FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 116128. July 12, 1996]

ALLIED BANKING CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS

COMMISSION, HON. JOSE G. DE VERA, ALLIED BANKING EMPLOYEES UNION NUBE,
TOMAS GONZALO, CRISANTO BALISI, NORBERTO AGUJA, BENITO BARRERA,
HERNANIE SISON, MAYNARD CUENCA, VICTOR M. ALVARES, INOCENCIO SALVADOR,
LUISITO MENDOZA, ARTURO VILLANUEVA, PEDRO PASCUAL, TAGGERT ABASTILLAS,
ALICIA ABILLE, NIDA ABUTAN, TONY ACIBAR, DAISY ADRIANO, ANDREA JOCELYN
AGUDO, ERLINDA AGUS, SONNY ALAYON, NESTOR ALCARION, RAUL ALIGAEN, EDWIN
AMORANTO, BUENERJES M. ANTE, LUISITO ARELLANO, CARLO ARRANZAMENDEZ,
ALVIN ARROCO, JOSEFINA AVILLANOSA, SUSAN BALLESTERE, TEODORO BANATCILA,
EDUARDO BANIS, NOEL BARCENAS, MAGTANGGOL BAWAL, RODRIGO BEGINO,
BENJIE C.S. BETRAN, VIRGILIO BRILLANTES, JOSE BUFI, APOLONIO BURLAZA,
EDUARDO CABALU, REYNALDO CALAROZA, WALFRIDO CALCABIN, EDUARDO
CALCES, LORENZO CALVELO, JR., EDUARDO CANIZARES, ROY CASIDO, ANGELITO
CASTRO, SALLY CASTRO, ARTHUR CASTROGERES, EDNA CEOCO, SUSAN CHAN,
ANNE CHUA, LETTY CHUA, RODALIA CHUA, CARLOS CHUNG, RASAURO CLERIGO,
MARY ANN CO, DELIA CONDE, AVELINO CONDERO, MAXIMO CORNEJO, JR., CHARLIE
CORPUZ, CYMBELINE CRUZ, JUDITH DE LA CRUZ, VENERANDO CUI, ADRIANO
CUTINES, JR., ED DAGUMAN, MARIE PAZ DAGUMAN, EDUARDO DAYAO, JESUS DAYAO,
WENCESLAO DIMO-OS, ROGELIO EDORA, LOLITA EL FANTE, ABELARDO EUGENIO,
JAIME FERRER, REYNALDO FERRERI, ROMEO T. FLORENTINO, JOY R. FLORES,
ROBERTINO FUCOY, BUENAVENTURA GABITAN, JOSE GACO, JR., RAUL GALSIM, RAUL
GONZALES, OSCAR CORDULA, CARMELITA GULAPA, OPHELIA DE GUZMAN, ROGER
HAO, BALAGTAS HERNANDEZ, GERARDO ILANO, ALAN DE JESUS, JAIME JIMENA,
CONNIE DE JOYA, HECTOR JULIANO, ALFREDO LEGASPI, DANILO DE LEON, ARMANDO
LIM, ANGELITA LOPEZ, ROEL LOPEZ, CAROL MABUGAT, ERWIN MACALINO, RAUL
MACATANGAY, CATALINO MACLANG, MANUEL C. MADERAZO, REGINALD MALAPIT,
MENARDO P. MALATE, GILBERT MANAOIS, TONY MANAOIS, JAIME MANIPIS, EDGAR
MARCELO, AMELITA MARCO, ABELARDO MARIANO, JANE MINA MARQUEZ, JULINO
MARQUEZ, RUBEN MEDINA, ERNESTO MENDOZA, NORBEN MENDOZA, BELINDA
MIRANDA, LUCILLE MONTILLA, MARY ANN MUEDA, LOURDES MUGAR, DINDO
NEMIADA, RENE NG, EDGARDO NICASIO, RODEL NUNEZ, ROLANDO OCAMPO, IRENE
OCOS, ALEX OLAES, JOSEFINA ONA, AMADO F. ONG, GERSON OZARAGA, ROSALEO
PACIBE, ANGELINO PALAO, MARIO PAPA, ELIZABETH PARUNGGAO, LILIBETH PAYPON,
ERNESTINA PELAEZ, ALFREDO DEL PILAR, ELPIDIO PINEDA, MA. LOURDES PLANA,
BLESIDA POBLETE, REMEDIOS POLINTA, AGUSTIN QUILLA, JOSEFINO RAMIREZ, ANA
ROBERTA RAMOS, ALFREDO RAYMUNDO, ROWENA REBOSA, CRISPINA REMIGIO,
EPITANIO REYES, JR., SONIA REYES, VICTORINO REYES, ANTONIO REQUEPO, TOMAS
RUBIALES, ANGELITA SACLOLO, OSCAR SAGGE, ROMEO SALTING, NICANOR SAYSON,
CARLOS SANCHEZ, DEXTER SANCHEZ, ELOIS SAN MATEO, ALBERT SANTIAGO,
CARMEN DE LOS SANTOS, ROMEO SIMAN, HELEN T. SIY, NOEL SOLIS, GENESIS
SORIANO, TERESITA SY, EVANGELINE SAULOG, JUANITO SULLERA, AMELOU TAN,
EVELYN TAN, GENE TAN, NANCY TAN, ROSALINO P. TAN, EMILIO TARROSA, JR.,
EDUARDO TOLENTINO, RUFINO TRINIDAD, JR., ARACELI UY, ALEXANDER
VALENZUELA, PRISCILA VELARDE, REUEL VELARDE, AUDIE VELASCO, WINSTON
VELASCO, LUISITO VENGCO, GRACE VICTORIA, IMELDA VILLAR, MA. CORAZON
VILLEGAS, JOSE VILLAMOR, ESTRELLA VILLAREAL, MA. VERONICA VILLARICA, ABE
VILLARINO, FE YAP, RAMON ZAFRA, MELY ABANO, ELLEN ABRIOL, GIL AJAS, VIRGILIO
ALCORIZA, FRANCISCO AQUINO, AUDREY ANN ARMENDI, FILIPINAS BOLLER,
ROZIELO CALIWAGAN, MARIE LIAN CEMBRANO, ZERALDA CHAN, MARY ANTONETTE
CHU, VEDASTO DE CLARO, ARNOLD COLLANTES, REYNALDO CRISTAL, RAMON
DIOLAZO, PROCESO DUJUNCO, ANTONIO ENDERIZ, FLORIAN ENRIQUEZ, ERNESTO
ESBER, MARLENE GENEVIEVE ESQUIVEL, TITA FELIPE, EDILBERTO GALSIM,
RIGOBERTO GARCIA, CLARO GANO, RAYMUNDO GANCIA, SYLVIA GUEVARRA, LAURO
DE GUZMAN, ELENA JABSON, RUBY KUIZON, ENRIQUE LABUSON, ERNESTO LAOANG,
EDUARDO TIAM LEE, AMADO LIM, SUSAN LIM, SHIRLEY LOCSIN, LEONARDO LULU,
MERLE MACARUBBO, CECILIA MAGNO, TERESITA MAHERALNAGH, PERSE-VERANDA
MALLARI, MARIO MARQUEZ, JOYCE ELIZABETH MELENCIO, ROMEO MENDOZA,
SEVERO MORIN, DANILO NATIVIDAD, JANELYN NELSON, MA. TERESA PAMA,
RAMONITA RECUENCO, EDGARDO REGOSO, TEDDY REY, EDITHA REYES, GEORGE
REYES, MA. CECILIA RIVERA, LOURDES ROSALES, ROBERTO SABAULAN, MANUEL
SAN AGUSTIN, MA. CLEOFE SANCHEZ, MARIO SAN GREGORIO, ARTURO SANTERVA,
CARMELITO SANTOS, MEYNARDO SANTOS, LORETA SIA, MA. TERESA SORIANO,
LEOPOLDO TACUGUE, NOEL TEANO, TEDDY TUPAS, NILO URBINA, MARY ANN UY,
CYNTHIA VICTORIA, VICENTE VIDAL, ERNESTO YAP, RUBEN ZARANDIN, TERESITA
ALHAMBRA, EDMUND ARRIOLA, KELLY CALUNGSUD, MA. LAARNI CHING, ELENITA DE
CASTRO, FLORINDA REGOSO, LEOVINO REYES, RICARDO SALVADOR, NICANOR
SAYSON, and GRACE VENERACION, respondents.
[G.R. No. 116461. July 12, 1996]

