FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 116128. July 12, 1996.]

ALLIED BANKING CORPORATION , petitioner, vs. NATIONAL

LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, HON. JOSE G. DE VERA,
ALLIED BANKING EMPLOYEES UNION — NUBE, TOMAS
GONZALO, CRISANTO BALISI, NORBERTO AGUJA, BENITO
BARRERA, HERNANIE SISON, MAYNARD CUENCA, VICTOR M.
ALVARES, INOCENCIO SALVADOR, LUISITO MENDOZA,
ARTURO VILLANUEVA, PEDRO PASCUAL, TAGGERT
ABASTILLAS, ALICIA ABILLE, NIDA ABUTAN, TONY ACIBAR,
DAISY ADRIANO, ANDREA JOCELYN AGUDO, ERLINDA AGUS,
SONNY ALAYON, NESTOR ALCARION, RAUL ALIGAEN, EDWIN
AMORANTO, BUENERJES M. ANTE, LUISITO ARELLANO,
CARLO ARRANZAMENDEZ, ALVIN ARROCO, JOSEFINA
AVILLANOSA, SUSAN BALLESTERE, TEODORO BANATCILA,
EDUARDO BANIS, NOEL BARCENAS, MAGTANGGOL BAWAL,
RODRIGO BEGINO, BENJIE C.S. BETRAN, VIRGILIO
BRILLANTES, JOSE BUFI, APOLONIO BURLAZA, EDUARDO
CABALU, REYNALDO CALAROZA, WALFRIDO CALCABIN,
EDUARDO CALCES, LORENZO CALVELO, JR., EDUARDO
CANIZARES, ROY CASIDO, ANGELITO CASTRO, SALLY
CASTRO, ARTHUR CASTROGERES, EDNA CEOCO, SUSAN
CHAN, ANNE CHUA, LETTY CHUA, RODALIA CHUA, CARLOS
CHUNG, RASAURO CLERIGO, MARY ANN CO, DELIA CONDE,
AVELINO CONDERO, MAXIMO CORNEJO, JR., CHARLIE
CORPUZ, CYMBELINE CRUZ, JUDITH DE LA CRUZ,
VENERANDO CUI, ADRIANO CUTINES, JR., ED DAGUMAN,
MARIE PAZ DAGUMAN, EDUARDO DAYAO, JESUS DAYAO,
WENCESLAO DIMO-OS, ROGELIO EDORA, LOLITA EL FANTE,
ABELARDO EUGENIO, JAIME FERRER, REYNALDO FERRERI,
ROMEO T. FLORENTINO, JOY R. FLORES, ROBERTINO FUCOY,
BUENAVENTURA GABITAN, JOSE GACO, JR., RAUL GALSIM,
RAUL GONZALES, OSCAR CORDULA, CARMELITA GULAPA,
OPHELIA DE GUZMAN, ROGER HAO, BALAGTAS HERNANDEZ,
GERARDO ILANO, ALAN DE JESUS, JAIME JIMENA, CONNIE DE
JOYA, HECTOR JULIANO, ALFREDO LEGASPI, DANILO DE
LEON, ARMANDO LIM, ANGELITA LOPEZ, ROEL LOPEZ,
CAROL MABUGAT, ERWIN MACALINO, RAUL MACATANGAY,
CATALINO MACLANG, MANUEL C. MADERAZO, REGINALD
MALAPIT, MENARDO P. MALATE, GILBERT MANAOIS, TONY
MANAOIS, JAIME MANIPIS, EDGAR MARCELO, AMELITA
MARCO, ABELARDO MARIANO, JANE MINA MARQUEZ,
JULINO MARQUEZ, RUBEN MEDINA, ERNESTO MENDOZA,
NORBEN MENDOZA, BELINDA MIRANDA, LUCILLE MONTILLA,
MARY ANN MUEDA, LOURDES MUGAR, DINDO NEMIADA,
RENE NG, EDGARDO NICASIO, RODEL NUNEZ, ROLANDO
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 OCAMPO, IRENE OCOS, ALEX OLAES, JOSEFINA ONA,
AMADO F. ONG, GERSON OZARAGA, ROSALEO PACIBE,
ANGELINO PALAO, MARIO PAPA, ELIZABETH PARUNGAO,
LILIBETH PAYPON, ERNESTINA PELAEZ, ALFREDO DEL
PILAR, ELPIDIO PINEDA, MA. LOURDES PLANA, BLESIDA
POBLETE, REMEDIOS POLINTA, AGUSTIN QUILLA, JOSEFINO
RAMIREZ, ANA ROBERTA RAMOS, ALFREDO RAYMUNDO,
ROWENA REBOSA, CRISPINA REMIGIO, EPITANIO REYES, JR.,
SONIA REYES, VICTORINO REYES, ANTONIO REQUEPO,
TOMAS RUBIALES, ANGELITA SACLOLO, OSCAR SAGGE,
ROMEO SALTING, NICANOR SAYSON, CARLOS SANCHEZ,
DEXTER SANCHEZ, ELOIS SAN MATEO, ALBERT SANTIAGO,
CARMEN DE LOS SANTOS, ROMEO SIMAN, HELEN T. SIY,
NOEL SOLIS, GENESIS SORIANO, TERESITA SY, EVANGELINE
SUALOG, JUANITO SULLERA, AMELOU TAN, EVELYN TAN,
GENE TAN, NANCY TAN, ROSALINO P. TAN, EMILIO
TARROSA, JR., EDUARDO TOLENTINO, RUFINO TRINIDAD,
JR., ARACELI UY, ALEXANDER VALENZUELA, PRISCILA
VELARDE, REUEL VELARDE, AUDIE VELASCO, WINSTON
VELASCO, LUISITO VENGCO, GRACE VICTORIA, IMELDA
VILLAR, MA. CORAZON VILLEGAS, JOSE VILLAMOR,
ESTRELLA VILLAREAL, MA. VERONICA VILLARICA, ABE
VILLARINO, FE YAP, RAMON ZAFRA, MELY ABANO, ELLEN
ABRIOL, GIL AJAS, VIRGILIO ALCORIZA, FRANCISCO AQUINO,
AUDREY ANN ARMENDI, FILIPINAS BOLLER, ROZIELO
CALIWAGAN, MARIE LIAN CEMBRANO, ZERALDA CHAN,
MARY ANTONETTE CHU, VEDASTO DE CLARO, ARNOLD
COLLANTES, REYNALDO CRISTAL, RAMON DIOLAZO,
PROCESO DUJUNCO, ANTONIO ENDERIZ, FLORIAN
ENRIQUEZ, ERNESTO ESBER, MARLENE GENEVIEVE
ESQUIVEL, TITA FELIPE, EDILBERTO GALSIM, RIGOBERTO
GARCIA, CLARO GANO, RAYMUNDO GARCIA, SYLVIA
GUEVARRA, LAURO DE GUZMAN, ELENA JABSON, RUBY
KUIZON, ENRIQUE LABUSON, ERNESTO LAOANG, EDUARDO
TIAM LEE, AMADO LIM, SUSAN LIM, SHIRLEY LOCSIN,
LEONARDO LULU, MERLE MACARUBBO, CECILIA MAGNO,
TERESITA MAHERALNAGH, PERSEVERANDA MALLARI,
MARIO MARQUEZ, JOYCE ELIZABETH MELENCIO, ROMEO
MENDOZA, SEVERO MORIN, DANILO NATIVIDAD, JANELYN
NELSON, MA. TERESA PAMA, RAMONITA RECUENCO,
EDGARDO REGOSO, TEDDY REY, EDITHA REYES, GEORGE
REYES, MA. CECILIA RIVERA, LOURDES ROSALES, ROBERTO
SABAULAN, MANUEL SAN AGUSTIN, MA. CLEOFE SANCHEZ,
MARIO SAN GREGORIO, ARTURO SANTERVA, CARMELITO
SANTOS, MEYNARDO SANTOS, LORETA SIA, MA. TERESA
SORIANO, LEOPOLDO TACUGUE, NOEL TEANO, TEDDY
TUPAS, NILO URBINA, MARY ANN UY, CYNTHIA VICTORIA,
VICENTE VIDAL, ERNESTO YAP, RUBEN ZARANDIN,
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 TERESITA ALHAMBRA, EDMUND ARRIOLA, KELLY
CALUNGSUD, MA. LAARNI CHING, ELENITA DE CASTRO,
FLORINDA REGOSO, LEOVINO REYES, RICARDO SALVADOR,
NICANOR SAYSON, and GRACE VENERACION, respondents.

