Malware and Software Vulnerability

Analysis

Software Security Introduction

Cliff Zou
Spring 2012
 Acknowledgement
 This lecture is extended and modified
from lecture notes by Dr. Erik Poll
 Spring’08 course: software security

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 Overview
 What is software security ?
 Understanding the role that software plays
 in providing security
 as source of insecurity

 Principles, methods & technologies to

make software more secure
 Practical experience with some of these
 Typical threats & vulnerabilities in
software, and how to avoid them

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 Overview
 Software plays a major role in providing
security, and is a major source of security
problems
 Software security does not get much
attention
 In programming courses
 Many future programmers have little training on
software security
 In software company’s goal

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 Overview
 We focus on software security, but don’t forget
that security is about many things:
 people
 human computer interaction, HCI
 Attackers, users, employees, sys-admins, programmers
 access control, passwords, biometrics
 cryptology, protocols
 Monitoring, auditing, risk management
 Policy, legislation
 public relations, public perception
 ….

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 Security Concepts and Goals

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 Software and Security
 Security is about regulating access to
assets
 E.g., information or functionality
 Software provides functionality
 E.g., on-line exam results
 This functionality comes with certain risks
 E.g., what are risks of on-line exam results?
 Privacy (score leakage); Modification
 Software security is about managing these
risks
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 Software and Security
 Security is always a secondary concern
 Primary goal of software is to provide
functionalities or services
 Managing associated risks is a
derived/secondary concern
 There is often a trade-off/conflict between
 security
 functionality & convenience
 Security achievement is hard to evaluate
when nothing bad happens
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Functionality vs Security

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Security Concept

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Starting Point for Ensuring Security
 Any discussion of security should start
with an inventory of
 the stakeholders (owners, companies…)
 their assets (data, service, customer info…)
 the threats to these assets (erase, steal…)
 Attackers
 employees, clients, script kiddies, criminals
 Any discussion of security without
understanding these issues is
meaningless

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 Security Concepts
 Security is about imposing countermeasures to
reduce risks to assets to acceptable levels
 “Perfect security” is not necessary and costly

 A security policy is a specification of what

security requirements/goals the
countermeasures are intended to achieve
 secure against what and from whom ?
 Security mechanisms to enforce the policy
 What actions we should take under an attack?

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 Security Objectives: CIA
 Confidentiality (or secrecy)
 unauthorized users cannot read information
 Integrity
 unauthorized users cannot alter information
 Availability
 authorized users can always access information

 Non-repudiation for accountability

 authorized users cannot deny actions
 Others
 Privacy, anonymity…

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 Security Goals
 The well-known trio
 confidentiality, integrity, avaliability (CIA)
 There are more “concrete” goals
 traceability and auditing (forensics)
 monitoring (real-time auditing)
 multi-level security
 privacy & anonymity
 ...
 and meta-property
 assurance – that the goals are met
 “information assurance”

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How to Realize Security Objectives? AAAA

 Authentication
 who are you?
 Access control/Authorization
 control who is allowed to do what
 this requires a specification of who is allowed
to do what
 Auditing
 check if anything went wrong
 Action
 if so, take action

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 How to Realize Security Objectives?

Other names for the last three A's

Prevention

measures to stop breaches of security goals

Detection

measures to detect breaches of security goals

Reaction

measures to recover assets, repair damage, and persecute
(and deter) offenders


Good prevention does not make detection &
reaction superfluous

E.g., breaking into any house with windows is trivial;
despite this absence of prevention, detection &
reaction still deter burglars

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 Threats vs Security Requirements
 information disclosure
 confidentiality
 tampering with information
 integrity
 denial-of-service (DoS)
 availability
 spoofing
 authentication
 unauthorized access
 access control

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 Countermeasures
 Countermeasures can be non-IT related
 physical security of building
 screening of personnel
 legal framework to deter criminals
 training employee

 but we won’t consider these

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 Countermeasures and More Vulnerabilities

 Countermeasures can lead to new vulnerabilities


E.g., if we only allow three incorrect logins, as a
countermeasure to brute-force attacks (account be
frozen), which new vulnerability do we introduce?

Denial of Service attack

If a countermeasure relies on new software, bugs in
this new software may mean

that it is ineffective, or

worse still, that it introduces more weaknesses

E.g., Witty worm appeared in Mar 2004 exploited ISS security
software

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Witty_%28computer_worm%29

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 Example: insecurities in SSH

From www.cert.org/advisories for (Open)SSH

CA-2001-35 Recent Activity Against Secure Shell Daemon (Dec
13)

Multiple vulnerabilities in several implementations of SSH. ...

CA-2002-18 OpenSSH Vulnerability in challenge-response
handling (Jun 26)

Vulnerabilities in challenge response handling code ...

CA-2002-23 Multiple Vulnerabilities in OpenSSH (July 30)

Four remotely exploitable buffer overflows in ...

CA-2002-24 Trojan Horse OpenSSH Distribution (Aug 1)

Some copies of the source code of OpenSSH package contain a
Trojan horse.

CA-2002-36 Multiple Vulnerabilities in SSH Implementations
(Dec 16)

Multiple vendors' implementations of SSH contain vulnerabilities...

CA-2003-24: Buffer Management Vulnerability in OpenSSH
(Sept 16)

There is a remotely exploitable buffer overflow in versions of
OpenSSH prior to 3.7. ...

