African Borders, Conflict, Regional and

Continental Integration

This book looks at the ways African borders impact war and conflict, as well
as the ways continental integration could contribute towards cooperation,
peace and well-being in Africa.
African borders or borderlands can be a source of problems and opportu-
nity. There is often a historical, geospatial and geopolitical architecture
rooted in trajectories of war, conflict and instability, which could be trans-
formed into those of peace, regional and continental integration and devel-
opment. An example is the cross-border and regional response to the Boko
Haram insurgency in West Africa. This book engages with cross-border forms
of cooperation and opportunity in Africa. It considers initiatives and inno-
vations which can be put in place or are already being employed on the
ground, within the current regional and continental integration projects.
Another important element is that of cross-border informality, which simi-
larly provides a ready resource that, if properly harnessed and regulated,
could unleash the development potential of African borders and borderlands.
Students and scholars within Geography, International Relations and
Border Studies will find this book useful. It will also benefit civil society
practitioners, policymakers and activists in the NGO sector interested in
issues such as migration, social cohesion, citizenship and local development.

Inocent Moyo is a Senior Lecturer in the Department of Geography and

Environmental Studies at the University of Zululand, South Africa.

Christopher Changwe Nshimbi is Director and Department of Science and

Technology-National Research Foundation (DST-NRF) Research Fellow,
Centre for the Study of Governance Innovation (GovInn), Department of
Political Sciences, University of Pretoria, Pretoria, South Africa.
Border Regions Series
Series Editor: Doris Wastl-Walter, University of Bern, Switzerland

In recent years, borders have taken on an immense significance. Throughout

the world they have shifted, been constructed and dismantled, and become
physical barriers between socio-political ideologies. They may separate socie-
ties with very different cultures, histories, national identities or economic
power, or divide people of the same ethnic or cultural identity.
As manifestations of some of the world’s key political, economic, societal
and cultural issues, borders and border regions have received much academic
attention over the past decade. This valuable series publishes high quality
research monographs and edited comparative volumes that deal with all
aspects of border regions, both empirically and theoretically. It will appeal to
scholars interested in border regions and geopolitical issues across the whole
range of social sciences.

The Politics of Good Neighbourhood

State, Civil Society and the Enhancement of Cultural Capital in East Central
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Béla Filep

European Borderlands
Living with Barriers and Bridges
Edited by Elisabeth Boesen and Gregor Schnuer

Ethnicity, Gender and the Border Economy

Living in the Turkey -Georgia Borderlands
Latife Akyüz

Community, Change and Border Towns

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Borderless Worlds for Whom?

Ethics, Moralities and Mobilities
Edited by Anssi Paasi, Eeva-Kaisa Prokkola, Jarkko Saarinen and Kaj
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African Borders, Conflict, Regional and Continental Integration

Edited by Inocent Moyo and Christopher Changwe Nshimbi

For more information about this series, please visit: www.routledge.com/

geography/series/ASHSER-1224
African Borders, Conflict,
Regional and Continental
Integration

Edited by
Inocent Moyo and Christopher Changwe
Nshimbi
First published 2019
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A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Names: Moyo, Inocent, editor. | Nshimbi, Christopher Changwe, editor.
Title: African borders, conflict, regional and continental integration /
[edited by] Inocent Moyo and Christopher Changwe Nshimbi.
Description: Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY : Routledge, [2019] |
Series: Border regions series | Includes bibliographical references and index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2018060684| ISBN 9780367174835 (hbk : alk. paper) |
ISBN 9780429057014 (ebk)
Subjects: LCSH: Regionalism--Africa. | Africa--Boundaries. |
Borderlands--Africa. | Peace-building--Africa. | African cooperation.
Classification: LCC JQ1873.5.R43 A37 2019 | DDC 327.6--dc23
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ISBN: 978-0-367-17483-5 (hbk)

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Contents

1 Borders, war and conflict in Africa: revisiting the narrative of a

war-torn continent 1
INOCENT MOYO AND CHRISTOPHER CHANGWE NSHIMBI

2 Borders and the coloniality of human mobility: a view from

Africa 11
EVERISTO BENYERA

3 Trans-border trajectories of violence: capabilities for peace and

cooperative engagement in the Afar Horn 30
MUAUZ GIDEY ALEMU

4 Border porosity and counterinsurgency in Nigeria 63

JAMES OKOLIE-OSEMENE AND BENJAMIN ADENIRAN ALUKO

5 Border fragility and the causes of war and conflict in the

Democratic Republic of the Congo 89
NELSON ALUSALA

6 The cross-border dimension of intrastate conflicts in Africa: an

analysis of the Great Lakes region and Mano River 115
JACKSON A. ALUEDE

7 Taking sustainable development to the limits: State policy –

grassroots actor activities interface in borderlands 136
CHRISTOPHER CHANGWE NSHIMBI

8 Undocumented migration between Zimbabwe and South Africa:

reflections on migration and peace 160
INOCENT MOYO

9 An examination of the SADC regional integration posture in the

context of the contested 2008 election run-off in Zimbabwe 172
PATRICK DZIMIRI
vi Contents
10 Does war/conflict hinder REI in Africa? The regional
integration–conflict/war nexus 197
NTONGWA BUNDALA

