EN BANC

[G.R. No. 139180. July 31, 2001.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROLANDO

RIVERA, accused-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Federico S. Tolentino, Jr. for accused-appellant.

SYNOPSIS

Accused-appellant Rolando Rivera was convicted of rape by the

Regional Trial Court of Pampanga of his 13-year old daughter and was
sentenced to suffer the supreme penalty of death. In his appeal before the
Court, appellant invoked his right to due process of law. He claimed that he
was denied the same because the trial judge disallowed his lawyer from
cross-examining the complainant Erlanie Rivera concerning the latter's
sworn statements on the ground of irrelevance and immateriality. Appellant
also imputed partiality on the part of the presiding judge when the latter
propounded numerous questions to appellant during his cross-examination
by the prosecutor.
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court convicting
appellant of rape. Appellant's right to due process was not violated. The
cross-examination of a witness is essential to test his or her credibility,
expose falsehoods or half-truths, uncover the truth which rehearsed direct
examination testimonies may successfully suppress, and demonstrate
inconsistencies in substantial matters which create reasonable doubt as to
the guilt of the accused and thus give substance to the constitutional right of
the accused to confront the witnesses against him. The right of the accused
to cross-examine a witness is, however, not without limits but is subject to
the rules on the admissibility and relevance of evidence. In the present case,
appellant's counsel argued that his questions to Erlanie on the other acts of
lasciviousness supposedly committed by appellant against her were for the
purpose of testing her credibility. There was, however, no showing on his
part-how these questions had any bearing on complainant's credibility or on
the truth of her claims. One is led to suspect that the purpose of these
questions was to confuse complainant into committing mistakes in her
answers during cross-examination that accused-appellant's counsel could
later use to possibly put complainant's credibility, not to mention her
character, in question. The Court also rejected appellant's claim of partiality.
The Court ruled that it is a judge's prerogative to ask questions to ferret out
the truth. It cannot be taken against him if the questions he propounds
reveals certain truths which, in turn, tend to destroy the theory of one party.
The Court, however, reduced the penalty of death imposed by the trial
court to reclusion perpetua because the minority of the victim was not
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com
 established. Although complainant's minority has been alleged in the
information, no independent and competent evidence was presented by the
prosecution to prove the same. Complainant did not even state her age at
the time of the rape during direct examination; it was only during her cross-
examination when she stated that she was 12 years old at the time she was
raped by her father. The Court stressed that to justify the imposition of the
death penalty, both the relationship of the victim and her age must be
alleged and proved.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; RIGHT TO CROSS-

EXAMINE A WITNESS; THE CROSS-EXAMINATION OF A WITNESS IS ESSENTIAL
TO TEST HIS OR HER CREDIBILITY, EXPOSE FALSEHOODS OR HALF TRUTHS,
UNCOVER THE TRUTH WHICH REHEARSED DIRECT EXAMINATION MAY
SUCCESSFULLY SUPPRESS AND DEMONSTRATE INCONSISTENCIES IN
SUBSTANTIAL MATTERS WHICH CREATE REASONABLE DOUBT AS TO THE
GUILT OF THE ACCUSED AND THUS GIVE SUBSTANCE TO THE
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF THE ACCUSED TO CONFRONT THE WITNESSES
AGAINST HIM. — The right of a party to cross-examine a witness is embodied
in Art. III, §14(2) of the Constitution which provides that the accused shall
have the right to meet the witnesses face to face and in Rule 115, §1(f) of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure which states that, in all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall have the right to confront and cross-examine
the witnesses against him. The cross-examination of a witness is essential to
test his or her credibility, expose falsehoods or half-truths, uncover the truth
which rehearsed direct examination testimonies may successfully suppress,
and demonstrate inconsistencies in substantial matters which create
reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused and thus give substance to
the constitutional right of the accused to confront the witnesses against him.
The right of the accused to cross-examine a witness is, however, not without
limits but is subject to the rules on the admissibility and relevance of
evidence. Thus, in People v. Zheng Bai Hui, (G.R. No. 127580, Aug. 22, 2000)
this Court upheld the ruling of the trial judge disallowing the questions
propounded by the accused's counsel on the ability of the arresting officer to
distinguish between tawas and shabu without a laboratory examination, the
academic degree of his training instructor, and the officer's authorship of
books on drug identity and analysis for being irrelevant, improper, and
impertinent. aTICAc

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; RIGHT TO CROSS-EXAMINE MAY BE DENIED WHERE

