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In the Syrian Arab Republic, freedom of religion is a constitutionally protected obligation. Although the Syrian Constitution of March 13, 1973 will soon be amended, applicable religious clauses are not expected to be changed.
In Syria religious freedom is closely associated with collective rights and duties. In other words, the comprehensive structure of the Syrian constitutional system has evolved and continues to evolve mainly around collective dimensions of religious tolerance. The extent of autonomy by which a religious community is free to organize and administer itself devoid of state external intervention or control is largely determined by personal status laws and public endowments.

History of the Constitutional Clauses

On March 8, 1963, the Ba‘ath Party seized power. The Ba‘ath theoretician Michel Aflaq associated religion with the old corrupt social order, oppression, and exploitation of the weak, seemingly influenced by a mixture of radical Hobbesian and Marxist views on religion. The constitution of 1963, however, still made it clear that "Islamic jurisprudence shall be ‘the’ main source for legislation." Despite this proviso there were a number of Sunni Muslims who felt that the secularization of the law had gone too far. Muslim Brothers pressed for Islam as a state religion, by demanding that all laws contrary to Islam should be abrogated. Their beliefs encompassed the understanding that the essential elements of the unity of Syria is the shari‘a which includes laws adequate to organize all aspects of this worldly life and the hereafter, at the level of the individual, the family, the nation and the state.
Already back then there was an underlying tension that stemmed from sectarian differences between the majority Sunni Muslims and the minority ‘Alawis. The immediate focus of the opposition to the regime was the demand by Sunni Muslims that Islam be declared the state religion in the Constitution. A new draft Constitution was adopted by the People’s Council at the end of January 1973 but had no provision to that effect. Viewing the Constitution as the product of an ‘Alawi dominated, secular, Ba‘athist ruling elite, Sunni militants staged a series of riots in February 1973 in conservative and predominantly Sunni cities such as Hamah and Homs. Numerous demonstrators were killed or wounded in clashes between the troops and demonstrators. As a result of these demonstrations, the Assad government had the draft charter amended to include a provision that the president of Syria must be Muslim. On March 13, 1973, the new Constitution (which is still applicable today but on the verge of being amended) went into effect. Islam was not declared the state’s religion, but instead a compromise was adopted in that the Constitution reads, in Article 3(1) and (2):

“ The religion of the President of the Republic has to be Islam. Islamic jurisprudence is a main source of legislation. ”

Paragraph 2 of Article 3 declares that Islamic jurisprudence is "a" source of law, but not "the" absolute source. Bernard Botiveau notes that from a Ba‘athist perspective "Islam was one of the fundamental components of Arabness, but required to be located at the religious, and not the political end." The provision constitutes a political compromise. Sunni Shaykh, Muhammad al-Habash, interprets the provision to mean that "a refers to the situation where there is another source of law. Islam is a main source, but not the unique source. There are other sources for a wide area of law." Scholarly commentator Nael Georges supposes that if there is no Islamic law that regulates a specific circumstance, secular law is applied. However, Georges concludes that there is not strict separation between Islam and the state in its present constitutional setup. Despite this proviso, it can hardly be said that the Syrian state adheres to an official Islamic ideology. But there is an express appeal to one particular ideology that should constitute the prime source of the state’s regulatory and normative functions.

Religious and Ethnic Landscape

Syria’s eighteen million population is a mosaic of ethnically, culturally, and religiously distinct communities. In the cradle of civilizations, ninety percent of the population is Arab in ethnicity; another roughly nine percent is Kurdish, with Armenians, Circassians, and Turkomans filling out the mix. It is estimated that Sunni Muslims make up seventy-four percent of Syria’s overall population. As such, Sunnis provide the central symbolic and cultural orientation. Of these, a minority are of the Yazidi faith, reducing the core Sunni Arab majority to roughly two-thirds of the populace. Approximately another sixteen percent of the population, while Arab in ethnicity, consists of a few Twelver Shi‘a, and various offshoots of Shi‘a Islam – ‘Alawis, Druze, and Isma‘ilis. The ‘Alawis are by far the largest community in the category of non-Sunni Muslims. Their number is estimated at eleven percent of the overall population. Christians, of various Orthodox and Uniate traditions and the Latin Rite, along with a smattering of Protestants, make up ten percent of the population. Syria’s Arab Jewish community has to a great extent disappeared as a result of emigration in the early 1990s.

