CSE4213 Computer Networks II

Chapter 8
Network Security

Course page:
http://www.cs.yorku.ca/course/4213

Slides modified from Jim Kurose’s slides

8: Network Security 8-1

Chapter 8: Network Security
Chapter goals:
 understand principles of network security:
 cryptography and its many uses beyond
“confidentiality”
 authentication
 message integrity

 security in practice:
 firewalls and intrusion detection systems
 security in application, transport, network, link
layers

8: Network Security 8-2

Chapter 8 roadmap

8.1 What is network security?

8.2 Principles of cryptography
8.3 Message integrity
8.4 End point authentication
8.5 Securing e-mail
8.6 Securing TCP connections: SSL
8.7 Network layer security: IPsec
8.8 Securing wireless LANs
8.9 Operational security: firewalls and IDS
8: Network Security 8-3
What is network security?
Confidentiality: only sender, intended receiver
should “understand” message contents
 sender encrypts message
 receiver decrypts message

Authentication: sender, receiver want to confirm

identity of each other
Message integrity: sender, receiver want to
ensure message not altered (in transit, or
afterwards) without detection
Access and availability: services must be
accessible and available to users
8: Network Security 8-4
Friends and enemies: Alice, Bob,
Trudy
 well-known in network security world
 Bob, Alice (lovers!) want to communicate “securely”
 Trudy (intruder) may intercept, delete, add messages

Alice Bob
data, control
channel
messages

data secure secure data

sender receiver

Trudy
8: Network Security 8-5
There are bad guys (and girls) out
there!
Q: What can a “bad guy” do?
A: a lot!
 eavesdrop: intercept messages
 actively insert messages into connection
 impersonation: can fake (spoof) source
address in packet (or any field in packet)
 hijacking: “take over” ongoing connection
by removing sender or receiver, inserting
himself in place
 denial of service: prevent service from being
used by others (e.g., by overloading
resources)
more on this later ……
8: Network Security 8-6
 Network Stack

email, Web, NFS Sendmail, FTP, NFS bugs,

application chosen-protocol and
version-rollback attacks
presentation
RPC RPC worms, portmapper exploits
session
TCP SYN flooding, RIP attacks,
transport sequence number prediction
IP
network IP smurfing and other
address spoofing attacks
802.11
data link
WEP attacks

physical

Only as secure as the single weakest layer…

8: Network Security 8-10
Chapter 8 roadmap

8.1 What is network security?

8.2 Principles of cryptography
8.3 Message integrity
8.4 End point authentication
8.5 Securing e-mail
8.6 Securing TCP connections: SSL
8.7 Network layer security: IPsec
8.8 Securing wireless LANs
8.9 Operational security: firewalls and IDS
8: Network Security 8-11
The language of cryptography
Alice’s Bob’s
K encryptio K decryptio
A
n Bn
key key
plaintext encryption ciphertext decryption plaintext
algorithm algorithm

symmetric key crypto: sender, receiver keys identical

public-key crypto: encryption key public, decryption
key secret (private)

8: Network Security 8-12

 Symmetric key cryptography
substitution cipher: substituting one thing for another
 monoalphabetic cipher: substitute one letter for another

plaintext: abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz

ciphertext: mnbvcxzasdfghjklpoiuytrewq

E.g.: Plaintext: bob. i love you. alice

ciphertext: nkn. s gktc wky. mgsbc

Q: How hard to break this simple cipher?:

 brute force (how hard?)
 other?

8: Network Security 8-13

 Symmetric key cryptography

KA-B KA-B

plaintext encryption ciphertext decryption plaintext

message, m algorithm algorithm
K (m)
A-B
m=K (KA-B(m) )
A-B

symmetric key crypto: Bob and Alice share know

same (symmetric) key: K
A-B
 e.g., key is knowing substitution pattern in mono
alphabetic substitution cipher
 Q: how do Bob and Alice agree on key value?

