Subsidies and Countervailing Measures

Dr. Gurpreet Singh,

Assistant Professor,
Law Centre – 1,
University of Delhi,
Delhi - 110007
 Subsidies
– Introduction: Subsidies are a very sensitive matter in international trade relations. On the one hand,
subsidies are evidently used by governments to pursue and promote important and fully legitimate
objectives of economic and social policy. On the other hand, however, subsidies may have adverse
effects on the interests of trading partners whose industry may suffer, in its domestic or export markets,
from the unfair competition from subsidised products.
– Subsidies are subject to an intricate set of rules. Some subsidies, such as export subsidies, are, as a
rule, prohibited, while other subsidies are not prohibited but must be withdrawn (or their adverse effects
removed) when they cause adverse effects to the interests of other members. Furthermore, if a subsidy
causes or threatens to cause material injury to the domestic industry of a member, that member is
authorised to impose countervailing duties on the subsidised products to offset the subsidisation.
– History: The WTO rules on subsidies and subsidised trade are set out in articles VI and XVI of the
GATT 1994 but also, and more importantly, in the WTO agreement on subsidies and countervailing
measures, commonly referred to as the SCM agreement. The GATT 1947 did not contain clear and
comprehensive rules on subsidies. In fact, article XVI of the GATT 1947, entitled ‘subsidies’, did not
even define the concept of ‘subsidies’. Moreover, with regard to subsidies in general, article XVI merely
provides that contracting parties to the GATT should notify subsidies that have an effect on trade and
should be prepared to discuss limiting such subsidies if they cause serious damage to the interests of
other contracting parties.
Subsidies
– In 1962, article XVI was amended to add a provision prohibiting contracting parties from granting
export subsidies to non-primary products which would reduce the sales price on the export market
below the sales price on the domestic market. However, that this amendment did not apply to
developing countries.
– In addition, article VI of the GATT 1947, which dealt with measures taken to offset any subsidy
granted to an imported product (i.E. Countervailing duties), did not provide for clear and
comprehensive rules. In order to elaborate on the GATT rules on subsidies and countervailing duties
and to provide greater uniformity and certainty in their implementation, the GATT contracting parties,
during the tokyo round (1973–9), negotiated and concluded the agreement on interpretation and
application of articles VI, XVI and XXIII of the general agreement, commonly referred to as the Tokyo
round subsidies code.
– The subsidies code certainly did not bring the degree of clarification and elaboration of the rules on
subsidies and countervailing duties sought by some of the contracting parties.
– The Uruguay round negotiations eventually resulted in the SCM Agreement, which forms part of
Annex 1A to the WTO Agreement. The multilateral rules on subsidies and subsidised trade are now set
out in articles VI and XVI of the GATT 1994 and, most importantly, in the SCM agreement. With
respect to the object and purpose of this agreement, the panel in Brazil – Aircraft clarified that: “the
object and purpose of the SCM agreement is to impose multilateral disciplines on subsidies which distort
international trade.”
 Subsidies
– The Concept of ‘Subsidy’: the SCM agreement contains, for the first time in the GATT/WTO context, a detailed
and comprehensive definition of the concept of ‘subsidy’. As the panel in US – FSC stated: “the inclusion of this
detailed and comprehensive definition of the term ‘‘subsidy’’ is generally considered to represent one of the most
Important achievements of the Uruguay round in the area of subsidy disciplines.”
– Subsidies have been provided widely throughout the world as a tool for realizing government policies. They can
take the form of grants (normal subsidies), tax exemptions, low-interest financing, investments, and export
credits. There are six primary categories of subsidies categorized by purpose: 1) export subsidies; 2) subsidies
contingent upon the use of domestic over imported goods; 3) industrial promotion subsidies; 4) structural
adjustment subsidies; 5) regional development subsidies; and 6) research and development subsidies. Subsidies
are also categorized by beneficiary as either specific subsidies, which are limited to specific businesses and
industries, or non-specific subsidies, which are not limited.
– Potential Effect of Subsidies: Because of this potential effect on trade, the WTO Agreements prohibit with
respect to industrial goods any export subsidies and subsidies contingent upon the use of domestic over
imported goods as having a particularly high trade-distorting effect. Furthermore, even for subsidies that are not
prohibited, it allows Members importing subsidized goods to enact countermeasures such as Countervailing
duties if such goods injure that Member‘s domestic industry and if certain procedural requirements are met. For
agricultural products, the WTO Agreements require obligations such as reducing export subsidies and domestic
supports.
