. Stull, President

International Personnel Protection, Inc.
Austin, Texas
Grace G. Stull, Vice President

International Personnel Protection, Inc.
Austin, Texas
234
APPENDIX 8 – GENERAL ORDERS
General Order 03-13 - Emergency Identifier Activation Procedure (10/11)
General Order 05-10 - Multiple Casualty Incident Operations (01/10)
General Order 06-01 - Fireground Standard Operating Procedure for Structural Fires
(01/10)
General Order 06-03 - 2-In-2 Out and Rapid Intervention (01/10)
General Order 06-04 - Mayday Procedure (10/11)
General Order 06-07 - Searching for Victims (01/10)
General Order 06-14 - Emergency Response Time (01/10)
General Order 08-17 - Respiratory Protection Program (01/10)
General Order 10-03 - Cleaning, Repair, Replacement, and Alterations of Personal

Protective Equipment (01/10)
235
FIRE/EMERGENCY MEDICAL SERVICES DEPARTMENT GENERAL ORDER
General Order Number: 03-13 Effective Date: October 2011

Division: Communication and Information Management/Technology
Chapter: Emergency Identifier Activation Procedure
By Order of the Fire Chief: Marc S. Bashoor Revision Date: N/A
POLICY
This General Order shall establish procedures for the prompt and appropriate handling of "distress
calls" via the Emergency Identifier.
DEFINITIONS
Hot Mic – A 10 second in duration open microphone on the fire department radio after the
activation of the Emergency Identifier.
PROCEDURES / RESPONSIBILITIES
1. Background
Emergency Identifier capability is a standard feature on Fire Department portable radio equipment.
It is designed to provide a rapid means to transmit a silent call for help when personnel are in
danger or in need of assistance.
In many cases, when such a situation exists, the sender is unable to include a verbal radio
transmission due to danger from adversaries, injury, or other limiting factors.
In spite of adverse factors, it is imperative that all "distress calls" via the Emergency Identifier be
handled promptly and appropriately. To accomplish this, the following procedures will be strictly
adhered to by all fire service personnel.
The Emergency Identifier is a very effective means to transmit a distress signal to Public Safety
Communications (PSC). It is, however, only effective when the location of the sender is known. On
emergency incidents, this information is normally available.
Portable radios are equipped with Global Positioning System (GPS) capability. This capability,
however, is only present when the radio is able to connect with a satellite. The radio does have the
ability to retain the last known GPS location prior to losing connection with the satellite.
In other situations, such as a stop to assist disable motorists or in cases that may involve a level of
risk, it is advisable for personnel who handle such matters to inform PSC of their location and
purpose.
If such procedures are followed, PSC personnel can quickly send help to personnel in trouble when
the Emergency Identifier signal is activated and the signal is confirmed.
Division 03– Communication and Information Management/Technology

Chapter 13 – Emergency Identifier Activation Procedure
Revision Date – N/A Page 1 of 3
2. Emergency Identifier Activation
When personnel are in a situation that poses danger to themselves or others, they shall activate the
Emergency Identifier by depressing the orange emergency button for 1 second. Upon receipt of the
trouble signal, PSC personnel shall immediately broadcast the following coded confirmation
transmission to verify the validity of the signal:
"Unit/individual radio ID number, verify EI status"
Example: "Engine 855, verify EI status"
NOTE: When PSC transmits the verification check, all other personnel will refrain from
noncritical radio transmissions or telephone contacts until the distress signal is confirmed or
canceled.
If within five (5) seconds no response is received from the individual or who activated the alarm,
PSC will repeat the message:
"Unit/individual radio ID number, verify EI status"
If within five (5) seconds there is no response to the second call, PSC will make the following
transmission, which indicates to the sender and to all Departmental personnel monitoring the radio
that the distress signal has been verified and help is being sent:
"Unit/individual radio ID number EI signal confirmed"
- REPEAT MESSAGE -
At this time, PSC will immediately notify the appropriate police agency to respond to the location
of the unit that activated the distress signal.
NOTE: At any time during the process, the unit/individual that transmitted the distress call may
cancel by doing so with a vocal radio transmission explaining the circumstances.
In the event of cancellation, PSC shall announce the following:
"Unit/individual radio ID number EI signal canceled"
- REPEAT MESSAGE IMMEDIATELY -
3. Personnel in the Vicinity of a Confirmed Distress Signal
Departmental personnel within the vicinity of, or responding to, the same call as the unit/individual
that activated the Emergency Identifier should attempt to assess the situation from a safe position.
If the situation requires assistance that they can safely provide, such as a vehicle accident, they
should:

• Proceed to the location.

• Provide aid.
• Notify PSC.
If the situation poses unusual danger to other personnel, they should:
• Remain at a safe distance.

• Update PSC via telephone or radio that cannot be monitored by others who may be
endangering the personnel who activated the Emergency Identifier.
4. Notification
Upon confirmation of a distress call, PSC will immediately make emergency notifications.
Departmental notifications shall be handled according to normal procedures after emergency
notifications have been completed.
5. Resetting the Emergency Identifier
On the current mobile (Motorola APX7500 ) and portable radios (Motorola APX6000/7000 Series)
depress and hold the orange emergency button for 2 seconds until a tone is heard. Release the
button and the radio will be in a normal operational mode.
REFERENCES
N/A
FORMS / ATTACHMENTS
Guide for Activating Emergency Identifier

General Order Number: 05-10 Effective Date: January 2010

Division: Emergency Medical
Chapter: Multiple Casualty Incident Operations
POLICY
This General Order provides operational guidance for Multiple Casualty Incidents (MCI). A MCI is
declared when the number of patients encountered severely taxes or exceeds normal Fire/EMS
Department resources. This plan intends to maximize effectiveness and efficiency regardless of size
or complexity of the incident.
DEFINITIONS
Blue Alert – When an EMS jurisdictional system is temporarily taxed to its limits in providing pre-
hospital care and ambulance transportation due to extraordinary situations such as multi-casualty
incidents, snow, icing, or flooding or other circumstances that contribute to high demand for
ambulance service, the jurisdiction may declare blue alert status which suspends yellow alert. The
jurisdiction’s EMS Program Manager or his designee shall declare a Blue Alert.
EMRC – Emergency Medical Resource Center - The EMRC medical channel radio
communications system links EMS providers in the field with hospital-based medical consultation.
Consultation facilities and multiple hospitals can be patched into a single consultation. The EMRC
plays a critical role that aids in ensuring a coordinated response to major incidents and catastrophic
events.
Medical Ambulance Bus (MAB) – An EMS unit designed to transport twenty (20) non-
ambulatory (immobilized) patients.
The department has one (1) Medical Ambulance Bus. Minimum staffing for this unit is three (3)
personnel. There are seven (7) Medical Ambulance Buses within the National Capital Region
(NCR).
Medical Care Support Unit (MCSU) – An EMS unit designed to carry supplies and equipment to
specifically address the resource needs of a multiple casualty incident (MCI). These units are
designed to rapidly deploy treatment areas and associated equipment.
The Department has two (2) Medical Care Support Units:
• MCSU 855 has the capability to address one hundred (100) patients
• MCSU 849 has the capability to address fifty (50) patients.
Division 05– Emergency Medical

Chapter 10 – Multiple Casualty Incident Operations
Minimum staffing for these units is three (3) personnel. Generally, the station where the unit is
assigned is responsible to meet the minimum staffing level. If the unit does not have three riding
positions, the station officer will determine what means will be used to transport the crew to the
scene. If this staffing level cannot be met with a single unit, additional units must be dispatched to
fulfill this requirement.
There are Medical Care Support Units deployed throughout the National Capital Region for over
1000 patients.
S.T.A.R.T. (Simple Triage and Rapid Treatment) - The triage method designated by the
Maryland Medical Protocols for Emergency Medical Providers (“Protocol”). S.T.A.R.T. is a thirty
(30) second assessment utilizing the following physiological signs:
• Respirations
• Perfusion
• Mental Status
Personnel performing this initial triage assessment will use Triage tape to identify findings.
S.T.A.R.T. findings
• Immediate (Red) – Patients with airway compromise or respirations over 30/minute, and or
capillary refill greater than two (2) seconds, and/or unconscious or unable to follow simple
commands
• Delayed (Yellow) – Patients with respirations under 30/minute, capillary refill less than two
(2) seconds, and is able to follow simple command
• Minor (Green) – Walking wounded, patients that require only minor medical intervention
• Deceased (Black) – Victims found pulse less and/or apneic after opening airway. No CPR
will be initiated during initial triage
Transportation Group (Transportation Group Supervisor) – The group that is responsible for:
• coordinating hospital capabilities

• assign patient transport destinations
• hospital communications, and
• transportation record keeping.
Treatment Group (Treatment Group Supervisor) – The group that is responsible for the overall
management of patient care in the Treatment Units. The Treatment Group Supervisor must:
• Request and maintain sufficient personnel and supplies to adequately treat expected patient
load.
• Maintain communications with the Transportation Group Supervisor and coordinate patient
movement out of the treatment areas.

• Ensure periodic reassessment of patients in the treatment area to ensure proper

categorization.
Triage Group (Triage Group Supervisor)

The group that is responsible to assess and prioritize patients and maximize effective patient
treatment and transportation. The S.T.A.R.T. method with triage tape will be used during initial
triage.
1. General
During a Multiple Casualty Incident (MCI), it is vital to establish the essential EMS groups as
needed within the established Incident Management System. These groups serve to effectively and
efficiently triage, treat, and transport patients from the scene to an appropriate medical facility,
according to their injuries or illnesses.
2. Dispatch
Public Safety Communications (PSC) or the Incident Commander may add a “Multiple Casualty
Incident (MCI) Task Force” to the initial assignment when information indicates, such as:
• Motor vehicle collision involving multiple patients, such as a commuter bus
• Passenger train collision/derailment
• Occupied building explosion/collapse
The Multiple Casualty Incident (MCI) Task Force includes:
• 4 BLS Ambulances
• 2 ALS Medic Units
• 1 Medical Care Support Unit (MCSU)
• 2 Engine Companies
• 2 EMS Officers
• 1 Battalion Chief
• Medical Ambulance Bus (MAB) will be dispatched on all incidents involving 20 patients or
greater.
3. Operations
The first unit to arrive on the scene establishes command and reports the following information:
• Type and/or cause of incident

• Any hazards present
• Approximate number of patients
• Area involved, including problems with scene access/egress

The first arriving EMS unit assumes the Triage Group and initiates triage procedures utilizing
S.T.A.R.T. Colored triage tape will be applied to each patient to indicate proper triage category.
Units assigned to the Triage Group must:
• Consider the potential for patient contamination. If patients are contaminated,

decontamination procedures must be completed prior to entering the treatment areas.
• Account for and retain all patients and potential patients
• Request additional resources, if needed.
o Two (2) providers for every twenty (20) patients is a guideline.
• Move all “Green Patients” to a secure and supervised treatment area, if not already done
• Triage all remaining patients where they are found
• Request sufficient personnel to begin moving all patients to designated treatment areas
Incident Command
The Incident Commander should establish an EMS Operations Group (or Branch). The EMS
Operations Group may consist of:
• Triage Group
• Treatment Group
• Transport Group
• EMS Staging
• EMS Supply Unit
• EMS Communications Unit
The EMS Operations Group should be assigned a separate radio channel for communication
purposes.
EMS Operations Group should have a separate staging area. All suppression and EMS units
assigned to the EMS Operations Group report to EMS Staging.
EMS Operations Group will contact EMRC for the following:
• Declare a Multiple Casualty Incident.

• Provide the type and approximate number of patients.
• Ensure area hospitals are notified
• Receive an initial assessment of each hospital’s patient capability
• Consider placing the County on a “Blue Alert” status.
• Consider designating an EMS Communications Unit who maintains appropriate
communications with hospital resources through EMRC.