8: Network Security 8-14

Symmetric key crypto: DES
DES: Data Encryption Standard
 US encryption standard [NIST 1993]
 56-bit symmetric key, 64-bit plaintext input
 How secure is DES?
DES Challenge: 56-bit-key-encrypted phrase
(“Strong cryptography makes the world a safer
place”) decrypted (brute force) in 4 months
 no known “backdoor” decryption approach
 making DES more secure:
 use three keys sequentially (3-DES) on each datum
 use cipher-block chaining

8: Network Security 8-15

Symmetric key
crypto: DES
DES operation
initial permutation
16 identical “rounds” of
function application,
each using different
48 bits of key
final permutation

8: Network Security 8-16

AES: Advanced Encryption
Standard
 new (Nov. 2001) symmetric-key NIST
standard, replacing DES
 processes data in 128 bit blocks
 128, 192, or 256 bit keys
 brute force decryption (try each key)
taking 1 sec on DES, takes 149 trillion
years for AES

8: Network Security 8-17

Block Cipher
64-bit input

8bits 8bits 8bits 8bits 8bits 8bits 8bits 8bits

loop for
n rounds
T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 T6 T7 T8

8 bits 8 bits 8 bits 8 bits 8 bits 8 bits 8 bits 8 bits

 one pass
64-bit scrambler
through: one
input bit
affects eight 64-bit output

output bits
 multiple passes: each input bit afects all output
bits
 block ciphers: DES, 3DES, AES

8: Network Security 8-18

 Cipher Block Chaining
 cipher block: if input m(1) = “HTTP/1.1”
t=1 block c(1) = “k329aM02”
block repeated, will cipher
produce same …
m(17) = “HTTP/1.1”
cipher text: t=17 block c(17) = “k329aM02”
cipher
 cipher block chaining: XOR ith
input block, m(i), with previous
block of cipher text, c(i-1) m(i)
 c(0) transmitted to receiver in clear
 what happens in “HTTP/1.1”
scenario from above? c(i-1) +
block
cipher

c(i)
8: Network Security 8-19
Public key cryptography

symmetric key crypto public key

 requires sender, cryptography
receiver know  radically different
shared secret key approach [Diffie-
 Q: how to agree on Hellman76, RSA78]
key in first place  sender, receiver do
(particularly if never not share secret key
“met”)?  public encryption
key known to all
 private decryption
key known only to
receiver
8: Network Security 8-20
 Public key cryptography
+ Bob’s public
K
B key

- Bob’s private
K
B key

plaintext encryption ciphertext decryption plaintext

message, m algorithm +
K (m)
algorithm message
- +
B m = KB (K (m))
B

8: Network Security 8-21

Public key encryption algorithms

Requirements:
+ . .
1 need KB ( ) and -K ( ) such that
B
- +
K (K (m)) = m
B B
+ be impossible
given public key K , it should
2 to compute private keyB K

-
B

RSA: Rivest, Shamir, Adleman algorithm

8: Network Security 8-22
 RSA: Choosing keys
1. Choose two large prime numbers p, q.
(e.g., 1024 bits each)

2. Compute n = pq, z = (p-1)(q-1)

3. Choose e (with e<n) that has no common factors

with z. (e, z are “relatively prime”).

4. Choose d such that ed-1 is exactly divisible by z.

(in other words: ed mod z = 1 ).

5. Public key is (n,e). Private key is (n,d).

+ -
KB KB
8: Network Security 8-23
 RSA: Encryption, decryption
0. Given (n,e) and (n,d) as computed above

1. To encrypt bit pattern, m, compute

e
c = me mod(i.e., remainder when m is divided by n)
n
2. To decrypt received bit pattern, c, compute
d
m = cd mod(i.e., remainder when c is divided by n)
n
Magic e mod d mod
m = (m
happens!
n) c n

8: Network Security 8-24

 RSA example:
Bob chooses p=5, q=7. Then n=35, z=24.
e=5 (so e, z relatively prime).
d=29 (so ed-1 exactly divisible by z.

letter m me c = me mod n
encrypt:
l 12 1524832 17

d
decrypt:
c c m = cd mod n letter
17 481968572106750915091411825223071697 12 l

8: Network Security 8-25

RSA: Why is that m = (m e mod d mod
n) n
Useful number theory result: If p,q prime and
n = pq, then: y y mod (p-1)(q-1)
x mod n = x mod n

e
(m mod d mod n = ed
m
n) mod n
ed mod (p-1)(q-
= m
1) number theory result above)
(using
mod n
1
= m mod n
(since we chose ed to be divisible by
(p-1)(q-1) with remainder 1 )

