Archytas: Author and Authenticator of Pythagoreanism: Phillip Sidney Horky Durham University

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Archytas: Author and Authenticator of Pythagoreanism

Phillip Sidney Horky


Durham University

It is well known that Archytas of Tarentum was assumed in Antiquity to play an important
role in Pythagorean philosophy – whether we are speaking of the historical Archytas of
Tarentum (ca 435/10 – ca 360/50), for whom only four substantial authentic fragments
survive1, or the author/s of a number of pseudepigraphical treatises ascribed to ‘Archytas the
Pythagorean’ (as he is often called)2, which comprise no less than 47 pages in the most
complete modern edition3. Until very recently, however, scholars have not thought much
about what makes Archytas, whether we mean the historical Archytas of Tarentum or the
figure we often call ‘Pseudo-Archytas’, so central to the Pythagorean tradition – what is it
about Archytas specifically that captured the imaginations of ancient philosophers and
historians of philosophy? Was it something having to do with his polymath learning, related
to his innovative theory and practice of science4? Or perhaps his success as a philosopher-
statesman in democratic Tarentum5? Or could it relate to his role as a bridge between Plato
and Pythagoreanism within the later traditions which linked these two ‘schools’ together6?
To my mind, all these seem to be plausible reasons, but the problem is that they don’t
reduce to one neat and all-encompassing explanation for why Archytas lies at the heart of the
Pythagorean tradition. Rather, there would seem to be a plethora of possibilities, each of
which may reflect the specific circumstances of the reception of Archytas at particular
moments, historical periods, geographic locations, or even personal preferences on the part of

* Versions of this paper have been presented at the ‘Pseudopythagorica’ Seminar of the
Laboratoire d’excellence Hastec, organized in partnership with the Laboratoire d’études sur les
monothéismes and the Centre Jean-Pépin, CNRS, Paris; the Department of Philosophy, University of
Edinburgh; the Department of Classical Studies, Duke University; and the Department of Classics,
University College London. In addition to audiences in those venues, I want to thank, in alphabetical
order, Ahmed Alwishah, Emily Cottrell, Costas Macris, and Angela Ulacco for their help in preparing
this paper. All translations from original languages into English are mine, unless otherwise noted.
1
For these fragments and a general understanding of the life, works, and reception of Archytas
of Tarentum, see C.A. Huffman (2005). For more recent bibliographical supplements, see C. Macris
(2018b: 1051-1052, 1113); C.A. Huffman (20202).
2
This is the moniker typically used by Stobaeus in his presentation of the works usually
considered inauthentic (e.g. 3.3.65, 4.50.28), but it is also sometimes applied to the fragments of the
genuine Archytas of Tarentum (e.g. by Porphyry, De Harm. Ptol. 1.3 = F 1 Huffman).
3
That is, H. Thesleff (1965: 3-48). Cf. C.A. Huffman (2005: 595-618).
4
For Archytas on the sciences, see C.A. Huffman (2005: 57-90); L. Zhmud (2012: passim –
see his index). For ps-Archytas on science and wisdom, see P.S. Horky (2015); on principles and
metaphysical theory, A. Ulacco (2017: 22-24) and J. Mansfeld (2019); on epistemology, A. Ulacco
(2017: 107-109) and G. De Cesaris & P.S. Horky (2018); on the categories, M. Hatzimichali (2018).
5
For Archytas and democratic Tarentum, see the historical account of C.A. Huffman (2005: 8-
18). On ps-Archytas’ On Law and Justice, see P.S. Horky & M.R. Johnson (2020); cf. also the
contribution of Francesca Scrofani in the present volume.
6
As argued very recently by B. Centrone (2021).
1
our sources. What lies at the root of this proliferation, I would argue, is a core issue about
what it means to speak of Archytas as an ‘author’ and an ‘authority’ within the Pythagorean
tradition. Indeed, as this essay will demonstrate, Archytas plays a dual role in the authorship
of Pythagorean philosophical views (in the form of purportedly authentic ‘Archytan’ texts)
and the authorization of certain texts not ascribed to him being genuinely Pythagorean
(according to the ancient authorities). For it is in the single name ‘Archytas’ that both the
author- and the authority-functions converge. Hence, one approach to the problem of
explaining the central significance of Archytas in the Pythagorean tradition would be to
approach the surviving evidence by dividing it according to whether it avails of the author- or
the authority-functions of Archytas, in order to at least arrive at a better differentiated
understanding of the cluster of Archytases that are preserved in Antiquity7. To put it more
succinctly, one way to properly differentiate the many ‘Archytases’ would be to arrive at a
foundational set of categories under which his many possible functions, viz. the Pythagorean
tradition, could be taxonomized: Archytas the ‘author’, and Archytas the ‘authority’. This will
of course require us to investigate what it means to speak of Archytas of Tarentum’s later
namesake, the purported author of the pseudepigrapha, as ‘Pseudo-Archytas’, with whom our
study commences.

1 ‘Author-Inflected’ Approaches to Archytas: Some Methodological Concerns with


‘Pseudo-Archytas’

Generally, scholars tend to associate the name ‘Pseudo-Archytas’ with authorship of a set of
philosophical treatises passed down in the corpus of Pythagorean Pseudepigrapha with the
name of ‘Archytas’ attached to them8. The modern collection of fragments and testimonia was
published by Holger Thesleff in 1965 and still remains, despite some points of disagreement
(especially in textual editing9), the authoritative edition and collection of these materials. But
‘Pseudo-Archytas’ is really an invention of the 19th Century, when scholars such as Eduard
Zeller sought to assign a designation to texts that were passed down under the name
‘Archytas’, but which were clearly not written by the historical figure Archytas of
Tarentum10. This is not to say that there haven’t been many ‘Archytases’ posited throughout
the history of ancient Pythagoreanism11. Indeed, Themistius (ca 317 – ca 385 CE) is the first
person on record to cast doubt on the equivocation of the figure we call ‘Pseudo-Archytas’
with Archytas of Tarentum – prior to Themistius, there is simply no evidence that anyone
doubted that the texts coming down under the name ‘Archytas’ were indeed the genuine
7
On the problem of authenticity of Archytas’ works, see B. Centrone (2021), M.R. Johnson
(2008), and C.A. Huffman (2005: 91-100). On the people named Archytas, see Huffman (2005: 25-
30). Of particular interest is the Archytas curiously referred to as ‘the elder’ (ὁ πρεσβύτερος),
mentioned by Iamblichus (VP 104), the Anonymous source behind Photius’ account of
Pythagoreanism (p. 237.6 Thesleff), and Apuleius (De Platone 1.3). I will not be able to account for
all these Archytases in this essay.
8
See E. Zeller (1923: 119-123), although we should be clear that Zeller does not refer to
‘Pseudo-Archytas’ as an individual figure, but instead refers to “pseudo-archyteische Schrift” (p. 120).
O.F. Gruppe (1840) believed that no surviving fragments of Archytas are authentic. For a list of the
treatises and other lost works, see Appendix 1.
9
Most notably seen in Th.A. Szlezák’s edition of On the Universal Logos / On the Ten
Categories (1972).
10
‘Pseudo-Archytas’ was made into an ‘author’, I believe, by Joseph Nolle (1914), who
speaks of Ps.-Archytae Fragmenta. He was then followed by W. Burkert (1960: 27 n. 3) and Th.A.
Szlezák (1972).
11
C.A. Huffman preserves the most comprehensive list (2005: 25-30).
2
works of the great Pythagorean philosopher12. But Themistius does not call this figure
‘Pseudo-Archytas’, and instead he offers a more carefully differentiated philosophical lineage,
as we see preserved by Boethius (ca 480 – ca 524 CE):

Archytas also wrote two books, which he entitled Universal Logoi; in the first of these,
he laid out these ten categories. Hence, certain later scholars suspected that Aristotle was
not the inventor of this division, because a Pythagorean man had already composed them,
and this is the opinion of Iamblichus, no mean philosopher. Themistius did not agree with
him in believing that this was the same Archytas as the Pythagorean from Tarentum who
spent a little time with Plato, but a certain Peripatetic Archytas, who established the
authority for a new work based on the antiquity of the name (qui novo operi auctoritatem
vetustate nominis conderet)13.

