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Message Authentication
message authentication is concerned with:
protecting the integrity of a message validating identity of originator non-repudiation of origin (dispute resolution) will consider the security requirements then three alternative functions used: hash function (see Ch 11) message encryption message authentication code (MAC) Message Security Requirements disclosure traffic analysis masquerade content modification sequence modification timing modification source repudiation destination repudiation Symmetric Message Encryption encryption can also provides authentication if symmetric encryption is used then: receiver know sender must have created it since only sender and receiver now key used know content cannot of been altered if message has suitable structure, redundancy or a checksum to detect any changes Public-Key Message Encryption if public-key encryption is used: encryption provides no confidence of sender • since anyone potentially knows public-key however if • sender signs message using their private-key • then encrypts with recipients public key • have both secrecy and authentication again need to recognize corrupted messages but at cost of two public-key uses on message Message Authentication Code (MAC) generated by an algorithm that creates a small fixed-sized block depending on both message and some key like encryption though need not be reversible appended to message as a signature receiver performs same computation on message and checks it matches the MAC provides assurance that message is unaltered and comes from sender Message Authentication Code a small fixed-sized block of data generated from message + secret key MAC = C(K,M) appended to message when sent Message Authentication Codes as shown the MAC provides authentication can also use encryption for secrecy generally use separate keys for each can compute MAC either before or after encryption is generally regarded as better done before why use a MAC? sometimes only authentication is needed sometimes need authentication to persist longer than the encryption (eg. archival use) note that a MAC is not a digital signature MAC Properties a MAC is a cryptographic checksum MAC = CK(M) condenses a variable-length message M using a secret key K to a fixed-sized authenticator is a many-to-one function potentially many messages have same MAC but finding these needs to be very difficult Requirements for MACs taking into account the types of attacks need the MAC to satisfy the following: 1. knowing a message and MAC, is infeasible to find another message with same MAC 2. MACs should be uniformly distributed 3. MAC should depend equally on all bits of the message Security of MACs like block ciphers have: brute-force attacks exploiting m/ strong collision resistance hash have cost 2 2
• 128-bit hash looks vulnerable, 160-bits better
MACs with known message-MAC pairs • can either attack keyspace (cf key search) or MAC • at least 128-bit MAC is needed for security Security of MACs cryptanalytic attacks exploit structure like block ciphers want brute-force attacks to be the best alternative more variety of MACs so harder to generalize about cryptanalysis Keyed Hash Functions as MACs want a MAC based on a hash function because hash functions are generally faster crypto hash function code is widely available hash includes a key along with message original proposal: KeyedHash = Hash(Key|Message) some weaknesses were found with this eventually led to development of HMAC HMAC Design Objectives use, without modifications, hash functions allow for easy replaceability of embedded hash function preserve original performance of hash function without significant degradation use and handle keys in a simple way. have well understood cryptographic analysis of authentication mechanism strength HMAC specified as Internet standard RFC2104 uses hash function on the message: HMACK(M)= Hash[(K+ XOR opad) || Hash[(K+ XOR ipad) || M)] ] where K+ is the key padded out to size opad, ipad are specified padding constants overhead is just 3 more hash calculations than the message needs alone any hash function can be used eg. MD5, SHA-1, RIPEMD-160, Whirlpool HMAC Overview HMAC Security proved security of HMAC relates to that of the underlying hash algorithm attacking HMAC requires either: brute force attack on key used birthday attack (but since keyed would need to observe a very large number of messages) choose hash function used based on speed verses security constraints CMAC previously saw the DAA (CBC-MAC) widely used in govt & industry but has message size limitation can overcome using 2 keys & padding thus forming the Cipher-based Message Authentication Code (CMAC) adopted by NIST SP800-38B CMAC Overview Authenticated Encryption simultaneously protect confidentiality and authenticity of communications often required but usually separate approaches Hash-then-encrypt: E(K, (M || H(M)) MAC-then-encrypt: E(K2, (M || MAC(K1, M)) Encrypt-then-MAC: (C=E(K2, M), T=MAC(K1, C) Encrypt-and-MAC: (C=E(K2, M), T=MAC(K1, M) decryption /verification straightforward but security vulnerabilities with all these