590 Phil.

490

THIRD DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 168081, October 17, 2008 ]

ARMANDO G. YRASUEGUI, PETITIONER, VS. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., RESPONDENT.

DECISION

REYES, R.T., J.:

THIS case portrays the peculiar story of an international flight steward who was dismissed because of his
failure to adhere to the weight standards of the airline company.

He is now before this Court via a petition for review on certiorari claiming that he was illegally dismissed.
To buttress his stance, he argues that (1) his dismissal does not fall under 282(e) of the Labor Code; (2)
continuing adherence to the weight standards of the company is not a bona fide occupational
qualification; and (3) he was discriminated against
because other overweight employees were promoted instead of being disciplined.

After a meticulous consideration of all arguments pro and con, We uphold the legality of dismissal.
Separation pay, however, should be awarded in favor of the employee as an act of social justice or based
on equity. This is so because his dismissal is not for serious misconduct. Neither is it reflective of his
moral character.

The Facts

Petitioner Armando G. Yrasuegui was a former international flight steward of Philippine Airlines, Inc. (PAL).
He stands five feet and eight inches (5'8") with a large body frame. The proper weight for a man of his
height and body structure is from 147 to 166 pounds, the ideal weight being 166 pounds, as mandated by
the Cabin and Crew Administration Manual[1] of PAL.

The weight problem of petitioner dates back to 1984. Back then, PAL advised him to go on an extended
vacation leave from December 29, 1984 to March 4, 1985 to address his weight concerns. Apparently,
petitioner failed to meet the company's weight standards, prompting another leave without pay from
March 5, 1985 to November 1985.

After meeting the required weight, petitioner was allowed to return to work. But petitioner's weight problem
recurred. He again went on leave without pay from October 17, 1988 to February 1989.

On April 26, 1989, petitioner weighed 209 pounds, 43 pounds over his ideal weight. In line with company
policy, he was removed from flight duty effective May 6, 1989 to July 3, 1989. He was formally requested
to trim down to his ideal weight and report for weight checks on several dates. He was also told that he
may avail of the services of the company physician should he wish to do so. He was advised that his case
will be evaluated on July 3, 1989.[2]

On February 25, 1989, petitioner underwent weight check. It was discovered that he gained, instead of
losing, weight. He was overweight at 215 pounds, which is 49 pounds beyond the limit. Consequently, his
off-duty status was retained.

On October 17, 1989, PAL Line Administrator Gloria Dizon personally visited petitioner at his residence to
check on the progress of his effort to lose weight. Petitioner weighed 217 pounds, gaining 2 pounds from
his previous weight. After the visit, petitioner made a commitment[3] to reduce weight in a letter addressed
to Cabin Crew Group Manager Augusto Barrios. The letter, in full, reads:

Dear Sir:

I would like to guaranty my commitment towards a weight loss from 217 pounds to 200
pounds from today until 31 Dec. 1989.
 From thereon, I promise to continue reducing at a reasonable percentage until such time that
my ideal weight is achieved.

Likewise, I promise to personally report to your office at the designated time schedule you will
set for my weight check.

Respectfully Yours,

F/S Armando Yrasuegui[4]

Despite the lapse of a ninety-day period given him to reach his ideal weight, petitioner remained
overweight. On January 3, 1990, he was informed of the PAL decision for him to remain grounded until
such time that he satisfactorily complies with the weight standards. Again, he was directed to report every
two weeks for weight checks.

Petitioner failed to report for weight checks. Despite that, he was given one more month to comply with the
weight requirement. As usual, he was asked to report for weight check on different dates. He was
reminded that his grounding would continue pending satisfactory compliance with the weight standards.[5]

Again, petitioner failed to report for weight checks, although he was seen submitting his passport for
processing at the PAL Staff Service Division.

On April 17, 1990, petitioner was formally warned that a repeated refusal to report for weight check would
be dealt with accordingly. He was given another set of weight check dates.[6] Again, petitioner ignored the
directive and did not report for weight checks. On June 26, 1990, petitioner was required to explain his
refusal to undergo weight checks.[7]

When petitioner tipped the scale on July 30, 1990, he weighed at 212 pounds. Clearly, he was still way over
his ideal weight of 166 pounds.

From then on, nothing was heard from petitioner until he followed up his case requesting for leniency on
the latter part of 1992. He weighed at 219 pounds on August 20, 1992 and 205 pounds on November 5,
1992.

On November 13, 1992, PAL finally served petitioner a Notice of Administrative Charge for violation of
company standards on weight requirements. He was given ten (10) days from receipt of the charge within
which to file his answer and submit controverting evidence.[8]

On December 7, 1992, petitioner submitted his Answer.[9] Notably, he did not deny being overweight. What
he claimed, instead, is that his violation, if any, had already been condoned by PAL since "no action has
been taken by the company" regarding his case "since 1988." He also claimed that PAL discriminated
against him because "the company has not been fair in treating the cabin crew members who are similarly
situated."

On December 8, 1992, a clarificatory hearing was held where petitioner manifested that he was undergoing
a weight reduction program to lose at least two (2) pounds per week so as to attain his ideal weight.[10]

On June 15, 1993, petitioner was formally informed by PAL that due to his inability to attain his ideal
weight, "and considering the utmost leniency" extended to him "which spanned a period covering a total of
almost five (5) years," his services were considered terminated "effective immediately."[11]

His motion for reconsideration having been denied,[12] petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal
against PAL.

Labor Arbiter, NLRC and CA Dispositions

On November 18, 1998, Labor Arbiter Valentin C. Reyes ruled[13] that petitioner was illegally dismissed.
The dispositive part of the Arbiter ruling runs as follows:
 WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered, declaring the
complainant's dismissal illegal, and ordering the respondent to reinstate him to his former
position or substantially equivalent one, and to pay him:

a. Backwages of Php10,500.00 per month from his dismissal on June 15, 1993 until
reinstated, which for purposes of appeal is hereby set from June 15, 1993 up to August
15, 1998 at P651,000.00;

b. Attorney's fees of five percent (5%) of the total award.

