Sino-Soviet split

The Sino-Soviet split was the breaking of political

Sino-Soviet split
relations between the People's Republic of China and
the Soviet Union caused by doctrinal divergences that Part of the Cold War and Sino-Soviet relations
arose from their different interpretations and practical
applications of Marxism–Leninism, as influenced by
their respective geopolitics during the Cold War of
1947–1991.[2] In the late 1950s and early 1960s, Sino-
Soviet debates about the interpretation of orthodox
Marxism became specific disputes about the Soviet
Union's policies of national de-Stalinization and
international peaceful coexistence with the Western
Bloc, which Chinese founding father Mao Zedong
decried as revisionism. Against that ideological
background, China took a belligerent stance towards
the Western world, and publicly rejected the Soviet Mao Zedong (left) and Nikita Khrushchev
Union's policy of peaceful coexistence between the (right) in Beijing, 1958
Western Bloc and Eastern Bloc.[2] In addition, Beijing
Date 1961–1989[1]
resented the Soviet Union's growing ties with India due
to factors such as the Sino-Indian border dispute, and Location China, Soviet Union
Moscow feared that Mao was too nonchalant about the Caused by De-Stalinization of the Soviet
horrors of nuclear warfare.[3] Union, revisionism, and Maoism

In 1956, CPSU first secretary Nikita Khrushchev Methods Proxy war, propaganda and
denounced Stalin and Stalinism in the speech On the Sino-Soviet border conflict
Cult of Personality and its Consequences and began Resulted in Tri-polar cold war and two-way
the de-Stalinization of the USSR. Mao and the Chinese competition for Eastern Bloc
leadership were appalled as the PRC and the USSR allies
progressively diverged in their interpretations and Lead figures
applications of Leninist theory. By 1961, their
Mao Zedong Nikita
intractable ideological differences provoked the PRC's
Khrushchev
formal denunciation of Soviet communism as the work
of "revisionist traitors" in the USSR.[2] The PRC also
declared the Soviet Union social imperialist.[4] For Eastern Bloc countries, the Sino-Soviet split was a
question of who would lead the revolution for world communism, and to whom (China or the USSR) the
vanguard parties of the world would turn for political advice, financial aid, and military assistance.[5] In that
vein, both countries competed for the leadership of world communism through the vanguard parties native
to the countries in their spheres of influence.[6]

In the Western world, the Sino-Soviet split transformed the bi-polar cold war into a tri-polar one. The
rivalry facilitated Mao's realization of Sino-American rapprochement with the US President Richard
Nixon's visit to China in 1972. In the West, the policies of triangular diplomacy and linkage emerged.[7]
Like the Tito–Stalin split, the occurrence of the Sino-Soviet split also weakened the concept of Monolithic
Communism, the Western perception that the communist nations were collectively united and would not
have significant ideological clashes.[8][9] However, the USSR and China continued to cooperate in North
Vietnam during the Vietnam War into the 1970s, despite rivalry elsewhere.[10] Historically, the Sino-Soviet
split facilitated the Marxist–Leninist
Realpolitik with which Mao established the tri-
polar geopolitics (PRC–USA–USSR) of the
late-period Cold War (1956–1991) to create an
anti-Soviet front, which Maoists connected to
Three Worlds Theory.[4] According to Lüthi,
there is "no documentary evidence that the
Chinese or the Soviets thought about their
relationship within a triangular framework
during the period."[11]
   China
   Soviet Union
Contents    Countries that shared borders with both: Mongolia was
Soviet-aligned while Afghanistan and North Korea remained
Origins neutral, with the former eventually becoming Soviet-aligned
Reluctant co-belligerents in the late 1970s.
Chinese communist revolution
Treaty of Sino-Soviet friendship
Socialist relations repaired
Discontents of de-Stalinization
Conflicting national interests
Two Chinas
Onset of the disputes
Khrushchev's criticism of Albania at
the 22nd CPSU Congress
Mao, Khrushchev, and the US
Personal attacks
Monolithic Communism fractured
Formal and informal statements
Conflict
Cultural Revolution
Border conflict
Nuclear China
Geopolitical pragmatism
Rivalry in the Third World
Occasional cooperation
After Mao
Transition from idealism to
pragmatism (1976–1978)
1978–1989
See also
Footnotes
Further reading
Primary sources
External links
Origins

Reluctant co-belligerents

During the Second Sino-Japanese War, the Chinese

Communist Party (CCP) and the nationalist Kuomintang party
(KMT) set aside their civil war to expel the Empire of Japan
from the Republic of China. To that end, the Soviet leader,
Joseph Stalin, ordered Mao Zedong, leader of the CCP, to co-
operate with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, leader of the
KMT, in fighting the Japanese. Following the surrender of
Japan at the end of World War II, both parties resumed their
civil war, which the communists won by 1949.[12]

At the war's conclusion, Stalin advised Mao not to seize

political power at that time, and, instead, to collaborate with
Chiang due to the 1945 USSR–KMT Treaty of Friendship and
In the Asian theatre of World War II,
Alliance. Mao abided Stalin in communist solidarity.[13] Yet,
Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek of the
three months after the Japanese surrender, in November 1945,
KMT was kidnapped by one of his own
when Chiang opposed the annexation of Tannu Uriankhai
officers and forced to ally with the
(Mongolia) to the USSR, Stalin broke the treaty requiring the
Communist Mao Zedong of the CCP as
Red Army's withdrawal from Manchuria (giving Mao regional
reluctant co-belligerents to expel Imperial
control) and ordered General Rodion Malinovsky to give the
Japan from China.
Chinese communists the Japanese leftover weapons.[14][15]

In the five-year post-World War II period, the United States partly financed Chiang, his nationalist political
party, and the National Revolutionary Army. However, Washington put heavy pressure on Chiang to form
a joint government with the Communists. US envoy George Marshall spent 13 months in China trying
without success to broker peace.[16] In the concluding three-year period of the Chinese Civil War, the CCP
defeated and expelled the KMT from mainland China. Consequently, the KMT retreated to Taiwan in
December 1949.