ROLANDO G. OCAMPO, ROWENA C. REBOSA, DEXTER C. SANCHEZ, ELPIDIO PINEDA,

BALAGTAS HERNANDEZ, ALAN DE JESUS, REYNALDO FERRER, ANGELITO CASTRO,
JOSE VILLAMOR, JR., EVANGELINE SUALOG, LILIBETH PAYPON, GILBERT MANAWIS,
SALLY CASTRO, JOSE BUFI, IMELDA VILAR, JANE MINA MARQUEZ, SUSAN CHAM,
CONNIE DE JOYA, TERESITA SY, SONIA REYES, EVELYN TAN, AMELITA MARCO,
HECTOR JULIANO, JUDITH DELA CRUZ, APOLONIO BURLAZA, ROGELIO EDORA, JAIME
MANIPIS, PRISCILA VELARDE, LOURDES MUGAR, RAUL GONZALES, BLESILDA
POBLETE, ANTONIO RAQUEPO, MARIO PAPA, TONY ACIBAR, VIRGILIO BRILLANTES,
TONY MANAOIS, ELOISA SAN MATEO, MA. LOURDES PLANA, ANGELITA LOPEZ,
ARTHUR CASTRO-GERES, EDGARDO NICASIO, DAISY ADRIANO, JESUS DAYAO,
CARMEN DELOS SANTOS, FE YAP, RUBEN MEDINA, ERNESTO MENDOZA, EDUARDO
CALCES, LUISITO ARELLANO, JOSE GACO, JR., TEODORO BANATICLA, ROEL LOPEZ,
DANILO DE LEON, NOEL SOLIS, GENESIS SORIANO, RUFINO TRINIDAD, JR.,
VICTORINO REYES, MAXIMINO CORNEJO, JR., ALVIN ARROCO, ERWIN MACALINO,
TOMAS RUBIALES, ANGELINO PALAO, EDNA CEOCO, JAIME FERRER, AUDIE VELASCO,
ANGELITA SACLOLO, CAROL RAMOS, AVELINO CORDERO, EPIFANO REYES, JR.,
OPHELIA DE GUZMAN, IRENE OCOS, REGINALD MALAPIT, JOSEFINO RAMIREZ,
ABELARDO MARIANO, RAMON ZARFA, DELIA CONDE, ANNE CHUA, NENA NG,
ESTRELLA VILLAREAL, LETTY CHUA, ANA ROBERTA RAMOS, EDUARDO CABALES,
RODRIGO BEGINO, JAIME GIMENA, GENE TAN, CARLOS CHUNG, WENCESLAO DIMO-
OS, LOLITA ELFANTE, ALICIA ABILLE, ROY CASIDO, LUCILLE MONTILLA, ALFREDO
RAYMUNDO, DINDO NEMIADA, GERARDO ILANO, CARLOS SANCHEZ, AGUSTIN
QUILLA, CHARLIE CORPUZ, WINSTON VELASCO, RODALIA CHUA, ALEXANDER
VALENZUELA, EDGAR MARCELO, ALBERT SANTIAGO, RAUL GALSIM, CARLO
ARRANZAMENDEZ, JOSEFINA ONA, CARMELITA GULAPA, ARACELI UY, CRISPINA
REMIGIO, BELINDA MIRANDA, GRACE VICTORIA, ROMEO SALTING, EDWIN
AMORANTO, ROGER HAO, MA. VERONICA VILLARICA, ALFREDO DEL PILAR,
BUENAVENTURA GABITAN, LUISITO VENGCO, HERSON OZARAGA, SUSAN
BALLESTEROS, RAMONITA RECUENCO, ABE VILLARINO, RODEL NUNEZ, ALFRED
LEGASPI, RAUL MACATANGAY, REYNALDO CALAROZA, ADRIANO CUTINES, JR.,
EDGARDO DAYAO, LORENZO CALVELO, JR., NESTOR ALCARION, EDUARDO
CANIZARES, REFUNIO MARQUEZ, NIDA ABUTAN, RAMON DIOLAZO, NORBEN
MENDOZA, ROMEO SIMAN, CYMBELINE CRUZ, ROSALEO PACIBE, ABELARDO
EUGENIO, MARY ANN CO, ANDREA JOCELYN AGUDO, EMILIO TARROSA, JR., TAGGERT
ABASTILLAS, RAUL ALIGAEN, CAROL MABUGAT, ERNESTINA PELAEZ, ROBERTINO
FUCOY, MARY ANN MUEDA, CATALINO MACLANG, REMEDIOS POLINTAN, NICANOR
SAYSON, NANCY TAN, JUANITO SULLERA, AMELOU TAN, SONNY ALAYON, WALFRIDO
CALCABIN, VENERANDO CUI, OSCAR GORDULA, ROSAURO CLERIGO, MAGTANGGOL
BAWAL, HELEN SIY, ELIZABETH PARUNGAO, REUEL VELARDE, NOEL BARCENAS,
petitioners, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and ALLIED BANKING
CORPORATION, respondents.
DECISION
HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:

For review in these consolidated petitions is the Decision, dated May 20, 1994, of
the National Labor Relations Commission as well as its Order, dated July 8, 1994, in
NLRC NCR Case No. 004005-92 and NLRC NCR Case No. 00316-92.