= m
8: Network Security 8-26
 RSA: another important property
The following property will be very useful later:

- + + -
K (K (m)) = m= K (K (m))
B B B B

use public key use private

first, followed key first,
by private key followed by
public key
Result is the
same!
8: Network Security 8-27
Chapter 8 roadmap

8.1 What is network security?

8.2 Principles of cryptography
8.3 Message integrity
8.4 End point authentication
8.5 Securing e-mail
8.6 Securing TCP connections: SSL
8.7 Network layer security: IPsec
8.8 Securing wireless LANs
8.9 Operational security: firewalls and IDS
8: Network Security 8-28
Message Integrity
Bob receives msg from Alice, wants to
ensure:
 message originally came from Alice
 message not changed since sent by Alice

Cryptographic Hash:
 takes input m, produces fixed length value, H(m)
 e.g., as in Internet checksum

 computationally infeasible to find two different

messages, x, y such that H(x) = H(y)
 equivalently: given m = H(x), (x unknown), can not
determine x.
 note: Internet checksum fails this requirement!

8: Network Security 8-29

 Internet checksum: poor crypto
hash function
Internet checksum has some properties of hash
function:
 produces fixed length digest (16-bit sum) of
message
But
 isgiven message with given hash value, it is easy
many-to-one
to find another message with same hash value:

message ASCII format message ASCII format

I O U 1 49 4F 55 31 I O U 9 49 4F 55 39
0 0 . 9 30 30 2E 39 0 0 . 1 30 30 2E 31
9 B O B 39 42 4F 42 9 B O B 39 42 4F 42
B2 C1 D2 AC different messages B2 C1 D2 AC
but identical checksums!
8: Network Security 8-30
 Message Authentication Code
(shared secret)
s
H(m+s)

(message) H(.)
m H(m+s) m
public
m append compare
Internet
H(m+s)
H(m+s)
H(.)
s
(shared secret)

8: Network Security 8-31

MACs in practice
 MD5 hash function widely used (RFC 1321)
 computes 128-bit MAC in 4-step process.
 arbitrary 128-bit string x, appears difficult to
construct msg m whose MD5 hash is equal to
x
• recent (2005) attacks on MD5
 SHA-1 is also used
 US standard [NIST, FIPS PUB 180-1]
 160-bit MAC

8: Network Security 8-32

Digital Signatures

cryptographic technique analogous to

hand-written signatures.
 sender (Bob) digitally signs document,
establishing he is document owner/creator.
 verifiable, nonforgeable: recipient (Alice) can
prove to someone that Bob, and no one else
(including Alice), must have signed document

8: Network Security 8-33

Digital Signatures
simple digital signature for message m:
 Bob “signs” m by encrypting with his private
- -
key KB, creating “signed” message, KB(m)
-
Bob’s message, m KB Bob’s private -
KB(m)
key
Dear Alice
Bob’s message,
Oh, how I have public key m, signed
missed you. I think of
you all the time! … encryption (encrypted) with
(blah blah blah) algorithm his private key
Bob

8: Network Security 8-34

Digital Signatures (more)
-
 suppose Alice receives msg m, digital signature KB(m)
 Alice verifies m signed by Bob by applying Bob’s
+ - + -
public key KB to KB(m) then checks KB(KB(m) ) = m.
+ -
 if KB(K B(m) ) = m, whoever signed m must have used

Bob’s private key.

Alice thus verifies that:
 Bob signed m.
 No one else signed m.
 Bob signed m and not m’.

non-repudiation:
 Alice can take m, and signature K (m) to court and
B
prove that Bob signed m. -

8: Network Security 8-35

Digital signature = signed MAC
Alice verifies signature and
Bob sends digitally signed integrity of digitally signed
message: message:
large
message H: hash encrypted
m function H(m)
msg digest
-
KB(H(m))
Bob’s digital large
private signature message
- Bob’s
key KB (encrypt) m digital
public
+ signature
key KB
encrypted H: hash (decrypt)
msg digest function
-
+ KB(H(m))
H(m) H(m)

equal
?
8: Network Security 8-36
Public Key Certification
public key problem:
 When Alice obtains Bob’s public key (from web
site, e-mail, diskette), how does she know it is
Bob’s public key, not Trudy’s?
solution:
 trusted certification authority (CA)

