Bilateral Tension Pneumothorax Following

Equipment Improvisation
Christine Zambricki, CRNA, DNAP, FAAN
Carol Schmidt, CRNA, MS
Karen Vos, CRNA, MS
This case report describes an unexpected event that
took place as a result of using improvised equipment.
The patient, a 16-year-old female undergoing complex
oral surgery, suffered bilateral pneumothorax following the improper use of an airway support device.
During the immediate postoperative period with the
patient still intubated, oxygen tubing was attached
to a right angle elbow connector with the port closed
and 10 L/minute oxygen flow was administered to the
patient in a manner that did not allow the patient to
exhale. Within seconds, pneumothorax was apparent
as the patients vital signs deteriorated, visible swelling was noted in the shoulders and neck, and there

16-year-old, 162 cm, 86-kg female with a

history of fibromyalgia and temporomandibular joint pain underwent bilateral sagittal
ramus osteotomies with rigid fixation, total
maxillary osteotomy with graft, and advancement genioplasty with turbinectomy under general anesthesia. Preoperatively, the patient received midazolam
2 mg, dexamethasone 8 mg, and a 900 mg clindamycin
drip infused 1 hour prior to incision. Following preoxygenation, the patient was induced with propofol 250 mg,
1 mg midazolam, and 100 g fentanyl. Vecuronium 10
mg and xylocaine 30 mg were administered prior to placing a 7.0 nasoendotracheal tube x 1 attempt. Following
verification of placement by end-tidal CO2 and bilateral
breath sounds, the tube was secured, eyes taped, and the
anesthetic was maintained with isoflurane, oxygen, air
and nitrous oxide, fentanyl, and vecuronium. Metoclopramide 10 mg was administered shortly after induction.
The patients intraoperative course was uneventful with
stable vital signs and minimal blood loss. Dexamethasone
8 mg and ondansetron 4 mg were administered during the
case. Hydromorphone 0.5 mg and midazolam 2 mg were
given near the end of the anesthetic. The muscle relaxant
was reversed at the end of the case with neostigmine 4 mg
and glycopyrrolate, and the patient was somnolent with
spontaneous respirations and good oxygen saturation.
The procedure lasted approximately 7.5 hours.
The certified registered nurse anesthetists (CRNA)
called for a bed in the main recovery room but the
postanesthesia care unit (PACU) was full. It was a busy

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was an absence of breath sounds on auscultation. This

case study has application beyond the immediate discussion of bilateral pneumothorax, serving as a caution about the unintended consequences of equipment
improvisation. In addition to highlighting the hazards
of providing patient care with a non-standard device,
this study also provides a powerful example of the
human factors that can contribute to medical errors in
the healthcare setting.
Keywords: Equipment improvisation, human factors,
normalization of deviance pneumothorax, right angle
connector.

surgical day and operating rooms were at a premium so

the team needed to vacate the operating room rather than
remain until the patient was more fully awake.
The CRNA clinical coordinator instructed the team to
take the patient to the childrens surgical center recovery
room. This unit is located a short walk down the hallway
from the main operating room area and is commonly
used for low acuity pediatric outpatient surgery cases,
such as tonsillectomies and hernia repairs.
The patient was transported to the childrens center
PACU via stretcher with the nasoendotracheal tube in
place and spontaneous respirations. Oxygen was administered en route. As was the custom at this facility, the
right angle elbow connector from the breathing circuit
was left attached to the NET for postoperative oxygen
administration.
When the patient arrived to the pediatric outpatient
surgery recovery room, the exhaust port on the right
angle elbow connector was closed and the PACU nurse
placed the oxygen tubing tightly within the lumen of
the connector as she set the oxygen flow meter at 10
L/minute. Upon admission to the PACU, the modified
Aldrete score was 9 with a blood pressure of 116/77,
pulse 103, and respirations 16. The SaO2 was 100 and the
EKG showed sinus tachycardia.
While the report was being given, the patient was
noted to have swelling in the upper chest and face.
Cyanosis developed rapidly with concomitant tachycardia, hypotension, and decreasing SaO2. Chest auscultation
revealed minimal or absent breath sounds and expanding

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subcutaneous emphysema was noted throughout the patients upper chest and neck.
The endotracheal tube was quickly disconnected from
the curved connector oxygen source and a loud pressure release sound was noted. A STAT chest x-ray was
obtained and surgery was consulted. The chest x-ray
identified bilateral pneumothorax. The surgical resident
placed bilateral chest tubes and again an audible air pressure release was noted upon insertion of the tubes.
The patient was ventilated with 100% O2, placed on
a ventilator, and medicated for comfort. Her vital signs
returned to baseline. She was transferred to the pediatric
intensive care unit. The following day the patient was
extubated and the chest tubes were removed. The event
was fully disclosed to the patient and her family and she
was discharged from the hospital on the 6th postoperative day without further complications.