Religious Clauses are Constitutionally Entrenched

Religious freedom is guaranteed in Article 35 of today’s Syrian Constitution. It stipulates in Paragraphs (1) and (2) respectively:

“ The freedom of faith is guaranteed. The state respects all religions. The state guarantees the freedom to hold any religious rites, provided they do not disturb public order. ”

The Syrian Constitution is entrenched by the need for a two-thirds majority vote of the "Peoples’ Assembly" as well as the President’s assent in order to effect any constitutional amendment. The government interprets the relevant provision to mean that "[f]reedom of belief is inviolable and the State respects all religions and guarantees full freedom of religious observance […]." It reports further that "Accordingly, the right of every religious community to profess and practise its religion and exercise its religious rights is firmly established in the Constitution and the laws in force." The comprehensive structure of the Syrian constitutional system has evolved and continues to evolve mainly around collective dimensions of religious tolerance. The extent of autonomy by which a religious community is free to organize and administer itself devoid of state (external) intervention or control in the Arab Republic is largely determined by personal status laws and public endowments. Their underlying concepts can be seen as constitutional customs.

Personal Status Laws

The Syrian Constitution identifies "freedom" (hurriya) as a "sacred right" (haqq muqaddas). Moreover, the state has an obligation to protect the "personal freedom of the citizens" (al-hurriya al-shakhsiyya) and to safeguard their "dignity and security" (al-karama wa-l-amn). The state does not generally interfere with the internal affairs of religious communities, and is for this reason believed to respect the personal freedom and dignity of religious adherents. For example, the Armenian religious leader, Pastor Bchara Moussa Oghli, states that the scope of autonomy as enjoyed in Syria gives the community the ability to retain its specific Armenian identity. He says that an advantage of the Syrian system is that Armenian citizens are "fully integrated," but that there would be no need to be "fully melted." Armenian Bishop Armash Nalbandian comments similarly: "We do not see our identity as ‘Christians in Syria,’ but as ‘Syrian Christians,’ in that we generally enjoy equal rights and obligations just like all other Syrian citizens."
Syrian identity appears to be formed by a conglomerate of Syrianness, Arab and non-Arab multiculturalism including religion, as well as strong historic ties. The land of dignity, as Muslim Arabs call Syria for its cultural distinctiveness, is to Islamic scholar and Shaykh Muhammad al-Habash a "blessed land," where before the Arab Spring all three monotheist religions could flourish in harmony with each other.
The acknowledgment of an entire body of personal status laws mirrors the constitutional guarantee not to interfere in, or control, collective religious self-determination. For instance, the incorporation of personal status laws and the grant of judicial capacities made it possible to accommodate Christian communities’ hierarchical structures. As Archbishop Bedros Miratian says: "[W]e do not have to seek a specific place in society. It was given to us long ago."
The institution of personal status law is an area of regulation in which the process of modernization has had the least effect. In present-day Syria personal status is governed by parliamentary enacted codes, religious rules or doctrines, custom, and practice. It refers to circumstance in which each legally recognized religious community runs its own body of institutions, including a court system. Eighteen religious cults are legally recognized.
Although Syrian public law allows religious communities to regulate and administer their own sphere of internal affairs, such activities must not contradict with generally applicable secular laws of land. Pluralism in the Arab Republic means that the personal status law of all Islamic communities is regulated by the shari‘a, whereas Christian rites are governed by the Gospel, and the Jewish community by talmudic law. Today, the Druze community, as a fully recognized religious organization, is subject to its own specific religious code. Personal status law issues of non-Syrian citizens are governed by their respective national law.
In Syria, two kinds of judicial systems exist: a secular and a religious one. Secular courts hear matters of public, civil and criminal law. Religious courts that exercise specialized jurisdiction are divided into shari‘a courts, doctrinal courts, and spiritual courts. They hear personal status law cases only. Shari‘a courts regulate disputes among Syrian Muslims, whereas doctrinal courts are empowered to guarantee the personal status decisions of members of the Druze cult. Spiritual courts settle personal status matters for Jewish, Christian and other non-Muslim groups. Decisions of all of the religious courts may be appealed to the canonical and spiritual divisions of the Court of Cassation.