8: Network Security 8-37

Certification Authorities
 Certification Authority (CA): binds public key to
particular entity, E.
 E registers its public key with CA.
 E provides “proof of identity” to CA.
 CA creates certificate binding E to its public key.
 certificate containing E’s public key digitally signed by
CA: CA says “This is E’s public key.”
- +
K CA(KB )
Bob’s digital
+
public signature KB
+
key KB (encrypt)
CA
certificate for
K-
Bob’s private
identifying key CA Bob’s public
informatio key, signed by
n
8: Network Security
CA
8-38
Certification Authorities
 when Alice wants Bob’s public key:
 gets Bob’s certificate (Bob or elsewhere).
 apply CA’s public key to Bob’s certificate,
get Bob’s public key

+
- +
K CA(KB ) digital Bob’s
KB signature public
+
(decrypt) KB key

CA
public K+
CA
key

8: Network Security 8-39

A certificate contains:
 Serial number (unique to issuer)
 info about certificate owner, including
algorithm and key value itself (not shown)
 info about
certificate issuer
 valid dates
 digital signature by
issuer

8: Network Security 8-40

Chapter 8 roadmap

8.1 What is network security?

8.2 Principles of cryptography
8.3 Message integrity
8.4 End point authentication
8.5 Securing e-mail
8.6 Securing TCP connections: SSL
8.7 Network layer security: IPsec
8.8 Securing wireless LANs
8.9 Operational security: firewalls and IDS
8: Network Security 8-41
 Authentication
Goal: Bob wants Alice to “prove” her
identity to him
Protocol ap1.0: Alice says “I am Alice”

“I am Alice”
Failure scenario??

8: Network Security 8-42

 Authentication
Goal: Bob wants Alice to “prove” her
identity to him
Protocol ap1.0: Alice says “I am Alice”

in a network,
Bob can not “see”
Alice, so Trudy
“I am Alice” simply declares
herself to be Alice

8: Network Security 8-43

Authentication: another try
Protocol ap2.0: Alice says “I am Alice” in an IP packet
containing her source IP address

Alice’s
IP address
“I am Alice”

Failure scenario??

8: Network Security 8-44

Authentication: another try
Protocol ap2.0: Alice says “I am Alice” in an IP packet
containing her source IP address

Trudy can create

a packet
Alice’s
“spoofing”
IP address
“I am Alice” Alice’s address

8: Network Security 8-45

Authentication: another try
Protocol ap3.0: Alice says “I am Alice” and sends her
secret password to “prove” it.

Alice’s Alice’s
“I’m Alice”
IP addr password

Alice’s Failure scenario??

OK
IP addr

8: Network Security 8-46

Authentication: another try
Protocol ap3.0: Alice says “I am Alice” and sends her
secret password to “prove” it.

Alice’s Alice’s
“I’m Alice”
IP addr password
playback attack:
Alice’s Trudy records Alice’s
OK
IP addr packet
and later
plays it back to Bob
Alice’s Alice’s
“I’m Alice”
IP addr password

8: Network Security 8-47

Authentication: yet another try
Protocol ap3.1: Alice says “I am Alice” and sends her
encrypted secret password to “prove” it.

Alice’s encrypted
“I’m Alice”
IP addr password

Alice’s Failure scenario??

OK
IP addr

8: Network Security 8-48

Authentication: another try
Protocol ap3.1: Alice says “I am Alice” and sends her
encrypted secret password to “prove” it.

Alice’s encrypted
“I’m Alice” record
IP addr password
and
Alice’s
OK playback
IP addr
still works!