Chinese communist revolution

As a revolutionary theoretician of Communism

seeking to realize a socialist state in China, Mao
developed and adapted the urban ideology of
Orthodox Marxism for practical application to the
agrarian conditions of pre-industrial China and the
Chinese people.[17] Mao's Sinification of Marxism-
Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought, established political
pragmatism as the first priority for realizing the
accelerated modernization of a country and a people,
and ideological orthodoxy as the secondary priority
Chairman Mao with US journalist Anna Louise
because Orthodox Marxism originated for practical
Strong, whose work presented and explained the
application to the socio-economic conditions of Chinese Communist revolution to the Western
industrialized Western Europe in the 19th century.[18] world. (1967)
During the Chinese Civil War in 1947, Mao dispatched US journalist Anna Louise Strong to the West,
bearing political documents explaining China's socialist future, and asked that she "show them to Party
leaders in the United States and Europe", for their better understanding of the Chinese Communist
Revolution, but that it was not "necessary to take them to Moscow."

Mao trusted Strong because of her positive reportage about him, as a theoretician of Communism, in the
article "The Thought of Mao Tse-Tung", and about the CCP's communist revolution, in the 1948 book
Dawn Comes Up Like Thunder Out of China: An Intimate Account of the Liberated Areas in China, which
reports that Mao's intellectual achievement was "to change Marxism from a European [form] to an Asiatic
form . . . in ways of which neither Marx nor Lenin could dream."

Treaty of Sino-Soviet friendship

In 1950, Mao and Stalin safeguarded the national interests of China and the Soviet Union with the Treaty
of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance. The treaty improved the two countries' geopolitical
relationship on political, military and economic levels.[19] Stalin's largesse to Mao included a loan for $300
million; military aid, should Japan attack the PRC; and the transfer of the Chinese Eastern Railway in
Manchuria, Port Arthur and Dalian to Chinese control. In return, the PRC recognized the independence of
the Mongolian People's Republic.

Despite the favourable terms, the treaty of socialist friendship included the PRC in the geopolitical
hegemony of the USSR, but unlike the governments of the Soviet satellite states in Eastern Europe, the
USSR did not control Mao's government. In six years, the great differences between the Soviet and the
Chinese interpretations and applications of Marxism–Leninism voided the Sino-Soviet Treaty of
Friendship.[20][21]

In 1953, guided by Soviet economists, the PRC applied the USSR's model of planned economy, which
gave first priority to the development of heavy industry, and second priority to the production of consumer
goods. Later, ignoring the guidance of technical advisors, Mao launched the Great Leap Forward to
transform agrarian China into an industrialized country with disastrous results for people and land. Mao's
unrealistic goals for agricultural production went unfulfilled because of poor planning and realization,
which aggravated rural starvation and increased the number of deaths caused by the Great Chinese Famine,
which resulted from three years of drought and poor weather.[22][23]

Socialist relations repaired

In 1954, Soviet first secretary Nikita Khrushchev repaired relations between the USSR and the PRC with
trade agreements, a formal acknowledgement of Stalin's economic unfairness to the PRC, fifteen industrial-
development projects, and exchanges of technicians (c. 10,000) and political advisors (c. 1,500), whilst
Chinese labourers were sent to fill shortages of manual workers in Siberia. Despite this, Mao and
Khrushchev disliked each other, both personally and ideologically.[24] However, by 1955, consequent to
Khrushchev's having repaired Soviet relations with Mao and the Chinese, 60% of the PRC's exports went
to the USSR, by way of the Five-year plans of China begun in 1953.[25]

Discontents of de-Stalinization

In early 1956, Sino-Soviet relations began deteriorating, following Khrushchev's de-Stalinization of the
USSR, which he initiated with the speech On the Cult of Personality and its Consequences that criticized
Stalin and Stalinism – especially the Great Purge of Soviet society, of the rank-and-file of the Soviet Armed
Forces, and of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). In light of de-Stalinization, the CPSU's
changed ideological orientation – from Stalin's confrontation of the
West to Khrushchev's peaceful coexistence with it– posed problems
of ideological credibility and political authority for Mao, who had
emulated Stalin's style of leadership and practical application of
Marxism–Leninism in the development of Socialism with Chinese
characteristics and the PRC as a country.[26]

The Hungarian Revolution of 1956 against the rule of Moscow

was a severe political concern for Mao, because it had required
military intervention to suppress, and its occurrence weakened the
political legitimacy of the Communist Party to be in government. In
response to that discontent among the European members of the
Eastern Bloc, the Chinese Communist Party denounced the
USSR's de-Stalinization as revisionism, and reaffirmed the Stalinist
ideology, policies, and practices of Mao's government as the correct
course for achieving socialism in China. This event, indicating
Sino-Soviet divergences of Marxist–Leninist practice and The Sino-Soviet split arose from the
interpretation, began fracturing "monolithic communism" — the ideological clash between Soviet first
Western perception of absolute ideological unity in the Eastern secretary Khrushchev's policies of
Bloc.[27] De-Stalinisation and peaceful
coexistence and Mao Zedong's
From Mao's perspective, the success of the Soviet foreign policy of bellicose and Stalinist policies.
peaceful coexistence with the West would geopolitically isolate the
PRC;[28] whilst the Hungarian Revolution indicated the possibility
of revolt in the PRC, and in China's sphere of influence. To thwart such discontent, Mao launched in 1956
the Hundred Flowers Campaign of political liberalization – the freedom of speech to criticize government,
the bureaucracy, and the CCP publicly. However, the campaign proved too successful when blunt criticism
of Mao was voiced.[29] Consequent to the relative freedoms of the de-Stalinized USSR, Mao retained the
Stalinist model of Marxist–Leninist economy, government, and society.[30]