THERE IS NO SHOWING THAT THE QUESTIONS TO BE PROPOUNDED HAD ANY
BEARING ON THE WITNESS' CREDIBILITY OR ON THE TRUTH OF HER CLAIMS.
— In this case, accused-appellant's counsel argued that his questions to
Erlanie on the other acts of lasciviousness supposedly committed by
accused-appellant against her were for the purpose of testing her credibility.
There was, however, no showing on his part how these questions had any
bearing on complainant's credibility or on the truth of her claims. One is led
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com
 to suspect that the purpose of these questions was to confuse complainant
into committing mistakes in her answers during cross-examination that
accused-appellant's counsel could later use to possibly put complainant's
credibility, not to mention her character, in question.
3. ID.; EVIDENCE; QUESTIONS IN RELATION TO A PART OF A
WRITING SUCH AS A SWORN STATEMENT MAY BE ALLOWED ONLY WHEN
SUCH WRITING IS GIVEN IN EVIDENCE. — Accused-appellant insists that his
counsel should have been allowed to ask questions in relation to the sworn
statement executed by complainant. He cites Rule 132, §17 of the Revised
Rules of Evidence which provides that: When part of an act, declaration,
conversation, writing or record is given in evidence by one party, the whole
of the same subject matter may be inquired into by the other. Neither can
this rule be invoked to justify the questioning of complainant which the trial
court did not allow. As the above provision states, this rule applies to parts of
"an act, declaration, conversation, writing or record" which is given in
evidence.
4. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHTS OF THE
ACCUSED; RIGHT TO COUNSEL; RIGHT OF AN ACCUSED TO SECURE THE
SERVICES OF A COMPETENT AND INDEPENDENT COUNSEL OF HIS OWN
CHOICE NOT ABSOLUTE; THE STATE'S AND THE OFFENDED PARTY'S RIGHT
TO SPEEDY AND ADEQUATE JUSTICE MUST ALSO BE CONSIDERED. — While
the Constitution recognizes the accused's right to competent and
independent counsel of his own choice, his option to secure the services of a
private counsel is not absolute. For considering the State's and the offended
party's right to speedy and adequate justice, the court may restrict the
accused's option to retain a private counsel if the accused insists on an
attorney he cannot afford, or if the chosen counsel is not a member of the
bar, or if the attorney declines to represent the accused for a valid reason.
The trial court appointed Atty. Bansil a counsel de oficio to represent
accused-appellant on October 6, 1998 because his regular counsel, Atty.
Anselmo Mangalindan, was absent without any explanation. Atty.
Mangalindan had previously been granted several postponements. As this
Court ruled in another case: . . . Courts are not required to wait indefinitely
the pleasure and convenience of the accused as they are also mandated to
promote the speedy and orderly administration of justice. Nor should they
countenance such an obvious trifling with the rules. Indeed, public policy
requires that the trial continue as scheduled, considering that appellant was
adequately represented by counsels who were not shown to be negligent,
incompetent or otherwise unable to represent him.
5. ID.; ID.; DUE PROCESS; RIGHT TO AN IMPARTIAL TRIBUNAL; A
TRIAL JUDGE'S PREROGATIVE TO ASK CLARIFICATORY QUESTIONS CANNOT
IN ITSELF BE CONSIDERED AS AN INDICATION OF PARTIALITY. — Where the
trial court is judge both of the law and of the facts, it is oftentimes necessary
in the due and faithful administration of justice for the presiding judge to re-
examine a witness so that his judgment, when rendered, may rest upon a
full and clear understanding of the facts. Our reading of the transcript of
stenographic notes in this case shows that the trial judge merely wanted to
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com
 clarify certain points relating to the defense of accused-appellant and not to
establish his guilt. It is a judge's prerogative to ask questions to ferret out
the truth. It cannot be taken against him if the questions he propounds
reveals certain truths which, in turn, tend to destroy the theory of one party.
6. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES; LONE
TESTIMONY OF A RAPE VICTIM, IF FOUND CREDIBLE, IS SUFFICIENT TO
WARRANT A JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION. — Well-settled is the rule that the
lone testimony of a rape victim, by itself, is sufficient to warrant a judgment
of conviction if found to be credible. It has likewise been established that
when a woman declares that she has been raped she says in effect all that is
necessary to mean that she has been raped, and where her testimony
passes the test of credibility the accused can be convicted on the basis
thereof. This is because from the nature of the offense, the sole evidence
that can usually be offered to establish the guilt of the accused is the
complainant's testimony. Considering complainant's tender age, her shy
demeanor, and manner of testifying in court, the trial court found Erlanie's
testimony to be straightforward, natural, and convincing and accorded the
same full faith and credit.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; DISCREPANCIES BETWEEN A WITNESS' AFFIDAVIT
AND HIS TESTIMONY IN OPEN COURT DOES NOT NECESSARILY IMPAIR HIS
CREDIBILITY. — Accused-appellant's counsel on cross-examination made
much of the discrepancy between complainant's sworn statement where she
stated that accused-appellant slept beside her mother after the rape and her
testimony that her mother returned home from the hospital only the day
after the rape took place. It must be pointed out, however, that
discrepancies between a witness' affidavit and his testimony in open court
does not necessarily impair his credibility. Affidavits, which are taken ex
parte, are often incomplete or inaccurate for lack of or absence of searching
inquiries by the investigating officer.acHETI

8. ID.; ID.; ID.; CREDIBILITY IS NOT IMPAIRED BY MINOR

INCONSISTENCIES THAT DOES NOT REFLECT ON THE COMMISSION OF THE
CRIME ITSELF. — Moreover, whether accused-appellant slept alone or with
complainant's mother after committing the rape of complainant is of no
moment as it is a minor point that does not reflect on the commission of the
crime itself. The rule is that discrepancies and inconsistencies on minor
matters neither impair the essential integrity of the prosecution evidence as
a whole nor reflect on the witness' honesty. Such inconsistencies may in fact
strengthen rather than weaken the credibility of the witness as they erase
any suspicion of rehearsed testimony.
9. ID.; ID.; ID.; IMPUTATION OF ILL MOTIVE REJECTED. — Accused-
appellant makes it appear that complainant's mother was responsible for the
filing of this case against him. This is not so. For that matter, his wife did not
testify against him. It was his daughter, complainant, alone who denounced
him in court. Accused-appellant's claim that the motivation for the filing of
this case was the animosity of his wife's relatives towards him caused by his
land-grabbing of their land is likewise without any basis. It may be that his
wife's relatives took advantage of his incarceration and made him sign his
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com
 waiver of rights over the land. But this does not necessarily mean they
conspired to persecute him. It is noteworthy that accused-appellant never
claimed that the document which he signed existed before the filing of the
criminal complaint against him or that his wife's relatives fabricated the
charge against him because of his failure to sign the same. Indeed, what
accused-appellant's defense cannot explain is the hymenal laceration
sustained by complainant or the steadfastness she has exhibited in pursuing
the charge against her own father. It is doubtful that complainant would let
herself be embroiled in a petty family dispute in exchange for her honor and
dignity. We cannot believe that a young girl, like complainant, would invent
a sordid tale of sexual abuse by accused-appellant unless it was the truth.
Where there is no evidence to show a doubtful reason or improper motive
why a prosecution witness should testify against the accused of falsely
implicate him in a crime, her testimony is trustworthy.
10. ID.; ID.; DENIAL AND ALIBI; DENIAL IS A NEGATIVE SELF-
SERVING EVIDENCE WHICH DESERVES NO EVIDENTIARY VALUE THAN THE
TESTIMONY OF A WITNESS WHO TESTIFIED ON AFFIRMATIVE MATTERS; ALIBI
CANNOT PROSPER IF IT IS ESTABLISHED MAINLY BY THE ACCUSED AND HIS
RELATIVES, AND NOT BY CREDIBLE PERSONS. — Accused-appellant also
raises the defense of denial and alibi. But the bare denial of accused-
appellant cannot overcome the positive declarations of complainant. Denial,
when unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, constitutes
negative self-serving evidence which deserves no greater evidentiary value
than the testimony of a credible witness who testified on affirmative
matters. Accused-appellant's sister, Concepcion Sayo, testified that accused-
appellant lived with her family in Bulacan at the time of the rape. No other
witness not related to accused-appellant, however, was called to corroborate
her claim. We have already held that the defense of alibi cannot prosper if it
is established mainly by the accused and his relatives, and not by credible
persons. It is not improbable that these witnesses would freely perjure
themselves for the sake of their loved ones. Accused-appellant's, defense
thus fails to convince this Court.
11. ID.; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; PROSECUTION OF OFFENSES;
PREGNANCY IS A NON-ISSUE IN THE PROSECUTION OF THE CRIME OF RAPE.
— Even granting that complainant could not have been impregnated by
accused-appellant during the period alleged by him, it remains possible for
complainant to have gotten pregnant afterwards. More importantly, it must
be emphasized that pregnancy is not an element of the crime of rape and is,
therefore, totally immaterial to the question of accused-appellant's guilt. In
other words, accused-appellant being the cause of complainant's pregnancy
is a non-issue in the prosecution of the crime of rape. What should not be
lost sight of is the fact that complainant's testimony constitutes proof
beyond reasonable doubt that accused-appellant had carnal knowledge of
her without her consent, and such fully established the crime of rape.
12. CRIMINAL LAW; PENALTIES; DEATH PENALTY; TO JUSTIFY ITS
IMPOSITION, THE MINORITY OF THE VICTIM MUST BE ESTABLISHED BY
COMPETENT AND INDEPENDENT EVIDENCE. — It is settled that to justify the
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com
 imposition of the death penalty, both the relationship of the victim and her
age must be alleged and proved. A duly certified certificate of live birth
showing complainant's age, or some other official document on record, such
as a school record, has been recognized as competent evidence. In this case,
although complainant's minority has been alleged in the information, no
independent evidence was presented by the prosecution to prove the same.
Complainant did not even state her age at the time of the rape during direct
examination; it was only during her cross-examination when she stated that
she was 12 years old at the time she was raped by her father. Nor was her
birth certificate or baptismal certificate or any school record presented by
the prosecution to prove the age of Erlanie at the time of the rape. Not even
her mother, whose testimony could have been sufficient to prove the age of
complainant, testified in this case. What was relied upon by the trial court
was that fact that the age of the victim was undisputed by the defense. It
also took judicial notice of the victim's minority on account of her
appearance. We do not agree with this conclusion. The trial court can only
take judicial notice of the victim's minority when the latter is, for example,
10 years old or below. Otherwise, the prosecution has the burden of proving
the victim's age at the time of the rape and the absence of denial on the part
of accused-appellant does not excuse the prosecution from discharging its
burden. The prosecution having failed to present evidence as to
complainant's age, accused-appellant can be convicted only of simple rape,
for which the penalty is reclusion perpetua.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J : p

