A Manual For Pyrotechnic Design Development and Qualification
A Manual For Pyrotechnic Design Development and Qualification
A Manual For Pyrotechnic Design Development and Qualification
Mony L. Schimmel
SchimmeI Company, St. Louis, Missouri
June 1995
(NASA-TM-110172)
A MANUAL FOR
P Y R O T E C H N I C D E S I G N , DEVELOPMENT AND
QUALIFICATION
(NASA,
Langley
Research C e n t e r )
82 p
Uncl a s
G3/18
0058498
FOREWORD
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Chapter
1
2
3
Page
.......................................
Pyrotechnics Definition. Considerations for
Applications .......................................
Pyrotechnic Functional Principles ..................
Introduction
1
2
5
..................................... 14
Initiation Systems/Initiators ...................... 17
pyrotechnic System Safety .......................... 25
Functional Reliability
............
28
.............................
45
14
... 50
Generate Performance-Based Specifications .......... 52
Pyrotechnic Component Design and Development ....... 53
Qualification ...................................... 55
Pyrotechnic Shock .................................. 56
Failure Modes and Effects Analyses ................. 58
15
16
10
11
12
13
17
18
............. 59
.................. 61
................ 63
Disposal Methods ................................... 71
Conclusions/Recommendations ........................ 72
References ......................................... 73
List of Tables ..................................... iii
Past Experience and Lessons Learned
List of Illustrations
..............................iii
LIST OF TABLES
Table
Page
IX
......................................... 9
I1
Major Past and Current Pyrotechnic Applications in
Astronautics ........................................ 9
I11 properties of a Time-Delay Mix
(Formula for D-16, MIL-M-21383) ..................... 15
IV
Properties of a as-Generating Material
(Hercules Hi-Temp) .................................. 15
V
Properties of Boron/Potassium Nitrate (B/KN03) ...... 16
VI
Properties of NASA Standard Initiator (NSI) ~ i x..... 16
VII Properties of Lead Azide ............................ 16
VIII Properties of Hexanitrostilbene (HNS) ............... 16
... 33
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS
Figure
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
Page
...............
Cross sectional views of pyrotechnically actuated
valves, describing function. .........................
5
6
................
Cross sectional views of mild detonating cord (MDC)actuated severance and separation approaches.
........
......
..............................
....................................
....................................
Functional depiction of Rotor Systems Research Aircraft
(RSRA) in-flight escape system. ...................... 10
iii
........................................ 11
11. Depiction of pyrotechnic devices used on Project
Gemini. .............................................. 11
12. Depiction of pyrotechnic devices used on the Command
Module and escape system, Project Apollo. ............ 12
13. Depiction of pyrotechnic devices used on the Lunar
Excursion Module, Project Apollo. .................... 12
14. Shuttle Transportation System pyrotechnics. .......... 13
15. Cross sectional view of NASA Standard Initiator (NSI). 19
16. Views of commercial or military center-fire percussion
19
primers.
17. Cross
Delta
........................................
sectional view of separation plane initiator for
Launch Vehicle. ................................ 20
20.
21.
22.
....
Views of SMDC tip fragment dispersion. ............... 22
Gaps at which SMDC fragments initiated acceptors;
donors and acceptors identical. ...................... 23
Cross sectional view of manually operated, explosive
transfer safe/arm. ................................... 26
Closed bomb firing and monitoring system. ............ 29
.......................
29
.......................
........................................ 30
............................................ 33
........................................ 35
sectional view of NASA Pin Puller. ............. 36
........................................ 38
.......
Percussion primer ignitability performance
definitions. ........................................ 39
............................................ 40
.......................................
Test fixture to evaluate the output of linear
explosives. ........................................
Lockheed Super*Zip separation joint tapered plate test
configuration. .......................................
41
43
43
...................................... 47
........................................ 49
Depiction of the need for the pyrotechnic specialist
to meet both safety and reliability requirements. .... 49
Cross sectional view of Viking pin puller. ........... 64
Statistical presentation of functional margin for
redesigned HALOE pin puller. ......................... 65
ShuttleICentaur deployment system, using the Lockheed
Super*Zip separation ring. ........................... 67
...................................
......... 68
..........................
69
*
*
*
initiation
jettison
time delay
*
*
*
release
valvinq
actuation
*
*
severance/fracture
switching
Reference 1
The first use of the term wpyrotechnics'' for explosive and
propellant-actuated devices in the aerospace field was by
Harry Lutz of McDonnell Aircraft Company during the Mercury
program. In response to a concern voiced by program
management about using explosive devices in close proximity
to the astronaut, Harry said, "Don't call them explosives,
call them pyrotechnics." This was quickly shortened to
*@pyrostW
whlch sounded even less threatening.