Conflicting national interests

In July 1958, in Beijing, Khrushchev and Mao were

negotiating joint Sino-Soviet naval bases in China, from
which nuclear-armed Soviet Navy ballistic missile
submarines would deter US intervention in East Asia. The
agreement failed when Mao accused Khrushchev of trying to
establish Soviet control of the PRC's coast.[31] At the end of
August, Mao sought the PRC's sovereignty upon Taiwan by
attacking the Matsu islands and Kinmen island which
resulted in the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis.

In launching that regional war, Mao did not inform

Khrushchev. Formal, ideological response to that geopolitical
contingency compelled Khrushchev to revise the USSR's
policy of peaceful coexistence to include regional wars, such
as the recent Taiwan crisis. Mao's withholding of information
from Khrushchev worsened their personal–political relations,
especially because the US threatened nuclear war upon The strait of Taiwan
China and the USSR, if the PRC invaded Taiwan; thus Mao's continual shoot-outs with Chiang Kai-shek
caused Khrushchev to react to Sino-American quarrels about the remnants of the civil war in China.[32]

Khrushchev doubted Mao's mental sanity, because his unrealistic policies of geopolitical confrontation
might provoke nuclear war between the capitalist and the communist blocs. To thwart Mao's
warmongering, Khrushchev cancelled foreign-aid agreements and the delivery of Soviet atomic bombs to
the PRC.[33]

Two Chinas

Throughout the 1950s, Khrushchev maintained positive Sino-Soviet relations with foreign aid, especially
nuclear technology for the Chinese atomic bomb project, Project 596. However, political tensions persisted
because the economic benefits of the USSR's peaceful-coexistence policy voided the belligerent PRC's
geopolitical credibility among the nations under Chinese hegemony, especially after a failed PRC–US
rapprochement. In the Chinese sphere of influence, that Sino-American diplomatic failure and the presence
of US nuclear weapons in Taiwan justified Mao's confrontational foreign policies with Taiwan.[34]

In late 1958, the CCP revived Mao's guerrilla-period cult of personality to portray Chairman Mao as the
charismatic, visionary leader solely qualified to control the policy, administration, and popular mobilization
required to realize the Great Leap Forward to industrialize China.[35] Moreover, to the Eastern bloc, Mao
portrayed the PRC's warfare with Taiwan and the accelerated modernization of the Great Leap Forward as
Stalinist examples of Marxism–Leninism adapted to Chinese conditions. These circumstances allowed
ideological Sino-Soviet competition, and Mao publicly criticized Khrushchev's economic and foreign
policies as deviations from Marxism–Leninism.

Onset of the disputes

To Mao, the events of the 1958–1959 period indicated that
Khrushchev was politically untrustworthy as an orthodox
Marxist.[36] In 1959, First Secretary Khrushchev met with
US President Dwight Eisenhower to decrease US-Soviet
geopolitical tensions. To that end, the USSR: (i) reneged an
agreement for technical aid to develop Project 596, and (ii)
sided with India in the Sino-Indian War. Each US-Soviet
collaboration offended Mao and he perceived Khrushchev as The Communist bloc: pro-Soviet (red), pro-
an opportunist who had become too tolerant of the West. The Chinese (yellow), the non-aligned (black)
CCP said that the CPSU concentrated too much on "Soviet– North Korea and Yugoslavia.
US co-operation for the domination of the world", with
geopolitical actions that contradicted Marxism–Leninism.[37]

Khrushchev's criticism of Albania at the 22nd CPSU Congress

In June 1960, at the zenith of de-Stalinization, the USSR denounced the People's Republic of Albania as a
politically backward country for retaining Stalinism as government and model of socialism. In turn, Bao
Sansan said that the CCP's message to the cadres in China was:

"When Khrushchev stopped Russian aid to Albania, Hoxha said to his people: 'Even if we
have to eat the roots of grass to live, we won't take anything from Russia.' China is not guilty
of chauvinism, and immediately sent food to our brother country."[38]
During his opening speech at the CPSU's 22nd Party Congress on
17 October 1961 in Moscow, Khrushchev once again criticized
Albania as a politically backward state and the Albanian Party of
Labour as well as its leadership, including Enver Hoxha, for
refusing to support reforms against Stalin's legacy, in addition to
their criticism of rapprochement with Yugoslavia, leading to the
Soviet–Albanian split.[39] In response to this rebuke, on the 19th of
October the delegation representing China at the Party Congress
led by Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai sharply criticised Moscow's
stance towards Tirana:
Solidarity: China's Mao Zedong and
“We hold that should a dispute or difference Albania's Enver Hoxha were united in
unfortunately arise between fraternal parties or both their stance against
fraternal countries, it should be resolved patiently in Revisionism as well as ideologically
the spirit of proletarian internationalism and according upholding Stalin.
to the principles of equality and of unanimity through
consultation. Public, one-sided censure of any fraternal
party does not help unity and is not helpful in
resolving problems. To bring a dispute between
fraternal parties or fraternal countries into the open in
the face of the enemy cannot be regarded as a serious
Marxist- Leninist attitude."[40]