This is a review pursuant to Rule 122, §10 of the Rules of Criminal

Procedure of the decision, 1 dated June 22, 1999, of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 49, Guagua, Pampanga, finding accused-appellant Rolando Rivera
guilty of rape and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of death and to pay
the offended party, Erlanie Rivera, the sum of P75,000.00 as compensatory
damages and P50,000.00 as moral damages.
The information against accused-appellant charged —
That sometime in the month of March 1997, in barangay
Santiago, municipality of Lubao, province of Pampanga, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused ROLANDO RIVERA, by means of violence, threat and
intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously,
and maliciously succeeded in having carnal knowledge [of] his 13 year
old daughter, Erlanie D. Rivera, against the latter's will and without her
consent.
Contrary to law. 2

When the information was read to him in the local dialect (Pampango)
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com
 during his arraignment on September 30, 1997, accused-appellant, duly
assisted by counsel de oficio, pleaded not guilty to the crime charged, 3
whereupon trial was held.
The prosecution presented as its witnesses complainant Erlanie Rivera,
her aunt, Marietta Pagtalunan, and Dr. Demetria Barin, who conducted the
physical examination of complainant.
Complainant Erlanie Rivera testified that sometime in March 1997, her
younger sister, Zaira, 4 was taken by their parents to the Escolastica Romero
Memorial Hospital in Lubao, Pampanga. Complainant's mother stayed with
her sister in the hospital, but her father, herein accused-appellant, went
back home to Santiago, Lubao, Pampanga. At around 11 o'clock in the
evening of the same day, complainant was awakened as accused-appellant
started kissing her and fondling her breasts. Complainant tried to resist by
kicking and pushing accused-appellant, but her efforts were to no avail.
Accused-appellant removed her shorts and panty, touched her private parts,
and then had sexual intercourse with her. After he was through with her,
accused-appellant told complainant not to tell anyone what had happened or
he would kill complainant's mother and sister. Hence, when her mother came
home the following day, Erlanie did not tell her what had happened because
she was afraid of accused-appellant.
On April 9, 1997, however, Erlanie, in the presence of her mother, told
her aunt, Marietta Pagtalunan, and her grandmother, Maxima Payumo, that
she had been raped by accused-appellant. For this reason, she was referred
to Dr. Barin for physical examination. She also executed a sworn statement
before the police of Lubao, Pampanga. 5
Erlanie testified that she became pregnant as a result of the rape
committed against her by accused-appellant, but the pregnancy was
aborted. 6 On cross-examination, she said she was 13 years old at the time of
her testimony, the second child in the family. She said that her parents were
not on good terms with each other and that she knew that her father had a
mistress. Atty. Mangalindan, then defense counsel, questioned Erlanie about
other supposed acts of molestation committed by accused-appellant against
her previous to the rape subject of the present case, but, upon objection of
the prosecution, the trial court disallowed the question on the ground that it
concerned matters not covered by her direct examination. 7
Erlanie testified that her mother, grandmother, aunt, and a certain
Nora Baluyut were present when she made her sworn statement before the
police. She said that her father raped her only once, sometime in March
1997. She could not remember the exact date when she was raped by
accused-appellant, but she did remember that the same took place in March
as her sister, Zaira, was hospitalized at the time. When the rape occurred,
her younger brother and sister were in their house asleep. She did not tell
her mother after the latter had returned home that she had been raped by
accused-appellant because she was afraid of her father who had threatened
her. After the rape, accused-appellant would only come home on Sundays. 8
Questioned further on cross-examination, Erlanie said that she gave
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com
 her sworn statement before the police and that her answers to questions
asked during her direct examination were freely given without coaching by
anyone. She could understand Tagalog, the language used in her sworn
statement. She told the court that she struggled against accused-appellant,
kicking and pushing him, but she was overpowered by her father. At that
time, Erlanie's younger sister, Corazon, was lying beside her, but Erlanie did
not shout even when her father succeeded in penetrating her. Erlanie could
not remember how long the sexual act took place, but she felt something
like urine come out of her father's penis after he was finished with her.
Erlanie testified that she was 12 years old when she was raped by her father.
9

On re-direct examination, when asked about the discrepancy between

her testimony that her mother returned home only the day after the rape
and her statement in her affidavit that accused-appellant slept beside her
mother after the rape, Erlanie replied that she made a mistake as the
incident narrated in her affidavit referred to a different occasion when no
rape was committed against her by accused-appellant. 10
The next witness for the prosecution was Marietta Pagtalunan,
complainant's aunt and the sister of complainant's mother, Evangeline.
Marietta corroborated Erlanie's testimony that the latter told her sometime
in April 1997 that she had been raped by accused-appellant. Marietta said
she took complainant to Dr. Barin, who examined complainant. 11
Dr. Demetria Barin was Chief Physician of the Escolastica Romero
District Hospital. Her findings are as follows:
P.E. FINDINGS:

- No signs of external Physical Injuries

I.E. FINDINGS:
HYMEN - healed laceration at 3:00 o'clock
VAGINA - Admits one finger with ease two fingers with difficulty

UTERUS - not enlarged

LMP - March 3, 1997
Pregnancy Test (+) 12

Dr. Barin testified that on April 10, 1997, she examined complainant
Erlanie Rivera and found that the victim had an injury in the hymen at the 3
o'clock position which could possibly have been caused by the insertion of a
hard object, such as a male organ. Dr. Barin testified that complainant
Erlanie went back to see her on May 2, 1997 because she suffered from
vaginal bleeding indicative of a threatened abortion. She said that she found
that complainant was then pregnant. Upon examination of the patient at that
time, Dr. Barin found that abortion had not yet taken place and prescribed
medicines for the complainant. Erlanie was subjected to another pregnancy
test on May 13, 1997, but the result was negative. Dr. Barin stated that the
vaginal bleeding suffered by complainant could have caused the abortion of
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com
 the fetus. 13

