Being Saved: Explorations in Human Salvation

Introduction:

Being Saved – Explorations in Human Salvation

MARC CORTEZ, JOSHUA R. FARRIS AND S. MARK HAMILTON

There is a growing interest in theological anthropology at the intersection of philosophy and systematic theology. Many recent works have offered theologically thoughtful treatments of the human person from a philosophical perspective, some ranging broadly over the entirety of theological anthropology, and others focusing more specifically on particular anthropological issues. To date, though, few works have tried to marry the findings of these theological and philosophical discussions with the doctrine of salvation. Being Saved: Explorations in Human Salvation attempts to fill the lacuna between human ontology and soteriology in a way that reflects the fruits of these philosophical and theological developments. This collection of chapters facilitates an increased interdisciplinary dialogue that brings various dogmatic subcategories in the doctrine of Salvation – e.g. Divine Decrees, Regeneration, Faith, Justification, Sanctification, Union with Christ, Resurrection, Satisfaction, and Glorification – into conversation with contemporary philosophical discussions of the nature of human persons.

On the one hand, these chapters emphasize the importance of maintaining the link between theological anthropology and soteriology. Historically speaking, theologians have always maintained that we can only understand who and what human persons are in light of how they are saved in and through the work of the triune God. On the other hand, we cannot comprehend the nature of salvation independently of our beliefs about the nature of those creatures God seeks to save. The relationship between anthropology and soteriology has been so tightly joined historically that earlier theological works often did not treat theological anthropology as a discrete doctrine. With the modern era, however, we see an increased emphasis on anthropology as its own field of study, leading to an increased tendency, even among Christian theologians, to study human persons in relative independence from soteriological considerations. Although the chapters in this volume often evidence a desire to understand the human person in dialogue with modern philosophical developments, they actually bear witness to an older theological intuition that insists on the inseparability of anthropology and soteriology in systematic theology.

That we understand our anthropology in this way seems particularly important in light of our contemporary cultural climate, characterized as it is by intellectual disintegration and growing fragmentation. Clear, cogent, holistic, and synthetic thinking is needed for communicating the Christian message. The task of theologians is an important part of the task of communicating Divine truth in every age. In our opinion, theological thinking is not complete until we have, at a minimum, forged a link between the doctrinal location of the topic at hand to a wider doctrinal frame of reference. The success of the systematician’s task is reflected in the ongoing attempt to clarify doctrine and organize it in our cultural context and historical period, in order that we might effectively carry on the message of what we believe as a message of hope for modern times. And it is along two conversational or dialogical axes that this message unfolds.

The first axis of the dialogue represented by these chapters is an intramural conversation between the various loci of systematic theology, specifically those focused more on anthropological and soteriological issues. The second axis of the conversation operates in a more interdisciplinary mode, utilizing various philosophical resources for engaging theological issues. Here again we are confronted with the intuitive link between the who and what of anthropology and the how of salvation, this time drawing more intentionally on the many ways that philosophical discussions might shed light on all three of these questions. For example, philosoph­ical discussions regarding the nature of human constitution (e.g. the issues surrounding the relationship of body and soul) affect our understanding of the role the body might play in salvation both now and in the eschaton. Similarly, discussions of divine and human action as they relate to the process of salvation are inevitably shaped by philosophical considerations regarding things like agency, action, causality and freedom. Or we might consider the many issues involved in the doctrine of sin, including debates about personal identity, corporate liability, the transferability of guilt, and so on. All of these are areas that have received considerable attention in the philosophical literature, generating areas of potentially fruitful dialogue for systematic theologians today.

In what follows, we have attempted to exemplify both axes of this dialogue in a set of chapters that address a range of soteriological and anthropological issues through engagement with a variety of philosophical resources.

Although united in their commitment to explore both the intramural and interdisciplinary axes described above, the chapters in this volume represent a diverse group of thinkers. Perhaps the most obvious manifestation of this diversity lies in the methodological differences represented by each chapter. Some leverage more philosophy than theology; others, more theology than philosophy. Although each offers some kind of constructive engagement with its source material, some chapters prioritize the expository work of retrieval through extended dialogue with some aspect of the Christian trad­ition. Others offer a more systematic approach to a particular set of issues. Some chapters deal in large part with the Christian Scriptures; others focus more on dogmatics. A number of these chapters manifest the attributes commonly associated with the analytic philosophical tradition, particularly the emphasis on logical argumentation and terminological precision. Others operate with a clear commitment to clarity but without any obvious dependence on such analytic modes of discourse.

Avoiding a homogenous approach to this multi-levelled discussion is a conscious editorial choice; one that we think provides readers with a critical resource that will undoubtedly invigorate some much-needed discussion about the intersection of Christian theology and philosophy. Organized according to a traditional, dogmatic theological categorization of Christian soteriology, Being Saved: Explorations in Human Salvation examines key structures of the doctrine of salvation in light of diverse metaphysical commitments about human persons for the purpose of theological exploration and dogmatic construction.