Treatment Group
The primary objective of the Treatment Group is to treat and stabilize patients until transportation
is available.
The Treatment Group is established prior to moving triaged patients. Each Treatment Area should
be established while considering:
• Area away from hazards
• Anticipating patient loads by patient category
• Distance from the incident site
• Level ground
• Access/egress for transport units
Patients are brought to the Treatment Area through a single entry point where secondary triage is
performed and a MIEMSS/MWCOG Triage Tag is attached to each patient. A patient identifier
sticker from the tag will be placed next to the patient’s information on the Patient Tracking Form
upon arrival in the Treatment Area.
The Treatment Group will consist of three (3) units:
• Red Treatment Unit

• Yellow Treatment Unit
• Green Treatment Unit
Initial staffing for each Treatment Unit is:
• Red Treatment Unit – one (1) ALS unit, one (1) BLS unit, and one (1) engine company
• Yellow Treatment Unit – one (1) BLS unit, and one (1) engine company
• Green Treatment Area – one (1) engine company
Treatment Unit staffing should increase in anticipation of increases in patient load.
All EMS providers in the Treatment Units operate under the established protocols within the
Maryland Medical Protocols for EMS Providers. When a local jurisdiction declares an MCI, it is
extremely important to maximize patient care resources and reserve EMS communications for
emergent situations. Except for extraordinary care interventions, EMS providers may perform all
skills and administer medications within protocol. When the MCI condition is instituted, the
Exceptional Call box must be checked on the Patient Care Report (PCR).
Patients must be periodically re-assessed while in the Treatment Area.

The Treatment Group Supervisor:
• Determines the order of patient transfer based on secondary triage and reassessment
outcomes
• Coordinates patient transfers with the Transport Group Supervisor.
The Treatment Group Supervisor and Transport Group Supervisor document entry and exit of all
patients on a Patient Tracking Form utilizing the patient identifier stickers from the triage tag.
The Medical Care Support Unit officer is designated as the EMS Supply Group. Additional medical
supplies for Treatment Areas are through the Medical Supply Group.
No patients are permitted to leave the Treatment Area without the Treatment Group Supervisor’s
knowledge. Pediatric patients may only be released to verified immediate family member. Any
person attempting to remove a pediatric patient from the scene must show proof of identification
and be verified by a law enforcement officer.
Transport Group
The primary objectives of this group are:
• Maximize the effectiveness of transportation resources

• Monitor the status of all receiving hospitals
• Assign patients to transport resources
• Assign transportation destinations
• Account for all patients transported by completing Multiple Casualty Patient Forms.
The Transport Group Supervisor obtains hospital capabilities, including trauma or specialty beds
from the EMS Operations Group Supervisor. Once hospital capabilities are established, patients are
distributed as effectively as possible.
The Transport Group Supervisor coordinates with the EMS Operations Group and the EMS Staging
Officer to ensure adequate ground and MEDEVAC transportation resources are available. The
Transportation Group Supervisor must maintain an effective traffic pattern to avoid congestion and
potential transport delays. Law enforcement personnel may be requested to assist.
Patients are moved to the Transport Group based on triage priority and when appropriate transport
resources are available.
The Transport Group Supervisor:
• Documents the disposition of each patient to a transport unit and receiving hospital.
• Documents the hospital destination of each patient using the Multiple Casualty Patient
Tracking Form.

• Assigns the destination of all transport units.

• Provides all EMS/medical communications to receiving hospitals related to transport
information, unless an EMS Communications Unit is created.
• Establishing a helicopter landing zone, if appropriate
MCI Transport information includes:
• Unit destination
• Estimated time of arrival
• Triage category and triage tag number
• Age/Sex of patient
• Chief complaint
Staging
In the event of a multiple casualty incident, separate staging areas should be considered for those
units assigned to EMS tasks and those assigned for other suppression/rescue tasks. The EMS
Staging Manager reports to the EMS Operations Group and is responsible for:
• Planning the layout of staging area (consider immediate and future needs)
• Maintaining direct communications and coordination with the Transportation Group
Supervisor
• Establishing routes of travel for EMS transport units
• Request additional resources through command to maintain sufficient staffing levels and
transport capabilities throughout the incident
• Coordinate with EMS Supply Unit to establish a system to restock transport units, if
necessary
Temporary Morgue
The Morgue Group is established only if necessary. Its location must be away from the operational
areas and not readily available to the public or other patients. Only deceased patients that hinder
operations or victims that expire in the treatment area are transported to this area. Other deceased
patients encountered on initial triage are left undisturbed as part of the investigation.
Bodies will be covered with sheets when available. Access to the morgue area will be restricted to
authorized Fire/EMS personnel and law enforcement. The Morgue Group must maintain Patients
Tracking Forms as the other EMS Operations Groups to track patient disposition.
Termination
All Group Supervisors must ensure a complete patient accountability and disposition can be
constructed from their respective Patient Tracking Forms. When all victims have been accounted
for and/or transported to medical facilities, the EMS Operations Group Supervisor may notify

Incident Command and the incident can be downsized. At this time, a complete patient disposition
report will be forwarded to the Incident Commander.
Triage Resources
Unit Tags Tape Tarps

Fire 50 1/ea
EMS 50 1/ea
EMS Sup 50 1/ea 1 set
MCSU 200 4/ea 1 set/50 pt
MAB 200 4/ea
Batt Ch 50 1/ea
REFERENCES
Emergency Medical Protocols for Emergency Medical Services Providers
FORMS / ATTACHMENTS
Attachment #1 – Treatment Unit Patient Tracking Form
Attachment #2 – Transportation Unit Patient Tracking Form
Attachment #3 – START/Jump START Algorithm
Attachment #4 – Maryland/MWCOG Triage Tag


Division: Emergency Operations
Chapter: Fireground Standard Operating Procedure for Structural Fires
POLICY
This General Order establishes the standard operational guidelines for structural firefighting
operations and investigating potentially hazardous situations. These procedures are designed to
provide a framework for safe operations when dealing with structural fire incidents in common
residential, commercial and mercantile type buildings within Prince George’s County.
Units are assigned specific tasks based upon the type of incident and order of dispatch. All units are
required to complete the listed responsibilities based upon their position in the dispatch sequence.
Units that are responding out of position will communicate this to the other responding units. The
altering of assignments will be at the discretion of the responding command officer only.
DEFINITIONS
Command Officer – Career and Volunteer Chief Officers as established in General Order 01-03,
Chain-of-Command.
Commercial Building – buildings used for industrial, mercantile, storage or office use.
High-Rise Building – for the purpose of this order, any building that is over four floors in height
and is equipped with a fire department standpipe system that will be used for firefighting
operations.
Incident Commander (IC) – the individual who has established or assumed command and is in
control of all groups/divisions on an incident.
Multi-Family Dwelling – residential building containing more than one family unit under one roof.
Obvious Rescue – a building occupant that is visible to the fire/rescue personnel and is in
immediate danger of injury or death.
Secondary Water Supply – water supply that has been established from a source other than the
hydrant or static water supply utilized by the first arriving engine.
Single Family Dwelling – residential building containing one family unit under one roof.
Special Service – a truck company, rescue squad, quint operating as a truck company, or a rescue
engine operating as a rescue squad.
Division 06– Emergency Operations

Chapter 01 - Fireground Standard Operating Procedure for Structural Fires
Unit Officer-In-Charge (OIC) – company officer or highest-ranking individual in charge of a

specific unit (engine, truck, squad, ambulance, etc.), responding in the officer’s seat of the
apparatus.
1. General Provisions
The following provisions pertain to all types of alarms and building types and will be adhered to by
all personnel.
Crews shall operate in teams of two (2) or more with a portable radio
All personnel are responsible to make obvious rescues and ensure occupants are evaluated and
given appropriate emergency medical care.
Staging
• Level I Staging
Level I staging shall be used when sufficient personnel are inside the structure and an initial size up
is being conducted.
Units that are directed to Level I stage shall partially carry out the operational procedures
established in this General Order. This includes reporting to side Alpha or Charlie, establishing a
water supply, positioning aerial apparatus to use the aerial ladder, etc.
Personnel that are directed to Level I stage are not to enter the structure, advance attack hose lines,
ladder the building, etc. They are to remain with the unit, standing by, and be fully prepared to
complete the remainder of their operational responsibilities when directed to do so by the IC.
• Level II Staging
Level II staging shall involve establishing a specific area designated by the IC to gather additional
resources away from the scene but in close proximity (with less than a 3 minute response time) for
situations such as a hazardous materials incident, a mass casualty incident, or significant fire
involvement in a large or high occupancy structure, etc.
Level II staging shall also be used when the initial units responding directly to the scene need to
remain uncommitted until a size up and operational plan can be formulated by the IC.
Units that are directed to Level II stage at a specific location away from the scene but in close
proximity shall report directly there and remain uncommitted.

Personnel shall remain intact in crews and shall not become engaged in operational activity unless
directed to do so by the IC.
The first arriving engine OIC shall assume the Staging Group, until the Group is reassigned by the
IC or a command officer arrives in the staging area.
PSC shall ensure that responding units are aware of the exact location of the staging area and the
command/unit officer that is coordinating it.
Units in Staging and responding to the staging area shall be directed to an alternate radio channel
than the fire ground channel by PSC.
• Base Staging
Base staging shall involve establishing a specific area designated by the IC to gather additional
resources at a location that is away from the scene (within a 3 to 5 minute response time) for
situations that will require extended operations, significant rotation of crews, etc. The same
procedures established for Level II staging shall be followed for base staging.
• Additional Responding Units
Additional responding units, to include command officers, shall stage their apparatus uncommitted
and report to the IC for assignment. Unit officers should refrain from requesting assignments over
the radio. In no case should a unit or command officer “self-deploy”, except to remedy an
immediately demonstrable safety concern or to affect an obvious rescue. In such cases, the unit or
command officer shall immediately notify the IC of their actions.
Additional units responding on Task Force alarms or multiple alarms shall take no action, which
has not been specifically assigned to them by the IC.
Engine companies responding extra, or on additional alarms, shall not lay additional supply lines
unless directed to do so by the IC.
Standpipe and Sprinkler Systems
Standpipes shall be charged immediately to the required pressure for the reported fire location.
Sprinkler systems shall be charged immediately if they are part of the standpipe system.
Otherwise, they shall be charged and maintained at 125 PSI if:
• Smoke or flame is visible

• The water motor gong is ringing
• The OIC directs it to be done

The engine operator shall advise the IC when the system(s) has been charged.
Building Side/Quadrant/Exposure Designation System
This system has been established to uniformly identify particular building segments and exposures,
which will allow companies to carry out these operating procedures in a coordinated manner.
Building Sides (Refer to Figure 1)
• Side Alpha - This is normally the front or main entrance/access to the building and usually
the side bearing the building address. For buildings with an unusual configuration, side
Alpha will be identified by the first arriving unit, utilizing a suitable landmark (Refer to
Figure 2) such as the parking lot, swimming pool, boiler room, etc.
• Side Bravo - This is the left side of building when facing side Alpha.
• Side Charlie - This is the side opposite side Alpha.
• Side Delta – This is the right side of the building when facing side Alpha.
Building wings (Refer to Figure 2)
Where configuration is such that sides cannot be easily identified, the building will be broken down
into wings (see attachment drawings). Side Alpha will be identified utilizing landmark. The
remaining sides shall be identified by clockwise rotation similar to the above.
Quadrants (Refer to Figure 1)
The building interior shall be divided into quadrants A, B, C & D starting at the left front of side
Alpha and moving in a clockwise rotation.
The wings are to be broken down into quadrants when this will enhance safety and/or operations.
Floor numbers will identify building level.
Exposures
Corresponds to sides of building, i.e. building on side Bravo is exposure Bravo, etc.
2. EMS Units Responding on Assignments
Basic Life Support (BLS) Ambulance
BLS ambulances responding to “make up staffing” for suppression units shall position at a location
that does not hinder other responding units. Personnel shall report to, and operate with their
assigned company.

BLS ambulances dispatched on the call or dispatched on the working fire dispatch shall:
Position at a location in close proximity to the scene that does not hinder other responding
apparatus and allows a path of exit for emergency transport.
Establish a triage and treatment area on side Alpha equipped with:
• Aid bag
• Oxygen with airway management aids
• AED
• Cot with backboard
Report to the IC.
Evaluate any civilian occupant of the structure that either escaped or is removed/rescued.
Advanced Life Support (ALS) Ambulance
ALS ambulances dispatched on the call or dispatched on the working fire dispatch shall position at
a location in close proximity to the scene that does not hinder other responding apparatus and
allows a path of exit for emergency transport.
ALS personnel shall report to the IC, evaluate the scene, and be prepared to administer ALS care to
a patient without delay.
The ALS crew should bring a minimum equipment of:
• Aid bag
• Drug box
• Monitor
3. Street Alarm
1st Due Engine
Take steps to establish continuous water supply. This will normally be accomplished by use of a
forward or straight lay from the closest appropriate hydrant or water supply point.
Apparatus shall normally be positioned on side Alpha, but in a way that does not hinder the
responding special services space to accomplish their responsibilities.

