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Two-state solution (Cyprus)

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The current situation in Cyprus

The two-state solution[1] for the Cyprus dispute refers to the proposed permanent division of the island of Cyprus into a Turkish Cypriot State in the north and a Greek Cypriot State in the south, as opposed to the various proposals for reunification that have been suggested since the island was split into two by the 1974 Turkish invasion. The two-state solution would entail the legalisation of the status quo, where Greek Cypriots govern the southern part of the island and Turkish Cypriots govern the northern part, the latter of which is currently not recognised by any country other than Turkey.

Recognizing the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus as a separate state, as required by a two-state solution, has been firmly refused by both the United Nations and the European Union. This refusal is grounded in the principles of maintaining territorial integrity and sovereignty as per international law and UN resolutions.[2] The European Union has stated that it will "never, ever" accept a two-state solution for Cyprus.[3]

On 14 December 2019, Foreign Minister of Northern Cyprus Kudret Özersay said a two-state solution to the issue was "close to hand".[4] On 23 February 2020, Ersin Tatar, who was then the prime minister of Northern Cyprus and was elected its president eight months later, said that "a forced marriage cannot be successful". He elaborated, "We are different, we speak Turkish and they speak Greek. We are Muslims and they are Christians. The new generation does not know each other at all. A child who was 10 in 1974 is now 55, he has grandchildren. We are separated."[5]

ICJ's 2010-Kosovo decision and its reflections on the two-state solution

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United Nations' International Court of Justice decided in 2010 that "International law contains no prohibition on declarations of independence".[6]

The International Court of Justice (ICJ)'s 2010 Kosovo decision, which stated that international law does not prohibit declarations of independence, does not translate to a similar acceptance in the Cyprus context. The ICJ clarified that the legality of such declarations often depends on whether they are associated with unlawful use of force or other egregious violations of international law.[7]

The International Court of Justice (ICJ), without specifying whether it agrees or not with the determination of some of the relevant UNSC resolutions, declared in 2010 that "81. Several participants have invoked resolutions of the Security Council condemning particular declarations of independence: see, inter alia, Security Council resolutions 216 (1965) and 217 (1965), concerning Southern Rhodesia: Security Council resolution 541 (1983), concerning northern Cyprus; and Security Council resolution 787 (1992), concerning the Republika Srpska.

The Court notes, however, that in all of those instances the Security Council was making a determination as regards the concrete situation existing at the time that those declarations of independence were made; the illegality attached to the declarations of independence thus stemmed not from the unilateral character of these declarations as such, but from the fact that they were, or would have been, connected with the unlawful use of force or other egregious violations of norms of general international law, in particular those of a peremptory character (jus cogens). In the context of Kosovo. the Security Council has never taken this position. The exceptional character of the resolutions enumerated above appears to the Court to confirm that no general prohibition against unilateral declarations of independence may be inferred from the practice of the Security Council."

Oral Observations of Harold Hongju Koh on behalf of the United States of America, rejected the argument of the Cyprus against the "legality of the unilateral declaration of independence" of Kosovo: "When Cyprus pointedly sought to analogize the 1244 process to the heart-wrenching, but misleading, case where a parent sends a small child off to state supervision, only to lose her forever, I argued that upon reflection, the far better analogy would be to acknowledge the futility of the state forcing an adult child to return to an abusive home against her will, particularly where parent and child have already long lived apart, and where repeated efforts at reconciliation have reached impasse. There, as here, declaring independence would be the only viable option, and would certainly be in accordance with law."[8][9] On 9 October 2014, the USA's Federal Court qualified the TRNC as "democratic republic with a president, prime minister, legislature and judiciary".[10][11][12]