Alice’s encrypted
“I’m Alice”
IP addr password

8: Network Security 8-49

 Authentication: yet another try
Goal: avoid playback attack
Nonce: number (R) used only once –in-a-lifetime
ap4.0: to prove Alice “live”, Bob sends Alice nonce, R.
Alice
must return R, encrypted with shared secret key
“I am Alice”

R
KA-B(R) Alice is live, and
only Alice knows
key to encrypt
nonce, so it
Failures, drawbacks? must be Alice!
8: Network Security 8-50
Authentication: ap5.0
ap4.0 requires shared symmetric key
 can we authenticate using public key techniques?
ap5.0: use nonce, public key cryptography

“I am Alice”
Bob computes
R + -
- KA(K A(R)) = R
K A (R) and knows only Alice
“send me your public key”
could have the
+ private key, that
KA encrypted R such that
+ -
K (K (R)) = R
A A

8: Network Security 8-51

 ap5.0: security hole
Man (woman) in the middle attack: Trudy poses
as Alice (to Bob) and as Bob (to Alice)

I am Alice I am Alice
R -
K (R)
T
R - Send me your public key
K (R) +
A K
T
Send me your public key
+
K
A +
K (m)
Trudy gets T
- +
+ m = K (K (m))
K (m) T m
sends T to
A
- + Alice encrypted
m = K (K (m))
A A with Alice’s
public key 8: Network Security 8-52
ap5.0: security hole
Man (woman) in the middle attack: Trudy poses
as Alice (to Bob) and as Bob (to Alice)

Difficult to detect:
 Bob receives everything that Alice sends, and
vice versa. (e.g., so Bob, Alice can meet one week
later and recall conversation)
 problem is that Trudy receives all messages as
well!

8: Network Security 8-53

Chapter 8 roadmap

8.1 What is network security?

8.2 Principles of cryptography
8.3 Message integrity
8.4 End point authentication
8.5 Securing e-mail
8.6 Securing TCP connections: SSL
8.7 Network layer security: IPsec
8.8 Securing wireless LANs
8.9 Operational security: firewalls and IDS
8: Network Security 8-54
 Secure e-mail
 Alice wants to send confidential e-mail, m, to Bob.
KS

m K (.)
KS(m KS(m
KS( ) . m
S ) )
+ Internet - KS

KS
+.
K ()
B + +
-
KB( )
.
KB(KS ) KB(KS )
+ -
KB
KB

Alice:
 generates random symmetric private key, KS.
 encrypts message with KS (for efficiency)
 also encrypts KS with Bob’s public key.
 sends both KS(m) and KB(KS) to Bob.
8: Network Security 8-55
 Secure e-mail
 Alice wants to send confidential e-mail, m, to Bob.
KS

m K (.)
KS(m KS(m
KS( ) . m
S ) )
+ Internet - KS

KS
+.
K ()
B + +
-
KB( )
.
KB(KS ) KB(KS )
+ -
KB
KB

Bob:
 uses his private key to decrypt and
recover KS
 uses K to decrypt K (m) to recover m
S S
8: Network Security 8-56
 Secure e-mail (continued)
• Alice wants to provide sender authentication
message integrity.

- KA
+
KA
- -
m .
H( )
-.
K ()
A
KA(H(m)) KA(H(m)) +
KA( )
. H(m )

+ Internet - compare

m H( ). H(m )
m

• Alice digitally signs message.

• sends both message (in the clear) and digital signature.

8: Network Security 8-57

 Secure e-mail (continued)
• Alice wants to provide secrecy, sender authentication,
message integrity.
-
KA
-
m .
H( )
-
KA( )
. KA(H(m))
KS

+ KS( ).
m + Internet

KS
+
KB( )
. +
KB(KS )
+
KB

Alice uses three keys: her private key, Bob’s

public key, newly created symmetric key
8: Network Security 8-58
Pretty good privacy (PGP)
 Internet e-mail A PGP signed message:
encryption scheme, de-
---BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE---
facto standard. Hash: SHA1
 uses symmetric key
cryptography, public key Bob:My husband is out of town
tonight.Passionately yours,
cryptography, hash Alice
function, and digital
signature as described. ---BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE---
 provides secrecy, sender Version: PGP 5.0
Charset: noconv
authentication, integrity. yhHJRHhGJGhgg/
 inventor, Phil 12EpJ+lo8gE4vB3mqJhFEvZP9t6n7G
6m5Gw2
Zimmerman, was target ---END PGP SIGNATURE---
of 3-year federal
investigation.