– Multilateral disciplines are the rules regarding whether or not a subsidy may be provided by a Member. They are
enforced through invocation of the WTO dispute settlement mechanism. Countervailing duties are a unilateral
instrument, which may be applied by a Member after an investigation by that Member and a determination that
Subsidies
– In comparison with the previous agreement, it provides more explicit definitions of subsidies with stronger and
clearer disciplines on countervailing measures. The current Subsidies Agreement begins by defining the subsidies
covered and classifying them into three types depending upon their purpose and nature. It then defines the
relationship of each category to countervailing measures and relief measures as well as the procedures to be
followed. It concludes with special and differential treatment for developing country Members and transitional
arrangement for Members in the process of transformation from a centrally planned economy into a market, free-
enterprise economy.
– WTO treatment of subsidies: Article XVI of the GATT 1994 and Articles 3 to 9 of the SCM Agreement deal with the
WTO treatment of subsidies. As discussed above, dumping is not prohibited. It is merely condemned if it causes
injury. The WTO treatment of subsidies is different. Certain subsidies are prohibited, and many other subsidies, at
least when they are specific rather than general, may be challenged when they cause adverse effects to the interests
of other Members. WTO law distinguishes between prohibited subsidies, actionable subsidies and non-actionable
subsidies. Each of these kinds of subsidy has its own substantive and procedural rules. Moreover, subsidies on
agricultural products are subject to certain rules set out in the Agreement on Agriculture.
– Definition of Subsidies: Broadly speaking, article 1.1 of the SCM agreement defines a subsidy as a financial
contribution by a government or public body, which confers a benefit. Furthermore, Article 2 of the SCM agreement
provides that the WTO rules on subsidies and subsidised trade only apply to ‘specific’ subsidies, i.e. Subsidies
granted to an enterprise or industry, or a group of enterprises or industries.
– The definition contains three basic elements: (i) a financial contribution (ii) by a government or
any public body within the territory of a Member (iii) which confers a benefit. All three of these
elements must be satisfied in order for a subsidy to exist.
Subsidies
– Article 1: Definition of a Subsidy 1.1 For the purpose of this Agreement, a subsidy shall be deemed to exist if:
(a)(1) there is a financial contribution by a government or any public body within the territory of a Member
(referred to in this Agreement as "government"), i.e. where: (i) a government practice involves a direct transfer
of funds (e.g. grants, loans, and equity infusion), potential direct transfers of funds or liabilities (e.g. loan
guarantees);
– (ii) government revenue that is otherwise due is foregone or not collected (e.g. fiscal incentives such as tax
credits);
– (iii) a government provides goods or services other than general infrastructure, or purchases goods;
– (iv) a government makes payments to a funding mechanism, or entrusts or directs a private body to carry out
one or more of the type of functions illustrated in (i) to (iii) above which would normally be vested in the
government and the practice, in no real sense, differs from practices normally followed by governments; or
– (a)(2) there is any form of income or price support in the sense of Article XVI of GATT 1994; and
– (b) a benefit is thereby conferred.
– 1.2 A subsidy as defined in paragraph 1 shall be subject to the provisions of Part II or shall be subject to the
provisions of Part III or V only if such a subsidy is specific in accordance with the provisions of Article 2.
Subsidies
– The concept of ―financial contribution was included in the SCM Agreement only after a protracted
negotiation. Some Members argued that there could be no subsidy unless there was a charge on the
public account. Other Members considered that forms of government intervention that did not involve
an expense to the government nevertheless distorted competition and should thus be considered to be
subsidies. The SCM Agreement basically adopted the former approach. The Agreement requires a
financial contribution and contains a list of the types of measures that represent a financial
contribution, e.g., grants, loans, equity infusions, loan guarantees, fiscal incentives, the provision of
goods or services, the purchase of goods.
– In order for a financial contribution to be a subsidy, it must be made by or at the direction of a
government or any public body within the territory of a Member. Thus, the SCM Agreement applies not
only to measures of national governments, but also to measures of sub-national governments and of
such public bodies as state-owned companies.