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 Example: insecurities in SSH
 SSH was meant to provide security, namely as
countermeasure against eavesdropping on network, but
is a source of new vulnerabilities
 Crypto is not the cause of these vulnerabilities, and
could not solve/prevent these vulnerabilities
 Protocol, implementation errors (e.g., WEP in WiFi)
 Programming errors (buffer overflow)
 Distribution errors (trojan)
 Bruce Schneier: “Currently encryption is the strongest link we have.
Everything else is worse: software, networks, people. There's
absolutely no value in taking the strongest link and making it even
stronger”

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Software Security

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 Two Sides to Software Security

 What are the methods and technologies,

available to us if we want to provide security?
 security in the software development lifecycle
 engineering & design principles
 security technologies
 What are the methods and technologies
available to the enemy who wants to break
security ?
 What are the threats and vulnerabilities we’re up
against?
 What are the resources and tools available to
attackers?

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Security in Software Development Life Cycle

 Source: Gary McGraw, Software security, Security & Privacy Magazine, IEEE, Vol 2,
No. 2, pp. 80-83, 2004.

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 Example Security Technologies
 Cryptography
 for threats related to insecure communication and
storage
 Covered in other courses
 Access control
 for threats related to misbehaving users
 E.g., role-based access control
 Language-based security
 for threats related to misbehaving programs
 typing, memory-safety
 sandboxing
 E.g., Java, .NET/C#

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 Example Security Technologies
 These technologies may be provided by the
infrastructure/platform an application builds on,
 networking infrastructure
 which may e.g. use SSL
 operating system or database system
 providing e.g. access control
 programming platform
 for instance Java or .NET sandboxing
 Of course, software in such infrastructures
implementing security has to be secure

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 Software Infrastructure
 Applications are built on top of "infrastructure"
consisting of
 operating system
 programming language/platform/middleware
 programming language itself
 interface to CPU & RAM
 libraries and APIs
 interface to peripherals (socket, interrupt…)
 provider of building blocks
 other applications & utilities
 E.g., database
 This infrastructure provides security
mechanisms, but is also a source of insecurity

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Typical Software Security Vulnerabilities

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Sources of Software Vulnerabilities

Bugs in the application or its infrastructure

i.e. doesn't do what it should do

E.g., access flag can be modified by user input

Inappropriate features in the infrastructure

i.e. does something that it shouldn't do

functionality winning over security

E.g., a search function that can display other users info

Inappropriate use of features provided by the
infrastructure

Main causes:

complexity of these features

functionality winning over security, again

ignorance of developers

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 Functionality vs Security
Lost battles?
 operating systems
 huge OS, with huge attack surface (API),
 programming languages
 buffer overflows, format strings, ... in C
 public fields in Java
 lots of things in PHP
 webbrowsers
 plug-ins for various formats, javascript, VBscript, ...
 email clients

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Threat Modeling

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 Threat Modeling
 Aka security/risk/requirements analysis
 A first step, not just for software
 Identify assets & stakeholders
 Consider architecture of application & its environment
 Brainstorm about known threats
 Define security assumptions
 Rank threats by risk
 ≈ impact x likelihood
 Decide which threats to respond to
 Decide how to mitigate these threats
 which techniques & technologies

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Example Techniques to Mitigate Threats
 Spoofing Identity
 authentication, protect keys & passwords, ...
 Tampering with Data
 access control, hashes, digital signatures, MACs (message
authentication codes), write-once storage...
 Repudiation
 logging, audit trails, digital signatures, ...
 Information Disclosure
 access control, encryption, not storing secrets, ...
 Denial of Service
 graceful degradation, filtering, increase server resources
 Elevation of Privilege
 access control, sandboxing, ...

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Example: Email System

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 Potential threats to the e-mail system
 Eavesdropping on e-mail
 Communication over the Internet is relatively easy to eavesdrop
 Hence, content of e-mail is by no means confidential
 Critical information can be encrypted and in email attachment
 Modifying e-mail
 Interception of the communication (e.g. between the two MTS’s)
allows an attacker to modify the e-mail
 Hence, integrity of the e-mail is not guaranteed
 Spoofing e-mail
 MTS blindly believes other MTS about who the sender of the e-
mail is
 Hence, no guarantee about the identity of the sender
 Attacks against the mail servers
 Server is a “trusted software layer”, making a limited
functionality (sending/receiving mail) available to all clients
 Email as an attack dispersion channel
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 Attack Formats
 Spam
 Marketer can send massive amounts of unsolicited e-mail
 Denial-of-service attacks
 Amount of storage space on mail server can be exhausted by
receiving too many very big e-mails
 A mail server is slowed down by too many received emails
 A client receives thousands of garbage emails and hence
missing real email
 Phishing
 Email clients trust received spoofed email
 Give out their private data (e.g., back account) accordingly
 Direct reply back
 Input in a directed fake website
 Email malware
 E-mail client is again a trusted software layer
 Executable attachments make virus-spreading easy

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 Possible Defenses

Many other threats

Privacy threat: detecting when an e-mail is read

Repudiation of sending: sender can deny having sent a
message

Repudiation of receiving: receiver can deny having ever
received a particular message

Eavesdropping and modification

Can be countered by cryptographic techniques

Spoofing

Can be countered by strong authentication protocols

Attacks against servers

Can be countered by

Careful software coding

Clear access control model

Strong authentication

However, email spam, phishing are hard to defend

Phishing: there are always users without security knowledge!
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Vulnerabilities in Countermeasures

Each of the discussed countermeasures
can again have vulnerabilities:

Bad choice of cryptographic algorithm
 Protocol design weakness
 Implementation bug
 …

Example: Witty worm in 2004

Compromise a class of security software from
Internet Security Systems (ISS) now IBM Internet
Security Systems installed on user computers

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Witty_%28computer_worm%29

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