Sin, Evil and Salvation

The first set of chapters in the volume focuses on questions related to sin and evil. Christian theologians have long reflected on the nature of salvation in light of the fundamental problems from which the world needs to be saved. Consequently, the four chapters in this part delve into some of the challenging issues that arise from any attempt to understand salvation in the context of a world shaped so pervasively by sin and evil.

Ryan Mullins begins this discussion by arguing that we should understand salvation in the context of the defeat of evil and the hope of resurrection, both of which require us to reflect on the ontological status of past events – often shaped by sin, evil and suffering – in the eschatological state. Mullins thus makes a soteriological argument in favour of a presentist account of temporal persistence. On his so-called ‘minimalist criterion’ for what the work of Christ’s actually amounts to and accomplishes for the believer – deliverance from evil, alleviation of suffering and full (physical and spiritual) healing – Mullins recommends that Christians adopt an understanding of the nature of time and their place in it which says that the only things that exist are those that exist right now, in the present (hence, presentism). While arguing in favour of this, Mullins also argues against the so-called eternalist position, (roughly) according to which all moments of time (past, present and future moments) exist in some real sense.

Greg Trickett and Tyler Taber take on the difficult questions raised by God’s apparent ‘hiddenness’ in the midst of pain and suffering, focusing more specifically on a soteriological form of that argument: the fact that divine hiddenness seems to be a contributing factor in why so many fail to respond to the gospel. If God was more obvious, it would seem reasonable to think that more might be saved. To respond to this worry, Trickett and Taber provocatively draw on the idealist ontology of George Berkeley to contend that the metaphysical assumption that all physical things are Divine communications to human minds eliminates the problem of Divine hiddenness.

Moving away from questions focused primarily on evil and suffering, Jonathan Rutledge engages the question of the relationship between retribution and salvation. According to Rutledge, we should reject any strong version of retributive logic in which God must punish all sin. Arguing against both philosophical and biblical arguments for strong retributivism, Rutledge contends that we have no good reasons for thinking that retribution is the primary motivation behind divine acts of judgement, suggesting instead that we focus more on the restoration motifs he finds in the biblical texts.

Continuing this discussion of the relationship between sin and punishment, Daniel Houck’s chapter focuses more specifically on original sin as a key problem that must be addressed by any adequate account of salvation. Noting the increasing popularity of accounts that seek to differentiate sin as ‘punishment’ (or maybe consequence) from sin as ‘guilt’ in their understanding of original sin, Houck contends that such accounts would benefit from examining the resources offered and challenges faced by an early form of that argument, one offered by Peter Abelard. After summarizing Abelard’s argument in its historical context, Houck traces three key worries raised by such an approach, noting some of the difficult challenges that continue to face any such account of original sin and guilt.

Joshua Farris and Mark Hamilton touch on the issues of sin, evil and salvation in their chapter on Reparative Substitution and the efficacy objection, which they argue is a modified and updated version of Anselmian satisfaction. The penal substitution model of atonement in particular has precipitated a great deal of recent interest, being held up by many Protestants as ‘the’ doctrine of atonement. In this chapter, the authors make a defence against a common objection to the Anselmian model of atonement that is often levelled against it by exponents of the penal substitution model, namely that Christ’s work does not accomplish anything for those whom it appears he undertakes his atoning work, but merely makes provision for salvation.

The Nature of Salvation

With the second set of chapters, we turn our attention to understanding the nature of salvation itself. The chapters in this part focus on discussing larger questions about how we should understand salvation and/or providing theological frameworks within which we should think about the relationship between ontology and salvation.

Oliver Crisp begins this discussion by peeling back several layers of the debate surrounding the doctrine of theosis and its relationship to that ever illusive and presently popular notion of human participation in the divine nature. Taking up one version of the doctrine – one that he reckons to be synonymous with Eastern depictions of divinization that stop short of effacing the humanity of individual persons and thereby retaining the creator/creature distinction – Crisp’s chapter issues some much-needed clarity about several developments to the doctrine of theosis in contemporary theological literature. Taking a cue from Thomas Flint and thereby a constructive step toward a more detailed model that reflects this clarity, Crisp offers several thought-provoking insights into Flint’s suggestion that humanity is somehow taken up or absorbed into the divine nature via the hypostatic union of the God-man.

Adonis Vidu argues that the events of Ascension and Pentecost provide a necessary theological framework within which we must understand the nature of salvation. Vidu explores the logical relationship of Christ’s ascension with the Spirit’s appearance at Pentecost in light of the divine missions. Working from the Apostolic record of Christ’s declaration that ‘if I do not go away, the Helper will not come to you’ (John 16.7), Vidu sets up the constructive segment of his argument in two parts. He offers up an exposition of Augustine and Aquinas’ account of divine processions and relations of origin, which he then puts into conversation with the findings of contemporary Catholic (Dominican) theologian, Edward Schillebeeckx, and Protestant theologian, Kathryn Tanner. He closes with a medley of thought-provoking soteriological reflections that are keyed to matters related to human participation.

