Hazard and Operability (HAZOP)

Study

Dr. Shagufta

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 Chapter 26
Safety Analysis

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 Contents

• Introduction
• Saftey Analysis tools
• Primilinary Hazard analysis(PHA)
• Failure Modes and effects analysis
• Fault Tree Analysis
• Hazard and operatability
analysis(HAZOP)

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4
Worksheet of PHA

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 HAzard

• Raw mateial
• Plant equipment
• Operator activity
• Operating condition
• Input information for PHA(PFD,raw
matrial etc)

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7
 Introductio HAZOP-----A
scenario…
• You and your family are on a road trip by
using a car in the middle of the night.
You were replying a text message while
driving at 100 km/h and it was raining
heavily. The car hits a deep hole and one
of your tire blows. You hit the brake, but
due to slippery road and your car tire
thread was thin, the car skidded and was
thrown off the road.

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 Points to ponder

What is the cause of the accident?

What is the consequence of the event?

What can we do to prevent all those things to

happen in the first place?

(All students 2 minutes for brainstorming ideas)

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What other possible accidents
might happen on the road trip?

Can we be prepared before the

accident occurs?

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 Can we make it more systematic?
Parameter Guideword Possible Consequences Action Safeguard
Causes

Car speed Too fast Rushing Skidded when - Slow down -proper brake system
Too slow emergency brake - Speed up -Safety belt
- Air bag

Tire No thread Tire too old, Car skidded - Check frequently

Less thread often speeding - Have spare tire
and emergency
break
Window Low Rain Cannot see the
visibility Very low road

Car light Dim -Stop car

No light -Go to nearest
garage
-Use emergency
signal
Road With holes Breaks the car tire - Put a signboard
Rocky -Street lights

Travel time Night No street light -Travel during daylight

Foggy

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 HAZOP?
• Systematic technique to IDENTIFY potential HAZard and
OPerating problems

• A formal systematic rigorous examination to the process and

engineering facets of a production facility

• A qualitative technique based on “guide-words” to help

provoke thoughts about the way deviations from the intended
operating conditions can lead to hazardous situations or
operability problems

- Operability problems degrade plant performance (product

quality, production rate, profit)
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 Origin of HAZOP

• Initially prepared by Dr H G Lawley

and associates of ICI at Wilton in
1960’s.
• Subsequently C J Bullock and A J D
Jenning from ChE Dept. Teeside
Polytechnic under supervision of T.A.
Kletz applied the method at higher
institution (post-graduate level).
• In 1977, Chemical Industries
Association published the edited
version.
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 Objective of HAZOP

• For identifying cause and the consequences of

perceived mal operations of equipment and
associated operator interfaces in the context of the
complete system.

• It accommodates the status of recognized design

standards and codes of practice but rightly
questions the relevance of these in specific
circumstances where hazards may remain undetected.

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 HAZOP - Hazard and operability

HAZOP keeps all team

members focused on the
same topic and enables
them to work as a
team(process
engr,commisining
engr,chemist,mechanica
l Engr)
NODE: Concentrate on one location in the process
1+1=3
PARAMETER: Consider each process variable individually
(F, T, L, P, composition, operator action, corrosion, etc.)

GUIDE WORD: Pose a series of standard questions about deviations

from normal conditions. We assume that we know a safe “normal”
operation. 15
 HAZOP - Hazard and operability

NODE: Pipe after pump and splitter

PARAMETER*: Flow rate

GUIDE WORD*: Less (less than normal value)

• DEVIATION: less flow than normal
A group
• CAUSE: of deviation, can be more than one members focus
on the same
• CONSEQUENCE: of the deviation/cause issue
• ACTION: initial idea for correction/ simultaneously

prevention/mitigation
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 Documents Needed for HAZOP
Study
• For Preliminary HAZOP
– Process Flow Sheet ( PFS or PFD )
– Description of the Process

• For Detailed HAZOP

– Piping and Instrumentation Diagram ( P & ID )
– Process Calculations
– Process Data Sheets
– Instrument Data Sheets
– Interlock Schedules
– Layout Requirements
– Hazardous Area Classification
– Description of the Process

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 Before Detailed HAZOP

• The development of the detailed P&I

Diagram is the last stage of the process
design.