Thereafter, the defense presented its evidence. Accused-appellant, his

sister, Concepcion Sayo, and Natividad Pinlac, Records Officer of the
Escolastica Romero District Hospital, were presented as witnesses.
Accused-appellant denied that he raped Erlanie Rivera. He alleged that
the rape charge was filed against him because his wife, Evangeline, had a
paramour and resented him because he hurt her. He explained that he saw
his wife talking with another man in their house and beat her up on April 1,
1997 because he heard that she had a lover. He also said that his wife was
angry with him because he had a mistress who stayed in their house for
three weeks. He further stated that his wife's relatives were likewise angry
with him because he caused the lot owned by his father-in-law in Santiago,
Lubao, Pampanga to be registered in his name. He said that he was
compelled to sign a waiver of his rights over the land owned by his parents-
in-law. 14 The defense presented a letter to accused-appellant written by his
wife, who was asking him to sign a document so that she could attend to it
before he got out of prison. 15
The defense also offered as evidence a document, designated as
Waiver of Rights, 16 signed by accused-appellant, in which he acknowledged
that he was a tenant of a parcel of land and that he waived and voluntarily
surrendered his right over the said landholding to the "SMPCI,"
recommending that a certain Ponciano Miguel be given the land to work on
the same. The document was identified by accused-appellant in open court.
He said that Ponciano Miguel was a first cousin of his wife and that he signed
the document because his wife's relatives promised him that he would get
out of prison after signing the document. 17
Another witness for the defense was Concepcion Sayo, accused-
appellant's sister, who testified that in March 1997, accused-appellant lived
with her family in Malawak, Bustos, Bulacan, to help her husband operate a
fishpond. She said that accused-appellant stayed in their house during the
entire month of March, except in March 19, 1997 when he stayed with their
sister, Perla, in Tibagan, Bustos, Bulacan. 18
The last defense witness was Natividad Pinlac, Records Officer of the
Escolastica Romero District Hospital, who identified 19 a certification, dated
April 29, 1999, in which it was stated that Zaira Rivera was confined at that
hospital from March 1 to March 2, 1997. 20
On June 22, 1999, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive
portion of which stated:
WHEREFORE, the court finding the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape as charged. For having violated
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act
7659, with the attendant circumstances that the victim is under
eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is the father of the victim
and absent any circumstance that could mitigate the commission
thereof, accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the supreme penalty of
death by lethal injection.
SECIcT

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com

 In line with established jurisprudence, said accused is also
ordered to indemnify the offended party Erlanie Rivera in the sum of
P75,000.00 as compensatory damages and P50,000.00 as moral
damages.
SO ORDERED. 21

Hence, this appeal. Accused-appellant contends that:

1. The lower court failed to observe the constitutional right of

the Accused-Appellant to due process and right to counsel;

2. The lower court failed to consider the evidence of the

Accused-Appellant. 22
I. Accused-appellant invokes his right to due process of law. He
claims that he was denied the same because: (a) the trial judge disallowed
his lawyer from cross-examining Erlanie Rivera concerning the latter's sworn
statements on the ground of irrelevance and immateriality; (b) the trial court
denied the motion made by accused-appellant's counsel de oficio to
postpone the cross-examination of Dr. Barin, the examining physician,
because of which the said counsel consequently waived the cross-
examination of Dr. Barin; (c) the judge propounded numerous questions to
accused-appellant during his cross-examination by the prosecutor; and (d)
the trial court's decision was promulgated just one day after accused-
appellant submitted his memorandum.
Procedural due process simply means that a person must be heard
before he is condemned. The due process requirement is a part of a person's
basic rights, not a mere formality that may be dispensed with or performed
perfunctorily. 23 Considering both the evidence and the law applicable to this
case, we hold that accused-appellant has been accorded his right to due
process.
A. One basis for accused-appellant's contention that he was denied
due process is the refusal of the trial judge to allow Atty. Mangalindan's
questions concerning the other alleged acts of molestation committed by
accused-appellant against complainant. Accused-appellant argues that no
legal ground exists for the trial court's ruling.
The transcript of stenographic notes concerning this incident shows the
following:
ATTY. MANGALINDAN:

Q You mentioned in your testimony that you were molested by your

father since 1996.

COURT:
Are you referring to a chain of events because police station you
are referring is something there are two places this girl testified
that she was raped, you referred to us Acts of Lasciviousness and
she did not testified about that, that is another case with another
Court, we are only trying here a rape case that is only they you
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com
 never mention. Only on the matters that she testified ( sic ).
ATTY. MANGALINDAN:
But this is also related to the rape case your Honor because I will
confront it with another form of a question. SEHaDI

ATTY. MANGALINDAN:
Q Prior to this incident, were you molested by your father?
PROSECUTOR SANTOS:

Immaterial, your Honor, whatever acts w[ere] done by the

accused is not a subject of the case at bar.

COURT:
Let us confine [questioning] to the complaint at bar which is a
rape case.

ATTY. MANGALINDAN:
This is related to the incident because we are here your Honor to
prove, we are trying to discredit her testimony. We will just direct
our question touching on the direct examination.

COURT:
Only on the matters that she only testified that is only thing you
can cross-examine. Only matters testified which is only a rape
case let us not dwell the Court knows there are other cases Acts
of Lasciviousness pending in the lower Court at the proper Court
otherwise if I will allow you to ask questions on other matters
specially I know you are pinpointing the Acts of Lasciviousness
you are prolonging this case here (sic ).cCAIDS

ATTY. MANGALINDAN:
I am trying to discredit the witness as one where the credibility
as witness here your Honor is very important. I stated before our
main cross-examination is the accused is not a plan in such case,
although I do sympathize (sic ). We would like to propound
question that will discredit her as witness and a complainant not
with her testimony alone. Our center of cross-examination is to
discredit her as complaining witness that is why our question
may not be limited to be accepted under the rule of cross-
examination your Honor the cross-examination your Honor the
cross-examiner is not limited on the direct-testimony of the
witness but he can propound questions which may petition or
destroy the credibility of the witness that is our view point (sic ).
PROSECUTOR SANTOS:

We cannot dispute the right of accused to discredit or to adopt

our credibility of our witness, but it should be done in the proper
way, not to ask immaterial questions which are not related.
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com
 ATTY. MANGALINDAN:

The rule for cross-examination insofar as to destroy the

credibility of the witness is not only limited to what the Honorable
Fiscal we came approach of so many cross-examinations goes
allow your Honor under the rules of Court insofar as this case is
related to the present case we are trying, this is very related
because even the witness I have transcript in my hand, testified
not only the rape case your Honor she had testified by direct-
examination the preparatory acts before the testimony of rape
that she was been molested early, finger of the father, this were
testified through by the witness, it is here direct-testimony it is
not limited (sic ).

PROSECUTOR SANTOS:

Prior to this incident were you molested by your father, obviously

your Honor the question is not relevant. THIASE

ATTY. MANGALINDAN:

Your Honor please I'm very disagreeable (sic), I have not with me
the transcript but I have read that you [can] ask questions
concerning the rape case.

