Non Zero Sum

So you want to know
about…
Non-zero-sum Game
Theory, Auctions and
Negotiation …Well what’s it
worth to you, eh?
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slides. Andrew would be delighted if you
Andrew W. Moore
found this source material useful in
giving your own lectures. Feel free to use
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Associate Professor
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Copyright © 2001, Andrew W. Moore Dec 19th, 2001

A Non-Zero Sum Game
Prisoner’s Dilemma
B B
Cooperates Defects
A
Cooperates
-1 , -1 -9 , 0
A’s B’s A’s B’s
payoff payoff payoff payoff
A
Defects
0 , -9 -6 , -6
A’s B’s A’s B’s
payoff payoff payoff payoff
Non-Zero-Sum means there’s at least one outcome in

which (A’s PAYOFF + B’s PAYOFF) ≠ 0
Copyright © 2001, Andrew W. Moore Non-Zero-Sum Game Theory: Slide 2
Normal Form Representation of a
Non-Zero-Sum Game with n players
Is a set of n strategy spaces S1 , S2 …Sn

where Si = The set of strategies available to player i
And n payoff functions

u1 , u 2 … u n
where
ui : S1 x S2 x … Sn →
is a function that takes a combination of strategies (one
for each player) and returns the payoff for player i
PLAYER A (1) PLAYER B (2)
C D
C -1 , -1 -9 , 0
D 0 , -9 -6 , -6
n=2
S1 = {C,D}
S2 = {C,D}
u1 (C,C) = -1 u2 (C,C) = -1
u1 (C,D) = -9 u2 (C,D) = 0
u1 (D,C) = 0 u2 (D,C) = -9
u1 (D,D) = -6 u2 (D,D) = -6
what would you do if you were Player A ??

Strict Domination
IT’S A COLD, CRUEL
WORLD. GET OVER IT.
Assuming B plays “C”, what

should I do ?
Player
A
Assuming B plays “D”, what
oh what should I do ?
PLAYER B
C D
If one of a player’s strategies is
-1 , -1 -9 , 0
PLAYER A
C never the right thing to do, no

matter what the opponents do, then
it is Strictly Dominated
D 0 , -9 -6 , -6
“Understanding” a Game
Fundamental assumption of game theory:
Get Rid of the Strictly Dominated strategies.

They Won’t Happen.
C D
C -1 , -1 -9 , 0
D 0 , -9 -6 , -6
In some cases (e.g. prisoner’s dilemma) this
means, if players are “rational” we can predict the
outcome of the game.


C D
C -1 , -1 -9 , 0
D 0 , -9 -6 , -6


C D
C -1 , -1 -9 , 0 C D
D 0 , -9 -6 , -6
D 0 , -9 -6 , -6


C D
C -1 , -1 -9 , 0 C D
D 0 , -9 -6 , -6
D 0 , -9 -6 , -6


C D
C -1 , -1 -9 , 0 C D
D 0 , -9 -6 , -6
D 0 , -9 -6 , -6
means, if players are “rational” we can predict the D
D -6 , -6
Strict Domination Removal Example
Player B
I II III IV
I 3,1 4,1 5,9 2,6
Player A
II 5,3 5,8 9,7 9,3

III 2,3 8,4 6,2 6,3
IV 3,8 3,1 2,3 4,5
So is strict domination the best tool for

predicting what will transpire in a game ?

Strict Domination doesn’t capture the
whole picture
I II III
I 0,4 4,0 5,3
II 4,0 0,4 5,3
III 3,5 3,5 6,6
What strict domination eliminations can we

do?
What would you predict the players of this
game would do?
Nash Equilibria
S1  S1 , S 2  S 2 ,  S n  S n
are a NASH EQUILIBRIUM iff

i Si  arg max ui S1 , S 2 ,  Si1 , Si , Si1  S n 
Si

Nash Equilibria
S1  S1 , S 2  S 2 ,  S n  S n
are a NASH EQUILIBRIUM iff

i Si  arg max ui S1 , S 2 ,  Si1 , Si , Si1  S n 
Si
Ib IIb IIIb
Ia 0 4 4 0 5 3
 u1 I a , IIIb  
IIa 4 0 0 4 5 3 u1 IIIa , IIIb   max  u1 IIa , IIIb  
IIIa 3 5 3 5 6 6 u1 IIIa , IIIb 
 u2 IIIa , I b  
AND u2 IIIa , IIIb   max  u2 IIIa , IIb  
(IIIa,IIIb) is a N.E. because
u3 IIIa , IIIb 

• If (S1* , S2*) is an N.E. then player 1 won’t want to
change their play given player 2 is doing S2*
• If (S1* , S2*) is an N.E. then player 2 won’t want to
change their play given player 1 is doing S1*
Find the NEs:

-1 -1 -9 0 0 4 4 0 5 3
0 -9 -6 -6 4 0 0 4 5 3
3 5 3 5 6 6
• Is there always at least one NE ?

