Final project of Advanced Topics in Computer & Network Security (ATCNS), at the University of Padova. Here, we're dealing with the Near-RT RIC platform and its interconnection with the Non-RT RIC platform. The developed xApp was built starting from the hw-go repository available on Gerrit.

The primary objective was to exploit a vulnerability in the RMR (RIC Message Router) library, specifically associated with route tables. The vulnerability arises from the lack of authentication in the route tables sent into O-RAN SC platform using the xApp. By analyzing the overall route table sent by the route manager, we crafted raw packets (can be found in rmr_payloads) designed to disrupt the connection between the Near-RT RIC module and all its external interfaces. As a result, we isolated the Near-RT RIC module from the rest of the RAN. The idea of this attack was inspired by the following paper.

To understand and execute the attack, please refer to the following Gist repository. The latter contains detailed instructions and the necessary scripts for replicating the attack on the RMR library vulnerability. repository from gerrit. The idea was to exploit a vulnerability in the RMR library associated to route tables in particular.

Now we will see the steps that led to achieving the previously mentioned objective. It is essential to specify that we will refer to the O-RAN SC H-release version. Initially, we can see the routing table just after deploying the malicious xApp with the insertion of the routes associated with it. Additionally, all the Kubernetes pods associated with ricplt are in a running state, and the gNB associated with the E2 node is connected to the RAN (via E2 termination).

The attack starts after about 40 seconds, giving the RMR library enough time to initialize. As seen from the xApp logs below, first the rmr_empty_rt.raw packet is sent, causing the E2 termination to crash, and immediately after, a DoS attack is launched against the A1 mediator.

Below we can see the results obtained regarding the crashed Kubernetes pods after the attack. In particular, since A1 and E2 are the only terminations interconnecting the Near-RT RIC module with the outside, the latter remains isolated from the rest of the O-RAN components (e.g., Non-RT RIC).

Indeed, as seen below and as previously specified, the exploit mainly affects the routing table, which theoretically the xApp should not be able to modify. However, due to a lack of authentication, the attack triggers an update of the routing table in which no gNB is connected via E2 termination. The DoS approach towards the A1 is different; in this case, it is not an issue associated with the routing tables being modified towards the A1 mediator, but rather, the component accepts raw packets sent by the xApp, causing a CrashLoopBackOff on its Kubernetes pod.

In conclusion, even when attempting to reconnect the E2 simulator (kpm_sim) to the O-RAN, the connection status remains UNDER_RESET; this implies that the network is compromised until a new installation of the ricplt is performed.