Public Endowments

The second preponderant element of collective religious self-determination under Article 35 of the Syrian Constitution is the ability to manage and control public waqf. Making available the waqf institution is not so much a new innovation of the Syrian state, but all the more a continuation of an ancient practice which has its roots in Byzantine and Sasanian trust law. Mainly the Umayyads and the Ottomans developed what can nowadays be seen as constitutional custom. For historians the waqf institution provided the foundation for much of what is considered Islamic civilization.

Islamic Waqf

In 1947 the Syrian waqf administration, headed by the Prime Minister, was formed. For the first time in Syrian history, the members of the High Council of Awqaf were nominated and not voted for. The law was later reversed, as in the year 1961, and a new statutory source came into effect. Parts of the Council’s initial authority were definitely curtailed in 1965. The competences to nominate leaders and teachers of mosques as well as religious administrators were eventually transferred to the powers of the Syrian Prime Minister in 1966.
In spite of that, notable Sunni Islamic leaders retained their influence in the waqf administration and Ministry in that they were given important offices. Today, the competences of the waqf Ministry encompass, inter alia: the administration of waqf wealth (which includes much of Syria’s property); mufti organization; administration of mosques and shari‘a schools; control of charitable state functions; and the preparation of parliamentary bills. The waqf administration as part of the waqf Ministry, is composed half of secular and half of religious personnel. Its minister is nominated by the President of the Syrian Arab Republic. Since the establishment of the Ministry, waqf ministers have always been adherents of Sunni Islam.

Non-Muslim Waqf

Non-Muslim waqf – those of the Druze, Christians, and Jews – were not included under the French programme and mandate reforms. Non-Muslim waqf continue to be administered by the leaders of the respective religious community, but is overseen by the waqf Ministry. Act No. 31 of 2006 contains an entire body of legal provisions regulating the waqf institution of the Catholic rites. Similar Acts were adopted for all non-Muslim waqf institutions. Many Christian or Jewish founders of pious trusts donated the revenues to their non-Muslim institutions. This kind of public waqf pays for the construction and maintenance of churches, schools, or the salaries of their personnel. Waqf revenues likewise pay for religious orders and other religious constructions and buildings such as cemeteries and tombs. Waqf funds are used for libraries, translation centres, and students’ scholarships. Orphanages, needs of widows, the blind or other handicapped or poor people are all cared for with waqf money.

Adoption, Change, and Renunciation of Religion

Syrians are free to engage or refrain from engaging in belief or religious observance in any manner other than is prohibited by law. Article 35(1) of the Syrian constitution holds that: "Freedom of faith is guaranteed […]." The provision includes the freedom to retain or chose one’s religion, or to replace the current religion with another, or to adopt atheistic views. There is no official legal punishment under Syrian law for apostasy of Islam, or any other religion. Islam unequivocally affirms the right of each individual to freedom of thought and religion. The late Grand Mufti Ahmand Kuftaro stated that the Prophet Muhammad and his close followers built "a society based on love, leniency, justice and brotherhood."The Qur’an commands: "Let there be no compulsion in religion."Kuftaro opines that Islam insists that all people, not just Muslims, enjoy freedom of religion and worship.
Article 35(2) of the Syrian Constitution stipulates that "the state guarantees the freedom to hold any religious rites […]," as long as "they [the apostates] do not disturb public order." As far as can be established, there is no Syrian case law that would define the prohibition to "disturb public order." The provision is interpreted by scholarly means in the sense that a person who wishes to convert is free to do so as long as such activity is "made in private." The meaning of the words “in private” in association with the requirement not to “disturb public order” need to be looked at from two varying angles: converting from a specific Islamic cult to another cult, or none; and vice versa.