• Can there be more than one NE ?
Example with no NEs among the
pure strategies:
S1 S2
S1
S2

Example with no NEs among the
pure strategies:
S1 S2
S1 0 1 1 0
S2 1 0 0 1

2-player mixed strategy Nash
Equilibrium
The pair of mixed strategies (MA , MB)
are a Nash Equilibrium iff
• MA is player A’s best mixed strategy
response to MB
AND
• MB is player B’s best mixed strategy
response to MA
Fundamental Theorems
• In the n-player pure strategy game G={S 1 S2 ·· Sn;
u1 u2 ·· un}, if iterated elimination of strictly
dominated strategies eliminates all but the
strategies (S1* , S2* ·· Sn*) then these strategies
are the unique NE of the game
• Any NE will survive iterated elimination of strictly
dominated strategies
• [Nash, 1950] If n is finite and Si is finite i, then
there exists at least one NE (possibly involving
mixed strategies)
The “What to do in Pittsburgh on a
Saturday afternoon” game
Pat enjoys football
Chris enjoys hockey
Pat and Chris are friends: they enjoy spending time
together Chris
H F
H 1 2 0 0
Pat
F 0 0 2 1
• Two Nash Equilibria.
• How useful is Game Theory in this case??
• Why this example is troubling…
INTERMISSION
(Why) are Nash Equilibria useful for
A.I. researchers?
Will our algorithms ever need to

play…
Prisoner’s Dilemma?
Saturday Afternoon?

Nash Equilibria Being Useful
THE
D Y
G E OF
TR A THE
Commons
         
YE OLDE
COMMONS
• You graze goats on the commons to eventually fatten up and sell

• The more goats you graze the less well fed they are
• And so the less money you get when you sell them
Commons Facts
Price  36  G
6¢
Selling 5
Price 4
per 3
2
Goat 1
0
0 10 20 30 36
G= number of goats
How many goats would one rational is …

Answering th
farmer choose to graze?
What would the farmer earn?
What about a group of n individual g o o d p r a c tice for
…is
is
farmers? answering th
n farmers
i’th farmer has an infinite space of strategies
gi  [ 0 , 36 ]
An outcome of
( g1 , g2 , g3 ·· , gn )
will pay how much to the i’th farmer?

n farmers
i’th farmer has an infinite space of strategies
gi  [ 0 , 36 ]
An outcome of
( g1 , g2 , g3 ·· , gn )
will pay how much to the i’th farmer?
n
g i  36   g j
j 1

Let’s Assume a pure Nash Equilibrium exists.
Call it g , g , g 

1

2

n
What can we say about g1 ?

Payoff to farmer i, assuming
 
g i  arg max  the other players play 
gi
 1 2  i 1 i 1 
 g  , g  , g  , g  , g 
n


For Notational Convenience,
write Gi   g j
j i
THEN
 
g i  arg max  

gi
 
Copyright © 2001, Andrew W. Moore What? Non-Zero-Sum Game Theory: Slide 26
Call it
g , g , g 

1

2

n
What can we say about g1 ?

 
g i  arg max  the other players play 
gi
 1 2 i 1 i 
 g  , g  , g  , g  , g 
1 n

 
For Notational Convenience,
j i
THEN
g i  arg max g i 36  g i  G*i  
gi

Call it g*i must satisfy
g , g , g 

1

2

n
 *
What can we say about g g
?* i  36  g *
i  Gi  0
*
g i 1

 therefore 
g i  arg max  the other players play * 3 *

 g  , g  ,  g  , g36  Gi  gi

gi
 1 2 i 1

 
i 1 ,  g n 2   0
For Notational Convenience, 36  g *

i  G *
i
j i
THEN
g i  arg max g i 36  g i  G*i  
gi

We have n linear equations in n
unknowns
g1* = 24 - 2/3( g2*+g3*+ ···gn*)
g2* = 24 - 2/3(g1*+ g3*+ ···gn*)
g3* = 24 - 2/3(g1*+g2*+ g4*···gn*)
: : :
gn* = 24 - 2/3(g1*+ ···gn-1*)
Clearly all the gi*’s are the same (Proof by “it’s bloody obvious”)
Write g*=g1*=···gn*
Solution to g*=24 – 2/3(n-1)g* is: g*= 72__
2n+1
Consequences
At the Nash Equilibrium a rational farmer grazes
72 goats.
2n+1
How many goats in general will be grazed? Trivial
algebra gives: 36 -2n+1
36 goats total being grazed
[as n --> infinity , #goats --> 36]
How much profit per farmer? 432 1.26¢ if

