1.

LUCAS VS LUCAS, GR 190710, JUNE 6, 2011

FACTS:

Jesse U. Lucas, filed a Petition to Establish Illegitimate Filiation (with Motion for the Submission of Parties to DNA
Testing). Respondent filed a Special Appearance and Comment. He manifested inter alia that: (1) he did not receive the
summons and a copy of the petition; (2) that DNA testing cannot be had on the basis of a mere allegation pointing to
respondent as petitioners father. Jurisprudence is still unsettled on the acceptability of DNA evidence.

RTC, acting on respondents motion for reconsideration, issued an Order dismissing the case. Petitioner seasonably
filed a motion for reconsideration. This time, the RTC held that the ruling on the grounds relied upon by petitioner for
filing the petition is premature considering that a full-blown trial has not yet taken place.

On appeal, the CA held that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of respondent, as no summons
had been served on him. The CA further held that a DNA testing should not be allowed when the petitioner has failed to
establish a prima facie case.

ISSUE:

1. Whether it was necessary to serve summons on respondent for the court to acquire jurisdiction over the case
of petition for establishing illegitimate filiation.

2. Whether or not a prima facie showing upon filing of the petition to establish illegitimate filiation is necessary
before a court can issue a DNA testing order?

RULING:

1. The answer is in the negative

A petition directed against the "thing" itself or the res, which concerns the status of a person, like a petition for adoption,
annulment of marriage, or correction of entries in the birth certificate, is an action in rem.

In an action in personam, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is necessary for the court to validly try and
decide the case. In a proceeding in rem or quasi in rem, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is not a prerequisite
to confer jurisdiction on the court, provided that the latter has jurisdiction over the res. Jurisdiction over the res is acquired
either (a) by the seizure of the property under legal process, whereby it is brought into actual custody of the law, or (b)
as a result of the institution of legal proceedings, in which the power of the court is recognized and made effective.

The herein petition to establish illegitimate filiation is an action in rem. By the simple filing of the petition to estab-
lish illegitimate filiation before the RTC, which undoubtedly had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the petition, the
latter thereby acquired jurisdiction over the case. An in rem proceeding is validated essentially through publication. Pub-
lication is notice to the whole world that the proceeding has for its object to bar indefinitely all who might be minded to
make an objection of any sort to the right sought to be established. Through publication, all interested parties are deemed
notified of the petition.

If at all, service of summons or notice is made to the defendant, it is not for the purpose of vesting the court with
jurisdiction, but merely for satisfying the due process requirements. Hence, failure to serve summons will not deprive the
court of its jurisdiction to try and decide the case. In such a case, the lack of summons may be excused where it is
determined that the adverse party had, in fact, the opportunity to file his opposition, as in this case.

2. The prima facie case for holding the test must be shown not upon the filing of the petition but during the trial.
A prima facie case is built by a partys evidence and not by mere allegations in the initiatory pleading.

The Supreme Court of Louisiana eloquently explained -

To warrant the issuance of the DNA testing order, there must be a show ause hearing wherein the applicant must
first present sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case or a reasonable possibility of paternity or "good cause"
for the holding of the test. 36 In these states, a court order for blood testing is considered a "search," which, under their
Constitutions (as in ours), must be preceded by a finding of probable cause in order to be valid. Hence, the requirement
of a prima facie case, or reasonable possibility, was imposed in civil actions as a counterpart of a finding of probable
cause.

Although a paternity action is civil, not criminal, the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and
seizures is still applicable, and a proper showing of sufficient justification under the particular factual circumstances of
the case must be made before a court may order a compulsory blood test. Courts in various jurisdictions have differed
regarding the kind of procedures which are required, but those jurisdictions have almost universally found that a prelim-
inary showing must be made before a court can constitutionally order compulsory blood testing in paternity cases. We
agree, and find that, as a preliminary matter, before the court may issue an order for compulsory blood testing, the
moving party must show that there is a reasonable possibility of paternity. As explained hereafter, in cases in which
paternity is contested and a party to the action refuses to voluntarily undergo a blood test, a show cause hearing must
be held in which the court can determine whether there is sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case which
warrants issuance of a court order for blood testing.

The same condition precedent should be applied in our jurisdiction to protect the putative father from mere har-
assment suits. Thus, during the hearing on the motion for DNA testing, the petitioner must present prima facie evidence
or establish a reasonable possibility of paternity.