Boethius suggests that Themistius disagreed with Iamblichus, who thought the works
ascribed to Archytas – notably On the Universal Logos or On the Ten Categories – were
unquestionably of the Tarentine philosopher14. Themistius maintained that they were
composed by another Archytas, “a certain Peripatetic”, who, according to him, grounded the
‘auctoritas’ he needed to legitimate his work by taking the name ‘Archytas’15. So, if we are
referring to this individual as ‘Pseudo-Archytas’, the work that is being done by ‘Pseudo-’
refers to the fact that a Peripatetic took the name ‘Archytas’ in order to lend literary and
philosophical authority to a new work. The activity of ‘forgery’ – whatever that is taken to
mean16 – is never mentioned or implied by Themistius17; and indeed Boethius elsewhere
shows agreement with the consensus position (including Iamblichus and Simplicius) in
believing that Archytas did indeed write a work on the categories prior to Aristotle, which
originated in a Pythagorean division whose influence upon not just Aristotle, but also Plato,
was paramount18.
All of this may stimulate us to wonder what interpretive work is being done when
scholars adjoin the ‘Pseudo-’ to the name ‘Archytas’19. Some worrying implications have

12
There are of course other descriptions of ‘spurious’ Pythagorean texts, which I will deal
with below.
13
Boethius, Commentary on Aristotle’s Categories, p. 162A Migne.
14
On the importance accorded to Ps.-Archytas by Iamblichus, see C. Macris (2002: 93-94).
Simplicius, following Iamblichus, will go on to defend the (pseudo-)Pythagorean author against
Themistius (without naming the latter); see Ph. Hoffmann (1980: 310, n. 19; 312, 315), and more
generally M.-A. Gavray (2011).
15
Noted by E. Zeller (1923: 120).
16
There is currently a debate concerning ‘forgeries’ in Antiquity, with, on the one side, A.
Baum (2001 and 2017) maintaining that in Antiquity ‘forgeries’ referred to texts that came down with
content that could not have been derived from the teachings of the authors to which the works were
ascribed; and on the other side, B. Ehrman (2012) arguing that in Antiquity works that were of
spurious authorship were labeled ‘forged’.
17
Compare H. Thesleff (1961: 76): “At any rate I cannot see why Pseudo-Archytas should be
regarded as forged any more than Pseudo-Hippokrates” or C.A. Huffman (2005: 96): “What we do not
find in the pseudo-Pythagorean treatises collected in Thesleff’s edition is evidence for a clever forger,
who produces Pythagorean texts which use only archaic terminology and concepts which predate Plato
and Aristotle”.
18
Boeth. Inst. Arithm. II.41, p. 139.13-21 Friedlein.
19
I have similar worries about the term ‘Pseudopythagorean’ – what is implied by the use of
the term ‘Pseudo-’ there? Are these ‘lying/false’, or ‘bastard’, or ‘counterfeit’ Pythagoreans (just to
take one recent breakdown of possible ways of thinking about the social context for forgeries, in B.
Ehrman [2012: 31-32]), as contrasted from ‘honest/true’, or ‘legitimate’, or ‘authentic’ Pythagoreans?
3
been drawn from what is, at least prima facie, most usefully employed as a heuristic
qualification, rather than a mark of distinctive authorial identity: scholars have inferred from
Themistius’ comment that ‘Pseudo-Archytas’ was an ‘imposter’20; that his philosophy was
‘banal’21 and a ‘pious fraud’, ‘like almost all Pythagorean writings’22; and, perhaps most
widely accepted, that ‘Pseudo-Archytas’ was a single figure responsible for authorship not
simply of the work On the Universal Logos/On the Ten Categories (the only work to which
Themistius actually refers), but of those other puzzling treatises ascribed to Archytas which
scholars have, with good reason, conjectured to have been written between the 1st century
BCE – 1st century CE23. Let us, for the moment, refer to this as the ‘author-inflected’
approach to the use of the name Archytas, which plays a crucial role in defining what the
moniker ‘Pseudo-Archytas’ is supposed to represent. The ‘author-inflection’ holds traction for
many of the authors within Thesleff’s collection of the Pythagorean Pseudepigrapha whose
works show signs of adapting the texts of Aristotle and Plato, including figures such as Ps.-
Timaeus of Locri (also called Timaeus Locrus)24, who, apart from being presented as the
‘real’ source behind the Platonic Timaeus, was thought by the Neopythagorean Nicomachus
of Gerasa to have passed on to Plato (via Philolaus and Archytas) the discovery of the musical
scale that reached up to the twenty-seventh multiple in their written texts25. But Pseudo-
Archytas assumed a significant place in terms of importance to the later Pythagorean
tradition, and in terms of the range, length, and variety of pseudepigrapha that survive26.
Some scholars have plausibly imagined that these texts were collected into a Corpus
Archyteum27, and we could even conjecture a list of them, based on what Porphyry (likely)
and Iamblichus (almost certainly) had at their disposal28: in addition to the four genuine

Or are we to imagine that we are dealing with other, related phenomena here, such as literary fictions
in ethopoeia, pen names, homonymity, false attributions, plagiarism, fabrications, or actual
falsifications (all explored methodologically by B. Ehrman [2012: 43-67])?
20
S. Swain (2013: 125-126).
21
C.H. Kahn (2001: 79).
22
J. Barnes (2012: 218).
23
E.g. J.M. Dillon (1996: 120-121); M. Bonazzi (2013); B. Centrone (2014: 324-326); A.
Ulacco (2017: 9); L. Zhmud (2019: 77-78). Alternative datings are provided by H. Thesleff (1961),
which are provided in Appendix 1. P.S. Horky & M.R. Johnson (2020) have argued that On Law and
Justice constitutes a special case.
24
See C. Macris (2018d).
25
Iambl. In Nic. Arithm. p. 118.19-119.2 Pistelli (perhaps actually deriving his information
from Nicomachus’ text (which he is commenting on), and Nicom. Ench. 11, p. 260.12-17 Jan. Also cf.
Cic. Rep. I.16.
26
In terms of historico-philosophical importance to the later Pythagorean tradition, probably
only Ps.-Timaeus competes with Ps.-Archytas.
27
H. Thesleff (1961: 76) describes the development of a Corpus Archyteum in this way: “The
many writings bearing Archytas’ name are explicable as an accumulation of material on the last great
name of the School. The unknown authors of these tracts felt that they were following in the path of
this great teacher; and probably they did so too, because Archytas seems to have been the most
‘atticizing’ of the Western Early Pythagoreans. The process can be imagined as a similar one to the
accretion of later elements to the Corpus Hippocraticum, the Corpus Democriteum, or the Corpus
Platonicum; except that the process does not appear to have been continuous in the case of Archytas,
and for this reason new models became more freely accepted”. W. Burkert also associates the
production and collection of Pythagorean Pseudepigrapha with the Pseudo-democritea (1960: 25 n. 5).
28
This grouping is based on the texts that are [1] quoted by Iamblichus (On Wisdom and On
Intellect and Perception), [2] referred to implicitly or by association with Iamblichus (On the
Universal Logos / On the Ten Categories), or [3] found in Stobaeus’ collection, a substantial portion
of which was formed from Iamblichus’ library (On Law and Justice; On Being; On Opposites; On the
Good and Happy Man; On Moral Education). Iamblichus, of course, also preserved parts of the
4
fragments of Archytas of Tarentum29, there would have been, among the pseudepigrapha, On
the Universal Logos / On the Ten Categories30, On Opposites31, On First Principles32, On
Being33, On Law and Justice34, On Wisdom35, On Intellect and Perception36, On the Good and
Happy Man, and On Moral Education37. The pseudepigraphic texts alone comprise 47 pages
of Greek in Thesleff’s volume – 47 pages that could easily be relegated to the bin if they are
uncritically taken to be “bald and didactic”, or part of a Pythagorean philosophy that
“occurred on the non-philosophical, or at least sub-philosophical level”38. Other alternative
scholarly accounts that are more sensitive to the content of the materials, and the social and
intellectual contexts for their production, can and should be sought. Indeed, to state the
obvious, it makes at least some difference if we choose to organize these texts under the
umbrella of a single author, whom we call ‘Pseudo-Archytas’.
There are also some good reasons, however, for retaining use of the name ‘Pseudo-
Archytas’. One justifiable rationale relates to our situating of the works that survive with
‘Archytas’ as imagined author within the tradition of the Pythagorean Pseudepigrapha. In this
case, the epithet ‘Pseudo-’ as applied to ‘Archytas’, has the value of contextualizing this
figure within a sustained production over some centuries of pseudepigrapha whose paternity
was asserted for various other figures more or less firmly associated with early
Pythagoreanism39. The benefit of using this moniker, then, is that it encourages us to
contextualize the pseudepigraphical treatises that survive under the name ‘Archytas’ with
other such philosophical texts and posits an intelligible intellectual framework (especially
Doric treatises that show affinities with the works of ‘Ps-Archytas’: among the most
prominent, Ps-Ocellus of Lucania and Timaeus Locrus/Pseudo-Timaeus). Indeed, this kind of
situating has positive explanatory force if it is taken with the assumption that the texts
ascribed to ‘Archytas’ and other early Pythagoreans were forgeries manufactured by one
forger to be purchased by wealthy clients – for one, it would explain such similarities as are
found across many of the Pythagorean Pseudepigrapha. In this case, however, we might
wonder whether we’re dealing with a single forger for all (or at least many) of the

genuine fragments of Archytas (Frs 1, 2, and 3). For the importance of Archytas and ‘Pseudo-
Archytas’ to Iamblichus, see P.S. Horky (2015), G. Staab (2002: 457-458), C. Macris (2002: 93-94),
and Ph. Hoffmann (1980). On the relationship between Iamblichus’ library and Stobaeus’ collection,
see Macris (2002: 97 with n. 78-79); also see the contribution of Rosa Maria Piccione in the present
volume.
29
Collected and discussed extensively by C.A. Huffman (2005: 103-252).
30
Th.A. Szlezak (1972).
31
A. Ulacco (2017: 57-98).
32
A. Ulacco (2017: 19-54) and, in relation to Aëtius’ account of Pythagoras’ theory of first
principles, J. Mansfeld (2019).
33
Little scholarly attention has been paid to this fragment. For the text, see p. 40.1-16
Thesleff.
34
On this text, see B. Centrone (2000) and now P.S. Horky & M.R. Johnson (2020). Also see
S. Minon (2018), as well as the contribution of Francesca Scrofani in the present volume.
35
This text is discussed at P.S. Horky (2015).
36
A. Ulacco (2017: 101-153) and G. De Cesaris & P.S. Horky (2018).
37
On these two ethical treatises, see B. Centrone (1990: 137-191). For the latter, also see S.
Giani (1993). It is worth also highlighting Pseudo-Perictione’s On Wisdom, since it replicates material
found in the same texts ascribed to Archytas and fits into its argumentative structure; see P.S. Horky
(2015: 33-35).
38
J. Dillon (1996: 119).
39
Best evidenced in B. Centrone’s work (see especially Centrone [2014], where he
demonstrates consistency in referring to ‘Ps.-Timaeus’ rather than ‘Timaeus Locrus’, as other scholars
do).
5
Pythagorean Pseudepigrapha. At this point, scholars who believe that these texts were
‘forged’ might point to an epistle, ascribed to Archytas and purportedly addressed to Plato:

Archytas to Plato – good health. You are doing well in ridding yourself of your ailment;
for we ourselves have learned this from yourself and from Lamiscus. And concerning the
matter of the notebooks (ὑπομνήματα), we attended to it and went up to Lucania, where
we happened upon the progeny of Occelus. Moreover, we ourselves have obtained the
works On Law, On Kingship, On Piety, and On the Generation of the Universe, which we
have sent to you. We haven’t been able to discover the rest at this time, but if they should
be found, you will have them40.

