Due Process Cases Study Guide
Due Process Cases Study Guide
Due Process Cases Study Guide
Mayor of Manila
Facts: Ordinance No. 4760: refrain from entertaining or accepting any guest or customer unless it fills out a prescribed form in the lobby in an
open view; prohibiting admission of less than 18 years old; increase of license fees; cancellation of license for subsequent violation of the
ordinance.
Ruling: No. Such limitations cannot be viewed as a transgression against the command of due process. To satisfy the due process requirement,
an official action must not outrun the bounds of reason and result in sheer oppression. Due process is thus hostile to any official action marred
by lack of reasonableness.
Ordinance No. 4760 was neither unreasonable not arbitrary. It was intended to curb the opportunity for the immoral or the illegitimate use to
which such premises could be devoted. It was a valid exercise of police power. But where such exercise of police power is considered as either
capricious, whimsical, unjust or unreasonable, a denial of due process or a violation of any other applicable constitutional guaranty may call for
a correction by the courts subject to judicial inquiry.
No man can do exactly as he pleases. Every man must renounce unbridled license. Liberty as understood in democracies, is not license; it is
“liberty regulated by law”. Implied in the term is restraint by law for the good of the individual and for the greater good of the peace and order of
society and the general well-being.
Facts: PhilPhos Movement for Progress, Inc. Filed with DOLE a petition for certification election among the supervisory employees of petitioner
alleging that as a supervisory employees of petitioner alleging that as a supervisory union it seeks to represent the supervisory employees of
Philippine Phosphate Fertilizer Co. Mediator-Arbiter issued an order directing the holding of a certification election among the supervisory
employees of petitioner, excluding therefrom the superintendents and the professional and technical employees. PMPI filed an amended petition
wherein it sought to represent not only the supervisory employees of petitioner but also its professional, technical and confidential employees.
Mediator-Arbiter granted the petition and directing the holding of a certification election. Petitioner appealed to the Secretary of the Department
of Labor and Employment who rendered a decision dismissing the appeal.
Issue: WON there was a denial of due process on the part of the petitioner.
Ruling: No. The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard or an opportunity to explain one’s side or an opportunity to seek a
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. Petitioner agreed to file its position paper with the Mediator-Arbiter and to consider the
case submitted for decision on the basis of the position papers filed by the parties, there was sufficient compliance with the requirements of due
process, as petitioner was afforded reasonable opportunity to present its side.
3. Sec. Of Justice v. Lantion, Presiding Judge, RTC Manila & Mark Jimenez (Extraditee)
Facts: The US Government through the Department of Foreign Affairs, requested the Philippine Government for the extradition of Mark
Jimenez. The request was forwarded by the Secretary of Foreign Affairs to the Secretary of Justice. Pending the evaluation of the extradition
documents by the DOJ, private respondent requested for copies of the official extradition request and all pertinent documents. When his request
was denied for being premature, private respondent resorted to an action for Mandamus, Certiorari and Prohibition. The trial court then issued
an order maintaining and enjoining the DOJ from conducting the extradition proceedings. Hence, this petition.
Issue: WON private respondent is entitled to the due process right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition
proceeding.
Ruling: Neither treaty nor extradition law precludes the rights to due process even to a prospective extraditee. An application of the basic twin
due process of notice and hearing will not go against the treaty or the implementing law. However, Extradition Treaty provides the time
when an extraditee shall be furnished a copy of the petition for extradition as well as its supporting papers, i.e., after the filing of
the petition for extradition in the extradition court. But while the extradition process is still in the evaluation stage, and there is
no certainty that a petition for extradition will be filed in the appropriate extradition court, the threat to private respondent’s
liberty is merely hypothetical.
Extradition Treaty affords an extraditee sufficient opportunity to meet the evidence against him once the petition is filed in court.
The time for the extraditee to know the basis of the request for his extradition is merely moved to the filing in court of the formal
petition for extradition. The extraditee’s right to know is momentarily withheld during the evaluation stage of the extradition
process to accommodate the more compelling interest of the State to prevent escape of potential extraditees which can be
precipitated by premature information of the basis of the request for his extradition.