SO ORDERED.[14]

The Labor Arbiter held that the weight standards of PAL are reasonable in view of the nature of the job of
petitioner.[15] However, the weight standards need not be complied with under pain of dismissal since his
weight did not hamper the performance of his duties.[16] Assuming that it did, petitioner could be
transferred to other positions where his weight would not be a negative factor.[17] Notably, other
overweight employees, i.e., Mr. Palacios, Mr. Cui, and Mr. Barrios, were promoted instead of being
disciplined.[18]

Both parties appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).[19]

On October 8, 1999, the Labor Arbiter issued a writ of execution directing the reinstatement of petitioner
without loss of seniority rights and other benefits.[20]

On February 1, 2000, the Labor Arbiter denied[21] the Motion to Quash Writ of Execution[22] of PAL.

On March 6, 2000, PAL appealed the denial of its motion to quash to the NLRC.[23]

On June 23, 2000, the NLRC rendered judgment[24] in the following tenor:

WHEREFORE, premises considered[,] the Decision of the Arbiter dated 18 November 1998 as
modified by our findings herein, is hereby AFFIRMED and that part of the dispositive portion of
said decision concerning complainant's entitlement to backwages shall be deemed to refer to
complainant's entitlement to his full backwages, inclusive of allowances and to his other
benefits or their monetary equivalent instead of simply backwages, from date of dismissal
until his actual reinstatement or finality hereof. Respondent is enjoined to manifests (sic) its
choice of the form of the reinstatement of complainant, whether physical or through payroll
within ten (10) days from notice failing which, the same shall be deemed as complainant's
reinstatement through payroll and execution in case of non-payment shall accordingly be
issued by the Arbiter. Both appeals of respondent thus, are DISMISSED for utter lack of merit.
[25]

According to the NLRC, "obesity, or the tendency to gain weight uncontrollably regardless of the amount of
food intake, is a disease in itself."[26] As a consequence, there can be no intentional defiance or serious
misconduct by petitioner to the lawful order of PAL for him to lose weight.[27]

Like the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC found the weight standards of PAL to be reasonable. However, it found as
unnecessary the Labor Arbiter holding that petitioner was not remiss in the performance of his duties as
flight steward despite being overweight. According to the NLRC, the Labor Arbiter should have limited
himself to the issue of whether the failure of petitioner to attain his ideal weight constituted willful
defiance of the weight standards of PAL.[28]

PAL moved for reconsideration to no avail.[29] Thus, PAL elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals (CA)
via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.[30]

By Decision dated August 31, 2004, the CA reversed[31] the NLRC:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby GRANT the petition. The assailed NLRC
decision is declared NULL and VOID and is hereby SET ASIDE. The private respondent's
complaint is hereby DISMISSED. No costs.
 SO ORDERED.[32]

The CA opined that there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC because it "looked at
wrong and irrelevant considerations"[33] in evaluating the evidence of the parties. Contrary to the NLRC
ruling, the weight standards of PAL are meant to be a continuing qualification for an employee's position.
[34] The failure to adhere to the weight standards is an analogous cause for the dismissal of an employee

under Article 282(e) of the Labor Code in relation to Article 282(a). It is not willful disobedience as the
NLRC seemed to suggest.[35] Said the CA, "the element of willfulness that the NLRC decision cites is an
irrelevant consideration in arriving at a conclusion on whether the dismissal is legally proper."[36] In other
words, "the relevant question to ask is not one of willfulness but one of reasonableness of the standard
and whether or not the employee qualifies or continues to qualify under this standard."[37]

Just like the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC, the CA held that the weight standards of PAL are reasonable.[38]
Thus, petitioner was legally dismissed because he repeatedly failed to meet the prescribed weight
standards.[39] It is obvious that the issue of discrimination was only invoked by petitioner for purposes of
escaping the result of his dismissal for being overweight.[40]

On May 10, 2005, the CA denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration.[41] Elaborating on its earlier ruling,
the CA held that the weight standards of PAL are a bona fide occupational qualification which, in case of
violation, "justifies an employee's separation from the service."[42]

Issues

In this Rule 45 petition for review, the following issues are posed for resolution:

I.

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT

PETITIONER'S OBESITY CAN BE A GROUND FOR DISMISSAL UNDER PARAGRAPH (e) OF
ARTICLE 282 OF THE LABOR CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES;

II.

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT

PETITIONER'S DISMISSAL FOR OBESITY CAN BE PREDICATED ON THE "BONA FIDE
OCCUPATIONAL QUALIFICATION (BFOQ) DEFENSE";

III.

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT

PETITIONER WAS NOT UNDULY DISCRIMINATED AGAINST WHEN HE WAS DISMISSED WHILE
OTHER OVERWEIGHT CABIN ATTENDANTS WERE EITHER GIVEN FLYING DUTIES OR
PROMOTED;

IV.

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT BRUSHED ASIDE
PETITIONER'S CLAIMS FOR REINSTATEMENT [AND] WAGES ALLEGEDLY FOR BEING MOOT
AND ACADEMIC.[43] (Underscoring supplied)

Our Ruling

I. The obesity of petitioner is a ground for dismissal under Article 282(e) [44] of the Labor Code.

A reading of the weight standards of PAL would lead to no other conclusion than that they constitute a
continuing qualification of an employee in order to keep the job. Tersely put, an employee may be
dismissed the moment he is unable to comply with his ideal weight as prescribed by the weight standards.
The dismissal of the employee would thus fall under Article 282(e) of the Labor Code. As explained by the
CA:
 x x x [T]he standards violated in this case were not mere "orders" of the employer; they were
the "prescribed weights" that a cabin crew must maintain in order to qualify for and keep his or
her position in the company. In other words, they were standards that establish continuing
qualifications for an employee's position. In this sense, the failure to maintain these standards
does not fall under Article 282(a) whose express terms require the element of willfulness in
order to be a ground for dismissal. The failure to meet the employer's qualifying standards is
in fact a ground that does not squarely fall under grounds (a) to (d) and is therefore one that
falls under Article 282(e) - the "other causes analogous to the foregoing."