[G.R. No. 116461. July 12, 1996.]

ROLANDO G. OCAMPO, ROWENA C. REBOSA, DEXTER C.

SANCHEZ, ELPIDIO PINEDA, BALAGTAS HERNANDEZ, ALAN
DE JESUS, REYNALDO FERRER, ANGELITO CASTRO, JOSE
VILLAMOR, JR., EVANGELINE SUALOG, LILIBETH PAYPON,
GILBERT MANAWIS, SALLY CASTRO, JOSE BUFI, IMELDA
VILAR, JANE MINA MARQUEZ, SUSAN CHAM, CONNIE DE
JOYA, TERESITA SY, SONIA REYES, EVELYN TAN, AMELITA
MARCO, HECTOR JULIANO, JUDITH DELA CRUZ, APOLONIO
BURLAZA, ROGELIO EDORA, JAIME MANIPIS, PRISCILA
VELARDE, LOURDES MUGAR, RAUL GONZALES, BLESILDA
POBLETE, ANTONIO RAQUEPO, MARIO PAPA, TONY ACIBAR,
VIRGILIO BRILLANTES, TONY MANAOIS, ELOISA SAN MATEO,
MA. LOURDES PLANA, ANGELITA LOPEZ, ARTHUR
CASTROGERES, EDGARDO NICASIO, DAISY ADRIANO, JESUS
DAYAO, CARMEN DELOS SANTOS, FE YAP, RUBEN MEDINA,
ERNESTO MENDOZA, EDUARDO CALCES, LUISITO
ARELLANO, JOSE GACO, JR., TEODORO BANATICLA, ROEL
LOPEZ, DANILO DE LEON, NOEL SOLIS, GENESIS SORIANO,
RUFINO TRINIDAD, JR., VICTORINO REYES, MAXIMINO
CORNEJO, JR., ALVIN ARROCO, ERWIN MACALINO, TOMAS
RUBIALES, ANGELINO PALAO, EDNA CEOCO, JAIME FERRER,
AUDIE VELASCO, ANGELITA SACLOLO, CAROL RAMOS,
AVELINO CORDERO, EPIFANO REYES, JR., OPHELIA DE
GUZMAN, IRENE OCOS, REGINALD MALAPIT, JOSEFINO
RAMIREZ, ABELARDO MARIANO, RAMON ZARFA, DELIA
CONDE, ANNE CHUA, NENA NG, ESTRELLA VILLAREAL,
LETTY CHUA, ANA ROBERTA RAMOS, EDUARDO CABALES,
RODRIGO BEGINO, JAIME GIMENA, GENE TAN, CARLOS
CHUNG, WENCESLAO DIMO-OS, LOLITA ELFANTE, ALICIA
ABILLE, ROY CASIDO, LUCILLE MONTILLA, ALFREDO
RAYMUNDO, DINDO NEMIADA, GERARDO ILANO, CARLOS
SANCHEZ, AGUSTIN QUILLA, CHARLIE CORPUZ, WINSTON
VELASCO, RODALIA CHUA, ALEXANDER VALENZUELA,
EDGAR MARCELO, ALBERT SANTIAGO, RAUL GALSIM, CARLO
ARRANZAMENDEZ, JOSEFINA ONA, CARMELITA GULAPA,
ARACELI UY, CRISPINA REMIGIO, BELINDA MIRANDA, GRACE
VICTORIA, ROMEO SALTING, EDWIN AMORANTO, ROGER
HAO, MA. VERONICA VILLARICA, ALFREDO DEL PILAR,
BUENAVENTURA GABITAN, LUISITO VENGCO, HERSON
OZARAGA, SUSAN BALLESTEROS, RAMONITA RECUENCO,
ABE VILLARINO, RODEL NUNEZ, ALFRED LEGASPI, RAUL
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 MACATANGAY, REYNALDO CALAROZA, ADRIANO CUTINES,
JR., EDGARDO DAYAO, LORENZO CALVELO, JR., NESTOR
ALCARION, EDUARDO CANIZARES, REFUNIO MARQUEZ,
NIDA ABUTAN, RAMON DIOLAZO, NORBEN MENDOZA,
ROMEO SIMAN, CYMBELINE CRUZ, ROSALEO PACIBE,
ABELARDO EUGENIO, MARY ANN CO, ANDREA JOCELYN
AGUDO, EMILIO TARROSA, JR., TAGGERT ABASTILLAS, RAUL
ALIGAEN, CAROL MABUGAT, ERNESTINA PELAEZ,
ROBERTINO FUCOY, MARY ANN MUEDA, CATALINO
MACLANG, REMEDIOS POLINTAN, NICANOR SAYSON, NANCY
TAN, JUANITO SULLERA, AMELOU TAN, SONNY ALAYON,
WALFRIDO CALCABIN, VENERANDO CUI, OSCAR GORDULA,
ROSAURO CLERIGO, MAGTANGGOL BAWAL, HELEN SIY,
ELIZABETH PARUNGAO, REUEL VELARDE, NOEL BARCENAS ,
petitioners, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION
and ALLIED BANKING CORPORATION, respondents.

Potenciano A. Flores, Jr. for petitioners in G.R. No. 116461 and for private
respondents in G.R. No. 116128.

Ocampo, Quiroz, Pesayco & Associates for Allied Banking Corporation.

The Solicitor General for respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. LABOR LAW; NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION; LABOR