Conversion Away "from" an Islamic Cult

A Muslim is disallowed by virtue of Islamic jurisprudence to challenge society. Former Judge Haitham Maleh comments, "any Syrian Muslim is allowed to change his religion provided that conversion is exercised behind closed doors and without affecting neighbours." Judge Maleh reiterates more specifically, "an effect must not even be felt by the closest family members." This can be construed to mean that in Syria the most intimate sphere of a person’s freedom is inviolable. However, whenever a person’s conscience is transferred into acts of belief, including all sorts of expressions, that right is limited. An apostate from an Islamic cult has no right to speak about or act upon her or his new belief. The word “private” means the forum internum of a person. This interpretation approach is also reflected, for instance, in the general inability to change a Muslim’s birth certificate or other personal documents. Moreover, it is a generally accepted practice that there are no religious ceremonies for such personal, highly intimate events. As a matter of fact, no Syrian Muslim can officially change her or his religion.
The first and foremost reason why Syrian Muslims cannot change their religion is not the passive role of the state, but Syrian society. Father Paulo comments "freedom of religion is virtually unthinkable with regard to the cultural role religion plays in everyday Syrian society." He opines that the "replacing of one’s current religion would not only mean the complete loss of one’s social ties, including one’s own family, friends, and acquaintances, but maybe also professional position." From this perspective there are no legal but a fortiori social sanctions. Islamic scholar Jørgen S. Nielsen says in the same regard "the state obviously discourages it because it simply rocks the boat."
However, the desire to adopt a new religion is a relatively rare phenomenon. Father Paulo believes that "there are only a few such cases."
In Syria the often-cited Hadith Sahih of al-Bukhari is of no direct legal effect. So the provision that demands, "If someone changes the religion you have to kill him" is not incorporated into the Syrian Penal Code of 1949. Judge Maleh argues that the idea of Sahih of al-Bukhari in 9:57 was "to protect the Islamic society from Muslims who change their religion and start to work as enemies against Islam." Shaykh al-Habash muses similarly "maybe Prophet Muhammad mentioned it for someone who changed his religion and began to fight as an enemy against Islam at that moment in history." Al-Habash cannot accept it as tradition that generally applies to all people changing from one religion to another, even in the case of Islam. To him, this tradition is not part of the precious Qur’an, but "is a statement made by Prophet Muhammad and was later narrated by the people." Finally, Shaykh al-Habash emphasizes, "ninety-nine percent of all Syrian Muslims believe that it is forbidden to use force against others."

Conversion "to" an Islamic Cult

Conversion to an Islamic cult is similarly regarded as private affair with one significant difference. Rule No. 212 of the Personal Status Act of 1953 holds that when a Muslim woman marries a non-Muslim man, Islam is offered to the husband. Moreover, the same rule reads, if he becomes Muslim his change in faith is written down in their marriage contract. But if he declines, the judge should keep them apart. In cases other than interfaith relationships, the act of conversion to Islam is not state institutionalized. Moreover, it is prohibited by Islamic fatwa to change religion once a person has converted to Islam. Conversion from a Christian cult to another Christian cult or Islam is also problematic. Negative implications are felt on one’s social ties including relations with family, friends and acquaintances. Patriarch Ignatius IV expresses his aversion to community members who adopt the faith of another Christian rite, by stating: "There are new sects coming from Europe and America to Syria. As long as they are of Christian faith they are subject to few limitations. From the Greek-Orthodox point of view we dislike them, because not only are they involved in missionary work, but divide us as a Christian community. We are fully against any division, we want to stay visible. Our belief is that Jesus comes from Bethlehem, and not from London or New York."

Understanding Syrian Ideals

The inherent difficulty with regard to Syrian religious freedom lies in the circumstance that the Western reader is required to reset some, but not all, knowledge on Western values unless she or he wants to be trapped by specific modes of thinking. While in the West, fairness means that the state protects a more or less autonomous society in which individuals are free to form a variety of allegiances and bonds of solidarity along any lines they choose (leisure, political, religious, cultural, racial, sexual etc.), in the Near East the justice system requires the state to assure that the individual is related to the religious community as part of a larger organism.
In other words, in Syrian culture the religious community is highly valuable as a positive human good, and as such, fully responsible for promoting the good of its members. Those members perpetually recognize a reciprocal obligation to act for the welfare of the community and their fellow adherents. In contrast, individuals in Western society find their place through the exercise of their individual freedom in competition or association with others. Thereby the law facilitates individual self-fulfilment first and foremost. The apparent conflict between Western and Near Eastern value and identity systems cannot easily be reconciled. Syria’s system includes structures and governmental functions that are not comparable with legal standards of Western systems.