(2n+1)3/2 24 farmers
How much if the farmers could all cooperate?
24*sqrt(12) = 83.1 3.46¢ if
n n 24 farmers
The Tragedy
The farmers act “rationally” and earn 1.26 cents each.
But if they’d all just got together and decided “one
goat each” they’d have got 3.46 cents each.
Is there a bug in Game Theory?

in the Farmers?
in Nash?
Would you recommend the farmers hire a police

force?
Recipe for Nash-Equilibrium-Based
Analysis of Such Games
• Assume you’ve been given a problem where the
i’th player chooses a real number xi
• Guess the existence of a Nash equilibrium
(x1* , x2* ··· xn*)
• Note that , i,
Payoff to player i if player i 
  
xi  arg max plays " xi " and the j ' th player
xi
plays x  for j  i 
 j 
• Hack the algebra, often using “at xi* we have
∂ Payoff + 0 “
∂xi
INTERMISSION
Does the Tragedy of the Commons matter to
us when we’re building intelligent
machines?
Maybe repeated play means we can learn to

cooperate??

Repeated Games with Implausible
Threats
Takeo and Randy are stuck in an elevator
Takeo has a $1000 bill
Randy has a stick of dynamite
Randy says “Give me $1000 or I’ll blow us both up.”
gives
Randy the Takeo keeps money
money
Randy Randy
Explode Explode
Do Nothing Do Nothing
Takeo: -1000 Takeo: -107 Takeo: 0 Takeo: -107

Randy: 1000 Randy: -107 Randy: 0 Randy: -107
What should Takeo do?????

Using the formalism of Repeated Games With
Implausible Threats, Takeo should Not give the
money to Randy
Takeo Assumes Randy is

Rational
Randy
At this node, Randy will

choose the left branch
T: 0 T: -107
R: 0 R: -107
Repeated Games
Suppose you have a game which you are going to play

a finite number of times.
What should you do?

2-Step Prisoner’s Dilemma
GAME 1 GAME 2
(Played with knowledge of
outcome of GAME 1)
Player B Player B
C D C D
Player A
Player A
-1 , -1 -9 , 0 -1 , -1 -9 , 0
C C
D 0 , -9 -6 , -6 D 0 , -9 -6 , -6
Idea 1
Player A has four pure strategies
C then C
C then D
D then C
Is Idea 1 correct?
D then D
Copyright © 2001, Andrew W. Moore Ditto for B Non-Zero-Sum Game Theory: Slide 36
Important Theoretical Result:
Assuming Implausible Threats, if the
game G has a unique N.E. (s1* ,·· sn*)
then the new game of repeating G T
times, and adding payouts, has a
unique N.E. of repeatedly choosing the
original N.E. (s1* ,·· sn*) in every game.
If you’re about to play prisoner’s dilemma 20 times, you

should defect 20 times.
DRAT 

Intermission
Game theory has been
cute so far.
But depressing.
Now let’s make it really
work for us.
We’re going to get more
real.
The notation’s growing
teeth.

Bayesian Games
You are Player A in the following game. What
should you do?
Player B
S1 S2
S1
3 ? -2 ?
Player A
S2
0 ? 6 ?
Question: When does this situation arise?