Judge Trindade made a statement in ICJ's Kosovo decision that "66. This leads us to consider a key aspect which was insufficiently singled out in the past, despite its great relevance, and which remains, in my view, of considerable importance in the present, namely, the aforementioned conditions of living of the population. People and territory go together, but the emphasis is shifted from the status of territory to the needs and aspirations of people...228...it would not be necessary to indulge into semantics of what constitutes a “people” either. This is a point which has admittedly been defying international legal doctrine to date. In the context of the present subject-matter, it has been pointed out, for example, that terms such as “Kosovo population”, “people of Kosovo”, “all people in Kosovo”, “all inhabitants in Kosovo”, appear indistinctly in Security Council resolution 1244 (1999) itself. There is in fact no terminological precision as to what constitutes a “people” in international law ((It has been argued, for example, that, for a human collectivity or a group to constitute a “people” for eligibility to statehood, it would need: a) sharing of common background of ethnicity, language, religion, history and cultural heritage; b) territorial integrity of the area claimed; c) the subjective element of the group’s self-conscious perception as a distinct “people”, able to form a viable political entity; for the view that the Kosovars meet these requirements and constitute a “people”, and, moreover, their right to internal self-determination was not respected by Milosevic-led Serbia, cf., e.g., M. Sterio, “The Kosovar Declaration of Independence: ‘Botching the Balkans’ or Respecting International Law?”, 37 Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law (2008-2009) pp. 277 and 287.)), despite the large experience on the matter. What is clear to me is that, for its configuration, there is conjugation of factors, of an objective as well as subjective character, such as traditions and culture, ethnicity, historical ties and heritage, language, religion, sense of identity or kinship, the will to constitute a people [Answers by The Netherlands, para. 16, and Albania. paras. 20-21]; these are all factual, not legal, elements, which usually overlap each other [Answer by Finland, p. 3]...229. It may be recalled that the UNMIK Constitutional Framework for Kosovo (2001) itself, clarifying the U.N. approach to matter at issue, pointed out that Kosovo is “an entity” which, “with its people, has unique historical, legal, cultural and linguistic attributes”. To these elements I would add yet another one, - and a significant one, - namely, that of common suffering: common suffering creates a strong sense of identity." [13]

Relevant Court Cases

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International law contains no prohibition on declarations of independence,[14] and the recognition of a country is a political issue.[15]

  • On 2 July 2013, The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) decided that "...notwithstanding the lack of international recognition of the regime in the northern area, a de facto recognition of its acts may be rendered necessary for practical purposes. Thus the adoption by the authorities of the "TRNC" of civil, administrative or criminal law measures, and their application or enforcement within that territory, may be regarded as having a legal basis in domestic law for the purposes of the Convention".[16]
  • On 9 October 2014, the USA's Federal Court stated that "the TRNC purportedly operates as a democratic republic with a president, prime minister, legislature and judiciary".[10][11] [12]
  • On 2 September 2015, ECtHR decided that "...the court system set up in the "TRNC" was to be considered to have been "established by law" with reference to the "constitutional and legal basis" on which it operated, and it has not accepted the allegation that the "TRNC" courts as a whole lacked independence and/or impartiality".[17]
  • On 3 February 2017, the High Court of Justice stated "There was no duty in the United Kingdom law upon the Government to refrain from recognizing Northern Cyprus. The United Nations itself works with Northern Cyprus law enforcement agencies and facilitates co-operation between the two parts of the island".[18]

Support for two-state solution

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The island of Cyprus is practically divided into two, the Republic of Cyprus in the south and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus in the north.[19]

A number of observers suggest partition is the best solution to the Cyprus dispute.[20]


In general, Turkey has often expressed its support for the two-state solution as an alternative to reunification, most notably by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan during his visit to majority Turkish North Nicosia in 2014.[21] According to Greek Cypriot media, the two-state solution is pushed by Turkey in case the UN-mediated peace process fails.[22]

After the USA's Federal Court's designation of TRNC as a "democratic republic" in 2014, the U.S. Department of State has called TRNC as "The Area Administered by Turkish Cypriots".[23][24]

In December 2021, the President of Northern Cyprus Ersin Tatar said that there are two separate states on the island and the Turkish Cypriot side will not accept a solution on the basis of a federation and it will not step back from the new policy of two separate states, which is fully supported by Turkey.[25]

On 30 January 2022, Turkish Cypriot president Tatar specified that the sovereign equality and the equal international status of the Turkish Cypriots are non-negotiable.[26][27][28][29]

On 5 July 2024, the mandate of the UN Secretary General personal envoy, María Ángela Holguín, ended. Holguín found no common ground for Cyprus solution. In parting letter, Holguín called for Cypriots to "think differently" to find solution to Cyprus problem.[30][31]

The former leader, Jeffrey Donaldson, of The Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) in Northern Ireland supports Two-state solution in Cyprus.[32] On 4 August 2024, the British politician Richard Balfe, Conservative member of the UK House of Lords, said that the TRNC should either become independent or unite with Turkey.[33]

On 15 October 2024, the UN Secretary General, António Guterres, stated that there is no common ground between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots in Cyprus for negotiations.[34]