Unit OIC shall complete an initial size-up and provide a brief radio return to include:
• Announce correct address

• Announce number of floors
• Announce type of construction
• Announce type of occupancy
• Announce conditions found, other pertinent information, and indicate the necessary level of
response, in accordance with General Order 06-05, Emergency Vehicle Fire/Rescue Operations
and Levels of Response.
• Establish or Pass Command per General Order 06-20, Incident Command System
Proceed to reported location to investigate and/or mitigate the hazardous situation.
2nd Due Engine
Ensure adequate and continuous water supply to 1st due engine. In instances where the 1st due
engine has secured their own water supply the apparatus of the 2nd due engine will be placed in a
position to provide an additional water supply.
OIC shall establish command, in accordance with General Order 06-20, if necessary, and assume
the role of IC until relieved by a command officer who has arrived on the scene.
Unless directed otherwise by the IC, the crew should stand-by and await further direction.
1st Due Truck
Position on side Alpha to provide ladders, lights, and ventilation.
Assist 1st due engine with investigating and mitigating the hazardous situation.
Special Service
Assume RIC duties.
4. Box Alarm - Single-Family Dwellings
1st Due Engine


• Announce conditions found and location of fire if known.
• Status of the occupants if known
Advance an attack hose line of sufficient GPM flow and length to the fire area capable of
confining, controlling, and/or extinguishing the fire. Include the tools and equipment needed to
complete this assignment.
See Special Note regarding Basement Fire as part of this Procedure
Conduct a primary search of the immediate fire area.
2nd Due Engine
OIC shall establish Command, in accordance with General Order 06-20, if necessary and assume
Ensure that the initial attack hose line from the 1st Due Engine has been advanced to the fire area
and is capable of confining, controlling, and/or extinguishing the fire. This includes but not limited
to removing hose kinks, feeding more attack hose line, or making up staffing for the 1st Due Engine
crew if understaffed.
Unless directed otherwise by the IC, the crew should advance an attack hose line to the area or
floor above the fire. Include the tools and equipment needed to complete this assignment.
3rd Due Engine
Establish a secondary water supply from a source not being used by the 1st due engine. This should
normally be accomplished by use of a forward or straight lay from an appropriate hydrant or water
supply point. This procedure shall be momentarily delayed if it will result in hindered access for the
responding special services.
Advance an attack line to Side Charlie of the structure. Unit OIC to provide and communicate to IC
an exterior size up to include:

• Number of floors on side Charlie

• Conditions present and location of fire, if known.
• Any rescue problems
• Is there a basement and is it involved in fire?
• Any other information that might need tactical consideration.
The attack hose line from the 3rd Due Engine shall be deployed in coordination with the IC to the
area or floor that is the most probable point of fire extension.
4th Due Engine
Ensure adequate and continuous water supply to 3rd due engine. In instances where the 3rd due
engine has secured their own water supply the apparatus of the 4th due engine will be placed in a
If needed, assist the 3rd Due Engine in the placement or advancement of their attack line. This
includes but not limited to removing hose kinks, feeding more attack hose line, or making up
staffing if understaffed.
Unless directed otherwise by the IC, the crew shall advance a back-up attack line to Side Alpha of
the structure,
1st Due Special Service
Position on side Alpha to provide special service duties including but not limited to ladders, lights,
and ventilation.
Ladder sides Alpha and Bravo to provide for the rescue/removal of occupants and for the safety of
operating personnel.
The crew and OIC shall report to the fire floor with the equipment needed for performance the
following duties:
• Primary Search in coordination with the first due engine.

• Forcible entry to support searches and hose line placement
• Utility control as necessary on the interior (Driver shall take care of exterior Utilities)
• Ventilation
• Opening for extension
• Salvage and overhaul
• A secondary search shall be completed once the fire is controlled, ventilation started and
lighting provided. Secondary searches should be completed by personnel not responsible
for the primary search.

Unit OIC shall assume Division supervision of the fire floor and report the following to the IC:
• Progress made
• Obstacles met
• Resources needed
2nd Due Special Service
Position apparatus in a way to enable personnel to provide special service duties including; ladders,
lights, and ventilation to side Charlie.
Ladder sides Charlie and Delta to provide for the rescue/removal of occupants and for the safety of
The crew and OIC shall report to the floor, or area above the fire with the equipment needed for
performance the following duties:
• Primary Search in coordination with the engine.

• Ventilation
Unit OIC shall assume Division supervision of the floor and report the following to the IC:
• Progress made
• Obstacles met
3rd Due Special Service
Establish RIC, which includes:
• Report to the IC
• Complete size-up
• Assemble tools
• Develop rescue plan
• Monitor radio channels
• Request additional resources through IC as necessary

5. Box Alarm - Multi-Family Dwellings
1st Due Engine

• Status of the occupants if known
• Ensure that sprinkler and/or standpipe connection(s) are covered by a responding engine
company
Advance an attack hose line of sufficient GPM flow and length to the fire area capable of
confining, controlling, and/or extinguishing the fire. Include the tools and equipment needed to
complete this assignment.
Note: The preferred advancement of the initial attack hose line in multi-family dwellings shall be
via the interior stairs to protect the means of escape for building occupants.
2nd Due Engine
OIC shall establish Command, in accordance with General Order 06-20, if necessary and assume

Unless directed otherwise by the IC, the crew should advance an attack hose line to the area or
floor above the fire. Include the tools and equipment needed to complete this assignment.
This attack hose line is normally advanced via the interior stairs and serves to confine, control,
and/or extinguish vertical fire extension on the floor or area above the fire.
Conduct a primary search of any interior area that the crew is assigned to.
3rd Due Engine
Establish a continuous water supply to side Charlie from a source not being used by the 1st due
engine. This should normally be accomplished by use of a forward or straight lay from an
appropriate hydrant or water supply point. This procedure shall be momentarily delayed if it will
result in hindered access for the responding special services.
Advance an attack line to Side Charlie of the structure. Unit OIC to provide and communicate to IC
an exterior size up to include:

• Conditions present and location of fire, if known
• Any other information that might need tactical consideration
area or floor that is the most probable point of fire extension.
4th Due Engine

Unless directed otherwise by the IC, the crew shall advance a back-up attack line to Side Alpha of
the structure.
Position on side Alpha to provide special service duties including but not limited to; ladders, lights,
and ventilation.
following duties:

• Ventilation
lighting provided. Secondary searches should be completed by personnel not responsible for
the primary search.
Unit OIC shall assume Division supervision of the fire floor and report the following to the IC:
• Progress made
• Obstacles met
Position on side Charlie to provide special service duties including but not limited to; ladders,
lights, and ventilation.
Ladder sides Charlie and Delta to provide for the rescue/removal of occupants and for the safety of
The crew and OIC shall report to the floor, or area above the fire with the equipment needed for

• Primary Search in coordination with the engine.

• Utility control as necessary on the interior (Driver shall assist first due special service driver
of taking care of exterior Utilities as needed)
• Ventilation
the primary search.
Unit OIC shall assume Division supervision of the floor or area above the fire and report the
following to the IC:
• Progress made
• Obstacles met
Establish RIC in accordance with General Order 06-03, which includes the following:
• Assemble tools
6. Basement Fire Procedure
At the first indication of fire in a basement or below grade area, the reporting unit shall contact IC.
A verbal announcement shall be made that the fire is in the basement.
The presence of lightweight floor components and truss systems shall immediately be
communicated to IC. Interior firefighting shall be immediately abandoned if these floor
components are burning, of at the first indication the floor is compromised.
The first due engine shall attempt to position the initial attack line at the top of the steps leading to
the basement and make an assessment as to the mode of attack on the fire.
If a “direct” mode of attack on the fire is warranted the line shall be advanced to the basement area.

• Direct attack via interior stairwell – “the attack line is taken directly down the interior
stairway to confine and extinguish the main body of fire.” (Consider good visual of the
stairs and/or the extent of the fire.)
If a “hold” mode of attack is warranted the line will be positioned to “hold-the-stairs”.
• Holding the steps – “the attack line is used to prevent vertical fire spread and protects crews
engaged in search and rescue operations.”
¾ If a door is present, keep it closed to minimize vertical travel of heat and smoke.
¾ If no door is present, prevent vertical fire spread with the use of the handline. Do not
direct stream down the stairwell while crews are operating in the basement.
¾ Position to protect the stairs while monitoring division conditions and means of egress.
The 3rd due engine will advance the attack hose line on side Charlie to the exterior doorway or
entrance to the basement. If no exterior doorway or entrance exists this must be relayed to
command. NO ATTACK ON THE FIRE SHALL COMMENCE WITHOUT APPROVAL FROM
THE INCIDENT COMMANDER.
• This line shall be used to attack the main body of fire in the basement if the “Hold the
Steps” attack is chosen. If there is no exterior entrance, the line may be used to knock down
the fire from a basement window or other opening. NO ATTACK ON THE FIRE SHALL
COMMENCE WITHOUT APPROVAL FROM THE INCIDENT COMMANDER.
7. Box Alarm - Commercial Buildings
The following standard operating procedures have been established to provide a consistent and safe
response and mitigation of structural fire emergencies involving commercial buildings.
1st Due Engine
Apparatus shall normally take a position on side Alpha, but in a way that does not hinder the


Advance an attack hose line capable of a minimum of 200 gallons per minute (GPM) and of
sufficient length to the fire area capable of confining, controlling, and/or extinguishing the fire.
Include the tools and equipment needed to complete this assignment.
Ensure that sprinkler and/or standpipe connection(s) are covered by a responding engine company
and charged to appropriate psi. if there is any indication of a working fire.
2nd Due Engine
engine has secured their own water supply, the 2nd due engine will supply any sprinkler/standpipe
connections as needed.
OIC shall establish Command, in accordance with General Order 06-20, if necessary, and assume
Unless directed otherwise by the IC, the crew should advance a back-up line to side Alpha capable
of a minimum of 200 gallons per minute (GPM) and of sufficient length to cover any location in the
building. Include the tools and equipment needed to complete this assignment.
3rd Due Engine
Establish a continuous water supply to side Charlie from a source not being used by the 1st due
engine. This procedure shall be momentarily delayed if it will result in hindered access for the
responding special services.
Unit OIC shall complete a size-up of side Charlie and provide a brief radio report to the IC to
include:


Unless directed otherwise by the IC, advance an attack hose line capable of a minimum of 200
gallons per minute (GPM) and of sufficient length to cover any location in the building. Include
the tools and equipment needed to complete this assignment.
area, floor or exposure that is the most probable point of fire extension.
Ensure that sprinkler and/or standpipe connection(s) are covered.
4th Due Engine
position to provide an additional water supply or will supply any sprinkler/standpipe connections
not covered.
Unless directed otherwise by the IC, advance an attack hose line capable of a minimum of 200
gallons per minute (GPM) and of sufficient length to cover any location in the fire building. Include
the tools and equipment needed to complete this assignment.
The attack hose line from the 4th Due Engine shall be deployed in coordination with the IC to the
area, floor or exposure that is the most probable point of fire extension not already covered by an
engine company.
and ventilation.
Ladder sides Alpha and Bravo to provide for the rescue/removal of occupants, for the safety of
operating personnel, and for access to the roof.
The crew and OIC shall report to the fire floor, or area, with the equipment needed for performance
the following duties:


• Ventilation
• Opening for Extension
the primary search.
Suspended or false ceilings shall be opened immediately, beginning at the entrance to any
occupancy, to examine for hidden smoke or fire extension.
Unit OIC shall assume Division supervision of the fire floor or area and report the following to the
IC:
• Progress made
• Obstacles met
Position on side Charlie to provide special service duties including but not limited to; ladders,
lights, and ventilation
Ladder sides Charlie and Delta to provide for the rescue/removal of occupants, for the safety of
operating personnel, and for access to the roof.
The crew and OIC shall report to the floor or area above the fire floor with the equipment needed
for performance the following duties:

• Ventilation
• Checking for Extension
• A secondary search shall be completed once the fire is controlled and ventilation is started.
This shall be completed by a crew other than the one who completed the primary.
Suspended or false ceilings shall be opened immediately, beginning at the entrance to any
occupancy, to examine for hidden smoke or fire extension.

In instances when the involved structure is a single story, the second due special service shall go to
the roof for ventilation and to determine the integrity of the roof. It is critical that all horizontal and
vertical ventilation is coordinated with the engine companies and IC
• Progress made
• Obstacles met
• Assemble tools
8. Box Alarm – Hi-Rise Building
1st Due Engine
Apparatus shall normally be positioned to take full advantage of building protective systems
including fire department connections and building enunciator panel.
• Announce correct address.