RELATIONS; ASSUMPTION OF JURISDICTION OVER A DISPUTE BY THE
SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT; A STRIKE UNDERTAKEN DESPITE THE
SECRETARY OF LABOR'S ASSUMPTION OF JURISDICTION OVER A DISPUTE
BECOMES ILLEGAL; UNION OFFICERS AND MEMBERS WHO PARTICIPATE IN SAID
ILLEGAL ACTIVITY ARE DEEMED TO HAVE LOST THEIR EMPLOYMENT STATUS. —
We agree with respondents' contention that mere participation of union
members in an illegal strike should not automatically result in their termination
from employment. However, the case at bar involves a different issue as a
perusal of the records shows that respondents were terminated from
employment by reason of their defiance to the return-to-work order of the
Secretary of Labor. Respondents staged a strike on January 3 and 4, 1985 or
fourteen (14) days after then Labor Minister Ople assumed jurisdiction over the
dispute between them and the bank. Thereafter, respondents again staged a
strike from February 11 up to March 11, 1985 while their labor dispute with the
Bank was still pending before Minister Ople. In the case of Union of Filipro
Employees v. Nestle Philippines, Inc., we ruled that a strike undertaken despite
the issuance by the Secretary of Labor of an assumption or certification order
becomes a prohibited activity and thus, illegal, pursuant to Article 264 (a) of the
Labor Code. Moreover, the union officers and members who have participated
in the said illegal activity, are, as a result, deemed to have lost their
employment status. In the cases of Sarmiento v. Tuico , and Asian Transmission
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 Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission , we explained the rationale
for this rule: "It is also important to emphasize that the return-to-work order not
so much confers a right as it imposes a duty; and while as a right it may be
waived, it must be discharged as a duty even against the worker's will.
Returning to work in this situation is not a matter of option or voluntariness but
of obligation. The worker must return to his job together with his co-workers so
the operations of the company can be resumed and it can continue serving the
public and promoting its interest. That is the real reason such return can be
compelled. So imperative is the order in fact that it is not even considered
violative of the right against involuntary servitude, as this Court held in
Kaisahan Ng Mga Manggagawa sa Kahoy v. Gotamco Sawmills. The worker can
of course give up his work, thus severing his ties with the company, if he does
not want to obey the order; but the order must be obeyed if he wants to retain
his work even if his inclination is to strike." This principle was reiterated in the
case of St. Scholastica's College v. Torres , wherein we cited the case of
Federation of Free Workers v. Inciong , and held that: "A strike undertaken
despite the issuance by the Secretary of Labor of an assumption or certification
order becomes a prohibited activity and thus illegal, pursuant to the second
paragraph of Art. 264 of the Labor Code as amended. . . . The Union officers
and members, as a result, are deemed to have lost their employment status for
having knowingly participated in an illegal act. Hence, respondents' failure to
immediately comply with the return-to-work order dated December 16, 1984
and January 6, 1985 cannot be condoned.
2. ID.; RULE THAT DEFIANCE OF THE RETURN-TO-WORK ORDER OF THE
SECRETARY OF LABOR CONSTITUTES A VALID GROUND FOR DISMISSAL MUST
BE STRICTLY ADHERED TO; GOOD FAITH ON THE PART OF A PARTICIPANT IN
SAID ILLEGAL ACTIVITY IS NO DEFENSE. — Respondents also contend that there
is nothing to prove that they knowingly participated in an illegal strike. Private
respondents' contentions are belied by the records as there was an assumption
order already issued by the Ministry of Labor when they first conducted a strike
on January 3 and 4, 1985, and this assumption order is manifested in their
answer dated September 26, 1985, which was summarized in the Decision of
the Labor Arbiter dated September 4, 1992. They also cited the cases of Insular
Life Assurance Co. Ltd. Employees Association - NATU v. The Insular Life
Assurance Co. Ltd. and the case of RCPI v. Philippine Communications
Electronics & Electricity Worker's Federation , wherein we held that mere failure
to report for work after notice to return, does not constitute abandonment nor
bar reinstatement. Private respondents, however, failed to take into
consideration the cases recently decided by this Court which emphasized on
the strict adherence to the rule that defiance of the return-to-work order of the
Secretary of Labor would constitute a valid ground for dismissal.

3. ID.; NON-COMPLIANCE WITH AN ASSUMPTION OR CERTIFICATION

ORDER AUTHORIZES THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT TO
IMPOSE SUCH SANCTIONS AS MAY BE PROVIDED FOR BY LAW. — Furthermore,
as non-compliance with an assumption or certification order is considered as an
illegal act committed in the course of a strike, the Ministry of Labor and
Employment (now DOLE) is authorized to impose such sanctions as may be
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 provided for by law which may include the hiring of replacements for workers
defying the order.
4. ID.; THIS COURT'S COMPASSION TO THE PLIGHT OF WORKERS SHOULD
BE COUPLED WITH A RESPECT OF THE EMPLOYER'S RIGHT UNDER THE LAW. —
Respondents also contend that the NLRC should have adopted a liberal
approach favoring labor which this Court has upheld in its decisions and that
the employers are urged to be more compassionate as to their workers' needs.
We agree with respondents' contention that this Court should view with
compassion the plight of the workers. However, this sense of compassion
should be coupled with a sense of fairness and justice to the parties concerned.
Hence, while social justice has an inclination to give protection to the working
class, the cause of the labor sector is not upheld at all times as the employer
has also a right entitled to respect in the interest of simple fair play.

DECISION

HERMOSISIMA, JR., J : p

For review in these consolidated petitions is the Decision, dated May 20, 1994,
of the National Labor Relations Commission as well as its Order, dated July 8,
1994, in NLRC NCR Case No. 004005-92 and NLRC NCR Case No. 00316-92.

In its petition, 1 the Bank questions the latter portion of the decision of the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) wherein it remanded to the Labor
Arbiter the issue of whether or not the forty-one (41) respondents are entitled
to back wages corresponding to the period that they should have been
reinstated since 1986, pursuant to the guideline stated in our Resolution, dated
May 4, 1988.
Respondents, on the other hand, contend in their petition 2 that the NLRC
gravely abused its discretion in affirming the validity of their dismissal by the
Bank.
The dispute between petitioner and respondent Union started when their
collective bargaining agreement which was to expire on June 30, 1984 came up
for renewal. They failed to reach an amicable settlement particularly on the
wage increase issue. Respondent Union thereupon filed a notice of strike with
the Bureau of Labor Relations.
On December 16, 1984, then Minister of Labor and Employment, Blas Ople
assumed jurisdiction over the dispute pursuant to Article 263 (g) of the Labor
Code of the Philippines, as amended. The orders enjoined the Union from
declaring a strike and the management from effecting a lock out. 3 The orders
notwithstanding, respondent Union nevertheless filed on December 20, 1984, a
report on the results of the strike vote that it earlier conducted. On January 3,
1985, respondent Union staged a strike upon the Union president's contention
that the Labor Minister's assumption order was a mere scrap of paper.
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 On January 4, 1985, petitioner filed with the Ministry of Labor and
Employment a Manifestation and Urgent Motion praying for a return-to-work
order. On January 6, 1985, Minister Ople granted the motion and issued a
return-to-work order which included a P1,000.00 grant per employee
chargeable to future CBA benefits.
In an Order, issued on January 18, 1985, Minister Ople directed the parties
to continue negotiations until January 31, 1985; otherwise, if no compromise
agreement is reached, he will personally resolve the bargaining deadlock.

The parties failed to break the deadlock and so, Minister Ople issued an
Order, dated January 31, 1985, directing them to incorporate in their collective
agreement the awards granted. 4

On February 11, 1985, "certain members of the Union resumed the strike
and, on the following day, acts of violence were committed . . . resulting in the
filing of criminal charges against some of the strikers." 5 Petitioner identified
these "certain members of the Union," numbering 271, the respondents
included.
Petitioner, through notices published in the Bulletin Today, the Times
Journal, and the Daily Express, directed the striking employees to return to work
not later than 1:00 p.m. of February 13, 1985.
In spite of these notices, respondents failed to report for work on the
stated deadline. Respondents explained that the resumption of their picketing
activities was brought about by their belief that Minister Ople's decision, dated
January 31, 1985, was not based on justice, equity and reason.

Private respondents' posture of intransigence caused petitioner to issue

notices of their termination.