Scholars have not implausibly hypothesized that this letter could have been used as an
authenticating cover letter for the pseudepigrapha ascribed to Occelus of Lucania and other
purported Pythagoreans41, and indeed fragments of the latter’s On Law42 survive, as well as
substantial passages of On the Nature of the Universe (an alternate title to On the Generation
of the Universe)43. Within the corpus of the Pythagorean Pseudepigrapha, an On Piety
ascribed to Diotogenes survives in three fragments (p. 75.18 - 77.9 Thesleff), as well as two
fragments of an On Piety and Reverence ascribed to Cleinias of Tarentum (p. 108.2-19
Thesleff)44; works entitled On Kingship ascribed to Sthenidas in one fragment (p. 187.9 -
188.13 Thesleff), Diotogenes in two fragments (p. 71.17 - 75.16 Thesleff), and Ecphantus in
four fragments (p. 79.3 - 84.8 Thesleff) are additionally extant45. The authentication
hypothesis rests on the assumption that a forger could have produced this letter in order to
legitimate the authenticity of certain works ascribed to Occelus (and possibly others), which
the forger would be selling to someone willing to purchase them46. Legitimacy of the texts
ascribed to Occelus would, then, be a function of Archytas’ activities of collecting the
treatises and authenticating them, a notion that is reflected implicitly in the reference to the
philosophical or familial ‘progeny’ (ἔκγονοι) of Occelus himself. That is, this Archytas would
be acting as the authority who legitimates the existence of these texts47. A late testimonium of

40
D.L. 8.80 (p. 646.10-18 Dorandi) = p. 46.8-15 Thesleff.
41
On this letter, see H. Thesleff (1962) and, more recently, M. Frede in M. Burnyeat & M.
Frede (2015: 15-26). See also the contribution of Luc Brisson in the present volume.
42
Stob. 1.13.2 = p. 124.15 - 125.7 Thesleff.
43
The text is presented at p. 126.3 - 138.12 Thesleff. It was known as On the Nature of the
Universe by Philo of Alexandria (Aet. Mund. 12). The standard edition is by R. Harder (1926), on
which see the substantial review of W. Theiler (1926). More recently, see B. Centrone & C. Macris
(2005).
44
For Cleinias, see below.
45
On these texts, see generally L. Delatte (1942), and more recently the studies published in
A. Gangloff (2020). An exhaustive bibliography is provided at C. Macris (2018c). On Diotogenes
specifically, now see G. Roskam (2020).
46
An added implication would be that these works eventually came to influence Plato, and
‘Occelus’ is the missing link between Pythagoras and Plato.
47
It is not evident from the text whether these texts are the same as the ‘notebooks’
(ὑπομνήματα) referred to earlier on in the letter. One might think that they are the ὑπομνήματα of
Pythagoras, which allegedly reflected the contents of his Sacred Account and were passed down to
Pythagoras’ daughter Damo to Telauges (Iamblichus, On the Pythagorean Life 146, p. 164.3-12
Thesleff), who made them public (on this Hieros logos, see Adrien Lecerf’s contribution in the present
volume; cf. also C. Macris [2016]). Or they could be the ὑπομνήματα associated with Lysis and
Archippus by Nicomachus (Nicomachus, FGrHist 1063 F 2 = Iamblichus, On the Pythagorean Life
252-253 = Porphyry, Life of Pythagoras 58; Nicomachus, FGrHist 1063 F 3 = Porphyry, Life of
Pythagoras 57), which he refers to as ‘summary and symbolic’ (κεφαλαιώδη καὶ συμβολικά). On
6
Censorinus48, who appears to have obtained his information from Varro, suggests that the
writings ascribed to Pythagoras, Archytas, and Ocellus were known to have been associated
with one another (perhaps collected?) in the mid-1st Century BCE49. And indeed, as Bruno
Centrone has noted, this ‘Archytan’ tradition could be seen as paralleling a tradition that
sought to credit Philolaus with divulging the writings of Pythagoras, by sending them to
Plato50. Let us refer to this as the ‘authority-inflected’ approach to Archytas. Now the
problem with this epistle is that, on its own, it provides insufficient evidence to explain the
existence of treatises surviving with the name ‘Archytas’ attached to them – nowhere does
this epistle refer to works by Archytas himself, and it seems that the residual effect of
appealing to the authority of ‘Archytas’ has little to do with legitimating Archytas’ own
writings. Or, to put it another way, it does little to explain the existence of philosophical
treatises that were attributed to Archytas of Tarentum by someone such as a ‘Peripatetic’
Archytas, as Themistius refers to him.
In addition to the aforementioned concerns about hypothesizing ‘Pseudo-Archytas’ as
a single forger, another negative effect is that it might encourage us to elide artificially the
many texts that could have been collected into a Corpus Archyteum without attention to the
possibility that diverse authors, or at least philosophical perspectives, might be contained in
the works51. It would not be prudent to assume consistency across the Corpus Archyteum52, or
even across the entirety of the Pythagorean Pseudepigrapha that are ‘philosophical’ (or fall
under Thesleff’s Class II)53. It may be that we end up discovering similarities, or various
types of ‘family resemblances’, across treatises54; and indeed it may be that the treatises can

these passages, see below. At any rate, in the ‘response’ to this letter (Diogenes Laertius 8.81 = Plato’s
Letter 12 = p. 46.8-15 Thesleff), ‘Plato’ acknowledges receipt of the texts, which he calls ‘notebooks’,
and laments that he cannot send his own ‘notebooks’ (or the ‘notebooks’ in his possession) in return.
One also naturally thinks of the Pythagorean notebooks transmitted by Alexander Polyhistor (ap.
D.L.), on which see A. Laks (2013) and A.A. Long (2013). On the ὑπομνήματα more generally, see
M. Frede’s comments in M. Burnyeat & M. Frede (2015: 24-25); C. Macris (2002: 102-103); T.
Dorandi (2000: 77-101); D. Thiel (1993: 123-159).
48
For Censorinus, one may consult the edition/translation of G. Freyburger & A.M. Chevallier
(2019).
49
Censorin. 4.3: sed prior illa sentential qua semper humanum genus fuisse creditor auctores
habet Pythagoran Samium et Occelum Lucanum et Archytan Tarentinum omnesque adeo
Pythagoricos. See B. Centrone (2000: 448-449). Cicero (On Ends 5.29.87) and Valerius Maximus
(Memorable Doings and Sayings 8.ext.2) have Archytas, Timaeus, Arion (?), and Echecrates; and a bit
later, in reference to the correspondence between ‘Plato’ and ‘Archytas’, Lucian has Archytas and
Occelus (A Slip of the Tongue in Greeting 5). Cf. L. Zhmud (2019: 84-85).
50
B. Centrone (2000: 443-444 and 448-449). Cf. Iambl. VP 198-199. On this tradition, see
most recently C. Macris (2018a: 641-642) and K.J. Fleischer (2019).
51
That multiple authors wrote these works was assumed by Thesleff, who dated them to
diverse periods according to his, if it is fair to call it this, somewhat baroque theory (I have attempted
to break down Thesleff’s dating of the various texts ascribed to Archytas alongside dialectical and
stylistic characteristics in the Appendix to this paper).
52
It might even be imprudent to assume any Corpus Archyteum as necessarily separated from
the rest of the philosophical texts among the Pythagorean Pseudepigrapha. An attractive alternative
approach that focuses on networks of texts across the tradition is that of D. Dutsch (2020).
53
H. Thesleff (1961: 75-77).
54
As, for example, Iamblichus seems to have done, in his description of the ‘Pythagorean
notebooks’ (VP 157), where he describes the texts as: ‘compact in all other respects; inspired through
their overwhelmingly pristine and antique patina, as if it were some bloom never touched by a hand;
deduced precisely, with heaven-sent knowledge; filled to the brim with good sense; especially varied
and versatile in form and content; exceedingly simple while, at the same time, not lacking in style;
replete with material both vivid and totally indisputable, with the accompaniment of demonstrations
7
shed light on one another when coupled together, as often happens in any corpus of
philosophical authors, or even across corpora. Another, perhaps more complementary, way of
trying to make sense of the Corpus Archyteum is to try to discover what it was that might
have compelled someone (a forger? a collector? a 1st Century BCE Platonist or Peripatetic?)
to produce a set of treatises, all in ‘literary Doric’ and dealing with various aspects of
Platonist/Peripatetic philosophical approaches, and to authenticate them by appeal to the name
‘Archytas’. Is there something about Archytas’ name that distinguished it from other names
that could have lent legitimacy to the contents? For the rest of this essay, I will focus on the
evidence that relates to an ‘authority-inflected’ approach to Archytas and the corpus of
pseudepigrapha that survives with his name attached.