Situation of minority groups

Membership in the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood is illegal, as is membership in any "Salafist" organization, a designation in Syrian parlance that denotes Saudi-inspired fundamentalism. The Syrian government and the State Security Court have not defined the exact parameters of what constitutes a Salafist or why it is illegal. Affiliation with the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood is punishable by death, although in practice the sentence is typically commuted to 12 years imprisonment.
All religions and religious orders must register with the government, which monitors fundraising and requires permits for all religious and nonreligious group meetings, except for worship. The registration process can be complicated and lengthy, but the government usually allows groups to operate informally while awaiting its response.
There is a de facto separation of religion and state in that the Syrian government generally refrains from involvement in strictly religious matters and religious groups tend not to participate in internal political affairs. However, Syria has increased its support for the practice and study of government-sanctioned, moderate forms of Islam, and Syrian state radio also began broadcasting the dawn and afternoon Muslim prayers, in addition to its traditional broadcast of noon prayers. Syrian state television also broadcasts recitations from the Qur'an in the morning.

Syria permits the use of religious language in public spaces, including the placement of banners bearing religious slogans at the site of prominent public landmarks during religious holidays. However, there have been no recent examples of prominent religious figures addressing government functions.
Syria's government policy officially disavows sectarianism of any kind; however, religion can be a factor in determining career opportunities. For example, Alawis hold dominant positions in the security services and military that are disproportionate to their percentage of the population. On the other hand, because their religion is banned, Jehovah's Witnesses are discriminated against in the area of employment.
The April 2007 parliamentary elections for the Syrian Peoples Assembly saw an increase in the number of Islamic clerics elected to the Parliament from one in 2003 to three.
The government promotes Islamic banking. In early 2007 two Islamic banks were allowed to conduct Initial Public Offerings: The Cham Islamic Bank and the Syrian International Islamic Bank. In addition, at the Second Islamic Banking Conference held in 2007, Central Bank Governor Adib Maleh recommended that the Ministry of Islamic Trusts encourage Syrians to invest in Islamic banking and pay the zakat (religious tax) through Islamic banks. The Government also licensed the first Islamic insurance company, Al Aqila, in March 2007.
In February 2007 the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs issued a decision to dissolve a women's nongovernmental organization (NGO) known as Social Initiative. There were scattered reports in local and regional media that a number of conservative Muslim clerics pressured the government to close the NGO because the clerics took exception to a questionnaire the NGO distributed to women asking their opinions on the personal status law.
Syria is intolerant of, and suppresses, extremist forms of Islam. Accordingly, it selects for religious leadership positions moderate Muslims who have no intention of altering the secular nature of the government. Sheikh Ahmed Baderedin Hassoun, the Grand Mufti of Syria, continued to call on Muslims to stand up to Islamic fundamentalism and has urged leaders of the various religious groups to engage in regular dialogues for mutual understanding.
All schools are officially government-run and non-sectarian, although in practice some schools are run by the Christian and Druze communities. There is mandatory religious instruction in schools for all religious groups, with government-approved teachers and curricula. Religious instruction is provided on Islam and Christianity only, and courses are divided into separate classes for Muslim and Christian students. Groups that participate in Islamic courses include Sunni, Shi'a, Alawi, Ismaili, Yezidi, and Druze. Although Arabic is the official language in public schools, the government permits the teaching of Armenian, Hebrew, Syriac (Aramaic), and Chaldean in some schools on the basis that these are "liturgical languages." There is no mandatory religious study at the university level.
Religious groups are subject to their respective religious laws for matters dealing with personal status. Syria has not yet passed legislation pertaining to personal status issues for Orthodox Christians.
A new Civil Law for Catholics went into effect in 2006. It contains strict rules on the order of inheritance with regard to the relatives of the deceased, as well as on the jurisdiction of Christian courts. Additionally, there are laws that establish the legal marriage age and prohibit some instances of mixed marriage for Catholics. The law gives the bishop of a diocese and the Christian courts expanded authority to determine the validity of an adoption. The new law also clarifies parental rights and inheritance rules between adopting parents and the adopted child. The Catholic leadership generally received the law positively.
The personal status law on divorce for Muslims in Syria is based on Shari'a religious law, and some of its provisions are interpreted in a manner that discriminates against women.
Syrian law specifically provides for reduced or commuted sentences in "honor crimes", which involve violent assaults by a direct male relative against a female. Section 548 of the Syrian penal code stipulates that a man can be absolved of any killing if he witnesses a direct female relative in the act of adultery. Moreover, a man's sentence for murder will be greatly reduced if he sees a direct female relative in a "suspicious situation" with a member of the opposite sex who is not a relative.
Under Syria's interpretation of Shari'a, the legal standard for men to be granted a divorce is much lower than that for women. Husbands may also claim adultery as grounds for divorce, while wives often face a higher legal standard when presenting the same case. A man can only be found guilty of adultery if the act takes place inside the home. If a wife requests a divorce from her husband, she may be denied alimony and the return of her dowry in some instances.
In the event of divorce, a woman loses the right to custody of her sons when they reach the age of 13, and her daughters when they reach the age of 15, regardless of religion. Women can also lose custody before this age if they remarry, work outside the home, or move outside of the city or country. In such cases the custody of the children reverts to the maternal grandmother until the age of 13 and 15 respectively. After that, custody reverts back to the father until the children reach the age of majority.
Inheritance for all citizens except Catholics is based on Shari'a. Accordingly, married women usually are granted half the inheritance share male heirs receive. In all communities, however, male heirs must provide financial support to unmarried female relatives who inherit less. For example, a brother would inherit his and his unmarried sister's share from their parents' estate, and he is obligated to provide for the sister's well-being with that inheritance. If the brother fails to do so, she has the right to sue. Polygamy is legal for Muslim men but is practiced only by a minority of them.
The Syrian government generally does not prohibit links between its citizens and co-religionists in other countries or between its citizens and the international hierarchies that govern some religious groups; however, it prohibits contact between the Jewish community and Jews in Israel.
The following holy days are national holidays: Western Christmas, Orthodox and Western Easter, Eid al-Adha, Eid al-Fitr, the Islamic New Year, and the Birth of the Prophet Muhammad.