11 Innovations for “silencing the guns” and redefining African

borders as promoters of peace, wellbeing, regional and
continental integration 217
CHRISTOPHER CHANGWE NSHIMBI AND INOCENT MOYO

Index 223
1 Borders, war and conflict in Africa
Revisiting the narrative of a war-torn
continent
Inocent Moyo and Christopher Changwe Nshimbi

Introduction
The causes of conflict in Africa are many, just as they are complex. In this
book we expand on this debate by focusing on the porosity of African borders
and their (possible) effect in fuelling war and conflict on one hand, and the
likelihood that they are sources or facilitators of peace, on the other hand.
The definition of a border is paramount, because it provides an overarching
frame of reference in this book. Borders are not only lines at the margins of
nation-states, but are also political institutions and spaces constituted of
social and political processes (Berg and van Houtum, 2003; Newman, 2006;
Johnson et al., 2011; Moyo, 2016). This is aptly captured by Novak (2011:
742) who observes that borders are “both static markers of sovereign jur-
isdictions and socially produced and reproduced institutions”. In this sense,
borders perform and serve a material and symbolic function (Anderson and
O’Dowd, 1999). The result of this is that they “can have a very obvious pre-
sence and even where visually indistinct, they are typically the bearers of a
wider symbolism” (Anderson and O’Dowd, 1999: 595). The obvious material
function and effect of borders is that they define the territoriality of nation-
states. This material function and effect of borders is evident in different
nation-states on the African continent and can be traced to the Berlin Con-
ference of 1884–85. Yes, that African borders are an artificial construct
occasioned by the deliberations of conveners and participants of the Berlin
conference of 1884–85 is well documented (see, e.g., Miles, 2014; Bach, 1997).
The mere fact that such borders are a product of colonial gerrymandering
means that these divisions are arbitrary in as much as they disregarded
socioeconomic conditions and existing naturally occurring sociocultural and
political delineations of the continent’s inhabitants (Miles, 2014; Ramutsin-
dela, 1999; Coleman, 1994). For this reason, people in many parts of Africa
have continued to migrate from one country to the other, demonstrating that
“boundary lines never proved much of a physical obstacle” (Bach, 1997: 103).
This frequent interaction of people across African borders seems to suggest
that the borders crossed them, rather than the people crossing the borders
(Lamb, 2014; Moyo, 2016). Despite this, many so-called post-colonial states
2 Inocent Moyo and Christopher Changwe Nshimbi
in Africa have rigidly maintained and enforced the colonial border (Moyo,
2016; Oloruntoba, 2018). This is the context within which Everisto Benyera
(Chapter 2 in this volume) argues that the partitioning of Africa by the Eur-
opean colonisers not only enabled the imperial powers to divide and rule
Africa but also planted the seeds of conflict. It also forced African countries
“to enter into the global capitalist, legal and Euro-North American moral
order” and also bequeathed postcolonial states with a lot of lethal institutions
such as borders (see, Chapter 2). The extent to which these institutions are
lethal is evidenced by, among others, the fact that the borders divide rather
than unite African people (see, e.g., Flynn, 1997; Moyo, 2016; Nshimbi,
2017). It can also be illustrated by the way in which most African countries
approach the movement of people across these institutions in contiguous
border areas which separate people who share common histories, ethnic
identities and cultures. Flynn (1997), Moyo (2016) and Nshimbi (2017),
respectively study borders in countries that span West, Southeast and South-
ern Africa. They each tell of the ways in which people who dwell in the bor-
derlands of disparate African countries in those places stake their claim to
cross-border movements; sometimes defying state authorities because, as far
as these people are concerned, the border is an institution imposed on and
dividing their longstanding habitat and communities. Such people are referred
to as border citizens (Meeks, 2007; Moyo, 2016). But today’s African state,
demarcated almost a century and half ago by colonialists, and modelled
according to the Westphalian state designed in the global North, apparently
opts to ignore such historical and contemporary ethnocultural and social
realities. The African state chooses instead to treat as law breakers, people
who are separated by the social and politically constructed symbols which
ignore the fact that these peoples are drawn together across such lines by
strong historical and filial bonds. This has led to the criminalisation of
migration between African states and the resultant xenophobia, as demon-
strated in Chapter 8 of this volume.
With this in mind, the chapters in this volume engage with the coloniality of
African borders; and the extent to which such coloniality led to the balk-
anisation of African countries and the conflict that this engendered (Chapter 2)
in some parts of Africa. These borders are abyssal lines. They have constructed
“others” out of people who have always been one community. Because of the
balkanisation of African countries, it is no wonder that their borders are
porous and serve as theatres of cross-border and regional conflicts for some
countries (see Chapter 3, Chapter 4, Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 in this volume).
There are various symbolic functions of borders – one of which may be
“putting distance in proximity” (Groupe Frontière et al., 2004 cited in Szary,
2015: 36) – suggesting that borders are “a kind of space where the relation-
ship with otherness can be developed in such a way as to allow for identity-
building and place-making” (Szary, 2015: 36). Just like in their material
forms, as social and political institutions, borders have been used as processes
to create and increase distance between and amongst African people, thus
 Borders, war and conflict in Africa 3
engendering xenophobia. Further, they have been used to create an archi-
tecture which provides a foundation for and thus sustain a trajectory of vio-
lence (see Chapter 3, Chapter 4, Chapter 5, Chapter 6, Chapter 8 and
Chapter 9 in this volume).
From the foregoing, it is evident that borders as material and symbolic
institutions have a divisive impact on African countries. However, we are also
using the same logic of the materiality and symbolism of borders to advance
the view that, beyond fostering a trajectory of conflict, violence and war,
borders can also provide an architecture for peace in Africa. This is the logic
behind regional integration schemes and the ultimate unification and “elim-
ination” of borders in Africa, as immortalised in the 1991 Abuja Treaty for
Establishing the African Economic Community and the Agenda 2063 project.
It is the context within which we advance the innovation that, as social or
symbolic institutions, borders can be used to promote peace and integration
on the continent. If borders can be used to put “distance in proximity”
(Groupe Frontière et al., 2004 cited in Szary, 2015: 36), they could equally be
used to move distance to proximity between and amongst African people.
This is because there are networks and different sets of cross-border archi-
tectures that existed in precolonial and survived colonial and post-colonial
systems. Such can be easily utilised for the purpose of development, peace,
integration and African unity (see Chapter 3, Chapter 7). By suggesting that
African borders can be innovatively used for establishing peace in Africa, we
are not oblivious to the presence of other processes and/or factors within
African states and, indeed, other “borders” that can militate against peace.
But this is a modest attempt at initiating debate which will ultimately lead to
a conceptualisation of African borders and borderlands beyond zones and
spaces where chaos and violence reign supreme. In this vein, the different
contributions in this volume attempt to bring to the fore the different angles
to this debate.

