India in South Asia: Interaction With Liberal Peacebuilding Projects
India in South Asia: Interaction With Liberal Peacebuilding Projects
India in South Asia: Interaction With Liberal Peacebuilding Projects
India Quarterly
India in South Asia: 74(2) 160–178
© 2018 Indian Council
Interaction with Liberal of World Affairs (ICWA)
SAGE Publications
Peacebuilding Projects sagepub.in/home.nav
DOI: 10.1177/0974928418766731
http://journals.sagepub.com/home/iqq
Monalisa Adhikari
Abstract
In fragile and conflict-affected States1 (henceforth FCAS) in South Asia, two
distinct forms of international engagement have worked simultaneously—the
engagement of India, the regional hegemon, and that of Western states that
promote liberal peacebuilding projects. From Norwegian engagement in Sri Lanka
to European Union (EU) and United Nations (UN) engagement in Myanmar, to
the UN-led international engagement in Nepal, liberal peacebuilding, despite its
fault lines, has ubiquitous presence in South Asia, a region fraught with different
forms of conflict and fragility. The norms, practices and modalities of engagement
of India as well as of liberal peacebuilding projects have their distinct specificities in
their normative foundations, practices and modalities of engagement. This article
contends that the current interaction, though often unacknowledged, is marked
by uncertainties, contrasts, instrumental use of norms, lack of coordination and
even unexpected overlaps. This article primarily argues that in order for India
to play a constructive role in the region, it needs to devise a policy on how it
engages with liberal peacebuilding norms and its diffusion in practice through a
variety of organisational and institutional networks.
Keywords
South Asia, India, conflict, fragility, liberal peacebuilding
Introduction
Studies on India’s engagement in South Asian countries have largely focused on
three themes: domestic imperatives, India’s bilateral relations with smaller
countries in its neighbourhood and Indian responses to American or Chinese
engagement in the region (Cohen, 2001; Ganguly, 2012; Hagerty, 1991; Muni,
2003). These works reflect the twin pillars of India’s regional policy: primacy of
regional hegemony and countering extra-regional influence (Mazumdar, 2012).
Corresponding author:
Monalisa Adhikari.
E-mail: adhikarimonalisa@gmail.com
Adhikari 161
While important, these studies place the primacy on India, its identity as a regional
emergent power and its interests in different sectors including trade, natural
resources and security in the region. These studies do not appreciate or at worst
obscure the interests and engagements of critical actors of liberal peacebuilding in
the region, which operate through a dense web of government, quasi-governmental
organisations, transnational civil society groups and their normative foundations
and practices. This article argues that the conflicts in South Asia are changing the
landscape of international engagement in the region, and this shift needs to be
acknowledged and factored in Indian foreign policymaking in its neighbourhood.
This article is divided into five parts. I start with a brief discussion on fragility and
conflict in India’s neighbourhood. This is followed by a discussion on origin and
evolution of liberal peacebuilding. In the third section, I explore the pervasiveness
of liberal peacebuilding in fragile and conflict-affected states (FCAS) in South
Asia. In the fourth section, I discuss Indian involvement in conflicts in South
Asia. Finally, I discuss the interaction between actors involved in liberal peace-
building and India in FCAS in South Asia and discuss its impact.
Context
India’s neighbouring states have distinctly been ‘fragile’ and conflict ridden.
Apart from India and Bhutan, all other South Asian states from Afghanistan,
Pakistan and Bangladesh to Myanmar, Sri Lanka and Nepal feature in Fragile
State Index in the ‘alert’ or ‘high alert’ category, presenting South Asia as a web
of ‘fragility’ (Messner et al., 2016). Academic and policy writings have tended to
use the terms of ‘weak’, ‘failing’ and ‘collapsed’ state interchangeably. In practice,
they can be seen as a continuum with fragile states at one end and collapsed states
at the other (Francois & Sud, 2006). In one of the most authoritative writings on
state collapse, Zartman argues that stats collapse when they can no longer perform
the functions required for them to pass as states, including positing as sovereign
source of authority and identity, commanding institutional strength to preserve
and enforce laws as well as promote social cohesion, and act as guarantor of
security (Zartman, 1995). Milliken and Krause further distinguish the concepts,
attesting that state failure reflects the inability of the state to fulfil its functions of
providing security, representation and welfare, while state collapse refers to a
complete disintegration of public authority and order (Milliken & Krause, 2002).
