US - China Ties

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US- China

ties
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/
.
• Sino-American or People's Republic of
China–United States relations refers to
international relations between the
People's Republic of China (PRC) and the
United States of America (US). Most analysts
characterize present Sino-American relations
as being complex and multi-faceted. The
United States and the People's Republic of
China are usually neither allies nor
enemies; the U.S. government and military
establishment do not regard the Chinese as an
adversary, but as a competitor in some areas
and a partner in others.
/
• As of 2011, the United States has the world's
largest economy and China the second largest. China
has the world's largest population and the United
States has the third largest. The two countries are
the two largest consumers of motor vehicles and oil,[1]
oil,
and the two greatest emitters of greenhouse gases.[2]
gases.
• Relations between the People's Republic of China and
the United States have been generally stable with
some periods of tension, most notably after the
breakup of the Soviet Union, which removed a
common enemy and ushered in a world characterized
by American dominance. There are also concerns
relating to
human rights in the People's Republic of China and the
political status of Taiwan
• While there are some tensions in Sino-
American relations, there are also many
stabilizing factors. The PRC and the
United States are major trade partners and
have common interests in the prevention and
suppression of terrorism and
nuclear proliferation. China and the US are
the largest mutual trading partners,
excluding the European Union.[3] China is
also the largest foreign creditor for the United
States. China's challenges and difficulties are
mainly internal, and there is a desire to
maintain stable relations with the United
States. The Sino-American relationship has
been described by top leaders and academics
as the world's most important bilateral
relationship of the 21st century
• Open Door Policy

• The former residence of Envoy Wu Tingfang and the Office of the Qing
Legation to the United States, located in the Dupont Circle neighborhood
of Washington, D.C.
• In the late 19th century the major world powers (France
( , the
United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, Japan, and Russia) began carving out
spheres of influence for themselves in China, which was then under the
Qing Dynasty. The United States, not having such influence, wanted this
practice to end. In 1899, US Secretary of State John Hay sent diplomatic
letters to these nations, asking them to guarantee the territorial and
administrative integrity of China and to not interfere with the free use of
treaty ports within their respective spheres of influence.[7]
influence. The major
powers evaded commitment, saying they could not agree to anything until
the other powers had consented first. Hay took this as acceptance of his
proposal, which came to be known as the Open Door Policy .
• While generally respected internationally, the Open Door Policy did suffer
serious setbacks. The first issue involved Russian encroachment in
Manchuria in the late 1890s. The US protested Russia's actions, which
led to a Russian war with Japan in 1904. Japan presented a further
challenge to the Open Door Policy with its Twenty-One Demands in 1915
made on the then-Republic
then- of China. Japan also made secret treaties with
the Allies promising Japan the German territories in China. The biggest
setback to the Open Door Policy came in 1931, when Japan invaded and
occupied Manchuria, setting up the puppet state of Manchukuo. The
United States, along with other countries, strongly condemned the action
• China formally declared war on Japan in 1941 following the
Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, which brought the Americans
into World War II. The Roosevelt administration gave massive
amounts of aid to Chiang's beleaguered government, now
headquartered in Chongqing. Madame Chiang Kaishek,[8] who had
been educated in the United States, addressed the US Congress and
toured the country to rally support for China. Congress amended the
Chinese Exclusion Act and Roosevelt moved to end the
unequal treaties. However, the perception that Chiang's government
was unable to effectively resist the Japanese or that he preferred to
focus more on defeating the Communists grew. China Hands such as
Joseph Stilwell argued that it was in American interest to establish
communication with the Communists to prepare for a land-based
counteroffensive invasion of Japan. The Dixie Mission, which began in
1943, was the first official American contact with the Communists.
Other Americans, such as Claire Chennault, argued for air power. In
1944, Generalissimo Chiang acceded to Roosevelt's request that an
American general take charge of all forces in the area, but demanded
that Stilwell be recalled. General Albert Wedemeyer replaced Stilwell,
and Patrick Hurley became ambassador.
• Chiang did not like the Americans, and was suspicious of their
motives.[9]
motives. The American OSS, forerunner of the CIA, showed interest
in a plot to seize control of Chiang's regime. Chiang ordered the
plotters executed.[10]
executed. Chiang felt no friendliness towards the United
States, and saw the US as pursuing imperialist motives in China.
Chiang did not want to be subordinate to either the United States or
the Soviet Union, but jockeyed for position between the two to avoid
taking sides and to get the most out of Soviet and American
relationships.[11]
relationships. Chiang predicted that war would come between the
Americans and Soviets and that they would both seek China's alliance,
which he would use to China's advantage.
• Chiang also differed from the Americans in ideology issues. He
organized the Kuomintang as a Leninist-style party, oppressed
dissention, and banned democracy,[12]
democracy, claiming it was impossible for
China.[13]
China.
• Chiang manipulated the Soviets and Americans during the war, at first
telling the Americans that they would be welcome in talks between the Soviet
Union and China, then secretly telling the Soviets that the Americans were
unimportant and their opinions were to be left out. At the same time, Chiang
positioned American support and military power in China against the Soviet
Union as a factor in the talks, keeping the Soviets from taking advantage of
China with the threat of American military action against the Soviets.[14]
Soviets.
• Chiang's right hand man, the secret police chief Dai Li, was both anti-
American, and anti-Communist.[15]
anti-Communist. Dai ordered Kuomintang agents to spy on
American officers.[16]
officers. Dai had previously been involved with the
Blue Shirts Society, a Fascist-inspired paramilitary group in the Kuomintang
that wanted to expel Western and Japanese imperialists, crush the
Communists, and eliminate feudalism.[17] Dai Li was assassinated in a plane
crash orchestrated by the American OSS or the Communists.[18]
Communists.
• After World War II ended in 1945, the hostility between the Republic of China
and the Communist Party of China exploded into open civil war. General
Douglas MacArthur directed the military forces under Chiang Kai-shek to go to
the island of Taiwan to accept the surrender of Japanese troops, thus
beginning the military occupation of Taiwan. American general
George C. Marshall tried to broker a truce between the Republic of China and
the Communist Party of China in 1946, but it quickly lost momentum. The
Nationalist cause declined until 1949, when the Communists emerged
victorious and drove the Nationalists from the Chinese mainland onto Taiwan
and other islands. Mao Zedong established the People's Republic of China
(PRC) in mainland China,[19]
China, while the Republic of China remains in Taiwan
• [edit] People's Republic of China
• The United States did not formally recognize the People's
Republic of China (PRC) for 30 years after its founding. Instead, the
US maintained diplomatic relations with the Republic of China
government on Taiwan, recognizing it as the sole legitimate government
of China.
• However, the Taiwan-based Republic of China government did not trust
the United States. An enemy of the Chiang family, Wu Kuo-chen, was
removed from his position as governor of Taiwan by Chiang Ching-kuo
and fled to America in 1953. Chiang Kai-shek, president of the Republic
of China, suspected that the American CIA was engineering a coup with
Sun Li-jen, an American-educated Chinese man who attended the
Virginia Military Institute, with the goal of making Taiwan an
independent state. Chiang placed Sun under house arrest in 1955.[20]
1955.
[21]
• Chiang Ching-kuo, educated in the Soviet Union, initiated Soviet-style
military organization in the Republic of China military, reorganizing and
Sovietizing the political officer corps and surveillance. Kuomintang
party activities were propagated throughout the military. Sun Li-jen
opposed this action.[22]
action.
• As the People's Liberation Army moved south to complete the
communist conquest of mainland China in 1949, the American embassy
followed Chiang Kai-shek's Republic of China government to Taipei,
while US consular officials remained in mainland China. However, the
new PRC government was hostile to this official American
presence, and all US personnel were withdrawn from mainland
China in early 1950.
• Korean War
• Main article: Korean War