The reality of the African border

Thus, the liberal movements that occur across Africa’s extensive and porous
borders, which in some cases disregard the colonial and post-colonial borders,
do not signify either the non-existence or the reality of the border. In fact,
African borders matter. They have an impact to the extent that they “separate
areas in war from countries at peace and democracies from dictatorships; they
structure settlement patterns, cultural forms, typical economic activities, con-
sumption opportunities or kinship ties” (Dobler, 2016: 147). This means that,
different administrative mechanisms, among other factors, account for why
some countries prosper and are peaceful, while others do not enjoy these
positives (Dobler, 2016). These differences emphasise that borders do matter
(Dobler, 2016). It is these differences between African states that directly or
indirectly trigger cross-border movement. This, in essence means that cross-
border movement is inevitable and that it occurs within the context where
4 Inocent Moyo and Christopher Changwe Nshimbi
some African states obsess about strengthening the border. But the strength-
ening of porous African borders actually does not deter and may, in fact,
generate other forms of cross-border migration. Cross-border movements
may occur at undesignated crossing points. This is pertinent in this age, when
some undesirable phenomena such as terrorism seen in the activities of Boko
Haram in West Africa or Al Shabab in the Horn of Africa, for example, have
been on the increase.

The African border as a source of conflict

The colonial border in Africa is, itself, a (potential) source of conflict too.
This arises from attempts by some of the continent’s post-colonial states to
enact or redefine the colonial border they share with fellow post-colonial
states. Tensions of this sort are spread out across Africa, with associated
challenges including terrorism, ethnic violence, military clashes, cattle rus-
tling, smuggling of goods as well as human smuggling and human trafficking,
among others. Multiple challenges underlying border disputes in this regard
fundamentally boil down to claims over or access to natural resources. In
Southern Africa, for example, South Africa and Namibia have long contested
over the Orange River while Botswana has had its own disagreements with
Namibia over the exploitation of the Okavango River (Nshimbi, 2017). In
North Africa, Egypt administers the Halaib region, which Sudan claims while
the Western Sahara – that former Spanish territory annexed by Morocco –
remains at the centre of disagreements among Morocco, Mauritania, Algeria
and Libya. In East Africa, Kenya and Sudan dispute over the Ilemi Triangle
while disputes over territories such as the Badme characterise relations
between Eritrea and Ethiopia. And in Central Africa, the Congo River,
flowing through the Republic of Congo (Brazzaville) and the Democratic
Republic of the Congo (DRC), is a source of dispute between the two coun-
tries over the location of the border between them, within the water body.
The foregoing being the case, this book examines borders in Africa and
how their porosity potentially contributes to the exacerbation of war and
conflict or to fostering cooperation, peace and well-being. Questions con-
cerning the ways in which the porosity of African borders could catalyse
instability and the spread thereof from one country to several others, as in the
case of Nigeria, where insurgency and counter insurgency has spread to parts
of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) region and
Central Africa, arise and are examined in this book. Indeed, the contributions
by James Okolie-Osemene and Benjamin Adeniran Aluko in this volume
(Chapter 4) and Nelson Alusala (Chapter 5) clearly demonstrate that, the
porosity of borders in West Africa and the DRC and the Great Lakes Region
exacerbated cross-border conflict and instability. In the latter, the porosity of
the borders, especially between the DRC and Rwanda, has promoted the
merging of proximate and core causes of conflict in the DRC. This has led to
the exacerbation of the DRC’s internal conflict, ultimately transforming it
 Borders, war and conflict in Africa 5
into a regional one. In this sense, and as a result of the porosity of borders,
instability in one country or society can contagiously spread across the border
and catalyse events in the neighbourhood, into an active conflict.
Jackson Aluede (Chapter 6), takes up this argument based on a compara-
tive analysis of the cross-border dimension of intra-state conflicts in the Great
Lakes (Burundi, Rwanda and the DRC) and the Mano River (Liberia and
Sierra Leone) regions. By employing theories of protracted social conflict
(PSC), transnationalism and ethnicity, Jackson argues that the porous nature
of the borders, coupled with other inherent challenges confronting the states –
ethnic divisions, forced migration, bad governance, rebel incursion and
others – contributed to the cross-border dimension of the conflicts (Chapter
6). Although intra-state conflicts in the Manor River ended around 2003, the
author concludes the discussion by highlighting that, both the sub-national
and national apparatuses of states in both regions could use the porous bor-
ders as a vehicle to achieve peace in the region. In the latter, the porosity of
borders has complicated efforts targeted at the Boko Haram insurgency in
Nigeria and the neighbouring West African states. Through the deployment
of the political theory of territory and that of ungoverned spaces, the authors
assert that, as a result of the porosity of borders between Nigeria and its
neighbouring states, insurgency has proved difficult to contain despite border
security efforts. At the same time, these authors observe that the same porous
borders can also be mobilised towards counter insurgency efforts through the
prioritisation of trans-border security collaboration and the timely incor-
poration of insurgence emergency response systems and border security gov-
ernance with active engagement of communities by the states concerned. In
other words, the porosity of borders should not only be seen in a negative
light, in terms of the efforts aimed at responding to the Boko Haram threat.