Kate Kirkpatrick’s chapter takes up the question of whether we should understand salvation as the kind of thing that can happen by degrees, an idea that has long been viewed with suspicion by Protestant theologians. To explore this idea, Kirkpatrick takes us into the soteriological implications of Augustine’s notion of being and non-being. Offering a close reading and exposition of several key primary texts, Kirkpatrick contends that Augustine’s theology offers important resources for understanding a degreed account of salvation today.

Continuing the emphasis on the importance of pneumatology for understanding soteriology, the chapter by Myk Habets explores the resources that a ‘Third Article Theology’ offers for thinking about the nature of salvation. Habets argues for the necessity of reading Scripture as a coherent story that moves from protos to telos, with the Spirit playing a pivotal role in the outworking of this story. This then provides the framework for understanding salvation as the ‘theopoetic transformation’ of human persons that must be viewed as comprising a holistic duality of body and soul.

Working within the virtue ethics and epistemology literature, Benjamin Arbour presents a case for moving beyond several standard treatments. He argues that, within a weak foundationalism, thereby rejecting Cartesianism, we can and ought to ground our understanding of virtue epistemology in theology. For Arbour, it is the imago Dei that provides fertile soil enough to root and fruitfully extend the discussion on virtue epistemology. In this way, the present chapter touches on that aspect of salvation that consists of our ongoing salvation. Theologians call this the doctrine of sanctification, which is a process of transformation from corruption to holiness.

The Process of Salvation

The heading of the third part of this volume is intended to capture the sense that these chapters shift from thinking broadly about the nature of salvation as a whole to considering specific aspects of the outworking of salvation. These chapters thus involve discussions of the atonement, predestination, justification, regeneration and sanctification, among others.

With Andrew Loke’s chapter, we turn our attention to the relationship between predestination and human freedom in our view of salvation. According to Loke, we face two significant difficulties when trying to affirm both predestination and human freedom. First, Loke addresses whether it is even possible to maintain the compatibility of two such apparently contrary ideas, drawing on the Middle Knowledge account developed by Luis de Molina to demonstrate one way in which we might maintain the coherence of affirming both ideas. Second, Loke deals with the classic debate regarding the origin of the soul, focusing on the worry that both Traducianism and Creationism view the person’s destiny as determined by events that are ‘external’ to the person and consequently undermine that person’s freedom. Instead, Loke argues for a modified hylomorphic view that, when combined with the molinism of the prior section, offers a way of resolving this difficulty. John Fesko’s chapter turns our attention to the relationship between justification and sanctification. Fesko defends the idea that the holiness of the saints requires the corporate accomplishment and individual application of Christ’s judicial work. With one eye on the doctrine of union with Christ and by the lights of such Reformation symbols as the Westminster Shorter Catechism, Fesko makes a strong biblical case for his assertion that ‘justification is the determining condition for sanctification’.

Since the atonement unquestionably stands as a central element of most Christian views of salvation, this part includes Adam Johnson’s discussion of the atonement in dialogue with Karl Barth and Boethius on the nature of human personhood. Moving from Barth’s understanding of Christ’s saving work – particularly the implications of both the substitutionary and representative motifs – to the implications that this account of soteriology has for how we view the human person, Johnson contends that we must understand humanity teleologically as having its true identity ‘in Christ’.

Arguably the most historical chapter in this collection, Madison Grace’s ‘Being Christ: Salvation and Bonhoeffer’s Christo-Ecclesiology’ resources Bonhoeffer’s social ontology and brings Bonhoeffer into the contemporary discussions in constructive systematic theology. Like Bonhoeffer’s contemporary, Karl Barth, Bonhoeffer’s works are a trove of philosophical and theological ideas. Unlike Barth, whose works have been the source of much debate, much of Bonhoeffer’s work remains untouched by contemporary theologians. Grace recommends Bonhoeffer’s ecclesiology as a vehicle into other doctrinal topics, namely questions about union with Christ, the nature of the Church, society and the sacraments. Being an unlikely candidate, systematic theologians would be wise to engage more carefully and consciously with Bonhoeffer.

Staying on theme of justification, James Arcadi explores the connection between a particular way of understanding the Eucharist and the event of justification. Drawing on the theology of Edward Schillebeeckx and recent analytic discussions, Arcadi argues for a ‘social ontology’ in which the ontology of an object is shaped by what humans deem them to be. Applied to the Eucharist, this means that the elements actually become the body and blood of Christ because that is what they have been deemed to be by the minister through the power of the Spirit. Arcadi then contends that we can similarly view justification as an event in which God deems a human person to be righteous, explaining the implications that such an account would have for both Catholic and Protestant views.

Paul Helm examines the nature of the Spirit’s activity in the soteriological work of Regeneration. Canvassing the Reformed scholastic development of this doctrine – with the Thomistically seasoned theology of Stephen Charnock as his principal interlocutor – Helm launches into a constructive exposition of Jonathan Edwards’ Lockean-influenced account of regeneration. According to Helm, Charnock’s account of the Spirit’s work in regeneration sets Edwards’ account in relief at a variety of formal and material points from the scholastic tradition. Aside from a clarification of Edwards’ doctrine of regeneration, the result of Helm’s work, among other things, is in it distinguishing Edwards from the more well-worn paths trodden by his scholastic forebears and its provoking a variety of questions for which readers will pause to consider their own doctrine.