• A column of troops and armor of the 1st Marine Division
move through communist Chinese lines during their
successful breakout from the Chosin Reservoir in North
Korea.
• Any remaining hope of normalizing relations ended when US
and PRC forces began fighting against each other in the
Korean War on November 1, 1950. In response to the
Soviet-backed North Korean invasion of South Korea, the
United Nations Security Council was convened and passed
UNSC Resolution 82, condemning the North Korean
aggression unanimously. The resolution was adopted mainly
because the Soviet Union, a veto-wielding power, had been
boycotting UN proceedings since January, protesting that
the Republic of China and not the People's Republic of China
held a permanent seat on the council
• Vietnam War
• Main article: Vietnam War
• The PRC's involvement in the Vietnam War began in 1949,
when China was reunified under communist rule. The
Communist Party of China provided material and technical
support to the Vietnamese communists. In the summer of
1962, Mao Zedong agreed to supply Hanoi with 90,000 rifles
and guns free of charge. After the launch of the American
"Rolling Thunder" mission, China sent anti-aircraft units and
engineering battalions to North Vietnam to repair the damage
caused by American bombing, rebuild roads and railroads,
and perform other engineering work, freeing North
Vietnamese army units for combat in the South. Between
1965 and 1970, over 320,000 Chinese soldiers fought the
Americans alongside the North Vietnamese Army, reaching a
peak in 1967, when 170,000 troops served in combat. China
lost 1,446 troops in the Vietnam War. The US lost 58,159 in
combat against the NVA, Vietcong, and their allied forces,
including the Chinese
• Relations frozen
• The United States continued to work to prevent
the PRC from taking China's seat in the
United Nations and encouraged its allies not to
deal with the PRC. The United States placed an
embargo on trading with the PRC, and encouraged
allies to follow it. The PRC developed nuclear weapons
in 1964 and, as later declassified documents revealed,
President Johnson considered preemptive attacks to
halt its nuclear program. He ultimately decided the
measure carried too much risk and it was abandoned.
• Despite this official non-recognition, the United States
and the People's Republic of China held 136 meetings
at the ambassadorial level beginning in 1954 and
continuing until 1970, first in Geneva and later in
Warsaw
• Rapprochement
• Both the PRC and the US made efforts to try to improve relations
between the two major powers. This became an especially
important concern for the People's Republic of China after the
Sino-Soviet border clashes of 1969. The PRC was
diplomatically isolated and the leadership came to believe
that improved relations with the United States would be a
useful counterbalance to the Soviet threat. Zhou Enlai, the
PRC premier foreign minister, was at the forefront of this effort
with the committed backing of Mao Zedong.