Borders, co-operation, peace and development?

Also examined are questions about the innovative ways in which some Afri-
can countries opt to cooperate in exploiting natural resources at their
common borders in pursuit of common political goals, which also leads to
peace (Nshimbi, 2017). This is predicated on the existing strategy for con-
tinental integration. Africa’s strategy for attaining integration by establishing
the African Economic Community (AEC) is, indeed, through Regional Eco-
nomic Communities (RECs). These should provide the foundation for inte-
gration based on eight such RECs on the continent; to move Africa towards
the AEC.1 The establishment of the African Continental Free Trade Area
(AfCFTA) and the AEC resonates with the African Union’s (AU) commit-
ment to speeding up actions that will “silence the guns by 2020”, in the AU’s
Agenda 2063. This is in order to make peace a reality for all people in Africa
(Agenda 2063: 6). This means that peace is linked to security and develop-
ment (Murithi, 2011), and the establishment of the AfCFTA and the AEC
are aspects of development, whose success may not be possible outside peace
6 Inocent Moyo and Christopher Changwe Nshimbi
in Africa. So, do wars or conflicts militate against the success of RECs and
the ultimate integration of the African continent? This is a pertinent question
to ask because the 1991 Abuja Treaty for Establishing the African Economic
Community clearly outlines the AU’s determination to establish an economic
community of African states by 2028, preceded by the AfCFTA. The
AfCFTA agreement has since been signed: at the AU Special Summit held in
Kigali, Rwanda on 21 March 2018.
The question of whether wars or conflict affect regional integration is
tackled by Ntongwa Bundala (Chapter 10) in this book. Ntongwa argues that
although war and conflict are the least factors that cause the failure of the
African regional integration plans, the presence of peace equally creates a
good environment for regional integration. The implication of this is that
peace is good for regional integration. In turn, regional integration can pro-
mote Africa because “RECs increase economic and political trust among
African countries” (see, Bundala, Chapter 10 in this volume). But there is
need to critically understand the concept of peace, beyond just the absence of
war within the setting of regional and continental integration. In this regard
Inocent Moyo (Chapter 8), asserts that integral to the process and imple-
mentation of regional and continental integration is the issue of human
mobility. Inocent argues that African countries, particularly those in the
Southern African Development Community (SADC) should devise migration
policies which promote the movement of people, as stringent migration poli-
cies are responsible for the uncertainties and anxieties of migrants who move
within the region, such as those from Zimbabwe to South Africa. Uncertain-
ties and anxieties of migrants create negative peace, which is comparable in
its effects on migrants to people who are fleeing actual war and conflict. For
this reason, Inocent argues that in line with the regional integration process in
the SADC, there is need for a reconfiguration of immigration policies which
reflect the reality of integration in the form of free human mobility. This free
human mobility is an essential element of regional peace, if peace is under-
stood as not only the absence of war, but also the absence of other intervening
factors and structures that disturb the inner peace and security of people
(Francis, 2011). Stringent immigration regimes, which place people in a ten-
uous immigration status, are a good example of such. This actually shows
that states, especially those in the SADC region, abandon the ordinary people
in pursuit of statist and colonial bordering policies.
Concerning the SADC states abandoning its people, Patrick Dzimiri
(Chapter 9) invokes the case of the 2008 disputed elections in Zimbabwe to
advance the argument that the region endorsed a dictator, in the person of
President Robert Mugabe, at the expense of the Zimbabwean people. The
SADC states did this in the name of solidarity and regional integration at the
level of the state, but ordinary citizens experienced untold suffering which led
to massive migration from Zimbabwe to neighbouring countries like South
Africa, Botswana, Namibia and Zambia. In some of these countries, Zim-
babweans were met with virulent xenophobic attacks in which some lost their
 Borders, war and conflict in Africa 7
lives. Patrick posits that, although at the level of the state there was no war
following the 2008 disputed elections in Zimbabwe, at the grassroots level it
was a different scenario.
In this vein, Patrick states that:

it is fair to argue that SADC states wanted to protect a dictator for the
sake of championing fake Afro-radicalism … and the defence of inde-
pendence against the so-called vampirism of neo-colonial matrices of
power … . Further examination of the human security costs of the elec-
toral conflict [in Zimbabwe] points to the fact that, [the so called] regio-
nal integration (defined [by Patrick] as the club of people/leaders who
fought against colonialism) should exist at the expense of the peace of the
ordinary person, as long as the SADC had prevailed against the Western
threat – real or imagined [by siding with and supporting Mugabe].
(see Chapter 9)