The Body, the Mind and Salvation

Carl Mosser extends the discussion on the nature of salvation by applying it specifically to the perfectibility of human nature. What does it mean for a human to be ‘perfect’ and to what extent should we utilize technological resources to transform human persons? Mosser thus enters into a conversation with two perspectives on the perfectibility of humanity: transhumanism and deification, raising significant questions about the viability of the former for offering an adequate framework within which we can develop a theologically satisfying account of personal transformation.

No account of sanctification can ignore the difficult questions raised by mental disorders and the extent to which we should understand such disorders under the label ‘sin’. Hans Madueme’s chapter tackles this difficult topic, addressing the polarity represented by ‘mental illness maximizers’ who view mental illnesses primarily as expressions of underlying biological or physical disorders and ‘sin maximizers’, who view mental illnesses primarily through the categories of agency and disobedience. Behind both perspectives lie certain assumptions about the mind–body relationship and the extent to which this shapes personal agency and responsibility. Working within this tension, Madueme argues for a mediating approach in which we must affirm the insights of both psychology and theology, recognizing the interdependence of mind and body without undermining the reality of sin and personal agency.

Theologians have long recognized the import of the mind–body debate for understanding salvation. Yet this debate typically revolves around physicalist and dualist perspectives, with various forms of idealism making the occasional appearance. Without rejecting these as options, Joanna Leidenhag’s chapter invites us to consider panpsychism as a viable alternative. Panpsychism is (roughly) the idea that mentality is a fundamental property of the universe such that all particular, even non-human particulars, possess some degree of consciousness. After summarizing the basic elements of panpsychism, Leidenhag discusses the implications such a view would have for soteriology, contending that panpsychism offers a viable way of understanding salvation that should be explored more thoroughly today.

In our final chapter, Marc Cortez discusses the significance of embodiment for the beatific vision, often viewed as the ultimate end of human salvation. Cortez addresses the argument that traditional views of the beatific vision, commonly represented by Thomas Aquinas, undermine the significance of the human body and that we should instead affirm the more embodied account of the beatific vision presented by Jonathan Edwards. After summarizing both accounts, Cortez argues instead that both views struggle to explain the eschatological significance of the human body and that we need to explore other avenues for conceiving the relationship between beatific vision and physical resurrection.

PART 1

Sin, Evil and Salvation

1

Identity Through Time and Personal Salvation

R. T. MULLINS

After reading other chapters in this book, one will naturally come to the opinion that the Christian understanding of salvation is complex and multifaceted. In this chapter I shall narrow my focus to two facets of Christian salvation: the defeat of evil and the proleptic hope of resurrection. The first facet is with regards to a future salvation that awaits fulfilment. The second facet focuses on the present salvific and life-transforming work of the Holy Spirit that comes with the hope of this future salvation.

It is my contention that human persons need salvation from evil and death. Part of the Christian story of salvation is that God shall ultimately defeat evil and bring about eschatological healing. Christianity claims that one day redeemed human persons will be saved from death by being resurrected to everlasting life. These individuals shall be healed by God and placed in everlasting community with God and the rest of the redeemed. These facets of Christian salvation are intended to fill believers with hope towards the future and shape the way that believers conduct their daily lives. However, this hope might be unfounded if certain theories of time are true.

In this chapter, I shall introduce readers to basic issues with regards to personal identity through time, and its relevance for understanding our future salvation from evil, and the hope that is supposed to spring from this. Section 1 of this chapter will introduce readers to basic theories in the ontology of time, and the corresponding theories of persistence through time. Section 2 will briefly note some reasons why Christians adopt certain theories on time called four-dimensionalism and eternalism. In section 3, I will then lay out my own theological and philosophical beliefs on the nature of time. Sections 4 and 5 will examine the problems that arise when four-dimensional eternalism is combined with Christian belief. Ultimately, I will argue that Christians ought not to be four-dimensional eternalists because it undermines Christian hope in salvation from evil.

1 The Ontology of Time and Persistence Through Time

Presentism and eternalism are theories about the ontology of time, or about what moments of time exist. Each is typically linked with a theory of change and persistence through time. Presentism is usually held alongside endurantism, whereas eternalism typically holds some version of four-dimensionalism. Allow me to elaborate.

Presentism is the thesis that only the present, the now, exists. The past no longer exists and the future does not yet exist.¹ Time involves temporal becoming, or absolute generation, as well as real passage from one moment to the next. New things that did not formerly exist come into existence, and other things pass out of existence or cease to exist.² For the presentist, it simply is the case that the only objects that exist are the ones that presently exist. As Trenton Merricks says of presentism, ‘an object has only those properties it has at the present time. The difference between past, present and future is metaphysical, not perspectival.’³

On presentism, an object endures through time. To say that an object endures through time is to say that an object is wholly present at each moment of its existence. Numerically one and the same object exists at each time that it exists, and it does not have parts at other times. On presentism and endurantism, objects undergo change by gaining and losing accidental properties over time. Let us say that some object O begins to exist at time t1 and persists all the way through to time t3. On this account, O exists entirely at each instant of time. Given presentism, as t2 comes into existence t1 ceases to exist and t3 does not yet exist. So O exists entirely at each instant only when that instant is the present. As O endures through time it will gain and lose various accidental, or non-essential, properties. Let us say that O is an armchair. At t1 the armchair is blue, and then at t2 someone paints the armchair such that at t3 the armchair is red. The armchair has retained all of its essential properties, but it has lost one accidental property – that of being blue – and gained a new accidental property – that of being red.