In its petition,[1]1 Docketed as G.R. No. 116128.1 the Bank questions the latter
portion of the decision of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) wherein it
remanded to the Labor Arbiter the issue of whether or not the forty-one (41)
respondents are entitled to back wages corresponding to the period that they
should have been reinstated since 1986, pursuant to the guideline stated in our
Resolution, dated May 4, 1988.

Respondents, on the other hand, contend in their petition[2]2 Docketed as G.R. No.
116461.2 that the NLRC gravely abused its discretion in affirming the validity of
their dismissal by the Bank.
The dispute between petitioner and respondent Union started when their collective
bargaining agreement which was to expire on June 30, 1984 came up for renewal.
They failed to reach an amicable settlement particularly on the wage increase issue.
Respondent Union thereupon filed a notice of strike with the Bureau of Labor
Relations.

On December 16, 1984, then Minister of Labor and Employment, Blas Ople assumed
jurisdiction over the dispute pursuant to Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code of the
Philippines, as amended. The orders enjoined the Union from declaring a strike and
the management from effecting a lock out.[3]3 G.R. No. 116128, Rollo, p. 91.3 The
orders notwithstanding, respondent Union nevertheless filed on December 20, 1984,
a report on the results of the strike vote that it earlier conducted. On January 3,
1985, respondent Union staged a strike upon the Union president's contention that
the Labor Minister's assumption order was a mere scrap of paper.

On January 4, 1985, petitioner filed with the Ministry of Labor and Employment a
Manifestation and Urgent Motion praying for a return-to-work order. On January 6,
1985, Minister Ople granted the motion and issued a return-to-work order which
included a P1,000.00 grant per employee chargeable to future CBA benefits.

In an Order, issued on January 18, 1985, Minister Ople directed the parties to
continue negotiations until January 31, 1985; otherwise, if no compromise
agreement is reached, he will personally resolve the bargaining deadlock.

The parties failed to break the deadlock and so, Minister Ople issued an Order,
dated January 31, 1985, directing them to incorporate in their collective agreement
the awards granted.[4]4 G.R. No. 116128, Rollo, pp. 95-99.4

On February 11, 1985, "certain members of the Union resumed the strike and, on
the following day, acts of violence were committed x x x resulting in the filing of
criminal charges against some of the strikers."[5]5 Record, p. 507.5 Petitioner
identified these "certain members of the Union," numbering 271, the respondents
included.

Petitioner, through notices published in the Bulletin Today, the Times Journal, and
the Daily Express, directed the striking employees to return to work not later than
1:00 p.m. of February 13, 1985.
In spite of these notices, respondents failed to report for work on the stated
deadline. Respondents explained that the resumption of their picketing activities
was brought about by their belief that Minister Ople's decision, dated January 31,
1985, was not based on justice, equity and reason.

Private respondents' posture of intransigence caused petitioner to issue notices of

their termination.

Meeting the Union demands halfway, Minister Ople, on March 7, 1985, issued a
Resolution modifying his January 31, 1985 Order and so the union lifted its picket
lines and notified petitioner, on March 11, 1985, that the striking employees were
returning back to work. Petitioner refused to accept them back on the ground that
the strikers have already been dismissed for abandonment of work when they failed
to obey the assumption order.

In order to quell further dispute, Minister Ople, on June 5, 1985, issued an Order
which directed the bank to reinstate provisionally all striking workers except (a)
those who have already accepted their separation pay; (b) officers of the union; and
(c) those with pending criminal charges.

The Union then filed with us a petition for certiorari, with a prayer for the issuance
of a preliminary mandatory injunction, docketed as G.R. No. 71239. In the said
petition, the union asked that the June 5, 1985 Order of Minister Ople be modified to
likewise direct the reinstatement of all union officers, employees with pending
criminal cases and employees who have received their separation pay with full back
wages, emergency cost of living allowance (ECOLA) and employee benefits counted
from March 8, 1985 until actually reinstated. In a Resolution, dated June 18, 1986,
we remanded the petition to the Ministry of Labor and Employment, with the
instruction to resolve all pending factual and legal issues relative to the petition.

On August 29, 1986, Minister Augusto Sanchez, the successor of Minister Ople,
modified the last Order of the latter by ordering the reinstatement of all striking
employees, except those who have already accepted their separation pay. The
bank, as a consequence, filed a petition with the Supreme Court, docketed as G.R.
No. 75749, to nullify the aforesaid Order.

In amplification of our Resolution of September 15, 1986, we issued in G.R. No.

75749 the following Resolution, dated May 4, 1988:
"In a resolution dated September 15, 1986 in G.R. No. 75749, the Court issued 'a
Temporary Restraining Order' enjoining enforcement of the August 29, 1986 order of
the Minister of Labor and Employment only insofar as it directs the payment of back
wages, allowances, and other benefits due to the private respondents effective
March 11, 1985 until their actual reinstatement. Considering, however, the financial
plight of some of the private respondents, the Court further Resolved to order the
petitioner to advance the equivalent of two (2) months salary to each of the private
respondents entitled to reinstatement under the MOLE order, said amount to be
repaid to the petitioner or charged to accumulated back wages depending on the
final outcome of this case' (p. 64, Rollo). A motion for clarification of this Resolution
filed by the Bank was denied.

In view of the above-mentioned resolution, Minister Sanchez' order to reinstate back

to work all striking employees except those who have accepted separation pay was
ordered implemented."[6]6 G.R. No. 116128, Rollo, p. 44.6

It appears that the problem of reinstating striking employees except those who had
accepted separation pay was reduced a bit when 71 of 112 affected employees
were additionally reinstated. Thus, only 41 among the individual respondents were
not reinstated.

In our Resolution dated May 4, 1988 we observed that:

"The individual private respondents in G.R. No. 75749 have filed motions to cite in
contempt the Bank for violation of the Court's Resolution ordering the
implementation of the reinstatement order of Minister Sanchez. They alleged that
they were 'forced to file the Motions to expose and protest the unabating display of
bad faith on the part of the Bank in effecting their reinstatement. (p. 400, Rollo in
74749)."

We did not act favorably upon private respondents' "motion to cite in contempt the
bank for violation of the court's Resolution ordering the implementation of the
reinstatement order of Minister Sanchez." Instead, we dismissed said petitions of
the union and the individual respondents in G.R. No. 71239, and the Bank's petition
in G.R. No. 71239, and in G.R. No. 75749; and remanded them to the Department of
Labor and Employment and its pertinent agencies for further proceedings as stated
in our resolution, to wit:
"A thorough review of the voluminous records of these two petitions shows that
unresolved factual issues prevent a final solution to the individual respondents' and
the Bank's problems.

