Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-43530             August 3, 1935

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,

Honesto K. Bausa for appellant.

RECTO, J.:

The defendant Aurelio Lamahang is before this court on appeal from a decision of the
Court of First Instance of Iloilo, finding him guilty of attempted robbery and
sentencing him to suffer two years and four months of prision correccional and to an
additional penalty of ten years and one day of prision mayor for being an habitual
delinquent, with the accessory penalties of the law, and to pay the costs of the
proceeding.

At early dawn on March 2, 1935, policeman Jose Tomambing, who was patrolling his
beat on Delgado and C.R. Fuentes streets of the City of Iloilo, caught the accused in
the act of making an opening with an iron bar on the wall of a store of cheap goods
located on the last named street. At that time the owner of the store, Tan Yu, was
sleeping inside with another Chinaman. The accused had only succeeded in breaking
one board and in unfastening another from the wall, when the policeman showed up,
who instantly arrested him and placed him under custody.

The fact above stated was considered and declared unanimously by the provincial
fiscal of Iloilo, the trial judge and the Solicitor-General, as constituting attempted
robbery, which we think is erroneous.

It is our opinion that the attempt to commit an offense which the Penal Code punishes
is that which has a logical relation to a particular, concrete offense; that, which is the
beginning of the execution of the offense by overt acts of the perpetrator, leading
directly to its realization and consummation. The attempt to commit an indeterminate
offense, inasmuch as its nature in relation to its objective is ambiguous, is not a
juridical fact from the standpoint of the Penal Code. There is no doubt that in the case
at bar it was the intention of the accused to enter Tan Yu's store by means of
violence, passing through the opening which he had started to make on the wall, in
order to commit an offense which, due to the timely arrival of policeman Tomambing,
did not develop beyond the first steps of its execution. But it is not sufficient, for the
purpose of imposing penal sanction, that an act objectively performed constitute a
mere beginning of execution; it is necessary to establish its unavoidable connection,
like the logical and natural relation of the cause and its effect, with the deed which,
upon its consummation, will develop into one of the offenses defined and punished by
the Code; it is necessary to prove that said beginning of execution, if carried to its
complete termination following its natural course, without being frustrated by external
obstacles nor by the voluntary desistance of the perpetrator, will logically and
necessarily ripen into a concrete offense. Thus, in case of robbery, in order that the
simple act of entering by means of force or violence another person's dwelling may be
considered an attempt to commit this offense, it must be shown that the offender
clearly intended to take possession, for the purpose of gain, of some personal
property belonging to another. In the instant case, there is nothing in the record from
which such purpose of the accused may reasonably be inferred. From the fact
established and stated in the decision, that the accused on the day in question was
making an opening by means of an iron bar on the wall of Tan Yu's store, it may only
be inferred as a logical conclusion that his evident intention was to enter by means of
force said store against the will of its owner. That his final objective, once he
succeeded in entering the store, was to rob, to cause physical injury to the inmates,
or to commit any other offense, there is nothing in the record to justify a concrete
finding.1avvphil.ñet

It must be borne in mind (I Groizard, p. 99) that in offenses not consummated, as the
material damage is wanting, the nature of the action intended (accion fin) cannot
exactly be ascertained, but the same must be inferred from the nature of the acts
executed (accion medio). Hence, the necessity that these acts be such that by their
very nature, by the facts to which they are related, by the circumstances of the
persons performing the same, and by the things connected therewith, they must
show without any doubt, that they are aimed at the consummation of a crime. Acts
susceptible of double interpretation , that is, in favor as well as against the culprit,
and which show an innocent as well as a punishable act, must not and can not furnish
grounds by themselves for attempted nor frustrated crimes. The relation existing
between the facts submitted for appreciation and the offense which said facts are
supposed to produce must be direct; the intention must be ascertained from the facts
and therefore it is necessary, in order to avoid regrettable instances of injustice, that
the mind be able to directly infer from them the intention of the perpetrator to cause
a particular injury. This must have been the intention of the legislator in requiring
that in order for an attempt to exist, the offender must commence the commission of
the felony directly by overt acts, that is to say, that the acts performed must be such
that, without the intent to commit an offense, they would be meaningless.

Viada (Vol. I, p. 47) holds the same opinion when he says that "the overt acts leading
to the commission of the offense, are not punished except when they are aimed
directly to its execution, and therefore they must have an immediate and necessary
relation to the offense."

Considering — says the Supreme Court of Spain in its decision of March 21, 1892 —
that in order to declare that such and such overt acts constitute an attempted offense
it is necessary that their objective be known and established, or that said acts be of
such nature that they themselves should obviously disclose the criminal objective
necessarily intended, said objective and finality to serve as ground for the designation
of the offense: . . . .