Meeting the Union demands halfway, Minister Ople, on March 7, 1985,

issued a Resolution modifying his January 31, 1985 Order and so the union
lifted its picket lines and notified petitioner, on March 11, 1985, that the striking
employees were returning back to work. Petitioner refused to accept them back
on the ground that the strikers have already been dismissed for abandonment
of work when they failed to obey the assumption order.
In order to quell further dispute, Minister Ople, on June 5, 1985, issued an
Order which directed the bank to reinstate provisionally all striking workers
except (a) those who have already accepted their separation pay; (b) officers of
the union; and (c) those with pending criminal charges.

The Union then filed with us a petition for certiorari, with a prayer for the
issuance of a preliminary mandatory injunction, docketed as G.R. No. 71239. In
the said petition, the union asked that the June 5, 1985 Order of Minister Ople
be modified to likewise direct the reinstatement of all union officers, employees
with pending criminal cases and employees who have received their separation
pay with full back wages, emergency cost of living allowance (ECOLA) and
employee benefits counted from March 8, 1985 until actually reinstated. In a
Resolution, dated June 18, 1986, we remanded the petition to the Ministry of
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 Labor and Employment, with the instruction to resolve all pending factual and
legal issues relative to the petition.
On August 29, 1986, Minister Augusto Sanchez, the successor of Minister
Ople, modified the last Order of the latter by ordering the reinstatement of all
striking employees, except those who have already accepted their separation
pay. The bank, as a consequence, filed a petition with the Supreme Court,
docketed as G.R. No. 75749, to nullify the aforesaid Order.

In amplification of our Resolution of September 15, 1986, we issued in

G.R. No. 75749 the following Resolution, dated May 4, 1988:
"In a resolution dated September 15, 1986 in G.R. No. 75749, the
Court issued 'a Temporary Restraining Order' enjoining enforcement of
the August 29, 1986 order of the Minister of Labor and Employment
only insofar as it directs the payment of back wages, allowances, and
other benefits due to the private respondents effective March 11, 1985
until their actual reinstatement. Considering, however, the financial
plight of some of the private respondent, the Court further Resolved to
order the petitioner to advance the equivalent of two (2) months salary
to each of the private respondents entitled to reinstatement under the
MOLE order, said amount to be repaid to the petitioner or charged to
accumulated back wages depending on the final outcome of this case'
(p. 64, Rollo ). A motion for clarification of this Resolution filed by the
Bank was denied.

In view of the above-mentioned resolution, Minister Sanchez'

order to reinstate back to work all striking employees except those who
have accepted separation pay was ordered implemented." 6

It appears that the problem of reinstating striking employees except

those who had accepted separation pay was reduced a bit when 71 of 112
affected employees were additionally reinstated. Thus, only 41 among the
individual respondents were not reinstated.
In our Resolution dated May 4, 1988 we observed that:
"The individual private respondents in G.R. No. 75749 have filed
motions to cite in contempt the Bank for violation of the Court's
Resolution ordering the implementation of the reinstatement order of
Minister Sanchez. They alleged that they were 'forced to file the
Motions to expose and protest the unabating display of bad faith on the
part of the Bank in effecting their reinstatement. (p. 400, Rollo in
74749)."

We did not act favorably upon private respondents' "motion to cite in

contempt the bank for violation of the court's Resolution ordering the
implementation of the reinstatement order of Minister Sanchez." Instead, we
dismissed said petitions of the union and the individual respondents in G.R. No.
71239, and the Bank's petition in G.R. No. 71239, and in G.R. No. 75749; and
remanded them to the Department of Labor and Employment and its pertinent
agencies for further proceedings as stated in our resolution, to wit:
"A thorough review of the voluminous records of these two
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 petitions shows that unresolved factual issues prevent a final solution
to the individual respondents' and the Bank's problems.
First, whether or not the strikes staged by the Union and the
individual respondents are legal remains unresolved. This question has
been pending before the Arbitration Branch of the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) even before the filing of the two
petitions.
In his order dated August 29, 1986, Minister Sanchez ordered
reinstatement pending the final outcome of the petition initiated by the
Bank to declare the strike illegal. The reinstatement is, therefore,
provisional. A permanent reinstatement will depend on the legality or
illegality of the strike.
Second, the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) or the
NLRC must also look into the roles played by the individual
respondents should the strike be declared illegal.
Third, in this Court's June 18, 1986 resolution, the respondent
Minister was ordered to resolve (sic) the certain factual questions, to
wit:

There are various factual issues which must first be resolved. Counsel for
the petitioners admits that the petitioners are not authorized by the Allied Bank
Employees Union nor NUBE to speak for the Union or the bargaining unit.
Neither have the petitioners any authority to file a case in behalf of the Union
officers and certain separated employees whom they want this Court to order
reinstated. In fact, there are statements filed by individual petitioners who
manifest that they did not authorize the petition to be filed in their names.
Counsel for the petitioners failed to clarify at the June 18, 1986 hearing how
many of the petitioners he really represents, how many workers have received
separation pay, and how many of these workers have authorized the filing of a
case in their behalf. Counsels for the parties have given this Court conflicting
data on positions of terminated personnel allegedly being filled by new
employees and various other factual matters necessitating the presentation of
evidence. It is also rather odd why a petitioner union affiliated with NUBE and
the Trade Union Congress of the Philippines (TUCP) or its members should be
represented in this case by the legal counsel of a rival labor federation, the
Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU).
There is at present pending with the respondent a
supplemental motion for partial reconsideration of the order now
challenged in this petition. Counsel for the petitioner admits that
they have not moved in the premises and have not asked the
present Minister of the MOLE whether or not he would reconsider
the questioned order issued by his predecessor. Both parties are
agreed that conciliation proceedings have not terminated and
both expressed a willingness to continue the proceedings. The
issue of whether or not the strike which commenced on February
11, 1985 is legal remains pending determination by NLRC and
calls for the presentation of the evidence. The status of the
pending criminal case is likewise not clear. The Assistant Solicitor
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 General who represented MOLE informed the Court that the
respondent Minister had to suspend action on the various matter
pending before him because the petitioners decided to file this
petition before allowing the administrative process to make the
initial determination (p. 420, Rollo in G.R. No. 71239).
These questions have not been resolved to date.
And fourth, there are likewise factual matters that have cropped
up in G.R. No. 75749 with regards (sic) to which the court has neither
the means or (sic) the time to look into.
The appropriate agencies of DOLE should conduct hearings on
the contention of the bank that it is now impossible to reinstate the
remaining 41 respondents inspite (sic) of its alleged bona fide attempts
to find equivalent positions for them and on the counter-contentions of
the individual respondents that there was discrimination in the
reinstatement of their companions, that the contractual employees
were hired to displace them, that the bank employed harassment
tactics, and that their dismissal was summary, arbitrary, and malicious
in gross violation of this Court's twin resolutions on September 17 and
29, 1986.
All the unresolved factual questions call for the presentation of
evidence before the appropriate administrative agency. They cannot
be resolved through pleadings or oral arguments before the Court." 7
xxx xxx xxx

In view of this development, the respondents, including the forty-one (41)

individual respondents, led by Rolando Ocampo, Rowena Rebosa and Alfredo
del Pilar, were not reinstated by the bank.
Subsequently, arbitration of the Bank's petition continued with the issues
confined to these matters, viz:
"(a) whether or not the subject strikes, i.e., one that took place
on January 3 and 4, 1985 to March 11, 1985, were illegal; (b) whether
or not anyone of the individual respondents committed illegal acts
during the duration of the strikes; (c) whether or not the individual
respondents were illegally dismissed and/or locked out; and (d)
whether or not the respondent-employees are entitled to moral and
exemplary damages." 8