COURT:

A question referring to events prior to the complaint at bar. 24

The trial court later issued an order, dated December 9, 1997, the
pertinent parts of which provided:
After private complainant testified on direct-examination,
counsel for accused attempted to cross-examine her on matters
relevant to the complaint for Acts of Lasciviousness which was objected
to by Asst. Provincial Prosecutor Arturo G. Santos on the ground that
private complainant did not testify on that matter but limited her
testimony on the rape case only. Counsel for the accused argued that
although that is correct nonetheless because [of] the sworn statement
executed by private complainant identified by said witness in her
direct examination and marked as Exhibit "C" for the prosecution, he is
at liberty to cross-examine the witness on all matters stated in her
sworn statement including that portion touching on the acts of
lasciviousness subject matter of another case before another court.

The Court sustained the objection. Section 6, Rule 132, Revised

Rules on Evidence provides that "the witness may be cross-examined
by the adverse party as to any matters stated in the direct
examination, or connected therewith, with sufficient fullness and
freedom to test his accuracy and truthfulness and freedom from
interest or bias or the reverse, and to elicit all important facts bearing
upon the issue."

The witness testified only on the rape case. She did not testify
anything about acts of lasciviousness committed upon her person. She
may not therefore be questioned on this matter because it is not
connected with her direct testimony or has any bearing upon the issue.
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com
 To allow adverse party to cross-examine the witness on the acts of
lasciviousness which is pending trial in another court and which the
witness did not testify is improper.

Questions concerning acts of lasciviousness will not in any way

test the accuracy and truthfulness and freedom from interest or bias or
the reverse. On the contrary such questions, if allowed, will unduly
burden the court with immaterial testimonies. 25

In another order, dated January 13, 1998, the trial court gave accused-
appellant's counsel 20 days within which to elevate its ruling to the appellate
court. 26 The records reveal, however, that no such petition was filed by Atty.
Mangalindan as regards this particular matter.
The question, therefore, is whether the trial court correctly disallowed
accused-appellant's counsel from questioning complainant as regards the
other supposed acts of lasciviousness contained in her sworn statement. On
this point, Rule 132, §6 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides:
Upon the termination of the direct examination, the witness may
be cross-examined by the adverse party as to any matters stated in
the direct examination, or connected therewith, with sufficient fullness
and freedom to test his accuracy and truthfulness and freedom from
interest, bias or the reverse and to elicit all important facts bearing
upon the issue.

The right of a party to cross-examine a witness is embodied in Art. III,

§14(2) of the Constitution which provides that the accused shall have the
right to meet the witnesses face to face and in Rule 115, §1(f) of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure which states that, in all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall have the right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses
against him. 27 The cross-examination of a witness is essential to test his or
her credibility, expose falsehoods or half-truths, uncover the truth which
rehearsed direct examination testimonies may successfully suppress, and
demonstrate inconsistencies in substantial matters which create reasonable
doubt as to the guilt of the accused and thus give substance to the
constitutional right of the accused to confront the witnesses against him. 28
The right of the accused to cross-examine a witness is, however, not
without limits but is subject to the rules on the admissibility and relevance of
evidence. Thus, in People v. Zheng Bai Hui, 29 this Court upheld the ruling of
the trial judge disallowing the questions propounded by the accused's
counsel on the ability of the arresting officer to distinguish between tawas
and shabu without a laboratory examination, the academic degree of his
training instructor, and the officer's authorship of books on drug identity and
analysis for being irrelevant, improper, and impertinent.
In this case, accused-appellant's counsel argued that his questions to
Erlanie on the other acts of lasciviousness supposedly committed by
accused-appellant against her were for the purpose of testing her credibility.
There was, however, no showing on his part how these questions had any
bearing on complainant's credibility or on the truth of her claims. One is led
to suspect that the purpose of these questions was to confuse complainant
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com
 into committing mistakes in her answers during cross-examination that
accused-appellant's counsel could later use to possibly put complainant's
credibility, not to mention her character, in question. HcSaTI

Accused-appellant insists that his counsel should have been allowed to

ask questions in relation to the sworn statement executed by complainant.
He cites Rule 132, §17 of the Revised Rules of Evidence which provides that:
When part of an act, declaration, conversation, writing or record
is given in evidence by one party, the whole of the same subject
matter may be inquired into by the other.

Neither can this rule be invoked to justify the questioning of

complainant which the trial court did not allow. As the above provision
states, this rule applies to parts of "an act, declaration, conversation, writing
or record" which is given in evidence.
Indeed, the records show that after Erlanie had finished with her direct
examination on November 25, 1997, the trial judge granted the motion
made by Atty. Anselmo Mangalindan, accused-appellant's private counsel, to
postpone Erlanie Rivera's cross-examination to allow him time to secure
copies of the transcript of stenographic notes of Erlanie's testimony and thus
enable him to fully question complainant. 30 Erlanie was first cross-examined
on December 2, 1997, but several postponements, namely, on January 13,
1998, 31 February 10, 1998, 32 March 12, 1998, 33 March 31, 1998, 34 April 7,
1998, 35 May 12, 1998, 36 May 26, 1998, 37 May 28, 1998, 38 and June 11,
1998, 39 on Erlanie's cross-examination took place because of the failure of
Atty. Mangalindan to appear on the said trial dates. Erlanie's cross-
examination was continued on July 14, 1998 and July 23, 1998. Her cross-
examination by accused-appellant's counsel was thorough and covered
various subjects, such as the nature of the relationship between her parents,
who were present during the execution of her sworn statement, whether the
same had been executed by her voluntarily, the date when she was raped by
accused-appellant, the reason for her delay in reporting the rape committed
by accused-appellant, her understanding of Tagalog, who were with her in
the house at the time of the rape, the details surrounding the rape
committed against her, and her age. It is evident that accused-appellant and
his counsel were given ample opportunity to conduct the cross-examination
of Erlanie Rivera in order to test her truthfulness.
B. The record shows that because accused-appellant's private
counsel was not present when Dr. Barin testified, Atty. Eddie Bansil was
appointed by the trial court as accused-appellant's counsel de oficio for that
particular hearing. Atty. Bansil moved for the postponement of the witness'
cross-examination, but the trial court denied his request because, on the one
hand, accused-appellant was a detention prisoner and Dr. Barin was a very
busy person, while, on the other hand, Atty. Bansil had heard the testimony
of the said witness. Atty. Bansil then decided not to cross-examine Dr. Barin.
40

Accused-appellant now contends that the trial judge denied the motion
of Atty. Bansil for postponement because he was biased against him.
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com
 Accused-appellant claims that the counsel de oficio was not familiar with the
facts of his case and was thus in no position to cross-examine Dr. Barin.
While the Constitution recognizes the accused's right to competent and
independent counsel of his own choice, his option to secure the services of a
private counsel is not absolute. For considering the State's and the offended
party's right to speedy and adequate justice, the court may restrict the
accused's option to retain a private counsel if the accused insists on an
attorney he cannot afford, or if the chosen counsel is not a member of the
bar, or if the attorney declines to represent the accused for a valid reason. 41
The trial court appointed Atty. Bansil a counsel de oficio to represent
accused-appellant on October 6, 1998 because his regular counsel, Atty.
Anselmo Mangalindan, was absent without any explanation. Atty.
Mangalindan had previously been granted several postponements. As this
Court ruled in another case:
. . . Courts are not required to wait indefinitely the pleasure and
convenience of the accused as they are also mandated to promote the
speedy and orderly administration of justice. Nor should they
countenance such an obvious trifling with the rules. Indeed, public
policy requires that the trial continue as scheduled, considering that
appellant was adequately represented by counsels who were not
shown to be negligent, incompetent or otherwise unable to represent
him. 42