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2. FIGUEROA VS. BARRANCO, SBC CASE # 519, JULY 31, 1997

FACTS:

Figueroa and Barranco were sweethearts since their teens. Their intimacy eventually resulted to a son born out
of wedlock. Barranco promised Figueroa that he would marry her when he passes the bar examinations. After four takes,
he finally passed but did not hold true to his promise of marriage.

In 1971, their relationship ended. Years later, he married another woman. When Barranco was about to take his
oath to enter the legal profession, Figueroa filed a complaint relaying to the court what happened between her and
Barranco.

Until 1988, Barranco has filed three motions to dismiss because Figueroa still would not persecute and because
for the past years, he has become elected in the Sangguniang Bayan, has actively participated in various civic organi-
zations and has acquired a good standing within his community while the case was pending.

The court sought the opinion of the IBP which recommended that Barranco be allowed to take his oath. Figueroa
reappeared and intercepted the scheduled oath-taking of Barranco which led to its delay.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the act of the respondent in marrying another woman constitute gross immorality, thus making
him ineligible to take the Lawyers Oath.

RULING:

No. The facts do not constitute gross immorality warranting the permanent exclusion of respondent from the legal
profession. His engaging in premarital sexual relations with complainant and promises to marry suggests a doubtful
moral character on his part but the same does not constitute grossly immoral conduct. The Court has held that to justify
suspension or disbarment the act complained of must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral. A grossly immoral act
is one that is so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled or disgraceful as to be reprehensible
to a high degree. It is a willful, flagrant, or shameless act which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of respectable
members of the community.

Mere intimacy between a man and a woman, both of whom possess no impediment to marry, voluntarily carried
on and devoid of any deceit on the part of respondent, is neither so corrupt nor so unprincipled as to warrant the impo-
sition of disciplinary sanction against him, even if as a result of such relationship a child was born out of wedlock.
3. KHO VS. REPUBLIC, GR 187462, JUNE 1, 2016

FACTS:

In May 31, 1972, Raquel Khos parents called a clerk in the office of the municipal treasurer to instruct him to
arrange the necessary papers for the intended marriage of their son, Raquel Kho and Veronica Kho. In June 1, 1972, the
two were married at 3 in the morning at a church.

Claiming that he has never gone to the office of the Local Civil Registrar to apply for a marriage license and had
not seen nor signed any papers in connection to the procurement of a marriage license, and considering the ONE DAY
difference between the time the clerk was told to obtain the papers to the actual moment of the marriage, no marriage
license could have been validly issued, Raquel Kho filed an action for the declaration of nullity of his marriage.

The RTC ruled that the marriage was void due to the lack of the requiresite marriage license and ruled in favor of
Raquel Kho. Later, the Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the RTC and ruled in favor of Veronica Kho. Raquel
Kho filed a petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court.

ISSUES

1. Whether the issues presented by the petitioner in the petition for review on certiorari are factual in nature and whether
it is proper for the Supreme Court to delve into these issues;

2. Whether the certification issued by the local civil registrar which attests to the absence in its records of a marriage
license, must categorically state that the document does not exist in the said office despite diligent search;

3. Whether the CA erred in disregarding the petitioners documentary evidences of the lack of a marriage licence and
giving weight to unsupported presumptions in favor of the respondent; and

4. Whether the CA erred in setting aside or reversing the lower courts judgment declaring the marriage a nullity for the
absence of the requisite marriage license.

RULING

1. No, the issues in the petition are not factual in nature. However, the rule that a question of fact is not appropriate
for a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is not without exceptions, which are the following:

(a) when the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, and conjectures;

(b) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;

(c) where there is a grave abuse of discretion;

(d) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;

(e) when the findings of fact are conflicting;

(f) When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, when beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary
to the admissions of both appellant and appellee;

(g) when the findings are contrary to those of the trial court;

(h) when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evience on which they are based;

(i) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners main and reply briefs are not disputed by
the respondents; and

(j) when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and
contradicted by the evidence on record.

In the case, of the RTC and CA on the issue on whether there was a marriage license obtained by petitioner and respondent
are conflicting. Hence, it was proper for the Supreme Court to review these findings.