Thus, state fragility can be seen as a precursor or indicator to possible collapse.
Fragile states constitute a heterogeneous group of countries diverse sources of
fragility, including conflict (civil war, armed challenge to state authority), political
instability and/or extreme vulnerability. Neighbouring states bear a heavy burden
of the contagion of state failure, in the form of conflict spill-overs, arms race and
transfer, illegal economy, refugee flows, the spread of disease, lowered economic
growth and facilitating safe havens for terrorists and drug traffickers (Francois &
Sud, 2006; Zartman, 1995). In South Asia, a common variant responsible for
fragility is internal conflict and political instability, which has been pervasive in
India as well as most of its neighbours. The contagion effects of this have travelled
162 India Quarterly 74(2)
both ways from India to its neighbours and from the neighbours to India, manifesting
in varied forms, such as refugees, ‘terrorism’, ethnic insurgencies, communist
insurgencies, resistance movements, arms transfer and illegal trade, testing India’s
own state capacity.
State fragility is increasingly seen as a challenge to both international security
and global development (Fukuyama, 2004). This is exemplified by the National
Security Strategy of the USA in 2002 which stated that ‘US is now threatened less
by conquering states than by failing ones’ (The White House, 2002). The US
Agency for International Development (USAID)’s Fragile states strategy paper
2005 also reinstated, ‘When development and governance fail in a country, the
consequences engulf entire regions and leap around the world’ (USAID, 2005,
p. 7). This has also led to an increase in international responses and interventions
to address sources of fragility, including peacebuilding and state-building program-
mes in FCAS. As ‘ungoverned spaces’ of fragile states from Afghanistan, Pakistan
to Myanmar becomes internationalised, they not only pose domestic challenges to
India in the form of spillover effects but also internationalise India’s regional
domain.
As internal conflicts have persisted globally, the Western liberal powers have
prioritised different forms of interventions to tackle conflicts and fragility that
include peacekeeping, peacebuilding, mediation and negotiation among others.
In this article, I focus on peacekeeping with a regional focus on South Asia. I start
with the premise that in a bid to address conflicts in South Asia, the largely
Western engagement has brought multiple actors of liberal peacebuilding in South
Asia, whose norms and practices are often distinct to India’s own engagement in
the region. The engagement and influences of these largely Western, party to the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) governments,
and the networks of non-governmental organisations are packaged in the form of
conflict management and peacebuilding/state-building projects, with normative
preferences on inclusion, human rights, transitional justice, democracy promotion
and through more specific activities such as supporting peace accords, support for
elections, governance reforms and development assistance. From the United
Nations (UN) Mission in Nepal, Norwegian brokered peace process in Sri Lanka,
the US and UN role in stabilisation efforts in Afghanistan, to the European Union
(EU) facilitated peace process in Myanmar, liberal peacebuilding is already a highly
prominent feature in the South Asian political landscape. As liberal peacebuilding
activities shape the political processes in FCAS in the region, Indian foreign
policy in its neighbourhood can no longer carry on with status quo but will need to
revisit how its policy interacts with those diffused projects of liberal peacebuilding.
African Union and EU. This network of actors, interests and identities forming a
‘complex networks and contracting arrangements, which interlink state and non-
state, and commercial and not-for-profit actors’ can be categorised as liberal
peacebuilding agents (Goodhand & Walton, 2009, p. 305). Further, in practice,
peacebuilding has also been accompanied with debates on state-building. It is also
to be noted that while peacebuilding and state-building are distinct concepts, on
ground, much of peacebuilding projects include state-building, which prioritises
creating and stabilising broader political, economic and security architecture of
states with a focus on state institutions (Richmond & Franks, 2009) making
peacebuilding all the more intrusive.