Eternalism will disagree with the presentist in several respects. On eternalism, all moments of time have equal ontological existence. To put it roughly, the past, present and the future all exist – they are all equally real. To put it more technically, there is no real distinction between past, present and future. There is just the four-dimensional space-time manifold with no privileged moment that marks the present.⁴ On this account there is no real passage of time, or temporal becoming, because all moments of time exist. Nothing ever comes into existence nor ceases to exist because everything simply does exist in the space-time manifold. As such, the experience of temporal passage is illusory.

On eternalism, the world is composed of time slices. Time slices are merely instants of time that can stand in earlier than and later than relations to other instants. The eternalist holds that all time slices simply exist in the space-time manifold. None ever come into nor pass out of existence. They are much like points on a map. In fact, most eternalists see a close connection between being located in space and being located at a time, whereas presentists reject the similarity between being located in space and located at a time.⁵

Recall that presentists hold that objects endure through time. On endurantism, objects persist over time by being wholly present at every moment at which they exist. There is numerically one object that persists from moment to moment. Eternalists typically disagree with presentists on how objects persist by rejecting endurantism. Thinkers who hold to eternalism typically hold to four-dimensionalism, which is the doctrine of temporal parts.⁶ Instead of numerically one object persisting through time, four-dimensionalism says that objects are spread out over time by having different temporal parts located at each time. Four-dimensionalists will often invoke a spatial analogy to help people understand the claim that is being made here. Objects have spatial parts that are extended throughout the three dimensions of space. For instance, my body is currently spread throughout a particular region of space. I have parts at different points in this spatial region. My feet are on the ground, my hands are on my desk, and so on. In a similar way, the four-dimensionalist says that objects have temporal parts that are extended throughout time, or the fourth dimension.⁷

On four-dimensionalism the entire world is a collection of numerically distinct temporal parts that exist at each instant of time.⁸ When thinking about how reality hangs together, four-dimensionalists commonly affirm two important metaphysical commitments that are worthy of our attention. These are metaphysical commitments that presentists and endurantists typically reject. The first four-dimensional commitment is metaphysical universalism. The metaphysical doctrine of universalism is the view that any collection of objects whatsoever has a sum, an object they compose. This is sometimes called an unrestricted mereology. ‘Any combination of temporal parts of any objects from any times, no matter how scattered and disparate, composes an object.’⁹ It could be possible for a four-dimensionalist to reject this metaphysical doctrine, though that will depend on other metaphysical and theological commitments she holds. For instance, she might adopt metaphysical universalism because she takes objects like bicycles and persons to be mere conventions.¹⁰ However, being a conventionalist about persons sounds much closer to Buddhist metaphysics than Christian metaphysics.¹¹

Another metaphysical commitment that four-dimensionalists typically hold, and that presentists typically reject, is Humean supervenience. Katherine Hawley describes this as the view that ‘facts about which intrinsic properties are instantiated at which points determine all the facts there are. There are no irreducibly holistic facts. In conjunction with four-dimensionalism, this entails that all the facts about a given persisting object supervene upon intrinsic facts about its briefest temporal parts.’¹² Again, a four-dimensionalist may reject this depending on her other metaphysical and theological commitments. What Christian thinkers must do, however, is make it clear which aspects of four-dimensionalism they wish to accept or reject if they wish to use four-dimensionalism in the defence and development of Christian doctrine. So far, this task has not been thoroughly undertaken.

Personal Persistence Through Time

In this chapter, I am not merely concerned with how objects persist over time. I am concerned with how persons persist over time. So I need to clear up a few issues with regards to personal persistence through time. In considering the matter of personal persistence, one needs to know how to answer the following question: what makes a person at one time the same person as an individual at some later time?

To illustrate this point, imagine that we ask Tony Bennett to sing ‘I Left My Heart in San Francisco’. If you are unfamiliar with this song, I suggest that you go and listen to it now. It is alright, I can wait. The song lasts for 2 minutes and 46 seconds. This book will still be here once you are done listening. Now that you are back, ask yourself this: What makes the Tony Bennett at the beginning of the song the same person as the Tony Bennett at the end of the song?

There are several ways to answer this question. The endurantist will say that Tony Bennett is entirely present throughout the 2 minutes and 46 seconds of his performance. There is numerically only one thing, Tony Bennett, who endures through the song. One might find this unsatisfying, and continue to ask what makes the Tony at the beginning of the song the same Tony as the one at the end of the song. The endurantist will say that nothing makes them the same Tony. This is because the endurantist affirms something called the simple theory of personal identity. On the simple view, there are no non-trivial or non-circular conditions for personal identity over time. This is because personal identity is a primitive notion that is not subject to a deeper analysis.¹³ The numerically one person that is Tony Bennett simply is identical to himself.