Restrictions on religious freedom

In 2007, Syria licensed the so-called Quabasis to hold their female-only Islamic study groups inside of mosques. Until then, they were held in private homes. Some regard the licensing as a cynical attempt by the security services to make it easier to monitor the Quabasis rather than to help facilitate their activities. However, Quabasis groups are still allowed to meet in private residences.
Proselytism is not prohibited by civil law; however, the government discourages it as a potential threat to the relations among religious groups. Nevertheless, foreign missionaries were present, operating discreetly. There were no reported cases of anyone being prosecuted for posing a threat to the relations among religious groups in recent years. Instead, there were several reports that Syria gave the Shi'a favorable treatment and allowed Shi'a missionaries to construct mosques and convert Sunnis to Shiites.
All groups, religious and nonreligious, are subject to surveillance and monitoring by government security services. The Government particularly considers militant Islam a threat to the regime and closely follows the practice of its adherents. While the Syrian government allows many mosques to be built, it monitors and controls sermons and often closes mosques between prayers.
In Damascus, a road is being built through the old city to a major Shi'a mosque. To complete the road, the government plans to tear down several predominantly Sunni residential complexes in the old city. The country's Sunni clerics and communities have criticized these plans.
Religious minorities, with the exception of Jews, are represented among the senior officer corps. In keeping with the Syria's secular policy, though, the military does not have a chaplain corps; members of the military do not have direct access to religious or spiritual support; and soldiers are expected not to express their faith overtly during work hours. For example, Muslims are discouraged from praying while on duty.
Syria canceled an Islamic religious program that had been broadcast just before the major weekly prayers were shown on government-run television. On April 20, 2007, the son of the late Grand Mufti, Sheikh Salah Khuftaro, in a speech at the Abu Nur Islamic Center, denounced the Information Minister for this decision.

Abuses of religious freedom

Both European diplomats and human rights organizations characterized the level of repression against alleged Islamists as about the same as in previous years, although some religious leaders insisted they faced increased repression at the hands of the Syrian government.
Human rights organizations documented the arrest of at least 30 persons for alleged ties to Islamist groups. The Government rarely furnishes documentation on the number of detained persons. Human rights groups report on Syrians who are arrested or detained for alleged ties to Islamist groups in previous years but whose detention has only recently been made public.
The Supreme State Security Court sentenced at least 80 alleged Islamists to lengthy prison sentences. Human rights groups and diplomats from European embassies estimated that at least hundreds of alleged Islamists remain detained in prisons, security service detention centers, or other secret detention facilities.
Syria continues to hold an unknown number of members of the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamists as political detainees and prisoners. Many alleged Islamists not connected to the Muslim Brotherhood have been charged and convicted for "membership in a Salafist organization." Arrests of alleged Islamists and, in some cases, convictions, were motivated primarily by the Syrian government's view of militant Islamists as potential threats to regime stability.