The policy and practice of liberal peacebuilding is not uncontested.
Peacebuilding has been criticised for its lack of effectiveness. The standardised
model of liberal peacebuilding, despite the differences in the context it operates
has led scholars like Mac Ginty to point out that it now resembles ‘peace from
IKEA, a flat-pack peace made from standardized components’ (Mac Ginty, 2008,
p. 145). From an economic perspective, Pugh argues that liberal peacebuilding
ignores the socio-economic challenges in states undergoing conflict, and its
insistence on free market exacerbates wealth imbalances and vulnerability of
populations to poverty (Pugh, 2005). Other criticism attributed to liberal peace-
building projects include: promoting forms of civil society that fit within liberal-
rights framework while marginalising others alternative forms (Kappler &
Richmond, 2011), often displacing of older liberal values of welfare which is
critical in countries overcoming prolonged period of conflict (Newman, Paris, &
Richmond, 2009) and increasing merger of peacebuilding and state-building,
which has legitimised externally driven approach with a that focus on larger
political, economic and security architecture at the expense of the local aspect of
peace (Richmond & Franks, 2009). There are also works which look at liberal
peacebuilding’s implication on sovereignty, arguing that peacebuilding projects
are best characterised by a ‘paradox of sovereignty’ whereby through state
sovereignty is compromised in order to build its capacity to deliver functions of a
sovereign state (Zaum, 2003). Despite the criticism, liberal peacebuilding projects
are well entrenched in FCAS globally and recent discourses that link fragile states
as the source of global insecurity has strengthened the normative core of liberal
peacebuilding.
neighbours and other significant international actors desist from supporting war
and begin supporting peace (Doyle & Sambanis, 2000). Such evidence has also
has enhanced the primacy ‘regions’ not only as clusters and vectors of conflicts
but also as sources of their resolution.
In different regions, regional organisations have often taken the lead in conflict
management at a regional level. The EU’s role in the ethnic conflicts in the Western
Balkans, the African Union’s ambition and evolving role in regional peace operations
offer a few insights into ‘regionalisation’ of security. South Asian Association for
Regional Cooperation (SAARC), South Asia’s regional organisation, though set
up back in 1985 has not been able to evolve as an effective regional forum for
conflict management and peacebuilding. Further, the constitution of SAARC
prohibits discussion on contentious bilateral issues from its deliberations, which
forms a barrier to its role in conflict management. This vacuum of regional
organisational leadership has carved a role for regional actors like India. This role
has been facilitated and substantiated by other factors. As the largest in size,
population, economy, sharing borders with all states barring Afghanistan, and
now positioned as an emergent global power, India naturally makes it as a lead
actor in managing regional conflicts. Further, given the propensity of conflicts to
spill over across borders, security externalities and inter-state ethnic/religious
linkages pressures compel India to engage with conflicts in the neighbourhood.
Despite contesting India’s hegemony, to India’s neighbour, it has always been a
great power (Cohen, 2001) with substantial influence to shape domestic political
settlements. This is more so during period of instability and civil wars when
neighbouring states have been extremely divided internally. Having an influence
in the region or regional hegemony has also been described as a criterion for
global emergence (Rajagopalan & Sahni, 2008), which New Delhi has historically
taken seriously. Accordingly, Indian foreign policy has always envisioned South
Asia as it natural sphere of influence. This influence increasingly is countered not
only by the prominent states that feature in Indian foreign policy discussions like
the US and Chinese engagement, as dominant literature cites, but also more
pertinently through liberal peacebuilding agents and their normative foundation
of democracy promotion, transitional justice and human rights as well as forms of
engagements ranging from sanctions, trade concessions, aid, diplomacy and
public engagement.