2-2 Pyrotechnics Are Extensively A ~ ~ l i eBecause
d
of Their
Hiuh Efficiency
o High energy delivered per unit weight
o Small volume, compact
o Long-term storable energy
o Controllable initiation and output energies
Reference 1
Few sources of energy combine all fpur of these attributes.
Pyrotechnics contain the needed energy to accomplish a
desired function within small volumes. The only external
energy required is an initiation input. Initiation inputs to
devices (mechanical, electrical, pneumatic, explosive
transfer or laser) can be precisely established to prevent
inadvertent initiation, as well as to assure adequate
initiation energy. Pyrotechnics utilize solid material
compositions that are highly energetic and can be selected to
be stable under extremes of both thermal and vacuum
conditions.
o Unique Characteristics
Single shot
Cannot be functionally checked before flight
Short-duration, impulsive loads (pyrotechnic
shock)
Safety issues
--
*
*
--
References 1, 2, 3 and 4
Clearly, the advantages of using pyrotechnics often outweigh
this burdensome list of disadvantages, concerns and
challenges, or there would be no applications. In the early
stages of the Shuttle program, an edict was made that there
will be no pyrotechnics used for the vehicle or for payloads.
Pyrotechnics violate one of their first ground rules, which
is that systems shall be reusable. However, over 400
pyrotechnic components fly on each Shuttle mission with some
used on each flight and others only for emergencies. A
primary requirement for Shuttle payload pyrotechnics is the
assurance that on functioning, the Shuttle will not be
damaged.
Pyrotechnics normally are used only once, since often
internal structural deformation is incurred in each firing.
These devices cannot be cycled like solenoid-actuated
switches to assure their functionality. The best assurance
of successful operation is that the devices are designed with
functional marglns and have been accurately manufactured.
The explosive, propellant and pyrotechnic-composition energy
sources will burn completely and quickly no matter if the
ignition input is intentional or inadvertent. Selecting lowlevel energy inputs to ignite these materials is a weight
advantage, but can be a safety hazard.
There are few guidelines for the design and application of
pyrotechnic devices. There is a lack of accepted test
standards to evaluate functional performance of devices.
Existing methods generally rely on go/no-go testing, which
means that a device either does or does not work.
No college courses are offered for this sophisticated
aerospace field, and past experience in other energy sources
cannot be applied, primarily due to the single-shot, dynamic
nature of pyrotechnic devices. Consequently, missioncritical functions are sometimes entrusted to pyrotechnic
devices with less than the required reliability. The lack of
understanding of these devices can lead to failures, as well
as inadequate failure resolution. Since there are few
sources of information, users are forced into a reliance on
manufacturers. In using noff-the-shelfM hardware, component
functional and system evaluation is often minimized with the
assumption that qualification exists. Furthermore,
manufacturers may have a different view of success than does
the user. Should a failure occur, there is a conflict
between finding out the exact cause and getting on with the
program schedule.
Statistical reliability and confidence is usually based on
information compiled by the manufacturer in functional
evaluations on any particular device and on its predecessor
designs. To achieve a statistical basis for a 99.9%
reliability with a 95% confidence level, more than 2000
identical devices would have to be evaluated. Such a number
is often cost prohibitive.
Chapter 3.-
Before Actuation
A f t e r Actuation
THRUSTER
RETRACTOR OR
PIN PULLER
PLANE OF
PLANE OF
SEPARATION
OF
I
PISTON (TENSION FAILURE)
PROPELLANT ACTUATED
MDC (TYPICAL)
EXPLOSIVE ACTUATED
METAL
SHEATH
EXPLOSIVE
CORE
-,
M I L D DETONATING C O R D ( M D C )
CONFINED
SEVERANCE
BREAK
BOLTS
in Aeronautics
i
PROGRAM
F-4 (DUAL PLACE)
(EXCLUDING ARMAMENT
REQUIREMENTS)
NUMBER OF
AIRCRAFT INSTALLED
PYROTECHNIC DEVICES USED
31
315
21 1
44
F-4 ARMAMENT
CARTRIDGE REQUIREMENTS
FOR A MISSION CONFIGURATION
OF (24) 500 LB BOMBS AND 4
SPARROW MISS1LES
42
MERCURY
NUMBER OF SPACECRAFT
INSTALLED PYROTECHNIC
DEVICES USED
46
GEMINI
139
SATURN
APPROX.
150
APO L LO
(CSMISLAILM)
314
APOLLO
(CSMISLA)
FOR SKY LAB
249
DEPLOYMENT
Mercury.
GUlLLOTlNE
1 REOD
EXPLOS1VE
VALVES
6 RE00
PYROTECHNIC
2 REOD
--
---
TABLE 111.