8: Network Security 8-59

Chapter 8 roadmap

8.1 What is network security?

8.2 Principles of cryptography
8.3 Message integrity
8.4 End point authentication
8.5 Securing e-mail
8.6 Securing TCP connections: SSL
8.7 Network layer security: IPsec
8.8 Securing wireless LANs
8.9 Operational security: firewalls and IDS
8: Network Security 8-60
Secure sockets layer (SSL)
 provides transport layer security to any TCP-based
application using SSL services.
 e.g., between Web browsers, servers for e-commerce
(shttp)
 security services:
 server authentication, data encryption, client
authentication (optional)
Application
Application
SSL sublayer SSL
TCP TCP TCP socket
socket
IP IP
TCP API TCP enhanced with SSL

8: Network Security 8-61

SSL: three phases
TCP SYN
1. Handshake:
 Bob establishes TCP NA CK
TC P SY
connection to Alice
 authenticates Alice T C P A CK
via CA signed SSL hello
certificate
 creates, encrypts r tifi c ate
ce
(using Alice’s public
key), sends master create
secret key to Alice Master
 nonce exchange not Secret KA +(MS)
(MS) decrypt
shown
using KA-
to get MS

8: Network Security 8-62

SSL: three phases

2. Key Derivation:
 Alice, Bob use shared secret (MS) to generate 4
keys:
 EB: Bob->Alice data encryption key
 EA: Alice->Bob data encryption key
 MB: Bob->Alice MAC key
 MA: Alice->Bob MAC key
 encryption and MAC algorithms negotiable
between Bob, Alice
 why 4 keys?

8: Network Security 8-63

SSL: three phases
3. Data transfer
TCP byte stream b1b2b3 … bn

block n bytes together d MB

.
H( )
compute
MAC

d H(d) EB

.
H( ) SSL
encrypt d,
MAC, SSL
seq. #
seq. #
d H(d)

SSL record
format Type Ver d H(d)
Len
unencryptedencrypted using EB
8: Network Security 8-64
Chapter 8 roadmap

8.1 What is network security?

8.2 Principles of cryptography
8.3 Message integrity
8.4 End point authentication
8.5 Securing e-mail
8.6 Securing TCP connections: SSL
8.7 Network layer security: IPsec
8.8 Securing wireless LANs
8.9 Operational security: firewalls and IDS
8: Network Security 8-65
 IPsec: Network Layer Security
 network-layer secrecy:
 for both AH and ESP,
 sending host encrypts the
data in IP datagram source, destination
 TCP and UDP segments; handshake:
ICMP and SNMP messages.  create network-layer
 network-layer authentication logical channel called a
 destination host can security association (SA)
authenticate source IP  each SA unidirectional.
address  uniquely determined by:
 two principal protocols:  security protocol (AH or
 authentication header
ESP)
(AH) protocol  source IP address
 encapsulation security
 32-bit connection ID
payload (ESP) protocol

8: Network Security 8-66

Authentication Header (AH) Protocol
 provides source AH header includes:
authentication, data  connection identifier
integrity, no confidentiality
  authentication data:
AH header inserted
between IP header, data source- signed message
field. digest calculated over
 protocol field: 51 original IP datagram.
 intermediate routers  next header field:
process datagrams as specifies type of data
usual
(e.g., TCP, UDP, ICMP)

IP header AH header data (e.g., TCP, UDP segment)

8: Network Security 8-67

ESP Protocol
 provides secrecy, host  ESP authentication
authentication, data field is similar to AH
integrity.
authentication field.
 data, ESP trailer encrypted.
 Protocol = 50.
 next header field is in ESP
trailer.

authenticated
encrypted
ESP ESP ESP
IP header TCP/UDP segment
header trailer authent
.

8: Network Security 8-68

Chapter 8 roadmap

8.1 What is network security?

8.2 Principles of cryptography
8.3 Message integrity
8.4 End point authentication
8.5 Securing e-mail
8.6 Securing TCP connections: SSL
8.7 Network layer security: IPsec
8.8 Securing wireless LANs
8.9 Operational security: firewalls and IDS
8: Network Security 8-69
IEEE 802.11 security
 war-driving: drive around Bay area, see what
802.11 networks available?
 More than 9000 accessible from public
roadways
 85% use no encryption/authentication
 packet-sniffing and various attacks easy!
 securing 802.11
 encryption, authentication
 first attempt at 802.11 security: Wired
Equivalent Privacy (WEP): a failure
 current attempt: 802.11i