Subsequently, on the 21st of October, Zhou visited the Lenin Mausoleum (then still entombing Stalin's
body), laying two wreathes at the base of the site, one of which read "Dedicated to the great Marxist,
Comrade Stalin"; on the 23rd of October, the Chinese delegation left Moscow for Beijing early, before the
Congress' conclusion; within days, Khrushchev had Stalin's body removed from the mausoleum.[41][42]

Mao, Khrushchev, and the US

In 1960, Mao expected Khrushchev to deal aggressively with Dwight D. Eisenhower by holding him to
account for the USSR having shot down a U-2 spy plane, the CIA's photographing of military bases in the
USSR; aerial espionage that the US said had been discontinued. In Paris, at the Four Powers Summit
meeting, Khrushchev demanded and failed to receive Eisenhower's apology for the CIA's continued aerial
espionage of the USSR. In China, Mao and the CCP interpreted Eisenhower's refusal to apologize as
disrespectful of the national sovereignty of socialist countries, and held political rallies aggressively
demanding Khrushchev's military confrontation with US aggressors; without such decisive action,
Khrushchev lost face with the PRC.[43]

In the Romanian capital of Bucharest, at the International Meeting of Communist and Workers Parties
(November 1960), Mao and Khrushchev respectively attacked the Soviet and the Chinese interpretations of
Marxism-Leninism as the wrong road to world socialism in the USSR and in China. Mao said that
Khrushchev's emphases on consumer goods and material plenty would make the Soviets ideologically soft
and un-revolutionary, to which Khrushchev replied: "If we could promise the people nothing, except
revolution, they would scratch their heads and say: 'Isn't it better to have good goulash?' "[44]

Personal attacks
In the 1960s, public displays of acrimonious quarrels about Marxist-Leninist doctrine characterized
relations between hardline Stalinist Chinese and post-Stalinist Soviet Communists. At the Romanian
Communist Party Congress, the CCP's senior officer Peng Zhen quarrelled with Khrushchev, after the latter
had insulted Mao as being a Chinese nationalist, a geopolitical adventurist, and an ideological deviationist
from Marxism-Leninism. In turn, Peng insulted Khrushchev as a revisionist whose régime showed him to
be a "patriarchal, arbitrary, and tyrannical" ruler.[45] In the event, Khrushchev denounced the PRC with 80
pages of criticism to the congress of the PRC.

In response to the insults, Khrushchev withdrew 1,400 Soviet technicians from the PRC, which cancelled
some 200 joint scientific projects. In response, Mao justified his belief that Khrushchev had somehow
caused China's great economic failures and the famines that occurred in the period of the Great Leap
Forward. Nonetheless, the PRC and the USSR remained pragmatic allies, which allowed Mao to alleviate
famine in China and to resolve Sino-Indian border disputes. To Mao, Khrushchev had lost political
authority and ideological credibility, because his US-Soviet détente had resulted in successful military
(aerial) espionage against the USSR and public confrontation with an unapologetic capitalist enemy.
Khrushchev's miscalculation of person and circumstance voided US-Soviet diplomacy at the Four Powers
Summit in Paris.[46]

Monolithic Communism fractured

In late 1961, at the 22nd Congress of the CPSU, the PRC and
the USSR revisited their doctrinal disputes about the orthodox
interpretation and application of Marxism–Leninism.[47] In
December 1961, the USSR broke diplomatic relations with
Albania, which escalated the Sino-Soviet disputes from the
political-party level to the national-government level.

In late 1962, the PRC broke relations with the USSR because
Khrushchev did not go to war with the US over the Cuban
Missile Crisis. Regarding that Soviet loss-of-face, Mao said
that "Khrushchev has moved from adventurism to In late 1962, the Cuban Missile Crisis
capitulationism" with a negotiated, bilateral, military stand- concluded when the US and the USSR
down. Khrushchev replied that Mao's belligerent foreign respectively agreed to remove
policies would lead to an East–West nuclear war.[48] For the intermediate-range PGM-19 Jupiter
Western powers, the averted atomic war threatened by the nuclear missiles from Italy and Turkey,
Cuban Missile Crisis made nuclear disarmament their political and to remove intermediate-range R-12
priority. To that end, the US, the UK, and the USSR agreed to Dvina and R-14 Chusovaya nuclear
the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty in 1963, which formally missiles from Cuba. In the context of the
forbade nuclear-detonation tests in the Earth's atmosphere, in Sino-Soviet split, Mao said that the
outer space, and under water – yet did allow the underground USSR's military stand-down was
testing and detonation of atomic bombs. In that time, the Khrushchev's betrayal of Marxist–Leninist
PRC's nuclear-weapons program, Project 596, was nascent, geopolitics.
and Mao perceived the test-ban treaty as the nuclear powers'
attempt to thwart the PRC's becoming a nuclear
superpower.[49]

Between 6–20 July 1963, a series of Soviet-Chinese negotiations were held in Moscow. However, both
sides maintained their own ideological views and, therefore, negotiations failed.[50] In March 1964, the
Romanian Workers' Party publicly announced the intention of the Bucharest authorities to mediate the
Sino-Soviet conflict. In reality, however, the Romanian mediation approach represented only a pretext for
forging a Sino-Romanian rapprochement, without arousing the Soviets' suspicions.[51]
Romania was neutral in the Sino-Soviet split.[52][53][54] Its neutrality in the Sino-Soviet dispute along with
being the small Communist country with the most influence in global affairs enabled Romania to be
recognized by the world as the "third force" of the Communist world. Romania's independence - achieved
in the early 1960s through its freeing from its Soviet satellite status - was tolerated by Moscow because
Romania was not bordering the Iron Curtain - being surrounded by socialist states - and because its ruling
party was not going to abandon Communism.[55][56] North Korea under Kim Il-sung also remained neutral
because of its strategic status after the Korean War, although it later moved more decisively towards the
USSR after Deng Xiaoping's Chinese economic reform.[57]