Hockey lovers get 2 units for watching hockey, and
1 unit for watching football.
Football lovers get 2 units for watching football, and
1 unit for watching hockey.
Pat’s a hockey lover.
Pat thinks Chris is probably a hockey lover also, but
Pat is not sure.
Chris Chris
H F H F
H 2 2 0 0 H 2 1 0 0
Pat
Pat
F 0 0 1 1 F 0 0 1 2
With 2/3 chance 1/3 chance
In a Bayesian Game each player is given a type. All
players know their own types but only a prob. dist. for their
opponent’s types
An n-player Bayesian Game has
a set of action spaces A1 ·· An
a set of type spaces T1 ·· Tn
a set of beliefs P1 ·· Pn
a set of payoff functions u1 ·· un
P-i(t-i|ti) is the prob dist of the types for the other players,
given player i has type i .
ui(a1 , a2 ··· an , ti ) is the payout to player i if player j
chooses action aj (with aj  Aj ) (forall j=1,2,···n) and if
player i has type ti  Ti
Bayesian Games: Who Knows What?
We assume that all players enter knowing the full
information about the Ai’s , Ti’s, Pi’s and ui’s
The i’th player knows ti, but not t1 t2 t3 ·· ti-1 ti+1 ·· tn
All players know that all other players know the
above
And they know that they know that they know, ad
infinitum
Definition: A strategy Si(ti) in a Bayesian Game is a
mapping from Ti→Ai : a specification of what action
would be taken for each type
Example
A1 = {H,F} A2 = {H,F}
T1 = {H-love,Flove} T2 = {Hlove, Flove}
P1 (t2 = Hlove | t1 = Hlove) = 2/3
P1 (t2 = Flove | t1 = Hlove) = 1/3
P1 (t2 = Hlove | t1 = Flove) = 2/3
P1 (t2 = Flove | t1 = Hlove) = 1/3
P2 (t1 = Hlove | t2 = Hlove) = 1
P2 (t1 = Flove | t2 = Hlove) = 0
P2 (t1 = Hlove | t2 = Flove) = 1
P2 (t1 = Flove | t2 = Hlove) = 0
u1 (H,H,Hlove) = 2 u2 (H,H,Hlove) = 2
u1 (H,H,Flove) = 1 u2 (H,H,Flove) = 1
u1 (H,F,Hlove) = 0 u2 (H,F,Hlove) = 0
u1 (H,F,Flove) = 0 u2 (H,F,Flove) = 0
u1 (F,H,Hlove) = 0 u2 (F,H,Hlove) = 0
u1 (F,H,Flove) = 0 u2 (F,H,Flove) = 0
u1 (F,F,Hlove) = 1 u2 (F,F,Hlove) = 1
u1 (F,F,Flove) = 2 u2 (F,F,Flove) = 2
(GASP, SPLUTTER)
Bayesian Nash Equilibrium
The set of strategies (s1* ,s2* ··· sn*) are a
Pure Strategy Bayesian Nash Equilibrium
iff for each player i, and for each possible type of i : tiTi
si*(ti) =
arg max u s 
t  
,... s 
t , a , s *
t ...s *

 i 1 1 i 1 i 1 i i 1 i 1 n tn   Pi ti ti 
ai  Ai t i Ti
i.e. no player, in any of their types, wants

to change their strategy

NEGOTIATION: A Bayesian Game
Two players: S, (seller) and
B, (buyer)
Ts = [0,1] the seller’s type is a real number between 0
and 1 specifying the value (in dollars) to
them of the object they are selling
Tb = [0,1] the buyer’s type is also a real number. The
value to the buyer.
Assume that at the start

Vs Ts is chosen uniformly at random
Vb Tb is chosen uniformly at random

The “Double Auction” Negotiation
S writes down a price for the item (g s)
B simultaneously writes down a price (g b)
Prices are revealed
If gs ≥ gb no trade occurs, both players have
payoff 0
If gs ≤ gb then buyer pays the midpoint price
(gs+gb)
2 and receives the item
Payoff to S : 1/2(gs+gb)-Vs
Payoff to B : Vb-1/2(gs+gb)
Negotiation in Bayesian Game
Notation
Ts = [0,1] write VsTs
Tb = [0,1] write VbTb
Ps(Vb|Vs) = Ps(Vb) = uniform distribution on [0,1]
Pb(Vs|Vb) = Pb(Vs) = uniform distribution on [0,1]
As = [0,1] write gsAs
Ab = [0,1] write gbAb
us(Ps,Pb,Vs) = What?
ub(Ps,Pb,Vb) = What?