2. No, in a previous case (Nicdao Carino vs. Yee Carino), the Supreme Court considered the certification issued
by the local civil registrar, that their office had no record of a marriage license, was adequate to prove the non-issuance of
said license.

In the present case, the petitioner was able to present a certification issued by the civil registrar attesting that the Office of
the local civil registrar has no record nor copy of any marriage license ever issued between the parties.
 3. Yes, the CA erred in disregarding the petitioners documentary evidences of the lack of a marriage licence and
giving weight to unsupported presumptions in favor of the respondent because the certification issued by the Civil Registrar
coupled with the testimony of the former Civil Registrar at the time of the wedding is sufficient to prove the absence of the
subject marriage license.

Article 58 of the Civil Code (Note: at the time of the marriage, the Family Code was not effective yet) makes explicit that
no marriage shall be solemnized without a license first issued by the local civil registrar. In addition, Article 80(3) of the
Civil Code makes it clear that a marriage performed without a marriage license is void.

4. Yes, the CA erred in setting aside or reversing the lower courts judgment declaring the marriage a nullity for
the absence of the requisite marriage license because the petitioner has successfully overcome the presumed validity of
the marriage by presenting the certification of the civil registrar which was sufficient to prove the absence of the marriage
license. In addition, the respondent was not able to prove that the marriage as valid as it is she who alleges such validity.

Based on the certification issued by the civil registrar and the respondents failure to produce a copy of the alleged
marriage license or of any evidence to show that such license was ever issued, the only conclusion that can be reached
is that no valid marriage license was issued. Hence, the marriage performed is null and void.

*The decision of the CA was reversed and set aside.

===========================================================================================

4. CASTILLO VS. CASTILLO, GR 189607, APRIL 18, 2016

FACTS:

On 25 May 1972, respondent Lea P. De Leon Castillo (Lea) married Benjamin Bautista (Bautista). On 6 January
1979, respondent married herein petitioner Renato A. Castillo (Renato).

On 28 May 2001, Renato filed before the RTC a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, praying that his marriage to
Lea be declared void due to her subsisting marriage to Bautista. Respondent opposed the Petition, and contended that
her marriage to Bautista was null and void as they had not secured any license therefor, and neither of them was a member
of the denomination to which the solemnizing officer belonged.

RTC declared the marriage between petitioner and respondent null and void ab initio on the ground that it was a
bigamous marriage under Article 41 of the Family Code. The RTC said that the fact that Lea's marriage to Bautista was
subsisting when she married Renato on 6 January 1979, makes her marriage to Renato bigamous, thus rendering it void
ab initio. The lower court dismissed Lea's argument that she need not obtain a judicial decree of nullity and could presume
the nullity of a prior subsisting marriage. The RTC stressed that so long as no judicial declaration exists, the prior marriage
is valid and existing. Lastly, RTC also said that even if respondent eventually had her first marriage judicially declared void,
the fact remains that the first and second marriage were subsisting before the first marriage was annulled, since Lea failed
to obtain a judicial decree of nullity for her first marriage to Bautista before contracting her second marriage with Renato.

CA reversed and set aside the RTC's Decision and Order and upheld the validity of the parties' marriage. In
reversing the RTC, the CA said that since Lea's marriages were solemnized in 1972 and in 1979, or prior to the effectivity
of the Family Code on 3 August 1988, the Civil Code is the applicable law since it is the law in effect at the time the
marriages were celebrated, and not the Family Code. Furthermore, the CA ruled that the Civil Code does not state that a
judicial decree is necessary in order to establish the nullity of a marriage.

ISSUE:
Whether or not judicial declaration is necessary in order to establish the nullity of a marriage.

RULING:

NO, under the Civil Code. Petition is DENIED.

The Court held that the subsequent marriage of Lea to Renato is valid in view of the invalidity of her first marriage
to Bautista because of the absence of a marriage license. That there was no judicial declaration that the first marriage was
void ab initio before the second marriage was contracted is immaterial as this is not a requirement under the Civil Code.
Nonetheless, the subsequent Decision of the RTC declaring the nullity of Lea's first marriage only serves to strengthen the
conclusion that her subsequent marriage to Renato is valid.