Facts: The Municipal Board of Manila enacted an Ordinance No. 6537 requiring aliens except those employed in the diplomatic and consular
missions of foreign countries and in technical assistance progress of the government and another country, and members of religious orders and
congregations to procure the requisite mayor’s permit so as to be employed or engage in trade in the City of Manila. The permit fee is P50 and
the penalty for the violation of the Ordinance is 3-6 months imprisonment or a fine of P100 to P200 or both.
Respondent filed a petition with the CFI Manila for the declaration of the said ordinance as null and void contending that it is arbitrary,
oppressive and unreasonable, being applied only to aliens who are thus, deprived of their rights to life, liberty and property and therefore,
violates the due process and equal protection clause of the Constitution.
CFI Manila rendered judgment declaring Ordinance No. 6537 as null and void. Hence, this petition.
Issue: WON Ordinance in question violates the due process of law and equal protection rule of the Constitution.
Ruling: Yes. Requiring a person before he can be employed to get a permit from the City Mayor of Manila who may withdraw or refuse it at will
is tantamount to denying him the basic right of the people in the Philippines to engage in a means of livelihood. While it is true that the
Philippines as a State is not obliged to admit aliens within its territory, but once an alien is admitted, he cannot be deprived of life without due
process of law. This guarantee includes the means of livelihood. Due process clause protects all persons, natural as well as artificial. The
shelter of protection under the due process and equal protection clause is given to all persons, both aliens and citizens.
5. Tañada v. Tuvera
Facts: Invoking the people’s right to be informed on matters of public concerns, a right recognized by the Constitution, as well as the principle
that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette, petitioners seek a writ of Mandamus to compel respondent
public officials to publish, and/or cause the publication in the official Gazette of various Presidential Decrees, Letters of Instructions, General
Orders, Proclamations, Executive Orders, Letters of Implementation and Administrative Orders.
Respondents on the other hand moved for the dismissal of the case, contending that petitioners have no legal personality to bring the instant
petition.
Issue: WON publication of issuances of “public nature” or “general applicability” is a requirement of due process.
Ruling: YES. Publication of laws is part of substantive due process. Laws should generally be published. The term “laws” should refer to all laws
and not only to those of general application, for strictly speaking, all laws relate to the people in general, albeit, there are some that do not apply
to them directly. All statute therefore, including those of local application and private laws shall be published as a condition for their effectivity,
which shall begin 15 days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature. “The furtive law is like a scabbarded
saber that cannot feint, parry or cut unless the naked blade is drawn.”
Gone are the days of secret laws and unpublished decrees. As we are once again, in an open society, all the acts of the government is subject
to public scrutiny and are always available to public cognizance. This has to be so if our country is to remain democratic, with sovereignty
residing in the people and all government authority emanating from them.
6. Sandoval v. HRET
Facts: On May 19, 2007, after the canvass of votes, the Board of Canvassers of the Legislative District of Malabon City, Novotas, proclaimed
Sandoval, herein petitioner, as the winning candidate for the Office of the Member of the House of Representatives as against protestant
Lacson-Noel who obtained the second highest number of votes. Refusing to concede defeat, protestant Lacson-Noel filed a petition alleging that
the results of the election do not reflect the true will of the voters as they are but products of various fraudulent and illegal acts committed by
Sandoval and his agents with the connivance of the Board of the Election Inspectors (BEIs). Sandoval filed an Answer wherein he specifically
denied the material allegations of the protest. Revision of Ballots have been conducted and the physical count thereof yielded the highest
number of votes cast in favor of Lacson-Noel. Sandoval filed a Motion for Technical Examination of Ballots alleging that there are substantial
discrepancies between the number of votes cast and counted as against the number of ballots physically counted during revision. A hearing was
scheduled on September 23, 2008 but was canceled upon the Motion of Sandoval. The Hearing Commissioner set additional hearing dates for
the reception of Sandoval’s evidence. On the last hearing date, Sandoval again filed a Motion for Leave to present an expert witness. The
Tribunal resolved to grant Sandoval’s Motion with a warning that no further extension shall be given. Despite the Tribunal’s warning, Sandoval
once again prayed for Leave to present additional expert witness. This time, the Tribunal denied Sandoval’s Motion and declared Lacson-Noel
as the duly elected Representative of the Lone District of Malabon-City Navotas. Petitioner Sandoval moved for reconsideration but was denied.
Hence, this petition.
Issue: WON HRET committed grave abuse of discretion by not admitting petitioner’s formal offer of evidence thereby denying him of due
process.