After weighing the arguments of both parties, the Arbiter ruled that:
"There is no dispute that under Art. 263, paragraph (g) of the
Labor Code, as amended, the assumption by the Secretary of Labor
and Employment over a labor dispute has the automatic effect of
enjoining any intended or impending strike or lockout. When then
Minister Blas Ople assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute between
the bank and the union on December 19, 1984, by operation of law, the
intended strike of the respondent union was automatically enjoined.
The union cannot feign ignorance of this legal mandate. It is the law
and compliance therewith cannot be excused on the more convenient
excuse of ignorance. Besides, the order of December 19, 1984 clearly
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 reiterated such legal injunction such that the respondent union may
not now be allowed to assert that it did not violate any law or order of
the lawful authorities when it staged the strike on January 3 and 4,
1985.
An assumption and/or certification order of the Secretary of Labor
automatically results in a return-to-work of all striking workers,
whether or not a corresponding order has been issued by the Secretary
of Labor. Once an assumption/certification order is issued strikers are
enjoined, or if one has already taken place, all strikers shall
immediately return to work. A strike that is undertaken despite the
issuance by the Secretary of Labor of an assumption or certification
order becomes a prohibited activity and thus illegal. . . .
Admittedly the respondent union went on strike on January 3 and
4, 1985, barely sixteen (16) days after then Minister of Labor and
Employment Blas Ople assumed jurisdiction. And while the labor
dispute between the parties was still pending before Minister Blas Ople,
another strike was staged on February 11, 1985 which continued up to
March 11, 1985. Being in violation of the provisions of Art. 263,
paragraph (g) of the Labor Code, as amended, as well as the
assumption order of December 19, 1984, both strikes are, therefore,
illegal and consequently, all union officers, namely, Tomas Gonzalo,
Crisanto Balisi, Norberto Aguja, Benito Barrera, Hernanie Sison,
Meynard Cuenca, Victor Alvares, Inocencio Salvador, Luisito Mendoza,
Arturo Villanueva, and Pedro Pascual, are declared to have lost their
employment status.

This Branch does not agree with the respondents' contention that
the strike on January 3 and 4, 1985 was already amicably settled
and/or condoned by the bank when it agreed to accept back to work
the striking workers. The bank merely complied with the return-to-work
order of Minister Blas Ople issued on January 6, 1985 but this did not
preclude the bank from questioning the legality or illegality of the said
strike.
Nor can this Branch accede to the respondents' assertion that
they are merely acting in self-defense when they resumed their
concerted activity on February 11, 1985 allegedly on account of unfair
labor practices committed by the bank's representatives and agents.
Regardless of their motives, or the validity of their claims, the striking
workers must cease and/or desist from any and all acts that tend to or
undermine the authority of Secretary of Labor and Employment once
an assumption order is issued. They cannot, for instance, ignore return-
to-work orders, citing unfair labor practices on the part of the company,
to justify their actions . . . ." 9

The Labor Arbiter qualified that, under Article 264 (a) of the Labor Code,
the individual respondents other than the union officers can be subjected to
dismissal only in cases where they knowingly participated in the commission of
illegal acts during the strike. Finding that all the individual respondents who
were not officers of the union did not commit the illegal acts complained of, the
Labor Arbiter held that they cannot validly be declared to have lost their
employment status.
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 With regard to the question of whether or not the Bank validly dismissed
the respondents for their failure to obey the return-to-work notices, the Labor
Arbiter held:
". . . Implicit in the petitioner's argument is that the individual
respondents by their failure to comply with the published return-to-
work order are liable for abandonment of work. Abandonment as a
ground for dismissal must be shown to be deliberate and that the
employee involved has shown no more inclination to resume work. This
is not true in the instant case. At the time they were terminated by the
bank, the individual respondents were then on strike, and until the
legality or illegality of the strike is resolved, the petitioner did not have
any basis for terminating the individual respondents' services.
Precisely, the primary reason why the respondents struck was rooted
on their conviction that their economic demands that led to bargaining
deadlock were justified. If the respondents through the strike have
shown their eagerness in improving their employment situation, how
could they now be held liable for abandonment. The grounds relied
upon by the bank in terminating the individual respondents being non-
existent, perforce such subject termination must be held to be without
just and valid grounds, and consequently, the individual respondents
are entitled to reinstatement with back wages from the time of their
termination until their actual reinstatement." 10

Hence, the Labor Arbiter's disposition of the case, viz.:

"WHEREFORE, all the foregoing premises being considered,
judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

a) Declaring the strikes complained of as illegal and

consequently, all union officers, namely, Tomas Gonzalo, Crisanto
Balisi, Norberto Aguja, Benito Barrera, Hernanie Sison, Meynard
Cuenca, Victor Alvarez, Inocencio Salvador, Luisito Mendoza, Arturo
Villanueva, and Pedro Pascual, lost their employment status;

b) Dismissing the petition to declare the strike illegal as against

the other individual respondents;
c) Declaring the dismissal of the abovenamed 163 counter-
complainants as illegal and ordering the petitioner Allied Banking
Corporation to pay their aggregate back wages and other computed
benefits in the total sum of P5,049,692.73;

d) Ordering the petitioner Allied Banking Corporation to reinstate

the forty-one (41) counter-complainants led by Rolando Ocampo,
Rowena Rebosa and Alfredo del Pilar, to their former or substantially
equivalent position with all the rights, privileges and benefits
appertaining thereto including seniority, and to pay them their
backwages and other computed benefits in the aggregate sum of
P3,548,213.80 plus moral and exemplary damages in the aggregate
amount of P615,000.00; and
e) Ordering the petitioner Allied Banking Corporation to pay
attorney's fees in the amount of P921,290.65. 11

On September 29, 1992, the forty-one (41) respondents who were ordered
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 reinstated filed a "Motion to Issue Partial Writ of Execution." This was granted
by the Labor Arbiter.

On September 30, 1992, petitioner appealed from the decision of the

Labor Arbiter. Respondents, on the other hand, filed, on October 2, 1992, a
partial appeal from the aforesaid decision of the Labor Arbiter praying that the
decision be modified: (1) to reflect in the computation of back wages the actual
basic monthly rates of the individual union members, including the other
employees' benefits; (2) to order the payment of actual, moral, and exemplary
damages, including attorney's fees to all 163 dismissed employees; (3) to order
the reinstatement of all dismissed 163 employees; and (4) to include
"Innocencio Salvador ". . . as one of the Union officers deemed to have lost
their employment status."
On October 6, 1992, petitioner filed a motion to quash the writ of
execution. This was denied on November 5, 1992. While the Labor Arbiter's
September 4, 1992 decision and his September 30, 1992 writ of execution
limited his identification of those to be reinstated pending appeal to the forty-
one (41) complainants led by Rolando Ocampo, Rowena Rebosa and Alfredo del
Pilar, he later on identified all the respondents to be reinstated in his Order,
dated November 5, 1992, rationalizing that —
"This alleged ground cited that other than three (3) individual
respondents, namely, Rolando Ocampo, Alfredo del Pilar and Rowena
Rebosa, the thirty-eight (38) others were not identified, the petitioner-
bank cannot feign its lack of awareness as to who are the thirty-eight
(38) other individual respondents considering that the petitioner itself
notified the Supreme Court in its Manifestation/Motion filed on March 7,
1988 that —

'2. Since October 7, 1986 to date, petitioner has found

equivalent positions only for 71 among 112 of those ordered
reinstated by this Honorable Court, although petitioner Bank paid
their salaries and other monetary benefits continuously from
October 1986 to the present without rendering work, to the
damage and prejudice of petitioner;

'3. Petitioner has exhausted all possible means to look for

adequate equivalent positions for the remaining 41 employees
but to no avail. . . .'