By its nature, these "qualifying standards" are norms that apply prior to and after an employee
is hired. They apply prior to employment because these are the standards a job applicant must
initially meet in order to be hired. They apply after hiring because an employee must continue
to meet these standards while on the job in order to keep his job. Under this perspective, a
violation is not one of the faults for which an employee can be dismissed pursuant to pars. (a)
to (d) of Article 282; the employee can be dismissed simply because he no longer "qualifies"
for his job irrespective of whether or not the failure to qualify was willful or intentional. x x x[45]

Petitioner, though, advances a very interesting argument. He claims that obesity is a "physical abnormality
and/or illness."[46] Relying on Nadura v. Benguet Consolidated, Inc.,[47] he says his dismissal is illegal:

Conscious of the fact that Nadura's case cannot be made to fall squarely within the specific
causes enumerated in subparagraphs 1(a) to (e), Benguet invokes the provisions of
subparagraph 1(f) and says that Nadura's illness - occasional attacks of asthma - is a cause
analogous to them.

Even a cursory reading of the legal provision under consideration is sufficient to convince
anyone that, as the trial court said, "illness cannot be included as an analogous cause by any
stretch of imagination."

It is clear that, except the just cause mentioned in sub-paragraph 1(a), all the others expressly
enumerated in the law are due to the voluntary and/or willful act of the employee. How
Nadura's illness could be considered as "analogous" to any of them is beyond our
understanding, there being no claim or pretense that the same was contracted through his
own voluntary act.[48]

The reliance on Nadura is off-tangent. The factual milieu in Nadura is substantially different from the case
at bar. First, Nadura was not decided under the Labor Code. The law applied in that case was Republic Act
(RA) No. 1787. Second, the issue of flight safety is absent in Nadura, thus, the rationale there cannot apply
here. Third, in Nadura, the employee who was a miner, was laid off from work because of illness, i.e.,
asthma. Here, petitioner was dismissed for his failure to meet the weight standards of PAL. He was not
dismissed due to illness. Fourth, the issue in Nadura is whether or not the dismissed employee is entitled
to separation pay and damages. Here, the issue centers on the propriety of the dismissal of petitioner for
his failure to meet the weight standards of PAL. Fifth, in Nadura, the employee was not accorded due
process. Here, petitioner was accorded utmost leniency. He was given more than four (4) years to comply
with the weight standards of PAL.

In the case at bar, the evidence on record militates against petitioner's claims that obesity is a disease.
That he was able to reduce his weight from 1984 to 1992 clearly shows that it is possible for him to lose
weight given the proper attitude, determination, and self-discipline. Indeed, during the clarificatory hearing
on December 8, 1992, petitioner himself claimed that "[t]he issue is could I bring my weight down to ideal
weight which is 172, then the answer is yes. I can do it now."[49]

True, petitioner claims that reducing weight is costing him "a lot of expenses."[50] However, petitioner has
only himself to blame. He could have easily availed the assistance of the company physician, per the
advice of PAL.[51] He chose to ignore the suggestion. In fact, he repeatedly failed to report when required
to undergo weight checks, without offering a valid explanation. Thus, his fluctuating weight indicates
absence of willpower rather than an illness.

Petitioner cites Bonnie Cook v. State of Rhode Island, Department of Mental Health, Retardation and
Hospitals,[52] decided by the United States Court of Appeals (First Circuit). In that case, Cook worked from
1978 to 1980 and from 1981 to 1986 as an institutional attendant for the mentally retarded at the Ladd
Center that was being operated by respondent. She twice resigned voluntarily with an unblemished record.
Even respondent admitted that her performance met the Center's legitimate expectations. In 1988, Cook
re-applied for a similar position. At that time, "she stood 5'2" tall and weighed over 320 pounds."
Respondent claimed that the morbid obesity of plaintiff compromised her ability to evacuate patients in
case of emergency and it also put her at greater risk of serious diseases.

Cook contended that the action of respondent amounted to discrimination on the basis of a handicap. This
was in direct violation of Section 504(a) of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,[53] which incorporates the
remedies contained in Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Respondent claimed, however, that morbid
obesity could never constitute a handicap within the purview of the Rehabilitation Act. Among others,
obesity is a mutable condition, thus plaintiff could simply lose weight and rid herself of concomitant
disability.

The appellate Court disagreed and held that morbid obesity is a disability under the Rehabilitation Act and
that respondent discriminated against Cook based on "perceived" disability. The evidence included expert
testimony that morbid obesity is a physiological disorder. It involves a dysfunction of both the metabolic
system and the neurological appetite - suppressing signal system, which is capable of causing adverse
effects within the musculoskeletal, respiratory, and cardiovascular systems. Notably, the Court stated that
"mutability is relevant only in determining the substantiality of the limitation flowing from a given
impairment," thus "mutability only precludes those conditions that an individual can easily and quickly
reverse by behavioral alteration."

Unlike Cook, however, petitioner is not morbidly obese. In the words of the District Court for the District of
Rhode Island, Cook was sometime before 1978 "at least one hundred pounds more than what is
considered appropriate of her height." According to the Circuit Judge, Cook weighed "over 320 pounds" in
1988. Clearly, that is not the case here. At his heaviest, petitioner was only less than 50 pounds over his
ideal weight.

In fine, We hold that the obesity of petitioner, when placed in the context of his work as flight attendant,
becomes an analogous cause under Article 282(e) of the Labor Code that justifies his dismissal from the
service. His obesity may not be unintended, but is nonetheless voluntary. As the CA correctly puts it, "
[v]oluntariness basically means that the just cause is solely attributable to the employee without any
external force influencing or controlling his actions. This element runs through all just causes under Article
282, whether they be in the nature of a wrongful action or omission. Gross and habitual neglect, a
recognized just cause, is considered voluntary although it lacks the element of intent found in Article
282(a), (c), and (d)."[54]

II. The dismissal of petitioner can be predicated on the bona fide occupational qualification defense.

Employment in particular jobs may not be limited to persons of a particular sex, religion, or national origin
unless the employer can show that sex, religion, or national origin is an actual qualification for performing
the job. The qualification is called a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ).[55] In the United States,
there are a few federal and many state job discrimination laws that contain an exception allowing an
employer to engage in an otherwise unlawful form of prohibited discrimination when the action is based
on a BFOQ necessary to the normal operation of a business or enterprise.[56]

Petitioner contends that BFOQ is a statutory defense. It does not exist if there is no statute providing for it.
[57] Further, there is no existing BFOQ statute that could justify his dismissal.[58]

Both arguments must fail.