First, whether or not the strikes staged by the Union and the individual respondents
are legal remains unresolved. This question has been pending before the Arbitration
Branch of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) even before the filing of
the two petitions.

In his order dated August 29, 1986, Minister Sanchez ordered reinstatement
pending the final outcome of the petition initiated by the Bank to declare the strike
illegal. The reinstatement is, therefore, provisional. A permanent reinstatement will
depend on the legality or illegality of the strike.

Second, the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) or the NLRC must also
look into the roles played by the individual respondents should the strike be
declared illegal.

Third, in this Court's June 18, 1986 resolution, the respondent Minister was ordered
to resolve (sic) the certain factual questions, to wit:

There are various factual issues which must first be resolved. Counsel for the
petitioners admits that the petitioners are not authorized by the Allied Bank
Employees Union nor NUBE to speak for the Union or the bargaining unit. Neither
have the petitioners any authority to file a case in behalf of the Union officers and
certain separated employees whom they want this Court to order reinstated. In fact,
there are statements filed by individual petitioners who manifest that they did not
authorize the petition to be filed in their names. Counsel for the petitioners failed to
clarify at the June 18, 1986 hearing how many of the petitioners he really
represents, how many workers have received separation pay, and how many of
these workers have authorized the filling of a case in their behalf. Counsels for the
parties have given this Court conflicting data on positions of terminated personnel
allegedly being filled by new employees and various other factual matters
necessitating the presentation of evidence. It is also rather odd why a petitioner
union affiliated with NUBE and the Trade Union Congress of the Philippines (TUCP) or
its members should be represented in this case by the legal counsel of a rival labor
federation, the Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU).

There is at present pending with the respondent a supplemental motion for partial
reconsideration of the order now challenged in this petition. Counsel for the
petitioner admits that they have not moved in the premises and have not asked the
present Minister of the MOLE whether or not he would reconsider the questioned
order issued by his predecessor. Both parties are agreed that conciliation
proceedings have not terminated and both expressed a willingness to continue the
proceedings. The issue of whether or not the strike which commenced on February
11, 1985 is legal remains pending determination by NLRC and calls for the
presentation of the evidence. The status of the pending criminal case is likewise not
clear. The Assistant Solicitor General who represented MOLE informed the Court that
the respondent Minister had to suspend action on the various matter pending before
him because the petitioners decided to file this petition before allowing the
administrative process to make the initial determination (p. 420, Rollo in G.R. No.
71239).

These questions have not been resolved to date.

And fourth, there are likewise factual matters that have cropped up in G.R. No.
75749 with regards (sic) to which the court has neither the means or (sic) the time
to look into.

The appropriate agencies of DOLE should conduct hearings on the contention of the
bank that it is now impossible to reinstate the remaining 41 respondents inspite
(sic) of its alleged bona fide attempts to find equivalent positions for them and on
the counter-contentions of the individual respondents that there was discrimination
in the reinstatement of their companions, that the contractual employees were
hired to displace them, that the bank employed harassment tactics, and that their
dismissal was summary, arbitrary, and malicious in gross violation of this Court's
twin resolutions on September 17 and 29, 1986.

All the unresolved factual questions call for the presentation of evidence before the
appropriate administrative agency. They cannot be resolved through pleadings or
oral arguments before the Court."[7]7 G.R. No. 116128, Rollo, pp. 46-48.7

xxx xxx xxx

In view of this development, the respondents, including the forty-one (41) individual
respondents, led by Rolando Ocampo, Rowena Rebosa and Alfredo del Pilar, were
not reinstated by the bank.
Subsequently, arbitration of the Bank's petition continued with the issues confined
to these matters, viz:

"(a) whether or not the subject strikes, i.e., one that took place on January 3 and 4,
1985 to March 11, 1985, were illegal; (b) whether or not anyone of the individual
respondents committed illegal acts during the duration of the strikes; (c) whether or
not the individual respondents were illegally dismissed and/or locked out; and (d)
whether or not the respondent-employees are entitled to moral and exemplary
damages."[8]8 Id., Rollo, pp. 49-50.8

After weighing the arguments of both parties, the Arbiter ruled that:

"There is no dispute that under Art. 263, paragraph (g) of the Labor code, as
amended, the assumption by the Secretary of Labor and Employment over a labor
dispute has the automatic effect of enjoining any intended or impending strike or
lockout. When then Minister Blas Ople assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute
between the bank and the union on December 19, 1984, by operation of law, the
intended strike of the respondent union was automatically enjoined. The union
cannot feign ignorance of this legal mandate. It is the law and compliance therewith
cannot be excused on the more convenient excuse of ignorance. Besides, the order
of December 19, 1984 clearly reiterated such legal injunction such that the
respondent union may not now be allowed to assert that it did not violate any law or
order of the lawful authorities when it staged the strike on January 3 and 4, 1985.

An assumption and/or certification order of the Secretary of Labor automatically

results in a return-to-work of all striking workers, whether or not a corresponding
order has been issued by the Secretary of Labor. Once an assumption/certification
order is issued strikers are enjoined, or if one has already taken place, all strikers
shall immediately return to work. A strike that is undertaken despite the issuance by
the Secretary of Labor of an assumption or certification order becomes a prohibited
activity and thus illegal. x x x

Admittedly the respondent union went on strike on January 3 and 4, 1985, barely
sixteen (16) days after then Minister of Labor and Employment Blas Ople assumed
jurisdiction. And while the labor dispute between the parties was still pending before
Minister Blas Ople, another strike was staged on February 11, 1985 which continued
up to March 11, 1985. Being in violation of the provisions of Art. 263, paragraph (g)
of the Labor Code, as amended, as well as the assumption order of December 19,
1984, both strikes are, therefore, illegal and consequently, all union officers,
namely, Tomas Gonzalo, Crisanto Balisi, Norberto Aguja, Benito Barrera, Hernanie
Sison, Meynard Cuenca, Victor Alvares, Inocencio Salvador, Luisito Mendoza, Arturo
Villanueva, and Pedro Pascual, are declared to have lost their employment status.

This Branch does not agree with the respondents' contention that the strike on
January 3 and 4, 1985 was already amicably settled and/or condoned by the bank
when it agreed to accept back to work the striking workers. The bank merely
complied with the return-to-work order of Minister Blas Ople issued on January 6,
1985 but this did not preclude the bank from questioning the legality or illegality of
the said strike.