As a Marxist–Leninist, Mao was much angered that Khrushchev did not go to war with the US over their
failed Bay of Pigs Invasion and the United States embargo against Cuba of continual economic and
agricultural sabotage. For the Eastern Bloc, Mao addressed those Sino-Soviet matters in "Nine Letters"
critical of Khrushchev and his leadership of the USSR. Moreover, the break with the USSR allowed Mao
to reorient the development of the PRC with formal relations (diplomatic, economic, political) with the
countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America.[49]

Formal and informal statements

In the 1960s, the Sino-Soviet split allowed only written Sino-Soviet split
communications between the PRC and the USSR, in which each Chinese name
country supported their geopolitical actions with formal statements Traditional Chinese 中蘇交惡
of Marxist–Leninist ideology as the true road to world
communism, which is the general line of the party. In June 1963, Simplified Chinese 中苏交恶
the PRC published The Chinese Communist Party's Proposal Transcriptions
Concerning the General Line of the International Communist
Standard Mandarin
Movement,[58] to which the USSR replied with the Open Letter of
the Communist Party of the Soviet Union; each ideological stance Hanyu Pinyin Zhōngsū jiāowù
perpetuated the Sino-Soviet split.[59] In 1964, Mao said that, in Russian name
light of the Chinese and Soviet differences about the interpretation Russian Советско–
and practical application of Orthodox Marxism, a counter-
китайский
revolution had occurred and re-established capitalism in the USSR;
consequently, following Soviet suit, the Warsaw Pact countries раскол
broke relations with the PRC. Romanization Sovetsko–
kitayskiy raskol
In late 1964, after Nikita Khrushchev had been deposed, Chinese
Premier Zhou Enlai met with the new Soviet leaders, First Secretary Leonid Brezhnev and Premier Alexei
Kosygin, but their ideological differences proved a diplomatic impasse to renewed economic relations. The
Soviet defense minister's statement damaged the prospects of improved Sino-Soviet relations. Historian
Daniel Leese noted that improvement of the relations "that had seemed possible after Khrushchev's fall
evaporated after the Soviet minister of defense, Rodion Malinovsky... approached Chinese Marshal He
Long, member of the Chinese delegation to Moscow, and asked when China would finally get rid of Mao
like the CPSU had disposed of Khrushchev."[60] Back in China, Zhou reported to Mao that Brezhnev's
Soviet government retained the policy of peaceful coexistence which Mao had denounced as
"Khrushchevism without Khrushchev"; despite the change of leadership, the Sino-Soviet split remained
open. At the Glassboro Summit Conference, between Kosygin and US President Lyndon B. Johnson, the
PRC accused the USSR of betraying the peoples of the Eastern bloc countries. The official interpretation,
by Radio Peking, reported that US and Soviet politicians discussed "a great conspiracy, on a worldwide
basis ... criminally selling the rights of the revolution of [the] Vietnam people, [of the] Arabs, as well as
[those of] Asian, African, and Latin-American peoples, to US imperialists".[61]
Conflict

Cultural Revolution

To regain political supremacy in the PRC, Mao launched the

Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in 1966 to counter the
Soviet-style bureaucracies (personal-power-centres) that had
become established in education, agriculture, and industrial
management. Abiding Mao's proclamations for universal
ideological orthodoxy, schools and universities closed
throughout China when students organized themselves into
politically radical Red Guards. Lacking a leader, a political
purpose, and a social function, the ideologically discrete units
of Red Guards soon degenerated into political factions, each of
whom claimed to be more Maoist than the other factions.[62]

In establishing the ideological orthodoxy presented in the Little

Red Book (Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-tung), the
political violence of the Red Guards provoked civil war in
parts of China, which Mao suppressed with the People's
Liberation Army (PLA), who imprisoned the fractious Red
Guards. Moreover, when Red Guard factionalism occurred
within the PLA – Mao's base of political power – he dissolved
the Red Guards, and then reconstituted the CCP with the new
generation of Maoists who had endured and survived the
Cultural Revolution that purged the "anti-Communist" old
generation from the party and from China.[63]

As social engineering, the Cultural Revolution reasserted the A public appearance of Chairman Mao and
political primacy of Maoism, but also stressed, strained, and Vice Chairman Lin Biao among Red
broke the PRC's relations with the USSR and the West. [64] Guards, in Beijing, during the Cultural
Geopolitically, despite their querulous "Maoism vs. Marxism– Revolution (November 1966)
Leninism" disputes about interpretations and practical
applications of Marxism-Leninism, the USSR and the PRC
advised, aided, and supplied North Vietnam during the Vietnam War,[65] which Mao had defined as a
peasant revolution against foreign imperialism. In socialist solidarity, the PRC allowed safe passage for the
Soviet Union's matériel to North Vietnam to prosecute the war against the US-sponsored Republic of
Vietnam, until 1968, after the Chinese withdrawal.[66][67]

Border conflict

In the late 1960s, the continual quarrelling between the CCP and the CPSU about the correct interpretations
and applications of Marxism–Leninism escalated to small-scale warfare at the Sino-Soviet border.[68]