First, the Constitution,[59] the Labor Code,[60] and RA No. 7277[61] or the Magna Carta for Disabled
Persons[62] contain provisions similar to BFOQ.

Second, in British Columbia Public Service Employee Commission (BSPSERC) v. The British Columbia
Government and Service Employee's Union (BCGSEU),[63] the Supreme Court of Canada adopted the so-
called "Meiorin Test" in determining whether an employment policy is justified. Under this test, (1) the
employer must show that it adopted the standard for a purpose rationally connected to the performance of
the job;[64] (2) the employer must establish that the standard is reasonably necessary[65] to the
accomplishment of that work-related purpose; and (3) the employer must establish that the standard is
reasonably necessary in order to accomplish the legitimate work-related purpose. Similarly, in Star Paper
Corporation v. Simbol,[66] this Court held that in order to justify a BFOQ, the employer must prove that (1)
the employment qualification is reasonably related to the essential operation of the job involved; and (2)
that there is factual basis for believing that all or substantially all persons meeting the qualification would
be unable to properly perform the duties of the job.[67]

In short, the test of reasonableness of the company policy is used because it is parallel to BFOQ.[68] BFOQ
is valid "provided it reflects an inherent quality reasonably necessary for satisfactory job performance."[69]

In Duncan Association of Detailman-PTGWTO v. Glaxo Wellcome Philippines, Inc.,[70] the Court did not
hesitate to pass upon the validity of a company policy which prohibits its employees from marrying
employees of a rival company. It was held that the company policy is reasonable considering that its
purpose is the protection of the interests of the company against possible competitor infiltration on its
trade secrets and procedures.

Verily, there is no merit to the argument that BFOQ cannot be applied if it has no supporting statute. Too,
the Labor Arbiter,[71] NLRC,[72] and CA[73] are one in holding that the weight standards of PAL are
reasonable. A common carrier, from the nature of its business and for reasons of public policy, is bound to
observe extraordinary diligence for the safety of the passengers it transports.[74] It is bound to carry its
passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very
cautious persons, with due regard for all the circumstances.[75]

The law leaves no room for mistake or oversight on the part of a common carrier. Thus, it is only logical to
hold that the weight standards of PAL show its effort to comply with the exacting obligations imposed
upon it by law by virtue of being a common carrier.

The business of PAL is air transportation. As such, it has committed itself to safely transport its
passengers. In order to achieve this, it must necessarily rely on its employees, most particularly the cabin
flight deck crew who are on board the aircraft. The weight standards of PAL should be viewed as imposing
strict norms of discipline upon its employees.

In other words, the primary objective of PAL in the imposition of the weight standards for cabin crew is
flight safety. It cannot be gainsaid that cabin attendants must maintain agility at all times in order to
inspire passenger confidence on their ability to care for the passengers when something goes wrong. It is
not farfetched to say that airline companies, just like all common carriers, thrive due to public confidence
on their safety records. People, especially the riding public, expect no less than that airline companies
transport their passengers to their respective destinations safely and soundly. A lesser performance is
unacceptable.

The task of a cabin crew or flight attendant is not limited to serving meals or attending to the whims and
caprices of the passengers. The most important activity of the cabin crew is to care for the safety of
passengers and the evacuation of the aircraft when an emergency occurs. Passenger safety goes to the
core of the job of a cabin attendant. Truly, airlines need cabin attendants who have the necessary strength
to open emergency doors, the agility to attend to passengers in cramped working conditions, and the
stamina to withstand grueling flight schedules.

On board an aircraft, the body weight and size of a cabin attendant are important factors to consider in
case of emergency. Aircrafts have constricted cabin space, and narrow aisles and exit doors. Thus, the
arguments of respondent that "[w]hether the airline's flight attendants are overweight or not has no direct
relation to its mission of transporting passengers to their destination"; and that the weight standards "has
nothing to do with airworthiness of respondent's airlines," must fail.

The rationale in Western Air Lines v. Criswell[76] relied upon by petitioner cannot apply to his case. What
was involved there were two (2) airline pilots who were denied reassignment as flight engineers upon
reaching the age of 60, and a flight engineer who was forced to retire at age 60. They sued the airline
company, alleging that the age-60 retirement for flight engineers violated the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967. Age-based BFOQ and being overweight are not the same. The case of
overweight cabin attendants is another matter. Given the cramped cabin space and narrow aisles and
emergency exit doors of the airplane, any overweight cabin attendant would certainly have difficulty
navigating the cramped cabin area.

In short, there is no need to individually evaluate their ability to perform their task. That an obese cabin
attendant occupies more space than a slim one is an unquestionable fact which courts can judicially
recognize without introduction of evidence.[77] It would also be absurd to require airline companies to
reconfigure the aircraft in order to widen the aisles and exit doors just to accommodate overweight cabin
attendants like petitioner.

The biggest problem with an overweight cabin attendant is the possibility of impeding passengers from
evacuating the aircraft, should the occasion call for it. The job of a cabin attendant during emergencies is
to speedily get the passengers out of the aircraft safely. Being overweight necessarily impedes mobility.
Indeed, in an emergency situation, seconds are what cabin attendants are dealing with, not minutes. Three
lost seconds can translate into three lost lives. Evacuation might slow down just because a wide-bodied
cabin attendant is blocking the narrow aisles. These possibilities are not remote.

Petitioner is also in estoppel. He does not dispute that the weight standards of PAL were made known to
him prior to his employment. He is presumed to know the weight limit that he must maintain at all times.
[78] In fact, never did he question the authority of PAL when he was repeatedly asked to trim down his

weight. Bona fides exigit ut quod convenit fiat. Good faith demands that what is agreed upon shall be done.
Kung ang tao ay tapat kanyang tutuparin ang napagkasunduan.