Ruling: No. The petition lacks merit. Such action of the HRET was not a denial of petitioner’s right to due process. The essence of due process
is the reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit evidence in support of one’s defense. To be heard does not mean verbal arguments in
court. One may be heard also through pleadings. The petitioner was given all the opportunity to be heard including dates for his presentation of
evidence but he still failed to fulfill his responsibility.
Facts: El Banco Español Filipino instituted an action to foreclose a mortgage upon various parcels of real property situated in the City of Manila.
The mortgage in question was executed by Engracio Palanca as a security for a debt owed by him to the bank. Since Palanca was a non-
resident at the time of the action, the plaintiff made the necessary notice by publication, and deposited in the Post Office a copy of the summons
and complaint to Palanca’s last known address. The action proceeded before the CFI Manila without the Respondent’s appearance. Judgment
by default was rendered in favor of the Plaintiff, ordering Palanca to deliver the amount of the mortgage. 7 years later, Defendant-Appellant,
Vicente Palanca, administrator of the estate of Engracio Palanca, filed a Motion to Set Aside the Order of the CFI Manila on the ground that it
never acquired jurisdiction over the Defendant or over the subject of the action.
Issue: WON the proceedings were conducted in such a manner as to constitute due process.
Ruling: There is no exact or definite definition of due process, the reason being that the idea expressed therein is applicable under so many
diverse conditions as to make any attempt at precise definition hazardous and unprofitable. HOWEVER, when applied to a judicial proceeding, it
may be laid down with certainty that the requirement of due process is satisfied if the following conditions are present:
1. There must be a court of tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the matter before it.
2. Jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person of the defendant or over the property which is the subject of the proceeding
3. The defendant must be given an opportunity to be heard.
4. Judgment must be rendered upon lawful hearing.
As regard to the question of jurisdiction, the jurisdiction of the court over the cause of action is obvious and requires no comment. Jurisdiction
over the person on the defendant, if acquired at all in such an action, is obtained by the voluntary submission of the defendant or by the
personal service of process upon him within the territory where the process is valid. If, however, the defendant is non-resident and, remaining
beyond the range of the personal process of the court, refuses to come in voluntarily, the court never acquires jurisdiction over the person at all.
Here the property itself is in fact the sole thing which is impleaded and is the responsible object which is the subject of the exercise of judicial
power. It follows that the jurisdiction of the court in such case is based exclusively on the power which, under the law, it possesses over the
property; and any discussion relative to the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the defendant is entirely apart from the case. The
jurisdiction of the court over the property, considered as the exclusive object of such an action, is evidently based upon the following conditions
and considerations, namely :
(1) that the property is located within the district;
(2) that the purpose of the litigation is to subject the property by sale to an obligation fixed upon it by the mortgage; and
(3) that the court at a proper stage of the proceedings takes the property into its custody, if necessary, and exposes it to sale for the purpose of
satisfying the mortgage debt. An obvious corollary is that no other relief can be granted in this proceeding than such as can be enforce enforced
against the property.
Facts: Toribio Teodoro owns and operates Ang Tibay, a leather company which supplies to the Philippine Army. Due to the alleged shortage of
leather, Toribio caused the lay-off of a number of his employees. However, National Labor Union (NLU) questioned the validity of said lay-offs
as it was averred that the said employees were members of NLU while no members of the rival union (National Worker’s Brotherhood) were laid
off. National Labor Union filed a Motion before the Supreme Court praying that the case be remanded back to the Court of Industrial Relations
for New Trial and to adduce evidence claiming among others that:
a) The National Workers Brotherhood is a company or employer union dominated by Toribio, the existence and functions of which are illegal;
b) The supposed lack of material claimed by Toribio was but a scheme to systematically discharged all the members of the National Labor
Union from work.
Ruling: YES. The Supreme Court pointed out that although the Court of Industrial Relations may be said to be free from the rigidity of certain
procedural requirements, it does not mean that it can, in justifiable cases before it, entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential
requirements of due process in trials and investigations of an administrative character. The record shows that the newly-discovered evidence
obtained by NLU, were evidence inaccessible to them at the time that even with exercise of due diligence they could not obtain the same.
Therefore, they should be granted new trial to comply with due process.