Sri Lanka, Nepal and Maldives. These included: airlifting paratroopers to thwart
a coup against the Maldivian President Abdul Gayoom and reinstating him,
closing off border points in the Nepal–India border, which is a landlocked Nepal’s
lifeline to imports in response to Nepal buying arms consignment from China, and
signing the Indo-Sri Lankan Accord paving way for the deployment of the Indian
Peacekeeping Force engaged in a war with the Tamil Tigers. This phase marked
aggressive Indian role in shaping the political contexts of the South Asian
neighbourhood (Raghavan, 2015). Raghavan attributes it to a combination of
domestic and international factors. Internally, Rajiv Gandhi had a comfortable
majority with the Congress winning the 48.1 per cent of the seats, which allowed
him to become more ambitious with foreign policy. Further externally, with
Mikhail Gorbachev in power in the USSR and ready to reach out to the USA,
Rajiv Gandhi knew Indian foreign policy needed recalibration as well.
Post-1980s, the approach on foreign policy has been comparatively cautious.
The change is underpinned by the fact that from 1980s to until 2014, Indian
politics has largely been one of coalitions, making uniformity across party lines
and ambition in foreign policymaking difficult. This is also reflected in the change
to a unipolar global order, the breakdown of Soviet Union and greater role
for multilateral institutions like the UN (Paris, 2004). The 1990s marked a new
policy orientation in Indian foreign policy focused on economic liberalisation.
This focus on economy prioritised three thematic policy areas: re-engagement
with major powers, prioritisation of the extended neighbourhoods in Asia, Africa
and the Indian Ocean, and defining its ties to immediate neighbourhood in the
subcontinent (Mohan, 2015). The most remarkable shifts in the post-1990s
transformation was the unveiling of the Gujral doctrine, wherein India shed off its
demands for reciprocity to unilateral accommodation for improved relations with
India’s smaller neighbours. Gujral Doctrine of 1996–1998 sought to accommodate
the interests and aspirations of the neighbouring states ‘admitting that as the larger
and more powerful member of the South Asian community, it (India) should travel
more than half the distance in accommodating the neighbors’ (Muni, 2003, p. 186).
However, with the Kargil conflict in 1999, hijacking of Indian Airlines from
Kathmandu in 1999, the civil war in Afghanistan from 1996 onwards, cumulatively
underscored the crises of unilateralism, as well as effect of regional crises and
instability on India.
While there have been debates if the Government led by Narendra Modi has
brought new dynamism to the conduct of Indian foreign policy, his approach is
essentially pragmatic, and resembles to his predecessors (Hall, 2015). However,
with his invitations to the head of governments of all SAARC states in his
swearing in ceremony, and his high-level visits among others, the focus on
the neighbourhood/region is certainly more visible. The ‘Neighbourhood First’
approach adopted by India has not only brought the focus on the region but
prioritised issues within the region. The policy encompasses four priorities,
namely political and diplomatic priority to its immediate neighbours and the
Indian Ocean island states, provide neighbours with support, as needed, in the
form of resources, equipment, and training, greater connectivity and integration,
so as to improve the free flow of goods, people, energy, capital and information and
168 India Quarterly 74(2)
promote a model of India-led regionalism with which its neighbours are comfortable
(Jaishankar, 2016). These priorities under ‘Neighbourhood First’ policy have also
neatly dovetailed into practices such as ‘first responder’ that reflects the country’s
growing capability and increasing willingness to lead in responding to regional
crises and provide for security in the region (Xavier, 2017).
Like the first responder in crises underscores, assessments on conflict and
instability in the neighbourhood will continue to be at the heart of India’s regional
policy. This regional environment, marred by conflict and fragility has threefold
impact to India’s foreign policy:
First, domestically, since the 1990s, Indian politics has been one of coalitions
between national and regional political parties. Coalitions have made regional
parties indispensable. The cross-border ethnic, sociopolitical and economic
linkages between Indian states/provinces/regions and other South Asian countries
have meant that regional parties are likely to advocate or weigh in issues that
impact their region and other South Asian states. This has also meant that
provinces/states, which were peripheral to the making of foreign policy decision
earlier, have emerged as prominent force in foreign policymaking. This linkage
between domestic political coalition related compulsions and the regional policy
has often constrained the choices of the federal government in foreign policy
preferences (Jha, 1999). The decision to create ‘States Division’ within the Ministry
of External Affairs (MEA) in 2014 to bring a sharper focus on states within the
MEA’s activities and enhance provincial engagement in India’s foreign policy
should be viewed in this context (Asthana & Jacob, 2017).