Reports of Anti-Semitism

Government-owned-and-controlled media printed anti-Zionistic articles and editorial cartoons depicting demonic images of Jews, stereotypical images of Jews along with Jewish symbols, and comparisons of Israeli leaders and Israel to Hitler and the Nazis. These expressions occurred primarily in the government-owned-and-controlled daily newspaper Tishrin. For instance, on February 4, 2007, Tishrin published an article accusing Jewish leaders of collusion with the Nazi party for the purposes of "inflating" the Holocaust. The article alleged that Jews wanted the Holocaust to justify immigration to "the Promised Land."
Also in July 2006, on Syrian television, Syrian Deputy Minister of Religious Endowment, Dr. Muhammad 'Abd Al-Sattar, proclaimed that Jews are cursed. The Qur'an, he explained, paints the people of Israel in a "sinister and dark way." He proceeded to use the national station to call Jews the "descendents of apes and pigs," claiming that "terms that are closer to animals than humans" are more fit to describe them.
Syria primarily cites tense relations with Israel as the reason for barring Jewish citizens from employment in the civil service or serving in the armed forces, and for exempting them from military service obligations. Jews are the only religious minority group whose passports and identity cards note their religion, and they must obtain the permission of the security services before traveling abroad.
Jews also face extra scrutiny from the government when applying for licenses, deeds, or other government papers. The Jewish community is prohibited from sending historical Torahs abroad under a law against exporting any of the country's historical and cultural treasures. This poses a serious problem for the dwindling Jewish community concerned about the preservation of its ancient religious texts.

Improvements and Positive Developments in Respect for Religious Freedom

On June 24, 2007, Syrian Grand Mufti Sheikh Ahmed Baderedin Hassoun called on Jews of Syrian origin to return to Syria, claiming that the property and synagogues of Jews who left Syria remained as they were and would be placed at the disposal of their original owners.
In March 2007, during a lecture at Damascus University, Syrian Grand Mufti Sheikh Ahmad Baderedin Hassoun called for amending the laws that allow honor killings, which he said violate the Islamic spirit of the law.

Societal abuses and discrimination

There have been occasional reports of minor tensions between religious groups, mainly attributable to economic rivalries rather than religious affiliation.
In March 2007 there were reports of riots in Hassakeh Province between Christians and predominantly Muslim Kurds. There were reports of three deaths. It was unclear whether there was any religious basis to the conflict.
No official statistics were kept on honor crimes, but there were scattered reports of them in the local media. Most prominent was the case of Zahra Ezzo. On January 31, 2007, Ezzo was murdered by her brother after being kidnapped and forced to run away by a friend of the family. The incidence of honor crimes is believed to be considerably higher in rural areas.
Social conventions and religious and theological proscriptions made conversion relatively rare, especially Muslim-to-Christian conversion. In many cases, societal pressure forced such converts to relocate within the country or leave the country to practice their new religion openly.

Banning of head and face coverings

In July 2010 the secular government in Damascus ordered the banning of face-covering Islamic veils such as burkas and niqabs in public and private universities amid fears of increasing Islamic extremism among young Muslim students, as many as 1,200 women teachers wearing niqabs and burkas were transferred out of Syrian schools and universities and reassigned to government offices where they would not come into contact with students.

Why the Syrian Arab Rebpublic can still not be seen as a Democracy

The current Constitution strengthened the late al-Assad’s already formidable presidential authority. The Syrian Constitution reads, in the first sentence of Article 8:

“ The leading party in the society and the state is the socialist Arab Ba‘ath party. ”

In other words, the provision binds future parliaments by requiring the Ba‘ath Party to constitute the leading party. Ba‘ath has held the majority of the seats in the Syrian unicameral parliament ever since it grabbed power. Because of the first sentence of Article 8, the Syrian Arab Republic cannot be regarded as a fully democratic nation in the Western understanding of the term. This provision is now being amended by way of popular vote.

Further reading

• MODELS OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM: Switzerland, the United States, and Syria by Analytical, Methodological, and Eclectic Representation, 375 ff. (Lit 2012)., by Marcel Stüssi, research fellow at the University of Lucerne.

Syria Category:Human rights in Syria Category:Religion in Syria