8: Network Security 8-70

Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP):

 authentication as in protocol ap4.0

 host requests authentication from access point
 access point sends 128 bit nonce
 host encrypts nonce using shared symmetric
key
 access point decrypts nonce, authenticates
host
 no key distribution mechanism
 authentication: knowing the shared key is enough

8: Network Security 8-71

WEP data encryption
 host/AP share 40 bit symmetric key (semi-
permanent)
 host appends 24-bit initialization vector (IV) to
create 64-bit key
 64 bit key used to generate stream of keys, kiIV
 kiIV used to encrypt ith byte, di, in frame:

ci = di XOR kiIV
 IV and encrypted bytes, ci sent in frame

8: Network Security 8-72

 802.11 WEP encryption
IV
(per frame)
KS: 40-bit key sequence generator
secret ( for given KS, IV)
symmetric
k1IV k2IV k3IV … kNIV kN+1IV… kN+1IV 802.11 WEP-encrypted data
key IV
header plus CRC
plaintext
frame data d1 d2 d3 … dN CRC1 … CRC4
plus CRC
c1 c2 c3 … cN cN+1 … cN+4

Figure 7.8-new1: 802.11 WEP protocol

Sender-side WEP encryption

8: Network Security 8-73

Breaking 802.11 WEP encryption
security hole:
 24-bit IV, one IV per frame, -> IV’s eventually reused
 IV transmitted in plaintext -> IV reuse detected
 attack:
 Trudy causes Alice to encrypt known plaintext d1 d2
d3 d4 …
 Trudy sees: ci = di XOR kiIV
 Trudy knows ci di, so can compute kiIV
 Trudy knows encrypting key sequence k1IV k2IV k3IV …
 Next time IV is used, Trudy can decrypt!

8: Network Security 8-74

802.11i: improved security
 numerous (stronger) forms of
encryption possible
 provides key distribution
 uses authentication server separate
from access point

8: Network Security 8-75

 802.11i: four phases of
operation
STA: AP: access point AS:
client station wired Authentication
network server

1 Discovery of
security capabilities

2 STA and AS mutually authenticate, together

generate Master Key (MK). AP servers as “pass through”

3 STA derives 3 AS derives

Pairwise Master
same PMK,
Key (PMK)
sends to AP

4 STA, AP use PMK to derive

Temporal Key (TK) used for message
encryption, integrity 8: Network Security 8-76
EAP: extensible authentication
protocol
 EAP: end-end client (mobile) to
authentication server protocol
 EAP sent over separate “links”
 mobile-to-AP (EAP over LAN)
 AP to authentication server (RADIUS over UDP)

wired
network

EAP TLS
EAP
EAP over LAN (EAPoL) RADIUS
IEEE 802.11 UDP/IP
8: Network Security 8-77
Chapter 8 roadmap

8.1 What is network security?

8.2 Principles of cryptography
8.3 Message integrity
8.4 End point authentication
8.5 Securing e-mail
8.6 Securing TCP connections: SSL
8.7 Network layer security: IPsec
8.8 Securing wireless LANs
8.9 Operational security: firewalls and IDS
8: Network Security 8-78
Firewalls
firewall
isolates organization’s internal net from larger
Internet, allowing some packets to pass,
blocking others.

administered public
network Internet

firewall

8: Network Security 8-79

Firewalls: Why
prevent denial of service attacks:
 SYN flooding: attacker establishes many bogus TCP
connections, no resources left for “real” connections
prevent illegal modification/access of internal data.
 e.g., attacker replaces CIA’s homepage with
something else
allow only authorized access to inside network (set of
authenticated users/hosts)
three types of firewalls:
 stateless packet filters
 stateful packet filters
 application gateways

8: Network Security 8-80

Stateless packet filtering
Should arriving
packet be allowed
in? Departing
packet let out?

 internal network connected to Internet via

router firewall
 router filters packet-by-packet, decision to
forward/drop packet based on:
 source IP address, destination IP address
 TCP/UDP source and destination port numbers
 ICMP message type
 TCP SYN and ACK bits
8: Network Security 8-81
Stateless packet filtering: example
 example 1: block incoming and outgoing
datagrams with IP protocol field = 17 and
with either source or dest port = 23.
 all incoming, outgoing UDP flows and
telnet connections are blocked.
 example 2: Block inbound TCP segments with
ACK=0.
 prevents external clients from making TCP
connections with internal clients, but
allows internal clients to connect to
outside.