• Announce number of floors.
• Announce type of construction.
• Announce type of occupancy.
• Announce conditions found, other pertinent information and indicate the necessary level of
response, in accordance with General Order 06-05.
• Establish or Pass Command per General Order 06-20, Incident Command System.
• Ensure that sprinkler and/or standpipe connection(s) are covered by a responding engine
company.

Check building enunciator panel for location of fire.
Advance an attack hose line (standpipe pack) of sufficient GPM flow and at least 200 feet in length
to the fire area capable of confining, controlling, and/or extinguishing the fire. Include the tools
and equipment needed to complete this assignment.
Unit OIC shall complete an interior size up and provide a brief radio return to include:
• Interior conditions present and location of the fire, if known.

• Designations for stairwells (attack, evacuation, ventilation, etc.).
2nd Due Engine
Ensure adequate and continuous water supply to 1st due engine and/or that the sprinkler/standpipe
connection(s) have been covered.
The crew should report to the fire floor with a standpipe pack made up of an attack hose line
capable of flowing a minimum of 200 GPM and of at least 200 feet in length. Include the tools and
equipment needed to complete this assignment.
Unless directed otherwise by the IC, assist the 1st due engine crew as needed to ensure that the
initial attack hose line has been advanced from the standpipe riser to the fire area and is capable of
confining, controlling, and/or extinguishing the fire.
After the initial attack hose line is in position, advance a backup line capable of flowing a minimum
of 200 GPM (standpipe pack) from the same stairwell (different outlet) as the initial attack hose
line. This line will be used as a backup line for the first engine or to extinguish horizontal fire
spread on the fire floor.
3rd Due Engine
Establish a secondary water supply to the side opposite the 1st due engine. This procedure shall be
momentarily delayed if it will result in hindered access for the responding special services.
Unit OIC shall complete a size-up and provide a brief radio report to the IC to include:
• Number of floors

Unless directed otherwise by the IC, report to the floor above the fire with an attack hose line
(standpipe pack) of sufficient GPM flow and of at least 200 feet in length. Include the tools and
equipment needed to complete this assignment.
Advance the attack hose line (standpipe pack) from the same stairwell and riser outlet as the initial
attack line to confine, control, and/or extinguish vertical fire extension
4th Due Engine
Ensure adequate and continuous water supply to 3rd due engine and/or that the sprinkler/standpipe
connection(s) have been covered.
Report to the floor above the fire with an attack hose line (standpipe pack) capable of flowing a
minimum of 200 GPM and of at least 200 feet in length. Include the tools and equipment needed to
complete this assignment. This line will be used as a backup line for the first engine or to
extinguish horizontal fire spread on the fire floor.
Assist the 3rd due engine crew as needed to ensure that the initial attack hose line on the floor
above the fire has been advanced from the standpipe riser to the fire area and is capable of
confining, controlling, and/or extinguishing the vertical fire extension.
and ventilation.
following duties:

• Ventilation in coordination with the IC (includes shutting down HVAC for entire building)

Unit OIC shall assume Division supervision of the fire floor or area and report the following to the
IC:
• Progress made
• Obstacles met
Position on side Charlie to provide ladders, lights, and ventilation.
Ladder sides Charlie and Delta, to provide for the rescue/removal of occupants and for the safety of
Gain control of building elevators and search elevator cars for victims.
The crew and OIC shall report to the floor above the fire floor with the equipment needed for

• Ventilation in coordination with the IC (includes shutting down HVAC for entire building)
• Progress made
• Obstacles met
• Assemble tools


For hi-rise operations, the RIC shall be staged on the floor below the fire.
9. Responsibilities
The first arriving unit OIC shall be responsible for reporting on the scene, initiating the IMS as
outlined in General Order 06-20, and indicating the necessary level of response, in accordance with
General Order 06-05.
Each Company/Unit Officer shall be responsible for:
• Supervision and control of personnel under his/her command.

• The safety and welfare of personnel under his/her command.
• Instituting the appropriate level of accountability in accordance with General Order 06-06,
Personnel Accountability Procedures.
• Reporting conditions found and progress being made to the IC or appropriate
Division/Group supervisor.
• Maintaining communications with the IC or appropriate Division/Group supervisor and
providing personnel accountability at 20-minute intervals.
Each Division/Group/Branch Officer shall be responsible for:
• The safety and welfare of personnel under his/her command.

• Supervision and control of personnel under his/her command.
• Maintaining the appropriate level of accountability in accordance with General Order 06-06.
• Reporting conditions found and progress being made to the Incident Commander.
• Maintaining communications with the IC, and providing personnel accountability at 20-
minute intervals.
The IC shall be responsible for:
• The safety and welfare of all personnel.

• Ensuring all orders and procedures are followed.
• Providing an update on the current conditions within ten minutes that includes:
¾ Confirmation of correct address
¾ Approximate size and type of occupancy
¾ Severity of conditions
¾ Units to be held
• Providing a progress report every 20 Minutes that includes the severity of the conditions,
current strategy, and progress.

REFERENCES
N/A
FORMS / ATTACHMENTS
Attachment #1 – Building Sides & Wings


Chapter: 2 In, 2 Out and Rapid Intervention
POLICY
A procedure for the deployment and operations of personnel when functioning as a member of the
Rapid Intervention Crew (RIC) or 2 In, 2 Out crew. In accordance with NFPA 1500, Sec. 6-5, and
OSHA 29 CFR 1910.134, the Prince George’s County Fire/EMS Department shall maintain a safe
practice of 2 In, 2 Out structural firefighting and operations in Immediately Dangerous to Life and
Health (IDLH) atmospheres. To further support the Department’s responsibility for personnel
safety, a Rapid Intervention Crew (RIC) shall be established while engaged in interior structural
firefighting and other IDLH or oxygen deficient atmospheres for the rescue of firefighting
personnel.
DEFINITIONS
2 In, 2 Out – is a term used to describe an initial entry and standby team. The initial entry team (2
In) shall consist of two firefighters operating in a hazardous area or an IDLH atmosphere. The
standby team (2 Out) shall consist of two firefighters outside of the hazardous area or IDLH
atmosphere in accordance with OSHA 29 CFR 1910.134.
Initial Entry Team – is at least two personnel equipped with full protective clothing and qualified
to participate in interior structural firefighting. These personnel must maintain constant visual
and/or voice contact with each other while entering into the IDLH atmosphere.
Initial Stages of an Incident – includes the period of an incident where tasks are being undertaken
by the first arriving company with an initial entry team assigned or operating in the hazardous area.
Rapid Intervention Crew (RIC) – is a crew specifically designated by the Incident Commander at
the scene of an emergency beyond the initial stages, consisting of a minimum of four personnel,
one preferably being a Company Officer. The RIC shall be available for the rescue of firefighters
should the need arise. Depending on the size and complexity of the incident, the Incident
Commander shall establish one or more RICs. The RIC normally replaces or enhances the standby
team, which was required during the initial stages of the incident.
Interior Structural Firefighting – is the physical activity of fire suppression, rescue or both,
inside of buildings or enclosed structures which are involved in a fire situation beyond the incipient
stage (fire growth beyond the first material ignited).
Immediate Danger to Life and Health (IDLH) - is an atmosphere that poses an immediate threat
to life, would cause irreversible adverse health effects, or would impair an individual’s ability to
escape from a dangerous atmosphere.

Chapter 03 -2 In, 2 Out and Rapid Intervention
Known Life Hazard – is circumstances where responding personnel hear or see a person in
distress, or receive reliable information from Public Safety Communications (PSC) or a bystander
that someone is in the IDLH atmosphere.
Mayday – is a radio term used to alert the Incident Commander or other persons on the emergency
scene that personnel are in an imminent life-threatening situation.
Oxygen Deficient Atmosphere – is an atmosphere with an oxygen content below 19.5% by

volume.
Personnel Accountability Report (PAR) – is a term used to report the location, status, and
welfare of personnel assigned to a given crew.
Standby Team – is at least two personnel who observe the initial entry team entering into the
IDLH atmosphere and are available, trained, and equipped (including full protective clothing and
SCBA) for immediate response to rescue the initial entry team. One of these individuals must
maintain contact with the initial entry team visually, verbally, by signal line, or by radio. The
second individual of the standby team may be assigned to other duties (Incident Commander,
wagon driver, aid station, etc.).
1. 2 In, 2 Out
The 2 In, 2 Out procedures shall be implemented during the initial stages of any operation within an
IDLH atmosphere. When the first arriving unit does not have sufficient personnel to implement 2
In, 2 Out, the second due engine shall be responsible to establish and maintain the 2 Out crew until
relieved or reassigned by the Incident Commander. No operations in an IDLH atmosphere shall
commence until 2 In, 2 Out is implemented, unless there is a known life hazard. Officers making
the initial decision of entry, which is not in compliance with 2 In, 2 Out, may be required to justify
his/her initial actions.
The 2 In, 2 Out procedure is for the protection of the initial entry team(s) and shall be maintained
until the RIC is in service and the standby crew is reassigned by the Incident Commander.
2. Rapid Intervention Crew
The Prince George’s County Fire/EMS Department has implemented the RIC procedure as a
standard practice for all emergency incidents having more than one team operating in a hazardous
or IDLH atmosphere. There is a distinct difference between the 2 In, 2 Out and the RIC, and they
should not be confused. Regardless of which unit is assigned at the RIC, the 2 IN, 2 Out
requirement must be maintained by the standby crew on the scene until the RIC is ready to assume
the RIC responsibilities unless there is a known life hazard.

A RIC shall be established anytime one of the following conditions exist:
• Structure fire where SCBA and 1 ½” hose line (or larger) will be used.
• Personnel are operating inside of an IDLH or potentially IDLH atmosphere.
• Incidents with the possibility of collapse or entrapment of personnel.
• Incidents where personnel might become lost or disoriented.
• When deemed necessary by the Incident Commander.
It shall be the responsibility of the Incident Commander to ensure the RIC has been established and
is in place. The rescue squad or 3rd due ladder truck dispatched on the alarm shall be responsible
for the RIC. When the rescue squad is needed for other operations due to arrival sequence or other
factors, the Incident Commander shall ensure that the RIC duties are assigned to another
responding special service.
The RIC shall only be used for duties related to the safe evacuation and rescue of public safety
personnel. The Incident Commander shall request additional uncommitted resources if it appears
that the incident is escalating and additional personnel may be needed. The RIC shall remain in
close view or radio contact at all times and shall only carry out those assignments given by the RIC
officer at the direction of the Incident Commander. On certain incidents, the RIC may be placed in
a forward position to provide quickest access to the personnel operating in the hazard area. Such
as:
• The floor below the fire on all high-rise or mid-rise building fires.
• Near the point of entry for personnel on large buildings such as shopping centers, schools,
or warehouses.
• When deemed appropriate by the Incident Commander or RIC officer.
Duties and Responsibilities
The Incident Commander/Operations Officer shall maintain an awareness of the location and
function of all Division/Group/Sector Officers. Division/Group/Sector and Company Officers shall
know the exact location and function being performed of each unit and all personnel under their
command. All personnel within the IDLH area are to ensure that their PASS device is operational
and on by using their SCBA. They shall operate in teams of at least two personnel, one of which
has a portable radio.
It shall be the responsibility of all crews to monitor changes in the stability and condition of the
structure throughout the operation. Any changes (i.e., missing stairways, holes in the floor, open
elevators, partial structural collapses, etc.) that could cause harm to the firefighters must be
reported to the Incident Commander/Operations Officer. Safety hazards shall be communicated to
all personnel via radio, and shall be roped off, blocked or a firefighter should be assigned (if safe to
do so) to the area to deny entry.

Upon arrival on the scene, the RIC Officer shall meet face-to-face with the Incident
Commander/Operations Officer and be briefed on:
• The current plan of action that is in place.

• The location of all companies and Division/Group/Sector Officers operating within the
structure.
• The location of the fire and possible areas of extension.
A copy of the building preplan shall be provided for the RIC by a member of the first due crew and
a complete exterior assessment shall be conducted by a member of the crew to ensure familiarity
with the building and identification of specific hazards, conditions, and obstructions. A complete
size up shall be completed by the RIC officer. This shall include:
• Size/height of building
• Type of construction
• Occupancy
• Location of fire
• Location and number of operating personnel
• Points of entry and exit
The RIC officer shall remain in close view or radio contact with the Incident Commander at all
times. He/she shall be responsible for developing the rescue plan based on the information
provided during the briefing and size up. He/she will be responsible for ensuring that the Incident
Commander is aware of any additional resources necessary to implement the rescue plan without
delay.
The RIC officer shall be prepared to brief the Incident Commander and/or provide the rescue plan
in writing if directed to do so. The rescue plan must ensure that sufficient egress is provided to the
interior crews as soon as possible. This shall include ensuring at least one ladder is at each floor
near the fire area, window bars are removed, door gates are opened, or any other obstruction to the
swift evacuation of the building is addressed. When possible, the RIC shall not be used to
accomplish these tasks if it will result in fatigue and an inability to carry out strenuous rescue
efforts, which may be required.
The RIC officer shall be responsible to ensure that each member of the RIC has been briefed on the
rescue plan and that each member understands their individual assignments.
The following resources will be compiled by the RIC at all working structural fires:
• Sufficient personnel to implement the plan.