2 ‘Authority-Inflected’ Approaches to Archytas: Nicomachus, Porphyry, and


Olympiodorus

In order to gain traction on the ‘authority-inflected’ usage of ‘Pseudo-Archytas’, let’s look at


what is often cited, without sufficient critical analysis, as one of the most important testimonia
on the Pythagorean Pseudepigrapha. It occurs in Olympiodorus’ Prolegomena, possibly
composed between 530-570 CE55:

First [we must examine] the number of ways in which books have been misattributed56
and what sorts of criteria can be employed to distinguish genuine from mistakenly
attributed books57. Well, in ancient times books were misattributed in three ways: either
through (a) the vainglory of kings, (b) devotion of disciples, or (c) homonymy; and
through homonymy, in three ways: homonymy (c¹) of the writer, (c²) the writings, or (c³)
the commentary.
However, if it seems best, let us learn how (a) the vainglory of kings was responsible
for misattribution of books. Well, one must know that the kings of old, as they were
lovers of treatises, sought to collect the writings of the ancients – because of their
vainglory. So, in this way, Juba, king of Libya, was so great a lover of the writings of
Pythagoras, as was Ptolemy, surnamed Philadelphus, of the writings of Aristotle, and
Pisistratus the tyrant of Athens of the writings of Homer – he sought to collect them, with
payment in return. Hence, many people, greedy for money, set out either to write them or,
to be more precise, to collect those they chanced upon and ascribe them to more ancient
authors, and to present them and reap the rewards, hawking them because of this [sc. the
kings’ vainglory]. And so it went, just as we have previously said: this is the situation in
which books were misattributed because of the vainglory of kings.
And there is a situation in which books have been misattributed because of (c¹)
homonymy of the writers, wherefore there wasn’t just one single Aristotle of Stagira, but

both scientific and complete, what is called “deductive argument”.’ On this passage, see the comments
of A.C. Cassio (2000: 153-165) and C. Macris (2002: 123-128).
55
Text and translation into German also available in A. Baum (2001: 238-241).
56
I translate ἐνοθεύοντο as ‘have been/were misattributed’ rather than ‘forged’, because the
word ‘forge’ in English might not be fit for purpose, since it intrinsically assumes intentional
‘fraudulence’ (see OED, s.v. ‘Forge (v.)’ 5a-b and 6). Other alternatives in English related to
‘spuriousness’, ‘illegitimacy’, or ‘inauthenticity’ cannot capture fully the repeated use of the same
word in noun and verb forms throughout this passage.
57
The terms translated ‘misattributed’ vel sim. all derive from the notion of ‘bastardy’. On the
issue of literary ‘bastardy’, see Joyal 2014 and Regali 2005.
8
also the Aristotle whose nickname was ‘Mythos’, and even the one whose nickname was
‘Gym Instructor’.
And books have been misattributed because of (c²) homonymy of the writings,
wherefore not only did Aristotle compose a Categories, but so too did Theophrastus and
Eudemus, his disciples. Hence, it has often happened that someone chancing upon the
Categories of Theophrastus, if he does chance upon it, has believed it to be by Aristotle.
There is also a situation in which books have been misattributed neither because of
homonymy of the writers, nor because of homonymy of the writings, but because of (c³)
homonymy of the commentaries, wherefore often someone composes a commentary on a
homonymous topic and it is thought to be of another [topic]. Hence, for example,
Theophrastus too wrote a commentary on his own Categories, and often someone has
been tricked into believing that the Categories of Aristotle is this commentary. And
often, when someone happens upon the commentary of Alexander of Aphrodisias on his
Categories, he thinks this is wholly the Categories of Aristotle, since he is confused not
only that Alexander wrote a commentary on Aristotle’s Categories, but also on
Theophrastus’ Categories.
There is also a situation in which books have been misattributed because of (b) the
gratitude of disciples towards a teacher, just like all the writings ascribed to Pythagoras.
For Pythagoras did not leave behind any writing of his own, reasoning that one should
not leave to posterity inanimate writings, since it is impossible for them to make a
defense on their own behalf, but rather to leave to posterity animate writings, that is his
students, those who have the capacity to fight together on behalf of themselves and their
own teachers. Hence, his disciples, because they composed writings by devotion,
ascribed the name of Pythagoras to them. And because of this reason all the writings
passed on under the name Pythagoras are misattributed58.

As previously mentioned, scholars have often taken this as prima facie evidence for
the production, circulation, collection, and sale of Pythagorean Pseudepigrapha in the 1st
century BCE, usually by reference to what is interpreted to be ‘Pythagorean writings’
(Πυθαγορικὰ συγγράμματα), which were allegedly forged to satisfy the vainglory of King
Juba II of Mauretania59. Unfortunately, two objections can be leveled against Olympiodous’
evidence being taken in any prima facie way: first, it is clear, as Thesleff pointed out, that the
term Πυθαγορικὰ συγγράμματα in this text does not refer to the ‘Pythagorean writings’, but
rather to the ‘writings of Pythagoras’, given the fact that the other two collections of writings
cited are those ascribed to Homer and Aristotle (not ‘Homeric’ and ‘Aristotelian’)60. This is
confirmed by concerns later in the passage of writings ascribed to Aristotle and Pythagoras,
and the absence of references to ‘Aristotelian’ or ‘Pythagorean’ writings there. A second
objection concerns the format and presentation of the evidence itself. Olympiodorus, or his
source (which is unfortunately unclear)61, is making a transhistorical point about how

58
Olympiodorus, Prolegomena p. 13.4 - 14.4 Busse.
59
C.H. Kahn (2001: 90), citing Zeller; B. Centrone (2000: 431); J.-J. Flinterman (2014: 350 n.
47); C. Macris (2018b: 1133-1134).
60
H. Thesleff (1961: 54-55). By contrast, B. Centrone (2000: 431) translates as ‘la letteratura
pitagorica’ – despite his reference in n. 6 to the corresponding text of Olympiodorus’ follower ps.-
Elias (p. 128.6 Busse) to τὰ Πυθαγόρου.
61
Possibly the same source as that of Athenaeus’ account (Deipnosophists 1.3a), which
presents evidence of Ptolemy Philadelphus obtaining the library of Aristotle from Neleus (who had in
turn obtained it from Theophrastus). That passage also mentions Pisistratus, but not Pythagoras. On
this passage, see C. Natali (2013: 101). On Pisistratus, see H. D’Agostino (2007): 6-7 (Greek text), 26-
9
‘vainglory’ stimulates the fabrication and collection of writings ascribed to Homer, Aristotle,
and Pythagoras by, respectively, Pisistratus (in the mid-6th Century), Ptolemy II Philadelphus
(ca 309 – ca 246 BCE), and Juba II (48 BCE – 23 CE)62. This is hardly secure historical
evidence for the rationale behind fabrication of books and their collection by Juba (or for the
respective cases of Pisistratus or Ptolemy, for that matter)63. Even the reason adduced for
Pythagoras’ not leaving behind writings can be reduced to a simple Platonist mask, as it
employs a commonplace sentiment about writings being unable to talk back found in Plato’s
Phaedrus (275d-276a)64. We might at this point inquire: what’s the use of Olympiodorus’
evidence, if it is at all useful, for our understanding the production of the Pythagorean
Pseudepigrapha?
I suspect that it can be considered useful if it is not taken prima facie as the critical key
that solves the problem of the production of Pythagorean forgeries, but rather in a slightly
more oblique way for the transmission of Pythagorean doctrines, precepts, and methods from
teacher to student within the philosophical ‘school’ (a concept that itself would require further
discussion). This is at least implicit in category (b), the category of writings ascribed to
Pythagoras that exemplifies the ‘gratitude’ (εὐγνωμοσύνη) or ‘devotion’ (εὔνοια) of
Pythagoras’ disciples. If we exclude the a fortiori speculation, on Olympiodorus’ part, for the
reason why Pythagoras left no writings, we are left with a basic observation that Pythagoras’
disciples passed off their writings as Pythagoras’65 as a means to defend their teacher’s ideas,
and their own, from external attack (καὶ ὑπὲρ ἑαυτῶν καὶ τῶν ἰδίων διδασκάλων...συμμαχεῖν).
Implicit here is the notion that the Pythagoreans were under attack and in a philosophical
dialectic with other philosophers from other schools, such as those levelled by Stoics,
Epicureans, Skeptics, and Early Christians66.
Olympiodorus’ evidence helps us to explain how, and for what reasons, Pythagorean
texts were ‘misattributed’, but it does little to fix an historical account of this process or to