- Pro~erties
of a Time-Delay Miy
ID-16. MIL-M-213831
3 bv Weiaht
Jnuredient
37
Manqanese
Barium Chromate
Lead Chromate
Burn rate: 8.7 seconds/inch
Virtually gasless output
Stability: Extended service life results
in longer delay
Application in sequencing pyrotechnic functions
o Formula:
o
o
o
o
Reference 10
TABLE 1V.- Pro~ertiesof a Gas-Generatinu Material (Hercules
Hi-Tem~l
o Formula:
Jnuredient
RDX
Nitrocellulose
% bv Weiaht
80
20
o Gas Composition: CO
co2
H2
;2*
0Zher
o Stability: less than 1% weight loss in 5 hr. at 275OF
(Source: Hercules Incorporated)
o RDX sublimes under vacuum (shouldn't be used for deepspace applications; container seal is a single-point
failure)
o Sensitive to ambient pressure for ignition and
burning (higher rate at higher pressures)
o Application as gas generating source for cartridges
----
References 4 and 13
TABLE VI1.- Proverties of Lead Azide
o Transfers from a deflagration to detonation, short
distance (about 0.1 inch)
o Detonation rate of about 7,000 feetlsecond
o Thermally stable (except for desensitizing agents:
dextrin)
o Vacuum stable (except for dextrin)
o Long shelf life
o Sensitive to impact, friction and electrostatics
o Application in detonators to initiate a highexplosive output
References 14, 15 and 16
TABLE VIII,
- Proverties of Hexanitrostilbene
(HNSl
o Electrical
o Mechanical
o Hot Gas
..
--
- - - -
--
. .
---
--
References 4 and 13
--
---
Reference 22
5-2-1 Mechanical Initiator Characteristics (M42 Percussion Primer
exam~le)
o Convert mechanical energy to ignite primer mix
o Primer composition ignited by crushing/friction between
cup and anvil
o Provide reproducible initiation characteristics
No-Fire (1.92-ounce ball drop):
50% firing level drop height minus 2 standard
deviations
shall not be less than 2 inches (3.84 inch-ounces)
All-Fire (1.92-ounce ball drop):
50% firing level drop height plus 5 standard deviations
shall not exceed 13 inches (25.49 inch-ounces)
50% firing level approximately 10 inch-ounces
o Provide ignltion output (heat, gas, light, burning
particles)
o Provide post-fire seal
o Primers themselves not sealed; must be sealed by assembly
into which it is installed
3/8-24 THREAD
ELECTRICAL
CUP. CLOSURE
DISK.INSUL ATMC
DISK, SEALING
EPOXY S E A L BOTH PINS
.586
.596 REF-
\Rimer
Cup
\1
Legpd
tab Primer
o Used where full containment not necessary
o Sharp firing pin penetrates through cup o Achieves ignition by- fracturelfriction of primer
composition
o Input energy generally less than needed for
percussion primer
o Output comparable to percussion primer
The Separation Plane Initiator Assembly (figure 17) has a
number of valuable design features to assure operational
safety and reliability. The "remove before flight" Pip Pin
prevents any motion of the Firing Pin. The expanded diameter
of the Sear assembly shoulders on the bore of the Primer Pin
Yoke, preventing Firing Pin displacement and contact with the
Percussion Primer. The Spring was preloaded to keep the Sear
assembly shoulder engaqed, preventing rattle. The energy
content in the2Spring in inch-pounds is determined by the
equation 1/2kX , where k is the spring constant and X is the
compression distance. When the Wire Rope pulls on the Sear,
the Spring is compressed. The Sear releases the firing pin,
as the Sear clears the Primer Pin Yoke, allowing the Sear's
angular interlocking finger to slide off the corresponding
finger on the Firing Pin. The Support Disc prevents too
great a penetration by the Firing Pin into the Percussion
Primer.
O-RING.
FIRING P I N
SILICONE
PIP PIN -.
)--------.---- ( 2 . 9 6 3 )
I N I T I A T O R HOUSING
PERCUSSION PRIMER
'RIDGE. I N I T I A T O R .
ASSEMBLY
SILICONE
P R I M E R P I N YOKE
O-RING.
SILICONE
SUPPORT D I S C
YOKE SUPPORT
SPRING.
COMPRESSION
ROPE
l BLE
M i l d deltonating
cord (MDC)
in.
Teflon extrusion
Resistance we1 d --I
Steel ferrule
(SMDC)
21
Rigid explosive transfbr lines (figure 18) for hightemperature environments and the technology for their use
were developed for the F-111 escape system in the early
1960's. Explosive transfer from donors to acceptors is
primarily accomplished by cup fragments. The sketches in
figure 19 show the explosively driven shrapnel patterns
produced as the end tip cup explodes. The sketches in figure
20 show the gaps at whlch explosive transfers were
accomplished. The shrapnel fragments produced off the end
(bottom) of the cup proceed across the gap through the air in
a contoured front with approximately a one-degree divergence.