• Henry Kissinger, shown here with Zhou Enlai and Mao Zedong
, made two secret trips to the PRC in 1971 before Nixon's
groundbreaking visit in 1972.
• In the United States, academics such as John K. Fairbank and
pointed to the need to deal realistically with the Beijing
government, while organizations such as the
National Committee on United States-China Relations sponsored
debates to promote public awareness. Many saw the specter of
Communist China behind Communist movements in Vietnam
, Cambodia, and Laos, but a growing number concluded that
if the PRC would align with the US it would mean a major
redistribution of global power against the Soviets. Mainland
China's market of nearly one billion consumers appealed to
American business. Senator William Fulbright, Chair of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, held a series of hearings on
the matter.
• Mike Mansfield, the Democratic Senate Majority Leader was indirectly approached
by the PRC and passed a note on to the State Department and President
Richard Nixon.
• Nixon had long been interested in Asia and his National Security Advisor
Henry Kissinger believed approaching the PRC would be valuable. Domestic political
concerns also entered into Nixon's thinking, as the boost from a successful courting
of the PRC could help him greatly in the 1972 American presidential election. He
also worried immensely that one of the Democrats would preempt him and go to the
PRC before he had the opportunity.
• Communication between PRC and American leaders were conducted with Pakistan
and Romania as intermediaries.
• Richard Nixon met with Mao Zedong in 1972.
• In 1969, the United States initiated measures to relax trade restrictions and
other impediments to bilateral contact, to which China responded. However,
this rapprochement process was stalled by US actions in Indochina.
• On April 6, 1971, the young American ping pong player Glenn Cowan missed
his US team bus and was waved by a Chinese table tennis player onto the bus
of the Chinese team at the 31st World Table Tennis Championship in Nagoya,
Japan. Cowan spoke with the Chinese players in a friendly fashion, and the Chinese
player, Zhuang Zedong, a three-time World Men's Singles Champion, presented him
with a silk-screen portrait of the famous Huangshan Mountains. While this had been
a purely spontaneous gesture of friendship between two athletes, the PRC chose to
treat it as an officially sanctioned outreach. Zhuang Zedong spoke about the incident
in a 2007 talk at the USC US-China Institute.[25]
Institute. According to sources from the
PRC, the friendly contact between Zhuang Zedong and Glenn Cowan, as well as the
photograph of the two players in , had an impact on Mao's decision making. He had
earlier decided not to invite the US team to tour mainland China along with teams of
other western countries, but in a move later known as Ping Pong Diplomacy, Mao
and the PRC invited the American ping pong team to tour after all. The Americans
agreed and on April 10, 1971 the athletes became the first Americans to officially
visit China since the communist takeover in 1949.[26]
1949.
• In July 1971, Henry Kissinger feigned illness while on a trip to
Pakistan and did not appear in public for a day. He was actually on a
top-secret mission to Beijing to open relations with the government of
the PRC. On July 15, 1971, President Richard Nixon revealed the
mission to the world and that he had accepted an invitation to visit
the PRC.
• This announcement caused immediate shock around the world. In the
United States, some of the most hardline anti-communists spoke
against the decision, but public opinion supported the move and
Nixon saw the jump in the polls he had been hoping for. Since Nixon
had sterling anti-communist credentials he was all but immune to
being called "soft on communism."
• Within the PRC there was also opposition from left-wing elements.
This effort was allegedly led by Lin Biao , head of the military, who
died in a mysterious plane crash over Mongolia while trying to defect
to the Soviet Union. His death silenced most internal dissent over the
visit.
• Internationally, reactions varied. The Soviets were very concerned
that two major enemies seemed to have resolved their
differences, and the new world alignment contributed
significantly to the policy of détente .
• America's European allies and Canada were pleased by the initiative, especially
since many of them had already recognized the PRC. In Asia, the reaction was far
more mixed. Japan was annoyed that it had not been told of the announcement
until fifteen minutes before it had been made, and feared that the Americans were
abandoning them in favor of the PRC. A short time later, Japan also recognized the
PRC and committed to substantial trade with the continental power. South Korea
and South Vietnam were both concerned that peace between the United States and
the PRC could mean an end to American support for them against their Communist
enemies. Throughout the period of rapprochement, both countries had to be
regularly assured that they would not be abandoned.
• From February 21 to February 28, 1972, President Nixon traveled to Beijing,
Hangzhou, and Shanghai. At the conclusion of his trip, the US and the PRC issued
the Shanghai Communiqué, a statement of their respective foreign policy views. In
the Communiqué, both nations pledged to work toward the full normalization of
diplomatic relations. The US acknowledged the PRC position that all Chinese on
both sides of the Taiwan Strait maintain that there is only one China and that
Taiwan is part of China. The statement enabled the US and PRC to temporarily set
aside the issue of Taiwan and open trade and communication.
• The rapprochement with the United States benefited the PRC immensely
and greatly increased its security for the rest of the Cold War. It has been
argued that the United States, on the other hand, saw fewer benefits than it had
hoped for. The PRC continued to heavily support North Vietnam in the Vietnam
War and also backed the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia. Eventually, however, the
PRC's suspicion of Vietnam's motives led to a break in Sino-Vietnamese
cooperation and, upon the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in 1979, the
Sino-Vietnamese War. Both China and the United States backed combatants in
Africa against Soviet and Cuban-supported movements. The economic benefits of
normalization were slow as it would take decades for American products to
penetrate the vast Chinese market. While Nixon's China policy is regarded by many
as the highlight of his presidency, others such as William Bundy have argued that it
provided very little benefit to the United States.
• Liaison Office, 1973–1978
• In May 1973, in an effort to build toward formal diplomatic
relations, the US and the PRC established the (USLO) in Beijing
and a counterpart PRC office in Washington, DC. In the years
between 1973 and 1978, such distinguished Americans as
David K. E. Bruce, George H. W. Bush, Thomas S. Gates, and
Leonard Woodcock served as chiefs of the USLO with the personal
rank of Ambassador.
• President Gerald Ford visited the PRC in 1975 and reaffirmed
American interest in normalizing relations with Beijing. Shortly
after taking office in 1977, President Jimmy Carter again reaffirmed
the goals of the Shanghai Communiqué. Carter's National Security
Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski and senior staff member of the
National Security Council Michel Oksenberg encouraged Carter to
seek full diplomatic and trade relations with China. Brzezinkski and
Oksenberg traveled to Beijing in early 1978 to work with
Leonard Woodcock, then head of the liaison office, to lay the
groundwork to do so. The United States and the People's Republic
of China announced on December 15, 1978 that the two
governments would establish diplomatic relations on January
1, 1979
sssssss
• Normalization to Tian'anmen
• In the Joint Communiqué on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations
, dated January 1, 1979, the United States transferred diplomatic
recognition from Taipei to Beijing. The US reiterated the Shanghai
Communiqué's acknowledgment of the Chinese position that there is
only one China and that Taiwan is a part of China; Beijing
acknowledged that the American people would continue to carry on
commercial, cultural, and other unofficial contacts with the people of
Taiwan. The Taiwan Relations Act (text) made the necessary changes
in US domestic law to permit such unofficial relations with Taiwan to
flourish.