In 1966, for diplomatic resolution, the Chinese revisited the national matter of the Sino-Soviet border
demarcated in the 19th century, but originally imposed upon the Qing Dynasty by way of unequal treaties
that annexed Chinese territory to the Russian Empire. Despite not asking the return of territory, the PRC
asked the USSR to acknowledge formally and publicly that such an historic injustice against China (the
19th-century border) was dishonestly realized with the 1858 Treaty of Aigun and the 1860 Convention of
Peking. The Soviet government ignored the matter.
In 1968, the Soviet Army had massed along the 4,380-kilometre
(2,720  mi) border with the PRC, especially at the Xinjiang
frontier, in north-west China, where the Soviets might readily
induce the Turkic peoples into a separatist insurrection. In 1961,
the USSR had stationed 12 divisions of soldiers and 200
aeroplanes at that border. By 1968, the Soviet Armed Forces
had stationed six divisions of soldiers in Outer Mongolia and 16
divisions, 1,200 aeroplanes, and 120 medium-range missiles at
the Sino-Soviet border to confront 47 light divisions of the
Chinese Army. By March 1969, the border confrontations
escalated, including fighting at the Ussuri River, the Zhenbao
Island incident, and Tielieketi.[68]

After the border conflict, "spy wars" involving numerous

espionage agents occurred on Soviet and Chinese territory
through the 1970s.[69][70]
The Sino-Soviet split allowed minor
border disputes to escalate to firefights
Nuclear China for areas of the Argun and Amur rivers
(Damansky–Zhenbao is southeast, north
In the early 1960s, the United States feared that a "nuclear of the lake (2 March – 11 September
China" would imbalance the bi-polar Cold War between the US 1969).
and the USSR. To keep the PRC from achieving the
geopolitical status of a nuclear power, the US administrations of
both John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson considered ways either to sabotage or to attack directly the
Chinese nuclear program — aided either by Nationalist China or by the USSR. To avert nuclear war,
Khrushchev refused the US offer to participate in a US-Soviet pre-emptive attack against the PRC.
[71]

To prevent the Chinese from building a nuclear bomb, the United States Armed Forces recommended
indirect measures, such as diplomacy and propaganda, and direct measures, such as infiltration and
sabotage, an invasion by the Chinese Nationalists in Taiwan, maritime blockades, a South Korean invasion
of North Korea, conventional air attacks against the nuclear production facilities, and dropping a nuclear
bomb against a "selected CHICOM [Chinese Communist] target".[72] On 16 October 1964, the PRC
detonated their first nuclear bomb, a uranium-235 implosion-fission device,[73] with an explosive yield of
22 kilotons of TNT;[74] and publicly acknowledged the USSR's technical assistance in realizing Project
596.[75]

Aware of the Soviet nuclear threat, the PRC built large-scale underground bomb shelters, such as the
Underground City in Beijing, and the military bomb shelters of Underground Project 131, a command
center in Hubei, and the 816 Nuclear Military Plant, in the Fuling District of Chongqing.

Geopolitical pragmatism

In October 1969, after the seven-month Sino-Soviet border conflict, in Beijing, Premier Alexei Kosygin
secretly spoke with Premier Zhou Enlai to determine jointly the demarcation of the Sino-Soviet border.
Despite the border demarcation remaining indeterminate, the premiers' meetings restored Sino-Soviet
diplomatic communications, which by 1970 allowed Mao to understand that the PRC could not
simultaneously fight the US and the USSR while suppressing internal disorders throughout China. In July
1971, the US advisor for national security, Henry Kissinger, went to Beijing to arrange for President
Nixon's visit to China. Kissinger's Sino-American rapprochement
offended the USSR, and Brezhnev then convoked a summit-
meeting with Nixon, which re-cast the bi-polar geopolitics of the
US-Soviet cold war into the tri-polar geopolitics of the PRC-US-
USSR cold war.

Concerning the Sino-Soviet disputes about the demarcation of

4,380 kilometres (2,720  mi) of territorial borders, Soviet
propaganda agitated against the PRC's complaint about the unequal
1858 Treaty of Aigun and the 1860 Convention of Peking, which
cheated Imperial China of territory and natural resources in the 19th To counter the USSR, Chairman Mao
century. To that effect, in the 1972–1973 period, the USSR deleted met with US President Nixon, and
the Chinese and Manchu place-names – Iman ( 伊曼 , Yiman), established Sino-American
Tetyukhe ( 野猪河 , yĕzhūhé), and Suchan – from the map of the rapprochement, in 1972.
Russian Far East, and replaced them with the Russian place-names:
Dalnerechensk, Dalnegorsk, and Partizansk, respectively.[76][77] To
facilitate social acceptance of such cultural revisionism, the Soviet press misrepresented the historical
presence of Chinese people – in lands gained by the Russian Empire – which provoked Russian violence
against the local Chinese populations; moreover, politically inconvenient exhibits were removed from
museums,[76] and vandals covered with cement the Jurchen-script stele, about the Jin dynasty, in
Khabarovsk, some 30 kilometres from the Sino-Soviet border, at the confluence of the Amur and Ussuri
rivers.[78]

Rivalry in the Third World

In the 1970s, the ideological rivalry between the PRC and the USSR extended into the countries of Africa,
Asia and of the Middle East, where each socialist country funded the vanguardism of the local Marxist–
Leninist parties and militias. Their political advice, financial aid, and military assistance facilitated the
realization of wars of national liberation, such as the Ogaden War between Ethiopia and Somalia; the
Rhodesian Bush War between white European colonists and anti-colonial black natives; the aftermath of
the Bush War, the Zimbabwean Gukurahundi massacres; the Angolan Civil War between competing
national-liberation groups of guerrillas, which proved to be a US–Soviet proxy war; the Mozambican Civil
War; and the guerrilla factions fighting for the liberation of Palestine. In Thailand, the pro-Chinese front
organizations were based upon the local Chinese minority population, and thus proved politically
ineffective as a Maoist revolutionary vanguard.[79] In the Soviet–Afghan War, China covertly supported
the opposing guerillas.[80] The KGB and Afghan KHAD cracked down on many prominent pro-China
and anti-Soviet activists and guerillas in 1980.[81]