On 6 November 2024, Ersin Tatar, President of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, participated in The Council of Heads of State of the Organization of Turkic States (OTS) in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan as a Guest of Honor.[35]

Polls

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In 2007, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus performed a poll on the topic, with 60% of Turkish Cypriots supporting the idea of the two-state solution.[1] Another poll in 2009, made by KADEM research, showed 77.9% support among Turkish Cypriots with 63% casting doubt over the success of the peace negotiations.[1]

In April 2009, an opinion poll conducted for the CyBC showed that the majority of Greek Cypriots supported partition.[36]

In a 2010 opinion poll, 84% of Greek Cypriots and 70% of Turkish Cypriots agreed with the sentiment that "the other side would never accept the actual compromises and concessions that are needed for a fair and viable settlement".[37]

On 16 November 2019, a European Social Survey poll revealed that 13.9% of Greek Cypriots were in favor of the two-state solution, while 13.7% were neither for or against it but could tolerate it if necessary. It also showed that 18% of Greek Cypriots were in favor of keeping things the same, and that 31.2% were neither for or against it but could tolerate it if necessary. The poll concluded that 49.2% of Greek Cypriots were not against the current situation, while 27.6% were not against the two-state solution.[38][unbalanced opinion?]

According to a January 2020 poll by Gezici, the two-state solution had a support rate of 81.3% among Turkish Cypriots.[39]

In an opinion poll conducted by Cypronetwork among Greek Cypriots on behalf of the Cyprus Broadcasting Corporation (CyBC) in 2022, 18% stated that the best solution to the Cyprus problem was two separate states; the same figure was 4% in May 2021.[40]

In an opinion poll conducted by RetailZoom among Greek Cypriots on 14-16 October 2024 in southern Cyprus, when asked where they thought the Cyprus issue would lead, 43% said the status quo would remain, 28% favoured a "two-state solution", 2% chose the "double Enosis" option, 6% mentioned a "confederation", 13% supported a "bi-zonal, bi-communal federation", and 8% did not want to answer.[41]

International memberships of Northern Cyprus with its official name

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On 11 November 2022, Northern Cyprus became an observer state of the Organisation of Turkic States (OTS) with its official name "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus".[42]

On 29 April 2023, Northern Cyprus became an observer member of the Parliamentary Assembly of Turkic States (TURKPA) with its official name "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus".[43]

Opposition to two-state solution

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The concept of a two-state solution for the Cyprus dispute, suggesting a permanent division of the island into a Turkish Cypriot State in the north and a Greek Cypriot State in the south, faces significant opposition grounded in international law, potential impact on international politics, and the precedents it might set for similar conflicts worldwide.

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United Nations Stance

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The United Nations has consistently opposed the recognition of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) as an independent state. This stance aligns with principles of maintaining territorial integrity and sovereignty, as enshrined in international law and various UN resolutions. The UN's focus has been on reunification based on a federal model, exemplified by initiatives like the Annan Plan, despite its rejection by Greek Cypriots in 2004.[44]

European Union's Position

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The European Union has made it clear that it will "never, ever" accept a two-state solution for Cyprus. This position is in line with the EU's commitment to supporting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of its member states, including the Republic of Cyprus.[45]

Impact on International Politics and Global Precedents

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A two-state resolution in Cyprus might embolden separatist movements and unrecognized states worldwide, potentially leading to increased instability and conflicts. This prospect raises concerns about the erosion of international norms regarding sovereignty and territorial integrity.[46]

