Prevent stack overflow in json-related functions.

Sufficiently-deep recursion heretofore elicited a SIGSEGV.  If an
application constructs PostgreSQL json or jsonb values from arbitrary
user input, application users could have exploited this to terminate all
active database connections.  That applies to 9.3, where the json parser
adopted recursive descent, and later versions.  Only row_to_json() and
array_to_json() were at risk in 9.2, both in a non-security capacity.
Back-patch to 9.2, where the json type was introduced.

Oskari Saarenmaa, reviewed by Michael Paquier.

Security: CVE-2015-5289

1 files changed, 6 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/src/backend/utils/adt/json.c b/src/backend/utils/adt/json.c
index eefe93bc8a..f394942bc3 100644
--- a/src/backend/utils/adt/json.c
+++ b/src/backend/utils/adt/json.c
@@ -490,6 +490,8 @@ parse_object(JsonLexContext *lex, JsonSemAction *sem)
 	json_struct_action oend = sem->object_end;
 	JsonTokenType tok;
 
+	check_stack_depth();
+
 	if (ostart != NULL)
 		(*ostart) (sem->semstate);
 
@@ -568,6 +570,8 @@ parse_array(JsonLexContext *lex, JsonSemAction *sem)
 	json_struct_action astart = sem->array_start;
 	json_struct_action aend = sem->array_end;
 
+	check_stack_depth();
+
 	if (astart != NULL)
 		(*astart) (sem->semstate);
 
@@ -1433,6 +1437,8 @@ datum_to_json(Datum val, bool is_null, StringInfo result,
 	char	   *outputstr;
 	text	   *jsontext;
 
+	check_stack_depth();
+
 	/* callers are expected to ensure that null keys are not passed in */
 	Assert(!(key_scalar && is_null));