APPROACHES

TO THE STUDY OF COMPARATIVE

POLITICS
INSTITUTIONAL APPROACH

The study of institutions has been central not only to the field of comparative
politics, but to the political science field as a whole. Many authors have argued
that institutions have shaped political behaviour and social change. These
authors have taken an “institutionalist” approach which treat institutions as
independent variables. In the last twenty-five years the field of comparative
politics has experienced the emergence of the “new institutionalism,” which
developed in reaction to the behavioural perspectives that exercise a significant
influence on the field during the 1960s and 1970s. The new institutionalism
body can be divided into three analytical approaches: historical institutionalism,
rational choice institutionalism, and sociological institutionalism. These three
theoretical islands developed independently from each other.
a) HISTORICAL INSTITUTIONALISM

This approach developed in response to group theories of

politics and structural-functionalism (Hall and Taylor
1996). Historical institutionalists sought to expand both
approaches by “borrowing” existent ideas and adding
new assumptions to them. From group theory, historical
institutionalists borrowed the assumption that conflict
among rival groups for resources is at the heart of politics
(Hall and Taylor 1996). From the structural-functionalists,
historical institutionalists borrowed the assumption that
the state is made up of interacting parts.
The big contributors to this approach are Steinmo and Thelen. Steinmo and Thelen see
institutions as a constraint upon individuals and their choices (Koelble 1995). They
argue that institutions are a determinant of choices and preferences. Steinmo and
Thelen critique the rational choice approach for viewing affect the behavior of
individuals, historical institutionalists use two approaches – the calculus and the
cultural approaches. institutions as a constraint upon individuals but not as
determinants of choice.

Historical institutionalists define institutions as the “formal or informal procedures,

routines, norms and conventions embedded in the organizational structure of the
polity or political economy” (Hall and Taylor 1996).
The calculus approach emphasizes the aspects of human behaviour that
are based on strategic calculation – individuals seek to maximize their goals
given by their preference and they act strategically in the pursuit of those
goals (Hall and Taylor 1996). It is important to note that preferences and
goals are exogenous to the analysis. Institutions affect human behaviour
mainly by providing actors decreasing the level of uncertainty about the
behaviour of other actors by providing information, rules and norms.

The cultural approach argues that human behaviour is not fully strategic;
rather it is bounded by an individual’s worldview. This approach does not
see individuals as utility maximizers, but as “satisficers” whose actions are
dependent on context rather than strategic calculation (Hall and Taylor
1996). Also, institutions provide moral or cognitive templates for
interpretation which in turn affect the identities, self-images, and
preferences of individuals.
Historical institutionalists are attentive to the relationship between
institutions and ideas. They emphasize the importance of institutions but
they do not posit institutions as the only causal force in politics; other
factors play a role such as socioeconomic development and diffusion of
ideas. Some of the weaknesses of this approach is that it does not
incorporate some aspects of individual decision making to its analysis.
Some of the strengths of this approach include its emphasis on the effect of
political struggle on institutional outcomes and how institutional outcomes
then affect political struggles. This approach should be more useful to the
analysis of institutional development and policymaking
b) RATIONAL CHOICE INSTITUTIONALISM

The rational choice institutionalism was born out of the study of

American congressional behaviour (Hall and Taylor 1996). These
scholars were trying to explain why congressional outcomes were
considerably stable and they decided to look at institutions. They
found that institutions of the Congress lowered transactions costs
among legislators making the passage of legislation stable.