Double Negotiation: When does
trade occur?
…when
gb*(Vb) = 1/12 + 2/3 Vb > 1/4 + 2/3 Vs = gs*(Vs)
i.e. when Vb > Vs + 1/4
1
↑ ¾
Vs ens
½ pp
Ha
¼ e e
rad Her
T
0 ¼ ½ ¾ 1
Vb →
Prob(Trade Happens) = 1/2 x (3/4)2 = 9/32
Value of Trade
1
↑ 3/4
Vs
0 1/4 1
Vb →
[Vs|Trade Occurs] = 1/3 x 3/4 = 1/4
[Vb|Trade Occurs] = 1/4 + 2/3 x 3/4 = 3/4
If trade occurs, expected trade price is

1/2[gs*(Vs) + gb*(Vb)] =
1/2(1/12 + 2/3Vb + 1/4 + 2/3Vs) =
1/6 + 1/3Vb + 1/3Vs
Value of Trade continued…
[ profit to S | trade occurred ] =
[ 1/6 + 1/3Vb + 1/3Vs – Vs | trade occurred ] =
1/6 + 1/3[ Vb | trade ] – 2/3[ Vs | trade ] =
1/6 + 1/3 x 3/4 - 2/3 x 1/4 = 1/4
Similar Algebra Shows: [ profit to B | trade occurred ] = 1/4 also
Using This Game If Both Were “Honest”

[ B’s profit ]= 1/4x9/32=0.07 [ B profit ]=1/12=0.083
[ S’s profit ]= 0.07 [ S profit ]=1/12=0.083
This Game seems Inefficient. What can be done???

Double Auction: Final Comments
• There are other Nash Equilibrium strategies.
• But the one we saw is provably most
efficient.
• In general, even for arbitrary prob. dists. of
Vs and Vb, no efficient NE’s can exist.
• And no other games for this kind of trading
can exist and be efficient.

Double Auction Discussion
What if seller used “giant eagle” tactics?
Seller states “I’ll sell it to you for price p : take it or leave it”
Exercise:
• How should* seller choose price (taking into account Vs of
course) ?
• And how should* buyer choose whether to buy ?
*(at a B.N.E.)
• When could/should double auction technology be
used?
• (How) can “Vs,Vb drawn randomly from [0,1]” be
relaxed ?
T I-
R
PL UL
CT E
S
Y
M
N
A
IO
U
A

First Price Sealed Bid
Seller wants to sell an object that has no value to
seller… anything seller is paid is pure profit.
There are n available buyers
Assumptions:
• Assume buyer i has a value for the object
distributed uniformly randomly in [0…1]Vi

• Assume Vi’s all independent
• Buyer i does not know Vj for i≠j
• Buyer i does know all Vj’s randomly generated from
[0,1]
First Price Sealed Bid Rules
Each buyer writes down their bid.
Call buyer i’s bid gi
Buyer who wrote highest bid must buy

object from seller at price=bid
Question: Why is “bid = Vi” a stupid
strategy ??
Auction Analysis: Back to
Bayesian Nash Equils
We’ll assume that all
players other than i do a
This assumption is
linear strategy:
completely unjustified
right now. Later we’ll
gj*(Vj) = mjVj for j ≠ i
see why it was an
okay assumption to
make.
Then what should i do ?

Profit if 
g vi   arg max  
*
i 
g  play g 

Profit if 
*
i 
g  play g 
Profit if   g is 
 arg max   i wins  Prob  
g  play g   winning bid 
 arg max 
g
what? what?

 g such that n  1vi  g g n  2  g n 1  0

 g i* vi   1  1 vi
n


Profit if 
*
i 
g  play g 
Profit if   g is 
 arg max   i wins  Prob  
g  play g   winning bid 
 arg max 
g
what? what?

 g such that n  1vi  g g n  2  g n 1  0

 g i* vi   1  1 vi
n

Thus we’ve an N.E. because if all other players use a linear strategy
then it’s in i’s interest to do so too. Above holds i
See, I told you the linear assumption
would be okay.
First-Price Sealed Auction
At BNE all players use
gi*(Vi) = (1-1/n)Vi
Note: [Fact of probability]
Expected value of the largest of n numbers drawn independently from
[0,1] is n
n+1
Expected profit to seller = what?

gi*(Vi) = (1-1/n)Vi
[0,1] is n
n+1
Expected profit to seller =

Expected highest bid = what?

gi*(Vi) = (1-1/n)Vi
[0,1] is n
n+1
Expected profit to seller =

Expected highest bid = Seller likes
 1  n  2 large n
1     1
 n  n  1  n 1
Exercise: compute expected profit to player i. Show it is 0(1/n).
Second-Price Sealed Bid
A different game:
Each buyer writes their bid
Buyer with highest bid must buy the object
But the price they pay is the second highest
bid
• What is player i’s best strategy
• Why?
• What is seller’s expected profit?