Atty. Bansil was present and heard the testimony of Dr. Barin, the
prosecution witness, on that day. Dr. Barin's testimony on direct examination
was simple, containing primarily a discussion of her findings on the hymenal
laceration sustained by complainant. Her testimony did not require
considerable study and extraordinary preparation on the part of defense
counsel for the purpose of cross-examination. It seems Atty. Bansil no longer
found it necessary to cross-examine Dr. Barin.
Moreover, beyond stating that Dr. Barin was a vital witness, accused-
appellant has not indicated what questions his counsel wanted to ask from
Dr. Barin. It may well be that these questions do not exist at all and that the
importance given by accused-appellant to counsel de oficio's failure to cross-
examine the witness is exaggerated. Indeed, a medical examination of the
victim, together with the medical certificate, is merely corroborative and is
not an indispensable element of rape. 43 The primordial issue in this case
remains to be whether the complainant's testimony, not Dr. Barin's,
established beyond reasonable doubt the crime of rape. TcHCDE

C. Accused-appellant likewise points to the trial judge's questions

propounded to him during his cross-examination as an indication of the
latter's partiality for the prosecution.
We find no merit in this contention. Where the trial court is judge both
of the law and of the facts, it is oftentimes necessary in the due and faithful
administration of justice for the presiding judge to re-examine a witness so
that his judgment, when rendered, may rest upon a full and clear
understanding of the facts. 44 Our reading of the transcript of stenographic
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com
 notes in this case shows that the trial judge merely wanted to clarify certain
points relating to the defense of accused-appellant and not to establish his
guilt. It is a judge's prerogative to ask questions to ferret out the truth. 45 It
cannot be taken against him if the questions he propounds reveals certain
truths which, in turn, tend to destroy the theory of one party. 46 As this Court
held:
In any case, a severe examination by a trial judge of some of the
witness for the defense in an effort to develop the truth and to get at
the real facts affords no justification for a charge that he has assisted
the prosecution with an evident desire to secure a conviction, or that
he had intimidated the witnesses for the defense. The trial judge must
be accorded a reasonable leeway in putting such questions to
witnesses as may be essential to elicit relevant facts to make the
record speak the truth. Trial judges in this jurisdiction are judges of
both the law and the facts, and they would be negligent in the
performance of their duties if they permitted a miscarriage of justice as
a result of a failure to propound a proper question to a witness which
might develop some material bearing upon the outcome. In the
exercise of sound discretion, he may put such question to the witness
as will enable him to formulate a sound opinion as to the ability or the
willingness of the witness to tell the truth. A judge may examine or
cross-examine a witness. He may propound clarificatory questions to
test the credibility of the witness and to extract the truth. He may seek
to draw out relevant and material testimony though that testimony
may tend to support or rebut the position taken by one or the other
party. . . 47

D. We also find no merit in accused-appellant's argument that he

was denied due process considering the speed with which the trial court
rendered judgment against him, which judgment was promulgated one day
after he filed his memorandum. EScAID

The decision rendered by the trial court gives a clear account of the
facts and the law on which it is based. It discusses in full the court's findings
on the credibility of both the prosecution and defense witnesses and its
evaluation of the evidence of both parties. What we said in the analogous
case of People v. Mercado 48 applies to this case:
. . . A review of the trial court's decision shows that its findings
were based on the records of this case and the transcripts of
stenographic notes during the trial. The speed with which the trial
court disposed of the case cannot thus be attributed to the injudicious
performance of its function. Indeed, a judge is not supposed to study a
case only after all the pertinent pleadings have been filed. It is a mark
of diligence and devotion to duty that a judge studies a case long
before the deadline set for the promulgation of his decision has arrived.
The one-day period between the filing of accused-appellants'
memorandum and the promulgation of the decision was sufficient time
to consider their arguments and to incorporate these in the decision.
As long as the trial judge does not sacrifice the orderly administration
of justice in favor of a speedy but reckless disposition of a case, he
cannot be taken to task for rendering his decision with due dispatch. . .
ECcaDT