Some of the big names of this approach are North, Levi and
Rothstein. North and Levi respond to the historical institutionalists
and sociological institutionalist’s view that individuals act upon
bounded rationality. They argue that if individuals do not realize their
interest, it is because they do not have complete information and are
subject to transaction costs.
Rational choice institutionalists assume that individuals have a fixed set of preferences
and they behave in manner that maximizes the attainment of these preferences. One of the
unique assumptions of rational choice institutionalists see politics as a series of collective
action problems (Hall and Taylor 1996). Individuals are constraint to take actions in the
absence of institutional arrangements that pose guarantees complementary behavior of
other individuals.
Some of the weaknesses of the rational choice institutionalism include: (a)rational choice
institutionalists are unable to provide an adequate predictive theory of action since it does
not specifies how preferences come about and why they vary from individual to
individual; (b) sociological institutionalists argue that the rational choice institutionalists
view that individuals create institutions in order to further their goals is incorrect because
individuals cannot choose among institutions and rules; (c) rational choice institutionalism
ignores social structure. The rational choice institutionalist approach ought to be more
useful for the analysis of interactions between organizations and individuals
c) SOCIOLOGICAL INSTITUTIONALISM

This approach emerged from organizational theory.

These scholars wanted to challenge the view that
some parts of the world reflect a formal rationality
while some others reflect culture. They argued that
the “institutional forms and procedures used by
modern organizations were not adopted simply
because they were most efficient for the task at
hand … instead… these forms and procedures
should be seen as culturally specific practices”
Sociological institutionalists define institutions more broadly than any other approach.
Powell and DiMaggio define institutions not just as “rules, procedures, organizational
standards, and governance structures, but also as conventions and customs” (Koelble
1995). They go further and make the assumption that institutions define “rational actors.”
When it comes to the relationship between individuals and institutions, scholars use the
cultural approach to explain outcomes. They argue that institutions affect behaviour of
individuals by socializing individuals into particular institutional roles and individuals
consequently internalize norms related to these roles.
One of the weaknesses of this approach is that it does not explain how institutions
originate. Another weakness is the operationalization of culture. Some of the strengths of
this approach are: (a) it is able to explain how institutions affect individuals’ preferences
or identities; (b) it provides an explanation how actors choose strategies from culturally-
specific repertoires.
RATIONAL CHOICE APPROACH

The rational choice approach derives from the neoclassical

economic model and it has been applied to a variety of
subfields of political science including interest groups and
bureaucracy, formation of coalition in government, electoral
politics and so forth.
Many scholars have contributed to the rational choice
approach. Mancur Olson was one of these scholars. In his The
Logic of Collective Action (1965), Olson emphasizes strategic
interaction and the individual decision making process. Olson
argues that “rational, self-interested individuals will not act to
achieve their common of group interests”
Olson explained that rational individuals will not act to achieve a common goal
because he knows that his efforts will not have an effect on the situation, and he will
be able to enjoy any improvement brought about by the other actors whether or not
he supports the organization. Members of a group have a common goal but they
have no common interest in paying the costs of providing that collective good.
These assumptions led scholars to investigate conditions under which individuals
will come together in an effort to influence government or each other (Levi 1997).
Olson also brought up to light the discussion of the fee rider problem which called
into question the assumption that interests are automatically translated into
organization.
Douglas North is another contributor to the rational choice
approach. North emphasis on transaction cost theory, economic
institutionalism, and the role of relative bargaining power have
stimulated investigation of the variation in state action and state
outcomes.

The model of rational choice conceives individuals as goal-

oriented actors who act to pursue the best available outcome.
This approach is methodologically individualist and purposeful
action (Kim 1997) but it also focuses on the aggregation of
individual choices. Thus all group choice ultimately is explained
by individual choice.
One of the core assumptions of the rational choice theory is that individuals are rational
actors. This assumption is the subject of much criticism. There is little agreement on
what it means to be rational. Levi suggests that the most useful assumption of
rationality for the field of comparative politics research is that “individuals act
consistently in relation to their preferences” (1997:24). Another assumption is that
individuals act strategically in order to attain their goals. Here an important evaluation
or consideration of behavior of other relevant actors takes place before decision-making
process. In order to make decisions, a strategic player should have expectations about
other players. Another key assumption regards the forms of constraints on human
behavior. Constraints come in two major forms. First is scarcity of resources. An
individual that wants to spend his vacation time in Hawaii, cannot realize his objective
if he does not have the capital to afford the trip. Another source of constraint is
institutional or organizational. Institutions shape individual choices in order to produce
equilibrium outcomes. On the other hand, some may also argue that institutions may
facilitate action.
According to Margaret Levi, the strengths of the rational choice approach
includes: (a) it has the capacity to produce testable theory; (b) its ability to
make sense of a correlation or a set of events by providing a story that
identifies the causal mechanisms linking independent and dependent
variables; (c) its universalism that allows us to make generalization that are
applicable to cases beyond those cases of immediate investigation.