Too, the weight standards of PAL provide for separate weight limitations based on height and body frame
for both male and female cabin attendants. A progressive discipline is imposed to allow non-compliant
cabin attendants sufficient opportunity to meet the weight standards. Thus, the clear-cut rules obviate any
possibility for the commission of abuse or arbitrary action on the part of PAL.

III. Petitioner failed to substantiate his claim that he was discriminated against by PAL.

Petitioner next claims that PAL is using passenger safety as a convenient excuse to discriminate against
him.[79] We are constrained, however, to hold otherwise. We agree with the CA that "[t]he element of
discrimination came into play in this case as a secondary position for the private respondent in order to
escape the consequence of dismissal that being overweight entailed. It is a confession-and-avoidance
position that impliedly admitted the cause of dismissal, including the reasonableness of the applicable
standard and the private respondent's failure to comply."[80] It is a basic rule in evidence that each party
must prove his affirmative allegation.[81]

Since the burden of evidence lies with the party who asserts an affirmative allegation, petitioner has to
prove his allegation with particularity. There is nothing on the records which could support the finding of
discriminatory treatment. Petitioner cannot establish discrimination by simply naming the supposed cabin
attendants who are allegedly similarly situated with him. Substantial proof must be shown as to how and
why they are similarly situated and the differential treatment petitioner got from PAL despite the similarity
of his situation with other employees.

Indeed, except for pointing out the names of the supposed overweight cabin attendants, petitioner
miserably failed to indicate their respective ideal weights; weights over their ideal weights; the periods they
were allowed to fly despite their being overweight; the particular flights assigned to them; the
discriminating treatment they got from PAL; and other relevant data that could have adequately
established a case of discriminatory treatment by PAL. In the words of the CA, "PAL really had no
substantial case of discrimination to meet."[82]

We are not unmindful that findings of facts of administrative agencies, like the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC,
are accorded respect, even finality.[83] The reason is simple: administrative agencies are experts in matters
within their specific and specialized jurisdiction.[84] But the principle is not a hard and fast rule. It only
applies if the findings of facts are duly supported by substantial evidence. If it can be shown that
administrative bodies grossly misappreciated evidence of such nature so as to compel a conclusion to the
contrary, their findings of facts must necessarily be reversed. Factual findings of administrative agencies
do not have infallibility and must be set aside when they fail the test of arbitrariness.[85]

Here, the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC inexplicably misappreciated evidence. We thus annul their findings.

To make his claim more believable, petitioner invokes the equal protection clause guaranty[86] of the
Constitution. However, in the absence of governmental interference, the liberties guaranteed by the
Constitution cannot be invoked.[87] Put differently, the Bill of Rights is not meant to be invoked against acts
of private individuals.[88] Indeed, the United States Supreme Court, in interpreting the Fourteenth
Amendment,[89] which is the source of our equal protection guarantee, is consistent in saying that the
equal protection erects no shield against private conduct, however discriminatory or wrongful.[90] Private
actions, no matter how egregious, cannot violate the equal protection guarantee.[91]

IV. The claims of petitioner for reinstatement and wages are moot.

As his last contention, petitioner avers that his claims for reinstatement and wages have not been mooted.
He is entitled to reinstatement and his full backwages, "from the time he was illegally dismissed" up to the
time that the NLRC was reversed by the CA.[92]

At this point, Article 223 of the Labor Code finds relevance:

In any event, the decision of the Labor Arbiter reinstating a dismissed or separated employee,
insofar as the reinstatement aspect is concerned, shall immediately be executory, even
pending appeal. The employee shall either be admitted back to work under the same terms
and conditions prevailing prior to his dismissal or separation or, at the option of the employer,
merely reinstated in the payroll. The posting of a bond by the employer shall not stay the
execution for reinstatement provided herein.

The law is very clear. Although an award or order of reinstatement is self-executory and does not require a
writ of execution,[93] the option to exercise actual reinstatement or payroll reinstatement belongs to the
employer. It does not belong to the employee, to the labor tribunals, or even to the courts.

Contrary to the allegation of petitioner that PAL "did everything under the sun" to frustrate his "immediate
return to his previous position,"[94] there is evidence that PAL opted to physically reinstate him to a
substantially equivalent position in accordance with the order of the Labor
Arbiter.[95] In fact, petitioner duly received the return to work notice on February 23, 2001, as shown by his
signature.[96]

Petitioner cannot take refuge in the pronouncements of the Court in a case[97] that "[t]he unjustified refusal
of the employer to reinstate the dismissed employee entitles him to payment of his salaries effective from
the time the employer failed to reinstate him despite the issuance of a writ of execution"[98] and ""even if
the order of reinstatement of the Labor Arbiter is reversed on appeal, it is obligatory on the part of the
employer to reinstate and pay the wages of the employee during the period of appeal until reversal by the
higher court."[99] He failed to prove that he complied with the return to work order of PAL. Neither does it
appear on record that he actually rendered services for PAL from the moment he was dismissed, in order
to insist on the payment of his full backwages.

In insisting that he be reinstated to his actual position despite being overweight, petitioner in effect wants
to render the issues in the present case moot. He asks PAL to comply with the impossible. Time and again,
the Court ruled that the law does not exact compliance with the impossible.[100]

V. Petitioner is entitled to separation pay.

Be that as it may, all is not lost for petitioner.

Normally, a legally dismissed employee is not entitled to separation pay. This may be deduced from the
language of Article 279 of the Labor Code that "[a]n employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall
be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full backwages,
inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time his
compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement." Luckily for petitioner, this
is not an ironclad rule.

Exceptionally, separation pay is granted to a legally dismissed employee as an act "social justice,"[101] or
based on "equity."[102] In both instances, it is required that the dismissal (1) was not for serious
misconduct; and (2) does not reflect on the moral character of the employee.[103]

Here, We grant petitioner separation pay equivalent to one-half (1/2) month's pay for every year of service.
[104] It should include regular allowances which he might have been receiving.[105] We are not blind to the

fact that he was not dismissed for any serious misconduct or to any act which would reflect on his moral
character. We also recognize that his employment with PAL lasted for more or less a decade.

WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED but MODIFIED in that petitioner
Armando G. Yrasuegui is entitled to separation pay in an amount equivalent to one-half (1/2) month's pay
for every year of service, which should include his regular allowances.

SO ORDERED.

Ynares-Santiago, (Chairperson), Austria-Martinez, Chico-Nazario, and Nachura,  JJ., concur.

[1] Rollo, p. 136; Annex "A" of Annex "G."

The Cabin Crew Administration Manual of PAL provides:

"C. A cabin crew one (1) to four (4) pounds over his/her weight maximum shall be given a verbal warning
and a two (2)-week period in which to meet weight standards.

1. A record of the verbal warning shall be maintained in the cabin crew's permanent file.
2. A cabin crew who fails to progress shall be given a written letter and an additional two
(2)-week period to meet weight standards.
3. A cabin crew who fails to reach the prescribed weights standard as required shall be
removed from schedule.

a. A cabin crew who has been removed from schedule shall report to his/her
assigned Check Cabin Crew for a weight check every two (2) weeks and will be
required to lose two (2) pounds per week.
b. A cabin crew who fails to reach his/her required weight standard within a
maximum period of ninety (90) days shall be terminated.
c. A cabin crew will return to active flight duty when he/she has reduced to his/her
maximum weight requirement.

1. A cabin crew who returns to active flight duty after being removed from
schedule and within the following three (3) months exceeds the maximum
weight standard will be removed from schedule until he/she reached
his/her maximum allowable standard.

D. A cabin crew who is five (5) pounds or more over his/her weight maximum will be given a written letter
and a two (2) week period to show substantial weight reduction to meet standards. At the end of the initial
two (2) weeks period, a cabin crew who has shown progress will continue on weight check until he/she
reached his/her maximum allowable standard.

1. Cabin crew who fails to show substantial weight reduction shall be removed from schedules.
a. Refer to letter C above for discipline guideline.
2. A cabin crew who is ten (10) pounds or more over his/her weight maximum shall be removed from
schedule immediately."

MEN
HEIGHT FEET inches w/o shoes SMALL FRAME MEDIUM FRAME LARGE FRAME
Five 7 128-137 134-147 142-161
8 132-141 138-152 147-166
9 136-145 142-156 151-170
10 140-150 146-160 155-174
11 144-154 150-165 159-179
Six 0 148-158 154-170 164-184
1 152-162 158-175 168-189
2 156-167 162-180 173-194
3 160-171 167-185 178-199
4 164-175 172-190 180-204
 WOMEN
HEIGHT FEET inches w/o shoes SMALL FRAME MEDIUM FRAME LARGE FRAME
Five 2 102-110 107-119 115-131
3 105-113 110-122 118-134
4 108-116 113-126 121-138
5 111-119 116-130 125-142
6 114-123 120-135 129-146
7 118-127 124-139 133-150
8 122-131 128-143 137-154
9 126-135 132-147 141-158
10 130-140 136-151 145-163
11 134-144 144-159 153-173

[2] Annex "C" of Annex "G."

[3] Annex "D" of Annex "G."

[4] Rollo, p. 139.

[5] Annex "E" of Annex "G."

[6] Annex "F" of Annex "G."

[7] Annex "G" of Annex "G."

[8] Annex "H" of Annex "G."

[9] Annex "J" of Annex "G."

[10] Annex "K" of Annex "G."

[11] Annex "M" of Annex "G."

[12] Annex "N" of Annex "G."

[13] Rollo, pp. 94-99; Annex "E." NLRC NCR Case No. 00-05-03078-96-A, promulgated on November 18,

1998.

[14] Id. at 99.

[15] Id. at 96.

[16] Id. at 96-98.

[17] Id. at 98.

[18] Id.

[19] Annexes "N" and "O."

[20] Annex "Q."

[21] Annex "U."

[22] Annex "R."

[23] Annex "V."

[24] Rollo, pp. 76-88; Annex "C." NLRC NCR Case No. 019725-99, promulgated on June 23, 2000. Penned by

Commissioner Alberto R. Quimpo and concurred in by Commissioner Vicente S.E. Veloso.

[25] Id. at 87-88.

[26] Id. at 83.

[27] Id.

[28] Id. at 83-86.

[29] Annex "E."

[30] Annex "BB."

[31] Rollo, 46-64; Annex "A." CA-G.R. SP No. 63027, promulgated on August 31, 2004. Penned by Associate

Justice Arturo D. Brion (now a member of this Court), with Associate Justices Delilah Vidallon-Magtolis
and Eliezer R. De los Santos, concurring.

[32] Id. at 64.

[33] Id. at 60.

[34] Id. at 61.

[35] Id.

[36] Id.

[37] Id.

[38] Id. at 62.

[39] Id.

[40] Id.

[41] Annex "B."

[42] Rollo, p. 70.

[43] Id. at 659-660.

[44] Termination by employer. - An employer may terminate an employment for any of the following causes.

a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his employer
or representative in connection with his work;
b) Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties;
c) Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or duly
authorized representative;
d) Commission of a crime or offense by the employee against the person of his employer or any
immediate member of his family or his duly authorized representatives; and
e) Other causes analogous to the foregoing.
[45] Id. at 60-61.

[46] Id. at 663.

[47] G.R. No. L-17780, August 24, 1962, 5 SCRA 879.

[48] Nadura v. Benguet Consolidated, Inc., id. at 881-882.

[49] Rollo, p. 153.

[50] Id.

[51] Id. at 137.

[52] 10 F. 3d 17, 20 (Ist Cir. 1993).

[53] (a) Promulgation of rules and regulations

No otherwise qualified individual with handicaps in the United States, as defined in section 706(8) of this
title, shall, solely by reason of her or his handicap, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance or under any program or activity conducted by any Executive agency or by the United States
Postal Service. The head of each such agency shall promulgate such regulations as may be necessary to
carry out the amendments to this section made by the Rehabilitation, Comprehensive Services, and
Developmental Disabilities Act of 1978. Copies of any proposed regulation shall be submitted to
appropriate authorizing committees of the Congress, and such regulation may take effect no earlier than
the thirtieth day after the date on which such regulation is so submitted to such committees.

