Socrates vs. COMELEC
Socrates vs. COMELEC
Socrates vs. COMELEC
Adora
Facts:
The then incumbent barangay officials of the Puerto Princesa convened themselves into a
Preparatory Recall Assembly (PRA) to initiate the recall of Victorino Dennis M. Socrates
(Socrates) who assumed office as Puerto Princesa's mayor on June 30, 2001. The members of
the PRA designated Mark David M. Hagedorn, president of the Association of Barangay
Captains, as interim chair of the PRA.
The PRA passed Resolution No. 01-02 (Recall Resolution) which declared its loss of confidence
in Socrates and called for his recall. The PRA requested the COMELEC to schedule the recall
election for mayor within 30 days from receipt of the Recall Resolution.
Socrates filed with the COMELEC a petition, docketed as E.M. No. 02-010 (RC), to nullify and
deny due course to the Recall Resolution. However, the COMELEC en banc promulgated a
resolution dismissing for lack of merit Socrates' petition. The COMELEC gave due course to the
Recall Resolution and scheduled the recall election on September 7, 2002.
Edward M. Hagedorn (Hagedorn) filed his certificate of candidacy for mayor in the recall
election.
The COMELEC en banc promulgated Resolution No. 5673 prescribing the calendar of activities
and periods of certain prohibited acts in connection with the recall election. The COMELEC
fixed the campaign period from August 27, 2002 to September 5, 2002 or a period of 10 days.
Ma. Flores F. Adovo (Adovo) and Merly E. Gilo (Gilo) filed a petition before the COMELEC,
docketed as SPA No. 02-492, to disqualify Hagedorn from running in the recall election and to
cancel his certificate of candidacy. On August 30, 2002, a certain Bienvenido Ollave, Sr.
(Ollave) filed a petition-in-intervention in SPA No. 02-492 also seeking to disqualify Hagedorn.
On the same date, a certain Genaro V. Manaay filed another petition, docketed as SPA No. 02-
539, against Hagedorn alleging substantially the same facts and involving the same issues. The
petitions were all anchored on the ground that Hagedorn is disqualified from running for a fourth
consecutive term, having been elected and having served as mayor of the city for three (3)
consecutive full terms immediately prior to the instant recall election for the same post.
Subsequently, SPA Nos. 02-492 and 02-539 were consolidated.
On September 23, 2002, the COMELEC en banc promulgated a resolution denying the motion
for reconsideration of Adovo and Gilo. The COMELEC affirmed the resolution declaring
Hagedorn qualified to run in the recall election.
Issues:
1. Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in giving due course to the
Recall Resolution and scheduling the recall election for mayor of Puerto Princesa.
2. Whether Hagedorn is qualified to run for mayor in the recall election of Puerto Princesa
on September 24, 2002.
Ruling:
1. Petitioner Socrates argues that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in
upholding the Recall Resolution despite the absence of notice to 130 PRA members and the
defective service of notice to other PRA members.
The COMELEC, however, found that the City Election Officer of Puerto Princesa City in her
Certification dated 10 July 2002 certified that upon a thorough and careful verification of the
signatures appearing in PRA Resolution 01-02, x x x the majority of all members of the PRA
concerned approved said resolution. She likewise certified that not a single member/signatory of
the PRA complained or objected as to the veracity and authenticity of their signatures.
Dane Pauline C. Adora
The Acting Director IV, Region IV, in his study dated 30 July 2002 submitted the following
recommendations:
'This Office, after evaluating the documents filed, finds the instant Petition sufficient in form and
substance. That the PRA was validly constituted and that the majority of all members thereof
approved Resolution No. 01-02 calling for the recall of Mayor Victorino Dennis M. Socrates.'
This Court is bound by the findings of fact of the COMELEC on matters within the competence
and expertise of the COMELEC, unless the findings are patently erroneous.
In the instant case, we do not find any valid reason to hold that the COMELEC's findings of fact
are patently erroneous.