As.these fragments impact against an acceptor tip, a
sufficiently high impulse is introduced into the acceptor tip
to initiate detonation in the explosive. The donor cups must
be fully annealed after forming to produce the fragment
patterns shown in figure 19, so as to maximize the
reliability of transfer. Although gaps to five inches are
indicated between donor and acceptor, a maximum gap of 0.250
inch is recommended to accommodate the limits of variables,
such as cup wall thickness and properties, cup breakup, and
explosive density. In the "end to sidew configuration, the
cylindrical side of the acceptor tip is a poorer target; oncoming fragments can be deflected, reducing the amount of
energy transferred into the acceptor. In the side-to-end
transfer mode, the fragments produced off the sides of the
cylindrical cup are strips, like barrel staves. With the
radial expansion of these fragments, appreciable gaps occur
between fragments. Note, gaps must be at least 0.006 inch to
allow the formation of fraqments; this phenomenon can be
explained through the realization that the cup has to expand
slightly before it bursts to create high-velocity fragments.
From Lucite Cup Tests:
_r
Side s h o p e l cone
1 1
/ /
nd shropmol corn
opporimotely 25 f m m n t s
Side View
End View
Figure 19.
Poor Torget
I
S c c e a a ot
b=d-4=:-i
Donor
Chapter 6
----
References 14 and 15
Elaborate procedures have been established (usually with
military specifications) to provide comparative information
on each of the above properties for raw materials. For
example, lead azide often has desensitizing agents mixed into
it, and it is shipped under water, to reduce the opportunity
of inadvertent initiation. Also, loadinq facilities are
designed to accommodate inadvertent initiations; no matter
what care, procedures and logic are applied, initiations can
occur. However, once lead azide is properly loaded in
sealed, electrically conductive containers made of compatible
materials, it is very stable.
6-2 Safe/Arm Devices
o Safelam devices provide configurations for:
Input isolation (safe)
Input transfer (arm)
o Actuation accomplished by electrical input,
mechanical input, or both
Electrical
* Safe = ganged electrical switches to short circuit
and electrically ground firing leads to components
* Arm = same switches open shorts and connect to
electrical energy source
* Electrical command (manual backup) moves switches
* Verified visually and electrically
Mechanical
* Safe = Physical barrier interposed to prevent
transfer of explosive, gas, laser or other
initiation stimuli
* Arm = Barrier removed to allow stimulus
to transfer
* Commands can be manual, electrical
and/or pyrotechnic
* Verified visually and electrically
--
6-3 Com~onentSafeaaurds
Chapter 7
FUNCTIONAL PERFORMANCE
Reference 29
7-2 Functional Tests
---
I
CURRENT
CONSTANT
CURRENT
SOURCE
- VOLTAGE
M O N lTOR
MAGNET IC
TAPE
RECORDER
OSCILLO-
GRAPt-1
I
PERMANENT
RECORD
CAR'I'RIDGE
I
u
PRES.
(2)
XDUCERS
-t
4
VSI
+ HI-SHEAR. NO ENV
*
:
--
29
+k HI-SHEAR, NO ENV
++
UPCO, NO ENV
UPCO. POST ENV
Hi-Shear NCCC
UPCO NCCC
VS I
NSI
I
I
.2
.4
.6
.8
1 .O
T i m e , millisecond
1.2
1.4
1.6
of Functional Marain
o Examples of functional performance tests
Piston/cylinder configurations
Ignitability
Explosive transfer or initiation of explosive acceptors
Explosive severance/fracture
Flexible linear shaped charge (FLSC)
* Lockheed's t@Super*Zipwseparation joint
Structural containment
---
confiaurations
- to
Energy iequired measured by dropping mass onto piston
find minimum energy required to accomplish function
Cyl i n d e r
Anvi 1
I n i t i a t o r f i r i n g block
P i s ton
lloneycomb
retainer
Interface
/-
Adapter
P i s t o n cap 7
\L Honeyconlb cubes
L p i s t o n real
Energy Delivered
inch-pounds
466121
Hi-Shear NGGC
815199
UPCO NGGC
812190
Post Environments
Hi-Shear NGGC
16
869180
UPCO NGGC
12
927158
I inder
ton
Pressure transducer face
Cartridge port
ring
u
Cross sectional view of NASA LaRC Dynamic Test
Device.
JI
aooo
(\
t-"PC0
NGGC
Hi-SI1e.r
?!