• A meeting between Deng Xiaoping and Zbigniew Brzezinski in 1979
• Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping's January 1979 visit to Washington, DC
initiated a series of important, high-level exchanges which continued
until the spring of 1989. This resulted in many bilateral agreements,
especially in the fields of scientific, technological, and cultural
interchange, as well as trade relations. Since early 1979, the United
States and the PRC have initiated hundreds of joint research projects
and cooperative programs under the Agreement on Cooperation in
Science and Technology, the largest bilateral program.[27]
program.
• On March 1, 1979, the United States and the People's Republic of
China formally established embassies in Beijing and Washington, DC.
In 1979, outstanding private claims were resolved and a bilateral
trade agreement was completed. Vice President Walter Mondale
reciprocated Vice Premier Deng's visit with an August 1979 trip to
China. This visit led to agreements in September 1980 on maritime
affairs, civil aviation links, and textile matters, as well as a bilateral
consular convention.

• Deng Xiaoping with US President Jimmy Carter
• As a consequence of high-level and working-level contacts initiated in
1980, US dialogue with the PRC broadened to cover a wide range of issues,
including global and regional strategic problems, political-military
questions, including arms control, UN, and other multilateral organization
affairs, and international narcotics matters.
• The expanding relationship that followed normalization was threatened in 1981
by PRC objections to the level of US arms sales to the Republic of China on Taiwan
. Secretary of State Alexander Haig visited China in June 1981 in an effort to
resolve Chinese concerns about America's unofficial relations with Taiwan. Vice
President Bush visited the PRC in May 1982. Eight months of negotiations
produced the US-PRC Joint Communiqué of August 17, 1982. In this third
communiqué, the US stated its intention to gradually reduce the level of arms
sales to the Republic of China, and the PRC described as a fundamental policy
their effort to strive for a peaceful resolution to the Taiwan question.
• High-level exchanges continued to be a significant means for developing US-PRC
relations in the 1980s. President Ronald Reagan and Premier Zhao Ziyang made
reciprocal visits in 1984. In July 1985, President Li Xiannian traveled to the United
States, the first such visit by a PRC head of state. Vice President Bush visited the
PRC in October 1985 and opened the US Consulate General in Chengdu, the US's
fourth consular post in the PRC. Further exchanges of cabinet-level officials
occurred between 1985 and 1989, capped by President Bush's visit to Beijing in
February 1989.
• In the period before the June 3–4, 1989 crackdown, a growing number of cultural
exchange activities gave the American and Chinese peoples broad exposure to
each other's cultural, artistic, and educational achievements. Numerous mainland
Chinese professional and official delegations visited the United States each month.
Many of these exchanges continued after the suppression of the Tiananmen
• Tian'anmen to September 11th, 2001

• Bill Clinton and Jiang Zemin holding a joint press conference at
the White House, October 29, 1997.
• Following the PRC's violent suppression of demonstrators in June
1989, the US and other governments enacted a number of
measures to express their condemnation of the PRC's violation
of human rights. The US suspended high-level official
exchanges with the PRC and weapons exports from the US
to the PRC. The US also imposed a number of
economic sanctions. In the summer of 1990, at the G7 Houston
summit, Western nations called for renewed political and
economic reforms in mainland China, particularly in the field of
human rights.
• Tian'anmen disrupted the US-PRC trade relationship, and US
investors' interest in mainland China dropped dramatically. The
US government responded to the political repression by
suspending certain trade and investment programs on June 5 and
20, 1989. Some sanctions were legislated while others were
executive actions. Examples include:
• Relations between the US and the PRC were severely strained for
a time by the NATO Bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade
in May 1999, which was blamed on an intelligence error but which
some Chinese believed to be deliberate. By the end of 1999,
relations began to gradually improve. In October 1999, the two
sides reached an agreement on humanitarian payments for families
of those who were injured or killed, as well as payments for
damages to respective diplomatic properties in Belgrade and
China.
• In April 2001, a PRC J-8 fighter jet collided with a US EP-3
reconnaissance aircraft flying south of the PRC in what became
known as the . The EP-3 was able to make an emergency landing
on PRC's Hainan Island despite extensive damage; the PRC aircraft
crashed with the loss of its pilot, Wang Wei. It was widely believed
that the EP-3 recon aircraft was conducting a spying mission on
the Chinese Armed Forces before the collision. Following extensive
negotiations resulting in the "letter of the two sorries," the crew of
the EP-3 was released from imprisonment and allowed to leave the
PRC 11 days later. The US aircraft was not permitted to depart
Chinese soil for another three months, after which the relationship
between the US and the PRC gradually improved once more
• Bush administration