Socrates also claims that the PRA members had no authority to adopt the Recall Resolution on
July 2, 2002 because a majority of PRA members were seeking a new electoral mandate in the
barangay elections scheduled on July 15, 2002. This argument deserves scant consideration...
considering that when the PRA members adopted the Recall Resolution their terms of office had
not yet expired. They were all de jure sangguniang barangay members with no legal
disqualification to participate in the recall assembly under Section 70 of the Local Government
Code.
Socrates bewails that the manner private respondents conducted the PRA proceedings violated
his constitutional right to information on matters of public concern. Socrates, however, admits
receiving notice of the PRA meeting and of even sending his representative and counsel who
were present during the entire PRA proceedings.
Thus, we rule that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in upholding the
validity of the Recall Resolution and in scheduling the recall election on September 24, 2002.
The 3-term limit rule for elective local officials is found in Section 8, Article 10 of the Constitution
which states that:
Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which
shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more
than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time
shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term
for which he was elected.
This term limit rule is reiterated in Section 43 (b) of RA 7160 (Local Government Code) which
provides:
These constitutional and statutory provisions have two parts. The first part provides that an
elective local official cannot serve for more than 3 consecutive terms. The clear intent is that
only consecutive terms count in determining 3 term-limit rule. Second part states that voluntary
renunciation of office for any length of time does not interrupt continuity of service. The clear
intent is that involuntary severance from office for any length of time interrupts continuity of
service and prevents service before and after interruption from being joined together to form a
continuous service or consecutive terms. After three consecutive terms, an elective local official
cannot seek immediate reelection for a fourth term. The prohibited election refers to next regular
election for the same office following the end of 3 rd consecutive term. Any subsequent election,
like a recall election, is no longer covered by the prohibition for two reasons. First, a subsequent
Dane Pauline C. Adora
election like a recall election is no longer an immediate reelection after 3 consecutive terms.
Second, intervening period constitutes an involuntary interruption in the continuity of service.
Clearly, what the Constitution prohibits is an immediate reelection for a fourth term following
three consecutive terms. The Constitution however, does not prohibit a subsequent reelection
for a fourth term as long as reelection is not immediately after the end of a 3 rd consecutive term.
A recall election mid-way in the term following third consecutive term is a subsequent election
but not an immediate reelection after the third term. Neither does the Constitution prohibit one
barred from seeking immediate reelection to run in any other subsequent election involving
same term of office. What the Constitution prohibits is a consecutive fourth term. The debates in
Constitutional Commission evidently show that the prohibited election referred to by the framers
of Constitution is immediate reelection after the third term, not any other subsequent election.
In the case of Hagedorn, his candidacy in the recall election is not an immediate reelection after
his 3rd consecutive term. The immediate reelection that the Constitution barred Hagedorn from
seeking refers to regular elections, which he did not seek.
From June 30, 2001 until the recall election on September 24, 2002, the mayor of Puerto
Princesa was Socrates. During the same period, Hagedorn was simply a private citizen. This
period is clearly an interruption in the continuity of Hagedorn's service as mayor, not because of
his voluntary renunciation, but because of a legal prohibition. Hagedorn's three consecutive
terms ended on June 30, 2001. Hagedorn's new recall term from September 24, 2002 to June
30, 2004 is not a seamless continuation of his previous three consecutive terms as mayor. One
cannot stitch together Hagedorn's previous three-terms with his new recall term to make the
recall term a fourth consecutive term because factually it is not. An involuntary interruption
occurred from June 30, 2001 to September 24, 2002 which broke the continuity or consecutive
character of Hagedorn's service as mayor.
In Hagedorn's case, the nearly 15-month period he was out of office, although short of a full
term of three years, constituted an interruption in the continuity of his service as mayor. The
Constitution does not require the interruption or hiatus to be a full term of three years. The clear
intent is that interruption "for any length of time," as long as the cause is involuntary, is sufficient
to break an elective local official's continuity of service.
In sum:
1. Hagedorn is not running for immediate reelection following his three consecutive terms
as mayor
2. Hagedorn’s continuity of service as mayor was involuntary interrupted from June 30,
2001 to September 24, 2002 during which time he was a private citizen
3. Term limits should be construed strictly to give the fullest possible effect to the right of
the electorate to choose their leaders.