Occasional cooperation

At times, the 'competition' led to the USSR and PRC supporting the same factions in concert, such as when
both supported North Vietnam. Both Soviet and Chinese support was vital for the supply of logistics and
equipment to the NLF and PAVN. Most of the supplies were Soviet, sent through China overland.[82]
Some analyses find that Chinese economic aid was larger than that of the Soviets as early as 1965–
1968.[83] One estimate finds that 1971–1973, the PRC sent the largest amount of aid constituting 90 billion
renminbi.[10] Soviet supplies flowed freely through China from before 1965 until 1969, when they were
cut off. In 1971 however, China encouraged Vietnam to seek more supplies from the Soviet Union. From
1972, Zhou Enlai encouraged expeditions of Soviet rail trips, missile shipments, allowed 400 Soviet experts
to pass to Vietnam, and on 18 June 1971, reopened Soviet freight in Chinese ports. China then agreed to all
Vietnamese requests of allowing Soviet warehouses to store materiel for shipment to Vietnam. The result
was a solid, and relatively continuous Communist Bloc support for North Vietnam during the Sino-Soviet
split.[10] However, some of the surmounting Soviet and Chinese tensions would grow into the Sino-
Vietnamese War in 1979.[10]

After Mao

Transition from idealism to pragmatism (1976–1978)

In 1971, the politically radical phase of the Cultural Revolution

concluded with the failure of Project 571 (the coup d'état to depose
Mao) and the death of the conspirator Marshal Lin Biao (Mao's
executive officer), who had colluded with the Gang of Four—Jiang
Qing (Mao's last wife), Zhang Chunqiao, Yao Wenyuan, and Wang
Hongwen—to assume command of the PRC. As reactionary
political radicals, the Gang of Four argued for regression to Stalinist
ideological orthodoxy at the expense of internal economic
development, but soon were suppressed by the PRC's secret
intelligence service.[84]

The re-establishment of Chinese domestic tranquility ended armed

confrontation with the USSR but it did not improve diplomatic
relations, because in 1973, the Soviet Army garrisons at the Sino-
Soviet border were twice as large as in 1969. The continued
military threat from the USSR  prompted the PRC to denounce The elimination of Marshal Lin Biao,
"Soviet social imperialism", by accusing the USSR of being an in 1971, lessened the political
enemy of world revolution.[85] Mao's statement that "the Soviet damage caused by Mao's Cultural
Union today is under the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie, a Revolution and facilitated the PRC's
dictatorship of the big bourgeoisie, a dictatorship of the German transition to the Realpolitik of the Tri-
fascist type, a dictatorship of the Hitler type." was also repeated by polar Cold War.
China's state press many times in the 1970s, reiterating the
diplomatic position.[86][87][88] Sino-Soviet relations would slowly
and gradually improve during the 1980s.

A year after Mao's death, at the 11th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in 1977, the
politically rehabilitated Deng Xiaoping was appointed to manage internal modernization programs.
Avoiding attacks upon Mao, Deng's political moderation began the realization of Chinese economic reform
by way of systematic reversals of Mao's inefficient policies, and the transition from a planned economy to a
socialist market economy.[89][90]

1978–1989

In 1978, the United States and the PRC began to establish diplomatic relations. US-China military
cooperation began in 1979 and in 1981 it was revealed that a joint US-China listening post had been
operated in Xinjiang to monitor Soviet missile testing bases.[91]

The Soviet Union provided intelligence and equipment support for Vietnam during the 1979 Sino-
Vietnamese War. Soviet troops were deployed at the Sino-Soviet and Mongolian-Chinese border as an act
of showing support to Vietnam. However, the Soviet Union refused to take any direct action to defend their
ally.[92] In December 1979, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan led the Chinese to suspend the talks on
normalizing relations with the Soviet Union, which began in September of the same year.[93]

In the 1980s, the PRC pursued Realpolitik policies, such as "seeking truth from facts" and the "Chinese
road to socialism", which withdrew the PRC from the high-level abstractions of ideology, polemic, and the
revisionism of the USSR, which diminished the political importance of the Sino-Soviet split.[89][90] Sino-
Soviet relations were finally normalized after Mikhail Gorbachev visited China in 1989 and shook Deng's
hand.

See also
Anti-Chinese sentiment
Anti-Russian sentiment
History of the Soviet Union (1953–1964)
History of the Soviet Union (1964–1982)
History of the People's Republic of China
Sino-Albanian split
Sino-American relations
Sino-Soviet relations
Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship
Soviet imperialism