27 (transl.), 61-68 (comm.), and xxiii-xxcii. On the assembling of Aristotle’s works into a corpus, see
M. Hatzimichali (2013).
62
In a similar vein, Galen (In Hipp. De Nat. Hom. 1.44, p. 54.26-55.14 Mewaldt) argues that it
was the vainglory of the Hellenistic kings in Alexandria and Pergamum that resulted in the first
pseudepigrapha, but he nowhere links this to Pythagoreanism or the works of Pythagoras. The
explanation for the production of pseudepigrapha according to the ‘vainglory’ of the Hellenistic kings,
then, must be a topos, and cannot be used to infer anything secure about the Pythagorean tradition.
63
Theophrastus is described as the ‘first to have collected books and taught the kings of Egypt
how to arrange a library’. Other evidence concerning Juba’s collection ([Elias] in Cat. p. 128.5-9 =
BNJ 275 T11) suggests that the texts of Pythagoras solicited for the ‘vainglory of kings’ were
elaborately forged: ‘certain people treated the works [sc. of Pythagoras] they came upon, and dyed
them with cedar and soaked them for the sake of the retail trade…so that they would then have a
credibility because of their age’ (transl. Roller at BNJ 275 T11).
64
Tracking the reception of these lines in later philosophical thought is beyond the remit of
this paper. One relevant comparison is to be found in Plutarch’s Life of Numa (22.2-3), where the
‘Pythagorean’ King of Rome Numa prefers that the sacred tablets on which his doctrines are preserved
should be buried with him once he himself is dead, and that the ideals should be passed down through
habituation and memory.
65
Contra L. Zhmud (2012:164-165) and B. Erhman (2013: 105-119).
66
Some examples would include the Stoics: Seneca, Epist. Mor. 108.17-21 (gentle rebuke of
Q. Sextius and Sotion of Alexandria’s ethics); Epicureans: Lucretius, DRN 3.670-78, 776-782 and
Diogenes of Oenoanda, Fragments 40-42 (critique of the theory of transmigration of the soul);
Skeptics: Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism 3.163-166 (criticism of Pythagorean
metaphysics); Early Christians: Tertullian, Apology 48.1; On the Testimony of the Soul 4.1-3; On the
Soul 28.1-2a and 31.3-6 (critique of Pythagorean metempsychosis); On the Soul 32.4 and 47.5-6
(critique of the Pythagorean theory that the nature of God and the human soul are derived from
numbers). For Tertullian's treatment of Pythagoreanism, see R.A.L. Montoya (2014) and (2015).
10
speak about the agents of this process. In order to gain ground on those questions, we may
turn to a difficult passage of Porphyry’s Life of Pythagoras, which appears to show some
Neopythagorean inclinations:

And, on account of this chiefly [sc. the Pythagorean treatment of numbers], their [sc. the
early Pythagoreans’] philosophy happened to die out – first because it was enigmatic, and
next because their writings were written in Doric (a dialect that is somewhat obscure) –
and, in fact, this is precisely why the doctrines recorded (ἀνιστορούμενα) in Doric were
suspected of being spurious (νόθα) and misunderstood (παρηκουσμένα), due to the fact
that those who published them were not Pythagoreans strictly speaking. In addition to
these, as the Pythagoreans (οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι) say, Plato and Aristotle, and Speusippus,
Aristoxenus, and Xenocrates, appropriated what was fruitful, with minor revisions; but
what was superficial and inconsequential (τὰ ἐπιπόλαια καὶ ἐλαφρά), and everything that
was advanced later on (ὕστερον) for refutation and mockery (πρὸς ἀνασκευὴν καὶ
χλευασμόν) of the school by its malicious slanderers (βασκάνως συκοφαντούντων), they
collected and recorded as the proper doctrines (ἴδια) of the sect67.

Porphyry’s discussion here – possibly derived from Nicomachus or Moderatus (the


‘Pythagoreans’ who are at least slightly critical of Plato’s Academy and Aristotle’s Lyceum in
the passage68) – speaks about the production of counterfeit doctrines in Doric, that were in
fact misattributed because they were published by figures known to be ‘not Pythagoreans
strictly speaking’69. It is due to these people that the doctrines were misunderstood, or ‘mis-
heard’ (παρηκουσμένα) – likely a reference to the genuine Pythagorean acusmata, which

67
Porphyry, Life of Pythagoras 53 = Speusippus F 32 Isnardi Parente (T 49 Tarán) =
Xenocrates T 79 Isnardi Parente2 = Aristoxenus, fr. 68 Wehrli. Text É. Des Places (CUF). On this
passage, also see the extensive commentary in C. Macris (2001: 354-360) and B. Centrone (2000: 153-
156).
68
It is doubtful, given the structure of the presentation, that this evidence derives from
Moderatus of Gades (cf. W. Burkert [1972: 95-96 with n. 52]; D.J. O’Meara [1989: 11 with n. 8]). For
the status quaestionis, see C. Macris (2002: 112 n. 157). Given the fact that Porphyry is more a
‘universalizing Platonist’ than a ‘Pythagoreanizing Platonist’, it may be that Porphyry himself quoted
this portion for dialectical purposes, and we should not assume simple agreement with it. On this
passage, see C. Macris (2014: 398 with n. 70) and P.S. Horky (2020: 168-170).
69
It is worth mentioning a somewhat parallel account in Iamblichus’ On the Pythagorean Life
252-53 and Porphyry’s Life of Pythagoras 57-58, which can be traced back to Nicomachus (FGrHist
1063 F 2, transl. Radicke, with modifications): “It therefore then came about that this knowledge [sc.
the ‘original customs and sciences’ referred to at Iambl. VP 251] perished together with those who
possessed it, because they had kept it secret in their hearts until that time, and only the difficult and
unintelligible parts were remembered by those outside the sect, with the rare exception of some very
faint and hardly visible sparks that had been preserved by those who had been abroad at the time [sc.
Archippus and Lysis – see Porphyr. VP 57-58 = 1063 FGrHist F 3, next note]. And these people,
isolated and very dejected about what had happened, dispersed to different places and could not bear
at all to communicate with mankind in [the] future. Living anywhere in solitude and seclusion each
preferred his own company to the rest of the world. They did, however, take care that the name of
philosophy should not become entirely lost from mankind and that they should therefore incur the
wrath of the gods because they had utterly ruined their great gift. Thus, by arranging some summary
and symbolic notebooks (ὑπομνήματά τινα κεφαλαιώδη καὶ συμβολικὰ συνταξάμενοι), and by
collecting the writings of the elders and what they themselves remembered (τά τε τῶν πρεσβυτέρων
συγγράμματα καὶ ὧν διεμέμνητο συναγαγόντες), each one left them to posterity wherever he happened
to die, instructing their sons or daughters or wives not to pass them onto anyone outside the household.
And their families observed this custom for a very long time, handing down the same order from
generation to generation”.
11
were not properly grasped as such70. A tentative reconstruction of the progression of the story,
supplemented with some extra contextual information, might be thus formulated:

1. The (legitimate) early Pythagoreans espoused an enigmatic philosophy (reflected


in the acusmata).
2. a. Their enigmatic philosophy was written down in Doric by legitimate
Pythagoreans. Likely candidates here include Archippus and Lysis71.
b. But some people, who were ‘not Pythagoreans strictly speaking’, by dint of not
being genuine Pythagoreans or having genuine Pythagorean understanding, caused
people to doubt the authenticity of these doctrines, which they made public in
written form.
3. Plato, Aristotle, Speusippus, Aristoxenus, and Xenocrates read the published Doric
texts (?) and appropriated what was fruitful from these to their own works, making
some minor modifications.
4. They also collected what was ‘superficial and inconsequential’ (from the Doric
texts?) and recorded it as the proper doctrines of the Pythagorean sect.
5. Sometime ‘later’, some unidentified ‘malicious slanderers’ read the ‘superficial or
inconsequential’ material recorded as the particular doctrines of the Pythagorean
sect and employed it for ‘refutation and mockery’ of the school.

It is difficult to infer on this evidence alone which texts within the corpus of
Pythagorean Pseudepigrapha belong to which step in the purported history of Pythagorean
writings. What is relatively clear, however, is that there was an original ‘writing down’ of the
enigmatic doctrines in Doric, some parts of which were appropriated by the members of the
Academy and the Lyceum, and some parts of which they recorded as being distinctively
Pythagorean, possibly in their doxographical works72; finally, sometime later on (ὕστερον),
the enemies of Pythagoreanism employed these latter materials. As we saw before with the
epistle to Plato, Archytas was thought to be central to the process of authenticating and
transferring early Pythagorean wisdom. Would Archytas best fit into this historical process in
step 2b, where people who were ‘not Pythagoreans strictly speaking’ wrote down and
published the genuine Pythagorean ideas? Or is Archytas instead to be associated with those
people who recorded only the superficial Pythagorean material (at least according to the
‘Pythagoreans’ who are Porphyry’s source here)? Or is there a step missing in Porphyry’s

70
Cf. Iambl. VP 105 = Protr. 21: “And unless someone, after carefully selecting the very
symbols, explicates and comprehends them with an interpretation free of mockery (ἀμώκῳ ἐξηγήσει),
the things said will seem to be ridiculous and trivial [litt. ‘old wife’s tales’] to ordinary people, full of
nonsense and rambling (λήρου μεστὰ καὶ ἀδολεσχίας)”. My thanks to Costas Macris for pointing me
to this passage. Cf. L. Graverini (2006); M. Massaro (1977).
71
See Nicomachus, FGrHist 1063 F 3 = Porphyry, Life of Pythagoras 57 (transl. after
Radicke): “There was no written work of Pythagoras himself, and the members who had escaped death
– Lysis and Archippus and all those who had been abroad – had only saved some faint and scarcely
visible sparks of their philosophy”. Indeed, both the Letter to Hipparchus (p. 111.14 - 114.12 Thesleff)
attributed to Lysis and On Tranquility attributed to Hipparchus (= Archippus?) (p. 89.6 - 91.16
Thesleff) are written in Doric.
72
Cf. P.S. Horky (2020: 169 n. 8) and P.S. Horky & M.R. Johnson (2020: 458 with n. 20). We
need to recall that Aristotle wrote several lost works on the Pythagoreans which would have included
the acusmata, and that Speusippus wrote a work On Pythagorean Numbers (Fragment 28 Tarán = 122
Isnardi Parente). Aristoxenus also preserved many acusmata and provided an account of early
Pythagorean ethics in the Pythagorean Precepts, on which now see the edition of C.A. Huffman
(2019). It is possible that other mirabilia were included in the lost texts as well. Cf. C. Macris (2002:
111-112 with n. 158).
12
story of the Pythagorean writings, where Archytas was thought to intervene? Indeed, there is
evidence to support this final hypothesis. It is found in Ibn Abī Uṣaybi‘a’s Sources of
Information on the Classes of Physicians, a 13th-century biographical work which preserves
two fragments derived from the larger work within which (possibly) Porphyry’s Life of
Pythagoras was originally embedded, On the History of the Philosophers:

The books of Pythagoras the sage, which Archytas the philosopher from Tarentum
collected by himself, are 80 [in number]. As for these books – which he [sc. Archytas]
diligently with all his effort brought together, compiled, and made into a collection, from
all the elders73 who were followers of Pythagoras the philosopher, men of his sect, and
from those who inherited his knowledge, one by one – they were 200 [in number]. And
whoever is distinguished by the purity of his intellect and sets aside those spurious books
which are said to be from the mouth of the sage and which are attributed to the sage and
his name, which dishonourable people created, such as the Book of Prayers, the Book of
the Description of Detestable Professions, the Book of the Science of Miracles, the Book
of the Formation of Symposia, the Book of the Construction of Drums, Cymbals, and
Lyres, the Book on the Generation of the Universe, the Book of Hands, the Book on
Magnanimity74, and many other books similar to these which have been recently created
– he will attain eternal happiness75.
As far as those unscrupulous men who created these spurious books which we have
mentioned: they are, according to the narratives that have been passed down: Aristippus
the Teller76, Nicos who used to be called ‘one-eyed'/'truly inefficient’, a man from Crete
called Conius, and Megillus, and Fūkhjwāqā[?], along with others who were worse than
them. And what led them to create these spurious books and attribute them to the mouth
and name of Pythagoras the philosopher was [the desire] to be well received by the
moderns77; and because of that, they are honoured, revered, and taken as models. As far
as the books of the sage which are beyond suspicion, [they are] 280 [in number]. They
were forgotten until they reappeared with a group of wise men with [pure] intentions and
temperance, who acquired, brought together, and made a collection of them. Before that,
they were not known in Greece; however, they were stored in Italy78.

73
My guess is this refers to the πρεσβύτεροι, mentioned in Nicomachus’ account preserved by
Porphyry (VP 58 = 1063 FGrHist F 2). Savage-Smith, Swain & van Gelder (2020: 4.3) have
‘disciples’ here.
74
C. Macris (2001: 381-384) has made some suggestions regarding the identification of some
of the works of this list with works attributed to Pythagoras in the Greek sources; cf. also C. Macris
(2018b: 834-850). For works attributed to Pythagoras in the Arabic sources, A. Izdebska (2018: 860-
862).
75
The original text is printed in Arabic in A. Müller (1884). Translation after E. Cottrell’s
French (2008: 533-535), with extra guidance from Ahmed Alwishah. Now see Cottrell (2016: 504-
505), with her brief comm. on p. 512. Compare the translations of Marwan Rashed in C.A. Huffman
(2005: 616-617) and of Carl Ernst in B. Ehrman (2012: 109, 110), as well as the rather free translation
into German by B.L. van der Waerden (1965: 862-863). Even more recently, see Savage-Smith, Swain
& van Gelder (2020: 4.3).
76
Something like a ‘narrator’ or ‘storyteller’ who publicly announces the Pythagorean
precepts.
77
I will explain my translation of this term below.
78
The latter portion disagrees with what was said in the preceding lines and might be thought
to indicate either a summary of what was said in the previous statements (but which misinterprets the
information?) or a marginal note that made its way into the manuscript tradition; cf. E. Cottrell (2008:
535 n. 47).
13
Obviously, this is a tremendously rich text, and it won’t be possible to undertake a
comprehensive analysis of all of its contents here. Instead, I will use it to inform the skeletal
account given in Porphyry’s Life of Pythagoras 53, discussed above. First, Porphyry states
that the report of the ‘unscrupulous men’ is based in tradition, and has been passed down by
someone else; this is in keeping with Porphyry’s passage from the Life of Pythagoras 53,
where some ‘Pythagoreans’ (who we cannot identify with certainty) are cited for reporting
that Plato, Aristotle, Speusippus, Aristoxenus, and Xenocrates appropriated what they found
fruitful in the written Doric treatises, and that ‘what was superficial and inconsequential, and
everything that was advanced for refutation and mockery of the school by the malicious
slanderers later on, they collected and recorded as the particular doctrines of the sect.’ Given
the fact that these views could be considered within an historical dialectic, it need not entail
that Porphyry committed to them79. Second, it’s clear that Porphyry took Archytas to be
central in the legitimation of genuine Pythagorean texts: not just the texts of Pythagoras, but
also the texts of the ‘elder’ Pythagoreans, those who had direct inheritance of his knowledge
and were purportedly of his sect. From this perspective, Porphyry would appear to disagree
with Nicomachus, who believed that “there was no written work of Pythagoras”80, and who
may indeed be the source behind Porphyry’s Life of Pythagoras 5381. Third, Porphyry invites
the audience to imitate Archytas in terms of using one’s purified intellect to make proper
discriminations about what texts are genuinely Pythagorean and what are spurious. Fourth, it
is not obvious, as some scholars have claimed82, that the text contradicts itself: that only 80
books are authenticated as being ‘of Pythagoras’, and 200 books authenticated as being ‘of
the elders’, does not mean that when Porphyry claims that there are 280 books ‘of the sage’,
he has been in error: he is simply assuming that the books ‘of Pythagoras’ and ‘of the elders’
all genuinely reflect Pythagorean ideas, as authenticated by the pure intellect of Archytas of
Tarentum. If this is right, then Bart Ehrman’s criticisms of Armin Baum’s hypothesis, that
authentication of texts is an activity of guaranteeing the content of the material as being
genuine, are misapplied: this text does, as Baum argues, indicate that Pythagorean forgeries
are identified as genuine or spurious based on whether they descend through the proper
lineage of the sect, and not simply on whether the figure in question is the author of the text83.
It is difficult to know who, precisely, Porphyry was attacking when he refers to the
‘unscrupulous men’ who proffered as Pythagorean their own ideas. The names, which are
likely to be translated from Syriac and are almost certainly corrupt, have presented a serious
challenge to decipher: [1] In Ernst and Ehrman’s text, based on al-Najjār’s edition of 2003,
we have first ‘Aristotle the Younger’, whereas in Huffman’s translation of Marwan Rashed’s
French version, based on Müller’s 1884 edition, we have ‘Aristippus the Young’ (presumably
79
Cf. C. Macris (2014: 386).
80
Nicomachus, 1063 FGrHist F 3 = Porphyry, Life of Pythagoras 57.
81
One wonders if Nicomachus obtained this information from Posidonius (cf. Galen, On the
Doctrines of Hippocrates and Plato 5.6.42-3, p. 334.30-33 De Lacy = Posidonius, Fr. 151 Edelstein-
Kidd), who would appear to believe that the writings which survive as Pythagorean in his time (2nd-1st
centuries CE) are by Pythagoras’ students, since no writing of Pythagoras himself survived. Equally,
Philodemus (De pietate 3, Fr. 10, p. 113 Schober = col. 4b, p. 66 Gomperz) seems to have the same
information, which he may have obtained from Posidonius (on which see L. Zhmud [2019: 73-74]).
Alternatively, one could imagine a common source which has gone missing. For an exhaustive study
of the ancient sources negating that Pythagoras has ever written anything, see C. Riedweg (1997) –
although not everyone is prepared to agree with his final suggestion that Pythagoras may indeed have
committed his thoughts to writing after all.
82
Contra E. Cottrell (2008: 535 n. 47), who follows Huffman/Rashed and van den Waerden
here.
83
B. Ehrman (2012: 87-88 et passim). See A. Baum’s convincing rejoinder to Erhman’s
claims concerning authenticity and content at Baum (2017).
14
‘the Younger’). We know nothing of an ‘Aristotle the Younger’ who wrote about Pythagoras,
whereas it’s clear that Aristippus the Elder, who was often confused with his grandson, wrote,
in some fashion, about Pythagoras in his On Natural Scientists84. In her 2008 article on these
fragments, Emily Cottrell, who employs Müller’s text but also takes into account al-Najjār’s
manuscript readings, to which Müller did not have access, agrees with Rashed in keeping
‘Aristippus’, but refers to him as ‘the rhetor’, which would again most likely indicate
Aristippus the Elder85. Thesleff, seeking connections with the other pseudepigrapha,
conjectured ‘Archippus’, and van den Waerden tried ‘Aristaeus’, but Cottrell has sufficiently
ruled these out on palaeographical grounds86. [2] The next figure on the list is ‘Nicos’, or, if
Thesleff’s conjecture is to be entertained, ‘Nearchus’, who is either described as ‘essentially
erroneous’ (Ernst and Ehrman) or ‘one-eyed’ (Rashed and Cottrell)87. To my mind, this looks
like it could possibly be an epithet. [3] Following that is the Cretan ‘Konios’, accepted by
Ernst and Ehrman, Rashed, and Cottrell, but the obvious reference, as noted by Thesleff, is to
Cleinias of Crete, the interlocutor of Plato’s Laws and the Epinomis who, along with Megillus
of Sparta, kept pace with the Athenian Stranger. Moreover, a pseudepigraphon with the title
On Piety and Reverence ascribed to ‘Cleinias of Tarentum’ survives in two fragments88.
Furthermore, the Neopythagorean Cronius may remain a possibility, especially given
Porphyry’s criticisms of his philosophy as insufficient elsewhere (see below)89. [4] Next on
the list comes ‘Megalos’ (Ernst and Ehrman) or ‘Magillos’ (Rashed), which is almost
certainly the aforementioned ‘Megillos’ (as Cottrell has it), for whom there is evidence of a
treatise On Numbers90. The final figure, rendered Fūkhajawāqā by Ernst, F W K H J W A Q
A by Rashed, and Fūkhjwāqā by Cottrell, is sadly unrecoverable91.
One final point about this fascinating evidence: Porphyry refers to some unknown
‘youths’ or, as I have translated it (with Rashed), ‘moderns’ whom the shameless fabricators
sought to please by assigning the spurious works to Pythagoras; there is, importantly here as
elsewhere, no mention of forgeries associated with Pythagoras’ early students (the ‘elders’).
The identity of these ‘youths’ is ambiguous – is Porphyry referring to young men or ephebes,