• Presidents George W. Bush, and Hu Jintao with first ladies Laura Bush,
and Liu Yongqing wave from the White House in April 2006.
• Sino-American relations changed radically following the
September 11, 2001 attacks. Many PRC citizens died in the September
11, 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center, and mainland Chinese
companies and individuals sent expressions of condolences to their US
counterparts. The PRC offered strong public support for the
war on terrorism. The PRC voted in favor of UNSCR 1373, publicly
supported the coalition campaign in Afghanistan,[citation
,[ needed] and
contributed $150 million of bilateral assistance to Afghan
reconstruction following the defeat of the Taliban. Shortly after 9/11,
the US and PRC also commenced a counterterrorism dialogue.
The third round of that dialogue was held in Beijing in February
2003.
• In the United States, the terrorist attacks greatly changed the nature
of discourse. It was no longer plausible to argue, as the Blue Team had
earlier asserted, that the PRC was the primary security threat to the
United States, and the need to focus on the Middle East and the
War on Terror made the avoidance of potential distractions in East
Asia a priority for the United States.
• There were initial fears among the PRC leadership that the war on
terrorism would lead to an anti-PRC effort by the US, especially as the
US began establishing bases in Central Asian countries like Uzbekistan
and Tajikistan and renewed efforts against Iraq. Because of setbacks in
America's Iraq campaign, these fears have largely subsided. The
application of American power in Iraq and continuing efforts by the
United States to cooperate with the PRC has significantly reduced the
popular anti-Americanism that had developed in the mid-1990s.
• The PRC and the US have also worked closely on regional issues, including
those pertaining to North Korea and its nuclear weapons program. The
People's Republic of China has stressed its opposition to North Korea's
decision to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, its concerns
over North Korea's nuclear capabilities, and its desire for a non-nuclear
Korean peninsula. It also voted to refer North Korea's noncompliance with its
International Atomic Energy Agency obligations to the UN Security Council.
• Taiwan remains a volatile issue, but one that remains under control. The
United States policy toward Taiwan has involved emphasizing the
Four Noes and One Without. On occasion the United States has rebuked
Republic of China President Chen Shui-bian for provocative pro-
independence rhetoric. However, in 2005, the PRC passed an
anti-secession law which stated that the PRC would be prepared to resort to
"non-peaceful means" if Taiwan declared formal independence. Many critics
of the PRC, such as the Blue Team, argue that the PRC was trying to take
advantage of the US war in Iraq to assert its claims on Republic of China's
territory. In 2008, Taiwan voters elected Ma Ying-jeou. Ma, representing the
Kuomintang, campaigned on a platform that included rapprochement with
mainland China. His election has significant implications for the future of
cross-strait relations.[29]
relations.
• China's president Hu Jintao visited the United States in April 2006.[30]
2006. Clark
Randt, U.S. Ambassador to China from 2001 to 2008 examined "The State of
U.S.-China Relations in a 2008 lecture at the USC U.S.-China Institute
• Obama administration

• Chinese Vice Premier Wang Qishan, center, holds the autographed basketball given to
him by President Barack Obama following their Oval Office meeting Tuesday, July 28,
2009, to discuss the outcomes of the first
US–China Strategic and Economic Dialogue . Looking on at left is Chinese State
Councilor Dai Bingguo.[32]
• The 2008 US presidential election centered on issues of war and economic decline, but
candidates Barack Obama and John McCain also spoke extensively regarding US policy
toward China.[33]
China. Both favored cooperation with China on major issues, but they
differed with regard to trade policy. Obama expressed concern that the value of
China's currency was being deliberately set low to benefit China's exporters .
McCain argued that free trade was crucial and was having a transformative effect in
China. Still, McCain noted that while China might have shared interests with the US, it
did not share American values.
• Barack Obama's presidency has fostered hopes for increased co-operation and
heightened levels of friendship between the two nations. On November 8, 2008,
Hu Jintao and Barack Obama shared a phone conversation in which the Chinese
President congratulated Obama on his election victory. During the conversation both
parties agreed that the development of US-China relations is not only in the interest of
both nations, but also in the interests of the world.[34][35][36]
world.
• Other organizations within China also held positive reactions to the election of Barack
Obama, particularly with his commitment to revising American climate change policy.
Greenpeace published an article detailing how Obama's victory would spell positive
change for investment in the green jobs sector as part of a response to the financial
crisis gripping the world at the time of Obama's inauguration.[37]
inauguration. A number of
organizations, including the US Departments of Energy and Commerce, NGOs such as
the Council on Foreign Relations and the Brookings Institution, and universities, have
been working with Chinese counterparts to discuss ways to address climate change.
Both US and Chinese governments have addressed the economic downturn with
massive stimulus initiatives. The Chinese have expressed concern that "Buy American"
components of the US plan discriminate against foreign producers, including those in
• As the two most influential and powerful countries in the world, there have been
increasingly strong suggestions within American political circles of creating a G-2
(Chimerica) relationship for the United States and China to work out
solutions to global problems together .[39]
• The Strategic Economic Dialogue initiated by then-US President Bush and Chinese
President Hu and led by US Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson and Chinese Vice
Premier Wu Yi in 2006 has been broadened by the Obama administration. Now
called the US-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue it is led by US Secretary of
State Hillary Clinton and US Secretary of the Treasury Timothy Geithner for the
United States and Vice Premier Wang Qishan and Chinese State Councilor
Dai Bingguo for China. The focus of the first set of meetings in July 2009 was in
response to the economic crisis, finding ways to cooperate to stem global warming
and addressing issues such as the proliferation of nuclear weapons and
humanitarian crises.[40]
crises.
• US President Barack Obama visited China on November 15–18, 2009 to discuss
economic worries, concerns over nuclear weapon proliferation, and the need for
action against climate change.[41]
change. The USC US-China Institute produced a digest
of press comments on this visit and on earlier presidential trips.[42]
trips.