In view of the foregoing, we are of the opinion, and so hold that the fact under
consideration does not constitute attempted robbery but attempted trespass to
dwelling (People vs. Tayag and Morales, 59 Phil., 606, and decisions of the Supreme
Court of Spain therein cited). Under article 280 of the Revised Penal Code, this
offense is committed when a private person shall enter the dwelling of another
against the latter's will. The accused may be convicted and sentenced for an attempt
to commit this offense in accordance with the evidence and the following allegation
contained in the information: "... the accused armed with an iron bar forced the wall
of said store by breaking a board and unfastening another for the purpose of entering
said store ... and that the accused did not succeed in entering the store due to the
presence of the policeman on beat Jose Tomambing, who upon hearing the noise
produced by the breaking of the wall, promptly approached the accused ... ." Under
the circumstances of this case the prohibition of the owner or inmate is presumed.
(U.S. vs. Ostrea, 2 Phil., 93; U.S. vs. Silvano, 31 Phil., 509' U.S. vs. Ticson, 25 Phil.,
67; U.S. vs. Mesina, 21 Phil., 615; U.S. vs. Villanueva, 18 Phil., 215; U.S. vs. Panes,
25 Phil., 292.) Against the accused must be taken into consideration the aggravating
circumstances of nighttime and former convictions, — inasmuch as the record shows
that several final judgments for robbery and theft have been rendered against him —
and in his favor, the mitigating circumstance of lack of instruction. The breaking of
the wall should not be taken into consideration as an aggravating circumstance
inasmuch as this is the very fact which in this case constitutes the offense of
attempted trespass to dwelling.

The penalty provided by the Revised Penal Code for the consummated offense of
trespass to dwelling, if committed with force, is prision correccional in its medium and
maximum periods and a fine not exceeding P1,000 (art. 280, par. 2); therefore the
penalty corresponding to attempted trespass to dwelling is to degrees lower (art. 51),
or, arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods. Because of the presence of
two aggravating circumstances and one mitigating circumstance the penalty must be
imposed in its maximum period. Pursuant to article 29 of the same Code, the accused
is not entitled to credit for one-half of his preventive imprisonment.

Wherefore, the sentence appealed from is revoked and the accused is hereby held
guilty of attempted trespass to dwelling, committed by means of force, with the
aforesaid aggravating and mitigating circumstances and sentenced to three months
and one day of arresto mayor, with the accessory penalties thereof and to pay the
costs.

Avanceña, C.J., Abad Santos, Hull, and Vickers, JJ., concur.

People vs Lamahang Digest
Posted on August 15, 2016
PEOPLE of the PHILIPPINES vs LAMAHANG
G.R. No. L-43530
August 03, 1935
 
FACTS:
 The defendant Aurelio Lamahang is  on appeal from a decision finding him 
guilty of attempted robbery.
 At early dawn on March 2, 1935, policeman Jose Tomambing, who was patrolli
ng his beat on Delgado and C.R. Fuentes streets of the City of Iloilo, caughtthe a
 ccused in the act of making an opening with an iron bar on the wall of a s
tore of cheap goods located on the last named street.
 At that time the owner of the store, Tan Yu, was sleeping inside with another C
hinaman.
 The accusedhad only succeeded in breaking one board and in unfastenin
g another from the wall, when the policeman showed up, who instantly arreste
d him and placed him under custody.
ISSUE:
WON the accused was erroneously declared guilty of attempted robbery
 
RULING:
YES, he was erroneously declared guilty of attempted robbery. The accused is then 
held guilty of attempted trespass to dwelling, committed by means of force, with the 
aforesaid aggravating and mitigating circumstances and sentenced to three months 
and one day of arresto mayor.
RATIONALE:
It is necessary to prove that said beginning of execution, if carried to its complete te
rmination following its natural course, without being frustrated by external obstacles 
nor by the voluntary desistance of the perpetrator, will logically and necessarily ripe
n into a concrete offense. In the case of robbery, it must be shown that the offe
nder clearly intended to take possession, for the purpose of gain, of some p
ersonal property belonging to another. In the instant case, it may only be inferr
ed as a logical conclusion that his evident intention was to enter by means of force s
aid store against the will of its owner. That his final objective, once he succeeded in 
entering the store, was to rob, to cause physical injury to the inmates, or to commit 
any other offense, there is nothing in the record to justify a concrete finding.
It must be borne in mind (I Groizard, p. 99) that in offenses not consummated, 
as the material damage is wanting, the nature of the action intended (accion  fi
n) cannot exactly be ascertained, but the same must be inferred from the na
ture of the acts executed (accion  medio).  The relation existing between the fac
ts submitted for appreciation and the offense which said facts are supposed to produ
ce must be direct; the intention must be ascertained from the facts and therefore it i
s necessary, in order to avoid regrettable instances of injustice.
Under article 280 of the Revised Penal Code, the Court is of the opinion  that the fac
t under consideration does not constitute attempted robbery but attempted trespass 
to dwelling. Against the accused must be taken into consideration the aggravating ci
rcumstances of nighttime and former convictions, — inasmuch as the record shows t
hat several final judgments for robbery and theft have been rendered against him — 
and in his favor, the mitigating circumstance of lack of instruction.