84
Aristippus claims there that “...he was named Pythagoras because he, no less than the
Pythian, orated the truth” (Πυθαγόραν αὐτὸν ὀνομασθῆναι ὅτι τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἠγόρευεν οὐχ ἧττον τοῦ
Πυθίου: D.L. 8.21 = SSR IV A 150). Thus Aristippus etymologized Pythagoras’ name (ἠγόρευεν…
Πυθίου). Compare with the view of Iamblichus (VP 7), contra Eudoxus and Xenocrates, on which see
P.S. Horky (2020: 187 n. 79), and more generally on the ancient and modern etymologies of
Pythagoras’ name C. Macris (2021: 7-11). Several pseudepigraphical letters, written in Doric, are
attested for Aristippus (Epistolographi Graeci, p. 617-634 Hercher).
85
E. Cottrell (2008: 534 n. 43). At Cottrell (2016: 504), she preferred ‘the rhetor/sophist’. We
have translated it ‘the Teller’, in the sense of someone who announces the philosophical precepts of
Pythagoras and narrates them to the public.
86
E. Cottrell (2008: 534 n. 43).
87
Less likely, ‘Proros’, as Cottrell ventures (2008: 534 with n. 44).
88
Stob. 3.1.75 and 76 = p. 108.2-19 Thesleff. There is a text On Numbers ascribed to Cleinias
of Tarentum ([Iambl.] Theol. Arithm. p. 21 de Falco and Syrian. in Arist. Metaph. p. 168 Kroll = p.
108.21-28 Thesleff). Furthermore, see the testimonies regarding the paradigmatic Pythagorean
friendship of Cleinias with Prorus (Diod. Sic. 10.6; Iambl. VP 198, 239).
89
Very little has been written about Cronius, but good starting points would be J.M. Dillon
(1996: 379-380) and J. Whittaker (1994).
90
See the Theologoumena arithmeticae attributed to Iamblichus, p. 34 De Falco = p. 115.15-
21 Thesleff.
91
One wonders if Perictione is a possibility (initially suggested to me per litteras by Cottrell)?
Commenting on this name, Savage-Smith, Swain & van Gelder (2020: 4.3) state: “The Arabic ductus
might support a conjectural reading of this name as a deformation of f-r-kh-t-w-n-ā, Perictione
(Περικτιόνη)”.
15
or to ‘recent’ people (both of which could be indicated by Greek words neoi and neoteroi)92?
It is interesting that Syrianus and Proclus refer to the Neopythagoreans Nicomachus and
Moderatus as the ‘younger’ or ‘more recent’ Pythagoreans (neoteroi)93, and it can be
conjectured from his Life of Plotinus (20.71-76 and 21.4-9) that Porphyry did not hold either
of these figures (along with Numenius, and Cronius) in the highest of esteem – at least with
regard to their respective descriptions of the Platonic-Pythagorean system, which, according
to Porphyry, Plotinus explained with far greater precision94. Hence, I have adopted the
translation ‘moderns’, to be distinguished from the Pythagoreans of old or ‘elders’ whose
works were, according to this account, legitimate.
A new reconstruction of Porphyry’s version of the history of the Pythagorean writings,
which combines the sections of Life of Pythagoras 53 and 57 with the Arabic fragments
preserved by Ibn Abī Uṣaybi‘a, would then be:

1. There are eighty legitimate books attributed to Pythagoras.


2. The (legitimate) early Pythagoreans espoused an enigmatic philosophy (reflected
in the acusmata).
3. Their enigmatic philosophy was written down in Doric by legitimate
Pythagoreans. Likely candidates here include Archippus and Lysis95.
But some people, who were ‘not Pythagoreans strictly speaking’, by dint of not
being genuine Pythagoreans or having genuine Pythagorean understanding, caused
people to doubt the authenticity of these doctrines.
4. Archytas of Tarentum collected the genuine writings attributed to Pythagoras and
Pythagoras’ early students (including Archippus and Lysis?). He probably edited
them and arranged them into some order as well. The number of books here is 280.
5. Plato, Aristotle, Speusippus, Aristoxenus, and Xenocrates read Archytas’
collection of Doric treatises and appropriated what was fruitful from these to their
own works, making some minor modifications.
6. They also collected what was ‘superficial and inconsequential’ from the Doric
texts and recorded it as the particular doctrines of the Pythagorean sect.
7. Other figures (like ‘Aristippus’, ‘Cleinias’, and ‘Megillus’), seeking to authorize
their own illegitimate ideas as Pythagorean to posterity, assigned them to
Pythagoras so that they would be honoured, but in reality these texts and their
ideas were spurious. They were looking to impress the ‘moderns’, a possible
reference to the Neopythagoreans (such as Moderatus, Nicomachus, Numenius,
and Cronius). This would place the false association of the illegitimate texts with
Pythagoreanism around the late 1st century CE.
8. Sometime ‘later’, some unidentified ‘malicious slanderers’ read the ‘superficial or
inconsequential’ material recorded as the particular doctrines of the Pythagorean
sect and employed it for ‘refutation and mockery’ of the school.

92
Savage-Smith, Swain & van Gelder (2020: 4.3) opt for ‘the more recent scholars’.
93
As contrasted with ‘Archytas’ as an ‘old’ or ‘elder’ Pythagorean (Syrianus, Commentary on
Aristotle’s Metaphysics p. 151.17-22 Kroll [viz. Arist. Metaph. 1084b13] = p. 47.27-48.2 Thesleff);
Proclus, Commentary on Plato’s Timaeus 2.19, 3-7.
94
To be sure, as C. Macris (2014: 393-398) argues, Porphyry’s high esteem for Plotinus does
not exclude his appreciation of these Neopythagoreans.
95
See Nicomachus FGrHist 1063 F 3 = Porphyry, Life of Pythagoras 57 (transl. after
Radicke): “There was no written work of Pythagoras himself, and the members who had escaped death
– Lysis and Archippus and all those who had been abroad – had only saved some faint and scarcely
visible sparks of their philosophy”.
16
9. A ‘group of wise men’ emulated Archytas of Tarentum’s activities by acquiring,
bringing together, and making a collection of the legitimate 280 writings, which
had been lost to Greece (or dispersed?). They were kept somewhere in Italy
(presumably in Tarentum).

Admittedly, this reconstruction is tentative and depends both on (a) synthesizing the
accounts of Porphyry as preserved in the extant Life of Pythagoras with the account preserved
by Ibn Abī Uṣaybi‘a, and (b) assuming that we can sift through the levels of textual
transmission in the passages with any certainty. At any rate, as Huffman correctly notes, this
information “would make excellent sense as someone’s attempt to explain a corpus of
pseudo-Pythagorean writings similar to that reflected in Thesleff’s collection”96. And it would
help to explain why such a complex set of texts as the Pythagorean Pseudepigrapha could
have had Archytas placed so prominently at the centre of its existence. Archytas’ role would
have been as authenticator of the genuine Pythagorean works, as the first and most important
textual and philosophical critic of Pythagoreanism whose own progeny would extend to Late
Antiquity and beyond.

3 Conclusions

What Porphyry’s history of the Pythagorean writings can contribute to our understanding of
the ‘authority-inflected’ appeal to Archytas is, I hope, relatively clear from what I’ve argued
here. Authorization of texts as being genuinely, or spuriously, Pythagorean depended on the
pure intellect that Archytas exhibited in his discrimination; and the audience of Porphyry’s
work is encouraged to follow Archytas and the other unnamed ‘wise men’ (possibly the
Alexandrian Platonists who reacted to Pseudo-Archytas, the most prominent of which would
have been Eudorus) in employing their pure intellects to understand the part they play in the
drama that is the history of Pythagoreanism – likely the same ‘pure intellect’ (καθαρὸς ὁ
νοῦς) that Plotinus referred to in the Enneads (VI.9.3) when speaking about the hyper-noetic
state one embraces in the mystical experience, when one’s soul is, as Porphyry himself puts it,
‘free of affection’ (ἀπαθής) (de Abst. 2.61.1). In a way, however, arriving at a better
understanding of the authority-inflection of Archytas circles us back where we started with
the ‘author-inflection’: as remarkable as Porphyry’s account of the Pythagorean
Pseudepigrapha is, it, like the epistle of ‘Archytas’ to ‘Plato’, doesn’t explicitly refer to
writings of Archytas himself. The treatises ascribed to ‘Archytas’ have no role to play in
Archytas’ editorial activities here. Why is this the case? It’s clear, as we mentioned above,
that Porphyry took Archytas’ writings to be genuine, as did Iamblichus; and yet the surviving
evidence doesn’t show them bridging the ‘author-‘ and the ‘authority-inflections’ of the name
Archytas. Rather, a proliferation of Archytases evades reduction to one simple Archytas, as
each Archytas plays a specific role in different parts of the ancient history of Pythagorean
philosophy. There is an ‘Archytas’ the author, an ‘Archytas’ the editor and collector (is this
the same as the author?), and an ‘Archytas’ the Peripatetic, who Pythagoreanized Aristotle
(and was not the same as the editor/collector or the original author). The first is not mentioned
alongside the second by Porphyry; and while the first is mentioned alongside the third by
Themistius, he does not discuss the second. And we have not yet dealt with those many
‘Archytases’ who wrote the works that don’t survive on mechanics and other topics, nor yet
the Archytas sometimes called ‘the Elder’. Moreover, I’m willing to suspend judgment at the
moment about whether there might be multiple authors of the Pythagorean Pseudepigrapha