The validity of a marriage and all its incidents must be determined in accordance with the law in effect at the time
of its celebration. In this case, the law in force at the time Lea contracted both marriages was the Civil Code. The children
of the parties were also born while the Civil Code was in effect i.e. in 1979, 1981, and 1985. Hence, the Court must resolve
this case using the provisions under the Civil Code on void marriages, in particular, Articles 80, 81, 82, and 83 (first para-
graph); and those on voidable marriages are Articles 83 (second paragraph), 85 and 86.
 Under the Civil Code, a void marriage differs from a voidable marriage in the following ways:
1) a void marriage is nonexistent - i.e., there was no marriage from the beginning - while in a voidable marriage, the
marriage is valid until annulled by a competent court;
2) a void marriage cannot be ratified, while a voidable marriage can be ratified by cohabitation;
3) being nonexistent, a void marriage can be collaterally attacked, while a voidable marriage cannot be collaterally at-
tacked;
4) in a void marriage, there is no conjugal partnership and the offspring are natural children by legal fiction, while in voidable
marriage there is conjugal partnership and the children conceived before the decree of annulment are considered legiti-
mate; and
5) "in a void marriage no judicial decree to establish the invalidity is necessary," while in a voidable marriage there must
be a judicial decree.

Emphasizing the fifth difference, this Court has held in the cases of People v. Mendoza, People v. Aragon, and
Odayat v. Amante, that the Civil Code contains no express provision on the necessity of a judicial declaration of nullity of
a void marriage. It must be emphasized that the enactment of the Family Code rendered the rulings in Odayat, Mendoza,
and Aragon inapplicable to marriages celebrated after 3 August 1988. A judicial declaration of absolute nullity of marriage
is now expressly required where the nullity of a previous marriage is invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage.
A second marriage contracted prior to the issuance of this declaration of nullity is thus considered bigamous and void.

===========================================================================================

5. RONULO VS. PEOPLE, GR 182438, JULY 2, 2014

FACTS:

Joey Umadac and Claire Bingayen were scheduled to marry on 29 March 2003 at the Sta. Rosa Catholic Parish
Church in Ilocos Norte. But on the day of the wedding, the church's officiating priest refused to solemnize the marriage
because of lack of a marriage license.

With the couple and the guests already dressed for the wedding, they headed to an Aglipayan Church. The
Aglipayan priest, herein petitioner Ronulo, conducted a ceremony on the same day where the couple took each other as
husband and wife in front of the guests. This was despite Petitioner's knowledge of the couple's lack of marriage license.

Petitioner was eventually charged of violating Article 352 of the RPC for performing an illegal marriage ceremony.
The MTC did not believe Petitioner's defense that what he did was an act of blessing and was not tantamount to solemni-
zation of marriage and was found guilty. The decision was affirmed by both the RTC and the CA.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Petitioner committed an illegal marriage.

RULING:

Yes. Article 352 of the RPC penalizes an authorized solemnizing officer who shall perform or authorize any illegal
marriage ceremony. The elements of this crime are: authority of the solemnizing officer; and his performance of an illegal
marriage ceremony.
The first element is present since Petitioner himself admitted that he has authority to solemnize a marriage.

The second element is present since the alleged "blessing" by Petitioner is tantamount to the performance of an
illegal marriage ceremony.

There is no prescribed form or rite for the solemnization of a marriage. However, Article 6 of the Family Code
provides that it shall be necessary: for the contracting parties to appear personally before the solemnizing officer; and
declare in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age that they take each other as husband and wife. The
first requirement is present since petitioner admitted to it. The second requirement is likewise present since the prosecution,
through the testimony of its witnesses, proved that the contracting parties personally declared that they take each other as
husband and wife.

The penalty for violating Article 352 of the RPC is in accordance with the provision of the Marriage Law, specifi-
cally Article 44, which states that: Section 44. General Penal Clause Any violation of any provision of this Act not specif-
ically penalized, or of the regulations to promulgated by the proper authorities, shall be punished by a fine of not more
than two hundred pesos or by imprisonment for not more than one month, or both, in the discretion of the court. As such,
Petitioner was held guilty of violating Article 352 and was fined P200 as penalty.
6. TUPAL VS. ROJO, AM MTJ-14-1842, FEBRUARY 24, 2014

FACTS:

Rex M. Tupal filed with the Office of the Court Administrator a complaint against Judge Remegio V. Rojo for
violating the Code of Judicial Conduct and for gross ignorance of the law.