"The petitioner attached to the said Manifestation/Motion a list of

the forty-one (41) employees together with the corresponding
separation pay and other benefits they are supposed to receive. And
these forty-one (41) employees are, as follows: Daisy Adriano, Luisito
Arellano, Teodoro Banaticla, Ruben Beltran, Jose Bufi, Walfrido
Calcabin, Roy Casido, Edna Cioco, Rosauro Clerigo, Mary Ann Co, Delia
Conde, Judith dela Cruz, Roberta dela Cruz, Carmen delos Santos,
Rogelio Edora, Raul Gonzales, Balagtas Hernandez, Gerardo Ilano, Alan
de Jesus, Hector Juliano, Teresita Licarte, Tony Manaois, Jaime Manipis,
Edgar Marcelo, Rufino Marquez, Edgardo Nicasio, Rolando Ocampo,
Irene Ocos, Herson Ozarraga, Alfredo del Pilar, Elpidio Pineda, Alfredo
Raymundo, Rowena Rebosa, Dexter Sanchez, Romeo Simon, Noel Solis,
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 Evangeline Saulog, Fe Uy, Ruel Velarde, Veronica Villarica, and Mario
Marquez." 12

On November 19, 1992, petitioner filed with the NLRC a consolidated

petition for injunction docketed as NLRC NCR IC NO. 000316-92.

But, before the NLRC could decide on the issue of reinstatement pending
appeal, respondents filed a petition for mandamus with us, docketed as G.R.
No. 110687, to compel the Chairman of the NLRC to issue a writ of execution as
regards the reinstatement aspect of the Labor Arbiter's September 4, 1992
decision.

On December 15, 1993, we promulgated a resolution dismissing the

aforesaid petition for mandamus.
On April 7, 1994, the NLRC issued an Order directing the reinstatement of
forty-one (41) respondents pending appeal and at the same time dismissing the
bank's petition for injunction.

The NLRC upheld the Labor Arbiter's finding that the strikes staged by the
employees of the bank on January 3 & 4, 1985 and from February 11 to March
11, 1985 were in violation of the provisions of Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code,
as amended, as well as the Assumption Order of December 19, 1984 and as
such the striking union members had lost their employment status.

However, in spite of its conclusion that the respondents were validly

dismissed the NLRC opined that "the 41 . . . respondents earned for themselves
the right to be reinstated not only under Article 223 of the Labor Code, as
amended by R.A. 6715, on March 2, 1989, but retroactive September 15, 1986,
the date the Supreme Court ordered the implementation of the Order of MOLE
Minister Sanchez directing the reinstatement of 'all striking employees except
those who have accepted separation pay' [as 'only 71 of the 112 affected
employees' were reinstated by the Bank (May 4, 1988 Resolution of the
Supreme Court in G.R. 71239 and G.R. 75749 p. 7)]. It then remanded to the
Labor Arbiter the query of whether or not the subject forty-one (41) individual
respondents, who were not reinstated since 1986, can validly be paid back
wages from September 1986 up to the time the NLRC promulgated its decision.
The dispositive portion of the assailed decision reads as follows:
"WHEREFORE, the appealed September 4, 1992 Decision insofar
as concerns disposition (b) to (e) thereof, is hereby set aside.
Our Order of April 7, 1994 is hereby reconsidered and likewise
set aside. Instead, the question of whether or not the forty-one (41)
individual Respondents (led by Rolando Ocampo, Rowena Rebosa and
Alfredo del Pilar) are entitled to back wages corresponding to the
period that they should have been reinstated since 1986 is hereby
remanded to the Arbiter of origin pursuant to the earlier quoted
guideline of the Supreme Court in its May 4, 1988 resolution." 13

The opposing parties moved for a reconsideration of the said decision,

which motions were denied in a Resolution of the NLRC, dated July 8, 1994.

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 Hence, these petitions.

The crux of the present controversy is whether or not the striking union
members terminated for abandonment of work after failing to obey the return-
to-work order of the Secretary of Labor and Employment, should be reinstated
with back wages.

Respondents contend that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion

when it ruled that their dismissal is legal considering that mere participation of
union members in an illegal strike should not automatically result in their
termination from employment. 14
We agree with respondents' contention that mere participation of union
members in an illegal strike should not automatically result in their termination
from employment. However, the case at bar involves a different issue as a
perusal of the records shows that respondents were terminated from
employment by reason of their defiance to the return-to-work order of the
Secretary of Labor. Respondents staged a strike on January 3 and 4, 1985 or
fourteen (14) days after then Labor Minister Ople assumed jurisdiction over the
dispute between them and the bank. Thereafter, respondents again staged a
strike from February 11 up to March 11, 1985 while their labor dispute with the
Bank was still pending before Minister Ople.

The provisions of law which govern the effects of defying a return-to-work

order are:
1) Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code

xxx xxx xxx

"When, in his opinion, there exists a labor dispute causing or
likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to the
national interest, the Secretary of Labor and Employment may assume
jurisdiction over the dispute and decide it or certify the same to the
Commission for compulsory arbitration. Such assumption or
certification shall have the effect of automatically enjoining the
intended or impending strike or lockout as specified in the assumption
or certification order. If one has already taken place at the time of
assumption or certification, all striking or locked out employees shall
immediately return to work and the employer shall immediately
resume operations and readmit all workers under the same terms and
conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout. The Secretary of
Labor and Employment or the Commission may seek the assistance of
law enforcement agencies to ensure compliance with this provision as
well as with such orders as he may issue to enforce the same . . ." (as
amended by Sec. 27, R.A. 6715; emphasis supplied.)

2) Article 264 (a)

"No strike or lockout shall be declared after assumption of
jurisdiction by the President or the Minister or after certification or
submission of the dispute to compulsory or voluntary arbitration or
during the pendency of cases involving the same grounds for the strike
or lockout.
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 Any worker whose employment has been terminated as a
consequent of an unlawful lockout shall be entitled to reinstatement
with full back wages. Any union officer who knowingly participates in
an illegal strike and any worker or union officer who knowingly
participates in the commission of illegal acts during a strike may be
declared to have lost his employment status: Provided, That mere
participation of a worker in a lawful strike shall not constitute sufficient
ground for termination of his employment, even if a replacement had
been hired by the employer during such lawful strike."

In the case of Union of Filipro Employees v. Nestle Philippines., Inc., 15 we

ruled that a strike undertaken despite the issuance by the Secretary of Labor of
an assumption or certification order becomes a prohibited activity and thus,
illegal, pursuant to Article 264 (a) of the Labor Code. Moreover, the union
officers and members who have participated in the said illegal activity, are, as a
result, deemed to have lost their employment status. Thus, we held that:
"UFE completely misses the underlying principle embodied in Art.
263 (g) on the settlement of labor disputes and this is, that assumption
and certification orders are executory in character and are to be strictly
complied with by the parties even during the pendency of any petition
questioning their validity. This extraordinary authority given to the
Secretary of Labor is aimed at arriving at a peaceful and speedy
solution to labor disputes, without jeopardizing national interests.
Regardless therefore of their motives, or the validity of their
claims, the striking workers must cease and/or desist from any and all
acts that tend to, or undermine this authority of the Secretary of Labor,
once an assumption and/or certification order is issued. They cannot,
for instance, ignore return-to-work orders, citing unfair labor practices
on the part of the company, to justify their actions. . . ."