750 inch-pounds
NGGC
.2
.4
780 inch-pounds
340 inch-pounds
,VSI-
u -1
.6
.8
1 .O
Time. milli~cconds
1.2
1.4
- 7 -
1.6
Cartridge Port
\\
rOrifice
(2)
,-Energy
Ab8orbing Cup
UPCO NGGC
520 inch-pounds
Hi-Shear NGGC
VSI
450 inch-pounds
150 inch-pounds
1.6
Time. millirecond
7.3.2
- Recommended
test for determininv ignitability (output
initiation performance of cartridges and ignition
sensitivity of materials)
Pressure at one millisecond
Peak pressure
References: 34, 35 and 36
DROP W E I G H T W I T H A C C E L E R O M E T E R
I t N l T A B l L l T Y T E S T BOMB
P R I M E RHOLDER
~ G N ~ T I O MNA T E R I A L
~ G N ~ T ~MO
A TNE R I A L HOLDER
PRESSURE T R A N S D U C E R
\\,
F I R I N G P I N STRIKE
PRESSURE
psig
at
'
FUNCTION TIME
IGNITABILITY
PRESSURE AT I m s
pW( PRESSURE
C1, FFG
BLACK POWDER
C2, FFG
BLACK POWDER
TIHE
- MILLISECONDS
7.3.3
--
Pattern 1 7
V,
V2 Vj
Pattern
L i n e detonation t r a n s f e r v e l o c i t y
A x i a l t i p fragment v e l o c i t y
Side t i p fragment v e l o c i t y
Pattern 1
Pattern 2
Radial fragment p a t t e r n i n a c r y l i c
End fragment p a t t e r n i n a c r y l i c
7.3.4
4
0.037 ligament
t-
0.095 hgarnenl
7.3.5
- Recommended
Tests for Demonstration of Structural
Containment
---
Chapter 8
FUNCTIONAL RELIABILITY
--
References 1, 4 and 40
Functional reliability must be evaluated on each device.
Each device should be evaluated through three phases:
development, determination of functional margins, and
qualification. This should be followed by system integration
and demonstration. The information collected throughout this
effort can be analyzed to produce classical statistical
reliability estimations. Every test firinq should be
designed to produce functional data that will contribute
toward defining reliability.
For each component, functional evaluations should be
conducted to understand the device's mechanisms and the
effect of parameter variability. Tests should be conducted
to functional limits. That is, tests should be conducted to
determine where devices fail to function to evaluate
parameters, such as structural strength and minimal
pyrotechnic energy input, and where structural failures
(rupturing) occur. The manner in which energy is delivered
within and by the device should be determined. The most
influential environment affectinq combustion is temperature.
At cold temperatures, both ignition sensitivity and burn rate
decrease. This combination normally produces the lowest
energy output. At high temperatures, the reverse occurs.
Also, at high temperatures, structural strength can be
reduced. The combination of higher combustion efficiency and
lower structural strength can push devices beyond structural
limits.
Currently applied go/no-go tests do not provide information
on functional performance, and contribute very little to
reliability predictions. When a device successfully passes
qualification testing, which typically requires 10 to 200
firings, the specification reliability is assumed to have
been met. The reliability/confidence predictions currently
in existence have been created by compiling the success of
M E A N ENERGY
ENERGY REQUIRED
TO PERFORM FUNCTION
MEANENERGY
LEVEL
ENERGY SUPPLIED
BY CARTRIDGE
MARGIN
O F SAFETY
I
INCREASING ENERGY
POTENTIAL
INCREASING ENERGY
Reference 1
Redundancy is defined as accomplishing a function through two
completely independent paths. In example A, figure 39, two
electrical firing systems each give a command to Single
SBASl B
SYSTEM B
6. REDUNDANT DEVICES
DEVICE A
SYSTEM
FUNCTION
SYSTEM
FUNCTION
=STEM
FUNCTION
DEVICE B
C. REDUNDANT CARTRIDGES
DEVICE
CARTRIDGE B
D . REDUNDANT SBASl
SEAS1 A
SBASl B
<
EXPLOSIVE
TlME DELAY
FALSE REDUNDANCY
TlME DELAY
--',
<
1
TRUE REDUNDANCY
SAFETY
PSYCHOLOGY
(NO FIRE)
RELIABILITY
(ALL FIRE)
...:....>..
... :
.:::
.:
_:_
. . . ,, , , ,.:;. ,
, ,,
, ,
PYROTECHNIC
Chapter 9
----
Chapter 10
o
o
o
o
Chapter 11
- PYROTECHNIC
--
Reference 4
The first cut at selecting and sizing the device, its
components, and its performance should be based on the
company's experience with comparable hardware. As described
in chapters 3 and 4, the possibilities and combinations are
nearly unlimited. One approach would be to use existing
hardware with minimal modifications and hardware that had
been qualified previously on a similar application. The
foundation to a successful design effort 1s to monitor
performance to determine and evaluate key functional
parameters; that is, those parameters, when slightly changed,
that most influence performance.
o Conduct development
Adjust performance to optimize
Conduct functional evaluation to limits of requirements
* Forces/loads
* Materials/conditions
* Environments
o Establish structural integrity
Locked shut
Pyrotechnic overload
At conditions of maximum stress, i.e. temperature
Dual-cartridge device must survive simultaneous firings
o Determine functional marginlreliability
--
References 4, 20 and 21
Development should be conducted to optimize the first five
parameters (energy delivery, materials/configurations,
scaling, compatibility and pyrotechnic charge) by conducting
functional evaluations to the limits of requirements.