Judge Rojo allegedly violated Circular No. 1-90 which allows municipal trial court judges to act as notaries public
ex officio and notarize documents only if connected with their official functions and duties. Tupal argues that affidavits of
cohabitation, which Judge Rojo notarized are not connected with a judges official functions and duties as solemnizing
officer.

He was also alleged to have violated the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice.

ISSUE:

Whether Judge Rojo is guilty of violating the New Code of Judicial Conduct and of gross ignorance of the law.

RULING:

YES. Judge Rojo is guilty of violating the New Code of Judicial Conduct and of gross negligence of law.

Municipal trial court and municipal circuit trial court judges may act as notaries public. However, they may do so
only in their ex officio capacities. They may notarize documents, contracts, and other conveyances only in the exercise of
their official functions and duties. Circular No. 1-90 dated February 26, 1990 provides:

Municipal trial court (MTC) and municipal circuit trial court (MCTC) judges are empowered to perform the function
of notaries public ex officio under Section 76 of Republic Act No. 296, as amended (otherwise known as the Judiciary Act
of 1948) and Section 242 of the Revised Administrative Code. But the Court hereby lays down the following qualifications
on the scope of this power:
MTC and MCTC judges may act as notaries public ex officio in the notarization of documents connected only with
the exercise of their official functions and duties x xx. They may not, as notaries public ex officio, undertake the preparation
and acknowledgment of private documents, contracts and other acts of conveyances which bear no direct relation to the
performance of their functions as judges. The 1989 Code of Judicial Conduct not only enjoins judges to regulate their extra-
judicial activities in order to minimize the risk of conflict with their judicial duties, but also prohibits them from engaging in
the private practice of law (Canon 5 and Rule 5.07).

Judge Rojo notarized affidavits of cohabitation, which were documents not connected with the exercise of his
official functions and duties as solemnizing officer. He also notarized affidavits of cohabitation without certifying that lawyers
or notaries public were lacking in his courts territorial jurisdiction. Thus, Judge Rojo violated Circular No. 1-90.
Before performing the marriage ceremony, the judge must personally interview the contracting parties and examine the
requirements they submitted.25 The parties must have complied with all the essential and formal requisites of marriage.
Among these formal requisites is a marriage license.26

A marriage license is issued by the local civil registrar to parties who have all the qualifications and none of the
legal disqualifications to contract marriage.27 Before performing the marriage ceremony, the judge must personally exam-
ine the marriage license presented.28

If the contracting parties have cohabited as husband and wife for at least five years and have no legal impediment
to marry, they are exempt from the marriage license requirement.29 Instead, the parties must present an affidavit of cohab-
itation sworn to before any person authorized by law to administer oaths.30 The judge, as solemnizing officer, must per-
sonally examine the affidavit of cohabitation as to the parties having lived together as husband and wife for at least five
years and the absence of any legal impediment to marry each other.31 The judge must also execute a sworn statement
that he personally ascertained the parties qualifications to marry and found no legal impediment to the marriage.32 Article
34 of the Family Code of the Philippines provides:
Art. 34. No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together as hus
band and wife for at least five years and without any legal impediment to marry each other. The contracting par
ties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. The
solemnizing officer shall also state under oath that he ascertained the qualifications of the contracting parties
and found no legal impediment to the marriage.

Based on law and the Guidelines on the Solemnization of Marriage by the Members of the Judiciary, the person
who notarizes the contracting parties affidavit of cohabitation cannot be the judge who will solemnize the parties marriage.
 As a solemnizing officer, the judges only duty involving the affidavit of cohabitation is to examine whether the
parties have indeed lived together for at least five years without legal impediment to marry. The Guidelines does not state
that the judge can notarize the parties affidavit of cohabitation.

Judge Rojo also violated the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. Rule IV, Section 2, paragraph (b) of the 2004 Rules
on Notarial Practice prohibits a notary public from notarizing documents if the signatory is not personally known to him.
Otherwise, the notary public must require the signatory to present a competent evidence of identity:
SEC. 2. Prohibitions. xxxx
(b) A person shall not perform a notarial act if the person involved as signatory to the instrument or document -
(1) is not in the notary's presence personally at the time of the notarization; and
(2) is not personally known to the notary public or otherwise identified by the notary public through competent evidence of
identity as defined by these Rules.
A competent evidence of identity guarantees that the person appearing before the notary public is the signatory to the
instrument or document to be notarized. If the notary public does not personally know the signatory, he must require the
signatory to present a competent evidence of identity.
In all the nine affidavits of cohabitation Judge Rojo notarized, he only stated that the parties subscribed and swore to their
affidavits before him. Judge Rojo did not state that the parties were personally known to him or that the parties presented
their competent pieces of evidence of identity. Thus, Judge Rojo violated the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice.