Nor can this Branch accede to the respondents' assertion that they are merely
acting in self-defense when they resumed their concerted activity on February 11,
1985 allegedly on account of unfair labor practices committed by the bank's
representatives and agents. Regardless of their motives, or the validity of their
claims, the striking workers must cease and/or desist from any and all acts that tend
to or undermine the authority of Secretary of Labor and Employment once an
assumption order is issued. They cannot, for instance, ignore return-to-work orders,
citing unfair labor practices on the part of the company, to justify their actions x x
x"[9]9 G.R. No. 116128, Rollo, pp. 51-52.9

The Labor Arbiter qualified that, under Article 264 (a) of the Labor Code, the
individual respondents other than the union officers can be subjected to dismissal
only in cases where they knowingly participated in the commission of illegal acts
during the strike. Finding that all the individual respondents who were not officers of
the union did not commit the illegal acts complained of, the Labor Arbiter held that
they cannot validly be declared to have lost their employment status.

With regard to the question of whether or not the Bank validly dismissed the
respondents for their failure to obey the return-to-work notices, the Labor Arbiter
held:

"x x x Implicit in the petitioner's argument is that the individual respondents by

their failure to comply with the published return-to-work order are liable for
abandonment of work. Abandonment as a ground for dismissal must be shown to be
deliberate and that the employee involved has shown no more inclination to resume
work. This is not true in the instant case. At the time they were terminated by the
bank, the individual respondents were then on strike, and until the legality or
illegality of the strike is resolved, the petitioner did not have any basis for
terminating the individual respondents' services. Precisely, the primary reason why
the respondents struck was rooted on their conviction that their economic demands
that led to bargaining deadlock were justified. If the respondents through the strike
have shown their eagerness in improving their employment situation, how could
they now be held liable for abandonment. The grounds relied upon by the bank in
terminating the individual respondents being non-existent, perforce such subject
termination must be held to be without just and valid grounds, and consequently,
the individual respondents are entitled to reinstatement with back wages from the
time of their termination until their actual reinstatement."[10]10 G.R. No. 116128,
Rollo, p. 53.10

Hence, the Labor Arbiter's disposition of the case, viz:

"WHEREFORE, all the foregoing premises being considered, judgment is hereby

rendered as follows:

a) Declaring the strikes complained of as illegal and consequently, all union officers,
namely, Tomas Gonzalo, Crisanto Balisi, Norberto Aguja, Benito Barrera, Hernanie
Sison, Meynard Cuenca, Victor Alvarez, Inocencio Salvador, Luisito Mendoza, Arturo
Villanueva, and Pedro Pascual, lost their employment status;

b) Dismissing the petition to declare the strike illegal as against the other individual
respondents;

c) Declaring the dismissal of the abovenamed 163 counter-complainants as illegal

and ordering the petitioner Allied Banking Corporation to pay their aggregate back
wages and other computed benefits in the total sum of P5,049,692.73;

d) Ordering the petitioner Allied Banking Corporation to reinstate the forty-one (41)
counter-complainants led by Rolando Ocampo, Rowena Rebosa and Alfredo del Pilar,
to their former or substantially equivalent position with all the rights, privileges and
benefits appertaining thereto including seniority, and to pay them their backwages
and other computed benefits in the aggregate sum of P3,548,213.80 plus moral and
exemplary damages in the aggregate amount of P615,000.00; and

e) Ordering the petitioner Allied Banking Corporation to pay attorney's fees in the
amount of P921,290.65.[11]11 G.R. No. 116128, Rollo, pp. 54-55.11
On September 29, 1992, the forty-one (41) respondents who were ordered
reinstated filed a "Motion to Issue Partial Writ of Execution." This was granted by the
Labor Arbiter.

On September 30, 1992, petitioner appealed from the decision of the Labor Arbiter.
Respondents, on the other hand, filed, on October 2, 1992, a partial appeal from the
aforesaid decision of the Labor Arbiter praying that the decision be modified: (1) to
reflect in the computation of back wages the actual basic monthly rates of the
individual union members, including the other employees' benefits; (2) to order the
payment of actual, moral, and exemplary damages, including attorney's fees to all
163 dismissed employees; (3) to order the reinstatement of all dismissed 163
employees; and (4) to include "Innocence Salvador "x x x as one of the Union
officers deemed to have lost their employment status."

On October 6, 1992, petitioner filed a motion to quash the writ of execution. This
was denied on November 5, 1992. While the Labor Arbiter's September 4, 1992
decision and his September 30, 1992 writ of execution limited his identification of
those to be reinstated pending appeal to the forty-one (41) complainants led by
Rolando Ocampo, Rowena Rebosa and Alfredo del Pilar, he later on identified all the
respondents to be reinstated in his Order, dated November 5, 1992, rationalizing
that

"This alleged ground cited that other than three (3) individual respondents, namely,
Rolando Ocampo, Alfredo del Pilar and Rowena Rebosa, the thirty-eight (38) others
were not identified, the petitioner-bank cannot feign its lack of awareness as to who
are the thirty-eight (38) other individual respondents considering that the petitioner
itself notified the Supreme Court in its Manifestation/Motion filed on March 7, 1988
that

'2. Since October 7, 1986 to date, petitioner has found equivalent positions only for
71 among 112 of those ordered reinstated by this Honorable Court, although
petitioner Bank paid their salaries and other monetary benefits continuously from
October 1986 to the present without rendering work, to the damage and prejudice
of petitioner;

'3. Petitioner has exhausted all possible means to look for adequate equivalent
positions for the remaining 41 employees but to no avail. x x x'

"The petitioner attached to the said Manifestation/Motion a list of the forty-one (41)
employees together with the corresponding separation pay and other benefits they
are supposed to receive. And these forty-one (41) employees are, as follows: Daisy
Adriano, Luisito Arellano, Teodoro Banaticla, Ruben Beltran, Jose Bufi, Walfrido
Calcabin, Roy Casido, Edna Cioco, Rosauro Clerigo, Mary Ann Co, Delia Conde, Judith
dela Cruz, Roberta dela Cruz, Carmen delos Santos, Rogelio Edora, Raul Gonzales,
Balagtas Hernandez, Gerardo Ilano, Alan de Jesus, Hector Juliano, Teresita Licarte,
Tony Manaois, Jaime Manipis, Edgar Marcelo, Rufino Marquez, Edgardo Nicasio,
Rolando Ocampo, Irene Ocos, Herson Ozarraga, Alfredo del Pilar, Elpidio Pineda,
Alfredo Raymundo, Rowena Rebosa, Dexter Sanchez, Romeo Simon, Noel Solis,
Evangeline Saulog, Fe Uy, Reuel Velarde, Veronica Villarica, and Mario
Marquez."[12]12 G.R. No. 116128, Rollo, pp. 57-58.12

On November 19, 1992, petitioner filed with the NLRC a consolidated petition for
injunction docketed as NLRC NCR IC NO. 000316-92.