Therefore, states should consider the needs of the ordinary person on the
ground both in terms of the policies that they enact and implement as well as
in simple processes such as elections.
Elections in the SADC region have a bearing on borders, migration,
regional integration and peace in the sense that, if they are not properly
monitored, as the case of Zimbabwe shows, they lead to the displacement of
people. This can destabilise regional peace. It suggests that the peace that the
region enjoys at the level of state-to-state relations may be fake, as long as
people on the ground are displaced and live under difficult conditions largely
created by those at the state level. But, this can all be solved if African
countries, such as SADC member states, seriously consider the needs of the
people and enact robust regional systems ranging from efficient election
security policies to managing cross-border migration.

Managing transboundary natural resources for development

If porous borders could precipitate or be a source of conflict, or, if they con-
stitute the means for establishing peace, could natural resources that cross
nation-state borders and are shared by at least two countries, such as trans-
boundary waterbodies, be harnessed in order to be of benefit to all who share
the resources? In what ways could the resources be governed in order to par-
ticularly benefit non-state actors who inhabit the borderlands of the prox-
imate states that share the resources? Christopher Nshimbi (Chapter 7)
attempts to answer these questions through a policy analysis of measures
designed to regulate the use of natural resources; particularly the effects on
grassroots actors whose sociocultural being is subjected to the division
brought about by the arbitrary construction of a line of separation in the
form of a political border, and whose livelihoods depend on the shared
transboundary resources. Citing the activities of artisanal fishers on a
8 Inocent Moyo and Christopher Changwe Nshimbi
transboundary water body shared by Zambia and Zimbabwe, Chris highlights
the importance of the activities of these actors for employment and the sus-
tenance of livelihoods.
Also important is the fact that the activities on the shared transbound-
ary water body highlight tensions and conflict between grassroots actors
and the state, and the neglected aspect of peaceful coexistence of actors in
the borderlands communities. Grassroots actors who traverse borders in
the SADC region secure livelihoods as they go about their activities and
operations. This means that their families are supported and food security
is achieved – both very important elements of peace, if it is understood to
be not the mere absence of war. For this cause, Chris proposes that the
states, together with local governing authorities need to proactively estab-
lish governance structures for the management of cross-border resources
and the activities of grassroots cross-border actors. This will enhance the
management of the shared resources and contribute to the achievement of
the United Nations (UN) sustainable development goals (SDGS), sustain
livelihoods, and contribute to the bottom-up processes of regional inte-
gration and, ultimately, peace.
A related case is that of the Afar Horn, which is constituted of Ethio-
pia, Djibouti and Eritrea. Muauz Gidey (Chapter 3), asserts that the
countries in this region share a common history, identities, geospatial
communities as well as economic and other ties. For this reason, it is not
surprising that the region is entangled in conflict, insecurity and similar
development challenges. However, the borders, history and assets that
characterise the region should not only be seen as raw materials that fuel
conflict, war and instability, but could be harnessed by states so as to
unleash the development potential of the region. Muauz asserts that, in
this sense, the existing historical, geospatial and geopolitical architecture,
which engenders a trajectory of war, conflict and instability across the
borders in the region, could be transformed to that of development, peace
and prosperity. In this context, borders and borderlands in the Afar region
can be used as an architecture for achieving peace in Africa.

Conclusion
For the reasons cited in the foregoing, beyond the question of how the
porosity of African borders exacerbate conflict and war, this book engages
with the question of the extent to which the porosity of African borders
can also be a source of regional peace. This volume thus engages with the
issue of African borders and how the borders can either fuel war and
conflict or become an instrument for forging cooperation and peace. If
African borders can be utilised in this way, the issue of regional and con-
tinental integration in Africa through RECs comes into sharp focus and is
thus explored in this book.
 Borders, war and conflict in Africa 9
Note
1 The eight RECs are the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD),
Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), East African
Community (EAC), Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS),
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Intergovernmental
Authority for Development (IGAD), Southern African Development Community
(SADC), Union du Maghreb Arabe (UMA). See www.au.int/en/recs/. [Accessed 26
November 2012].

