p. 87: Differences exist among the three Druze communities regarding their identity recourse. The Syrian and Lebanese Druze are strongly influencecd by Arab nationalism and Sunni Islam, and strive to be acepted as 'genuine' Arabs and Muslims, whether from conviction or social pressure. In contrast, the majority of Israeli Druze are adamantly convinced that they constitute a distinct ethnic and religious community that has nothing in common with Muslims and shares only a language with Arabs. This distinction was acknowledged, in their view, by the prophet Shu`aib, whom the Israeli Druze revere as their founder. As the son-in-law of Moses, he further symbolises the historic unity of the Jewis and Druze communities.
In Druze dogma, Shu`aib is seen as the personification of al-aql al-kulli. Nowhere in Syrian and Lebanese literature is he given further importance; in interviews with Syrian and Lebanese Druze, his name is never mentioned. When asked about this phenomenon, Israeli Druze argue that their Syrian and Lebanese brothers practise taqiyya on this question, since they are forced to acknowledge Muhammad to be the greatest prophet. Only a minority among them, the most prominent being Samih al-Qasi, Salman Natur and shaikh Jamal Mu`addi, openly distance themselves from this position and insist on their identity as Muslim Palestinians.
(brief discussion and quotes from Samih al-Qasi and Salman Natur ) p.88 A comparison of interviews with Druze in the 3 countries shows that Israeli Druze seem to be the ones most resistant to reform movements seeking to open their community to the outside world or to allow their culture to absorb influence from it. The communities in Syria and Lebanon show a much greater willingness to accept basic changes in their traditional religious, social and political policies. This observation is based not only upon the impressions of foreign observers, but also upon the perceptions of Lebanese and Syrian Druze. They consider the Druze in Israel to form the most 'tightly-woven', 'closed', 'traditional' Druze community. The reasons for this can be found in the socio-political positions of the Druze in Israel. Since Israel is a declared Jewish state, the Druze will never be able to identify with it completely. The officially propagated Zionism is hardly an ideology attrative to non-Jews. In addition, the Israeli government seeks to keep the distinctive identities of non-Jewish minorities within a framework that suits its policies. As a result, the desire of - or social pressure from - non-Jewish comunities for integration into Israeli society is very small, even if the Western-oriented life-style of many Israelis might tempt the younger generation of Druze.
In Lebanon and Syria, which possess predominantly Arab/Muslim populations, the Druze have greater possibilities for social and political influence and advancement. This gives them, in turn, an incentive to overcome their minority status - albeit in a controlled and gradual manner. Moreover, one must not underestimate the attraction of secular ideologies, suh as arab nationalism and socialism, although these have lost much of their strength in recent years. For both of these reasons, the chances of positive integration into the social and political spheres are much greater in Lebanon and Syria than they are in Israel.
Schenk, Bernadette "Druze Identity in the Middle East", in Salibi, Kamal, ed, The Druze: Realities and Perceptions, London, Druze Heritage Foundation, 2005