Chapter 3
Chapter 3
Chapter 3
Chapter three
There is one major problem with Shakespeare’s
comedies: they are not funny.
angry
dare first declaring his intention to perform, and inviting Antipholus to allow the performance
Molly Mahood claims that Johnson’s objections to puns (or quibbles, to use his term) are due
to ‘a linguistic revolution’ which separates ‘his verbal habits from Shakespeare’s’.
Molly Mahood was an early champion of ‘wordplay’ as ‘a game the
Elizabethans played seriously’; Pat Parker has argued, across a series
of articles and books, that wordplay deserves more than a groan and
invented stage business; Russ McDonald has suggested that we give
notice to the notion of the ‘serious pun’.8 This counter-tradition is
rooted in the historicized, rhetorical approach to Shakespeare’s
language exemplified by the work of Miriam Joseph, which is not
made uneasy by the artificial nature of puns, and which does not
necessarily view the connections made in wordplay as arbitrary.9
Following this tradition, I want to suggest that if we take a
properly historicized view of wordplay, we will find that when it
comes to ‘unfunny’ puns, in performance and reading, the fault
lies not in Shakespeare, but in ourselves.
An attempt to historicize our understanding of wordplay
might well begin with a consideration of the word ‘pun’ itself.
Look up the word ‘pun’ in the Oxford English Dictionary, and
you will be told that the word appears first with its cognate verb
soon after 1660.In other words, there are no puns in
Shakespeare in the strict historical sense that the word seems
not to have been available to him: it appears in print around the
middle of the seventeenth century, after his death. This of
course does not mean that the thing cannot be found in
Shakespeare, or that his culture did not have other terms for
the thing, but it should at least give us pause when we try to
think about how the Renaissance might have approached
‘puns’.
W
• Antana clasis
• Syllepsis
• Paronomasia
• Asteismus
“Antanaclasis” she defines as ‘a figure which in repeating a word
shifts from one of its meanings to another’, giving (amongst others) the following
examples:
To steal:
1) move away unnoticed.
2) take without permission
Pole:
1) either of the regions contiguous to the extremities of the earth's rotational axis.
2) Stake (столб)
Although ‘pole’ and ‘pole’ are homophones, the OED gives them separate entries, and different etymologies (from Latin ‘polus’ and
‘palus’ respectively), though OED spelling forms suggest that they have always been homophonous in English – so for most
English speakers they have always been indistinguishable in use. It is arguable that it is only with standardization and the fixing of
spelling and defi ni tions by dictionaries that these become two ‘different’ words in English.
Syllepsis is also defined as a figure involving one word with more than one meaning,
though it is distinguished from antanaclasis by the fact that in syllepsis, the word appears
only once, with both meanings brought simultaneously into play: ‘hang no more about
me, I am no gibbet for you’ (MW 2.2.16 –17).
Hang Gibbet
1. To fasten from above 1. A device used for hanging a
with no support from person until dead; a gallows.
below; suspend. 2. To expose to public ridicule
2. To pay strict attention
An apparently major distinction comes with paronomasia. This involves two iterations, as in
antanaclasis, but, crucially, in paronomasia the words are not pure homophones: ‘out, sword,
and to a sore purpose!’
‘I am here with thee and thy goats, as the most capricious poet, honest
Ovid, was among the Goths’.
early modern pronunciation meant that ‘goats’ and ‘Goths’ would have been pure
homophones for some speakers: [go:ts].
Asteismus involves a deliberate shifting of sense by a second speaker:
Not all examples rely on a shift between senses, and so would fall
outside our definition of puns
Обьяснение
There are certainly some instances of criticism of mis- or
overused figures of ambiguity in the Renaissance. Around the
end of the sixteenth century, John Hoskyns warned against over
extending paronomasia. It is significant that Hoskyns here criticizes puns which rely on
similarity in sound rather than similarity in sense.
For Addison and the later seventeenth century, ‘words’ are distinguished
primarily by having different senses (if you have a different sense, you have
a different word), and then (ideally) by formal differences – if not in
sound, then in spelling. So different ‘words’ which happen to ‘agree in
sound’ can be distinguished by spelling.
For the early modern language user, ‘words’ are abstracts with various possible
realizations, and understanding them depends wholly on context– users know
that multiple possible physical realizations exist for many groupings of semantic
content.
For Saussure, the linguistic sign consists of two parts: a signal (which can be the
acoustic sound or the written letters) and the mental concept this evokes (the
signified).
Wordplay in the Renaissance does not begin with difference and seek resemblance:
it begins with identity and explores distinction. Thinking of puns
in this way challenges Booth’s witty, but intellectually bankrupt,
representation of them. In the Renaissance, at least, puns are not
trivial relations between essentially unrelated things paraded
triumphantly before a passive audience: they are active processes
of disambiguation in which the audience must engage.