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com

 II. Coming now to the merits of this case, we find that the evidence
proves beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of accused-appellant. In reviewing
rape cases, we have been guided by the following principles: (a) An
accusation for rape is easy to make, difficult to prove, and even more
difficult to disprove; (b) In view of the intrinsic nature of the crime, the
testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and
(c) The evidence for the prosecution must stand on its own merits and
cannot draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense. 49
A. Well-settled is the rule that the lone testimony of a rape victim,
by itself, is sufficient to warrant a judgment of conviction if found to be
credible. It has likewise been established that when a woman declares that
she has been raped she says in effect all that is necessary to mean that she
has been raped, and where her testimony passes the test of credibility the
accused can be convicted on the basis thereof. This is because from the
nature of the offense, the sole evidence that can usually be offered to
establish the guilt of the accused is the complainant's testimony. 50
Considering complainant's tender age, her shy demeanor, and manner
of testifying in court, the trial court found Erlanie's testimony to be
straightforward, natural, and convincing and accorded the same full faith
and credit. 51
Complainant told the court how she was awakened because accused-
appellant kissed her and fondled her breasts. She narrated that she tried to
resist accused-appellant's advances by pushing and kicking him, but the
latter succeeded in ravishing her. She told of how her father threatened to
kill her mother and her siblings if she reported the incident. Despite the
lengthy cross-examination of accused-appellant's counsel, she remained firm
and steadfast in her story of how she was raped by her father. Her narration
not only rings true and sincere but is consistent and unshaken on its material
points. Complainant's testimony is fully corroborated by the medical findings
of Dr. Barin who examined complainant shortly after she had been raped.
She found complainant to have suffered a hymenal laceration at the 3
o'clock position which could have been caused by the penetration of a hard
object, such as a male organ.
Complainant's failure to remember the date of the commission of the
rape cannot be taken against her. The exact date when complainant was
sexually abused is not an essential element of the crime of rape. 52 Nor does
the fact that complainant was sleeping beside her sister when the rape
occurred detract from her credibility. The possibility of rape is not negated
by the fact that the presence of even the whole family of the accused inside
the same room produced the possibility of discovery. For rape to be
committed, it is not necessary for the place to be ideal, for rapists respect
neither time nor place for carrying out their evil designs. 53
In sum, accused-appellant failed to show any reason why this Court
should disbelieve complainant's testimony. Indeed, the gravity of filing a
case for incestuous rape is of such a nature that a daughter's accusation
must be taken seriously. It is against human experience for a girl to
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com
 fabricate a story which would drag herself and her family to a lifetime of
dishonor, unless it is the truth. More so when her charge could mean the
execution of her own father, as in this case. 54
Accused-appellant's counsel on cross-examination made much of the
discrepancy between complainant's sworn statement where she stated that
accused-appellant slept beside her mother after the rape 55 and her
testimony that her mother returned home from the hospital only the day
after the rape took place. 56 It must be pointed out, however, that
discrepancies between a witness' affidavit and his testimony in open court
does not necessarily impair his credibility. Affidavits, which are taken ex
parte, are often incomplete or inaccurate for lack of or absence of searching
inquiries by the investigating officer. 57
Moreover, whether accused-appellant slept alone or with complainant's
mother after committing the rape of complainant is of no moment as it is a
minor point that does not reflect on the commission of the crime itself. The
rule is that discrepancies and inconsistencies on minor matters neither
impair the essential integrity of the prosecution evidence as a whole nor
reflect on the witness' honesty. Such inconsistencies may in fact strengthen
rather than weaken the credibility of the witness as they erase any suspicion
of rehearsed testimony. 58
Accused-appellant contends that complainant could not have been
raped on March 1 or 2, 1997, the dates when her sister Zaira was
hospitalized, because she had her last menstrual period on March 3, 1998
and thus she could not have gotten pregnant as a result of the rape. He
argues that a woman who had her monthly period cannot be impregnated as
a result of sexual intercourse five days before or five days after her last
menstruation. 59
Accused-appellant does not, however, cite any legal or medical
authority for his thesis, except what he claims to be common knowledge. On
the other hand, we have previously held that it is hard to ascertain the exact
date of fertilization inasmuch as more than two weeks is considered to be
the life span of the spermatozoa in the vaginal canal. 60 Hence, even
granting that complainant could not have been impregnated by accused-
appellant during the period alleged by him, it remains possible for
complainant to have gotten pregnant afterwards. More importantly, it must
be emphasized that pregnancy is not an element of the crime of rape and is,
therefore, totally immaterial to the question of accused-appellant's guilt. 61
In other words, accused-appellant being the cause of complainant's
pregnancy is a non-issue in the prosecution of the crime of rape. What
should not be lost sight of is the fact that complainant's testimony
constitutes proof beyond reasonable doubt that accused-appellant had
carnal knowledge of her without her consent, and such fully established the
crime of rape.
B. Accused-appellant imputes ill motive on the part of
complainant's mother and her relatives for bringing charges against him. He
claims that complainant's mother resented the fact that he used to beat her
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com
 up out of jealousy and that he had several paramours in the past. He further
asserts that his wife's relatives were angry with him because of the land
which he caused to be registered in his name to the prejudice of the latter.
This allegation is without merit. Accused-appellant makes it appear
that complainant's mother was responsible for the filing of this case against
him. This is not so. For that matter, his wife did not testify against him. It
was his daughter, complainant, alone who denounced him in court.
Accused-appellant's claim that the motivation for the filing of this case
was the animosity of his wife's relatives towards him caused by his land-
grabbing of their land is likewise without any basis. It may be that his wife's
relatives took advantage of his incarceration and made him sign his waiver
of rights over the land. 62 But this does not necessarily mean they conspired
to persecute him. It is noteworthy that accused-appellant never claimed that
the document which he signed (Exh. 3) existed before the filing of the
criminal complaint against him or that his wife's relatives fabricated the
charge against him because of his failure to sign the same. CIDaTc

Indeed, what accused-appellant's defense cannot explain is the

hymenal laceration sustained by complainant or the steadfastness she has
exhibited in pursuing the charge against her own father. It is doubtful that
complainant would let herself be embroiled in a petty family dispute in
exchange for her honor and dignity. We cannot believe that a young girl, like
complainant, would invent a sordid tale of sexual abuse by accused-
appellant unless it was the truth. 63 Where there is no evidence to show a
doubtful reason or improper motive why a prosecution witness should testify
against the accused or falsely implicate him in a crime, her testimony is
trustworthy. 64
Accused-appellant also raises the defense of denial and alibi. But the
bare denial of accused-appellant cannot overcome the positive declarations
of complainant. Denial, when unsubstantiated by clear and convincing
evidence, constitutes negative self-serving evidence which deserves no
greater evidentiary value than the testimony of a credible witness who
testified on affirmative matters. 65
Accused-appellant's sister, Concepcion Sayo, testified that accused-
appellant lived with her family in Bulacan at the time of the rape. No other
witness not related to accused-appellant, however, was called to corroborate
her claim. We have already held that the defense of alibi cannot prosper if it
is established mainly by the accused and his relatives, and not by credible
persons. It is not improbable that these witnesses would freely perjure
themselves for the sake of their loved ones. 66 Accused-appellant's defense
thus fails to convince this Court.
C. The foregoing discussion notwithstanding, we think that the
imposition of the death penalty by the trial court is erroneous. It is settled
that to justify the imposition of the death penalty, both the relationship of
the victim and her age must be alleged and proved. 67 Thus, in People v.
Javier, 68 where the victim was alleged to be 16 years old at the time of the
commission of the rapes, it was held:
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com
 . . . Although the victim's age was not contested by the defense,
proof of age of the victim is particularly necessary in this case
considering that the victim's age which was then 16 years old is just
two years less than the majority age of 18. In this age of modernism,
there is hardly any difference between a 16-year old girl and an 18-
year old one insofar as physical features and attributes are concerned.
A physically developed 16-year old lass may be mistaken for an 18-
year old young woman, in the same manner that a frail and young-
looking 18-year old lady may pass as a 16-year old minor. Thus, it is in
this context that independent proof of the actual age of a rape victim
becomes vital and essential so as to remove an iota of doubt that the
victim is indeed under 18 years of age as to fall under the qualifying
circumstances enumerated in Republic Act No. 7659. In a criminal
prosecution especially of cases involving the extreme penalty of death,
nothing but proof beyond reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to
constitute the crime with which an accused is charged must be
established by the prosecution in order for said penalty to be upheld.