Second, given the pervasive instability and fragility in South Asia, liberal
peacebuilding agents will be vested in South Asia to remedy sources of conflicts
and help with conflict resolution. The deployment of liberal peacebuilding projects
introduces yet another layer of international engagement in the subcontinent.
Indian engagement competes not only with the US and Chinese influence in the
countries in the region but also with normative and material aspects of liberal
peacebuilding, which has continued to mobilise a wide section of population in
FCAS in South Asia.
Third, India’s policy in dealing with FCAS in the region will be the litmus test
to India’s global commitments. India’s participation and ratification of different
forums and conventions have a bearing on its unstable neighbourhood. If India
signs or endorses a position on issues like human rights and transitional justice
globally, it is likely to be evaluated based on its adherence to human rights at a
regional level. The region, thus, limits India’s global ambition. There is an Indian
anxiety over the implication of subscription to different international norms in
limiting its option in the region (Khilnani et al., 2012).
liberal peacebuilding and India’s foreign policy in its fragile and conflict-affected
countries in its neighbourhood is manifested in five ways:
Contestation: Like discussed earlier, there is a trend of regionalisation of
security, with a sense of responsibility being given to regional powers to manage
political instabilities of the region. India was supported by the USA to take a more
active role in preventing conflict and restoring democracy in Nepal in the
aftermath of the ‘royal coup’ in February 2005 (Vaughn, 2006). In Asia, this is
also true for China, which has been called upon to play a crucial role in facilitating
negotiations between the military regime and the ethnic armed groups by the
international community (Myoe, 2015). This enthusiasm of entrusting regional
hegemons with powers to govern regional affairs has, however, rarely been
evaluated positively. International partners have also been critical on the practices
of engagement regional powers like India. For example, the ‘international
community’ has cited India’s lack of interest in cooperating with international
actors in the Sri Lankan conflict, in different phases of the Lankan peace process
(Destradi, 2010). The critique of norms and forms of regional involvement in the
Sri Lankan peace process and its divergences with the liberal peacebuilding model
of engagement is summated in the excerpts from the evaluation report on the
Norwegian role in Sri Lanka.
region. India’s facilitation of dialogue between the democratic parties and the
Maoist rebels ultimately leading to the reinstatement of democracy and the end of
the civil war in Nepal (Destradi, 2012). Further, on the issue of inclusion and state
restructuring, when liberal Western powers were backtracking on their commitment
to support ethnic groups and forums, India, as discussed earlier, backed the
Madhesi groups. It went far enough to state that it has only ‘noted’ of the promulga-
tion of Nepal’s new constitution on ground of exclusionary provisions, while
other countries welcomed the promulgation (MyRepublica, 2015). Similarly, in
Afghanistan, there have been calls for increased aid and support from the inter-
national community, amid dangers of Afghanistan backsliding on the gains in
security and development, especially since the International Security Assistance
Force (ISAF) combat operations have been disbanded. India, in this context, has
stepped up it engagement on reconstruction and infrastructure building in
Afghanistan. Despite expansive extra-regional involvement and regional
competition, India has refrained from supporting elements of security and conflict
management including peacebuilding, human rights, governance reform-related
programme (Destradi, 2014) instead of focusing on developmental programmes,
with a specific focus on infrastructure. This focus has been visible in India’s
support in building institutional capacity in Afghanistan through trainings to
professionals in various departments of Afghanistan government, focusing on
strengthening its nascent public transport system as well as undertaking infra-
structural projects that are critical to Afghanistan’s recovery (Pant, 2010). Further,
the large infrastructural projects undertaken by India from construction of the
Parliament building, transmission lines, dams, to scholarship programmes extend
from Kandahar to Herat, some of the most unstable areas in Afghanistan (Ministry
of External Affairs, India, 2016). This enhanced cooperation comes at a time,
when the differences between the West and Kabul are aggravating the prevailing
uncertainty over conflict-recovery in Afghanistan (Chandra, 2010). India’s focus
on infrastructure and capital heavy sectors in Afghanistan is also reflective of the
wider debate on aid priorities of emergent donors, which argues that while
emergent donors like China and India prioritise infrastructure and investment
(Chin & Quadir, 2012; Sato, Shiga, Kobayashi & Kondon, 2011), the more
established Western donors are focusing on inclusive development through ‘soft’
approaches ‘technical assistance’.