• Spare SCBA with facepiece
• An uncommitted hose line
• Sufficient ground ladders
• 125’ life line

• Forcible entry tools (flathead axe, haligan bar, rabbit tool, bolt cutters), lights, power saws,
and other equipment deemed necessary
• One portable radio for each two-person team
After compiling the minimum resources noted above, the RIC shall work with the Incident
Commander to obtain any other specialized equipment needed; stokes basket, hydraulic rescue
tools, air bags, torches, collapse equipment, rappelling equipment, etc.
The RIC officer and personnel shall have a minimum of two portable radios. The RIC officer will
be responsible for monitoring the radio for a mayday or other distress/safety messages, progress
reports, changes in the interior and exterior conditions, urgent messages, etc.
Deployment of the Rapid Intervention Crew
When a swift rescue or recovery cannot be affected by interior crews, the Incident Commander
shall notify PSC and deploy the RIC to the last know or reported location of the lost, trapped, or
missing firefighter(s). The RIC officer shall obtain as much information as possible regarding the
exact nature and problem and implement the rescue plan with any adjustments necessary. This
includes determining how many firefighters are involved and if they are:
• Missing, lost, trapped, cut off by fire

• Injured or require immediate medical attention
• In need of immediate SCBA equipment
To assist in obtaining the above information, the acronym “LUNAR” shall be used.
• L Location (last known location including floor number, quadrant, etc.)

• U Unit (identification of the crew and their unit or sector assignment)
• N Name (name of the individuals that need rescue or recovery)
• A Assignment (the last known assignment given to the individuals)
• R Resources needed (what equipment is needed to implement the rescue plan)
PSC shall make a radio transmission with an alert tone on the operations channel, call for radio
silence, and announce to all units that the RIC has been deployed. The transmission shall include
the reason given by the Incident Commander, the last known location, unit number, name and
assignment of the missing or trapped firefighter(s).
If it becomes necessary, a Rapid Intervention Task Force shall be requested by the Incident
Commander upon the activation of the RIC. Resources requested shall conform to the need for
establishing an additional RIC; EMS units commensurate with the number of possible victims, fire
units for replaced of exhausted crew, etc.

The Incident Commander shall establish a Rescue Group, normally this will be assumed by the RIC
officer. He/she shall communicate progress being made by the RIC, any changing conditions on
the interior, progress being made, and other resources needed.
The Incident Commander shall be the only one with the authority to cancel a RIC rescue operation.
He/she shall contact PSC, which shall make a radio transmission that the RIC rescue operation has
been canceled and that normal operations are continuing, all units are to resume normal radio
operations.
REFERENCES
N/A
FORMS / ATTACHMENTS
N/A

General Order Number: 06-04 Effective Date: October 2011

Chapter: Mayday Procedure
POLICY
This General Order shall establish a procedure for personnel to utilize to alert Command that an
imminent life-threatening situation exists.
DEFINITIONS
Mayday - term used to alert the Incident Commander or other persons that personnel are in an
imminent life-threatening situation.
Mayday Alert Tone - a distinct audible signal broadcast for 5 seconds over operational incident
talkgroups by Public Safety Communications (PSC) to notify personnel that a MAYDAY has been
declared.
Personnel Accountability Report (PAR) or Roll Call - a term used to track and report the
location, status, and welfare of personnel
Rapid Intervention Crew (RIC) - a crew (unit) specifically designated by the Incident
Commander, in accordance with General Order 06-03, whose sole responsibility is the rescue of
members in distress.
1. Declaring a MAYDAY
When personnel operating on the scene of an emergency incident find themselves in a life
threatening situation and require immediate assistance, they shall instantly declare a MAYDAY.
Declaration of a MAYDAY shall be limited to only those situations which demand immediate
action by on scene resources to come to the aid of a distressed member. Examples would include:
• Personnel trapped or entangled

• Personnel lost
• Personnel out of air
• Serious medical emergency
Radio equipped members shall declare a MAYDAY by transmitting a verbal message over the
operational incident talkgroup. The message shall begin with “MAYDAY, MAYDAY,
MAYDAY” and immediately followed by:

Chapter 04 - Mayday Procedure
WHO - is calling the MAYDAY

WHAT - is the problem
WHERE - is the location
The acronym LUNAR can be used to guide members in providing important information:
L - location
U - unit
N - name
A - assignment
R - resources
Personnel calling a MAYDAY must make certain that the MAYDAY is acknowledged. If no
acknowledgement is received personnel should utilize the Emergency Identifier (EI) function of the
portable radio.
Depressing the EI button on the top of the portable radio will transmit an emergency alert over all
radio frequencies to alert PSC an emergency situation exists. Personnel must give a verbal message
as listed above and receive an acknowledgement.
When non-radio-equipped members find themselves in a MAYDAY situation they must alert their
partner, officer, division/group supervisor or any other member in the vicinity of the situation. The
Personal Alert Safety System (PASS) is to be activated to alert members that an emergency
situation exists.
2. Public Safety Communications actions/responsibilities
The monitoring of operational incident talkgroups by the PSC dispatcher is an essential component
of firefighter safety. Any time that a PSC dispatcher recognizes that an emergency situation exists
they are to immediately notify the IC.
In the event that a MAYDAY is transmitted by a unit and not acknowledge by the IC, the PSC
dispatcher shall attempt to contact the unit calling and alert the IC that an emergency situation
exists.
In the event that an EI has been activated from a fireground unit, PSC shall immediately notify the
IC and take action to identify the unit involved.
As soon as a MAYDAY has been declared, PSC shall dispatch a RIC task force in accordance with
General Order 06-03 and identify an additional talkgroup for the IC.
PSC shall designate a dispatcher to the sole responsibility of monitoring the channel the MAYDAY
was called on. The dispatcher shall assist the IC and ensure pertinent information is acknowledged.
At the conclusion of the MAYDAY event PSC will make an announcement on all radio channels
and return to normal operational mode.

3. Command actions/responsibilities
Upon receipt of a MAYDAY the Incident Commander (IC) shall immediately acknowledge the
unit/person calling and ascertain the following information:

The IC will shall repeat the information back to ensure confirmation and accuracy. After
acknowledging the MAYDAY Command will request that the MAYDAY alert tone be transmitted
by PSC. PSC shall transmit the alert tone over the operational incident talkgroup, talkgroup 1, and
talkgroup 2.
At the conclusion of the MAYDAY alert tone, the IC will announce that a MAYDAY has been
declared for:

IC shall deploy the RIC based upon an established action plan (WHO; WHAT; WHERE) and in
accordance with General-Order 06-03. Appropriate deployment is generally considered to be:
• Reported location
• Last known Location
• Most hazardous area first
If units on the incident were operating on any of the alternate talkgroups, within the specific
incident group (i.e. talkgroup 4or 5), the IC must make the MAYDAY announcement on the
appropriate announcement talkgroup (i.e. talkgroup 6).
• IC is to request additional resources as appropriate.

¾ A RIC Task-Force is to be dispatched in accordance with General-Order 03-11.
¾ Ensure appropriate level of EMS resources is available for potential number of victims.
¾ Ensure sufficient resources to maintain suppression efforts.
• IC must control the fireground communications.

¾ Non-essential radio traffic is to cease
¾ Members in distress should not be expected to switch radio channels.
¾ Assign officer to monitor the talkgroup the MAYDAY was called on.
¾ Operational units are to be assigned an alternate talkgroup by PSC.
¾ Face-to-face communications should be utilized with-in groups and divisions

• Expand the Incident Management System (IMS)

¾ As a minimum, the functional areas of suppression and RIC (rescue) must be separated.
¾ Additional Branches, Divisions and Groups shall be established based upon the needs
and the anticipated needs of the incident. Consideration should be given to the
following:
o EMS
o Staging
o PIO
o CISD
o Family/Survivors Support
The IC shall complete a PAR as soon as possible. The PAR should not be done over the talkgroup
at a time that would be a detriment to the MAYDAY event. PAR’s at the division/group level
should be conducted immediately and through face-to-face communication.
Upon confirmation that the MAYDAY issue has been resolved, and after a complete PAR has been
conducted, the IC will clear the MAYDAY and return units to a normal operating mode.
After the MAYDAY event has been cleared the IC will reassesses the incidents priorities and make
any needed adjustments to the incident action plan. The adjustments to the incident action plan and
the current operational mode shall be communicated to all branches, divisions and groups.
4. Division/Group/Unit Supervisor actions/responsibilities
Officers operating on the scene of any emergency must ensure close accountability of personnel
and/or units (resources) under their command. Officer must be prepared to give an accurate
accountability report at any time.
When a MAYDAY has been declared all officers must adhere to operational discipline and keep
assigned personnel and/or units under control. Personnel and/or units must not freelance into the
rescue effort.
• Officers must be aware, and listen for a change in talkgroup assignments and switch to the
correct talkgroup.
Division/Group/Unit supervisors shall ensure that any rescue or search for distressed member(s) is
a coordinated effort at the authorization of the IC.
Only crews in direct physical contact with distressed member(s) may engage in any rescue effort.
Division/Group/Unit supervisors shall immediately account for all assigned members. This should
be accomplished by face-to-face contact leaving the radio frequency clear for emergency traffic.
• If personnel and/or units are unaccounted for the IC must be notified immediately.

• If personnel and/or units have been accounted for the officer will give the report when
called for.
Division/Group/Unit supervisors shall ensure that operational assignments are carried out and
suppression efforts are maintained.
5. All Operating Personnel actions/responsibilities
Every member working on the scene of an emergency incident must ensure that accountability is
maintained at the unit level. Personnel must keep their direct supervisor apprised of their current
location and progress.
• Each member is responsible to work in pairs/groups.

• Every group and/or pair must be radio equipped.
• Every effort must be made to not become separated.
When a MAYDAY has been declared, every member must adhere to operational discipline not
freelance into the rescue effort.
• Members must be aware, and listen for a change in the talkgroup assignment and switch to
the correct talkgroup.
When a MAYDAY has been declared each member shall immediately report to their assigned
officer for accountability. This should be accomplished by face-to-face contact when-ever possible,
leaving the radio frequency clear for emergency traffic.
If the member’s officer is unaccounted for, the IC must be notified immediately.
REFERENCES
N/A
FORMS / ATTACHMENTS
N/A


Chapter: Searching for Victims
POLICY
The Department shall establish a system for conducting searches and documenting searched areas
at a structure fire.
DEFINITIONS
Primary Search – is a rapid, thorough, systematic search that is performed to locate and remove
occupants before the fire has been declared under control.
Secondary Search – is a systematic search that is conducted after the fire has been declared under
control. Ventilation and sufficient lighting shall be introduced into the structure. A different
company or companies than those involved in the primary search activities will complete the
secondary searches. The secondary search will include the entire fire structure and all exposure
buildings.
Search/Guide Ropes – are ropes deployed for the primary purpose of ensuring firefighters
assigned to search operations will be able to return to their entrance/anchor point.
Systematic Search – is a search technique deployed to ensure that a designated area has been
completely and methodically searched.
Thermal Image Camera – is a device that translates a thermal picture into an electrical picture,
and then a visual image for the human eye. This is accomplished because it relies on the thermal
energy emitted by all objects and not on reflected visible light. Thermal Imagers provide vision
capability with zero light present.
Search Communications – is the key to ensuring and documenting that a meticulous search of a
structure has been completed. Communications must take place verbally (face-to-face) or via
radio, or written utilizing a marking system.
1. General
Personnel directed to perform search operations shall be properly trained in search and rescue
techniques, and shall have reviewed and practiced the procedures found herein
Primary and secondary searches will be completed within all structures where an Immediately
Dangerous to Life and Health (IDLH) atmosphere exists.
Chapter 07 - Searching for Victims
Members entering an IDLH atmosphere will don all personal protective equipment, including self-
contained breathing apparatus.
The officer in-charge of the search team is responsible for performing a rescue related size-up,
identifying the fire’s location, all means of entrance and egress, and communicating the search and
rescue plan to the search team.
Companies engaging in search operations will deploy in teams of at least two (2) personnel. Each
search team will be equipped with a minimum of a Department radio, hand lights, hydraulic
forcible entry tool, set of irons, and a rope (personal or rope bag). Units that are equipped with a
thermal imaging camera will utilize the camera while performing searches.
When a victim is encountered, the search team officer will notify the Division Supervisor,
announce the route of egress, and ensure that appropriate emergency medical care is initiated.
When companies assigned to either the primary or secondary search group encounter and remove
victims, the Incident Commander must assign another company to continue/complete the search.
2. Basic Search Process
Primary search of the structure shall be prioritized in the following order, unless conditions dictate
otherwise:
• The fire area