– A financial contribution by a government is not a subsidy unless it confers a ―benefit. In many cases,
as in the case of a cash grant, the existence of a benefit and its valuation will be clear. In some cases,
however, the issue of benefit will be more complex. For example, when does a loan, an equity infusion or
the purchase by a government of a good confer a benefit? Although the SCM Agreement does not provide
complete guidance on these issues, the Appellate Body has ruled (Canada – Aircraft) that the existence
of a benefit is to be determined by comparison with the market-place (i.e., on the basis of what the
recipient could have received in the market). In the context of countervailing duties, Article 14 of the
SCM Agreement provides some guidance with respect to determining whether certain types of measures
Subsidies

– Specificity: Assuming that a measure is a subsidy within the meaning of the SCM Agreement, it nevertheless is
not subject to the SCM Agreement unless it has been specifically provided to an enterprise or industry or
group of enterprises or industries. The basic principle is that a subsidy that distorts the allocation of resources
within an economy should be subject to discipline. Where a subsidy is widely available within an economy,
such a distortion in the allocation of resources is presumed not to occur. Thus, only ―specific‖ subsidies are
subject to the SCM Agreement disciplines. There are four types of ―specificity‖ within the meaning of the
SCM Agreement:
 Enterprise-specificity. A government targets a particular company or companies for
subsidization;
 Industry-specificity. A government targets a particular sector or sectors for subsidization.
 Regional specificity. A government targets producers in specified parts of its territory for
subsidization.
 Prohibited subsidies. A government targets export goods or goods using domestic inputs for
subsidization.
– Categories of Subsidies: The SCM Agreement creates two basic categories of subsidies: those that
are prohibited, those that are actionable (i.e., subject to challenge in the WTO or to countervailing
measures). All specific subsidies fall into one of these categories.
Subsidies

– Prohibited subsidies: Two categories of subsidies are prohibited by Article 3 of the SCM Agreement. The first category
consists of subsidies contingent, in law or in fact, whether wholly or as one of several conditions, on export performance
(―export subsidies). A detailed list of export subsidies is annexed to the SCM Agreement. The second category consists of
subsidies contingent, whether solely or as one of several other conditions, upon the use of domestic over imported goods
(―local content subsidies). These two categories of subsidies are prohibited because they are designed to directly affect
trade and thus are most likely to have adverse effects on the interests of other Members.
– The scope of these prohibitions is relatively narrow. Developed countries had already accepted the prohibition on export
subsidies under the Tokyo Round SCM Agreement, and local content subsidies of the type prohibited by the SCM Agreement
were already inconsistent with Article III of the GATT 1947. What is most significant about the new Agreement in this area
is the extension of the obligations to developing country Members subject to specified transition rules, as well as the creation
in Article 4 of the SCM Agreement of a rapid (three-month) dispute settlement mechanism for complaints regarding
prohibited subsidies.
– Actionable subsidies: Most subsidies, such as production subsidies, fall in the ―actionable‖ category. Actionable subsidies
are not prohibited. However, they are subject to challenge, either through multilateral dispute settlement or through
countervailing action, in the event that they cause adverse effects to the interests of another Member. There are three types of
adverse effects.
– First, there is injury to a domestic industry caused by subsidized imports in the territory of the complaining Member. This is
the sole basis for countervailing action.
Subsidies

– Second, there is serious prejudice. Serious prejudice usually arises as a result of adverse effects (e.g., export displacement)
in the market of the subsidizing Member or in a third country market. Thus, unlike injury, it can serve as the basis for a
complaint related to harm to a Member's export interests.
– Finally, there is nullification or impairment of benefits accruing under the GATT 1994. Nullification or impairment arises
most typically where the improved market access presumed to flow from a bound tariff reduction is undercut by
subsidization.
– The creation of a system of multilateral remedies that allows Members to challenge subsidies which give rise to adverse
effects represents a major advance over the pre-WTO regime. The difficulty, however, will remain the need in most cases
for a complaining Member to demonstrate the adverse trade effects arising from subsidization, a fact-intensive analysis that
panels may find difficult in some cases(2).
– Agricultural subsidies: Article 13 of the Agreement on Agriculture establishes, during the implementation period specified
in that Agreement (until 1 January 2003), special rules regarding subsidies for agricultural products. Export subsidies which
are in full conformity with the Agriculture Agreement are not prohibited by the SCM Agreement, although they remain
countervailable. Domestic supports which are in full conformity with the Agriculture Agreement are not actionable
multilaterally, although they also may be subject to countervailing duties. Finally, domestic supports within the ―green box
of the Agriculture Agreement are not actionable multilaterally nor are they subject to countervailing measures. After the
implementation period, the SCM Agreement shall apply to subsidies for agricultural products subject to the provisions of
the Agreement on Agriculture, as set forth in its Article 21.