The four-dimensionalist will see things differently. For each second of the song there is a temporal part, or person stage, called Tony Bennett. The four-dimensionalist will say that each person stage is a Tony Bennett. There is the Tony Bennett that exists at t1 and another Tony Bennett that exists at t2, and so on. Yet one will ask how these Tony stages are the same person. The four-dimensionalist has a complicated story to tell here in order to answer this question. This is because the four-dimensionalist rejects the simple view of personal identity because she rejects numerical identity over time. Instead, she must adopt some version of the complex view of personal identity over time. On the complex view, there are substantive conditions for personal identity over time. The complex view says that personal identity can be explained in non-personal or sub-personal terms. What the complex theorist says is ‘that a person persists over time is nothing more than some other facts which are generally spelled out in either biological or psychological terms, or both’.¹⁴

Recall that the four-dimensionalist holds to metaphysical universalism – any temporal parts whatsoever can compose an object. This creates a very large number of bizarre objects, but that need not concern us at this time. Since the four-dimensionalist has rejected numerical identity over time, she will try to identify a continuity relation that connects certain temporal parts together in order to talk about personal persistence through time. This is sometimes referred to as the gen-identity relation in order to emphasize the fact that this is not numerical identity.¹⁵ As alluded to earlier, two sorts of continuity relations that a four-dimensionalist might appeal to are either biological or psychological. I shall focus on the psychological approach since it is the most popular.

On the psychological approach, what makes one person stage continuous with his later temporal counterpart is the fact that he is psychologically continuous with his later temporal counterpart. In other words, the two numerically distinct person stages share enough of the same psychology (memory, character traits, etc.) to count as the same person. Not just any kind of psychological continuity will do the trick. There has to be what is called an immanent causal relation that connects the person stages. An immanent causal relation obtains when one person stage causes a temporal counterpart at the next instant in time to have the relevant psychological states.¹⁶ This immanent causal relation rejects any sort of gap in time between distinct person stages in order to secure a tight personal continuity relation. The Tony stage at the beginning of ‘I Left My Heart in San Francisco’ is the same person as the Tony stage at the end of the song because they are psychologically continuous with one another. Further, there is an immanent causal relation between the different Tony stages. The Tony stage at the beginning of the song passes on his psychological states to the Tony stage at the next instant. This Tony stage passes on his psychological states to the Tony stage at the instant after that, who in turn passes on his psychological stages to the next Tony stage, and so on until we reach the Tony stage at the end of the song. Thus, according to the four-dimensionalist, making the Tony temporal counterparts the same Tony.

2 Why Might a Christian Hold Four-Dimensionalism and Eternalism?

Contemporary Christian philosophers and theologians have adopted four-dimensionalism and eternalism for various reasons. In this section I shall briefly note several of the most prominent reasons offered in favour of four-dimensional eternalism.

First, some are motived by scientific concerns. Four-dimensionalism and eternalism are often said to be derived from certain interpretations of the special theory of relativity. Why? One reason for thinking this is because there is nothing within the special theory of relativity that allows us to pick out a preferred reference frame for the cosmic present.¹⁷ In other words, nothing within the standard interpretations of the special theory of relativity helps us identify the present moment of time. Presentists disagree that the special theory of relativity entails four-dimensional eternalism.¹⁸ I shall not bore readers with the details of this debate here. I shall simply note that it is a matter of contemporary dispute as to what, if any, particular ontology of time is entailed by contemporary science.¹⁹

I should also note that I find it somewhat implausible that one should deny the existence of a preferred reference frame simply because current relativity theory cannot pick it out. On the older Galilean understanding of space-time, one could pick out a preferred temporal reference frame. However, one could not determine if two events happened at the same spatial location.²⁰ I strongly doubt that the older generations of scientists and philosophers denied that there is a fact of the matter as to whether or not two events happened at the same spatial location, even though they could not determine it scientifically using the best available understanding of space-time. Myself, and other scientists and philosophers, feel a similar doubt should be in order with regards to contemporary interpretations of relativity theory and its inability to pick out a preferred temporal reference frame. This is because there are other interpretations that allow one to pick out a preferred temporal reference frame.²¹