The scope of practice of CRNAs demands detailed

expertise and airway management is of vital concern.
Nonetheless, anesthesia providers continue to experience
challenges within this clinical realm, as over 37% of liability claims in the American Society of Anesthesiologists
(ASA) Closed Claims Project database are due to issues
related to airway management.1 In their early and precedent setting work in anesthesia safety, Cooper et al
identified airway-related occurrences as contributing to
the highest number of critical incidents in anesthesia
practice.2
Oxygen is commonly delivered from a central hospital
supply. Through the use of metered down-regulating
devices, the high pressure (50 psi) hospital source is
reduced to low pressure variable flow delivered within
physiologic ranges, generally at a flow rate of 115 L/
minute.
Pneumothorax as a Critical Incident. Barotrauma
and bilateral pneumothorax are serious physiologic abnormalities that can result in significant morbidity and
even death. In the anesthesia literature, these complications are described most commonly in association with
jet ventilation and rarely seen in the course of routine
recovery from general anesthesia.3,4,5 It is unusual for
cases describing pulmonary barotrauma to appear in conjunction with low-pressure oxygen insufflation alone,6
but when it occurs, it is generally due to problems with
egress of air from the lungs.
Anesthesia-associated pneumothorax have also been
known to occur following central venous pressure line
placement, right mainstem bronchus intubation, regional
nerve block, or surgery in close proximity to the pleural
cavity, such as nephrectomy. Other causes of pneumothorax include injury during chest trauma or with
diagnostic procedures, such as pleurocentesis or laparoscopy. Spontaneous pneumothorax may also occur in

association with chronic obstructive pulmonary disease

or occasionally in healthy young adults.
Pulmonary barotrauma may occur with the rapid or
excessive application of positive pressure to the tracheobronchial tree and is damaging to the respiratory structures. Volutrauma is a distinct entity referring to overdistension of alveoli. Initially well tolerated, this increase in
volume eventually leads to an increase in pressure, culminating in barotrauma. The subsequent alveolar injury
results in a tension pneumothorax.
While high-pressure jet ventilation may cause barotrauma by direct damage to tissues, low-flow gas insufflation may first cause volutrauma which can lead to
barotrauma. In this case study, the continuous gas insufflation was particularly hazardous because the closed
cap on the circuit elbow coupled with the tight fit of
the oxygen tubing prevented the egress of exhaled gas.
At 10 L/min flow, rapid breath stacking and auto-PEEP
occurred. The inspired gas volume exceeded the exhaled
gas volume with resultant volutrauma damaging lung
parenchyma. This injury led to barotrauma and bilateral
pneumothorax within seconds.
Gaba7 identifies several critical strategies for the
recognition and treatment of pneumothorax, including
prompt diagnosis by chest auscultation, assessment of
tracheal deviation (unilateral pneumothorax, especially
tension pneumothorax), and recognition of soft tissue
swelling and crepitus. Simultaneous administration of
100% oxygen, vasopressors, insertion of a large-bore IV
catheter into the pleural space at the intersection of the
second intercostal space and the mid-clavicular line are
essential strategies while the responsible surgeon is notified. These immediate interventions are life-saving until
a chest tube can be placed. In the event of cardiovascular
collapse, vasopressors may be required.
Human Factors. The Swiss Cheese Model8 (Figure
1) is a familiar failure construct in healthcare depicting layers of defense in which, on occasion, the holes in
the defenses line up and a latent error turns into a bad
patient outcome. This case study describes human factors
that together resulted in swift deterioration of a young
healthy patient and avoidable morbidity. Even though
the critical event was perceived as sudden in onset and
rapid in development, it is clear that the evolution of this
crisis emerged from preexisting factors.
In order to achieve a root cause understanding, this
case will be analyzed based on a human factors approach9 as well as crew resource management principles.
Fletcher10 proposes the acronym ERR WATCH as an effective tool for CRNAs to remember and interpret these
concepts. These ERR WATCH principles will be used to
guide our case discussion (Table 1).
Environment. The environment consists of people,
location, and things that come together in the care of the
patient.