Among the weaknesses of this approach are: (a) the approach seems
inadequately sensitive to the historical, political, and cultural contexts (Levi
1997). As a matter of fact, political culture scholars argue that the
conceptual weakness of rational choice theory can be corrected through the
use of political cultures; political culture when conceptually clear and
empirically defined is able to specify the whole range of human objectives
or goals
POLITICAL CULTURAL APPROACH

Political culture has been used as a conceptual umbrella that wraps around values,
perceptions and beliefs, dealing with every political phenomenon. Political culture
emerged out of the need, emphasized especially by Almond, to deepening and
broadening the scope of political explanation. The goal of political culture was to
explain the diversity among and continuity within states (Lane 1992). The origins of
the modern political and cultural analysis can be related to the Political Culture and
Political Development (Pye and Verba 1965).
The political culture approach, like the other approaches, faces
conceptual problems. Scholars within have not reached a compromise in
defining “culture.” In Political Culture and Political Preferences, David
Latin criticizes Wildvsky for his definition of culture. Wildavsky defines
culture as “shared values legitimating social practices” (Latin 1988:499).
Latin argues that by focusing only on shared values, Wildavsky misses the
point that people with strongly opposed views can share a culture and
people with strongly similar views may come from different cultures. Latin
proposes that we should see culture as not as values that are upheld but
rather as “point of concern” (idea presented initially by Thomas Metzger).
Latin argues that to share a culture means to share a religion, language, or
history. As one can assume, if the difficulties in reaching a common
definition of culture are great, its operationalization is even greater.
Ronald Inglehart is one of the major contributors to the political culture approach.
Inglehart tries to operationalize culture through levels of what he calls “civic
culture.” Civic culture refers to a coherent syndrome of personal life satisfaction,
political satisfaction, interpersonal trust, and support for existing social order. He
also argues that public of different societies are characterized by durable cultural
orientations that have major political and economic consequences which are closely
linked to the viability of democracy (Inglehart 1988).

Edward Muller and Mitchell Seligson develop a model that allows them to make
inferences about the possibility of unidirectional or reciprocal causation between
civic culture attitudes and democracy. They find that most civic culture attitudes do
not have any impact on changes in levels of democracy.
Raymond Duch and Michael Taylor in their Post materialism and the Economic
Condition test the notion that early economic experiences have a lasting effect
on post materialism values as proposed by Inglehart. And their findings
suggest that education and economic conditions at the time of the survey are
much more relevant explanations for variations in the post materialist
measure.
Some of the weaknesses of this approach are: (a) the inability to draw a
distinction between subcultures and the overall political culture; (b) the
inability to bridge the inferences made on the individual level to the state or
system level. the greatest strength of this approach is its potential to correct
the rational choice theory conceptual flaw of not being able to identify the
range of human goals. Marc Howard Ross is an advocate of the political
culture approach and he points out to two features of culture relevant to
comparative politics (Lichbach and Zuckerman 1997). First, people use culture
to define meaning; second culture is the foundation of social and political
identity which affects individual behavior.
CONCLUSION
These three discussed approaches have dominated the field of comparative politics.
They all have the same aim, explain social phenomena – they just have different
assumptions and use different methods.
These three approaches are more useful if seen as complimentary rather than as
antagonistic. As Zuckerman and Lichbach indicate, no approach displays rigid and
uniform orthodoxy; and they share an ontological and epistemological symmetry.
(1997). In order to improve theory in our field we should embrace creative
confrontations and try to extract the best out of each school of thought.