96
C.A. Huffman (2005: 617).
17
attributed to ‘Archytas’, even if it is not the most elegant solution; after all, dialectical
discrepancies in the Doric composition of those texts (provided in the Appendix), should
make us hesitate to assume that there is a single author behind their composition. I have only
this deflationary conclusion to offer: ‘Pseudo-Archytas’ is a moniker that, more than a century
after it was first advanced, may be losing its simple viability and its explanatory value in the
context of the variety of ancient evidence and modern theoretical problems with the concept
of ‘forgery’ in the history of ancient philosophy. Could we think of a possible replacement
term that could do the positive work that ‘Pseudo-Archytas’ does to aid in our understanding
– without the negative effects of elision of functions or illegitimation of the philosophical
content of the treatises? One possibility presents itself by parallel, and it’s used all the time in
modern scholarly parlance: ‘Platonism’. By ‘Platonism’ we do not generally mean the same
thing as ‘Platonic’, and scholars routinely understand that what is ‘Platonic’ refers to Plato’s
own writings and thoughts, whereas what is ‘Platonist’ refers to all the complex and
contradictory aspects of its reception over a long period of time and by many different people.
A similar move could be applied in the case: we could think about speaking of these complex
historical and philosophical phenomena as ‘Archytist’, thus rendering a break between the
unique historical figure ‘Archytas of Tarentum’, and the challenging and multifaceted history
of the reception and reconstruction of this figure’s philosophical influence after his death.
Such a term is sufficient to accommodate that thorny point that the only ‘Pseudo-Archytas’
mentioned in Antiquity is Themistius’ ‘certain Peripatetic Archytas’; and it is, I think,
sufficient also to account for the range of possible functions that the name ‘Archytas’ took on
throughout ancient philosophy, from the arrival of the first Archytan pseudepigrapha in the 1st
century BCE to Boethius’ reception of Archytan philosophy in the 6th century CE. With the
term ‘Archytist’, we might find a way to differentiate, without totally alienating, the one
Archytas of Tarentum, and the multiple Archytases that followed.

18
Appendix 1: The ‘Corpus Archyteum’

Thesleff’s
Title of Work Hypothesized Dialectical Attributes Description of Style97
Date
Καθολικοὶ λόγοι Late (4th CE or Many distinctive and Manneristic/artificial
δέκα Later) unusual archaizing (Thesleff 1961: 110)
features (see Thesleff
1961: 90); πρᾶτος for
πρῶτος; τουτέων; ποτί
for πρός; 3 pl. –ντι;
mostly koine forms
except long α.
Ὀψαρτυτικά 3rd BCE None (no texts) None.
Περὶ ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ 3rd BCE Feminine participle in ‘tono scholastico’, ‘il
καὶ εὐδαίμονος -οισα; dative plural of intento espositivo
3rd declension in – conferisce al trattato un
εσσι; use of ἦμεν; use andamento piano e
of αὐταυτ-; scorrevole’ (Centrone
contraction of ου to ω; 1990: 47)
use of ὅκα/ὅκκα;
μεζον- for μειζον-; 3
pl. -ντι; non-
contraction of εε; -μες
for –μεν; ποτί for
πρός; retention of
primitive long α;
confusion of -εω for –
αω; use of α in place
of ε; ρσ is not
assimilated into ρρ;
loss of ι in forms like
ποέν; κρέσσον for
κρείσσων
Περὶ ἀντικειμένων 3rd BCE use of ἦμεν; retention
of primitive long α;
use of ὅκα/ὅκκα; use
of αἴκα; 3 pl. –ντι;
contraction of ου and
lengthening of ο to ω
at the beginning of
words
(ὠνυμασμένον); υ for
ο; non-contraction of
εα of to η; non-
contraction of εε; ποτί

97
According to Thesleff, Centrone, or Huffman.
19
for πρός; μεζον- for
μειζον-; ὀπτίλος for
ὄμμα (πτιλῶσσον)
Περὶ ἀρχῶν Middle or End Feminine participle in Simple/non-archaizing
of 4th BCE -οισα; use of αὐταυτ-; (Thesleff 1961: 110)
use of εἶμεν;
contraction of ου to ω;
use of nominative
ἐστώ and μορφώ; ὥτ’
for ὥστε; use of both
ὠσία and οὐσία (as
distinct from ἐστώ?);
κρέσσον for κρείσσων
Περὶ αὐλῶν 3rd BCE None (no texts) None.
Περὶ γεωργίας 3rd BCE None (no texts) None.
Περὶ τῆς δεκάδος Middle or End None (no texts) None.
of 4th BCE
Περὶ τῶν καθόλου 3rd BCE Koine extant, but
λόγου / Περὶ δέκα some parts in Doric; in
κατηγοριῶν the Doric, we have: ευ
for εο; contraction of
ου to ω; retention of
primitive long α; use
of πράτα for πρῶτα;
use of ὠσία
(apparently equivalent
to οὐσία) and μορφά;
use of αὐταυτ-;
thematic infinitive in –
εν; -μες for –μεν; use
of ὅκα; ταὶ for αἱ; non-
contraction of εε
Περὶ μηχανῆς 3rd BCE None (no texts) None.
Περὶ νόμου καὶ Middle or End αἴκα for ἐάν; use of ‘Somewhat’ archaizing
δικαιοσύνης of 4th BCE ἦμεν; τοὶ for οἱ; (Thesleff 1961: 112)
contraction of ου to ω;
non-contraction of εε;
retention of primitive
long α; πρᾶτος for
πρῶτος; ταὶ for αἱ;
μεζον- for μειζον-;
dative plural of 3rd
declension in –εσσι;
thematic infinitive in –
εν; ποτί for πρός;
subjunctives in short-
vowel –οντι; ιο = ιω;
ευ = εο; non-
contraction of εο to ου
Περὶ νοῦ καὶ Middle or End -ηιο = -ειο; Simple/non-archaizing

20
αἰσθάσιος of 4th BCE contraction of αε to η (Thesleff 1961: 110)
(but see Thesleff
1961: 87 n. 5);
retention of primitive
long α; use of εἶμεν;
use of ὅκα/ὅκκα; use
of γινώσκει (loss of
initial γ); αι becomes
α (loss of ι in
σαμάνωμεν – post 2nd
Century BCE?); non-
contraction of οο to ου
(νόος instead of νοῦς);
non-contraction of εα
of to η; 3rd pl. -ντι;
ποτί for πρός; dative
plural in –εσσιν;
thematic infinitive in –
εν; use of οὐσία (not
ὠσία)
Περὶ τοῦ ὄντος Middle or End η for ε (ναμαρτέας); ‘Somewhat’ archaizing
of 4th BCE retention of primitive and possibly ‘authentic or
long α; πρᾶτον for at least comparatively
πρῶτον; use of εἶμεν; old’ (Thesleff 1961: 112)
contraction of ου to ω;
3 pl. -ντι
Περὶ παιδεύσεως 3rd BCE αἴκα for ἐάν; dative ‘Pretenzioso nello
ἠθικῆς plural of 3rd stile’,‘tono polemico’,
declension in –εσσι; ‘tono moraleggiante e
use of εἶμεν; use of sentenzioso’ (Centrone
αὐταυτ-; 3 pl. -ντι; ταὶ 1990: 46)
for αἱ; τοὶ for οἱ; -μες
for –μεν; αἰ for εἰ
(αἴτε); retention of
primitive long α;
contraction of αε to η;
non-contraction of οο
to ου (νόος instead of
νοῦς); non-contraction
of εε; ποτί for πρός;
feminine participle in
–οισα; thematic
infinitive in –εν; δδ/σδ
= ζ; ἐς for εἰς; υ for ο
(ὀνυμαίνω); κάρρων
for κρείσσων
Περὶ σοφίας 3rd BCE dative plural of 3rd Archaizing (Thesleff
declension in –εσσι; 1961: 90)
retention of primitive
long α; non-

21
contraction of οο to ου
(νόος instead of νοῦς);
non-contraction of εα
of to η; contraction of
ου to ω; ταὶ for αἱ; 3
pl. -ντι; thematic
infinitive in –εν; use
of ἦμεν; υ for ο
(ὀνυμάτων);
Letters 3rd – 2nd BCE –μειν in the athematic
infinitive; retention of
primitive long α;
contraction of ου to ω;
-μες for –μεν
Varia retention of primitive
long α (not across all
fragments)
Genuine fragments 4th BCE use of αὐταυτ-; –μεν ‘Hodgepodge of Attic,
(Huffman) for –ναι in athematic Doric, and even Lesbian
infinitives; thematic and Epic forms’
infinitive in –εν; non- (Huffman 2005: xiii)
contraction of εα of to
η; contraction of ου to
ω; retention of
primitive long α;
crasis in ο + α
becomes ω; τοὶ for οἱ;
πρᾶτον for πρῶτον;
ὅκκα for ὅτε ἄν; ποτί
for πρός; μικκ- for
μικρ-; subjunctives in
short-vowel –οντι

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