• The area adjacent to the fire area
• Floor above the fire
• Other areas (stairwells, elevators, balconies, etc.)
Personnel conducting a search should be cognizant of the following:
• Occupants will normally exit through their normal means of egress when presented with an
emergency situation.
• Check behind doors and underneath windows.
• Children have a tendency to hide when faced with an emergency situation.
Units performing the searches in stairwells and elevators are searched will place the appropriate
markings at the lobby level entrance of the stairwell and elevators.
3. Large or Open Area Searches
When searching large open spaces, multi-family dwellings, or when a search/guide rope is being
utilized, the Incident Commander will assign a search group supervisor. The search group
supervisor will be responsible for ensuring that a systematic primary and secondary search has been
completed in all areas of the structure. Before declaring the incident mitigated, the search group

supervisor will be responsible for entering the structure and verifying that all areas have been
marked as searched, and shall report findings to the Incident Commander.
Search/guide ropes will be deployed on all searches of large, open, or congested spaces, or when
deemed necessary by the unit officer, division/group supervisor, or the Incident Commander.
Incident Commanders will ensure that when units are deployed to search large open spaces, or
when a search/guide rope is being utilized, a thermal imaging camera is placed in operation by the
search teams.
The search line should be secured to a fixed object at the search team’s entry point. In addition to
the search line, light(s)/strobe(s) may be placed at the entry point to provide the search crew a point
of reference.
4. Progress Reports and Documentation
Communicating the progress of a search is vital to documenting and ensuring that all areas within a
structure have been searched. Progress reports should include the name of the unit completing the
search, the type of search, the division that has been searched, and search results.
Example: Division 3 to command – “Truck 1 has completed a primary search of Division 3, search
is negative.” When a victim is located, the search team will include the location of the victim and
the route of egress.
To reduce radio traffic, unit officers should make every effort to provide the required search
information to their division/group supervisor face-to-face. The supervisor will then inform
command.
A marking system will be utilized to document all searches in high occupancy dwellings and large
commercial buildings, or when deemed appropriate by the division/group supervisor and/or
Incident Commander. The search teams will utilize a lumber crayon to write the status of the
search on the wall adjacent to the doorknob.
Units initiating a primary search will write their station number as they enter the unit on the wall
adjacent to the doorknob to indicate that personnel are currently conducting a primary search of the
area. After completing the primary search, the officer-in-charge of the primary search team will
write a “P” next to their station number to indicate that the primary search has been completed.
Units initiating a secondary search will write their station number upon entering the unit to be
searched on the wall adjacent to the doorknob to indicate that personnel are currently conducting a
secondary search of the area. After completing the secondary search, the officer-in-charge of the
secondary search team will write an “S” next to their station number to indicate that the secondary
search has been completed.

Example: When Truck 876 completes the primary search and TK880 completes the secondary
search on apartment T-2, the following markings will be written adjacent to the doorknob:
T-2
TK876P
TK880S
Structures not qualifying for implementation of the Department’s marking system should be
searched following criteria established in this General Order, and shall be documented verbally and
by the traditional methods (example: mattresses, furniture overturned and repositioned).
5. Responsibilities
The Incident Commander, Division Supervisor, and Unit Officer will each be responsible for:
• Supervision and control of personnel under his/her command
• The safety and welfare of personnel under his/her command
The Incident Commander will be responsible for:

• Verifying that a systematic primary and secondary search has been completed within all
addresses involved in the incident.
• Ensuring that Stairwells, elevators, and balconies are searched.
The Division Supervisor will be responsible for:

• Ensuring that a systematic primary and secondary search has been completed within the
division being supervised.
• Ensuring proper documenting of the progress of their search
• Providing the Incident Commander with timely search status reports
The Unit Officer will be responsible for:

• Ensuring that primary or secondary searches are conducted in a systematic manner as
outlined herein
• Providing the appropriate supervisor with search progress reports
REFERENCES
N/A
FORMS / ATTACHMENTS
N/A


Chapter: Emergency Response Time
POLICY
To establish response time goals and objectives to ensure the prompt dispatch, response, and arrival
of emergency apparatus to all calls for service.
DEFINITIONS
Alert – the primary means utilized by Public Safety Communications (PSC) to notify a station of a
call for service by activating the station alerting system and pagers, and announcing the call over
the radio. Station alerting shall be done in accordance with General Order 3-18, Radio System Use
and Alerting.
Call Intake Time – the elapsed time from when a call for service is answered (by a 911 call-taker)
and the time the call is entered into the Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD) system.
Call Processing Time – the elapsed time from when a call for service is answered (by a 911 call-
taker) and the time the appropriate units are dispatched, which is the cumulative time of call intake
time and dispatch time.
Dispatch Time – the elapsed time from when a call is entered into the CAD system and the time
the appropriate unit(s) are alerted.
On-scene – term used by unit officer to notify PSC of their arrival at the address or incident
location to which they were dispatched.
Responding - term used by unit officer to notify PSC that a unit dispatched has begun their
response as defined by wheels rolling.
Response Time – the elapsed time from when a call for service is answered (by 911 call-taker) and
the time the first unit arrives on the scene, which is the cumulative time of call-intake time,
dispatch time, turnout time, and travel time
Travel Time – the elapsed time from wheels rolling and the time the unit arrives on-scene.
Turnout Time – the elapsed time from when PSC alerts unit(s) to a call for service and the time
the unit(s) begins their response and acknowledges on the radio that the unit is responding.
Wheels Rolling – vehicle in gear and wheels in motion moving the vehicle toward the incident
location.

Chapter 14 - Emergency Response Time
General Provisions
PSC will ensure the call processing time is accomplished as quickly as possible and in accordance
with the Emergency Medical Dispatch Protocols, Fire/Emergency Medical Services (EMS)
Department General Orders, Directives, and policies.
PSC will ensure that all Fire/EMS Department radio transmissions related to response times are
entered in the CAD promptly. PSC will only make CAD entries based upon a unit advising they
are “responding” or “on-scene.”
The turnout time objective for all calls for service (including transfers) for all units throughout the
Department shall be one (1) minute. All Fire/EMS Department personnel will ensure that all calls
for service are responded to promptly, without delay.
To ensure the integrity of response time data, all Fire/EMS personnel are responsible to make radio
transmissions that reflect their status, as defined in this General Order.
Emergency Operations Command (EOC) will evaluate all statistical data available to determine our
current capabilities with our existing resources. After reviewing the data, EOC will make
recommendations to the Fire Chief outlining our short- and long-term goals with respect to
response times. The recommendations will include strategies to improve our capabilities of each
component of response time. Upon acceptance, the response time goals will be distributed as an
attachment to this General Order or as an Interim General Order.
REFERENCES
N/A
FORMS / ATTACHMENTS
N/A

Chapter 14 - Emergency Response Time

Division: Health and Safety
Chapter: Respiratory Protection Program
POLICY
This General Order shall establish a Respiratory Protection Program for all work areas of the
Department that contain, or potentially contain, hazardous atmospheres to which
employees/members could be exposed. To fully comply with all applicable codes, regulations, and
standards pertinent to respirator use for the Department including, but not limited to, OSHA 29
CFR 1910.134 Respiratory Protection.
DEFINITIONS
Air-Purifying Respirator - a respirator with an air-purifying filter, cartridge, or canister that

removes specific air contaminants by passing ambient air through the air-purifying element.
EMS ONLY Member - a volunteer member that participates in an operational capacity as part of
an EMS crew only, either by personal choice or related to the use of respiratory protection. Without
more specific information on the individual’s training and/or certification, an EMS ONLY member
shall not perform any operational activity within an IDLH atmosphere. However, an EMS ONLY
member must be trained and qualified to use the SCBA and maintain certification to wear SCBA.
Members who have not yet obtained SCBA Training will be required to do so within 18-months
from the time this General Order takes effect.
Fire/EMS Department Physician - a physician employed by or under contract to the Prince

George’s County Fire/EMS Department. The physician shall be familiar with the operations and
operational environment of the Department and with the Respiratory Protection Program.
Immediately Dangerous to Life or Health (IDLH) - an atmosphere that poses an immediate

threat to life, would cause irreversible adverse health effects, or would impair an individual’s
ability to escape from a dangerous atmosphere.
Interior Structural Firefighting - the physical activity of fire suppression, rescue or both, inside
of buildings or enclosed structures, which are involved in a fire situation beyond the incipient stage.
Operational Activity - any duty, responsibility, or function that involves the delivery of service,
training, etc. This includes drivers/operators of vehicles, command officers, and emergency
medical service providers.
Member - any career employee or volunteer member of the Prince George’s County Fire/EMS
Department.
Division 08 – Health and Safety

Chapter 17 – Respiratory Protection Program
Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus (SCBA) - a County-approved, atmosphere-supplying

respirator for which the breathing air source is designed to be carried by the user.
Supplied-Air Respirator (SAR) or Airline Respirator - an atmosphere-supplying respirator for

which the source of breathing air is not designed to be carried by the user.
1. Use of SCBA and Air-Purifying Respirators
All members who participate in operational activities and/or may be potentially exposed to
respiratory hazards shall be qualified and maintain their qualification to use the Department-
approved air-purifying respirator, which is the N99 respirator.
All members that are involved in operational activities as part of a crew on any fire suppression
vehicle (including driver) shall obtain and maintain certification to wear SCBA.
All members who are, or could be, exposed to IDLH atmospheres during fire suppression
operations and/or training exercises shall use SCBA. This includes:
• All interior structural firefighting operations.

• Interior and/ or exterior exposure to smoke or other products of combustion.
SCBA or SAR shall be used by members exposed, or potentially exposed, to IDLH atmospheres at
any other type of incident or training exercise including:
• Oxygen deficient atmospheres.

• Carbon monoxide incidents.
• Confined space rescue operations.
• Hazardous materials incidents.
Members operating in the vicinity of known or potential IDLH atmospheres, who could be required to
enter the IDLH area shall wear SCBA or have SCBA or SAR available for immediate donning and use.
Air-purifying respirators (filter masks) may be used to provide respiratory protection in situations
where SCBA use is not required. This includes:
• Protection from asbestos particles during salvage, overhaul, and fire investigation.
• Certain hazardous materials incidents.
• Dust producing activities.
Air-purifying respirators shall not be used in areas that are, or have the potential, to become IDLH
or oxygen deficient atmospheres. The particular filter media (filter or chemical canister) to be
utilized must be selected for the specific application.

The N99 respirators shall be used in accordance with General Order 08-26.
Unit officers or command officers who have “Observer/ Ride Alongs” (as defined by General
Order 13-05) on board their unit shall be responsible for ensuring that these persons are not
permitted to enter any potential IDLH zone that exists or may present itself during any incident.
Observer/Ride-Alongs shall be left outside of all IDLH hazard zones, as required, until atmospheric
conditions permit their entry.
2. Training Policy
All members who are expected to perform interior fire suppression operations, and all members
who are expected to operate at emergency incidents in areas that could involve respiratory hazards,
shall be qualified to use SCBA.
Members shall not be permitted to use respirators in hazardous atmospheres or at emergency

incidents unless they have been trained and qualified to use the specific type and model of
respirator.
The initial qualification process to use a respirator, including SCBA, requires:
• Medical evaluation that includes the OSHA Respiratory Medical Evaluation

Questionnaire.
• Fit testing.
• Training.
• Demonstration of proficiency.
Members must qualify annually to use respirators. Qualification requires:
• Annual refresher training within 60 days of fit testing.

• Fit testing.
• Demonstration of proficiency.
• Annual medical clearance utilizing an OSHA Respiratory Medical Evaluation
Questionnaire.
The Commander of the Fire/EMS Training Academy shall maintain the records of members
who are qualified to use each type of respirator. These records shall be regularly provided to the
Emergency Operations Command to identify the members who are qualified to participate in
operational activities.
3. Availability
An adequate number of approved SCBAs shall be provided on each fire suppression e and AEMS
vehicle for crewmembers that are expected to perform interior fire suppression operations and/or
operate in an IDLH atmosphere.

