Quantum Cryptography
Quantum Cryptography
Alice
Bob
Eve
Sequence
• Cryptology – General View
• Quantum Cryptography - How it came up
• Theoretical Background
• History of Quantum Cryptography (QC)
• Quantum Key Distribution Protocol - BB84
• Quantum Key Distribution – Example
• Attack and Vulnerabilities
• Main Contribution of QC
• Security of QC
• State of the QC Technology
• Pros and Cons
Cryptology – General View
• Need
– > Secure Communication
– > Secure Data Transmission
• Two techniques
– Symmetric - key encryption (shared key)
• Key - distribution problem
– Asymmetric - key encryption (pair of public &
secret keys)
• Success based on hardware limitations, absence of
good algorithms
Cryptology – General View
Symmetrical (secret-key) cryptosystems:
Distribute key over secure channel
M S M
S: 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 M: 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0
XOR K: 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 XOR K: 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0
M: 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 S: 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
Private Public
Filter to distinguish
polarized photons
Correct Filter
applied
Wrong Filter
applied
Theoretical Background
• Quantum Superposition
• Quantum Entanglement
• Measurement and Disturbance
Example of QKD: The BB84 Protocol
Step-1 :
To begin creating a key, Alice sends a photon
through either ‘0’ or ‘1’ slot of the rectilinear or
diagonal polarizing filters, while making a
record of previous orientations
Quantum Key Distribution - Example
Step- 2 :
For each incoming bit, Bob chooses randomly which filter
slot he uses for detection and writes down both the
polarization and bit values.
Quantum Key Distribution - Example
Step- 3 :
If Eve, the eavesdropper, tries to spy on the train of photons,
quantum mechanics prohibits her from using both filters to
detect the orientation of a photon. If she chooses the wrong
filter, she may create errors by modifying their polarization.
If Eve has intruded the
communication, she will
DEFINITELY left some traces due to
Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle
(HUP) and non cloning theorem
Quantum Key Distribution - Example
Step- 4 :
After all the photons have reached Bob, he tells Alice over
public channel (telephone, email) the sequence of filters he
used for the incoming photon but not the bit values of
photons.
Quantum Key Distribution - Example
Step- 5 :
Alice tells Bob during the same conversation which filter she
chose correctly. Those instances constitute the bits that
Alice and Bob will use to form the key that they will use to
encrypt message.
Key : 0 0 1 1 1
Description of the E91 Protocol
• Entangled Photon Pairs:
– The protocol begins with the generation of entangled photon pairs.
Each pair of photons is created in an entangled state, meaning that
the quantum state of one photon is intrinsically linked to the quantum
state of the other, no matter how far apart they are.
– Suppose Alice and Bob are the two parties communicating. They each
receive one photon from each of several entangled photon pairs.
• Measurement:
– Alice and Bob independently choose measurement bases
for their respective photons. For simplicity, let’s assume
each photon can be measured in one of two bases (e.g.,
horizontal/vertical or diagonal/anti-diagonal polarization).
– The choice of basis is made randomly by both Alice and
Bob.
• Sharing Measurement Results:
– After performing their measurements, Alice and Bob retain
the measurement outcomes and discard the results where
they used different bases.
– They publicly exchange information about which bases
they used for each photon pair but not the measurement
results themselves.
• Key Generation:
– Alice and Bob only keep the measurement results from
photon pairs where they used the same measurement
basis. These results are used to form a shared secret key.
• Basis Choice:
– Alice and Bob each randomly choose one of two possible measurement
bases for each photon. Let’s say they have two measurement bases:
• Basis 1: Horizontal/Vertical (H/V)
• Basis 2: Diagonal/Anti-Diagonal (D/A)
– Alice and Bob make their basis choices independently and randomly for
each photon.
– For example, Alice might choose Basis 1 for 70 of her photons and
Basis 2 for the remaining 30, while Bob makes his choices randomly as
well.
• Measurement:
– Alice measures the polarization of her photons using her chosen bases
and records the results (e.g., H or V for Basis 1; D or A for Basis 2).
– Bob does the same for his photons.
• Result Sharing
• Basis Announcement:
– After measurement, Alice and Bob publicly announce
which basis they used for each photon pair but not the
measurement outcomes. For example, Alice might
announce, "For photons 1 to 70, I used Basis 1," and
similarly for Bob.
• Matching Bases:
– Alice and Bob only keep the results from the photon
pairs where they used the same measurement basis.
For instance, if both chose Basis 1 for a particular pair,
they keep those results; if they chose different bases,
they discard those results.
• Key Generation
• Create the Key:
– After filtering out the results where they used different bases, Alice and Bob
compare their measurement results for the photon pairs where they used
the same basis. They then use these results to generate a shared secret key.
– Suppose they used Basis 1 for 70 photon pairs, and after measurement, they
find that their results for these pairs match in, say, 60 cases. They will use
these 60 results as part of their shared key.
• Security Check
• Error Detection:
– Alice and Bob perform a verification step where they randomly check a
subset of their results to detect any discrepancies. If an eavesdropper had
tried to intercept the photons, it would disturb the entanglement and
introduce detectable errors.
– If the error rate is within an acceptable range (which is low), they proceed. If
not, they might discard the key and start the process again.
• Error Correction and Privacy Amplification:
– Alice and Bob use error correction techniques to reconcile
any differences in their results and then apply privacy
amplification to ensure the final key is secure and free
from any eavesdropping effects.
• Outcome
– After completing the security check and corrections, Alice
and Bob end up with a shared, secure key that they can
use for encrypted communication. The security of the key
is guaranteed by the principles of quantum mechanics and
the entanglement of the photons, ensuring that any
eavesdropping attempts are detectable.
ATTACKS
Cause
• If more than one photon for each bit is sent
– Eve can steal extra photons to extract the stolen
photons information
Measure
• Ensure photon splitter only sends exactly ONE
photon at each time
• Single photon ensures quantum mechanic laws are
satisfied
Vulnerabilities - Spectral attack
Cause
• If photons are created by DIFFERENT laser photo
diodes, they have different spectral characteristics.
– Eve performs spectral attack by measuring COLOR,
and not polarization
Measure
Use single laser photo diode
Vulnerabilities – Random Numbers
Cause
• Are our random numbers really "Random"?
• Bob side, randomness is determined by Beam Splitter
• Alice side, randomness if a bit stream cannot be proven
mathematically
– "random" sequences by following specific patterns, Algorithms
generate NOT that random!
– Eve can use same algorithm to extract information
Measure
Entangled Photon
Pairs comes to the
rescue
(discussed in theoretical
background)
Vulnerabilities – Fake State Attack
• Solution:
– send the photons according to a time schedule.
– then Bob knows when to expect a photon and can
discard those that doesn't fit into the scheme's time
window
Privacy Amplification
• Eve might have partial knowledge of the key
• Suppose there are n bits in the key and Eve has
knowledge of m bits.
• Alice randomly chose a hash function where
h(x): {0,1}n {0,1} n-m-s
• Reduces Eve's knowledge of the key to 2–s / ln2 bits
Main Contribution of Quantum
Cryptography
QKD systems are unconditionally secure, based on
the fundamental laws of physics
However, physical realisations of those systems
violate some of the assumptions of the security
proof
Eavesdroppers may thus intercept some of the sent
messages
CONCLUSION