See also

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References

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  1. ^ a b c Salih, Halil Ibrahim (2013). Reshaping of Cyprus: A Two-State Solution:. US: Xlibris. p. 220. ISBN 978-1-4797-8014-3.
  2. ^ "Cyprus – the two-state solution the UN rejects". MPC Journal, 22.07.2021. 22 July 2021. Retrieved 12 January 2024.
  3. ^ "EU will 'never, ever' accept two-state deal on Cyprus". Reuters, 08.07.2021. 8 July 2021. Retrieved 12 January 2024.
  4. ^ "Ozersay anticipates two-state solution". Cypriumnews. Cyprium News, 14.12.2019. 14 December 2019. Retrieved 25 March 2020.
  5. ^ "Brexit can end Cyprus stand-off between north and south, Prime Minister says". Express, 20.03.2020. 23 February 2020. Retrieved 25 March 2020.
  6. ^ United Nations' International Court of Justice Archived 21 August 2010 at the Wayback Machine 22 July 2010
  7. ^ "ICJ's 2010-Kosovo decision and its reflections on the two-state solution" (PDF). International Court of Justice. Retrieved 12 January 2024.
  8. ^ "Public sitting held on Tuesday 8 December 2009 at the Peace Palace, President Owada, presiding, on the Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence by the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo" (PDF). ICJ. 8 December 2009. Retrieved 27 May 2023. page 38, paragraph 40
  9. ^ Milanovic, Marco, ed. (2015). The Law and Politics of the Kosovo Advisory Opinion. Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198717515.001.0001. ISBN 9780198717515.
  10. ^ a b Courthouse News Center 13.10.2014 Property Spat Over Turk-Controlled Cyprus Fails
  11. ^ a b USA's Federal Court Michali Toumazou, Nicolas Kantzilaris and Maroulla Tompazou versus Republic of Turkey and Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus
  12. ^ a b USA's Federal Court Toumazou et al v. Republic of Turkey and Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus
  13. ^ [https://www.icj-cij.org/sites/default/files/case-related/141/141-20100722-ADV-01-08-EN.pdf Separate opinion of Judge Cançado Trindade, p.228-229
  14. ^ BBC Archived 22 May 2018 at the Wayback Machine The President of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) Hisashi Owada (2010): "International law contains no prohibition on declarations of independence."
  15. ^ Oshisanya, An Almanac of Contemporary and Comperative Judicial Restatement, 2016 Archived 14 November 2022 at the Wayback Machine p.64: The ICJ maintained that ... the issue of recognition was apolitical.
  16. ^ ECtHR The decision of 02.07.2013. paragraph 29
  17. ^ ECtHR The decision of 02.09.2015. paragraph 237.
  18. ^ The Telegraph 03.02.2017 Criminals fleeing British justice can no longer use Cyprus as a safe haven, judges rule, in landmark decision
  19. ^ The president of Northern Cyprus rejects the idea of new negotiations (Pledge Times; 04 August 2024)
  20. ^ For example:
    • James Ker-Lindsay (UN Secretary-General's Special Advisor on Cyprus) (April 2011). The Cyprus Problem: What Everyone Needs to Know. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0199757152. {{cite book}}: |author= has generic name (help)
    • Hugo Gobbi (United Nations Secretary General's former Special Representative on Cyprus) (26 February 1996). "Partition may be the only solution". Cyprus Mail.
    • James Ker-Lindsay (expert advisor to UN Special Advisor on Cyprus): "As the status quo in Cyprus becomes untenable, perhaps the solution lies in a more radical option – partition." James Ker-Lindsay (3 September 2007). "The unmentionable solution – part 2". The Guardian. Retrieved 18 May 2018.
    • Michael Moran (Sussex University). "Denktaş: Toplu mezarlar zamanına döneriz". Hürriyet (in Turkish). 18 June 2009.
    • Riz Khan (Al-Jazeera): "Cyprus: time for formal partition?". 10 November 2010. Retrieved 18 May 2018.
    • Jack Straw (UK Foreign Secretary): "Cyprus should be partitioned". Archived at Ghostarchive and the Wayback Machine: Today. BBC Radio 4. 8 November 2010.
    • William Chislett (5 July 2010). "Cyprus: Time for a Negotiated Partition?". Spain: Real Instituto Elcano.
    • Marios Matsakis (Greek Cypriot MEP), Hermes Solomon and Loucas Charalambous (Greek Cypriot columnists, Cyprus Mail), Nicola Solomonides (Greek Cypriot academic), Rauf Denktas (founder of Northern Cyprus)
    • Clement Dodd: "Exactly fifty years after Cyprus became independent, the chances of reuniting the island look slim." Quoted in "To those who think Cyprus cannot be partitioned...it already is". Cyprus Mail. 12 December 2010.
