Mandeville: The Fable of the Bees

• 1670-1733
• Born c Rotterdam
• Studied medicine at Leiden
• Visited England c 1862-3, learnt English; immigrated to
England in c 1695.
• First publications – satirical poetry in 1703
• First prose works The Vigin Unmask’d (1709)
• The Female Tatler 1709-10
• The Grumbling Hive 1714
• Fable of the Bees 1723
…significance…
• Attack on the prevailing pieties about virtue and morality
• and on the republican attack on luxury and commerce
• Beginning of a line of argument about the way in which the
things we value are tied up with social status, pretentions,
fame and honour.
• Simple theory of appetitive motivation, plus an account of how
people’s desires and aspirations are exploited by the rich and
powerful to serve their interests and to secure order.
• Provides the basis for development of theory of the mutual
interdependence of interests and the idea that from private
vices spring public goods and virtues.
• As such – a founding text in economics
• Widely influential – Montesquieu uses it to inform his account
of commercial monarchies. Rousseau for account of
Discourse on Inequality, Adam Smith… etc.
Two models of individual vs society
Interests/passions/preferences → agreement/contracts →
society and government

• Society/language/order → role/place/norms → interests

/passions/preferences

• Two models of liberty –

• Hobbes ‘absence of impediment to the satisfaction of
wants
• French tradition – ordered relation between
wants/preferences and the means of their satisfaction
• (Pascal and the Wager)
MONTESQUIEU
1689-1755
Major works

• Persian Letters (1721)

• Considerations on the Causes
of Rome's greatness and decline (1734)
• Spirit of the Laws (1748)

• Pensées
Law
• Laws, taken in the broadest meaning, are the necessary
relations deriving from the nature of things; and in this
sense, all beings have their laws: the divinity has its laws,
the material world has its laws, the intelligences superior
to men have their laws, the beasts have their laws, man
has his laws. (I,1,3)
• Before there were intelligent beings, they were possible;
therefore they had possible relations and consequently
possible laws. Before laws were made, there were
possible relations of justice.(I,1,4)
Law as norm not determinism
• Man as a physical being, is governed by invariable laws
like other bodies....he is subject to ignorance and error, as
are all finite intelligences...As a feeling creature, he falls
subject to a thousand passions. Such a being could at
any moment forget his creator; God has called him back
to him by the laws of religion. Such a being could at any
moment forget himself; philosophers have reminded him
of himself by the laws of morality. Made for living in
society, he could forget his fellows; legislators have
returned him to his duties by political and civil law.
• I,1, 5. (cf L 83 in Persian Ltrs)
Law in General – and in Particular
• A. Law in general is human reason insofar as it governs all the peoples
of the earth;
• B. the political and civil laws of each nation should be only the particular
cases to which human reason is applied. Laws should be so appropriate
to the people for whom they are made that it is very unlikely that the laws
of one nation can suit another.
• Laws must relate to the nature and principle of the government that is
established or that one wants to establish, whether those laws form it as
do political laws, or maintain it, as do civil laws. They should be related
to the physical aspect of the country; to the climate...to the properties of
the terrain...;to the way of life of the peoples...;they should be related to
the degree of liberty that the constitution can sustain, to the religion of
the inhabitants, their wealth, their number, their commerce, their mores
and their manners; finally, the laws are related to one another, to their
origin, to the purpose of the legislator, and to the order of things on which
they are established.
State of nature
• The natural state is one feature of human existence, but it is not the only one, and it has almost no role
as a standard against which to measure society - one which might be used to justify resistance to public
authorities.

• Book 26 Natural Law claims (ch.3)

• If a slave, says Plato, defends himself, and kills a freeman, he ought to be treated as a parricide. 1 This is
a civil law which punishes self-defence, though dictated by nature.
• The law of Henry VIII which condemned a man without being confronted by witnesses was contrary to
self-defence. In order to pass sentence of condemnation, it is necessary that the witnesses should know
whether the man against whom they make their deposition is he whom they accuse, and that this man be
at liberty to say, "I am not the person you mean."
• The law passed during the same reign, which condemned every woman, who, having carried on a
criminal commerce did not declare it to the king before she married him, violated the regard due to
natural modesty. It is as unreasonable to oblige a woman to make this declaration, as to oblige a man
not to attempt the defence of his own life.
• The law of Henry II which condemned the woman to death who lost her child, in case she did not make
known her pregnancy to the magistrate, was not less contrary to self-defence. It would have been
sufficient to oblige her to inform one of her nearest relatives, who might watch over the preservation of
the infant.
• What other information could she give in this situation, so torturing to natural modesty? Education has
heightened the notion of preserving that modesty; and in those critical moments scarcely has she any
idea remaining of the loss of life.
Natural law
4 plausible candidates for natural laws:
seeking peace;
seeking nourishment;
attraction;
and the desire to live in society arising out of the capacity for
knowledge.