'xxx xxx xxx

One other point that must be underscored is that the

return-to-work order is issued pending the determination of the
legality or illegality of the strike. It is not correct to say that it
may be enforced only if the strike is legal and may be
disregarded if the strike is illegal, for the purpose precisely is to
maintain the status quo while the determination is being made.
Otherwise, the workers who contend that their strike is legal can
refuse to return to their work and cause a standstill on the
company operations while retaining the positions they refuse to
discharge or allow the management to fill. Worse, they will also
claim payment for work not done, on the ground that they are
still legally employed although actually engaged in the activities
inimical to their employer's interest.

This is like eating one's cake and having it too, and at the
expense of the management. Such an unfair situation surely was
not contemplated by our labor laws and cannot be justified under
the social justice policy, which is a policy of fairness to both labor
and management. Neither can this unseemly arrangement be
sustained under the due process clause as the order, if thus
interpreted, would be plainly oppressive and arbitrary.'"
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 In the cases of Sarmiento v. Tuico , 16 and Asian Transmission Corporation
v. National Labor Relations Commission , 17 we explained the rationale for this
rule:
"It is also important to emphasize that the return-to-work order
not so much confers a right as it imposes a duty; and while as a right it
may be waived, it must be discharged as a duty even against the
worker's will. Returning to work in this situation is not a matter of
option or voluntariness but of obligation. The worker must return to his
job together with his co-workers so the operations of the company can
be resumed and it can continue serving the public and promoting its
interest. That is the real reason such return can be compelled. So
imperative is the order in fact that it is not even considered violative of
the right against involuntary servitude, as this Court held in Kaisahan
Ng Mga Manggagawa sa Kahoy v. Gotamco Sawmills . The worker can
of course give up his work, thus severing his ties with the company, if
he does not want to obey the order; but the order must be obeyed if he
wants to retain his work even if his inclination is to strike."

This principle was reiterated in the case of St. Scholastica's College v.

Torres, 18 wherein we cited the case of Federation of Free Workers v. Inciong , 19
and held that:
"A strike undertaken despite the issuance by the Secretary of
Labor of an assumption or certification order becomes a prohibited
activity and thus illegal, pursuant to the second paragraph of Art. 264
of the Labor Code as amended. . . . The Union officers and members, as
a result, are deemed to have lost their employment status for having
knowingly participated in an illegal act."

Hence, respondents' failure to immediately comply with the return-to-work

order dated, December 16, 1984 and January 6, 1985 cannot be condoned.

Respondents also contend that there is nothing on record to prove that

they knowingly participated in an illegal strike. 20
Private respondents' contentions are belied by the records as there was
an assumption order already issued by the Minister of Labor when they first
conducted a strike on January 3 and 4, 1985, and this assumption order was
still in effect when they struck continuously from February 11 to March 11,
1995. This knowledge of the assumption order is manifested in their answer
dated September 26, 1985, which was summarized in the Decision of the Labor
Arbiter dated September 4, 1992, the pertinent portions of which are hereby
quoted:
"On their part, the individual respondents in their answer dated
September 26, 1985 denied that the strike on January 3 and 4, 1985
was illegal contending that there was already an amicable settlement
pursuant to which the bank agreed to accept back to work all striking
employees. Further, the said respondents alleged that the bank in an
Order dated January 6, 1985 was directed to accept back all striking
employees under the same terms and conditions previous to work
stoppage and this order allegedly became final and executory.
Regarding the strike on February 11, 1985, the respondents argued
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 that the same is legal for the following alleged reasons, namely: (a)
they resorted to such concerted action upon the representation of the
union officers that it was legal; (b) said concerted action was
resumption of their picketing activities considering that the Order of
January 31, 1985 was nothing but a mere reiteration of the position
taken by the bank on the deadlocked issues and the Minister unjustly
ignored the position of the respondents; (c) the said action was justified
in view of alleged acts of the bank amounting to unfair labor practices;
and (d) the order of January 31, 1985 of the Minister has not yet
become final considering that there was filed by this union a motion for
reconsideration on February 11, 1985. The respondents charged as
unfair labor practice the act of the petitioner in publishing in
metropolitan newspapers the notices requiring the striking employees
to return to work under threat of disciplinary action contending that it
was a coercive act which was tantamount to interference and restraint
when the publication adverted to the concerted action on February 11,
1985 as illegal. Furthermore, the respondents argued that even if the
strike staged by them was illegal, they did not incur any liability for the
following stated reasons, to wit: a) the individual respondents
participated in the strike on the strength of representations/assurances
made by union officers that the strike was legal; b) they have acted in
good faith and merely exercised their constitutional right to strike and
engage in concerted action; c) they acted in defense of their political
and economic rights which were allegedly ignored by the Minister of
Labor; d) they have acted in peaceful and orderly manner during the
picketing and they did not commit any illegal or violent act; e) they
have faithfully complied with the orders of the Minister of Labor and f)
they merely acted in self-defense to repel the continuing acts of unfair
labor practices committed by the petitioner's representatives and
agents." 21

Furthermore, private respondents contend that a strike is not

synonymous with abandonment of work as the employer-employee relationship
is not terminated during the duration of the strike but merely suspended. They
also cited the cases of Insular Life Assurance Co. Ltd., Employees Association —
NATU v. The Insular Life Assurance Co. Ltd., 22 and the case of RCPI v. Philippine
Communications Electronics & Electricity Worker's Federation , 23 wherein we
held that mere failure to report for work after notice to return, does not
constitute abandonment nor bar reinstatement.

However, private respondents failed to take into consideration the cases

recently decided by this Court which emphasized on the strict adherence to the
rule that defiance of the return-to-work order of the Secretary of Labor would
constitute a valid ground for dismissal.

The respective liabilities of striking union officers and members who failed
to immediately comply with the return-to-work order, are clearly spelled out in
Article 264 of the Labor Code which provides that any declaration of a strike or
lockout after the Secretary of Labor and Employment has assumed jurisdiction
over the labor dispute is considered an illegal act. Therefore, any worker or
union officer who knowingly participates in a strike defying a return-to-work
order may as a result thereof be considered to have lost his employment
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 status.

Moreover, as aptly stated by the NLRC in its decision:

"Abandonment of work as a ground to dismiss under Article 282
(b) of the Labor Code should not be confused with abandonment of
work under the law on strike, particularly those as provided in Article
263 (g) and Article 264 (a) of the Labor Code. To rule that [t]o
constitute abandonment of position, there must be concurrence of the
intention to abandon and some overt act from which it may be inferred
that the employee concerned has no more interest in working . . . while
available as a defense against dismissals under Article 282 of the Labor
Code, cannot, however, be validly invoked in dismissals resulting from
a striker's defiance of a DOLE Secretary's assumption order so clearly
spelled out in Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code, much less as a defense
against the ban on strikes after assumption of jurisdiction by . . . the
Minister of Labor and Employment (Article 264 (a), Labor Code)." 24

Furthermore, as non-compliance with an assumption or certification order

is considered as an illegal act committed in the course of a strike, the Ministry
of Labor and Employment (now DOLE) is authorize to impose such sanctions as
may be provided for by law which may include the hiring of replacements for
workers defying the order. In the case of Jackbilt Concrete Block Company, Inc.
v. Norton and Harrison Company , 25 it appeared that in an earlier decision the
Supreme Court ordered the reinstatement without back wages of the strikers
who staged a strike on the good-faith belief that the Company had committed
an unfair labor practice. Some of the strikers reported for work and were
reinstated. The rest of the strikers listed in the order either ignored or
disobeyed said order. Of the strikers who reported for work, some have either
not submitted themselves to medical examination as required and did not
report back anymore or after having gone through medical examination, did
not report back for work, or after reporting back for work did not continue
working anymore and the others were found suffering from disease and unfit for
work.