But, before the NLRC could decide on the issue of reinstatement pending appeal,
respondents filed a petition for mandamus with us, docketed as G.R. No. 110687, to
compel the Chairman of the NLRC to issue a writ of execution as regards the
reinstatement aspect of the Labor Arbiter's September 4, 1992 decision.

On December 15, 1993, we promulgated a resolution dismissing the aforesaid

petition for mandamus.

On April 7, 1994, the NLRC issued an Order directing the reinstatement of forty-one
(41) respondents pending appeal and at the same time dismissing the bank's
petition for injunction.

The NLRC upheld the Labor Arbiter's finding that the strikes staged by the
employees of the bank on January 3 & 4, 1985 and from February 11 to March 11,
1985 were in violation of the provisions of Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code, as
amended, as well as the Assumption Order of December 19, 1984 and as such the
striking union members had lost their employment status.

However, in spite of its conclusion that the respondents were validly dismissed the
NLRC opined that "the 41 x x.x respondents earned for themselves the right to be
reinstated not only under Article 223 of the Labor Code, as amended by R.A. 6715,
on March 2, 1989, but retroactive September 15, 1986, the date the Supreme Court
ordered the implementation of the Order of MOLE Minister Sanchez directing the
reinstatement of 'all striking employees except those who have accepted separation
pay' [as 'only 71 of the 112 affected employees' were reinstated by the Bank (May
4, 1988 Resolution of the Supreme Court in G.R. 71239 and G.R. 75749 p. 7)]. It
then remanded to the Labor Arbiter the query of whether or not the subject forty-
one (41) individual respondents, who were not reinstated since 1986, can validly be
paid back wages from September 1986 up to the time the NLRC promulgated its
decision. The dispositive portion of the assailed decision reads as follows:

"WHEREFORE, the appealed September 4, 1992 Decision insofar as concerns

disposition (b) to (e) thereof, is hereby set aside.

Our Order of April 7, 1994 is hereby reconsidered and likewise set aside. Instead,
the question of whether or not the forty-one (41) Individual Respondents (led by
Rolando Ocampo, Rowena Rebosa and Alfredo del Pilar) are entitled to back wages
corresponding to the period that they should have been reinstated since 1986 is
hereby remanded to the Arbiter of origin pursuant to the earlier quoted guideline of
the Supreme Court in its May 4, 1988 resolution."[13]13 G.R. No. 116128, Rollo, p.
68.13

The opposing parties moved for a reconsideration of the said decision, which
motions were denied in a Resolution of the NLRC, dated July 8, 1994.

Hence, these petitions.

The crux of the present controversy is whether or not the striking union members
terminated for abandonment of work after failing to obey the return-to-work order of
the Secretary of Labor and Employment, should be reinstated with back wages.

Respondents contend that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion when it
ruled that their dismissal is legal considering that mere participation of union
members in an illegal strike should not automatically result in their termination from
employment.[14]14 G.R. No. 116461, Rollo, pp. 80-89.14

We agree with respondents' contention that mere participation of union members in

an illegal strike should not automatically result in their termination from
employment. However, the case at bar involves a different issue as a perusal of the
records shows that respondents were terminated from employment by reason of
their defiance to the return-to-work order of the Secretary of Labor. Respondents
staged a strike on January 3 and 4, 1985 or fourteen (14) days after then Labor
Minister Ople assumed jurisdiction over the dispute between them and the bank.
Thereafter, respondents again staged a strike from February 11 up to March 11,
1985 while their labor dispute with the Bank was still pending before Minister Ople.

The provisions of law which govern the effects of defying a return-to-work order are:

1) Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code

xxx xxx xxx

"When, in his opinion, there exists a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike
or lockout in an industry indispensable to the national interest, the Secretary of
Labor and Employment may assume jurisdiction over the dispute and decide it or
certify the same to the Commission for compulsory arbitration. Such assumption or
certification shall have the effect of automatically enjoining the intended or
impending strike or lockout as specified in the assumption or certification order. If
one has already taken place at the time of assumption or certification, all striking or
locked out employees shall immediately return to work and the employer shall
immediately resume operations and readmit all workers under the same terms and
conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout. The Secretary of Labor and
Employment or the Commission may seek the assistance of law enforcement
agencies to ensure compliance with this provision as well as with such orders as he
may issue to enforce the same xx x " (as amended by Sec. 27, R.A. 6715; Italics
supplied.)

2) Article 264 (a)

"No strike or lockout shall be declared after assumption of jurisdiction by the

President or the Minister or after certification or submission of the dispute to
compulsory or voluntary arbitration or during the pendency of cases involving the
same grounds for the strike or lockout.

Any worker whose employment has been terminated as a consequent of an unlawful

lockout shall be entitled to reinstatement with full back wages. Any union officer
who knowingly participates in an illegal strike and any worker or union officer who
knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during a strike may be
declared to have lost his employment status: Provided, That mere participation of a
worker in a lawful strike shall not constitute sufficient ground for termination of his
employment, even if a replacement had been hired by the employer during such
lawful strike."

In the case of Union of Filipro Employees v. Nestle Philippines., Inc.,[15]15 192 SCRA
396 (1990).15 we ruled that a strike undertaken despite the issuance by the
Secretary of Labor of an assumption or certification order becomes a prohibited
activity and thus, illegal, pursuant to Article 264 (a) of the Labor Code. Moreover,
the union officers and members who have participated in the said illegal activity,
are, as a result, deemed to have lost their employment status. Thus, we held that:

"UFE completely misses the underlying principle embodied in Art. 263 (g) on the
settlement of labor disputes and this is, that assumption and certification orders are
executory in character and are to be strictly complied with by the parties even
during the pendency of any petition questioning their validity. This extraordinary
authority given to the Secretary of Labor is aimed at arriving at a peaceful and
speedy solution to labor disputes, without jeopardizing national interests.

Regardless therefore of their motives, or the validity of their claims, the striking
workers must cease and/or desist from any and all acts that tend to, or undermine
this authority of the Secretary of Labor, once an assumption and/or certification
order is issued. They cannot, for instance, ignore return-to-work orders, citing unfair
labor practices on the part of the company, to justify their actions x x x"

xxx

One other point that must be underscored is that the return-to-work order is issued
pending the determination of the legality or illegality of the strike. It is not correct to
say that it may be enforced only if the strike is legal and may be disregarded if the
strike is illegal, for the purpose precisely is to maintain the status quo while the
determination is being made. Otherwise, the workers who contend that their strike
is legal can refuse to return to their work and cause a standstill on the company
operations while retaining the positions they refuse to discharge or allow the
management to fill. Worse, they will also claim payment for work not done, on the
ground that they are still legally employed although actually engaged in the
activities inimical to their employer's interest.