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Discussion

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Fletchers ERR WATCH principles

Know your environment
Use your resources appropriately
Reevaluate frequently
Workload
Attention allocation
Teamwork
Communication
Call for help early

Table 1. ERR WATCH

Figure 1. Swiss Cheese Model (Reason)

Adapted with permission.

Figure 2. Right Angle Connector with Port Open and

Oxygen Tubing Inserted

Figure 3. Traditional T-piece with Oxygen Tubing

Attached

A key predisposing factor in this case was the presence

of a latent error that had been dormant in the system for
a long time. It was customary at this hospital to transport
intubated patients to the recovery room with the curved
connector from the anesthesia breathing circuit attached
to the endotracheal tube. The port cap for end-tidal CO2
monitoring during anesthetic administration was always
left open or removed. In the PACU, green oxygen tubing
was pushed into the open end of the curved connector
and the other end was connected to the oxygen flow
meter (Figure 2).
This improvised equipment was referred to as a tpiece by the staff. In contrast, a traditional t-piece is a
plastic t with a plastic corrugated tube attached to one
side and the other side attached to a humidified jar that
is connected to the oxygen source (Figure 3). Exhaled air
flows freely out of the corrugated tubing.
Lacking correct equipment in a hospital is not uncommon. The improvised t-piece in this case study can
be viewed as a concrete example of the normalization
of deviance described by Vaughan11 in reference to the
Challenger disaster. In the case of both rocket science
and hospital procedure, production pressure and the
institutional goal to reduce costs become part of depart-

mental culture. The improvised t-piece in this case study

had been in place for at least a decade without apparent
harm to patients; thus, the continued successful outcome
gave the impression of low risk to patients and clever
cost-saving ingenuity. The perceived risk of using this
invention dissipated with the gradual acceptance of the
abnormal as normal.
In human beings, performance is not constant; rather,
it varies because it is affected by many factors, such as
fatigue, stress, distraction, and production pressure.
These realities in the operating room environment may
have played a role in causing the human error of leaving
the port closed on the curved connector (Figure 4).
Clinicians do not consciously sacrifice safety to cut
costs or get the next case completed faster. Rather, production pressure and resource constraints become institutionalized into operating room culture. Although in
retrospect it is easy to see that using this piece of equipment for a purpose for which it was not designed was
a bad decision, the equipment was used successfully in
this manner for years without patient harm and became
an established norm. Through repeated use, acceptance
persisted until the combination of this latent error and
human factors led to a critical incident.

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Fixation error: the persistent failure to revise a diagnosis or

plan in the face of readily available evidence that suggests a
revision is necessary
This and only this
There is a persistent failure to revise a diagnosis or plan despite
plentiful evidence to the contrary. The available evidence is
interpreted to fit the initial diagnosis. Attention is allocated to a
minor aspect of a major problem.
Everything but this
There is a persistent failure to commit to the definitive treatment
of a major problem. An extended search for information is made
without ever addressing potentially catastrophic conditions.

Figure 4. Right Angle Connector with Port Closed and

Oxygen Tubing Inserted

Everything is OK
There is a persistent belief that no problem is occurring in
spite of plentiful evidence that it is. Abnormalities are attributed to artifacts or transients. There is a failure to declare an
emergency or seek help when facing a major crisis.

Table 3. Fixation Error (DeKeyser)

Simultaneous interventions
Sensorimotor Level
Detach oxygen source
Ventilate the patient
Procedural Level

Source: DeKeyser V, Woods DD, Masson M, et al. Fixation

Errors in Dynamic and Complex Systems: Descriptive Forms,
Psychological Mechanisms, Potential Countermeasures. Technical
Report for NATO Division of Scientific Affairs. Brussels, Belgium:
NATO; 1988. Used with permission.

Other environmental factors leading to this event

were the people and location of the care. The Registered
Nurse (RN) and the CRNA involved in the care of the
patient had not worked together before. The recovery
room location was unexpected and somewhat unfamiliar
to the CRNA; she was directed at the end of the case to
change the postoperative plan and proceed to the pediatric PACU rather than to the PACU adjacent to the main
operating room. This last-minute change in plans was a
distraction that took the CRNAs attention away from the
routine action of removing the cap on the curved connector. Similarly, the PACU RN involved in the case felt that
she was not familiar with caring for adult-like patients
undergoing adult procedures. This insecurity was partially responsible for the nurses decision not to question
the airway equipment set up.
Resources. Effective management of critical incidents when they occur is the key to preventing evolution to an adverse outcome. Resource management is an
essential skill for nurse anesthetists. Within the context
of detecting and correcting problems in the periopera-

