风萧萧_Frank
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新加坡如何应对中美紧张局势
这个城市国家的国防部长解读了北京和华盛顿在亚洲的意图。
《外交政策》主编拉维·阿格拉沃尔 (Ravi Agrawal) 撰稿。
拉维·阿格拉沃尔 (Ravi Agrawal)
2024 年 7 月 18 日
很少有国家比新加坡更善于解读中美关系。这个小而富裕的城市国家与华盛顿和北京有着广泛的联系，了解双方。它知道利害关系。它致力于将两国拉到一起，避免印太地区发生冲突。新加坡主办一年一度的香格里拉对话，世界各地的国防部长都出席了会议。上个月，该峰会成为中美国防部长高层会晤的举办地。
很少有国家比新加坡更善于解读中美关系。这个小而富裕的城市国家与华盛顿和北京有着广泛的联系，了解双方。它知道利害关系。新加坡致力于将两国拉近距离，避免印太地区发生冲突。新加坡每年都会主办香格里拉对话，各国国防部长都会出席。上个月，中美国防部长在香格里拉对话峰会上举行了高层会晤。
那么，新加坡如何看待世界？在科罗拉多州阿斯彭安全论坛开幕之夜，我与新加坡国防部长黄永宏就一系列问题进行了交谈，从美国的软实力到中国的自信。以下是谈话记录，为清晰起见，我们对其进行了轻微编辑和压缩。
拉维·阿格拉沃尔：黄部长，毫无疑问，在过去十年左右的时间里，中国变得更加好战。正如您所理解的那样，您认为为什么中国人在过去十年左右的时间里变得更加自信和好战？
黄永宏：我并不假装了解中国，也不假装为中国辩护。那么让我来阐述一下我们的观点。
我们有两个冲突战场，对吧？一个在乌克兰。另一个在 10 月 7 日哈马斯袭击之后开始。以色列国防军的报复和报复对我们所有人都是痛苦的。但更大的问题是，它可能扩展到加沙和以色列之外。
我们承受不起亚洲第三个冲突战场。首先，我认为体制无法承受。但我认为更重要的是，我认为开战的理由根本不存在，至少现在还没有。
RA：当然。但你是一位敏锐的中国观察家。从与对话者的交谈中，你能试着解释一下他们如何看待世界以及他们为什么这样做吗？
NEH：好吧，如果你把自己放在中国，他们做的很多事情对他们来说都是有意义的。我并不是说他们没有犯过任何错误。但是，比如在南海修建岛礁，将他们的前沿防线向前推进几百公里，这在军事战略上是完全合理的。岛链概念是美国的概念，旨在遏制中国。从这个角度来看，如果他们能做到，他们就会这么做。他们也确实这么做了。
你所描述的在南海的强硬态度可能是一种糟糕的外交政策。如果你平静而坦率地和他们交谈，他们会说他们并没有对每一寸海域都提出主权要求。他们公开这么说，但私下里却说他们没有。如何收回这些主权是他们需要处理的问题。
RA：让我反过来问这个问题。美国对华政策在过去七八年里也发生了巨大变化。这让你担心吗？
NEH：是的。
但让我试着重新审视一下。今天的中国是对 20 世纪 60 年代到 21 世纪美国伟大外交政策的精彩见证。事实上，整个亚洲都是如此。从肯尼迪总统开始，历届政府都曾表示，“任何形式的殖民控制都不应被铁腕专制所取代”，当时美国率先发起了反共斗争。克林顿总统支持中国加入世贸组织。
他说服两党的理由是，这对亚洲的安全很重要。从这个角度来看，从 1960 年代到 2010 年左右，美国的外交政策始终如一，致力于建立一个让大国和小国都受益的全球体系。其成果十分惊人。从经济上讲，中国现在占世界贸易的 17%，经济规模为 17 万亿美元。[美国仍以 28 万亿美元位居第一。]但有 8 亿人摆脱了贫困。从历史上看，没有任何国家能做到这一点。在 1960 年代，如果把整个亚洲算在内，它占全球贸易的 4%。现在这个比例是 30%。所有这些都是美国的成功。
RA：我注意到你止步于 2010 年。那么 2010 年至 2024 年呢？
NEH：推动全球化的动力突然转变，并决定为全球化创建的机构不适用于这一进程。该法案没有通过，但美国试图退出世贸组织。巴黎协定。拉
How Singapore Manages U.S.-China Tensions
The city-state’s defense minister decodes what Beijing and Washington want in Asia.
By Ravi Agrawal, the editor in chief of Foreign Policy. July 18, 2024
Few countries are better equipped to interpret the U.S.-China relationship than Singapore. The small but wealthy city-state has extensive contacts with Washington and Beijing and understands both sides. It knows what’s at stake. And it’s invested in trying to bring the two together and avoid conflict in the Indo-Pacific. Singapore hosts the annual Shangri-La Dialogue, attended by defense ministers from around the world. Last month, that summit was the site of a high-level meeting between the U.S. and Chinese defense chiefs.