This is like eating one's cake and having it too, and at the expense of the
management. Such an unfair situation surely was not contemplated by our labor
laws and cannot be justified under the social justice policy, which is a policy of
fairness to both labor and management. Neither can this unseemly arrangement be
sustained under the due process clause as the order, if thus interpreted, would be
plainly oppressive and arbitrary.'"

In the cases of Sarmiento v. Tuico,[16]16 162 SCRA 676 (1988).16 and Asian
Transmission Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission,[17]17 179 SCRA
582 (1989).17 we explained the rationale for this rule:

"It is also important to emphasize that the return-to-work order not so much confers
a right as it imposes a duty; and while as a right it may be waived, it must be
discharged as a duty even against the worker's will. Returning to work in this
situation is not a matter of option or voluntariness but of obligation. The worker
must return to his job together with his co-workers so the operations of the
company can be resumed and it can continue serving the public and promoting its
interest. That is the real reason such return can be compelled. So imperative is the
order in fact that it is not even considered violative of the right against involuntary
servitude, as this Court held in Kaisahan Ng Mga Manggagawa sa Kahoy v. Gotamco
Sawmills. The worker can of course give up his work, thus severing his ties with the
company, if he does not want to obey the order; but the order must be obeyed if he
wants to retain his work even if his inclination is to strike."

This principle was reiterated in the case of St. Scholastica's College v. Torres,[18]18
210 SCRA 565 (1992).18 wherein we cited the case of Federation of Free Workers v.
Inciong,[19]19 208 SCRA 157 (1992).19 and held that:

"A strike undertaken despite the issuance by the Secretary of Labor of an

assumption or certification order becomes a prohibited activity and thus illegal,
pursuant to the second paragraph of Art. 264 of the Labor Code as amended. x x x
The Union officers and members, as a result, are deemed to have lost their
employment status for having knowingly participated in an illegal act.

Hence, respondents' failure to immediately comply with the return-to-work order

dated, December 16, 1984 and January 6, 1985 cannot be condoned.

Respondents also contend that there is nothing on record to prove that they
knowingly participated in an illegal strike.[20]20 G.R. No. 116461; Rollo, pp. 89-
90.20
Private respondents' contentions are belied by the records as there was an
assumption order already issued by the Minister of Labor when they first conducted
a strike on January 3 and 4, 1985, and this assumption order was still in effect when
they struck continuously from February 11 to March 11, 1995. This knowledge of the
assumption order is manifested in their answer dated September 26, 1985, which
was summarized in the Decision of the Labor Arbiter dated September 4, 1992, the
pertinent portions of which are hereby quoted:

"On their part, the individual respondents in their answer dated September 26, 1985
denied that the strike on January 3 and 4, 1985 was illegal contending that there
was already an amicable settlement pursuant to which the bank agreed to accept
back to work all striking employees. Further, the said respondents alleged that the
bank in an Order dated January 6, 1985 was directed to accept back all striking
employees under the same terms and conditions previous to work stoppage and
this order allegedly became final and executory. Regarding the strike on February
11, 1985, the respondents argued that the same is legal for the following alleged
reasons, namely: (a) they resorted to such concerted action upon the representation
of the union officers that it was legal; (b) said concerted action was resumption of
their picketing activities considering that the Order of January 31, 1985 was nothing
but a mere reiteration of the position taken by the bank on the deadlocked issues
and the Minister unjustly ignored the position of the respondents; (c) the said action
was justified in view of alleged acts of the bank amounting to unfair labor practices;
and (d) the order of January 31, 1985 of the Minister has not yet become final
considering that there was filed by this union a motion for reconsideration on
February 11, 1985. The respondents charged as unfair labor practice the act of the
petitioner in publishing in metropolitan newspapers the notices requiring the
striking employees to return to work under threat of disciplinary action contending
that it was a coercive act which was tantamount to interference and restraint when
the publication adverted to the concerted action on February 11, 1985 as illegal.
Furthermore, the respondents argued that even if the strike staged by them was
illegal, they did not incur any liability for the following stated reasons, to wit: a) the
individual respondents participated in the strike on the strength of
representations/assurances made by union officers that the strike was legal; b) they
have acted in good faith and merely exercised their constitutional right to strike and
engage in concerted action; c) they acted in defense of their political and economic
rights which were allegedly ignored by the Minister of Labor; d) they have acted in
peaceful and orderly manner during the picketing and they did not commit any
illegal or violent act; e) they have faithfully complied with the orders of the Minister
of Labor and f) they merely acted in self-defense to repel the continuing acts of
unfair labor practices committed by the petitioner's representatives and
agents."[21]21 G.R. No. 116128, Rollo, pp. 305-306.21

Furthermore, private respondents contend that a strike is not synonymous with

abandonment of work as the employer-employee relationship is not terminated
during the duration of the strike but merely suspended. They also cited the cases of
Insular Life Assurance Co. Ltd., Employees Association NATU v. The Insular Life
Assurance Co. Ltd.,[22]22 37 SCRA 244 (1971).22 and the case of RCPI v. Philippine
Communications Electronics & Electricity Worker's Federation,[23]23 58 SCRA 763
(1974).23 wherein we held that mere failure to report for work after notice to return,
does not constitute abandonment nor bar reinstatement.

However, private respondents failed to take into consideration the cases recently
decided by this Court which emphasized on the strict adherence to the rule that
defiance of the return-to-work order of the Secretary of Labor would constitute a
valid ground for dismissal.

The respective liabilities of striking union officers and members who failed to
immediately comply with the return-to-work order, are clearly spelled out in Article
264 of the Labor Code which provides that any declaration of a strike or lockout
after the Secretary of Labor and Employment has assumed jurisdiction over the
labor dispute is considered an illegal act. Therefore, any worker or union officer who
knowingly participates in a strike defying a return-to-work order may as a result
thereof be considered to have lost his employment status.

Moreover, as aptly stated by the NLRC in its decision:

"Abandonment of work as a ground to dismiss under Article 282 (b) of the Labor
Code should not be confused with abandonment of work under the law on strike,
particularly those as provided in Article 263 (g) and Article 264 (a) of the Labor
Code. To rule that [t]o constitute abandonment of position, there must be
concurrence of the intention to abandon and some overt act from which it may be
inferred that the employee concerned has no more interest in working x x x while
available as a defense against dismissals under Article 282 of the Labor Code,
cannot, however, be validly invoked in dismissals resulting from a striker's defiance
of a DOLE Secretary's assumption order so clearly spelled out in Article 263 (g) of
the Labor Code, much less as a defense against the ban on strikes after assumption
of jurisdiction by x x the Minister of Labor and Employment (Article 264 (a), Labor
Code)."[24]24 G.R. No. 116128, Rollo, pp. 62-63.24

Furthermore, as non-compliance with an assumption or certification order is

considered as an illegal act committed in the course of a strike, the Ministry of
Labor and Employment (now DOLE) is authorize to impose such sanctions as may
be provided for by law which may include the hiring of replacements for workers
defying the order. In the case of Jackbilt Concrete Block Company, Inc. v. Norton and
Harrison Company,[25]25 71 SCRA 44 (1976).25 it appeared that in an earlier
decision the Supreme Court ordered the reinstatement without back wages of the
strikers who staged a strike on the good-faith belief that the Company had
committed an unfair labor practice. Some of the strikers reported for work and were
reinstated. The rest of the strikers listed in the order either ignored or disobeyed
said order. Of the strikers who reported for work, some have either not submitted
themselves to medical examination as required and did not report back anymore or
after having gone through medical examination, did not report back for work, or
after reporting back for work did not continue working anymore and the others were
found suffering from disease and unfit for work.