Before the Supreme Court, the Company raised in issue the employment
status of the strikers who failed to comply with the return-to-work order,
contending that they should be declared to have forfeited their right to
reinstatement. Sustaining this contention, the Supreme Court said:
"We are also of the opinion and so hold that the strikers who
failed, without proper justification, to report for work assignment
despite the issuance of the orders reinstating them to their jobs are
deemed to have forfeited their right to reinstatement. Their
unexplained failure to request for another period or an extended period
within which to comply with the reinstatement orders and report back
for work militates against them.
I n East Asiatic Company Ltd., et al. vs. CIR, et al., G.R. No. L-
29068, August 31, 1971, 40 SCRA 521, this Court had occasion to rule
that the failure to report for work when one had the opportunity to do
so waived thereby his right to reinstatement. Because of the apparent
lack of interest of the strikers concerned as shown by their failure to
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 report for work without justifiable reason with the petitioner herein, We
are constrained to declare them to have forfeited their right to
reinstatement."

In the case at bar, we fully agree with the ruling of the NLRC in declaring
that respondents were validly dismissed considering their defiance of the
return-to-work order issued by the Secretary of Labor. As a consequence of
such defiance, they are considered severed from their employment.

Apparently, the basis of the portion of NLRC's decision remanding the

issue of back wages to the Labor Arbiter, is this Court's Resolution dated May 4,
1988 issued in the cases of Allied Bank Employees Union-NUBE, et al. v. Hon.
Blas Ople, et al., G.R. No. 71239 and Allied Banking Corporation v. Hon. Augusto
S. Sanchez, et al., G.R. No. 75749. In the said resolution we remanded the
aforecited cases to the Department of Labor, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
"Considering the foregoing, the Court RESOLVED to DISMISS the
instant petitions and to REMAND them to the Department of Labor and
Employment and its pertinent agencies for further proceedings as
outlined in this resolution. This action is without prejudice to either or
both parties filing an appropriate and concise petition with this Court, if
they are so minded after the final administrative determination of the
issues has been made." 26

Furthermore, a perusal of our Resolution reveals that the issue of whether

or not the forty one (41) respondents should be paid back wages from
September, 1986 up to the date of the promulgation of the decision, was not
raised therein. Only the determination of factual matters, i.e., whether or not
the strike was illegal; the roles played by respondents should the strike be
declared illegal; issue of representation and the impossibility of reinstating the
41 respondents by bank, were remanded by this Court to the DOLE.
This Resolution of ours, as must be noted, was issued when the petition to
declare the strike illegal has not yet been resolved. It was only resolved last
September 4, 1992, when the NLRC issued a Decision declaring the strike
illegal and upholding the dismissal of the respondents. The reinstatement
ordered by then Minister Sanchez, in his August 29, 1986 order, was only
provisional and subject to the outcome of the petition to declare the strike
illegal, viz.:
"In his order dated August 29, 1986, Minister Sanchez ordered
reinstatement pending the final outcome of the petition initiated by the
Bank to declare the strike illegal. The reinstatement is, therefore,
provisional. A permanent reinstatement will depend on the legality or
illegality of the strike."
As a consequence of the declaration of the illegality of the strike and the
upholding of the dismissal of respondents in the NLRC Decision, the factual
matters mentioned in our Resolution dated May 4, 1988 have already become
moot and academic.

Moreover, an award of back wages is incompatible with the findings of the

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 NLRC upholding the dismissal of respondents.

The NLRC's disposition of the case remanding to the Labor Arbiter the
issue of reinstating respondents and the computation of their back wages is an
illogical consequence of respondents' valid dismissal from their employment.
Such disposition is inconsistent with our pronouncement in the cases aforecited
and should be struck down as having been issued with grave abuse of
discretion.

Respondents also contend that the NLRC should have adopted a liberal
approach favoring labor which this Court has upheld in its decisions and that
the employers are urged to be more compassionate as to their workers' needs.
27

We agree with respondents' contention that this Court should view with
compassion the plight of the workers. However, this sense of compassion
should be coupled with a sense of fairness and justice to the parties concerned.
Hence, while social justice has an inclination to give protection to the working
class, the cause of the labor sector is not upheld at all times as the employer
has also a right entitled to respect in the interest of simple fair play. 28 Thus, in
the case of St. Scholastica's College v. Torres, 29 we stated that:
"The sympathy of the Court which, as a rule, is on the side of the
laboring classes (Reliance Surety and Insurance Co., Inc. v. NLRC ),
cannot be extended to the striking union officers and members in the
instant petition. There was willful disobedience not only to one but two
return-to-work orders. Considering that the UNION consisted mainly of
teachers, who are supposed to be well-lettered and well-informed, the
court cannot overlook the plain arrogance and pride displayed by the
UNION in this labor dispute. Despite containing threats of disciplinary
action against some union officers and members who actively
participated in the strike, the letter dated 9 November 1990 sent by
the COLLEGE enjoining the union officers and members to return to
work under the same terms and conditions prior to the strike. Yet, the
UNION decided to ignore the same. The COLLEGE, correspondingly, had
every right to terminate the services of those who chose to disregard
the return-to-work orders issued by respondent SECRETARY in order to
protect the interests of its students who form part of the youth of the
land."

WHEREFORE, the NLRC Decision of May 20, 1994 is AFFIRMED with

respect to the finding that private respondents were validly dismissed.
However, as to its disposition that the issue of reinstatement and computation
of back wages be remanded to the Labor Arbiter, the same, being inconsistent
with the finding of valid dismissal, is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.

Padilla, Bellosillo, Vitug, and Kapunan, JJ ., concur.

Footnotes

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 1. Docketed as G.R. No. 116128.
2. Docketed as G.R. No. 116461.

3. G.R. No. 116128, Rollo , p. 91.

4. G.R. No. 116128, Rollo , pp. 95-99
5. Record, p. 507.

6. G.R. No. 116128, Rollo , p. 44.

7. G.R. No. 116128, Rollo , pp. 46-48.
8. Id., Rollo , pp. 49-50.

9. G.R. No. 116128, Rollo , pp. 51-52.

10. G.R. No. 116128, Rollo , p. 53.
11. G.R. No. 116128, Rollo , pp. 54-55.
12. G.R. No. 116128, Rollo , pp. 57-58.

13. G.R. No. 116128, Rollo , p. 68.

14. G.R. No. 116461, Rollo , pp. 80-89.
15. 192 SCRA 396 (1990).

16. 162 SCRA 676 (1988).

17. 179 SCRA 582 (1989).
18. 210 SCRA 565 (1992).

19. 208 SCRA 157 (1992).

20. G.R. No. 116461, Rollo , pp. 89-90.
21. G.R. No. 116128, Rollo , pp. 305-306.
22. 37 SCRA 244 (1971).

23. 58 SCRA 763 (1974).

24. G.R. No. 116128, Rollo , pp. 62-63.
25. 71 SCRA 44 (1976).

26. G.R. No. 116128, Rollo , p. 49.

27. Rollo, p. 86.
28. National Sugar Refineries Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission,
220 SCRA 452 (1993).

29. 210 SCRA 565 (1992).

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