    • Chaim Kaufmann, quoted in Barbara F. Walter; Jack Snydered (1999). "When All Else Fails: Evaluating Population Transfers and Partition as Solutions to Ethnic Conflict". Civil War, Insecurity, and Intervention. New York: Columbia University Press. p. 248. We should not fail to separate populations in cases that have already produced large-scale violence and intense security dilemmas.
    • Chaim Kaufmann (22 May 2007). "An Assessment of the Partition of Cyprus". International Studies Perspectives. 8 (2): 220–221. doi:10.1111/j.1528-3585.2007.00281.x. the partition of Cyprus contributed to the settlement of violent conflict there
    • Cyprus Mail, 12 January 2014: "The only Plan B on offer is partition which may well be the only viable solution after all these years, but this should be made clear."
  21. ^ "Kempton two state solution". Archived from the original on 2019-05-02. Retrieved 2017-07-09.
  22. ^ "Famagusta two state Cyprus". Archived from the original on 2012-03-01. Retrieved 2017-07-09.
  23. ^ "Cyprus: Area Administered by Turkish Cypriots". The United States Department of State. 2022. Retrieved 11 November 2024.
  24. ^ "Refusing to Call Cyprus Occupied Isn't Sophisticated. It's Stupid". The American Enterprise Institute. 24 April 2024. Retrieved 11 November 2024. "the State Department ...to describe the ... region as the Area Administered by Turkish Cypriots."
  25. ^ "Turkish Cypriot President slams EU, backs its position". hurriyetdailynews.com. 25 December 2021. Retrieved 25 December 2021.
  26. ^ "Tatar insists on sovereign equality to start Cyprus talks". philenews. 30 January 2022. Archived from the original on 31 January 2022. Retrieved 31 January 2022.
  27. ^ "Tatar says he's ready for an informal dialogue". Cyprus-mail. 30 January 2022. Retrieved 31 January 2022.
  28. ^ "E. Tatar: First recognition of sovereign equality, then negotiation". worldstockmarket. 30 January 2022. Retrieved 31 January 2022.
  29. ^ "Incendiary statements of Tatars: Varosia belongs to the pseudo-state – "The federation is out of time"". Fourals. 30 January 2022. Archived from the original on 21 September 2022. Retrieved 31 January 2022.
  30. ^ "UNSC head says Holguin only found 'there is no common ground for Cyprus solution'". Cyprus Mail. 1 July 2024. Retrieved 20 August 2024.
  31. ^ "Inflammatory rhetoric soared as Cyprus marked 50th anniversary of Turkish troop presence". International Crisis Group. 15 July 2024. Retrieved 20 August 2024.
  32. ^ "The unionists from Northern Ireland who are fond of and support the Turkish-Cypriot run territory of Northern Cyprus". Newsletter (UK). 27 July 2024. Retrieved 29 July 2024."...the then DUP leader Sir Jeffrey Donaldson and his party colleague Sammy Wilson went a step further and joined the Turkish Cypriots in calling for a two-state solution to the island in which the north would be a state on a par with the south. "
  33. ^ "British MP: "The only solution is the recognition of Northern Cyprus or its union with Turkey"". Omega Lives. 4 August 2024. Retrieved 5 August 2024.
  34. ^ "Guterres: No Common Ground Between Leaders, Informal Expanded Meeting Planned". Cyprus Mirror. 16 October 2024. Retrieved 17 October 2024.
  35. ^ "Bishkek Declaration of the Eleventh Summit of the Organization of Turkic States, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan" (PDF). Cyprus Mirror. 7 November 2024. Retrieved 7 November 2024.
  36. ^ Loucas Charalambous (5 February 2017). "Why the majority want partition". Cyprus Mail.
  37. ^ "Cyprus 2015 Initiative: Solving the Cyprus Problem: Hopes and Fears; 2011, p. 38". UNDP. Retrieved 25 March 2020.
  38. ^ "GC poll on two-state solution, BBF or ?". Cypriumnews. Cyprium News, 16.11.2019. 16 November 2019. Retrieved 25 March 2020.
  39. ^ "Gezici Poll firm revealed survey results: Tatar is leading". Gundem Kibris, 20.01.2020. Retrieved 25 March 2020.
  40. ^ "Majority of Cypriots feel 'anxious, dissatisfied and angry' – poll". Retrieved 18 November 2022.
  41. ^ "The majority of the Greek population does not believe in the possibility of achieving a federation". Retrieved 24 October 2024.
  42. ^ "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus". 4 May 2023.
  43. ^ "No: 114, 29 April 2023, Press Release Regarding the Acceptance of the Assembly of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus As An Observer Member of the Parliamentary Assembly of Turkic States". 29 April 2023.
  44. ^ "The two-state solution the UN rejects". MPC Journal. 22 July 2021. Retrieved 12 January 2024.
  45. ^ "The EU will 'never, ever' accept a two-state solution in Cyprus". Cyprus Mail. 8 July 2021. Retrieved 12 January 2024.
  46. ^ "The rise of separatist movements and unrecognized states". Council on Foreign Relations. Retrieved 12 January 2024.