Additional SCBAs shall be provided to ensure that one is available for each member who is
required to use a SCBA. This includes extra SCBAs provided for:
• Staff and command vehicles.

• Special use vehicles.
• Training.
• Replacement of units that are out-of-service for maintenance or repairs.
At least one spare air cylinder shall be carried on each fire apparatus for each SCBA assigned to
that vehicle. Additional spare air cylinders and/or refilling capabilities shall be provided for long
duration incidents.
SCBA carried on apparatus for the use of crewmembers shall be secured in brackets and stored in a
manner that protects the SCBA from contamination by dirt, dust, or weather conditions. Additional
respirators shall be in enclosed compartments and/or carrying cases.
An adequate number of approved N99 respirators shall be provided on each fire suppression and
emergency medical vehicle for crewmembers that are expected to perform emergency medical
duties. These respirators shall be stored in a manner that protects them from contamination by dirt,
dust, and weather conditions.
4. Respirator Selection
The approved standard respirator used by the Prince George’s County Fire/EMS Department for
fire suppression and other IDLH emergency operations shall be Scott Air-Pak Fifty 4.5, Single
EBSS, AV-3000 Face piece, 2002 NFPA and CBRN Compliant. All members exposed to IDLH, or
potential IDLH atmospheres shall use this respirator. This unit may be used with 45 or 60 minute
rated air cylinders.
Only approved supplied air respirators (air line breathing apparatus) may be used in IDLH or
potential IDLH atmospheres. Supplied air respirators are reserved for special applications requiring
long duration and/or reduced weight and bulk, including confined space rescue and hazardous
material incidents. These units shall only be used by members who have been trained in their use.
The MSA Advantage 1000® system is approved as an alternative respirator for non-IDLH
exposure to hazardous vapors, gases, and/or particulate matter. Air purifying respirators shall only
be used in situations where the atmosphere contains at least 19.5% oxygen, the nature and
concentration of the contaminant(s) are known, and the appropriate chemical or particulate air-
purifying cartridge is available. All other respiratory exposure situations require the use of SCBA.
All members shall wear the NIOSH approved N99 respirator when providing care to the following
high risk group of patients or patients who exhibit signs and symptoms (persistent cough ≥ three
weeks, bloody sputum, night sweats, weight loss, anorexia, and fever) suspicious of Tuberculosis
(TB):

• Person with HIV infection, close contacts of infectious TB cases, foreign-born persons
from countries with a high prevalence of TB (e.g., Asia, Africa, Latin American and
some Caribbean and European countries), or medically underserved, low-income
populations, including the homeless and residents of shelters.
• Alcoholics and intravenous drug users, persons currently incarcerated/history of
incarceration or residents of mental institutions, and long-term care facilities.
• Persons with medical conditions (silicosis, gastrectomy, jejunoileal bypass, chronic
renal failure, diabetes mellitus, leukemia and lymphomas), conditions requiring
prolonged high dose corticosteroid and other immunosuppressive therapy, and weight of
10% or more below ideal body weight.
• The use of other alternative respirators for particular situations may be authorized, in
writing, by the Fire Chief or his/her designee. This shall be based on a detailed review
of the specific situation and the alternatives that are available.
Additional information can be found in General Order 08-26.
5. Medical Evaluation
Initial Evaluation
The Fire/EMS Department physician shall examine each member before being authorized to use a
respirator. The physician shall issue a written recommendation that the member is medically
qualified to use a respirator and to engage in emergency operations before the member shall be
permitted to be fit tested or to use a respirator within a hazardous environment.
A confidential medical file shall be maintained for each member under the control of the Manager
of Risk Management. The physician’s recommendation shall be maintained in the member’s file. A
copy of the physician’s recommendation will be provided to the member upon written request to
the Manager of Risk Management. The member will have the opportunity to discuss the
recommendation with the physician.
Re-evaluation
Members shall be reevaluated for respirator use by the Fire/EMS Department physician if:
• The member reports medical signs or symptoms relating to his/her ability to use a
respirator to a supervisor or to the Fire/EMS Department physician.
• Responses to items in the medical questionnaire indicate the need for reevaluation.
• The supervisor has reason to believe that the member requires further medical
evaluation or requires a member to be reevaluated for any other reason.
• There is a significant change in the member’s work conditions related to respirator use.

All career employees and volunteer members who are scheduled for a full physical examination by
the Fire/EMS Department physician shall also have their status for respirator use reviewed at that
time using an OSHA Respiratory Medical Evaluation Questionnaire.
All career employees and volunteer members will complete an OSHA Respiratory Medical
Evaluation Questionnaire annually.
6. Confidentiality of Records
The questionnaire is a confidential medical record and the responses shall only be reviewed by the
Fire/EMS Department physician or a qualified medical professional working under the direction of
the Fire/ EMS Department physician. If the need for a medical reevaluation is identified, the
member shall be notified to contact the Fire/EMS Department physician within 30 days. If the
member has not responded to the notification within 30 days, the Manager of Occupational Safety
and Health will be notified and the member’s authorization to use a respirator shall be suspended
until the medical reevaluation has been completed.
7. Fit Testing
Test Requirements
Members shall successfully complete a quantitative fit test administered by the Prince George's
County Fire/EMS Department before being authorized to use SCBA or other respirators in a
hazardous or potentially hazardous atmosphere. Annual fit testing shall be required for all members
to retain their qualification to use respirators and participate in operational activities.
Fit testing shall be conducted as part of the initial training program and the annual respirator
training program by individuals who have been trained and are qualified to use the fit testing
apparatus. The fit test records will be maintained by the Manager of the Fire/EMS Apparatus
Maintenance.
Members, who have any presence of facial hair that comes between the sealing surface of the face
piece and the face, or interferes with the operation of the unit, shall not be fit tested. Additional fit
testing may be required if:
• The member reports changes in his/her physical condition or problems maintaining a

seal during respirator use.
• Recommended by a supervisor or the Fire/EMS Department physician.
• A new or different type of face piece is to be used by the member.
Use Requirements
Members shall only use the type and size of face piece that was used when completing the fit test.
Members shall be issued a proper fitting face piece for their personal use.

Members who have any presence of facial hair that comes between the sealing surface of the face
piece and the face, or hair that could interfere with the operation of the unit, shall not be permitted
to use respiratory protection at emergency incidents, IDLH, or potentially IDLH atmospheres, and
shall not be authorized to participate in operational activities. These restrictions shall apply
regardless of the specific fit test measurement that can be obtained under test conditions.
Nothing shall be allowed to enter or pass through the area where the respirator face piece is
designed to seal with the face, regardless of any specific fit test measurement that can be obtained.
Members shall always perform a self-check of the face piece seal when donning an SCBA before
entering a hazardous atmosphere.
8. Training
Initial Training
All members who perform fire suppression operations and/or any other emergency operational
activities shall be trained and certified in the use of SCBA and the N99 respirator prior to being
authorized to participate in emergency incidents, training exercises, or other activities that involve
respiratory hazards.
Members who are expected to use other types of respirators shall be trained in the use of that
specific equipment prior to use.
The initial training shall ensure that the member is thoroughly familiar with the respirator and has
experience in using it in a non-hazardous environment. The initial training shall address:
• Why the respirator is necessary and how improper fit, use, or maintenance can
compromise its protection.
• Capabilities and limitations of the respirator.
• Inspection, donning, doffing, seal checking, and normal use of the respirator.
• Emergency procedures, including situations that involve malfunction of the respirator,
maintenance, and storage procedures.
• Recognition of medical signs and symptoms that may limit or prevent effective use of
the respirator.
• The general requirements of 29 CFR 1910.134, Respiratory Protection.
Each member shall demonstrate proficiency in the proper procedures for:
• User inspection of the respirator.

• Donning the respirator, including the seal check.
• Confident use of the respirator.
• Emergency procedures.
• Doffing, cleaning, and maintenance.

Annual Refresher Training
Each member who is authorized to participate in operational activities and required to use SCBA,
the N99 respirator, or other respirators, shall be required to participate in an annual refresher
training and re-qualification program. The refresher training shall ensure the member is able to
meet the objectives listed for initial training and provide any new information that is required. Each
member shall also demonstrate proficiency in the same skills as are required for initial training
program.
Training Records
The Fire/EMS Training Academy shall maintain the training records, and the records of annual
refresher training, of all members who have been initially trained and certified to use respirators.
Supervisors shall ensure that all career members maintain their qualification to use respirators.
Each volunteer company shall ensure that all members participating in Fire/EMS Department
operational activities have met the specific requirements.
9. Maintenance and Inspections
Inspection
Respirators shall be maintained in working order and in a clean and sanitary condition. Units that
require maintenance or repairs shall be removed from apparatus and tagged to prevent inadvertent
use.
Regular inspections of respirators shall be conducted in accordance with the following schedule:
• SCBA carried on in-service apparatus for the regular use of crewmembers shall be
checked daily.
• SCBA and spare air cylinders carried on apparatus, including reserve apparatus,
command and staff vehicles, shall be checked weekly.
• SCBA reserved for training and spare units shall be checked before each use and before
being placed in regular service.
• Other types of respirators shall be checked weekly and before each use.
• All respirators shall be checked after each use, after cleaning and servicing, and before
being placed back in service.
Respirator inspections shall follow the manufacturer’s recommended procedures. Regular user
inspections of SCBA shall include verification that:
• The air cylinder is full - cylinders shall be refilled if the pressure is found to be below
90% of the rated capacity (4050 psi for a 4500 psi SCBA).

• The regulator, low-pressure alarm, heads up display, and integral PASS device function
properly.
• All parts are in operable condition.
• The unit is clean and ready for use.
Cleaning and Sanitizing
Respirators shall be cleaned and sanitized following the manufacturer’s instructions, after each use,
and at any other time when the need for cleaning is identified.
Function Testing
Each SCBA unit shall be thoroughly inspected and flow tested annually by a qualified technician
following the manufacturer’s recommended procedures. Units shall also be flow tested after major
maintenance or repairs are conducted, and before being returned to service.
Maintenance, inspection, and flow test records for each SCBA unit shall be maintained by the
Manager of Apparatus Maintenance.
Maintenance and Repairs
Maintenance and repairs shall only be performed by Apparatus Maintenance Personnel who have
been trained and certified to perform such operations on the specific make and model of respirator,
and by using parts and procedures approved by the manufacturer. Personnel who have been trained
and certified by the manufacturer shall perform repairs or adjustments to high-pressure
components, regulators, or low-pressure alarms. SCBA respirators requiring maintenance shall be
sent to Apparatus Maintenance.
A maintenance record for each SCBA respirator shall be maintained at Apparatus Maintenance.
Air Quality
Breathing air compressors, air storage systems, and refill stations shall be regularly inspected and
maintained in compliance with the manufacturer’s recommendations. The Manager of Apparatus
Maintenance is responsible for ensuring that all such systems are properly inspected and
maintained.
Compressed gaseous breathing air for SCBA cylinders shall meet the requirements of ANSI/CGA
G-7.1, Commodity Specification for Air with a minimum air quality of Grade D, even though it
will be tested to Grade E specifications.
Air produced by each of the Department’s compressor and refill systems shall be tested at least
quarterly by an independent laboratory to ensure that it meets the required specification. The test
results shall be maintained by the Manager of the Apparatus Maintenance.

A certificate of compliance certifying that the air has been analyzed by a reputable testing
agency, and complies with the required specification, shall accompany air obtained from other
sources. These certificates shall be maintained at the location where the air is stored until it is
expended then forwarded to the Manager of the Risk Management Office (RMO).
Apparatus Maintenance shall maintain a record of each SCBA respirator noting the dates of
acquisition and assignment, annual inspections and function tests, modifications, overhaul, and
repairs.
Apparatus Maintenance shall also maintain records for each breathing air refill system, including
compressors, filters, air storage cylinders, and refill stations. This record shall track all
maintenance, inspection, repairs, and modifications to the system.
10. Program Evaluation
The Manager of RMO and the Infection Control Officer shall annually review the effectiveness of
the Respiratory Protection/ Tuberculosis Program and develop a report to the Fire Chief. This
review shall include:
• An assessment of compliance with the program requirements.