But: As soon as men are in society, they lose their feelings of

weakness; the equality that was among them ceases, and the state of
war begins. To settle this state of war requires two orders - a law of
nations to settle matters between peoples; and internal laws: political
ones to govern matters within a society, between governed and
governors, and civil ones to govern those between citizens.

So - inversion of Social Contract – war follows from society

Climate
• Book XV
• Ch 2, ch 12 and 13 (On England) and see XIX ch 27.

• =

= Despotism!
forms of government
• i. three types of government: republican - where the people
(democracy) or part of the people (aristocracy) hold supreme
power; monarchical - where a single person governs, but by
fixed and established laws and despotic - where a single man,
unrestrained by law, dominates all by his will and caprice.
• ii. There are certain basic laws which flow from these types,
without which the nature of the government would change: e.g.,
In a democracy we need to define who will vote, we need fixed
rules and clear criteria for citizenship; there must be a system
for naming of ministers and election of councils or senate, and
some method by which the people can enact their laws or ratify
them. The most important distinction which Montesquieu draws
is between monarchy and despotism(II, 4, 17)
principes of government:
republics
While the nature of the government describes its special and fundamental
laws, the principle describes the human passion which set it in motion.
‘Dans cette œuvre capitale, qui rencontra un énorme succès, Montesquieu
tente de dégager les principes fondamentaux et la logique des différentes
institutions politiques par l'étude des lois considérées comme simples
rapports entre les réalités sociales.’

Republics
• Democracy - virtue In a democracy 'when virtue no longer exists,
ambition enters the hearts capable of it, and avarice becomes universal.'
'What I call virtue in republics is the love of one's native land, that is the
love of equality.' Where there is no virtue in a republic, then the state is
ready to fall.
• Aristocracy - Members of the aristocracy need virtue among themselves
so as to maintain order. The customary distinctive trait of stable
aristocracies is a lesser virtue - moderation.
monarchies
• Monarchy - not moved by virtue, but by honour: by self-
interest, ambition, and the pursuit of honour.
Montesquieu depicts courtiers as pretty wretched
creatures - 'ambition combined with idleness, meanness
mixed with pride, desire of riches without work, aversion
to truth, flattery, treason, bad faith, failure to carry out
commands'.
• 'Monarchy is a state of tension, which always degenerates
into despotism or republicanism. Power can never be
divided equally between prince and people: it is too
difficult to keep the balance.'
despotism
Moved by fear.
The prince must hold his people constantly in fear, or else
they will destroy him.
crainte, not peur
Peur concerns the sudden response we have to danger.
Crainte is more like a constant psychological and indeed,
physiological state - involuntary, uncontrollable, and
undercutting every other activity - making enjoyment
impossible.
Book VIII
Moderate vs Immoderate Governments: The potential extremism of the principles.
• Democracies become corrupt when all inequalities are levelled so that the people can brook no
authority;
• Monarchies become corrupt when the king can brook no other authority in his state.
• Despotisms are corrupt by their nature.
Moderate government, then, means a government in which power is not abused, but is limited,
constrained and regulated in its exercise. Moderation is achieved in part through moeurs, good laws,
and ‘fit’ between the type of rule and the size of the state, and to its religion, climate, commerce and
familial life. Moderation is the disposition of rulers to accept law as a constraint on their will and
passions.

the principles of government depend for their stability on a broader range of factors - ie., the conditions
under which people can brook the rule of law.

Part One (1-8) examines the fundamental political structures that define and organise the three basic
forms of state;
Part two (9-13) looks at laws that determine the liberty of a state (first concerning defensive and
offensive capabilities, then looking at different forms of liberty
Part 3 (14-19) concern the impact of climate and geography;
Part 4 (20-24) concern commerce;
Part 5 (25-6) religion;
Part 6 (27-31) Various legal systems and their institution.
Moderation and liberty
• Books 11 (esp ch 6) and 12. Ch 6 glosses the English
constitution, and the doctrine of the separation of powers.
These books pick up from Book 8 the idea of moderate
government as well-regulated liberty (that is a liberty
under the law) and they ask about what constitutional
structures can help preserve this good.
• So combines a normative and constitutional project