[54] Id. at 71.

[55] Black's Law Dictionary, 6th ed.

[56] 45A Am. Jur. 2d, Job Discrimination, § 269.

[57] Rollo, p. 669.

[58] Id. at 670.

[59] Constitution (1987), Art. XIII, Sec. 3. The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas,

organized and unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for
all.

It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and
peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law. They shall be entitled to
security of tenure, humane conditions of work, and a living wage. They shall also participate in policy and
decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law.

The State shall promote the principle of shared responsibility between workers and employers and the
preferential use of voluntary modes in settling disputes, including conciliation, and shall enforce their
mutual compliance therewith to foster industrial peace.

The State shall regulate the relations between workers and employers, recognizing the right of labor to its
just share in the fruits of production and the right of enterprises to reasonable returns to investments, and
to expansion and growth.

[60] ART. 3. Declaration of Basic Policy. - The State shall afford protection to labor, promote full employment,

ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race or creed, and regulate the relations between
workers and employers. The State shall assure the rights of workers to self-organization, collective
bargaining, security of tenure, and just and humane conditions of work.

[61] Approved on March 24, 1992.

[62] Sec. 32. Discrimination of Employment. - No entity, whether public or private shall discriminate against a

qualified disabled person by reason of disability in regard to job application procedures, the hiring,
promotion, or discharge of employees compensation, job training and other terms, conditions and
privileges of employment. The following constitute acts of discrimination:

a) Limiting, segregating or classifying a disabled job applicant in such a manner that adversely affects
his work opportunities;
b) Using qualification standards, employment tests or other selection criteria that screen out or tend to
screen out a disabled person unless such standards, tests or other selection criteria are shown to be
related for the position in question and are consistent with business necessity;
c) Utilizing standards, criteria, or methods of administration that:
1) have the effect of discrimination on the basis of disability; or
2) perpetuate the discrimination of others who are the subject to common administrative control.
d) Providing less compensation, such as salary, wage or other forms of remuneration and fringe
benefits, to qualified disabled employee, by reason of his disability, than the amount to which a non-
disabled person performing the same work is entitled;
e) Favoring a non-disabled employee over a qualified disabled employee with respect to promotion,
training opportunities, study and scholarship grants, solely on account of the latter's disability;
f) Re-assigning or transferring a disabled employee to a job or position he cannot perform by reason of
his disability;
g) Dismissing or terminating the services of a disabled employee by reason of his disability unless the
employer can prove that he impairs the satisfactory performance of the work involved to the
prejudice of the business entity; Provided, however, That the employer first sought to provide
reasonable accommodations for the disabled persons;
h)
Failing to select or administer in the most effective manner employment tests which accurately
reflect the skills, aptitude or other factor of the disabled applicant or employee that such test
purports to measure, rather than the impaired sensory, manual or speaking skills of such applicant or
employee, if any; and

i) Excluding disabled persons from membership in labor unions or similar organizations.

[63] 3 SCR 3 (1999).

[64] The focus is not on the validity of the particular standard but rather on the validity of its more general

purpose.

[65] To show that the standard is reasonably necessary, it must be demonstrated that it is impossible to

accommodate individual employees sharing the characteristics of the claimant without imposing undue
hardship on the employer.

[66] G.R. No. 164774, April 12, 2006, 487 SCRA 228.

[67] Star Paper Corporation v. Simbol, id. at 242-243, citing Flood, R.G. and Cahill, K.A., The River Bend

Decision and How It Affects Municipalities' Personnel Rule and Regulations (June 1993), Illinois Municipal
Review, p. 7.

[68] Id. at 243.

[69] Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Company v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 118978,

May 23, 1997, 272 SCRA 596, 613.

[70] G.R. No. 162994, September 17, 2004, 438 SCRA 343.

[71] Rollo, p. 96. "In light of the nature of complainant's function as a cabin flight crew member, the setting

of weight standard by company policy finds relevance, and in fact, reasonableness. But in judging what is
reasonably set for a cabin crew member to comply should not be viewed in isolation from its obvious
ultimate objective, which is to maintain agility at all time while on flight, especially in time of emergencies,
effect to grooming merely secondary. x x x"

[72] Id. at 84. "Observe that the reasonableness of the rule [i.e., the weight standards of PAL] was already

established with his [i.e., the Labor Arbiter] finding - to which we agree - that the aim thereof is to maintain
their agility to as to assure the air safety of passengers, as well by his finding of the parties unanimity in
the correctness of the weight range that should be observed by complainant as prescribed in the rule. x x
x"

[73] Id. at 61-62. "While the private respondent disputes in his position paper the reasonableness of PAL's

weight standards, the NLRC's assailed decision finds the weight standard to be valid and reasonable. In
our view, this is a fair and correct assessment as the weight limits are not whimsical standards. They are
standards put in place by an air carrier for reasons of safety in order to comply with the extraordinary
diligence in the care of passengers that the law exacts. x x x"

[74] Civil Code, Art. 1733.

[75] Id., Art. 1755. Thus, in case of death or injuries to passengers, a common carrier is presumed to have

been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless it proves that it observed extraordinary diligence. (Id., Art.
1756)

Not only that. The responsibility of a common carrier for the safety of passengers cannot be dispensed
with or lessened by stipulation, by the posting of notices, by statements on tickets, or otherwise. (Id., Art.
1757) So much so that when a passenger is carried gratuitously, a stipulation limiting the liability for
negligence of a common carrier is valid, but not for willful acts or gross negligence. (Id., Art. 1758) Even a
reduction of fare does not justify any limitation of the liability of the common carrier. (Id.)

