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Password Hashing Best Practices

The document compares bcrypt, scrypt, and PBKDF2 for secure password storage, highlighting their resistance to brute-force attacks. It recommends using scrypt or bcrypt for modern systems, with scrypt preferred for its memory-hardness. PBKDF2 is considered acceptable but weaker against contemporary threats, emphasizing the importance of using salt and high cost factors in hashing policies.

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2 views11 pages

Password Hashing Best Practices

The document compares bcrypt, scrypt, and PBKDF2 for secure password storage, highlighting their resistance to brute-force attacks. It recommends using scrypt or bcrypt for modern systems, with scrypt preferred for its memory-hardness. PBKDF2 is considered acceptable but weaker against contemporary threats, emphasizing the importance of using salt and high cost factors in hashing policies.

Uploaded by

winiforall
Copyright
© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
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Download as PPTX, PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd
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Password Hashing Best Practices

• Comparing bcrypt, scrypt, and PBKDF2


• Presented by: [Your Name]
Introduction
• Objective:
• To compare bcrypt, scrypt, and PBKDF2 in
terms of resistance to brute-force attacks for
secure password storage.
Why Password Hashing Matters
• - Prevents plaintext password leaks
• - Slows down attackers in brute-force attempts
• - Essential for secure authentication systems
What is a Brute-force Attack?
• - Automated guessing of all possible password
combinations
• - Effectiveness depends on hashing algorithm
and system resources
• - Goal: make it computationally expensive
bcrypt Overview
• - Designed for password hashing
• - Introduced in 1999
• - Built-in salting
• - Adjustable cost factor (2^n rounds)

• Brute-force Resistance:
• ✅ Strong due to slow hashing and adaptable
cost
• 🚫 CPU only — not memory-intensive
scrypt Overview
• - Designed for password-based key derivation
• - Memory-hard: uses large memory buffers
• - Adjustable CPU, memory, and parallelization
parameters

• Brute-force Resistance:
• ✅ High — costly for attackers due to memory
requirements
• ✅ Good against GPU/ASIC attacks
PBKDF2 Overview
• - Part of RSA’s PKCS #5 standard
• - Used in many legacy systems
• - Adjustable iteration count
• - Fast on standard CPUs

• Brute-force Resistance:
• ⚠️Moderate — no memory hardness
• ⚠️Easier for attackers using GPUs
Comparison Table
• Feature | bcrypt | scrypt |
PBKDF2
• -------------------|--------------|------------------|------
--------
• Year Introduced | 1999 | 2009 |
2000
• Salt Support | Yes | Yes | Yes
• Memory-Hard | No | Yes | No
• Adjustable Cost | Yes (2^n) | Yes (CPU,
mem) | Yes (iter.)
Recommendation
• - For modern systems: Use scrypt or bcrypt
• - If memory-hardness needed: Prefer scrypt
• - PBKDF2: Still acceptable but weaker against
modern attacks
Conclusion
• - Choose algorithms based on threat model
• - Always use salt and high cost factors
• - Regularly review and update hashing policies
Questions
• Any questions or thoughts?

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