Also affecting this optimization is the requirement to
maintain structural integrity. That is, the resistance to
rupture of the pressurized structure can be evaluated by a
locked-shut test (preventing stroke or motion of a piston),
or a pyrotechnic overload at conditions of maximum stress,
such as at temperature extremes. For those devices that
Chapter 12
o
o
o
o
- QUALIFICATION
---
--
References 2, 4, and 41
The objectives of component and subsystem qualification are
to demonstrate the capability to withstand environments and
to compile additional information on performance. By
determining the level of performance, based on dynamic or
passive energy measurements, this data will provide further
substantiation of functional margin demonstrations. Two
basic approaches exist in regard to conducting environmental
exposure tests: 1) exposing all test units to all
environments, and 2) subdividing the test units for
sequential exposure to environments. For example, with 5
groups of test units and 5 environments, group 1 would be
subjected to environment 1 and functionally tested, group 2
would be subjected to environments 1 and 2 and functionally
tested, group 3 would be subjected to environments 1, 2 and 3
and functionally tested, etc. With a thorough understanding
of the effects of environments from the developmental effort,
qualification testing should produce no surprises. However,
without a thorough development, test units are subdivided for
sequential exposures. This allows for determination of which
environment had a deleterious effect on performance. At the
conclusion of environmental exposures, the test units should
be functioned at physical and environmental extremes, as well
as demonstrate structural integrity.
Chapter 13
- PYROTECHNIC SHOCK
--
Reference 42
Recent spacecraft failures have been associated with a
mechanical environment called pyrotechnic shock. Following
the loss of memory on a backup computer in the Galileo
spacecraft, the Magellan and Mars Observer spacecraft have
been powered down, prior to firing pyrotechnics. A firing
command for pyrotechnically actuated valves was the last
signal to be transmitted to the Mars Observer before
communications with the spacecraft were lost. Since the
spacecraft had no onboard systems in operation, no diagnostic
information could be obtained to analyze the failure of the
spacecraft.
When pyrotechnic devices are functioned, dynamic, impulsive
waves of compressive and tensile strain are produced within
the device and through the release of loads at structural
interfaces. On functioning, pyrotechnic devices produce
strain by rapid, high pressurization of gas-actuated
mechanisms and the impact of these mechanisms at the limits
of the function. An example of the sudden release of loads
is a bolted interface released by explosive bolts. These
strain waves contain frequencies to over 40 khz. A 10 khz
upper frequency level is an artificial constraint applied by
dynamicists, due to the limitations of accelerometers and the
equipment used to simulate pyrotechnic shock inputs. An
assumption is made that frequencies above 10 khz cannot
damage structure. However, small-mass electronics have
exhibited sensitivities in this regime.
Chapter 14
--
Failure Modes and Effects Analyses (F'MEAs) are more than just
a paperwork qame to be played after a pyrotechnic device and
its application have been designed, developed and qualified.
FMEAs (what can Itgo wrong," and what can result) should be
considered throughout the effort, from the earliest
conceptualizations, through qualification. In fact,
considering FMEAs at the conclusion of the design process is
a mistake, since it is almost certainly too late to modify
devices or system designs. The emphasis should be placed on
preventinq incidents and demonstrating device and s stem
capabilities. The best way of preventing failures s through
design, using logic, such as the positioning of components to
assure proper assembly and the demonstration of functional
margins. Equal in importance is the awareness of personnel
concerning what the system is supposed to accomplish and how,
by way of device and subsystem schematics, as well as system
diagrams and assembly and checkout procedures.
Chapter 15
Reference 43
Installation, integration and checkout is not only the final
assurance the system will accomplish the required task, it is
the last opportunity to detect and correct any flaws in the
hardware or software of the systems. Since pyrotechnic
devices generally cannot be functioned during checkout of
electrical or other firing systems, it is imperative that
personnel are aware of what they are testing and what is
expected to occur on any given firing command. This
information should be included on end-to-end system
schematics, diagrams and procedures. One drawing should
contain sufficient information, (referring to supporting
drawings, hardware and procedures), to allow personnel to
trace an entire command subsystem from generation (what the
command is supposed to look like), through how it is
transferred to the pyrotechnic device, and what is supposed
to occur when the command is received. Simplified,
standardized labeling should be continuous throughout all of
the components of a subsystem; do not allow labeling to be
independent among individual subsystems and designers.
Accurate mockups (with appropriate sensors and indicators to
acknowledge the arrival of the command) of the devices and
subsystems into which these firing systems are to be
installed are also valuable in assuring that the system will
function as required and that the correct installations will
be accomplished. That is, personnel should be able to
understand that command A should be transmitted through
electrical circuit A to fire the primary energy source, not
just that a final connection was made. End-to-end checkouts
should be performed on the assembled subsystems by powering
up electrical (or other) firing circuits to verify the proper
firing signals were generated, and related to the commands at
the correct sequence, as well as to verify that the signals
were correct and reached the correct point to accomplish the
function.