tive environment, the resources available to the CRNA

include self, other personnel, equipment, cognitive aids,
and external resources.
In this case, the CRNA detected the problem and deployed critical resources to intervene before it progressed
to a potentially fatal outcome. While giving report, the
CRNA used parallel processing (giving report and observing the patient at the same time). The anesthetists
decision making at this point involved multiple levels of
activity (Table 2).12
With the possible exception of inserting a large-bore
intravenous catheter into the pleural space to immediately treat the pneumothorax, the handling of this event
was successful based on universally accepted algorithms
and abstract reasoning for an optimum result. The chest
x-ray confirmed the clinical diagnosis but was not essential in an unstable patient.
When the CRNA detected that something was wrong
with the patient, fixation errors13 (Table 3) were not
a factor as the CRNA moved immediately to active resource management. This is consistent with the preconditioned response of an expert vs a novice anesthetist.
Reevaluate. Successful dynamic problem solving requires frequent reevaluation because the available cues do
not always identify a problem. Had the CRNA reevaluated
the nasoendotracheal tube and the connector during transport of the patient, the problem may have been detected
sooner. Prior to connecting the oxygen is a good time to
reevaluate the entire oxygen delivery system for patency
and correctness.
After the critical event occurred, frequent reevaluation
of the patient took place, including repeated auscultation
of the chest, rechecking vital signs, obtaining pertinent lab

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Reassess the patient

Check breath sounds
Call for help
Abstract
Respond to unanticipated cues
Respond to new information about the patients condition
Collaborate to solve the problems, ie, chest tubes, ICU
admission

Table 2. Levels of Activity in Crisis

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results, and reevaluation of oxygenation and perfusion.

Workload. When a crisis occurs, the CRNA must
call for help and distribute the workload across all of the
available resources. Tasks must be assigned based on the
skills of the individuals. In this case, there was no overload or failure as a team. The team membersincluding
surgeon, anesthesiologist, surgical resident, CRNA, RN,
and radiation technologistworked in a coordinated
fashion and performed correct and timely interventions
successfully.
Attention. Attention allocation is a dynamic process
in which tasks must continually be reprioritized. Although
this cascade of events was set in motion by a lack of attention to an important detail (capped port on curved connector), team members maintained vigilant assessment
of the patient throughout the myriad of tasks occupying
their attention.
Teamwork. Good teamwork is never as important as
it is in the midst of a patient crisis; yet, it is frequently
at that point where teamwork breaks down. In this case
study, the team worked well together. They concentrated
on what was right for the patient rather than what had
happened or whose fault it was. Due to the atmosphere
of open exchange, everyone participated in reassessing
the patient and acting on the information in a concerted
manner.
Communication. Good communication is a complex
skill that is required for highly effective teamwork. In
healthcare as in aviation, the social structure of communication may impair the conveyance of clear meaning.14
For example, an individual from a social level considered
subordinate may hesitate to mention a concern or to
correct someone considered to be their superior.
Nursing has a long history of not speaking up in relation to physicians, but this case describes the reluctance
of an RN to question an advanced practice nursethe
CRNA. After the fact, the PACU RN reported that when
the CRNA brought the patient to the pediatric PACU she
thought it odd that the port on the connector was closed
but she hesitated to bring it up because she assumed that
the CRNA knew more than she did and she did not want
to appear foolish. The RN had not previously worked
with the CRNA and said that she felt hesitant to question
the CRNA since she worried that the CRNA would not
respond positively to her questions.

Conclusion
This case study reports an unexpected event in the
course of treating a patient and the resultant morbidity
as a result of latent errors and human factors. A review
such as this serves to draw attention to these conditions
and assist clinicians who may encounter similar circum-

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stances in the future. These important lessons include

the value of explaining rather than judging when critical
incidents occur.
While there is no question that human error occurred
in this case, this human mistake proved a starting point
for deeper investigation into the factors that contribute to
errors within an anesthesia department. Only people can
create safety in an inherently unsafe and complex healthcare system by reconciling the multiple constraints and
complexities within the organization to improve care.
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AUTHORS
Christine Zambricki, CRNA, DNAP, FAAN, was previously at William
Beaumont Hospital and held several administrative positions, including
assistant hospital director for surgical services and chief nurse executive.
Email: [email protected].
Carol Schmidt, CRNA, MS, is the director of nurse anesthesia at William Beaumont Hospital.
Karen Vos, CRNA, MS, is a clinical nurse anesthetist at William
Beaumont Hospital and a Clinical Instructor at the Oakland UniversityBeaumont Graduate Program of Nurse Anesthesia.

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