===========================================================================================
7. REPUBLIC VS. ALBIOS, GR 198780, OCTOBER 16, 2013

FACTS:

On October 22, 2004, Fringer, an American citizen, and Albios were married, as evidenced by a Certificate of
Marriage. On December 6, 2006, Albios filed with the RTC a petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage with Fringer,
alleging that immediately after their marriage, they separated and never lived as husband and wife because they never
really had any intention of entering into a married state or complying with any of their essential marital obligations.

Fringer did not file his answer. On September 13, 2007, Albios filed a motion to set case for pre-trial and to admit
her pre-trial brief. After the pre-trial, only Albios, her counsel and the prosecutor appeared. Fringer did not attend the
hearing despite being duly notified of the schedule.

The RTC declared the marriage void ab initio. The RTC opined that the parties married each other for conven-
ience only. Albios stated that she contracted Fringer to enter into a marriage to enable her to acquire American citizenship
and that in consideration thereof, she agreed to pay him the sum of $2,000.00. However, she did not pay Fringer $2,000.00
because the latter never processed her petition for citizenship

The OSG filed an appeal before the CA. The CA affirmed the RTC ruling which found that the essential requisite
of consent was lacking.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the marriage contracted for the sole purpose of acquiring American citizenship void ab initio on
the ground of lack of consent?

RULING:
The marriage between the parties is valid

In 1975, the seminal case of Bark v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, established the principal test for
determining the presence of marriage fraud in immigration cases. It ruled that a arriage is a sham if the bride and groom
did not intend to establish a life together at the time they were married.This standard was modified with the passage of the
Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendment of 1986 (IMFA), which now requires the couple to instead demonstrate that the
marriage was not ntered into for the purpose of evading the immigration laws of the United States.The focus, thus, shifted
from determining the intention to establish a life together, to determining the intention of evading immigration laws. It must
be noted, however, that this standard is used purely for immigration purposes and, therefore, does not purport to rule on
the legal validity or existence of a marriage.

In the 1969 case of Mpiliris v. Hellenic Lines, which declared as valid a marriage entered into solely for the hus-
band to gain entry to the United States, stating that a valid marriage could not be avoided erely because the marriage was
entered into for a limited purpose.The 1980 immigration case of Matter of McKee, further recognized that a fraudulent or
sham marriage was intrinsically different from a nonsubsisting one.

Under Article 2 of the Family Code, for consent to be valid, it must be (1) freely given and (2) made in the presence
of a solemnizing officer. A reelygivenconsent requires that the contracting parties willingly and deliberately enter into the
marriage. Consent must be real in the sense that it is not vitiated nor rendered defective by any of the vices of consent
under Articles 45 and 46 of the Family Code, such as fraud, force, intimidation, and undue influence. Consent must also
be conscious or intelligent, in that the parties must be capable of intelligently understanding the nature of, and both the
beneficial or unfavorable consequences of their act.
 Based on the above, consent was not lacking between Albios and Fringer. In fact, there was real consent because
it was not vitiated nor rendered defective by any vice of consent. Their consent was also conscious and intelligent as they
understood the nature and the beneficial and inconvenient consequences of their marriage, as nothing impaired their ability
to do so. That their consent was freely given is best evidenced by their conscious purpose of acquiring American citizenship
through marriage. Such plainly demonstrates that they willingly and deliberately contracted the marriage. There was a
clear intention to enter into a real and valid marriage so as to fully comply with the requirements of an application for
citizenship. There was a full and complete understanding of the legal tie that would be created between them, since it was
that precise legal tie which was necessary to accomplish their goal.
8. GO-BANGAYAN VS. BANGAYAN, GR 201061, JULY 3, 2013

FACTS:

In September 1979, Benjamin Bangayan, Jr. married AzucenaAlegre. In 1982, while Alegre was outside the Phil-
ippines, Benjamin developed a romantic relationship with Sally Go. Sallys father was against this. In order to appease her
father, Sally convinced Benjamin to sign a purported marriage contract in March 1982.

