Right to Privacy

Prof. Raj Varma

→ It declared privacy to be an integral component of Part III of the Constitution of India, which lays down our
fundamental rights, ranging from rights relating to equality (Articles 14 to 18); freedom of speech and expression
(Article 19(1)(a)); freedom of movement (Article 19(1)(d)); protection of life and personal liberty (Article 21) and
others.

→ These fundamental rights cannot be given or taken away by law, and all laws and executive actions must abide by
them.

→ The Supreme Court has, however, clarified that like most other fundamental rights, the right to privacy is not an
"absolute right".

→ Subject to the satisfaction of certain tests and benchmarks, a person's privacy interests can be overridden by
competing state and individual interests
→ The question of whether or not privacy is a fundamental right first arose in 2015 before a three-judge bench of the
Supreme Court considering the constitutional challenge to the Aadhaar framework.

→ The Attorney General had then argued that although a number of Supreme Court decisions had recognised the right
to privacy, Part III of the Constitution does not guarantee such a fundamental right since larger benches of the Court
in:
- M.P Sharma (8 judge bench)
- Kharak Singh (6 judge bench), had refused to accept that the right to privacy was constitutionally protected.

→ Consequently, this bench referred the matter to a five-judge bench to ensure "institutional integrity and judicial
discipline".

→ Thereafter, the five-judge bench referred the constitutional question to an even larger bench of nine judges to
pronounce authoritatively on the status of the right to privacy
→ The eight-judge bench decision in M P Sharma (1954), which held that the right to privacy is not protected by the
Constitution stands over-ruled;

→ The Court's subsequent decision in Kharak Singh (1962) also stands over-ruled to the extent that it holds that the
right to privacy is not protected under the Constitution

→ The right to privacy is protected as an intrinsic part of the right to life and personal liberty under Article 21 and as a
part of the freedoms guaranteed by Part III of the Constitution

→ The body of case law that developed subsequent to Kharak Singh, recognizing the right to privacy, enunciated the
correct position of law.

→ It is a well-settled legal principle that a case is only an authority for what it actually decides , not any observations
made in the course of the judgment or any propositions that may logically follow from it
→ Chandrachud J., holds that the right to privacy is not independent of the other freedoms guaranteed by Part III of the
Constitution. It is an element of human dignity and is an inalienable natural right.

→ He focuses on the informational aspect of privacy, its connection with human dignity and autonomy, and rejects the
argument that privacy is an elitist construct.

→ During the course of his opinion, Chandrachud J. makes several observations about privacy in the digital economy,
dangers of data mining, positive obligations on the State, and the need for a data protection law.

→ He also raises an important point about the negative and positive elements of privacy.

→ The former restricts the State from unfairly interfering in the privacy of individuals, while the latter obliges it to put
in place a legislative framework to restrict others from doing so.
→ Chelameswar J. on the other hand, grounds the right to privacy, as comprising of three facets, namely repose
(freedom from unwarranted stimuli), sanctuary (protection from intrusive observation) and intimate decision
(autonomy to make personal life decisions)

→ Nariman J. too endorses Gary Bostwick's conceptual understanding of privacy as encompassing "repose, sanctuary,
and intimate decision". He gives further content to the right by classifying it into three categories: (1) that which
involves invasion by the State into a person's physical body, (2) information privacy which captures unauthorised
uses of personal information, and (3) privacy of choice, or "individual autonomy over fundamental personal
choices".
→ For Bobde J., fundamental rights have two aspects - first, to restrict legislative powers and second, to provide the
conditions for the development and dignity of individuals. Thus, similar to Chandrachud J., he recognizes both the
positive and negative aspects of enforcing fundamental rights, although he is clear that fundamental rights claims (as
opposed to other laws) fall squarely on the State.

→ Kaul J., on the other hand, recognizes the claims of privacy against the State and non-State actors. In respect of the
State, he identifies concerns of surveillance and profiling, whereas, in respect of non-State actors, he emphasizes on the
impact of technology, in the form of pervasive data generation, collection, and use in a digital economy. Kaul J. also
elaborates on the influence of big data, in particular, its impact on the actions of an individual and the resultant chilling
effect it may have on free speech and expression. He thus observes the need to protect certain information from both
the State as well as private actors

→ Finally, Sapre J. focuses his opinion on the importance of the Preamble to the Constitution, and the principles of liberty,
dignity, and fraternity enshrined therein
Tests for infrigment

→ the Supreme Court's jurisprudence on privacy evolved to accept that privacy forms an integral part of "personal
liberty" under Article 21 of the Constitution, which cannot be denied except through a "procedure established by
law".

→ The Supreme Court has clarified this to mean that the procedure prescribed by law must necessarily be "just, fair and
reasonable".

→ How this, and other standards of judicial review, will apply in the case of intrusion by the State into the right
privacy, was the subject matter of much discussion in the various opinions in Puttaswamy
→ The judgment written by Chelameswar J. provides a good overview by highlighting that the requirement of
reasonableness pervades throughout Part III, albeit operating slightly differently for different fundamental rights.