Chapter 16
--
--
References 37 and 38
The survivability of pyrotechnic devices under long-term
shelf and service conditions should be evaluated by
demonstrating performance before and after such exposures.
The long-term stability of devices cannot be accurately
predicted, nor demonstrated through accelerated aging
techniques. Past assumptions have been made that 1) all
reactive materials have a predictable deterioration mechanism
to allow predictions of allowable lifetimes, and 2) elevating
the temperature would predictably accelerate the
deterioration.
Key performance parameters must be determined and a baseline
established for comparison to the performance produced by
devices removed from the shelf or after a lonq time in
service. For example, in the evaluation of rigid explosive
transfer lines, functional measurements included the velocity
of explosive propagation down the explosive cord, and the
velocity and pattern of the explosively accelerated fragments
off the end and side of the transfer cups. The purity of the
explosive materials was evaluated, and degradation studies
were conducted, which corroborated functional performance
decreases with loss in chemical purity. However, for
percussion primer-initiated devices, a chemical analysis of
the multi-ingredient primer mix would be not only complex,
but would be difficult to correlate to functional
performance. Furthermore, the failure modes of percussion
primers are contamination and displacement of the mix, due to
mechanical inputs, such as vibration. Therefore, the
evaluation emphasis was placed on determining functionality
with the highly sensitive ignitability test method.
The frequency of removing samples from service for evaluation
depends on the design, the performance of the device and the
criticality of its function. To use the rigid explosive
transfer llne example, the design of the line provides for
hermetic sealing of all explosive materials, the materials
selected were extremely pure and very stable under time and
Chapter 17
- Failure Investiaation of
--
Reference 4
Following the successful use of the Viking Lander pin puller
(figure 42) on the surface of the planet Mars, two other
programs selected it for further application. A NASA Langley
Research Center project, the Halogen Occultation Experiment
(HALOE), used residual Viking pin pullers. The Jet
Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) planned to go to the manufacturer
of these pin pullers to produce another lot, conduct a deltaqualification for their unique requirements, and fly it on
the Magellan spacecraft. However, early in their evaluation
effort, a unit only stroked half the required distance.
Following a JPL analysis and resolution, another unit failed
to stroke at all. This design was then abandoned by JPL and
another previously qualified pin puller was selected and
used. Meanwhile, NASA Langley Research Center had made a
commitment to use this device and elected to conduct a
failure investigation.
As shown in figure 42, the energy sources were the Viking
Standard Initiators (VSIs), which are virtually identical to
the NASA Standard Initiator (NSI). Firing either or both
units would accomplish the function. The outputs of the VSIs
each pressurized a blind port, that has a 0.100-inch diameter
orifice to vent the gas behind the piston. An 80-pound
strength shear pin prevented premature motion. An energy
absorbing cup was crushed by the excess energy achieved by
the piston/pin at the end of the stroke.
The Viking development effort relied on monitoring the peak
pressure produced in the pin puller to obtain an
understanding of functional margin. A transducer was
installed in the port opposite to the VSI that was fired. It
ENERGY
REQUIRED
TO FUNCTION
NO
CUP
ZRUSH
ORIGINAL
DETERMINISTIC
MARGIN
CRlTERlON
X 3
CUP CRUSH
136
ENERGY, IN-LBS
165
190
17.2
- Joint
Failure Investiaation of
Lockheed S u ~ e r * Z iSe~aration
~
--
References 2 and 39
The Lockheed Super*Zip separation joint was developed and
qualified in the late 1960's for payload shrouds (opening the
shroud lonqitudinally and across the nose) and for payload
release (c~rcumferential,cylindrical severance, as shown in
figure 44). In 1984, during a cold-temperature ground-test
demonstration of the ShuttleICentaur system, the joint failed
to separate around the entire circumference. This is one of
the worst possible failure modes, in that a partial
separation would prevent payload release, requiring astronaut
extravehicular activity to dump the payload. The Shuttle
cannot land with the partially released payload on-board.
Landing loads might cause the remainder of the joint to fail,
dropping the payload into the cargo bay, and destroying the
Orblter
IUS
If
F~~ght
lolm
(0 042 In. Irgamaml
9.5
1.27
7.5
(maximum allowable t h i ~ k n e s s ) ~
For the Shuttle/IUS:
(0.08213
1.71
Chapter 18
DISPOSAL METHODS
o Environmental restrictions
Burning to atmospheric discharge
Burial in land fills
Discharqe into streams/water
o Biggest Military problem = base cleanup/weapons disposal
o Government approach
Closed-cycle burning, minimal discharge
Chemically dissolving/separation/recycling
o U.S. Army Defense Ammunition Center and School
Savanna, Illinois 61074-9639
(815) 273-8901
--
--
REFERENCES
Lake, E.R.; Thompson, S. J.; and Drexelius, V.W.: A Study
of the Role of Pyrotechnics on the Space Shuttle Program.