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Further reading
Athwal, Amardeep. "The United States and the Sino-Soviet Split: The Key Role of Nuclear
Superiority." Journal of Slavic Military Studies 17.2 (2004): 271–297.
Chang, Jung, and Jon Halliday. Mao: The Unknown Story. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2005.
Ellison, Herbert J., ed. The Sino-Soviet Conflict: A Global Perspective (1982) online (https://
www.questia.com/library/101611113/the-sino-soviet-conflict-a-global-perspective)
Floyd, David. Mao against Khrushchev: A Short History of the Sino-Soviet Conflict (1964)
online (https://www.questia.com/library/32878/mao-against-khrushchev-a-short-history-of-the
-sino-soviet)
Ford, Harold P., "Calling the Sino-Soviet Split " Calling the Sino-Soviet Split (https://web.arc
hive.org/web/20060811005137/https://www.cia.gov/csi/studies/winter98_99/art05.html)",
Studies in Intelligence, Winter 1998–99.
Friedman, Jeremy. "Soviet policy in the developing world and the Chinese challenge in the
1960s." Cold War History (2010) 10#2 pp. 247–272.
Friedman, Jeremy. Shadow Cold War: The Sino-Soviet Competition for the Third World
(UNC Press Books, 2015).
Garver, John W. China's Quest: The History of the Foreign Relations of the People's
Republic (2016) pp 113–45.
Goh, Evelyn. Constructing the US Rapprochement with China, 1961–1974: From "Red
Menace" to "Tacit Ally" (Cambridge UP, 2005)
Heinzig, Dieter. The Soviet Union and Communist China, 1945–1950: An Arduous Road to
the Alliance (M. E. Sharpe, 2004).
 Jersild, Austin. The Sino-Soviet Alliance: An International History (2014) online (https://www.
questia.com/library/120089427/the-sino-soviet-alliance-an-international-history)
Jian, Chen. Mao's China & the Cold War. (U of North Carolina Press, 2001). online (https://w
ww.questia.com/library/120089402/mao-s-china-and-the-cold-war)
Kochavi, Noam. "The Sino-Soviet Split." in A Companion to John F. Kennedy (2014)
pp. 366–383.
Li, Danhui, and Yafeng Xia. "Jockeying for Leadership: Mao and the Sino-Soviet Split,
October 1961 – July 1964." Journal of Cold War Studies 16.1 (2014): 24–60.
Lewkowicz, Nicolas. The Role of Ideology in the Origins of the Cold War (https://archive.org/
details/the-role-of-ideology-in-the-origins-of-the-cold-war) (Scholar's Press, 2018).
Li, Hua-Yu et al., eds China Learns from the Soviet Union, 1949–Present (The Harvard Cold
War Studies Book Series) (2011) excerpt and text search (https://www.amazon.com/Learns-
Soviet-1949-Present-Harvard-Studies/dp/0739142232/)
Li, Mingjiang. "Ideological dilemma: Mao's China and the Sino-Soviet split, 1962–63." Cold
War History 11.3 (2011): 387–419.
Lukin, Alexander. The Bear Watches the Dragon: Russia's Perceptions of China and the
Evolution of Russian-Chinese Relations Since the Eighteenth Century (2002) excerpt (http
s://www.amazon.com/Bear-Watches-Dragon-Perceptions-Russian-Chinese/dp/076561025
6)
Lüthi, Lorenz M. (2010). The Sino-Soviet Split: Cold War in the Communist World (https://bo
oks.google.com/books?id=dl4TRDxqexMC). Princeton UP. ISBN 9781400837625.
Chi-Kwan, Mark (2013). "Chapter 4: Ideological Radicalization and the Sino-Soviet split".
China and the World since 1945: An International History (https://books.google.com/books?i
d=0oioAgAAQBAJ). The Making of the Contemporary World. Routledge.
ISBN 9781136644771.
Olsen, Mari. Soviet-Vietnam Relations and the Role of China 1949–64: Changing Alliances
(Routledge, 2007)
Ross, Robert S., ed. China, the United States, and the Soviet Union: Tripolarity and Policy
Making in the Cold War (1993) online (https://www.questia.com/library/77420976/china-the-
united-states-and-the-soviet-union-tripolarity)
Scalapino, Robert A (1964). "Sino-Soviet Competition in Africa". Foreign Affairs. 42 (4):
640–654. doi:10.2307/20029719 (https://doi.org/10.2307%2F20029719). JSTOR 20029719
(https://www.jstor.org/stable/20029719).
Shen, Zhihua, and Yafeng Xia. "The great leap forward, the people's commune and the
Sino-Soviet split." Journal of contemporary China 20.72 (2011): 861–880.
Wang, Dong. "The Quarrelling Brothers: New Chinese Archives and a Reappraisal of the
Sino-Soviet Split, 1959–1962." Cold War International History Project Working Paper Series
2005) online (https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/media/documents/publication/
WP49DW_rev.pdf).
Westad, Odd Arne, ed. Brothers in arms: the rise and fall of the Sino-Soviet alliance, 1945–
1963 (Stanford UP. 1998)
Zagoria, Donald S. The Sino-Soviet Conflict, 1956–1961 (Princeton UP, 1962), major
scholarly study.

Primary sources
Luthi, Lorenz M. (2008). "Twenty-Four Soviet-Bloc Documents on Vietnam and the Sino-
Soviet Split, 1964–1966". Cold War International History Project Bulletin. 16: 367–398.
[Bao] Sansan and Bette Bao Lord (1964/1966), Eighth Moon: The True Story of a Young
Girl's Life in Communist China, reprint, New York: Scholastic, Ch. 9, pp. 120–124. [summary
 of lectures to cadres on Sino-Soviet split].
Prozumenshchikov, Mikhail Yu. "The Sino-Indian Conflict, the Cuban Missile Crisis, and the
Sino-Soviet Split, October 1962: New Evidence from the Russian Archives." Cold War
International History Project Bulletin (1996) 8#9 pp. 1996–1997. online (https://web.archive.
org/web/20140429183544/http://www.claudearpi.net/maintenance/uploaded_pics/Cuba_an
d_SinoIndian_conflict.pdf)

External links
The CWIHP Document Collection on the Sino-Soviet Split (http://www.wilsoncenter.org/inde
x.cfm?topic_id=1409&fuseaction=va2.browse&sort=Collection&item=Sino-Soviet%20Split)
Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20110605132936/http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cf
m?topic_id=1409&fuseaction=va2.browse&sort=Collection&item=Sino-Soviet%20Split) 5
June 2011 at the Wayback Machine
The Great Debate: Documents of the Sino-Soviet Split (https://www.marxists.org/history/inter
national/comintern/sino-soviet-split/index.htm) at Marxists Internet Archive

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