Countervailing Measures

– Part V of the SCM Agreement sets forth certain substantive requirements that must be fulfilled in order to impose a countervailing
measure, as well as in-depth procedural requirements regarding the conduct of a countervailing investigation and the imposition and
maintenance in place of countervailing measures. A failure to respect either the substantive or procedural requirements of Part V can be
taken to dispute settlement and may be the basis for invalidation of the measure.
– Substantive rules: A Member may not impose a countervailing measure unless it determines that there are subsidized imports, injury to a
domestic industry, and a causal link between the subsidized imports and the injury. As previously noted, the existence of a specific
subsidy must be determined in accordance with the criteria in Part I of the Agreement. However, the criteria regarding injury and
causation are found in Part V. One significant development of the new SCM Agreement in this area is the explicit authorization of
cumulation of the effects of subsidized imports from more than one Member where specified criteria are fulfilled. In addition, Part V
contains rules regarding the determination of the existence and amount of a benefit.
– Procedural rules: Part V of the SCM Agreement contains detailed rules regarding the initiation and conduct of countervailing
investigations, the imposition of preliminary and final measures, the use of undertakings, and the duration of measures. A key objective of
these rules is to ensure that investigations are conducted in a transparent manner, that all interested parties have a full opportunity to
defend their interests, and that investigating authorities adequately explain the bases for their determinations. A few of the more important
innovations in the WTO SCM Agreement are identified below:
• Standing: The Agreement defines in numeric terms the circumstances under which there is sufficient support from a domestic industry to
justify initiation of an investigation.
• Preliminary investigation. The Agreement ensures the conduct of a preliminary investigation before a preliminary measure can be
imposed.
• Undertakings. The Agreement places limitations on the use of undertakings to settle CVD investigations, in order to avoid Voluntary
 Countervailing Measures

• Sunset. The Agreement requires that a countervailing measure be terminated after five years unless it is
determined that continuation of the measure is necessary to avoid the continuation or recurrence of subsidization
and injury.
• Judicial review. The Agreement requires that Members create an independent tribunal to review the consistency
of determinations of the investigating authority with domestic law.
• Countervailing legislation and measures: All Members are required to notify their countervailing duty laws and regulations
to the SCM Committee pursuant to Article 32.6 of the SCM Agreement. Members are also required to notify all
countervailing actions taken on a semi-annual basis, and preliminary and final countervailing actions at the time they are
taken. Members also are required to notify which of their authorities are competent to initiate and conduct countervailing
investigations.
– Dispute Settlement: The SCM Agreement generally relies on the dispute settlement rules of the DSU. However the
Agreement contains extensive special or additional dispute settlement rules and procedures providing, inter alia, for expedited
procedures, particularly in the case of prohibited subsidy allegations. It also provides special mechanisms for the gathering of
information necessary to assess the existence of serious prejudice in actionable subsidy cases.
• US - Countervailing Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled Carbon Steel Flat Products from India, WT/DS 436/AB/R (19
December 2014)
• Key Facts: Complaint by India: On 12 April 2012, India requested consultations with the United States with regard to the
imposition of countervailing duties by the United States on certain hot rolled carbon steel flat products from India (―subject
goods).
Countervailing Measures
• India challenges countervailing duties levied on those products through various instruments, as well as
provisions of the US Tariff Act and Code of Federal Regulations on customs duties. India claims that the
countervailing duty investigation and related measures are inconsistent with Articles I and VI of the GATT 1994
and with Articles 1, 2, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 19, 21 and 22 of the SCM Agreement. India also claims
that the challenged provisions of US Law are inconsistent ―as such with Articles 12, 14, 15, 19 and 32 of the
SCM Agreement. On 7 May 2012, Canada requested to join the consultations. On 12 July 2012, India requested
the establishment of a panel.
• Panel Proceedings: At its meeting on 31 August 2012, the DSB established a panel. Australia, Canada, China, the European
Union, Saudi Arabia and Turkey reserved their third-party rights. On 7 February 2013, India requested the Director-
General to determine the composition of the panel. On 18 February 2013, the Director-General composed the panel.
On 8 July 2013, the Chair of the panel informed the DSB that the panel expected to issue its final report to the parties by April 2014,
in accordance with the timetable adopted after consultation with the parties. On 14 July 2014, the panel report was circulated to
Members.