In 1994, the relationship between Sally and Benjamin soured. Sally filed a bigamy case against Benjamin. Ben-
jamin on the other hand filed an action to declare his alleged marriage to Sally as non-existent. To prove the existence of
their marriage, Sally presented a marriage license allegedly issued to Benjamin.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the marriage between Sally and Benjamin is bigamous.

RULING:

No. The elements of bigamy are:

1. That the offender has been legally married.
2. That the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse
could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code.
3. That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage.
4. That the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.

In this case, the fourth element is not present. The marriage license presented by Sally was not authentic as in
fact, no marriage license was ever issued to both parties in view of the alleged marriage. The marriage between them was
merely in jest and never complied with the essential requisites of marriage. Hence, there is no bigamous marriage to speak.

==========================================================================================

9. ABBAS VS. ABBAS, GR 183896, JAN 30, 2013

FACTS:

The present case stems from a petition filed by petitioner Syed Azhar Abbas (Syed) for the declaration of nullity
of his marriage to Gloria Goo-Abbas as a ground for the annulment of his marriage to Gloria. At the trial court, Syed, a
Pakistani citizen, testified that he was told that he was going to undergo some ceremony, one of the requirements for his
stay in the Philippines, but was not told of the nature of said ceremony. During the ceremony he and Gloria signed a
document. He claimed that he did not know that the ceremony was a marriage until Gloria told him later. He further testified
that he did not go to Carmona, Cavite to apply for a marriage license, and that he had never resided in that area.

The Municipal Civil Registrar, Leodivinia C. Encarnacion, issued a certification on July 11, 2003 to the effect that
the marriage license number appearing in the marriage contract he submitted, Marriage License No. 9969967, was the
number of another marriage license issued to a certain ArlindoGetalado and Myra Mabilangan.

Pasay City RTC held that no valid marriage license was issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona,
Cavite in favor of Gloria and Syed, as Marriage License No. 9969967 had been issued to ArlindoGetalado and Myra
Mabilangan, and the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite had certified that no marriage license had been

The CA reversed the decision of the trial court on the following grounds: (1) that petitioner had admitted that he
had sign the marriage contract; (2) marriage ceremony took place with witnesses to prove the same; (3) the certification
issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona failed to state therein that due diligence was done in searching for a
marriage license but to no avail.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a person may rely on the marriage contract as well as the testimonies of her witnesses to prove
the existence of said license as against the certification issued by the Civil Registrar that such license was issued to another
person.

RULING:
 In that case that the certification issued by the civil registrar enjoyed probative value, as his duty was to maintain
records of data relative to the issuance of a marriage license.

The presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to
perform a duty." No such affirmative evidence was shown that the Municipal Civil Registrar was lax in performing her duty
of checking the records of their office, thus the presumption must stand. In fact, proof does exist of a diligent search having
been conducted, as Marriage License No. 996967 was indeed located and submitted to the court. The fact that the names
in said license do not correspond to those of Gloria and Syed does not overturn the presumption that the registrar con-
ducted a diligent search of the records of her office.

All the evidence cited by the CA to show that a wedding ceremony was conducted and a marriage contract was
signed does not operate to cure the absence of a valid marriage license. Article 4 of the Family Code is clear when it says,
"The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Article
35(2)." Article 35(3) of the Family Code also provides that a marriage solemnized without a license is void from the begin-
ning, except those exempt from the license requirement under Articles 27 to 34, Chapter 2, Title I of the same
Code.51 Again, this marriage cannot be characterized as among the exemptions, and thus, having been solemnized without
a marriage license, is void ab initio.

As to the motive of Syed in seeking to annul his marriage to Gloria, it may well be that his motives are less than
pure, that he seeks to evade a bigamy suit. Be that as it may, the same does not make up for the failure of the respondent
to prove that they had a valid marriage license, given the weight of evidence presented by petitioner. The lack of a valid
marriage license cannot be attributed to him, as it was Gloria who took steps to procure the same. The law must be applied.
As the marriage license, a formal requisite, is clearly absent, the marriage of Gloria and Syed is void ab initio.