• The development will follow a normal

standard procedure and include the
following considerations :
– Basic process control system - this is a closed
loop control to maintain process within an
acceptable operating region.
– Alarm system - this is to bring unusual situation
to attention of a person monitoring the process in
the plant
– Safety interlock system - this is to stop operation
or part of the process during emergencies. 18
– Relief system - this is to divert material safely
 P&ID
• A Piping and Instrumentation Diagram - P&ID, is a
schematic illustration of functional relationship of piping,
instrumentation and system equipment components.

• P&ID represents the last step in process design.

• P&ID shows all of piping including the physical sequence of

branches, reducers, valves, equipment, instrumentation
and control interlocks.
• P&ID is normally developed from process flow diagram
(PFD).
• The P&ID are used to operate the process system.
• A process cannot be adequately designed without proper
P&ID.

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 P&I D
A P&ID should include: (Basically every mechanical aspect of the plant with some
exceptions)
• Instrumentation and designations
• Mechanical equipment with names and numbers
• All valves and their identifications
• Process piping, sizes and identification
• Miscellaneous - vents, drains, special fittings, sampling lines, reducers,
increasers and swagers
• Permanent start-up and flush lines
• Flow directions
• Interconnections references
• Control inputs and outputs, interlocks
• Interfaces for class changes
• Quality level
• Computer control system input
• Vendor and contractor interfaces
• Identification of components and subsystems delivered by others
• Intended physical sequence of the equipment

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 P&I D
A P&ID should not include:
• Instrument root valves
• control relays
• manual switches
• equipment rating or capacity
• primary instrument tubing and valves
• pressure temperature and flow data
• elbow, tees and similar standard fittings
• extensive explanatory notes

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 HAZOP Study Procedure

GUIDE WORDS *

POSSIBLE CAUSES DEVIATION ( FROM DESIGN AND/OR

OPERATING INTENT )

CONSEQUENCES

ACTION(S) REQUIRED OR
RECOMMENDEED

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 Guide Words
NONE No forward flow when there should be
MORE More of any parameter than there should
be, e.g more flow, more pressure, more
temperature, etc.
LESS As above, but "less of" in each instance
PART System composition difference from what it
should be
MORE THAN More "components" present than there
should be for example, extra phase,
impurities
OTHER What needs to happen other than normal
operation, e.g. start up,shutdown,
maintenance

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 Guide Words

NONE e.g., NO FLOW caused by blockage; pump

failure; valve closed or jammed : leak: valve
open ;suction vessel empty; delivery side over -
pressurized : vapor lock ; control failure
REVERSE e.g., REVERSE FLOW caused by pump failure :
NRV failure or wrongly inserted ; wrong routing;
delivery over pressured; back- siphoning ; pump
reversed
MORE OF e.g., MORE FLOW caused by reduced delivery
head ; surging ; suction pressurised ; controller
failure ; valve stuck open leak ; incorrect
instrument reading.

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 Guide Words
MORE OF MORE TEMPERATURE, pressure caused by
external fires; blockage ; shot spots; loss of control ;
foaming; gas release; reaction;explosion; valve
closed; loss of level in heater; sun.
LESS OF e.g., LESS FLOW caused by pump failure; leak;
scale in delivery; partial blockage ; sediments ; poor
suction head; process turndown.
LESS e.g., low temperature, pressure caused by Heat
loss; vaporisation ; ambient conditions; rain ;
imbalance of input and output ; sealing ; blocked
vent .
PART OF Change in composition high or low concentration of
mixture; additional reactions in reactor or other
location ; feed change.