Second, some philosophers and theologians are philosophically motived to hold to eternalism and four-dimensionalism because these theories are said to comport well with truth-maker theory. On one version of truth-maker theory, it is said that every true proposition has something that makes the proposition true.²² Consider the proposition ‘Theresa May is the prime minister of the UK’. What makes this proposition true? There is an individual named ‘Theresa May’ who currently has the property being the prime minister. Theresa May, along with the properties she currently possesses, serves as the truth-maker for the proposition in question. Now consider another proposition: ‘Abraham Lincoln is the sixteenth president of the USA’. What makes this proposition true? Eternalists will argue that presentism cannot offer a satisfactory answer to this question because, on presentism, the past no longer exists. The eternalist will complain that, on presentism, Lincoln no longer exists, so Lincoln can no longer serve as the truth-maker for the proposition in question. The eternalist goes on to point out that she can easily solve this problem. On four-dimensional eternalism, the past does exist. So temporal parts, or person stages, of Lincoln do exist at the relevant times, and they can serve as the truth-makers for the proposition Abraham Lincoln is the sixteenth president of the USA. Presentists have responded in various ways to this problem.²³ For instance, I for one believe that Lincoln currently exists in the intermediate state awaiting resurrection. Lincoln currently possesses the relevant properties needed to make this proposition true. As such, he can serve as the truth-maker for the proposition in question. Again, I shall not bore readers with details of the debate. I shall simply note that there is a debate to be had here.

Third, in recent literature one can find Christians adopting four-dimensional eternalism for explicitly theological reasons. For instance, Katherin Rogers and T. J. Mawson have used it to defend the classical doctrines of divine omniscience and timelessness against open theism. Oliver Crisp has used it to articulate the doctrine of atonement. Michael Rea has deployed it to make sense of original sin. Paul J. Griffiths thinks it is useful for developing Christian eschatology.²⁴ It might seem, then, that four-dimensional eternalism is a fruitful metaphysical doctrine.

But should Christians be four-dimensional eternalists? It seems to me that there are various areas of Christian thought that conflict with four-dimensional eternalism, and these conflicts have not been fully considered. Further, some of the salvific and eschatological proposals show a deficient understanding of the basic issues in the ontology of time and persistence through time. Below, I shall argue that Christians should not be four-dimensional eternalists since adopting this theory exacerbates the problem of evil and wreaks havoc on our eschatological hope of salvation.

3 Laying My Cards on the Table

Before moving forward, I should like to lay my own beliefs on the table. Perhaps this will help the reader better understand what I hold and what I am arguing against. It will also help the reader understand what I think a good option is for Christians to take instead of four-dimensional eternalism.

First, I am an unrepentant substance dualist.²⁵ To be sure, there are many other views within philosophical anthropology such as hylomorphism, physicalism and material constitution.²⁶ I believe, however, that a human person is a soul with a body. A person is identical to an immaterial substance (a mind) that has the capacity to think, feel and act. A person is a centre of consciousness that is capable of being self-aware – i.e. a thing with a first-person perspective. A human person is an immaterial substance that is appropriately related to a human organism or body. This appropriate relationship is to be understood in terms of satisfying various conditions for being embodied.²⁷

Second, I am an unrepentant endurantist and presentist. I believe that there is numerically one thing that is me that persists through time. This one thing that is me is wholly located at the present moment. There are not temporal parts of me laying about at other times, and there are no other times besides the present that are actual. Classical Christian theologians have long held to presentism and endurantism.²⁸ Though I disagree with various things about classical Christian theology, this is not one of them.²⁹ I believe that presentism and endurantism are the best ways to satisfy certain desiderata for personal salvation and identity through time. I shall now articulate some of these desiderata.

Third, I look forward to the resurrection of the dead. As noted above, there are many dimensions, or aspects, of the doctrine of salvation. As much contemporary work in soteriology will make clear, there is no such thing as the Christian doctrine of atonement. There are many different theories about the nature of salvation such as penal substitution, satisfaction theory, ransom theory, Christus victor, and so on. However, what I think is essential to any Christian doctrine of salvation is the claim that God is saving us from evil and death. God saves us from death through the resurrection of our bodies. God saves us from evil by placing us in a new/resurrected creation that is no longer subject to sin and suffering.³⁰

I believe that any theory of identity through time that entails that I will not be resurrected is an unsatisfactory theory for a Christian to hold. Of course, I am assuming here the security of my own salvation. If you are uncertain as to the security of my personal salvation, feel free to insert a person you feel confident is saved. Perhaps you could restate my claim as follows: ‘Any theory of persistence through time that entails that my God-fearing grandmother will not be resurrected is an unsatisfactory theory for a Christian to hold.’

Fourth, I believe in the healing power of Jesus and the defeat of evil. I believe that there are many aspects to the doctrine of the resurrection and salvation, but I wish to focus on a particular issue here – eschatological healing and the defeat of evil. As many New Testament scholars will point out, the New Testament often speaks in terms of the present age and the age to come. The present age is marked by evil, sin, sickness and death. Jesus is establishing a kingdom in the age to come that will be characterized by healing, life, righteousness and the presence of the Holy Spirit. This is something that Christ’s earthly ministry has begun, and it is something that awaits eschatological fulfilment for its completion. There are many things that we suffer in this life, and Jesus has promised us healing and restoration in his future kingdom.

In Matthew 5, we see Jesus proclaim several things pertinent to our present discussion. Jesus makes various statements about the way things are now, and how they will be when his kingdom is fully established. In particular, Jesus makes the following claims: (1) those who presently mourn will be comforted; (2) those who are weak will inherit the earth; and (3) the righteous who are persecuted will receive rewards in heaven.