• Obama meets with Wen Jiabao and members of the Chinese delegation after a
bilateral meeting at the United Nations in New York City.
• In January 2010, the US proposed a $6.4 billion arms sale to the Republic of China.
In response, the PRC threatened to impose sanctions on US companies supplying
arms to Taiwan and suspend cooperation on certain regional and international
issues.[43]
issues.
• On February 19, 2010, President Obama met with the Dalai Lama, who China
accuses of "fomenting unrest in Tibet." After the meeting, China summoned the US
ambassador to China, Jon Huntsman,[44] but Time has described the Chinese
reaction as "muted," speculating that it could be because "the meeting came during
the Chinese New Year... when most officials are on leave." Some activists criticized
Obama for the relatively low profile of the visit
• [edit] US-China economic relations
• This article is outdated. Please update this article to reflect recent events or
newly available information. Please see the talk page for more information.
(May 2010)The PRC and the US resumed trade relations in 1972 and 1973.
Direct investment by the US in mainland China covers a wide range of
manufacturing sectors, several large hotel projects, restaurant chains,
and petrochemicals. US companies have entered agreements establishing
more than 20,000 equity joint ventures, contractual joint ventures, and
wholly foreign-owned enterprises in mainland China. More than 100 US-
based multinationals have projects in mainland China, some with
multiple investments. Cumulative US investment in mainland China is
valued at $48 billion. The US trade deficit with mainland China
exceeded $350 billion in 2006 and was the United States' largest
bilateral trade deficit.[69] Some of the factors that influence the U.S. trade
deficit with mainland China include:
• Beginning in 2006, the US and China agreed to hold regular high-level talks
about economic issues and other mutual concerns by establishing the
China-US strategic economic dialogue, which meets biannually. Five meetings
have been held, the most recent in December 2008. Economic nationalism
seems to be rising in both countries, a point the leaders of the two delegations
noted in their opening presentations.[71][72][73]
presentations. The United States and China
have also established the high-level US-China Senior Dialogue to discuss
international political issues and work out resolutions.
• In September 2009 a trade dispute emerged between China and the United
States, which came after the US imposed tariffs of 35 percent on Chinese tire
imports. The Chinese commerce minister accused the United States of a "grave
act of trade protectionism,"[74]
," while a USTR spokesperson said the tariff "was
taken precisely in accordance with the law and our international trade
agreements."[75]
agreements." Additional issues were raised by both sides in subsequent
• Currency dispute
• Monetary policy has been one of the biggest issues surrounding
relations between the United States and China within the past
decade. At the heart of the issue is the question of whether or not
each country’s currency is at the proper value. Each country has
placed the blame with the other. Most monetary and trade
experts agree that China’s currency has been and is still
undervalued,[78] but an article by Business Insider argues that
China raising the value of their currency would have a large effect
on the trade balance between the two countries.[79]
countries.
• Domestic leaders within the United States have pressured the
Obama Administration to take a hard line against China and compel
them to raise the value of their currency. The United States
Congress currently has before it a bill which would call on the
President to impose tariffs on Chinese imports until China properly
values its currency.[80][81]
currency. Many Congressional members from
states with large manufacturing sectors are leading the push to
retaliate against China.[citation
China.[ needed] The Chinese state
newspaper has criticized the United States for unfair monetary
policies as well.[citation
well.[ needed] Both countries have sought out
other international partners to side with them.[
• [edit] Influence in Asia
• China's economic rise has led to some geo-political friction
between the US and China in the East Asian region.[82][
dead link] For example, in response China's response to the
Bombardment of Yeonpyeong by North Korea, "Washington is
moving to redefine its relationship with South Korea and Japan,
potentially creating an anti-China bloc in Northeast Asia that
officials say they don't want but may need." [83] For its part, the
Chinese government fears a US Encirclement Conspiracy.[84]
Conspiracy. [
dead link]
• [edit] Controversies
• In 2005, the partly state-owned Chinese National Offshore Oil
Corporation attempted an $18.5 billion takeover of UNOCAL. The
deal was rejected by the American government on the grounds
that it threatened national security.[85]
security.
• China also rejected a $2.4 billion bid from the
The Coca-Cola Company for the Huiyuan Juice Group on the
grounds that it would be a virtual monopoly, though nationalism
was also thought to be a reason for aborting the deal
• China containment policy
• The China Containment Policy is a current political belief[
citation needed] that U.S. foreign policy strives to diminish the economic
and political growth of the People’s Republic of China. The term, which
primarily originates from political analysts in China[citation
China[ needed],
harks of the U.S. containment policy against the former Soviet Union
during the Cold War.
• Taken to its national conclusion, proponents of this realist theory
claim the U.S. will or needs to seek a divided and weak China to
continue its hegemony in Asia. It is thought this shall be
accomplished by establishing military, economic, and diplomatic
ties to countries adjacent to China's borders. If so, American
proponents of this policy[who?
policy[ ] espouse U.S. military activities in
Afghanistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, South Korea, and Japan are only
U.S. intentions to diminish the P.R.C. regional power.
Additionally, U.S. efforts to improve relations with India and
Vietnam would also be examples of the U.S. utilizing its economic
influence to "box in" the P.R.C.
• This version of containment should not be confused with the previous
versions of the theory initially proposed by George Kennan in the 1940s
to counter the Comintern. This original version, which later expanded to
include the P.R.C. after 1949, included shutting off all trade, cultural and
educational exchanges, and political recognition to the P.R.C. starting
with a formal denormalization of diplomatic relations. It may also be
noted that the question of the legitimacy of the P.R.C. versus the
Republic of China (Taiwan) as the rightful representatives of the Chinese
people under international law and as recognized by the United Nations
was within this context
• Challenges
• The neutrality of this article is disputed. Please see the discussion
on the talk page. Please do not remove this message until the
dispute is resolved. (October 2009)Australia: Australia has a growing
dependency on China’s market. Its mining industry is booming thanks
to China.[citation
China.[ needed] Ahead of the visit by Condoleezza Rice and
her warning about China becoming a "negative force" , Alexander
Downer, warned that Australia does not agree with a policy of
containment of China.[citation
China.[ needed] Australia has recently initiated
an annual security dialogue with China.[citation
China.[ needed]
• India: China is India's largest trading partner.[12]
partner. Bush’s visit to
India is seen also as an attempt to boost bilateral trade and keep
some influence by offering India something that only US can provide,
high nuclear technology. China is the United's States fifth-largest
trading partner in terms of exports, while India ranks twenty-fourth.
[13]
• Japan: Although the economy of the United States is 4.2 times larger
than China’s, China has already overtaken the US as Japan’s largest
trading partner.[14]
partner. China gives imports from Japan preference and
priority over the US[citation
US[ needed] which has been an important
factor in the recovery of Japan's for a decade stagnant economy
• The Group of Two (G-2 or G2) is a proposed informal special relationship
between the United States and the People's Republic of China. Originally initiated
by C. Fred Bergsten as primarily an economic relationship, it began to gain wider
currency and scope from foreign policy experts as a term recognizing the centrality
of the U.S.-China relationship near the beginning of the Obama Administration.
Prominent advocates include former National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski
, historian Niall Ferguson, World Bank President Robert Zoellick and chief
economist Justin Yifu Lin.
• As the two most influential and powerful countries in the world, there has been
increasingly strong suggestions within American political circles of creating a G-2
relationship where the United States and China would work out solutions to
global problems together.[1]
• [edit] History
• The concept of a G-2 was first raised by noted economist C. Fred Bergsten in 2005.
[2] In 2009, Bergsten made the following arguments for such a relationship:
• Zbigniew Brzezinski has been a vocal advocate for the concept. He publicly
advanced the notion in Beijing in January 2009 as the two countries celebrated the
30th anniversary of establishing formal diplomatic ties.[4]
ties. He views the informal G-
2 as helpful in finding solutions to the global financial crisis, climate change (
Politics of global warming), North Korea's nuclear program,
Iran's nuclear program, the India-Pakistan tensions, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict
, UN peacekeeping, nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament. He
called the principle of "harmony" a "mission worthy of the two countries
with the most extraordinary potential for shaping our collective future."[5]
future."
[6]
• Historian Niall Ferguson has also advocated the G-2 concept. He coined the term
Chimerica to describe the symbiotic nature of the U.S.-China economic
relationship.
• U.S.–China Strategic and Economic Dialogue