• But he also describes England as a republic

masquerading as a monarchy – effectively identifying a
commercial republic as a new type of order, influenced by
Mandeville.
Political liberty
• Moderate government is government in which there is political liberty - ie.,
where one citizen cannot fear another: ‘
• Political liberty is that tranquillity of spirit which comes from the opinion each
has of his own security, and in order for him to have this liberty the
government must be such that one citizen cannot fear another citizen.
(ll,6,157)
• or 'Political liberty in no way consists in doing what one wants. In a ... society
in which there are laws, liberty can consist only in having the power to do what
one should want to do and in no way being constrained to do what one should
not want to do....Liberty is the right to do everything the laws permit (11,3,155)
• Combining elements of books 11 and 12 - that is the distinction between when
a constitution is free, because in it the exercise of power is moderated; and
when a citizen is free, because they are secure.
• A moderate government is one in which law is king. Where government rules
by fundamental laws and does so in the common interest, one has political
liberty; one may also have security:- 'manners, customs or received examples
may give rise to it, and particular civil laws may encourage it.' (12,1, 187)
Book XI (6)
• i. There is a story about the separation of powers, and the existence of checks
and balances - basically that no individual or group of individuals should be
entrusted with the whole of the powers of the state, for while they may rule well
in the short term there is no guarantee that they will do so for long '..it has
eternally been observed that any man who has power is led to abuse it; he
continues until he finds limits' (11,4, 155) To ensure that a ruler finds limits
before encroaching on the citizen's liberty there must be some countervailing
power.
•
ii. Montesquieu continues to appeal, beneath the separation of powers
account, to a much older and more formidable theory of the doctrine of mixed
government (expounded by Polybius and Machiavelli). The division between
the commons the Lords and the Crown is another version of the one, the few
and the many, and is a way of introducing a balance of social forces into the
constitution. (King Charles’s Answer to 19 Propositions
• iii. Although chap 6 is a long one, and although it does seem important to
Montesquieu, its principle is not prominent enough to justify a separate book,
or a more extended discussion - why should this be so?
Laws and security
• The Spirit of the Laws starts out by looking at types of government, their natures, and the
fundamental laws which seem required by this nature. Such laws, and the basic types and
their principles play some part in determining the character of government and the quality of
life of the inhabitants, but there are many other things as well. There is the size of the state,
the climate, the customs, the religion, the mores, the state of commerce, and so on.
• Also two other developments in Montesquieu's position:
• i he moves from a concern with the different principles and types of government, to a more
detailed and practical concern with those forces which constrain or are constrained by these
principles. The ideal typical forms of government and their principles remain a central
innovation, but there are more detailed, more particular forces which conspire to support or
undermine the stability of one or other form of government.
• ii Also having sketched the three forms and their principles, Montesquieu is re-invoking a
natural law perspective -trying to fix a normative baseline which he can use to guide the task
of legislation - this becomes 'the tranquillity of spirit which comes from the opinion each has
of his security.'
• There is no such security in despotisms - fear, craintre, penetrates into the very soul of the
individual, and destroys the will of the agent. But elsewhere, security will depend on
expectations, which will depend on customs and mores, these will be associated with laws,
and these will be related to the climate and the sensibilities of men and women. This concern
with security is a crucial element in the Spirit of the Laws - so much so that it frequently cuts
across, and makes secondary, the tripartite distinction between forms of government, in
favour of a bipartite distinction - moderate and immoderate. But it is also a modern concern.
History
• i. Nostalgia for the classical republics, and a sense that
modern states are too corrupt to allow the development of the
degree of civic virtue, and public spiritedness which marked
the classical world.
• ii. The classical view of the rise and fall of states: (and
climate)
• iii. But there is also a third view of history canvassed by
Montesquieu, which does much to tie together the different
strands of his account, and which provides support for seeing
the moderate/immoderate distinction as being closest to his
heart. This is broached in his discussion of commerce,
particularly in Book 21, chap 20, entitled How commerce in
Europe penetrated barbarism.
•
Commercial republics
• Britain vs France
• Self-interest and virtue

• This does seem to be a feature of Montesquieu’s account – ie., he thinks that

the English commercial spirit has generated a huge commercial empire from
the free activities of individuals who jealously guard their liberty from political
interference.
• In France the government interferes with manufactures and commerce and the
core activity has become one driven to support the functioning of the monarchy
and its competitive climate of luxury, as against the more egalitarian commercial
activity of the English that spreads the benefits of trade throughout the country.
• This suggests a division in forms of luxury, and a sense that one provides more
secure revenues for the state through tax on commercial exchange, while the
other risks despotism in orchestrating the activity of production and exchange
around the court. But there remains in Britain a danger that commercial capital
could become too closely linked to the crown, creating a joint interest in
conspiring against the security of the people.