NASA CR-2292, September 1973.
Bement, Laurence J. and Schimmel, Morry L.:
Integration of Pyrotechnics into Aerospace Systems.
Presented at the 27th Aerospace Mechanisms Symposium, May
12-14, 1993, NASA Ames Research Center, California.
Bement, Laurence J.: Pyrotechnic System Failures:
Causes and Prevention. NASA TM 100633, June 1988.
Bement, Laurence J. and Schimmel, Morry L.:
Determination of pyrotechnic ~unctionalMargin.
Presented at the 1991 SAFE Symposium, November 11-14,
1991, Las Vegas, Nevada.
Schimmel, Morry L.: The F-111 Crew Module: ~ a j o r
Challenge for Thermally Stable Explosives. Presented at
the Symposium on Thermally Stable Explosives, U.S. Naval
Ordnance ~aboratory-WhiteOak, silver Spring, Maryland.
June 23-25, 1970.
Bement, Laurence J.: Rotor Systems Research Aircraft
(RSRA) Emergency Escape System. Presented at the 34th
Annual National Forum of the American Helicopter Society,
Washington, DC, May 1978.
Simmons, William H.: Apollo Spacecraft Pyrotechnics.
NASA TM X-58032, October 1969.
Falbo, Mario J. and Robinson, Robert L.: Apollo
Experience Report. NASA TN D-7141, March 1973.
Graves, Thomas J.: Space Shuttle
A Pyrotechnic
Overview. Presented at the European Space Agency
Conference on Explosives and Pyrotechnics, Space
Applications, October 23-25, 1979, Toulouse, France.
Ellern, Herbert: Modern Pyrotechnics. Chemical
Publishing Company, 1961.
MIL-P-46994/B, Amendment 3: General specification for
boron/potassium nitrate
Drexelius, V. W. and Schimmel, M. L.: A Simplified
Approach to Parachute Mortar Design. Presented at the
Seventh Symposium on Explosives and Pyrotechnics,
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, September 7-9, 1971.
Design and Performance Specification for NSI-1 (NASA
Standard Initiator-1). SKB26100066. Januarv 3. 1990.
Meyer, Rudolph: ~xplosives. printed by ~ e c l a g
Chemie, 1977.
properties of Explosives of Military Interest. AMCP
706-177, AD 764340. U.S. Army Materiel Command, January
1971.
Rouch, L. L. and Maycock, J. N.: Explosive and
Pyrotechnic Aging Demonstration. NASA CR-2622, February
1976.
17. Material Specification for HNS Explosive, WS5003J.
Naval Surface Weapons Center, February 1981.
18. Kilmer, E. E.: Heat-Resistant Explosives for Space
Applications. Journal of Spacecraft and Rockets, Vol. 5,
--
F m 4w-d
w m . OlOCOlee
P u b l b ~ h r h b c h i ~ d H m r J o n b . . l i m d b u g . l ~ r
he4dhghh.b-=-dlr
*
.
r
k
o
~
~
*
~
~
~
d
~ P ~l l ~ d ~
*
~~ * ~
d r = Y n.
*
~dkhnnYohMvlirp-hr~*bubn.b~-~.D..OrLbkbrrmbn~rdRqorr1216J.I*MnD.ri.
C(igl*rq.&I*=.mVA
~ d ( D h O l l b . d - n d B d O l P ~ ~ P l o i . d ~ l Y ) . ~ . D C
1. m
12 REPORT DATE
I
I
297-50-00-02
8. PERFORMW ORQANIUTKWJ
REFORT NUMBER
lo.
SPONSORINQ IYON~ORLNG
MENCY REPOIIT NWBER
NASA TM 110172
I
Unclassified Unlimited
Subject Category 18
Although pyrotechnic devices have been singularly responsible for the success of many of the critical
mechanicalfunctions in aerospace programs for over 30 years, ground and in-flight failures continue to occur.
Subsequent investigations reveal that little or no quantitative information is available on measuring the effects on
performance of system variables or on determiningfunctional margins. hrotechnics are considered to be
readily available; and, therefore, can be managed by any subsystem in which they are applied, such as
structure, propulsion, electric power, or lie support. The primary purpose of this manual is to alter the concept
that the use of pyrotechnics is an art and refute qustlicationsathat applicationsdo not need to be understood by
providing information on pyrotechnic design, devebprnent, and qualification on an engineering basis. Included
are approaches to demonstrate functional reliabilii with less than 10 units, how to manage pyrotechnic-unique
requirements, and methods to assure that the system is properly assembled and will performthe requiredtasks.
I&
SUBJECTTERNS
1A NUMBER OF PUYO
Unclassified
ISN 754001-2805500
Unchsslied
;,,-,,
81
A05
I
Sundad Form 291 IRw. 2-