• The U.S.–China Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED) is


a high-level dialogue for the United States and China to discuss a
wide range of bilateral, regional and global political, strategic,
security, and economic issues between both countries. The
establishment of the S&ED was announced on April 1, 2009 by
U.S. President Barack Obama and Chinese President Hu Jintao.
The upgraded mechanism replaced the former Senior Dialogue
and Strategic Economic Dialogue started under the
George W. Bush administration. The format is such that high-
level representatives of both countries and their delegations will
meet annually at capitals alternating between the two countries.
[1][2]
• The S&ED has both a "Strategic Track" and an "Economic
Track". U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Chinese State
Councilor Dai Bingguo co-chair the "Strategic Track". U.S.
Secretary of the Treasury Timothy Geithner and Chinese Vice
Premier Wang Qishan co-chair the "Economic Track".
• Strategic Track
• The Strategic Track of the S&ED consists of
four pillars:
• Climate change, clean energy, and the
environment were also discussed in separate
special sessions.
• Key highlights from the Strategic Track
include: Climate Change, Energy, and
Environment MOU, North Korea, South Asia,
Sudan, Counter-Terrorism, Non-proliferation,
Military-to-Military Relations, Human Rights,
Energy Security, and Global Issues
• Purpose
• The Senior Dialogue was conceived at a 2004 APEC meeting, after a
suggestion made by the Chinese President Hu Jintao to U.S.
President George H. W. Bush to create a forum where the global
superpower and emerging global player could come together and
discuss issues of mutual concern. The typically two-day rounds help
establish a framework for bilateral cooperation between the two
countries, and give the U.S. an opportunity to shape China's impact
on the world as its economy continues to industrialize.
• Integrating China into the world's security, economic and political
systems continues to be the U.S.'s current policy in dealing with
China's rise on the global sphere. However, China's current
international economic policies are increasingly rankling American
workers and businesses, among others around the world who
consider China's trade practices unfair. On June 13, 2007, four U.S.
senators introduced a bill that would pressure China to allow its
currency to rise in value, which would help close the huge U.S.
trade deficit with China, which hit a record $233 billion
in 2006. However, Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson believes in
pursuing a less confrontational and non-protectionist
• US policy of containment as well as
engagement of China
• Chimerica is a neologism coined by Niall Ferguson and describing
the symbiotic relationship between China and the United States, with
incidental reference to the legendary chimera.[1][2][3][4][5]
• In March 2010, anticipating the risk of tensions between the two
nations escalating into a currency war, Ferguson published a paper
forecasting that Chimerica would soon unravel. [6]
• [edit] Origin
• First coined by historian Niall Ferguson and economist in late 2006,
they argue that saving by the Chinese and overspending by Americans
led to an incredible period of wealth creation that contributed to the
global financial crisis of 2008–2009.[7] For years, China accumulated
large currency reserves and channeled them into U.S.
government securities, which kept nominal and real long-term
interest rates artificially low in the United States. Ferguson describes
Chimerica as one economy which "accounts for around 13 percent of the
world’s land surface, a quarter of its population, about a third of its
gross domestic product, and somewhere over half of the global
economic growth of the past six years."[8]
years." He suggests Chimerica could
end if China were to decouple from the United States bringing with it a
shift in global power and allowing China "to explore other spheres of
global influence, from the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, of which
Russia is also a member, to its own informal nascent empire in
commodity-rich Africa."[9]
Africa."
• The accumulation of American debt which has been estimated at around
$800 billion suggests the two nations are intrinsically linked; the
economic symbiosis prevalent between the two suggests the separation
would be difficult to engender.
• The idea of Chimerica features prominently in Ferguson's 2008 book and
adapted television documentary The Ascent of Money which reviews the
history of money, credit, and banking
• The U.S.-China Senior Dialogue (also
known as the China-U.S. Strategic
Dialogue) was a regular, high-level
strategic dialogue between the
United States and the
People's Republic of China.[1] The Senior
Dialogue has been upgraded to the
strategic track of the
Strategic and Economic Dialogue in the
Obama Administration and will be headed
by Hillary Clinton and Dai Bingguo
Cold War role reversal in US-
China ties