A duly certified certificate of live birth showing complainant's age, or

some other official document on record, such as a school record, has been
recognized as competent evidence. 69
In this case, although complainant's minority has been alleged in the
information, no independent evidence was presented by the prosecution to
prove the same. Complainant did not even state her age at the time of the
rape during direct examination; it was only during her cross-examination
when she stated that she was 12 years old at the time she was raped by her
father. 70
Nor was her birth certificate or baptismal certificate or any school
record presented by the prosecution to prove the age of Erlanie at the time
of the rape. Not even her mother, whose testimony could have been
sufficient to prove the age of complainant, 71 testified in this case. What was
relied upon by the trial court was that fact that the age of the victim was
undisputed by the defense. 72 It also took judicial notice of the victim's
minority on account of her appearance. 73
We do not agree with this conclusion. The trial court can only take
judicial notice of the victim's minority when the latter is, for example, 10
years old or below. Otherwise, the prosecution has the burden of proving the
victim's age at the time of the rape and the absence of denial on the part of
accused-appellant does not excuse the prosecution from discharging its
burden. 74 In a similar case, People v. Tundag 75 in which the trial court took
judicial notice of the minority of the victim who was alleged to be 13 years
old, we ruled:
In this case, judicial notice of the age of the victim is improper,
despite the defense counsel's admission, thereof acceding to the
prosecution's motion. As required by Section 3 of Rule 129, as to any
other matters such as age, a hearing is required before courts can take
judicial notice of such fact. Generally, the age of the victim may be
proven by the birth or baptismal certificate of the victim, or in the
absence thereof, upon showing that said documents were lost or
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com
 destroyed, by other documentary or oral evidence sufficient for the
purpose. ASEIDH

The prosecution having failed to present evidence as to complainant's

age, accused-appellant can be convicted only of simple rape, for which the
penalty is reclusion perpetua.
Consequently, the award of civil indemnity in the amount of
P75,000.00 made by the trial court cannot be sustained. Such amount can
only be awarded if the crime of rape was effectively qualified by any of the
circumstances under which the death penalty is authorized by the applicable
amendatory laws. 76 Accordingly, the civil indemnity awarded to complainant
must be reduced to P50,000.00 in consonance with current rulings. 77
The award of moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 to
complainant is correct. Moral damages is awarded in rape cases without
need of showing that the victim suffered from mental, physical, and
psychological trauma as these are too obvious to require recital by the
victim during trial. 78
In addition to the damages given by the trial court, exemplary
damages in the amount of P25,000.00 should likewise be awarded in favor of
complainant. Accused-appellant being the father of complainant, such
relationship can be appreciated as a generic aggravating circumstance
warranting the award of exemplary damages. In rapes committed by fathers
against their daughters, such award may be imposed to serve as a deterrent
to other parents similarly disposed to commit the same crime. 79
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 49,
Guagua, Pampanga, finding accused-appellant guilty of the crime of rape is
AFFIRMED with the modification that accused-appellant is sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay complainant Erlanie
Rivera the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral
damages, and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages. aTHCSE

SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Quisumbing, Pardo, Gonzaga-Reyes,
Ynares-Santiago and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Melo, Panganiban and Buena, JJ., are abroad on official
business.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J., is on leave.

Footnotes
1. Per Judge Rogelio C. Gonzales.

2. Records, p. 2.
3. Id., p. 15
4. Also referred to as Shaira.

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com

 5. TSN, pp. 4-14, Nov. 4, 1997.
6. TSN, pp. 2-3, Nov. 25, 1997.

7. TSN, pp. 2-10, Dec. 2, 1997.

8. TSN, pp. 4-10, July 14, 1998.
9. TSN, pp. 2-16, July 23, 1998.

10. TSN, pp. 2-6, Aug. 27, 1998.

11. TSN, pp. 3-6, Sept. 3, 1998.
12. Exh. C.

13. TSN, pp. 3-10, Oct. 6, 1998.

14. TSN, pp. 2-15, Oct. 29, 1998.
15. Exh. 2.
16. Exh. 3.

17. TSN, pp. 4-7, Feb. 11, 1997.

18. TSN, pp. 3-5, March 30, 1999.
19. TSN, pp. 3-6, April 29, 1999.

20. Exh. 4.
21. Decision, p. 11; Records, p. 142.
22. Brief for the Accused-Appellant, p. 1; Rollo , p. 54.

23. People v. Santocildes, Jr., 321 SCRA 310 (1999).

24. TSN, pp. 5-8, Dec. 2, 1997.
25. Records, pp. 26-27.
26. Records, p. 30.

27. People v. Suplito, 314 SCRA 493 (1999).

28. People v. Nadera, Jr., 324 SCRA 490 (2000).
29. G.R. No. 127580, Aug. 22, 2000.

30. TSN, pp. 3-4, Nov. 25, 1997.

31. Id., p. 30.
32. Id., p. 32.
33. Id., p. 37.
34. Id., p. 42.
35. Id., p. 47.
36. Id., pp. 56-57.
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com
 37. Id., p. 58.
38. Id., pp. 59-60.
39. Id., p. 65.
40. TSN, p. 11, Oct. 6, 1998.

41. People v. Serzo, Jr., 274 SCRA 553 (1997).

42. Id., p. 568.
43. People v. Segui , G.R. Nos. 131532-34, Nov. 28, 2000.
44. People v. Aquino , 314 SCRA 543 (1999) citing People v. Manalo , 148 SCRA
98 (1987).

45. People v. Cabiles, G.R. No. 125005, Oct. 3, 2000.

46. People v. Docena , 322 SCRA 820 (2000) citing People v. Edualino, 271
SCRA 189 (1997).
47. People v. Zheng Bai Hui, supra.
48. G.R. No. 116239, Nov. 29, 2000.

49. People v. De Guzman, G.R. No. 124368, June 8, 2000.

50. People v. Aloro , G.R. No. 129208, Sept. 14, 2000.
51. Decision, pp. 4-5; Records, pp. 135-136.

52. People v. Garcia , G.R. No. 117406, Jan. 16, 2001.

53. People v. Watimar, G.R. Nos. 121651-52, Aug. 16, 2000 citing People v.
Antonio, G.R. No. 122473, June 8, 2000.
54. People v. Elpedes , G.R. Nos. 137106-07, Jan. 31, 2001.
55. Exh. C; Exh. 1.
56. TSN, p. 10, Nov. 4, 1997.
57. People v. Perez, 319 SCRA 622 (1999).
58. People v. Villanueva, G.R. No. 135330, Aug. 31, 2000.
59. Brief for the Accused-Appellant, pp. 9-10; Rollo , pp. 62-63.
60. People v. Sta. Ana, 291 SCRA 188 (1998).
61. Id. See also People v. Perez, 307 SCRA 276 (1999) and People v. Adora, 275
SCRA 441 (1997).

62. Exh. 3.
63. People v. Segui, supra .
64. People v. Aloro, supra .
65. People v. Quilatan , G.R. No. 132725, Sept. 28, 2000.

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com

 66. People v. Gopio , G.R. No. 133925, Nov. 29, 2000.
67. People v. Francisco , G.R. Nos. 134566-67, Jan. 22, 2001.
68. 311 SCRA 122, 140-141 (1999).
69. People v. Marquez , G.R. Nos. 137408-10, Dec. 8, 2000.
70. TSN, p. 12, July 23, 1998.
71. People v. Dela Cruz, G.R. Nos. 131167-68 Aug. 23, 2000.
72. Decision, p. 10; records, p. 141.

73. Id., p. 4; id., p. 135.

74. People v. Tipay , 329 SCRA 52 (2000); People v. Cula , 329 SCRA 101 (2000).
75. G.R. Nos. 135695-96, Oct. 12, 2000.

76. People v. Rafales , 323 SCRA 13 (2000).

77. People v. Lomibao, G.R. No. 135855, Aug. 3, 2000; People v. Mendez, G.R.
No. 132546, July 5, 2000.
78. People v. Docena, supra.
79. People v. Lopez , G.R. Nos. 135671-72, Nov. 29, 2000; People v. Tundag,
supra.

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com