• Analysis of reports of respiratory injuries and exposures.
• Review of changes to applicable regulations and consensus standards.
• Advances in respiratory protection technology.
The Manager of Occupational Safety and Health and the Infection Control Officer shall
periodically develop and issue updates to this Respiratory Protection/ Tuberculosis Program and to
related procedures and practices.
11. Responsibilities
All employees who might be required to wear tight fitting respirators as a condition of employment
shall be required to remove all visible facial hair (clean shaven/clipped to the skin) at the start of
each tour of duty per General Order 08-11. This should prevent facial hair from coming between
the face and the sealing portion of the SCBA face piece or respirator.
All members shall be required to remove all visible facial hair (clean shaven/clipped to the skin)
prior to participating in an operational activity. This should prevent facial hair from coming
between the face and the sealing portion of the SCBA face piece or respirator.
All members are required to comply with the specific requirements of the program that relate to
their duties and activities. Authorization to participate in operational activities shall be dependent
upon the member’s full compliance with the specific requirements.
All career and volunteer members shall be responsible to ensure that all operational members under
their supervision are in full compliance with the specific requirements.

The Manager of RMO is responsible for the overall administration and management of the
Respiratory Protection Program, and is designated as the Program Administrator.
The Infection Control Officer is responsible for all aspects of the Tuberculosis Control Program
(see General Order 08-26, Tuberculosis Exposure Control Program) and management of suspected
or confirmed Tuberculosis exposure incidents.
The Commander of the Fire/EMS Training Academy is responsible for the training components of
the Respiratory Protection Program.
The Manager of Apparatus Maintenance is responsible for the maintenance of respirators and
associated equipment, and administering the fit testing of respirators.
REFERENCES
ANSI/CGA G-7.1, Commodity Specification for Air
FORMS / ATTACHMENTS
N/A


Division: Logistics and Supply
Chapter: Cleaning, Repair, Replacement and Alterations of Personal Protective Equipment
POLICY
This General Order shall set forth the procedure for cleaning, repairing, replacing and altering
Personal Protective Equipment (PPE).
DEFINITIONS
PPE – Personal Protective Equipment.
Compromised PPE – Any element of PPE that may have a diminished ability to fully protect
personnel from burn/injury. This may be due to thermal damage, cuts/rips/tears, damaged/missing
hardware, fabric integrity, or cleanliness.
Contaminated PPE – PPE that has been exposed to blood/body fluids, petroleum products,
chemicals, pesticides, or any other hazardous materials.
Vendor- The verified Independent Service Provider (ISP) contracted to provide advanced
inspection, cleaning, and alterations/repairs to Department issued PPE.
Verified ISP – A company that has either been 3rd party certified to perform repairs, or has been
trained by the element manufacturer in Advanced Cleaning and Advanced Inspection.
Individually Owned Items – Approved PPE that was not issued by the Department, but was
purchased by an individual. (Only Approved PPE may be worn for Emergency Operations).
1. General Provisions
Logistics and Supply is responsible for ensuring that PPE is properly fitted (by lengths and overlap
of coat and pants) to an individual before being issued. If alterations are necessary, they must be
performed by the verified ISP (vendor) prior to being issued.
Chief officers/battalion chiefs and station officers shall ensure that PPE will be routinely examined
and sent for cleaning, repair, or replacement as necessary, in accordance with NFPA 1971 and
NFPA 1851.
All PPE that is sent out for cleaning, repairs, or decontamination shall be evaluated by the
appropriate chief officer/battalion chief or safety officer prior to being sent to Logistics & Supply
for pick up by the contracted vendor. An Advance Inspection of the gear will be completed by the
Division 10– Logistics and Supply
Chapter 03 - Cleaning, Repair, Replacement and Alterations of Personal Protective Equipment Page 1 of 4
Revision Date – N/A
vendor. Following their evaluation, the vendor will contact Logistics & Supply and a
determination will be made whether it is cost effective for the Department to have the PPE cleaned,
repaired, or condemned. The criteria used to make the determination will be the age and condition
of the PPE.
With the approval of the Duty Chief, a safety officer has the authority to place unsafe/ unapproved
PPE out-of-service. All potentially compromised PPE of burned or seriously injured personnel
shall be collected and sent to the Operational Safety Office for documentation.
2. Cleaning/Repair
The general cleaning/repair of PPE shall be handled as follows:
• The employee/member and the station officer shall inspect all PPE after each IDLH
exposure to determine the need for cleaning and/or repairs.
• If cleaning or repairs are necessary, the employee/member’s supervisor shall complete a
PPE Cleaning/Repair Request (PGC Form #5201) and have it verified and approved by
either the Chief Officer/Battalion Chief within the chain of command, or the Safety Officer.
• All cleaning and repairs of PPE must be approved by a chief officer/battalion chief, or
safety officer.
• The check sheet shall indicate whether the gear needs cleaning and/or repairs. If the gear is
in need of repair, the check sheet will clearly indicate the repairs needed.
• Upon approval (w/verified signature), supervisors are to arrange to get the gear to Logistics
& Supply, who will arrange for the Department’s vendor to pickup the PPE to clean and/or
repair the gear.
• A copy of the signed PPE Cleaning/Repair Request Form (PGC Form #5201) shall be
forwarded to Logistics & Supply, with the PPE.
3. Pickup/Delivery
Logistics will schedule a day for pickup, all PPE will be assigned an authorization number, which
will be written on the PPE Cleaning/Repair Request and placed in the bag with the PPE for the
vendor to pickup. The PPE should be in bags (trash bag, gear bag, etc.) and a vendor-furnished tag
with the name, ID number, and station number of the individual to whom the PPE is issued is to be
affixed to the bag. A copy of the signed PPE Cleaning/Repair Request Form must accompany the
PPE to be sent to Logistics & Supply. The vendor will pickup and return the PPE to Logistics &
Supply within three business days. If alterations or repairs are needed, it will be a 5-7 business day
turnaround to Logistics & Supply. If a longer turnaround time is necessary, the Department’s
vendor will communicate that to Logistics & Supply, who will make the notifications to the
appropriate command and Operational Safety Office.
4. Contaminated/Compromised PPE
PPE that has been contaminated by blood, petroleum products, chemicals, pesticides, or any other
hazardous materials are to be handled in the following manner:

• Contaminated PPE is to be bagged in a RED trash bag, or hazard bag, affixing a vendor-
supplied tag with the individual’s name, ID number, station number and the contaminant
clearly marked on it.
• Notification to have the PPE picked up is to be made as soon as possible to the Safety
Officer, followed by the station transporting the contaminated PPE to Logistics & Supply.
The PPE worn by personnel, who have received burns or serious injuries requiring treatment at a
hospital, is considered compromised until it has been appropriately inspected and documented by
the Operational Safety Office.
The Safety Officer is responsible to collect the gear of a burned/injured firefighter and will
coordinate cleaning, repair and replacement of their gear with Logistics & Supply. Individually
owned items will be returned after inspection and documentation is completed.
5. Condemned PPE
Upon notification regarding condemnation of any piece of PPE, Logistics & Supply shall notify the
appropriate command and the Operational Safety Office.
Condemned PPE (red tagged) will be held at Logistics & Supply for disposal, and personnel will be
advised to report to Logistics & Supply for replacement PPE. The employee/member will be
issued new PPE. If alterations are necessary, the PPE will be sent to the vendor and the employee is
required to report to the vendor for appropriate fitting. Once alterations are completed, the PPE will
be delivered to Logistics, who will notify employee.
6. Replacement
All PPE issued to career and volunteer personnel are the property of the Prince George’s County
Government. PPE that is no longer usable shall be returned to Logistics & Supply. Personnel
leaving the Fire/EMS Department must return all issued PPE.
Lost or stolen PPE, whether entire or portions thereof, must be reported, in writing, utilizing a
Loss/Damage Report (PGC Form #556). The completed form is to be submitted to Risk
Management, with a copy going to Logistics & Supply.
The career individual in need of replacement PPE shall complete Clothing Request (PGC Form
#1362). The Station Officer shall verify the need for the replacement before forwarding the request
to the Battalion Chief within the chain of command for approval and documentation. The original
and other attached copies will be returned to the employee. The employee then presents the
approved form, along with the items to be exchanged on a one-for-one basis, to Logistics &
Supply.
A volunteer member must have an Issuance of PPE Request/Agreement (PGC Form #4371) signed
by the Volunteer Chief or President in order to exchange PPE.

Any request or need for PPE (running coat, pant, helmet, etc.) after 1530 hours Monday through
Friday, and on weekends, should be directed via the Duty Chief to the Logistics & Supply
Manager.
This is applicable only in an emergency situation, when gear is damaged after normal business
hours and it is anticipated that the member might return to duty before the next business day.
All returned items shall come under the scrutiny of the Logistics & Supply Manager for final
approval of the exchange.
7. Alterations
The Department will only be responsible for alterations to PPE pertaining to safety. This includes
length of sleeves and pants, 2” overlap of coat and pants, and issues related to appropriate fitting
and/or safety requirements of the garment. Any other alterations, including but not limited to, radio
pockets, accommodations for flashlights, etc. shall be done at the employee/member’s own
expense, and only with an ISP, with coordination through Logistics & Supply.
8. PPE for Specialty Teams and Personnel Assigned to FETA
Cleaning, repair, replacement and alterations of specialized PPE not covered by the
cleaning/repairing contract, such as technical rescue gear, CBRN protective ensembles, etc., will be
coordinated through the Logistics & Supply office.
REFERENCES
NFPA 1971
NFPA 1851
FORMS / ATTACHMENTS
Attachment #1– Notice of Loss/Damage Report (PGC Form #556)
Attachment # 2– Clothing Request (PGC Form #1362)
Attachment # 3 – PPE Cleaning/Repair Request Form (PGC Form #5201)
Attachment # 4 – PPE Inspection/Tracking Form (PGC Form #4057)
Attachment #5 – Issuance of PPE Request/Agreement Form (PGC Form #4371)


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PRINCE GEORGE’S COUNTY

Safety Investigation Team Report

House Fire with Significant

Battalion Chief Sayshan L. Conver-White, Co-Chair

Fire Chief Richard R. Bowers, Jr.

Deputy Fire Chief William Goldfeder

Assistant Fire Chief Michael Nelson

Volunteer Safety Division Chief Stefan C. Gansert

Paramedic Captain Roland D. Berg

Fire Lieutenant Philip Bird, Jr.

Fire Lieutenant Daniel R. Schrader

Fire Investigator Aaron Tyler

Fire Protection Engineer Lee McCarthy

President Charles W. Walker

Administrative Aide II Xiomara Lozano-Chevez

Prince George’s County Fire/Emergency Medical Services Department

Prince George’s County Fire Commission

Prince George’s County Public Safety Communications

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms & Explosives

Colerain Township Fire/EMS Department, Ohio

Loudon County Department of Fire, Rescue, and Emergency Management

Montgomery County Fire and Rescue Service

Montreal Fire Department, Canada

Penn Township Fire Department, Indiana

Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission

1. An effective size-up was not completed, including a 360-degree survey walk

2. No incident action plan was communicated, and firefighters were dangerously

3. A firefighter emergency occurred, but no MAYDAY was effectively

4. Multiple existing policies and procedures were not followed.

5. Training deficiencies were identified at all levels.

6. Command, control, and accountability deficiencies were identified at all levels.

COMMAND AND CONTROL OF INCIDENT OPERATIONS

FIREGROUND SAFETY AND ACCOUNTABILITY

A life-threatening firefighter emergency occurred during the initial company operations.

PERSONAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT

STRATEGY AND TACTICAL OPERATIONS

ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS AND WIND-DRIVEN FIRES

RISK ASSESSMENT AND DECISION MAKING AT STRUCTURE FIRES

COMMAND AND COMPANY OFFICER TRAINING

FIRE BEHAVIOR AND SIZE-UP

EMS TRIAGE, TREATMENT, AND TRANSPORT

ORGANIZATION OF THIS REPORT

Table 1: Personnel Description (Riding Position)

Data gathered included:

A – Alpha H – Hotel O – Oscar U – Uniform

Figure 1: Terms used to describe Building Sides and Interior Quadrants

FREQUENTLY USED TERMS

Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) – The ensemble of specialized clothing and

Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus (SCBA) – An atmosphere-supplying respirator

Truck – A special service vehicle designed to carry a complement of ground ladders as

Working Fire Dispatch – Terminology used by Public Safety Communications (PSC)

Incident Command System

Figure 2: ICS Command Structure

Strategy and Tactics

PRINCE GEORGE’S COUNTY, MARYLAND

Figure 3: Regional Map (Prince George’s County outlined in red)

COMBINATION FIRE AND RESCUE SYSTEM

FIRE/EMS DEPARTMENT MANAGEMENT

The Administrative Services Command includes Human Resources, Logistics and

 Battalion Chief (other than dispatched on the assignment)