Congo

This OECD report examines risks prevalent in cobalt and copper sourcing from the Democratic Republic of the Congo, as well as strategies for building more responsible mineral supply chains. The report highlights often-overlooked links in the supply chain, challenging assumptions that industrial and artisanal mining and refining are entirely distinct. It raises concerns about the low level of scrutiny of some risks and calls upon copper and cobalt users to extend due diligence beyond child labour to include corruption and human rights risks associated with security forces.

Ce rapport de l'OCDE examine les risques liés à l'approvisionnement en cobalt et en cuivre de la République démocratique du Congo, ainsi que les stratégies visant à construire des chaînes d'approvisionnement en minéraux plus responsables. Le rapport met en lumière des maillons souvent négligés de la chaîne d’approvisionnement, remettant en question les hypothèses selon lesquelles l’exploitation minière et le raffinage industriels et artisanaux sont entièrement distincts. Il soulève des inquiétudes quant au faible niveau de surveillance de certains risques et appelle les utilisateurs de cuivre et de cobalt à étendre leur diligence raisonnable au-delà du travail des enfants pour inclure les risques de corruption et de droits de l'homme associés aux forces de sécurité.

This report takes stock of 5 years of implementation of national and international programmes and initiatives designed to operationalise the recommendations of the OECD Due Diligence Guidance on Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas in the Great Lakes Region of Central Africa, mainly focusing on the Democratic Republic of the Congo. It has been prepared by the International Peace Information Service (IPIS) for the OECD.

Ce rapport fait le point sur 5 années de mise en œuvre de programmes et d'initiatives nationaux et internationaux conçus pour opérationnaliser les recommandations du Guide OCDE sur le devoir de diligence pour des chaînes d'approvisionnement responsables en minerais provenant de zones de conflit ou à haut risque dans la région des Grands Lacs d'Afrique centrale. , se concentrant principalement sur la République démocratique du Congo. Il a été préparé par le Service international d’information sur la paix (IPIS) pour l’OCDE.

Congo has four tax agreements in force as reported in its response to the Peer Review questionnaire. One of those agreements, the agreement with China (People’s Republic of), complies with the minimum standard.

La Colombie compte quatorze conventions fiscales en vigueur, ainsi que l’indique sa réponse au questionnaire d’examen par les pairs, y compris la Décision 578 de la Commission de la Communauté andine pour les membres de la Communauté andine (la Convention de la Communauté andine) La Décision 578 de la Commission de la Communauté andine établissant un régime tendant à éviter la double imposition et à prévenir la fraude fiscale, adoptée le 4 mai 2004. Les membres actuels de la Communauté andine sont la Bolivie*, la Colombie, l’Équateur* et le Pérou. . Quatre de ces conventions sont conformes au standard minimum.

Congo can legally issue the following two types of rulings within the scope of the transparency framework: (i) cross-border unilateral APAs and any other cross-border unilateral tax rulings (such as an advance tax ruling) covering transfer pricing or the application of transfer pricing principles; (ii) permanent establishment rulings.

Congo has not yet introduced a requirement for the filing of CbC reports, as required under the BEPS Action 13 (CbC reporting) minimum standard.

Le Congo compte trois conventions fiscales en vigueur, comme l’indique sa réponse au questionnaire d’examen par les pairs. Aucune de ces conventions n’est conforme au standard minimum.

Congo has three tax agreements in force as reported in its response to the Peer Review questionnaire. None of those agreements, comply with the minimum standard.

Congo can legally issue the following two types of rulings within the scope of the transparency framework: (i) cross-border unilateral APAs and any other cross-border unilateral tax rulings (such as an advance tax ruling) covering transfer pricing or the application of transfer pricing principles and (ii) permanent establishment rulings.

Congo has not yet introduced a requirement for the filing of CbC reports, as required under the BEPS Action 13 (CbC reporting) minimum standard.

Le Congo compte trois conventions fiscales en vigueur, comme l’indique sa réponse au questionnaire d’examen par les pairs. Aucune de ces conventions n’est conforme au standard minimum.

Congo has three tax agreements in force as reported in its response to the Peer Review questionnaire. None of those agreements, comply with the minimum standard.

Congo can legally issue the following two types of rulings within the scope of the transparency framework: (i) cross-border unilateral APAs and any other cross-border unilateral tax rulings (such as an advance tax ruling) covering transfer pricing or the application of transfer pricing principles and (ii) permanent establishment rulings.

Congo does not yet have legislation in place to implement the BEPS Action 13 minimum standard.

Congo has three tax agreements in force, as reported in its response to the Peer Review questionnaire.

Le Congo compte trois conventions fiscales en vigueur, comme l’indique sa réponse au questionnaire d’examen par les pairs.

Congo can legally issue the following two types of rulings within the scope of the transparency framework: i) cross-border unilateral advance pricing agreements (APAs) and any other cross-border unilateral tax rulings (such as an advance tax ruling) covering transfer pricing or the application of transfer pricing principles and ii) permanent establishment rulings.

Congo was first reviewed during the 2018/2019 peer review. This report is supplementary to that previous report (OECD, 2018[2]).