• It has become part of the political orthodoxy in America that
former United States president Ronald Reagan's defense
spending catapulted the Soviet Union into bankruptcy and
collapse. As broad narratives go, this perspective certainly
captures two things accurately: that the Reagan administration
aggressively funded the US military and that the Soviet Union
did in fact collapse.
• But as with any question of historical cause and effect, time has
provided a much needed bit of perspective on both events, the
nut of which is to reconsider whether relating the two so
intimately is actually appropriate.
• What we know now - and what was admittedly largely obscured
from outsiders attempting to peer behind the Iron Curtain - was
that the Soviet Union's socialist command economy was already
failing by the time Reagan took office in 1981.
• Not only had centralized decision making and economic
planning not yielded the efficiency gains the Soviet model
proposed, but they had actually set whole industries in concrete,
unable to innovate or allocate capital towards retooling and
modernizing key national manufacturing sectors.
.
• Bureaucracies had impossibly choked off the life blood of the
Soviet economy, leaving the average citizen impoverished, with
little more to show for their shared sacrifice towards the
national ideal of communism than barely enough bread to feed
themselves and their families.
• The Reagan administration was fortunate enough to enter the
world's stage not only with an honorable belief in the decrepit
nature of communism and a willingness to use the bully pulpit
of the presidency to say as much, nor necessarily with a foreign
policy inherently capable of breaking communism's back as
much as a finely tuned sense of timing and good old-fashioned
luck.
• As with many judgments made by American policy makers
about the purported strength of the Soviet Union - the feared
missile gap, or the supposed superiority of their economic
model (a common fear in academic circles in the years after
World War II when communism was wrapping its tentacles
around Eastern Europe) - even the Reagan administration's
view of the country's strengths proved to be fundamentally
flawed once the Soviet Union collapsed and its inner workings
were made visible to all.
• Only hindsight shows the country's failed efforts in Afghanistan
not so much as a strategic military error, but as the sort of
mistake declining powers make when trying to convince
themselves of their own relevance and superiority.
.

•China as a rising
super power
• China
• See also: Chinese Century
• People's Republic of ChinaThe People's Republic of China receives
continual coverage in the popular press of its potential superpower
status,[21]
status, and has been identified as a rising or emerging economic and
military superpower by academics and other experts.[22][23][24][25]
experts.
• Barry Buzan asserts that "China certainly presents the most promising
all-round profile" of a potential superpower.[26]
superpower. Buzan claims that "China
is currently the most fashionable potential superpower and the one
whose degree of alienation from the dominant international society
makes it the most obvious political challenger." However, he notes this
challenge is constrained by the major challenges of development and by
the fact that its rise could trigger a counter coalition of states in Asia.
• Shujie Yao of Nottingham University has said that the London G-20
Summit helped to "further cement [China's] position as the world's
emerging superpower by allowing it to stake out a clear leading role". He
notes that "China will overtake the United States to become the world's
largest economy by 2038 if current growth rates continue". He argues
that the credit crisis has provided China a rare chance to secure
superpower status
• Parag Khanna states that by making massive trade and investment deals with
Latin America and Africa, China has established its presence as a superpower
along with the European Union and the United States. China's rise is
demonstrated by its ballooning share of trade in its gross domestic product. He
believes that China's "consultative style" has allowed it to develop political and
economic ties with many countries including those viewed as rogue states by
the United States. He states that the Shanghai Cooperation Organization
founded with Russia and the Central Asian countries may eventually be the
"NATO of the East".[28]
• Geoffrey Murphay's China: The Next Superpower argues that while the
potential for China is high, this is fairly perceived only by looking at the risks
and obstacles China faces in managing its population and resources. The
political situation in China may become too fragile to survive into superpower
status according to Susan Shirk in China: Fragile Superpower.[29] Other
factors that could constrain China's ability to become a superpower in the
future include: limited supplies of energy and raw materials, questions over its
innovation capability, inequality and corruption, and risks to social stability and
the environment. Minxin Pei does not believe that China is a superpower or that
it will be one anytime soon arguing that it faces daunting political and economic
challenges.[30] Amy Chua states that whether a country has enough pull to
bring immigrants is an important quality for a superpower. She also writes that
China lacks the pull to bring scientists, thinkers, and innovators from other
countries as immigrants. However, she believes that China has made up for this
with its own diaspora, saying that size and resources for them are unparalleled
sss

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