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2 Borders and the coloniality of human
mobility
A view from Africa
Everisto Benyera

Introduction
Borders perform many functions, such as separating countries at war from
those at peace, and democracies from dictatorships; they structure settlement
patterns, cultural forms, typical economic activities, consumption opportu-
nities or kinship ties, among others (Dobler, 2016). This notwithstanding,
borders are not innocent infrastructure, especially for those in (formerly)
colonised parts of the world, and especially Africa, which is the focus of this
chapter. Concerning African borders, a background is needful. About two
centuries before the Berlin Conference of 1884–85, after the 30 years’ war in
Europe, Europeans gathered in Westphalia, Germany, and agreed to thence-
forth respect each other’s sovereignty. That was the birth of the cherished
notion of state sovereignty. Ironically, it was also at the Berlin Conference
that European leaders of the day agreed to arbitrarily partition Africa, a
development well addressed in scholarship (Grosfoguel and Cervantes-Rodri-
guez, 2002; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2015; Nimako, 2015; Táíwò, 2009). While the
reasoning of the delegates at the signing of the Treaty of Westphalia and the
Berlin Conference, respectively, to respect each other’s state sovereignty and
to deny Africa and Africans their state sovereignty, is illogical, it is consistent
with imperialist colonial expansion. This is best illustrated by the facts that:

First, colonialism and capitalism forcibly incorporated Africa into the

world economy, beginning with the slave trade … . Secondly, Africa
had been excluded from the post-1648 Westphalian sovereign state
system … Third, Africa was incorporated into a Euro-North Amer-
ican-centric world culture and European languages. Fourth, Africa was
incorporated into a heavily Euro-North American-centric world of
international law. Fifth, as a consequence of colonialism, Africa was
incorporated into the modern technological age including being
“swallowed by the global system of dissemination of information”.
Finally, Africa was dragged into a Euro-North American-centric
moral order dominated by Christian thought.
(Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2015: 47–48)
12 Everisto Benyera
The resilience and perseverance of the asymmetrical colonial power relations
between the (formerly) colonised peoples and their (former) colonisers is
termed coloniality. It is coloniality which defines the way borders between the
(formerly) colonised and the (former) colonisers are operated (Ndlovu-Gat-
sheni, 2013). Coloniality differs from decolonisation in that, decolonisation
denotes the departure of the colonisers from the colony back to the metro-
polis. But they left behind a sophisticated system and network of infra-
structure which allows them to dominate these relations (Ndlovu-Gatsheni,
2013). Within this system, colonial borders as institutions bequeathed on
(post-)colonial states by colonialism, allow the (former) colonisers to enjoy
what is termed distributed presence in their (former) colonies.
Arguing from a decolonial perspective, Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2015) views bor-
ders in Africa as a product of coloniality of power and contends that coloni-
ality of power is still productive in policing western borders so that, inter alia,
those from the (former) colonies do not enjoy unfettered access into the
metropolis. Coloniality, indeed, denotes the resultant relationship in which
power relations remain tilted heavily in favour of the (former) colonisers, even
after the official end of colonialism. Ndlovu-Gatsheni argues:

The concept of coloniality of power enables delving deeper into how the
world was bifurcated into “Zone of Being” (the world of those in charge
of global power structures and beneficiaries of modernity) and “Zone of
Non-Being” (the invented world that was the source of slaves and victims
of imperialism, colonialism, and apartheid) maintained by an invisible
line that Boaventura de Sousa Santos termed “abyssal thinking”.
(Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2015: 490)

Once the zone of non-being was officially created at the Berlin Conference,
the colonisers started engaging in concerted efforts to divide and rule the
people occupying this zone through the construction of ethnic differences
and identities, in some cases with the complicity of the Church (Ranger,
1989). How the Belgian colonisers constructed the ethnic identities of the
Hutus and Tutsis in Burundi and then weaponised them, is a well-docu-
mented case which largely contributed to the genocide of 1994 (Clark, 2007;
Mamdani, 2010; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2010: 289; Senier, 2008). Based on such
differences, instances exist in which people in the zone of non-being do not
enjoy social cohesion and, even, engage in conflict against each other on the
basis of ethnic difference.
Mahmood Mamdani differs from those whom he terms Africanists who
blame Euro-North American modernity for the “border challenges” Africa
faces. Mamdani writes:

Well, what would be genuine boundaries? From this point of view, the
answer would be that they would be “natural,” meaning they would not
cut through ethnic boundaries. In other words, the political map of Africa
 The coloniality of human mobility 13
should have followed its cultural map. I find two problems with this kind
of argument. All boundaries are artificial; none are natural. War and
conquest have always been integral to state-building … The real problem
with this point of view is the assumption that cultural and political
boundaries should coincide, and that the state should be a nation-state –
that the natural boundaries of a state are those of a common cultural
community.
(Mamdani, 2015: 4)

A counter-argument to Mamdani would be: what is wrong with a common

cultural community as the basis for nation-states, because in Mamdani’s
words African borders, “were drawn up with a pencil and a ruler on a map at
a conference table in Berlin in the 1880s” (Mamdani, 2015: 4)? Various forms
of violence were then used to enforce and institutionalise these borders. For-
cing (former) colonies into the global capitalist, legal and Euro-North Amer-
ican moral order (Mazrui, 1986; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2015: 487–488), through
what Achille Mbembe termed foundational and maintenance violence
(Mbembe, 2000), locked (former) colonies into various forms of borders that
preserve the colonial status quo. Explaining Mbembe’s three forms of colonial
violence which were efficacious in the normalisation of colonial order,
Benyera writes:

[There was] “foundational violence” which authorised the right of con-

quest and had an “instituting function” of creating Africans as its tar-
gets; … “legitimating violence,” was used after conquest to construct the
colonial order and routinise colonial reality; and “maintenance violence,”
was infused into colonial institutions and cultures and used to ensure
their perpetuation.
(Benyera, 2017: 69)