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 Guide Words

MORE THAN Impurities or extra phase Ingress of

contaminants such as air, water, lube oils;
corrosion products; presence of other process
materials due to internal leakage ; failure of
isolation ; start-up features.
OTHER Activities other than normal operation start-up
and shutdown of plant ; testing and inspection ;
sampling ; maintenance; activating catalyst;
removing blockage or scale ; corrosion; process
emergency ; safety procedures activated ; failure
of power, fuel, steam , air, water or inert gas;
emissions and lack of compatibility with other
emission and effluents.

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HAZOP STUDY REPORT FORM
HAZOP Study Form
TITLE :
Sheet 1 of
LINE 1 :

CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING PROVISIONS ACTIONS, QUESTIONS OR

DEVIATION RECOMMENDATIONS

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 HAZOP Study

HAZOP study are applied during :

• Normal operation
• Foreseeable changes in operation, e.g. upgrading, reduced
output, plant start-up and shut-down
• Suitability of plant materials, equipment and
instrumentation
• Provision for failure of plant services, e. g . steam,
electricity, cooling water
• Provision for maintenance.

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 Managing HAZOP

How to manage HAZO

P

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 Preliminary HAZOP Example
Cooling Coils

Monomer
Feed Refer to reactor system shown.

Cooling Water to Sewer

The reaction is exothermic. A
cooling system is provided to
Cooling remove the excess energy of
Water In
reaction. In the event of cooling
function is lost, the temperature
of reactor would increase. This
would lead to an increase in
reaction rate leading to additional
energy release.

T
The result could be a runaway
C Thermocouple reaction with pressures exceeding
the bursting pressure of the
reactor. The temperature within
the reactor is measured and is
used to control the cooling water
flow rate by a valve.
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Perform HAZOP Study
 Preliminary HAZOP on Reactor -
Example
Guide Word Deviation Causes Consequences Action

NO No cooling ?????? Temperature increase ?????

in reactor

REVERSE Reverse Failure of water ?????? ?????

cooling flow source resulting in
backward flow

MORE More cooling ?????? ????????? Instruct operators

flow on procedures

AS WELL AS Reactor ?????? ??????? Check

product in coils maintenance
procedures and
schedules

OTHER THAN Another Water source ????? ????????????

material contaminated
besides cooling
water

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 Preliminary HAZOP on Reactor –
Answer
Guide Word Deviation Causes Consequences Action

NO No cooling Cooling water valve Temperature increase Install high temperature

malfunction in reactor alarm (TAH)

REVERSE Reverse cooling Failure of water Less cooling, possible runaway Install check valve
flow source resulting in reaction
backward flow

MORE More cooling Control valve failure, Too much cooling, reactor cool Instruct operators
flow operator fails to take action on procedures
on alarm

AS WELL AS Reactor product More pressure in reactor Off-spec product Check maintenance
in coils procedures and
schedules

OTHER THAN Another Water source May be cooling inefffective If less cooling, TAH will
material contaminated and effect on the reaction detect. If detected, isolate
besides cooling water source. Back up
water water source?

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 Case Study,2 – Shell & Tube Heat
Exchanger
• Using relevant guide works, perform HAZOP study on shell
& tube heat exchanger

Process
fluid

Cooling water

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 HAZOP on Heat Exchanger –
Answer 2
Guide Word Deviation Causes Consequences Action

NONE No cooling water flow ??? Process fluid temperature is ?????

not lowered accordingly

MORE More cooling water Failure of inlet cooling ?? ??????

flow water valve to close

LESS Less cooling water ???? ???? Installation of flow meter

REVERSE Reverse process fluid ????? ???? Install check valve (whether
flow it is crucial have to check?)

CONTAMINATION Process fluid Contamination in cooling ?????? ?????????

contamination water

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 HAZOP on Heat Exchanger –
Guide Word
Answer 2
Deviation Causes Consequences Action

NONE No cooling water flow Failure of inlet cooling Process fluid temperature is Install Temperature
water valve to open not lowered accordingly indicator before and after
the process fluid line
Install TAH

MORE More cooling water Failure of inlet cooling Output of Process fluid Install Temperature
flow water valve to close temperature too low indicator before and after
process fluid line
Install TAL

LESS Less cooling water Pipe leakage Process fluid temperature too Installation of flow meter
low

REVERSE Reverse process fluid Failure of process fluid inlet Product off set Install check valve (whether
flow valve it is crucial have to check?)