Here is the claim that I want to make in light of Jesus’ promises of salvation from the present evil age. I believe that Jesus’ promises require that the numerically same mind who suffers in this life, will be the numerically same mind who shall receive eschatological healing. I am the one who is currently suffering, and who is in need of comfort. I want to be the numerically same person who receives eschatological healing. I want to inhabit the renewed creation, and all of the heavenly rewards that come along with it. Perhaps I am being greedy here, but a boy can dream.

Fifth, I believe that all those who seek to be virtuous will be fully established in virtue in the eschaton.³¹ I believe that God has created us for a life of virtue.³² God has created a world where we can grow in virtue, and become more like God through the daily renewal of our minds (Rom. 12.2). In Matthew 5.6, Jesus promises that those who currently hunger and thirst for righteousness will be satisfied. Through the power of the Holy Spirit, and a life of devotion, those who presently seek righteousness will be firmly established in righteousness. God will ensure that those who seek to cultivate a virtuous character will in fact form a virtuous character in the eschaton. Once again, I believe that endurantism is needed in order to make sense of this promise. The people who presently seek virtue must be numerically identical to the people who will be established in virtue. Otherwise, I can make no sense of the moral order of the universe. As I shall argue below, four-dimensional eternalism undermines the Christian claims about developing a virtuous character.

With these commitments in mind, I now turn to my reasons for rejecting four-dimensional eternalism. The arguments I offer below assume four-dimensionalism and eternalism. One could easily modify my arguments to attack views that combine four-dimensionalism with presentism. I focus on the combination of four-dimensionalism and eternalism because that is the most commonly held combination among contemporary philosophers and theologians.

4 Four-Dimensional Eternalism and Salvation from Evil

Most four-dimensionalists reject substance dualism and opt for some form of physicalism. It is possible to be a substance dualist and affirm four-dimensionalism, but it is rare. Substance dualists who are endurantists often affirm the simple theory of personal identity through time. Again, on the simple view, there are no non-trivial or non-circular conditions for personal identity over time. This is because personal identity is a primitive notion that is not subject to a deeper analysis.³³ The dualist says that a person is identical to a simple, immaterial substance that persists through time.³⁴ There is no deeper analysis to give for personal identity over time.

On four-dimensionalism, personal persistence is typically understood in terms of causal and psychological continuity relations between numerically distinct temporal parts or person stages. Again, this is so because the four-dimensionalist explicitly denies numerical identity over time. The person stage that exists at time t1 persists by being causally related to a temporal counterpart at some later time t2. This later temporal counterpart will exemplify a psychological continuity to the earlier temporal counterpart in that each will have many of the same beliefs, memories, desires, and so on.³⁵

Four-dimensionalists also typically hold that personal survival of death does not really matter to us because numerical personal identity through time does not really matter to us.³⁶ As the four-dimensionalist Eric Steinhart proclaims: ‘Personal identity is not retained in the resurrection. It is sacrificed.’³⁷ According to Steinhart, and others, what really matters to us is that we have later resurrected temporal counterparts that are continuous with us in some interesting causal relationship. Apparently, human persons do not really concern themselves with personal survival, but only care about having later temporal counterparts. I should think that this will be quite shocking news to most human persons to hear that personal survival is not what matters to them. I, for one, hold that personal identity through time matters. I should think that our personal survival of death matters deeply to us.

It is at this point that I think one can begin to see the failure of four-dimensionalism for Christianity. On standard Christian defences and theodicies, the problem of evil is in part assuaged by the soteriological promises of personal eschatological healing, resurrected bodies, reconciliation with other persons (both human and divine), and an eternal and blissful union with God. The Christian claim is that God could not create a world where evil has the ultimate say, nor could he create a world where there is a perfect balance of good and evil. The Christian God is an evil defeater, not an evil balancer. God will bring about a state of affairs where goodness will outweigh any past evils.³⁸ One way to capture this is to say that God will ensure that human persons who participate in horrors will have their horrors defeated. God will ensure that these human persons will have a life that, on the whole, is one worth living. One day their suffering will cease, and they shall receive resurrected bodies and enter into God’s everlasting kingdom.³⁹

A presentist and endurantist has no problem making sense of these claims since past horrors no longer exist. The numerically same endurant person who participated in horrors will be the numerically same person who will be resurrected in the future. Those tragic moments of her past no longer exist, and she has an eternity of future healing and bliss to look forward to. I shall argue that a four-dimensional eternalist cannot make good on these claims. In particular, a four-dimensional eternalist cannot make good on the claim that the participant of horrors will cease to participate in those horrors, nor that God will ultimately defeat evil.

Blessed are Those Who Suffer, for They Shall be Comforted

On four-dimensional eternalism, persons persist by having temporal parts, or stages, that are psychologically continuous with earlier temporal parts. On four-dimensional eternalism the entire space-time manifold exists and contains all events. The temporal parts of each object exist only at the times at which they exist, and the temporal locations of those times are eternally fixed.⁴⁰ From God’s perspective, it simply is the case that each temporal part exists at the times at which they do from all eternity. It is always the case that a temporal part of