Few countries are better equipped to interpret the U.S.-China relationship than Singapore. The small but wealthy city-state has extensive contacts with Washington and Beijing and understands both sides. It knows what’s at stake. And it’s invested in trying to bring the two together and avoid conflict in the Indo-Pacific. Singapore hosts the annual Shangri-La Dialogue, attended by defense ministers from around the world. Last month, that summit was the site of a high-level meeting between the U.S. and Chinese defense chiefs.
So, how does Singapore see the world? I spoke with the country’s defense minister, Ng Eng Hen, on a range of issues, from U.S. soft power to Chinese assertiveness, on the opening night of the Aspen Security Forum in Colorado. What follows is a transcript, lightly edited and condensed for clarity.
Ravi Agrawal: Minister Ng, there’s little question now that over the last decade or so, China has just become a lot more belligerent. As you understand them, why do you think the Chinese have shifted in the last decade or so to become more assertive and belligerent?
Ng Eng Hen: I don’t pretend to understand China or to be an apologist for China. So let me frame our perspective. We have two theaters of conflict, right? One in Ukraine. And you have one which started after the Oct. 7 Hamas attack. The retaliation and the retribution by the IDF is painful for all of us. But the greater problem there is that it can expand beyond Gaza and Israel.
We can ill afford a third theater of conflict in Asia. First, I don’t think the system can take it. But I think more importantly, I think the reasons for casus belli are simply not there, or at least not yet.
RA: Well, sure. But you’re an astute observer of China. From speaking to your interlocutors, can you try and explain how are they seeing the world and why they’re acting as they are?
NEH: Well, if you situate yourself in China, a lot of things that they’re doing make sense to them. I’m not saying they didn’t make any mistakes. But to build, for example, features within the South China Sea to move their forward defense line a couple of hundred kilometers makes perfect military strategic sense. The island chain concept was an American concept, and it was meant to contain China. And, from that point of view, if they could do it, they would. So they did.
The assertiveness you were describing in the South China Sea was probably a bad foreign policy. If you speak to them quietly and candidly, they say that they don’t claim every inch of water. They’ve said so publicly, but in private, they say they don’t. How to roll it back is something that they need to deal with.
RA: So let me flip that question. America’s approach toward China has also changed dramatically in the last seven or eight years. Does that worry you?
NEH: It does.
But let me try to reframe it. The China of today is a wonderful testament to great American foreign policy from the 1960s to the 2000s. In fact, the whole of Asia is. Across administrations, starting from President Kennedy [who said] “one form of colonial control [shall] not … be replaced by an iron tyranny” in 1961 when America spearheaded the fight against communism. You talk about President Clinton, sponsoring China’s ascension into the WTO. The reason he gave to convince both sides of the aisle was that it was important for the security of Asia. Now, from that perspective, American foreign policy from the 1960s to somewhere in 2010 has been consistent in building a global system that benefited small and large countries. And the results have been spectacular. Economically, China is now 17% of world trade, with an economy of $17 trillion. [The U.S. still leads at $28 trillion.] But 800 million people were lifted out of poverty. No way, historically, has any country ever done that. In the 1960s, if you take all of Asia, it accounted for 4 percent of global trade. It’s now 30 percent. All these have been American successes.
RA: I noted you stopped at 2010 there. What about 2010 to 2024?
NEH: The moving spirit did a volte-face and decided that the institutions created for globalization didn’t work for this process. The bill didn’t pass, but America tried to get out of the WTO. The Paris Agreement. Pulling out of the TPP. So America was the moving spirit for the globalized world, for trade, for finance that would benefit small and large countries. It’s now changed. We don’t know where it will go. And I don’t think China is the only reason. And we have to ask ourselves, where will the U.S. be and where will China be?
Because the reality now for China is that from the Asian perspective, China is the largest trading partner for almost all countries in Asia. Now, Joseph Nye talks about soft power. Kissinger talks about legitimacy. But here’s a question for you. Can the U.S. sustain its global presence and its military presence in Asia solely predicated on military power?
RA: I’m guessing the answer is no. I mean, that was a rhetorical question.
NEH: In case you haven’t noticed, Americans weren’t always popular in Asia. In the 1960s, there was a real anti-American backlash. Now in 1990, America became more popular because basically the foreign policy worked. “A rising tide lifts all boats,” and the Asian economies grew. But, when American forces had to pull out of Clark and Subic [military bases], we offered Singapore. Today, American ships and planes are the largest user of Changi Naval Base.
So from Singapore’s perspective, we’ve held that the U.S. presence in Asia is a force for stability. We’ve said it’s indispensable. But that was of a U.S. that was leading the global charge. And [then-Singaporean Prime Minister] Lee Kuan Yew, when he addressed the U.S. Congress in 1985, said America, as a superpower, will have to decide on the rules and enforce it, which America did marvelously, I would say, for 20 years hence. Today, I would argue that it’s a different America, and one that has to be careful to maintain its moral legitimacy, even in Asia.
RA: Are you saying America has lost its moral legitimacy in Asia?
NEH: Has to maintain its moral legitimacy.
The Chinese say to us, “You ASEAN countries or Asian countries, you’re very difficult. You choose China when it comes to trade, and you choose America when it comes to military power.” So we look at them and say, “Why not?”