CONTAMINATION Process fluid Contamination in cooling Outlet temperature too low Proper maintenance and
contamination water operator alert

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 HAZOP - Hazard and Operability

ATTITUDE CHECK

All of these terms! This stupid table! Consequence

I hate HAZOPS. Why don’t we just
learn the engineering?

Nodes HA Guide
ZO
P words

Parameters

Deviation
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 I suppose that I
should have done that
HAZOP Study!

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HAZOP Management

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SAFETY ENGINEERING - Some terms to
know
• HAZARD: A hazard introduces the
potential for an unsafe condition,
possibly leading to an accident.
• RISK is the probability or likelihood of a
Hazard resulting in an ACCIDENT
• INCIDENT is an undesired circumstance
that produces the potential for an
ACCIDENT
• ACCIDENT is an undesired circumstance
that results in ill health, damage to the
environment, or damage to property
HAZARD  INCIDENT  ACCIDENT
(includes near misses) 39
 Hazards & risk Assesment(ch
11,hazard n control n 12 promoting
safe practices)
By Willie Hamer

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• The mouture of program – Butane
enters vessel D-1 at 75°c at 22bar/27
bar. Then mixture pumped from
bottom to seprator T-001 by p-001
pump. An FRC valve control flow rate.
Mixture preheated at 85°c by heat
exchanger. Draw simple P&1D and
perform what if analysis.

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• What if analysis
• It is simplest technique for hazard
identifical based on question “what
will happen if” an essential part of
process does not operate as per
design conditions. It is applicable to
any part of process or to analyse
whole process.

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 Table what if analyses
Questions Consequences Recommendation
If operator close (V- D1 level rises Install level
1) accidently Level of T-1 also indicator L1, incase
upset of L1 feuls RV will
open
The pump (p-1) As above -
shutdown
The flow control Risk of fire More frequent
valve FRC- leaking increases valve maintain
Propose installation
of double seal
There is fire close Increases is P & Check capacities of
to D-1 temp relief valve for
Possible bolting of vent.
contents. Install P1 on venel
with PHA (high
presum alarm)
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A crack in E-1 Spread hazardous Replace steam
 Failure modes Effect Analysis
(FMEA)
• It evaluates the ways in which
equipment can fail and effect the
failures can have on an installation
these failure provides analysis with a
basic for determining where changes
can be made to improve a system
design.
• FMEA applied to system, subsystem,
components, procedures, interface
etc.
• Suitable for mechanical equipment 44
and electrical failures but not for
• FMEA based on 03 criteria
RPN=SxPxb
• Where,
RPN= Risk Priority no.
S= Sererity of componant
P= Prohability of occurance of event
urer period of year
b= Difficulty in identifying the
particular event.
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 Overview of Qualitative
Evaluation Technique
1- Safety review/ process safety
review/ Design safety review.
2-check list analysis (sop) safety
procedure of each equipment.
3-preliminary Hazard analysis (initial
stage)
4- criticality analysis (analyze critically
damage of equipment etc)
5- change analysis( analyze change in
process)
6- critical incident technique (previous46
mistake)
7- energy analysis( identification of
energy source and limit unheated
flow)
8- worst case analysis ( all possible
failure)
9- network logic analysis ( Bolean
agebra)
10- Scenario analysis (eslahlest by
experience process personal)
11- Systematic inspection ( checklist,
codes, regulation, industrial standard
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 Event frequency Technique

1- fault tree analysis

2- event tree analysis
(Analytical Technique)
FTA:
It is based on logical tree, the event
sequence of primary and
intermediate event failure likely to
top event failure.

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