The burden that the law imposes on a common does not stop there. A common carrier is liable for the
death or injuries to passengers through the negligence or willful acts of its employees. (Id., Art. 1759) This
liability attaches although such employees may have acted beyond the scope of their authority or in
violation of the orders of the common carrier. (Id.) Truly, the requirement of the law is very strict in that the
liability of a common carrier for the death of or injuries to passengers does not cease upon proof that it
exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its employees.
(Id.) The liability of a common carrier cannot be eliminated or limited by stipulation, by the posting of
notices, by statements on the tickets or otherwise. (Id., Art. 1760) Although the passenger must observe
the diligence of a good father of a family to avoid injury to himself (id., Art. 1761), the contributory
negligence of the passenger does not bar recovery of damages for his death or injuries, if the proximate
cause is the negligence of the common carrier. (Id., Art. 1762) In such case, the amount of damages shall
only be equitably reduced. (Id.) It does not totally excuse the common carrier.

Lastly, a common carrier is responsible for injuries suffered by a passenger on the account of the willful
acts or negligence of the other passengers or of strangers, if the employees of the common carrier
through the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a family could have prevented or stopped the act
or omission. (Id., Art. 1763)

[76] 472 US 400 (1985).

[77] Rules of Court, Rule 129, Sec. 2.

[78] See Duncan Association of Detailman-PTGWO v. Glaxo Wellcome Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 162994,

September 17, 2004, 438 SCRA 343, 356.

[79] Rollo, p. 673.

[80] Id. at 63.

[81] Jimenez v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 116960, April 2, 1996, 256 SCRA 84, 89.

[82] Rollo, p. 63.

[83] Zarate, Jr. v. Olegario, G.R. No. 90655, October 7, 1996, 263 SCRA 1.

[84] Id.

[85] Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 117038, September 25, 1997,

279 SCRA 445.

[86] CONSTITUTION (1987), Art. III, Sec. 1. "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without

due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws."

[87] People v. Marti, G.R. No. 81561, January 18, 1991, 193 SCRA 57, 65.

[88] Id. at 67. The Court, in buttressing its ruling also cited the Sponsorship Speech of Commissioner

Bernas in the Bill of Rights; Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 1, p. 674; July 17, 1986, viz.:

"First, the general reflections. The protection of the fundamental liberties in the essence of constitutional
democracy. Protection against whom? Protection against the state. The Bill of Rights governs the
relationship between the individual and the state. Its concern is not the relation between individuals,
between a private individual and other individuals. What the Bill of Rights does is to declare some
forbidden zones in the private sphere inaccessible to any power holder."

[89] United States Constitution, Fourteenth Amendment (ratified July 9, 1868), Sec. 1. "All persons born or

naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and
of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws."

[90] 16B Am. Jur. 2d, Constitutional Law, § 799 citing District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 US 418, 93 S. Ct.

602, 34 L. Ed. 2d 613 (1973), reh'g denied, 410 US 959, 93 S. Ct. 1411, 35 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1973) and on
remand to, 489 F. 2d 1272 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 US 163, 92 S. Ct. 1965, 32 L.
Ed. 2d 627 (1972); Equality Foundation of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 54 F. 3d 261, 67 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1290, 66 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) ¶ 43542, 1995 FED App. 147P (6th Cir. 1995), cert.
granted, judgment vacated on other grounds, 116 S. Ct. 2519, 135 L. Ed. 2d 1044, 71 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 64 (US 1996), ON REMAND TO, 128 F. 3d 289, 75 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 115, 1997 FED App.
318P (6th Cir. 1997); Gallagher v. Neil Young Freedom Concert, 49 F. 3d 1442, 98 Ed. Law Rep. 639 (10th Cir.
1995); Mahoney v. Babbitt, 105 F. 3d 1452 (DC Cir. 1997), reh'g denied, 113 F. 3d 219 (DC Cir. 1997).

[91] Id., citing Medical Institute of Minnesota v. National Ass'n of Trade and Technical Schools, 817 F. 2d

1310, 39 Ed. Law Rep. 62 (8th Cir. 1987); First Nat. Bank of Kansas City v. Danforth, 523 S.W. 2d 808 (Mo.
1975), cert. denied, 421 US 992, 95 S. Ct. 1999, 44 L. Ed. 2d 483 (1975) and cert. denied, 421 US 1016, 95
S. Ct. 2424, 44 L. Ed. 2d 685 (1975).

[92] Rollo, p. 687.

[93] Pioneer Texturizing Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 118651, October 16,

1997, 280 SCRA 806.

[94] Rollo, p. 684.

[95] Id. at 648. Petitioner was informed that:

"In connection with our manifestation dated 25 January 2001 you are hereby directed to physically return
to work effective 01 March 2001. You are to report to the Office of the Vice-President-Airport Services.

Pending appeal you are going to be assigned to a `substantially equivalent' position in accordance with the
18 November 1998 Decision of Labor Arbiter Ramon Valentin Reyes as modified by the 23 June Resolution
of the National Labor Relations Commission.

Failure on your part to heed this order may be a ground to administratively charge you in accordance with
the Company Code of Discipline, policy, rules and regulations.

CESAR B. LAMBERTE"

[96] Id.

[97] Roquero v. Philippine Airlines, Inc., G.R. No. 152329, April 22, 2003, 401 SCRA 424.

[98] Id. at 430.

[99] Id.

[100] Pizza Inn/Consolidated Foods Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. L-74531,

June 28, 1988, 162 SCRA 773; Philippine Engineering Corporation v. Court of Industrial Relations, G.R. No. L-
27880, September 30, 1971, 41 SCRA 89.

[101] San Miguel Corporation v. Lao, 433 Phil. 890, 898 (2002); Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company

v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. L-80609, August 23, 1988, 164 SCRA 671, 682.

[102] Aparente, Sr. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 387 Phil. 96, 107 (2000).

[103] San Miguel Corporation v. Lao, supra at 898; Aparente, Sr. v. National Labor Relations Commission, id.;

Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company v. National Labor Relations Commission, supra at 682.

[104] Aparente, Sr. v. National Labor Relations Commission, supra at 108.

[105] Planters Products, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 78524, January 20, 1989, 169

SCRA 328; Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd. v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. L-74191,
December 21, 1987, 156 SCRA 740; Soriano v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. L-75510,
October 27, 1987, 155 SCRA 124.

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