• With regard to the United States' request for preliminary ruling relating to the scope of these proceedings, the Panel concluded that
India’s claims that the United States acted inconsistently with Articles 11.1, 11.2 and 11.9 of the SCM Agreement in connection with
the alleged initiation of an investigation, despite the insufficiency of evidence in the domestic industry’s written application, fell
outside the Panel’s terms of reference. The Panel dismissed the United States' remaining preliminary objections to India's claims.
• With regard to India's claims that were within the scope of these proceedings, the Panel concluded that the United States acted
inconsistently with:
Countervailing Measures

A. in connection with the provision of high grade iron ore by the NMDC (National Mineral Development Cooperation):
– i. Article 2.1(c) of the SCM Agreement by failing to take account of all the mandatory factors in its determination of de facto
specificity regarding NMDC; and
– ii. Article 14(d) of the SCM Agreement by failing to consider the relevant domestic price information for use as Tier I
benchmarks, in respect of which the United States sought to rely on ex post rationalization;
B. in connection with the Captive Mining of Iron Ore Programme and the Captive Mining of Coal Programme:
i. Article 12.5 of the SCM Agreement by failing to determine the existence of the Captive Mining of Iron Ore Programme on
the basis of accurate information;
ii. Article 1.1(a)(1)(iii) of the SCM Agreement by determining without sufficient evidentiary basis that GOI granted Tata a
financial contribution in the form of a captive coal mining lease under the Captive Mining of Coal Programme/Coal Mining
Nationalization Act; and
iii. Article 14(d) of the SCM Agreement in connection with the USDOC's rejection of certain domestic price information when
assessing benefit in respect of mining rights for iron ore;
C. Article 15.3 of the SCM Agreement, with respect to Section 1677(7)(G) “as such” and “as applied” in the original
investigation at issue, in connection with the “cross-cumulation” of the effects of imports that are subject to a CVD investigation
with the effects of imports that are not subject to simultaneous CVD investigations;
Countervailing Measures

D. Articles 15.1, 15.2, 15.4 and 15.5 of the SCM Agreement, with respect to Section 1677(7)(G) “as such” and “as applied” in the original
investigation at issue, in connection with injury assessments based on inter alia the volume, effects and impact of non-subsidized, dumped
imports;
E. Article 12.7 of the SCM Agreement by applying ―facts available‖ devoid of any factual foundation in connection with the following
determinations:
– i. JSW received iron ore from NMDC at no charge during the period covered by the 2006 administrative review;
– ii. VMPL used and benefited from the 1993 KIP, 1996 KIP, 2001 KIP and 2006 KIP subsidy programmes;
– iii. Tata used and benefited, during the period covered by the 2008 administrative review, from the following subsidy programmes under the
2001 JSIP: (1) capital investment incentive; (2) feasibility study and project report cost reimbursement; (3) incentive for quality
certification; and (4) employment incentives;
– iv. Tata used and benefited, during the period covered by the 2008 administrative review, from the following subsidy programmes: (1) 6
programmes at issue administered by the SGOG; (2) 8 programmes at issue administered by the SGOM; (3) 10 programmes at issue
administered by the SGAP; (4) 9 programmes at issue administered by the SGOC; and (5) 22 programmes at issue administered by the
SGOK;
– v. Tata used and benefited from the subsidy provided through the purchase of high- grade iron ore from NMDC during the period covered by
the 2008 administrative review;
– vi. Tata used and benefited from the MDA and MAI subsidy programmes during the period covered by the 2008 administrative review; and
– vii.Tata used and benefited from the six sub-programmes of the SEZ Act at issue during the period covered by the 2008 administrative
review;
 Countervailing Measures

F. Article 22.5 of the SCM Agreement by failing to provide adequate notice of the USDOC's consideration of certain
in-country benchmarks when assessing benefit conferred by NMDC's sales of iron ore.
Appellate Proceeding: The Panel exercised judicial economy in connection with a small number of India's claims, and rejected
India's remaining claims. On 8 August 2014, India notified the DSB of its decision to appeal to the Appellate Body certain issues of
law and legal interpretation in the panel report. On 13 August 2014, the United States filed an other appeal in the same dispute. On
6 October 2014, the Chair of the Appellate Body informed the DSB that it estimated that the Appellate Body report would be
circulated no later than 8 December 2014. On 8 December 2014, the Appellate Body report was circulated to Members.