→ Accordingly, he suggests a "menu" of tests that can be used in privacy cases, depending on the underlying rights that
are affected.

→ Thus, a violation of privacy in the context of an arbitrary State action would attract a "reasonableness" enquiry
under Article 14; similarly, privacy invasions that implicate Article 19 freedoms would have to fall under the
specified restrictions under this constitutional provision like public order, obscenity etc; and finally, intrusion into
life or personal liberty under Article 21, which forms the "bedrock of the privacy guarantee", would have to be just,
fair and reasonable

→ E.g. over-broad telephone-tapping regulations would implicate both a citizen's freedom of speech (Article 19(1)(a))
as well as her personal liberty (Article 21)
→ Justice Chelameswar also includes a fourth test for privacy claims which deserve the "highest standard of scrutiny"
and can be justified only in case of a "compelling state interest".

→ Borrowing the strict scrutiny standard, typically reserved for discrimination cases in the U.S., he notes that there
exists a category of privacy claims which must satisfy not just the tests of being "just, fair and reasonable" under
Article 21, but also a higher level of importance in terms of the government's interest in the privacy intrusion.

→ While laying down this higher standard of scrutiny, Chelameswar J., however, stops short of illustrating what sort of
actions could fall under this category, and what would be the trigger for the application of this test. These issues have
been left open for future Courts to deal with.
→ Nariman J. adds to this analysis by giving several examples to emphasize that the restrictions on privacy will need to
be tested based on the combination of rights being infringed.

→ For example, if the violation is of Article 21 read with Article 14 (right to equality), then tests of arbitrariness and
unreasonableness will apply; or under Article 21 read with Article 19(1) (a) (freedom of speech), then the impugned
law/policy will have to relate to the reasonable restrictions specified in Article 19(2), as described in the wiretapping
example above.

→ Thus, Nariman J., rather than elucidating a test, only clarifies that the analysis will be case by case - based on
existing jurisprudence under the relevant fundamental right that is invoked.

→ Bobde J. states that privacy infringements will have to answer the tests under those particular freedoms "in addition
to the one applicable to Article 21"
→ Justice Sapre borrows from the ECHR and states: the State can impose reasonable restrictions on the right to privacy
"on the basis of social, moral and compelling public interest in accordance with law".

→ If Sapre J. is indeed articulating a new test, it is unclear where its textual basis lies in the Indian Constitution, given
that many fundamental rights, such as the freedom of speech and expression, do not recognize public interest as a
valid restriction.

→ Moreover, such an articulation lacks clarity on what standards will apply to judge the "social, moral, and compelling
public interest" or how this would interact with Chelameshwar J's "compelling state interest" test. It may thus be
better understood as a general articulation of the Article 19 standard for reasonable restrictions, which will apply
differently based on the specific right that has been infringed.
→ Drawing from the concept of proportionality that is used to balance rights and competing interests under European
law, Chandrachud J., notes that any invasion of life or personal liberty must meet the three requirements of
(a) legality, i.e. there must be a law in existence;
(b) legitimate aim, which he illustrates as including goals like national security, proper deployment of national
resources, and protection of revenue;
(c) proportionality of the legitimate aims with the object sought to be achieved.

→ Although Chandrachud J. has used the term "proportionality", he stops short of actually adopting the very technical
European proportionality standard, with its focus on narrow tailoring and least restrictive means.
→ Kaul J.'s "proportionality" test differs slightly from Chandrachud J.

→ It requires
(a) legality,
(b) necessity (narrow tailoring) and
(c) proportionality, which is closer to the European standard.

He adds to this the fourth element of (d) procedural safeguards against abuse of interference with rights, which
echoes Article 21's central requirement of having a "procedure established by law"
→ One way of reading the judgment could be through the proportionality standard espoused by Chandrachud J. and
elaborated by Kaul J. According to this, the four elements of the judicial review standard are as follows, although it
is relevant to note that the additional observations made by Kaul J. do not constitute part of the "majority view":

→ Legality: The existence of a law.

→ Legitimate Goal: The law should seek to achieve a legitimate state aim (Chandrachud J.). The proposed action must
be necessary for a democratic society for a legitimate aim (Kaul J.). Justice Kaul's opinion can be read to espouse
the EU narrow tailoring test

→ Proportionality: There should be a rational nexus between the objects and the means adopted to achieve them
(Chandrachud J.). The extent of interference must be proportionate to its need (Kaul J.).

→ Procedural Guarantees: To check against the abuse of State interference (Kaul J.)
→ There was unanimity amongst the nine judges that privacy is not an absolute right, although the basis for assessing
violations is less clear.

→ While the content and applicability of the aforesaid proportionality test will be determined by subsequent decisions,
what is certain is that privacy claims will be tested against the existing standards applicable under the Constitution or
developed by Courts for different categories of fundamental rights.

→ At the very least, the impugned action should satisfy the test of "just, fair and reasonable" procedure under Article
21 of the Constitution.