Auction Comments
• Second-price auction is preferred by cognoscenti
 No more efficient
 But general purpose
 And computationally better
 And less variance (better risk management)
• Auction design is interesting
 So far mostly for economics
 But soon for e-commerce etc.?
• Important but not covered here
 Expertise
 Collusion
 Combinatoric Auctions
 What if all cooperative ????
What You Should Know
Strict dominance
Nash Equilibria
Continuous games like Tragedy of the Commons
Rough, vague, appreciation of threats
Bayesian Game formulation
Double Auction
1st/2nd Price auctions

What You Shouldn’t Know
• How many goats your lecturer has on his
property
• What strategy Mephistopheles uses in his
negotiations
• What strategy this University employs when
setting tuition
• How to square a circle using only compass and
straight edge
• How many of your friends and colleagues are
active Santa informants, and how critical they’ve
been of your obvious failings

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So you want to know

Copyright © 2001, Andrew W. Moore Dec 19th, 2001

Non-Zero-Sum means there’s at least one outcome in

Is a set of n strategy spaces S1 , S2 …Sn

And n payoff functions

Copyright © 2001, Andrew W. Moore Non-Zero-Sum Game Theory: Slide 4

Assuming B plays “C”, what

C never the right thing to do, no

Get Rid of the Strictly Dominated strategies.

Copyright © 2001, Andrew W. Moore Non-Zero-Sum Game Theory: Slide 6

Get Rid of the Strictly Dominated strategies.

Copyright © 2001, Andrew W. Moore Non-Zero-Sum Game Theory: Slide 7

Get Rid of the Strictly Dominated strategies.

Copyright © 2001, Andrew W. Moore Non-Zero-Sum Game Theory: Slide 8

Get Rid of the Strictly Dominated strategies.

Copyright © 2001, Andrew W. Moore Non-Zero-Sum Game Theory: Slide 9

Get Rid of the Strictly Dominated strategies.

II 5,3 5,8 9,7 9,3

So is strict domination the best tool for

Copyright © 2001, Andrew W. Moore Non-Zero-Sum Game Theory: Slide 11

What strict domination eliminations can we

Copyright © 2001, Andrew W. Moore Non-Zero-Sum Game Theory: Slide 13

Copyright © 2001, Andrew W. Moore Non-Zero-Sum Game Theory: Slide 14

Find the NEs:

• Is there always at least one NE ?

Copyright © 2001, Andrew W. Moore Non-Zero-Sum Game Theory: Slide 16

Copyright © 2001, Andrew W. Moore Non-Zero-Sum Game Theory: Slide 17

Will our algorithms ever need to

Copyright © 2001, Andrew W. Moore Non-Zero-Sum Game Theory: Slide 21

• You graze goats on the commons to eventually fatten up and sell

How many goats would one rational is …

Copyright © 2001, Andrew W. Moore Non-Zero-Sum Game Theory: Slide 24

Copyright © 2001, Andrew W. Moore Non-Zero-Sum Game Theory: Slide 25

What can we say about g1 ?

What can we say about g1 ?

Copyright © 2001, Andrew W. Moore Non-Zero-Sum Game Theory: Slide 27

Payoff to farmer i, assuming

 g  , g  ,  g  , g36  Gi  gi

For Notational Convenience, 36  g *

Copyright © 2001, Andrew W. Moore Non-Zero-Sum Game Theory: Slide 28

How much profit per farmer? 432 1.26¢ if

Is there a bug in Game Theory?

Would you recommend the farmers hire a police

Maybe repeated play means we can learn to

Copyright © 2001, Andrew W. Moore Non-Zero-Sum Game Theory: Slide 33

Takeo: -1000 Takeo: -107 Takeo: 0 Takeo: -107

What should Takeo do?????

Takeo Assumes Randy is

At this node, Randy will

Suppose you have a game which you are going to play

Copyright © 2001, Andrew W. Moore Non-Zero-Sum Game Theory: Slide 35

If you’re about to play prisoner’s dilemma 20 times, you

Copyright © 2001, Andrew W. Moore Non-Zero-Sum Game Theory: Slide 37

Copyright © 2001, Andrew W. Moore Non-Zero-Sum Game Theory: Slide 38

Question: When does this situation arise?

Copyright © 2001, Andrew W. Moore Non-Zero-Sum Game Theory: Slide 39

i.e. no player, in any of their types, wants

Copyright © 2001, Andrew W. Moore Non-Zero-Sum Game Theory: Slide 44

Assume that at the start

Copyright © 2001, Andrew W. Moore Non-Zero-Sum Game Theory: Slide 45