9. Lao Gi “Chia” Sr v. CA
Facts: Herein petitioner faces a charge for deportation when a judgment was rendered canceling his citizenship (obtained from a prior judgment)
on the grounds of fraud and misrepresentation. Petitioners were required to register as aliens but refused. They filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the Order directing them to register as aliens and to oppose the Motion for their arrest. Such was denied by then Acting
Commissioner Victor Nituda. Subsequent actions were filed by Petitioner with the CFI Manila and the Court of Appeals but was again denied.
Hence this petition.
Issue: WON petitioners are entitled to the right of due process even if they are aliens.
Ruling: YES. The power to deport an alien is an act of State. It is an act by or under the authority of the sovereign power. It is a police measure
against undesirable aliens whose presence in the country is found to be injurious to the public good and domestic tranquility of the people.
Although a deportation proceeding does not partake of the nature of a criminal action, however, considering that it is a harsh and extraordinary
administrative proceeding, affecting the freedom and liberty of a person, the constitutional right of such person to due process should not be
denied. Thus, the provisions of the Rules of Court of the Philippines particularly on criminal procedure are applicable to deportation proceeding.
Section 37(c) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940 provides that “no alien shall be deported without being informed of the specific grounds
for deportation nor without being given a hearing under the rules of procedure to be prescribed by the Commissioner of Immigration.”
Hence, the charge against an alien must specify the acts or omissions complained of which must be the stated in ordinary and concise language
to enable a person of common understanding to know on what ground he is intended to be deported and enable the Commission on
Immigration and Deportation to pronounce a proper judgment.
Facts: Private respondent Riviera Home Improvements, Inc. is engaged in the business of selling and installing ornamental and
construction materials. It employed petitioners Virgilio Agabon and Jenny Agabon as gypsum board and cornice installers from
19922 to 1999 when they were dismissed for abandonment of work. Petitioners then filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and
payment of money claims. The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision declaring the dismissals illegal and ordered private respondent
to pay the monetary claims. On appeal, the NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiter because it found that the petitioners had
abandoned their work, and were not entitled to backwages and separation pay. The other money claims awarded by the Labor
Arbiter were also denied for lack of evidence. 5 Upon denial of their motion for reconsideration, petitioners filed a petition
for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals in turn ruled that the dismissal of the petitioners was not illegal
because they had abandoned their employment but ordered the payment of money claims.
Ruling: NO. The dismissal was for just cause but imposing sanctions on the employer for failure to extend to his employee his
right to an investigation before causing his dismissal. The rule thus evolved: where the employer had a valid reason to dismiss
an employee but did not follow the due process requirement, the dismissal may be upheld but the employer will be penalized to
pay an indemnity to the employee.
Due process under the Labor Code, like Constitutional due process, has two aspects: substantive and procedural. Constitutional
due process protects the individual from the government and assures him of his rights in criminal, civil or administrative
proceedings; while statutory due process found in the Labor Code and Implementing Rules protects employees from being
unjustly terminated without just cause after notice and hearing.
Facts: The Office of the Ombudsman filed an Information before the Sandiganbayan against President Joseph Estrada for violations of the
following:
a) The Plunder Law
b) Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
c) The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees
d) Perjury
e) Illegal use of an Alias
Petitioner bewails the failure of the law to provide for the statutory definition of the terms “combination” and “series” in the key phrase “a
combination or series of overt or criminal acts” found in Section 1 and Section 2, and the word “pattern” in Section 4 of the Plunder Law. These
omissions, according to petitioner, render the Plunder Law unconstitutional for being impermissibly vague and overboard and deny him the right
to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, hence, a violation of his fundamental right to due process.
Ruling: NO. The Plunder Law contains ascertainable standards and well-defined parameters which would enable the accused to determine the
nature of his violation. As long as the law affords some comprehensible guide or rule that would inform those who are subject to it what conduct
would render them liable to its penalties, its validity will be sustained. A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely because general terms
are used therein, or because of the employment of terms without defining them; much less do we have to define every word we use. Besides,
there is no positive constitutional or statutory command requiring the legislature to define each and every word in an enactment.
When a statute forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that man of common intelligence must necessarily guess as to its
meaning and differ as to its application, that law is deemed VOID. Such kind of statute violates the first essential requisite of due process of law
because it denies the accused the right to be informed of the charge against him.