Uncertainty: With areas of overlaps, normative differences, some outright
rejections and a policy vacuum, a form of uncertainty with regard to India’s
engagement on conflict management in the region has emerged. This uncertainty
has surfaced in two forms: contradictory practices in different times in similar
situations and contexts and differences in practices in similar situation in different
countries. The shifting goal posts of Indian priorities have surfaced in Sri Lanka
and Nepal where different political forces have been abetted and varied priorities
have been supported in different phases of the conflict and the peace process. The
glaring difference of India engagement in different South Asian states is most
visible on issues of Indian support to different regimes. In Afghanistan, when the
Taliban took over most of Afghanistan in 1996, India supported the Northern
Alliance (NA), along with other regional actors like Iran and Russia (Fair, 2011).
Adhikari 173
Impact
India is well positioned to work more visibly with liberal peacebuilding agents in
the region. The ‘Neighbourhood First’ approach provides tangible stimuli to engage
with liberal peacebuilding in the region more robustly. However, it is currently
inhibited by Indian foreign policy’s ambivalence towards discussions on peace-
building as well as fragility and conflicts in the region more systematically.
A recognition of ‘peacebuilding’-related interventions in the neighbourhood as a
form of international engagement is a starting point. The lack of coordination and
dialogue on the issue needs to be addressed for two reasons: First, in FCAS in South
Asia, the engagement of regions like India and China, and how they interact with
liberal peacebuilding agents is a key factor that determines its political settlement.
As Indian involvement in post-conflict settings in the region is likely to increase in
scale and scope, it will be able to engage better in the region by articulating its
priorities in fragile contexts. The impact of the sheer lack of coordination between
the two modes of engagement with no clear agreement on what sort of political
settlement is to be endorsed leads them to complicate the process.
Second, the interactions between liberal peacebuilding agents/projects vis-á-
vis Indian engagement also impacts both the Indian engagement and liberal
peacebuilding projects in the region. Liberal peacebuilding agents, their projects
and strategies have changed on the face of regional powers and domestic contexts,
and consequently, regional powers will also need to increasingly adapt to working
with liberal peacebuilding agents. In conflict settings in South Asia, Indian opinion
on different aspects of the peace process is invoked by liberal peacebuilding agents.
This is a testament to the increasing realisation of the primacy of India’s influence
in the region by liberal peacebuilding agents. India, will accordingly, need to
acknowledge and calibrate their foreign policies with the considerations of the
expansive scope of liberal peacebuilding agents in FCAS. This also includes
interaction with governments, bilateral and multilateral agencies, transnational
civil society and NGOs, which might not always have been in the Indian foreign
policy calculus.
174 India Quarterly 74(2)
Acknowledgements
This article is an output of the Political Settlements Research Programme (www.
politicalsettlements.org) funded by the Department for International Development (DFID),
UK. However, the views expressed, and information contained herein are not necessarily
those of or endorsed by DFID, which can accept no responsibility for such views or
information or for any reliance placed on them.
Note
1. I use the term fragile and conflict affected to describe states which have been marked
as fragile, failed or collapsed, and countries undergoing intra-state conflicts. The
terminologies have been discussed in subsequent paragraphs.
Adhikari 175
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