These three forms of violence, where the imperialists laid the foundation for
colonial borders in Berlin, used law, war, religion, morality, commerce, cul-
ture and language to legitimise them and then used institutions and structure
to maintain the nefariousness of borders in Africa today. Another way of
analysing African borders and their effects is to use what is termed the locus
of enunciation (Mignolo, 2009). The notion of locus enunciation states that
the same phenomenon can be interpreted differently depending on where one
is located (epistemologically and geographically). Mignolo argues:

Westerners then defined the locus of enunciation (not as geo-historically

and geo-politically located, but as the enunciation of the universal).
Easterners defined instead the enunciated to whom the enunciation was
denied: Easterners were defined by Westerners as if Westerners had the
universal authority to name without being named in return.
(Mignolo, 2009: 8)
14 Everisto Benyera
Hence others looking at African borders from the West and a western per-
spective naturally arrive at different conclusions from those analysing borders
from the perspective of (those who were previously) the colonised. Those in
what is loosely termed the global South are not contesting the authenticity of
their views. Rather they are presenting an alternative perspective on borders,
one conceptualised from what Fanon termed the zone of non-being. Accord-
ing to Fanon, “there is a zone of non-being, an extraordinarily sterile and
arid region, an utterly naked declivity where an authentic upheaval can be
born” (Fanon, 1952: 2). This zone is the place where those in the global
South analyse borders from.
In arguing for the use of locus of enunciation as a decolonial perspective to
provide an alternative view of “the border”, for instance, William Mpofu
argues that the locus of enunciation:

is a concept that is founded on the thinking that in a “pluriversal

world”, and a world that espouses not just one imperial knowledge, but
“ecologies of knowledge” all knowledges are situated and located. In
arguing for “shifting the geography of reason in the age of disciplinary
decadence”, Afro-American philosopher of humanity, Lewis R Gordon
depicts the geopolitics of knowledge, where knowing and thinking are
grounded. In the same way, when Paula ML Moya insists on the
importance of being “who we are, from where we speak” she argues for
a geo-politics and a body-politics of thinking and knowing from an
announced locale.
(Mpofu, 2014: 15–16)

As a result, in this chapter, I carry forward the context provided in Chapter 1

and ask the following questions: what are borders? What is their function?
What is the result of the creation of borders? Who has the authority to (re)
draw borders? And, what processes were used to (re)draw borders in Africa,
at least? Because the first two questions have been addressed in Chapter 1, I
will focus more on the last three and make them the chapter’s central research
contribution. I will answer them in the next sections, and use Africa and
Euro-North America as my reference cases; drawing especially on their colo-
nial and post-colonial relationships. Looking at African society and econo-
mies today, we realise how relevant borders have become over the last one-
and-a-half centuries, as they (colonial borders) are increasingly being unchal-
lenged by (post-)colonial African governments.

Conceptualising borders as abyssal lines

As Moyo and Nshimbi (see Chapter 1) have conceptualised borders, I also
argue that borders are not only a physical phenomenon but have many facets,
forms and functions. I rely on the notion of the abyssal line, which was pos-
tulated by Bonaventura de Sousa Santos (2007), in developing this section.
 The coloniality of human mobility 15
For de Sousa Santos, coloniality operates through enacting abyssal lines,
which are constituted “of a system of visible and invisible distinctions” (de
Sousa Santos, 2007: 45). When conceptualised as abyssal lines which divide
the zone of being from the zone of non-being, it becomes clear that borders
are not only geographical in nature but assume a variety of other forms which
give rise to terms such as “illegal” immigrant and “undocumented” immi-
grant. Accordingly, a human being becomes “illegal” the moment they leave
“their native land” and cross the abyssal line in flight from, among other
things, deprivation, persecution, war and conflict. As the illegal or undocu-
mented immigrants try to fit into the zone of being, the “border” pursues
them, as it refuses to be left at the physical border (Moyo and Nshimbi,
2017). So omnipresent is the border that those deemed to be illegal immi-
grants are routinely rounded up and deported.
The argument that borders have evolved into institutions and mechanisms
as opposed to simple lines at the margins of nation-states has been sufficiently
advanced (Cons and Sanyal, 2013; Laine, 2015; Novak, 2011; Paasi, 2012),
and this work is hereby acknowledged for laying the foundation on which the
main arguments of this chapter are premised. As argued by Laine:

Today, borders are widely recognised as complex multileveled and

-layered social phenomena related to the fundamental organisation of
society as well as human psychology. This has not, however, been always
the case, but the way borders have been viewed and interpreted has
evolved – much in line with broader discursive shifts in social sciences as
well as in relation to overlying geopolitical events.
(Laine, 2015: 14)