Public Body: India appealed the Panel's findings regarding the USDOC's determination that the National Mineral Development
Corporation (NMDC) is a public body within the meaning of Article 1.1(a)(1) of the SCM Agreement. For its part, the United
States argued that the Panel interpreted and applied Article 1.1(a)(1) in a manner consistent with the Appellate Body report in US
— Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China). Further, the United States requested, in its other appeal, that the Appellate
Body clarify that “an entity that is controlled by the government, such that the government may use the entity's resources as its
own” is also a public body. The Appellate Body recalled that a public body is “an entity that possesses, exercises or is vested with
governmental authority”, and explained that whether the conduct of an entity is that of a public body must in each case be
determined on its own merits, with due regard to the core characteristics and functions of the relevant entity, its relationship with
the government, and the legal and economic environment prevailing in the country in which the investigated entity operates. The
Appellate Body found that the Panel erred in its application of Article 1.1(a)(1) to the USDOC's public body determination in the
underlying investigation, in effect treating the GOI's ability to control the NMDC as determinative for purposes of establishing
whether the NMDC constitutes a public body. The Appellate Body consequently reversed the Panel's findings, and completed the
legal analysis and found that the USDOC's determination that the NMDC is a public body is inconsistent with Article 1.1(a)(1).
Countervailing Measures
Financial Contribution: India appealed the Panel's findings regarding whether India's captive mining rights and Steel Development Fund
(SDF) loans constitute financial contributions within the meaning of Article 1.1(a)(1) of the SCM Agreement. Finding that the Panel
correctly determined that there was a reasonably proximate relationship between India's grant of mining rights for iron ore and coal and the
beneficiary's use or enjoyment of the final extracted goods, the Appellate Body upheld the Panel's finding in respect of Article 1.1(a)(1)(iii).
With respect to SDF loans, the Appellate Body found that the Panel correctly found that the role of the SDF Managing Committee in
making critical decisions regarding the issuance and terms of the SDF loans supported a conclusion that the SDF loans constitute direct
transfers of funds, and upheld the Panel's finding in respect of Article 1.1(a)(1)(i).
Benefits: India appealed multiple findings of the Panel concerning Section 351.511(a)(2)(i)-(iv) of the United States Code of Federal
Regulations, setting forth the US benchmarking mechanism for calculating benefit. The Appellate Body rejected India's ―as such‖ claims
regarding benefit benchmark selection. Although the Appellate Body disagreed with the Panel to the extent it suggested that investigating
authorities could, at the outset, discard all prices of government-related entities in a benchmark analysis, the Appellate Body considered
that, under Section 351.511(a)(2)(i), the USDOC is required to consider in its benchmark analysis all market-determined prices in the
country of provision for the good in question, including such prices of government-related entities other than the entity providing the
financial contribution.
Specificity: India appealed aspects of the Panel's analysis concerning the USDOC's determination that the sale of iron ore by the NMDC is
specific within the meaning of Article 2.1(c) of the SCM Agreement because it concerns the ―use of a subsidy programme by a limited
number of certain enterprises‖. The Appellate Body upheld each of the Panel's findings challenged by India in respect of Article 2.1(c),
namely: that there was no obligation on the USDOC to establish that only a ―limited number‖ within the set of ―certain enterprises‖
actually used the subsidy programme; that specificity need not be established on the basis of discrimination in favour of ―certain
enterprises‖ against a broader category of other, similarly situated entities; and that, if the inherent characteristics of the subsidized good
limit the possible use of the subsidy to a certain industry, it is not necessary, in establishing specificity, that the subsidy be limited to a
Countervailing Measures
Reasonable period of time : At the DSB meeting on 16 January 2015, the United States stated that it intended to
implement the DSB's recommendations and ruling in a manner that respects its WTO obligations and that it would need a
reasonable period of time to do so. On 24 March 2015, India and the United States informed the DSB that they had
agreed that the reasonable period of time for the United States to implement the DSB recommendations and rulings shall
be 15 months from the date of adoption of the Appellate Body and panel reports. Accordingly, the reasonable period of
time was set to expire on 19 March 2016. On 9 March 2016, India and the United States informed the DSB that they had
mutually agreed to modify the previously notified reasonable period of time for implementation of the recommendations
and rulings of the DSB so as to expire on 18 April 2016.