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Hmac, Cmac

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29 views19 pages

Hmac, Cmac

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© © All Rights Reserved
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Message Authentication

 message authentication is concerned with:



protecting the integrity of a message

validating identity of originator

non-repudiation of origin (dispute resolution)
 will consider the security requirements
 then three alternative functions used:

hash function (see Ch 11)

message encryption

message authentication code (MAC)
Message Security Requirements
 disclosure
 traffic analysis
 masquerade
 content modification
 sequence modification
 timing modification
 source repudiation
 destination repudiation
Symmetric Message Encryption
 encryption can also provides authentication
 if symmetric encryption is used then:

receiver know sender must have created it

since only sender and receiver now key used

know content cannot of been altered

if message has suitable structure, redundancy
or a checksum to detect any changes
Public-Key Message Encryption
 if public-key encryption is used:

encryption provides no confidence of sender
• since anyone potentially knows public-key

however if
• sender signs message using their private-key
• then encrypts with recipients public key
• have both secrecy and authentication

again need to recognize corrupted messages

but at cost of two public-key uses on message
Message Authentication Code
(MAC)
 generated by an algorithm that creates a
small fixed-sized block

depending on both message and some key

like encryption though need not be reversible
 appended to message as a signature
 receiver performs same computation on
message and checks it matches the MAC
 provides assurance that message is
unaltered and comes from sender
Message Authentication Code
 a small fixed-sized block of data
 generated from message + secret key
 MAC = C(K,M)
 appended to message when sent
Message Authentication
Codes
 as shown the MAC provides authentication
 can also use encryption for secrecy

generally use separate keys for each

can compute MAC either before or after encryption

is generally regarded as better done before
 why use a MAC?

sometimes only authentication is needed

sometimes need authentication to persist longer than
the encryption (eg. archival use)
 note that a MAC is not a digital signature
MAC Properties
 a MAC is a cryptographic checksum
MAC = CK(M)

condenses a variable-length message M

using a secret key K

to a fixed-sized authenticator
 is a many-to-one function

potentially many messages have same MAC

but finding these needs to be very difficult
Requirements for MACs
 taking into account the types of attacks
 need the MAC to satisfy the following:
1. knowing a message and MAC, is infeasible
to find another message with same MAC
2. MACs should be uniformly distributed
3. MAC should depend equally on all bits of the
message
Security of MACs
 like block ciphers have:
 brute-force attacks exploiting
m/

strong collision resistance hash have cost 2 2

• 128-bit hash looks vulnerable, 160-bits better



MACs with known message-MAC pairs
• can either attack keyspace (cf key search) or MAC
• at least 128-bit MAC is needed for security
Security of MACs
 cryptanalytic attacks exploit structure

like block ciphers want brute-force attacks to
be the best alternative
 more variety of MACs so harder to
generalize about cryptanalysis
Keyed Hash Functions as MACs
 want a MAC based on a hash function

because hash functions are generally faster

crypto hash function code is widely available
 hash includes a key along with message
 original proposal:
KeyedHash = Hash(Key|Message)

some weaknesses were found with this
 eventually led to development of HMAC
HMAC Design Objectives
 use, without modifications, hash functions
 allow for easy replaceability of embedded
hash function
 preserve original performance of hash
function without significant degradation
 use and handle keys in a simple way.
 have well understood cryptographic analysis
of authentication mechanism strength
HMAC
 specified as Internet standard RFC2104
 uses hash function on the message:
HMACK(M)= Hash[(K+ XOR opad) ||
Hash[(K+ XOR ipad) ||
M)] ]

where K+ is the key padded out to size

opad, ipad are specified padding constants
 overhead is just 3 more hash calculations than the
message needs alone
 any hash function can be used

eg. MD5, SHA-1, RIPEMD-160, Whirlpool
HMAC
Overview
HMAC Security
 proved security of HMAC relates to that of
the underlying hash algorithm
 attacking HMAC requires either:

brute force attack on key used

birthday attack (but since keyed would need
to observe a very large number of messages)
 choose hash function used based on
speed verses security constraints
CMAC
 previously saw the DAA (CBC-MAC)
 widely used in govt & industry
 but has message size limitation
 can overcome using 2 keys & padding
 thus forming the Cipher-based Message
Authentication Code (CMAC)
 adopted by NIST SP800-38B
CMAC Overview
Authenticated Encryption
 simultaneously protect confidentiality and
authenticity of communications

often required but usually separate
 approaches

Hash-then-encrypt: E(K, (M || H(M))

MAC-then-encrypt: E(K2, (M || MAC(K1, M))

Encrypt-then-MAC: (C=E(K2, M), T=MAC(K1, C)

Encrypt-and-MAC: (C=E(K2, M), T=MAC(K1, M)
 decryption /verification straightforward
 but security vulnerabilities with all these

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