In extreme cases borders consist of physical walls erected between two coun-
tries, the obvious case being the Israel–Palestine wall, and the one proposed at
the Mexico–USA border. In this chapter, I argue that the border is more than a
physical phenomenon, but one which consists of both visible and invisible lines.
“The invisible lines form the foundation for visible ones” (de Sousa Santos,
2007: 45). Borders form a painful reality for (previously) colonised people. As
de Sousa Santos argues, abyssal lines give rise to two contrasting situations
“this side of the line” and “the other side of the line” (de Sousa Santos, 2007:
54) where life on the two different sides is the exact opposite of the other in
terms of people’s existentialism. Borrowing from Fanon’s (1952: 2) zones of
being and non-being seen earlier, adverse conditions in the zone of non-being
explain the many perilous journeys across the Mediterranean Sea taken by
Africans seeking to cross the abyssal line and enter the zone of being, which is
Euro-North America. When the border is conceptualised as an abyssal line, we
are then able to make sense of how this institution works in metropolitan
societies as well as and in contrast to colonial territories. In particular, the
border in the zone of non-being was used as an instrument for subjugating the
colonised. This was because the colonisers also engaged in a concerted effort to
16 Everisto Benyera
divide and rule the people within this zone, through the construction of ethnic
differences and identities. Based on such difference, instances exist in which
people in the zone of non-being are not socially cohesive, and even war against
each other on the basis of the colonially constructed ethnic difference – wherein
processes of othering and construction of “us” and “them” occur. This is the
context within which border and intra-state conflicts on the African continent
are ignited and spread. Such conflicts involve essentially the same people, who
were nonetheless reconstructed and misrepresented as ethnically different by
the colonial project (see, e.g., Chapters 4 and 5 in this volume).

Types of borders
The obvious types of borders are the national, provincial and other adminis-
trative borders which geographically demarcate jurisdictions. There are many
other latent forms, such as the structural, ontological and epistemological
borders. By ontological borders, I am referring to the system of ascribing
ontological density and validity to humanity mainly based on their place of
birth, gender and race (Mignolo, 2009). In this system, the Euro-North
American white male has more ontological density than an African black
female (Mignolo, 2009) and on the basis of this, the “modern/colonial capi-
talist/patriarchal western-centric/Christian-centric world-system has privileged
the culture, knowledge, and epistemology produced by the West inferiorising
the rest” (Grosfoguel, 2011: 10).
Then there are structural borders, which relate to systemic issues, which
affect black people. For instance, when a black person graduates from the
anthropos to join the humunitas (Benyera, Mtapuri and Nhemachena, 2018),
they are still criminalised and denied entry into the system primarily because
of their race. The racial border is described by Chinweizu thus:

if you are white and running down the street, you are an athlete; but if
you are black and running down the street, you are a thief! And in most
parts of the world today, if you are white and rich, you are honoured and
celebrated, and all doors fly open as you approach; but if you are black
and rich, you are under suspicion, and handcuffs and guard dogs stand
ready to take you away. Yes, the black skin is still the badge of contempt
in the world today, as it has been for nearly 2,000 years.
(Chinweizu, 1993: 1)

The result of this ontological ordering of humans is that movement from one
layer to another is prevented by a solid “border” consisting of privileges,
norms, values and standards whose combination renders it almost impossible
for black mankind to enter the realms of white mankind (Ndlovu-Gatsheni,
2013). Similarly, epistemological borders consist of a system which orders
knowledge, in the process privileging Euro-North American knowledge. Not
only is Euro-North American knowledge privileged, it is also universalised,
 The coloniality of human mobility 17
taken as the standard and rarely questioned. Knowledge from elsewhere in
the (previously) colonised world is often doubted and treated as myth
(Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013). The opening of colleges of the University of
London in colonies of the United Kingdom actualised this system of export-
ing the British education system to colonies. Once planted and operational,
(former) colonies are today stuck with a colonial education resulting in what
has been termed the western university in Africa among other institutions.
Indigenous knowledge and knowledge systems are locked outside the “bor-
ders” of knowledge (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013).
Other types of borders are social, cultural, economic, class, residential, health,
educational, gender, occupational, professional, associational, organisational
and generational (Benyera, 2018: 142; Mtapuri, Nhemachena and Benyera,
2018). Movement from one culture to another or trying to enter a culture is not
very difficult in Africa because of the precolonial and colonial legacy of African
states such as the Ndebele, Torwa, Mutapa and Mapungubwe which used to
accept citizens from other nations as part of their nation building processes
(Cobbing, 1974). Ndlovu-Gatsheni argues this notion well when he states that:

Precolonial African socio-political formations had room for full incor-

poration and successful assimilation of defeated communities into the
host society. But under colonial modernity that was shot through with a
racial order of identities, whites could not be accommodated into the
African societies they despised and sought to transform and black people
could not be accommodated into colonial white society that was fenced
in by racism.
(Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013: 127)

Unlike colonial borders which are rigid, there are ways of gaining cultural
acceptability such as performing certain rites and rituals. However, with Euro-
North American cultures, one can enter through ways such as assimilado, but
equal status will never be granted as such communities remain structured
according to racism. For Ramón Grosfoguel, racism has become an instru-
ment of ordering humans according to ascribed superiority/inferiority from
which one can hardly escape. Grosfoguel argues:

Racism is a global hierarchy of superiority and inferiority along the line

of the human that have been politically, culturally and economically
produced and reproduced for centuries by the institutions of the “capi-
talist/patriarchal western-centric/Christian-centric modern/colonial world-
system”.
(Grosfoguel, 2015: 10)

Economic and class “borders”, while theoretically permeable, are difficult as

those who possess land and generational wealth tend to acquire more wealth
while those born in poverty tend to stagnate or regress into more poverty. The