Before the Supreme Court, the Company raised in issue the employment status of
the strikers who failed to comply with the return-to-work order, contending that they
should be declared to have forfeited their right to reinstatement. Sustaining this
contention, the Supreme Court said:

"We are also of the opinion and so hold that the strikers who failed, without proper
justification, to report for work assignment despite the issuance of the orders
reinstating them to their jobs are deemed to have forfeited their right to
reinstatement. Their unexplained failure to request for another period or an
extended period within which to comply with the reinstatement orders and report
back for work militates against them.

In East Asiatic Company Ltd., et al. vs. CIR, et. al., G.R. No. L-29068, August 31,
1971, 40 SCRA 521, this Court had occasion to rule that the failure to report for
work when one had the opportunity to do so waived thereby his right to
reinstatement. Because of the apparent lack of interest of the strikers concerned as
shown by their failure to report for work without justifiable reason with the
petitioner herein, We are constrained to declare them to have forfeited their right to
reinstatement."

In the case at bar, we fully agree with the ruling of the NLRC in declaring that
respondents were validly dismissed considering their defiance of the return-to-work
order issued by the Secretary of Labor. As a consequence of such defiance, they are
considered severed from their employment.

Apparently, the basis of the portion of NLRC's decision remanding the issue of back
wages to the Labor Arbiter, is this Court's Resolution dated May 4, 1988 issued in
the cases of Allied Bank Employees Union-NUBE, et al. v. Hon. Blas Ople, et al., G.R.
No. 71239 and Allied Banking Corporation v. Hon. Augusto S. Sanchez, et al., G.R.
No. 75749. In the said resolution we remanded the aforecited cases to the
Department of Labor, the dispositive portion of which reads:
"Considering the foregoing, the Court RESOLVED to DISMISS the instant petitions
and to REMAND them to the Department of Labor and Employment and its pertinent
agencies for further proceedings as outlined in this resolution. This action is without
prejudice to either or both parties filing an appropriate and concise petition with this
Court, if they are so minded after the final administrative determination of the
issues has been made."[26]26 G.R. No. 116128, Rollo, p. 49.26

Furthermore, a perusal of our Resolution reveals that the issue of whether or not the
forty one (41) respondents should be paid back wages from September, 1986 up to
the date of the promulgation of the decision, was not raised therein. Only the
determination of factual matters, i.e., whether or not the strike was illegal; the roles
played by respondents should the strike be declared illegal; issue of representation
and the impossibility of reinstating the 41 respondents by bank, were remanded by
this Court to the DOLE.

This Resolution of ours, as must be noted, was issued when the petition to declare
the strike illegal has not yet been resolved. It was only resolved last September 4,
1992, when the NLRC issued a Decision declaring the strike illegal and upholding
the dismissal of the respondents. The reinstatement ordered by then Minister
Sanchez, in his August 29, 1986 order, was only provisional and subject to the
outcome of the petition to declare the strike illegal, viz:

"In his order dated August 29, 1986, Minister Sanchez ordered reinstatement
pending the final outcome of the petition initiated by the Bank to declare the strike
illegal. The reinstatement is, therefore, provisional. A permanent reinstatement will
depend on the legality or illegality of the strike."

As a consequence of the declaration of the illegality of the strike and the upholding
of the dismissal of respondents in the NLRC Decision, the factual matters mentioned
in our Resolution dated May 4, 1988 have already become moot and academic.

Moreover, an award of back wages is incompatible with the findings of the NLRC
upholding the dismissal of respondents.

The NLRC's disposition of the case remanding to the Labor Arbiter the issue of
reinstating respondents and the computation of their back wages is an illogical
consequence of respondents' valid dismissal from their employment. Such
disposition is inconsistent with our pronouncement in the cases aforecited and
should be struck down as having been issued with grave abuse of discretion.

Respondents also contend that the NLRC should have adopted a liberal approach
favoring labor which this Court has upheld in its decisions and that the employers
are urged to be more compassionate as to their workers' needs.[27]27 Rollo, p.
86.27

We agree with respondents' contention that this Court should view with compassion
the plight of the workers. However, this sense of compassion should be coupled with
a sense of fairness and justice to the parties concerned. Hence, while social justice
has an inclination to give protection to the working class, the cause of the labor
sector is not upheld at all times as the employer has also a right entitled to respect
in the interest of simple fair play.[28]28 National Sugar Refineries Corporation v.
National Labor Relations Commission, 220 SCRA 452 (1993).28 Thus, in the case of
St. Scholastica's College v. Torres,[29]29 210 SCRA 565 (1992).29 we stated that:

"The sympathy of the Court which, as a rule, is on the side of the laboring classes
(Reliance Surety and Insurance Co., Inc. v. NLRC), cannot be extended to the striking
union officers and members in the instant petition. There was willful disobedience
not only to one but two return-to-work orders. Considering that the UNION consisted
mainly of teachers, who are supposed to be well-lettered and well-informed, the
court cannot overlook the plain arrogance and pride displayed by the UNION in this
labor dispute. Despite containing threats of disciplinary action against some union
officers and members who actively participated in the strike, the letter dated 9
November 1990 sent by the COLLEGE enjoining the union officers and members to
return to work under the same terms and conditions prior to the strike. Yet, the
UNION decided to ignore the same. The COLLEGE, correspondingly, had every right
to terminate the services of those who chose to disregard the return-to-work orders
issued by respondent SECRETARY in order to protect the interests of its students
who form part of the youth of the land."

WHEREFORE, the NLRC Decision of May 20, 1994 is AFFIRMED with respect to the
finding that private respondents were validly dismissed. However, as to its
disposition that the issue of reinstatement and computation of back wages be
remanded to the Labor Arbiter, the same, being inconsistent with the finding of
valid dismissal, is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.
Padilla (Chairman), Bellosillo, Vitug, and Kapunan, JJ., concur.