8: Network Security 8-82

Stateless packet filtering: more
examples
Policy Firewall Setting

No outside Web access. Drop all outgoing packets to any IP

address, port 80

No incoming TCP connections, Drop all incoming TCP SYN packets

except those for institution’s to any IP except 130.207.244.203,
public Web server only. port 80

Prevent Web-radios from eating Drop all incoming UDP packets -

up the available bandwidth. except DNS and router broadcasts.

Prevent your network from Drop all ICMP packets going to a

being used for a smurf DoS “broadcast” address (eg
attack. 130.207.255.255).

Prevent your network from Drop all outgoing ICMP TTL expired
being tracerouted traffic

8: Network Security 8-83

Access Control Lists
 ACL: table of rules, applied top to bottom to
incoming packets: (action, condition) pairs
source dest source dest flag
action protocol
address address port port bit
222.22/1 outside of any
allow TCP > 1023 80
6 222.22/16
outside
allow of 222.22/16
TCP 80 > 1023 ACK
222.22/1
6
222.22/1 outside of
allow UDP > 1023 53 ---
6 222.22/16
outside
allow of 222.22/16
UDP 53 > 1023 ----
222.22/1
6
deny all all all all 8: Network Security
all all8-84
Stateful packet filtering
 stateless packet filter: heavy handed tool
 admits packets that “make no sense,” e.g., dest
port = 80, ACK bit set, even though no TCP
connection established:
source dest source dest flag
action protocol
address address port port bit

allow outside of 222.22/16

TCP 80 > 1023 ACK
222.22/16

 stateful packet filter: track status of every TCP connection

 track connection setup (SYN), teardown (FIN): can determine
whether incoming, outgoing packets “makes sense”
 timeout inactive connections at firewall: no longer admit packets

8: Network Security 8-85

Stateful packet filtering
 ACL augmented to indicate need to check
connection state table before admitting
packet
source dest source dest flag check
action proto
address address port port bit conxion
outside of any
allow 222.22/16 TCP > 1023 80
222.22/16

allow outside of 222.22/16 x

TCP 80 > 1023 ACK
222.22/16

outside of
allow 222.22/16 UDP > 1023 53 ---
222.22/16

allow outside of 222.22/16 x

UDP 53 > 1023 ----
222.22/16

deny all all all all all all

8: Network Security 8-86
Application gateways gateway-to-remote
host telnet session
host-to-gateway
telnet session
 filters packets on
application data as well application
gateway
router and filter

as on IP/TCP/UDP fields.
 example: allow select
internal users to telnet
outside.

1. require all telnet users to telnet through gateway.

2. for authorized users, gateway sets up telnet connection
to dest host. Gateway relays data between 2
connections
3. router filter blocks all telnet connections not originating
from gateway.

8: Network Security 8-87

 Limitations of firewalls and gateways

 IP spoofing: router  filters often use all or

can’t know if data nothing policy for
“really” comes from UDP.
claimed source  tradeoff: degree of
 if multiple app’s. need
communication with
special treatment,
outside world, level
each has own app.
of security
gateway.
 many highly
 client software must
know how to contact protected sites still
gateway. suffer from attacks.
 e.g., must set IP address
of proxy in Web browser

8: Network Security 8-88

Intrusion detection systems
 packet filtering:
 operates on TCP/IP headers only
 no correlation check among sessions

 IDS: intrusion detection system

 deep packet inspection: look at packet
contents (e.g., check character strings in
packet against database of known virus,
attack strings)
 examine correlation among multiple packets
• port scanning
• network mapping
• DoS attack
8: Network Security 8-89
 Intrusion detection systems
 multiple IDSs: different types of
checking at different locations

application firewall
gateway

Internet
internal
network Web
IDS server DNS
sensors server
FTP
server demilitarized
zone
8: Network Security 8-90
Network Security (summary)
Basic techniques…...
 cryptography (symmetric and public)
 message integrity
 end-point authentication

…. used in many different security scenarios

 secure email
 secure transport (SSL)
 IP sec
 802.11

Operational Security: firewalls and IDS

8: Network Security 8-91