CS 259 2008

SSL / TLS Case Study

John Mitchell
 Course organization (subject to revision)

 January
• Two written homeworks: first due next Thursday (9 days)
• Lectures on case studies (protocols and tools)
• Choose your project: we’ll start giving examples Thursday
 February
• Project presentation #1: describe your system (5-10 min)
• Lectures on additional approaches
• Project presentation #2: describe security properties
 March
• Project presentation #3: results of study

Grading: 20% homework, 30% project presentations, 50% project results and final presentation
Overview
 Introduction to the SSL / TLS protocol
• Widely deployed, “real-world” security protocol
 Protocol analysis case study
• Start with the RFC describing the protocol
• Create an abstract model and code it up in Mur
• Specify security properties
• Run Mur to check whether security properties are
satisfied
 This lecture is a compressed version of what you
would do if SSL were your project!
What is SSL / TLS?
 Transport Layer Security protocol, ver 1.0
• De facto standard for Internet security
• “The primary goal of the TLS protocol is to provide
privacy and data integrity between two communicating
applications”
• In practice, used to protect information transmitted
between browsers and Web servers
 Based on Secure Sockets Layers protocol, ver 3.0
• Same protocol design, different algorithms
 Deployed in nearly every web browser
SSL / TLS in the Real World
History of the Protocol
 SSL 1.0
• Internal Netscape design, early 1994?
• Lost in the mists of time
 SSL 2.0
• Published by Netscape, November 1994
• Several problems (next slide)
 SSL 3.0
• Designed by Netscape and Paul Kocher, November 1996
 TLS 1.0
• Internet standard based on SSL 3.0, January 1999
• Not interoperable with SSL 3.0
SSL 2.0 Vulnerabilities
 Short key length
• In export-weakened modes, SSL 2.0 unnecessarily weakens the
authentication keys to 40 bits.
 Weak MAC construction
 Message integrity vulnerability
• SSL 2.0 feeds padding bytes into the MAC in block cipher
modes, but leaves the padding-length unauthenticated, may
allow active attackers to delete bytes from the end of messages
 Ciphersuite rollback attack
• An active attacker may edits the list of ciphersuite preferences
in the hello messages to invisibly force both endpoints to use a
weaker form of encryption
• “Least common denominator" security under active attack
Let’s get going with SSL/TLS …

Informal
Formal Intruder
Protocol
Protocol Model
Description

RFC
(request for
comments) Analysis
Find error Tool
Request for Comments
 Network protocols are defined in an RFC
 TLS version 1.0 is described in RFC 2246
 Intended to be a self-contained definition of the
protocol
• Describes the protocol in sufficient detail for readers
who will be implementing it and those who will be
doing protocol analysis (that’s you!)
• Mixture of informal prose and pseudo-code
 Read some RFCs to get a flavor of what protocols
look like when they emerge from the committee
Evolution of the SSL/TLS RFC

80
70
60
50
40
Page count
30
20
10
0
SSL 2.0 SSL 3.0 TLS 1.0
From RFC to MurModel

Informal
Formal Intruder
Protocol
Protocol Model
Description

Mur code
RFC

Analysis
Find error Tool
TLS Basics
 TLS consists of two protocols
 Handshake protocol
• Use public-key cryptography to establish a shared
secret key between the client and the server
 Record protocol
• Use the secret key established in the handshake
protocol to protect communication between the client
and the server
 We will focus on the handshake protocol
TLS Handshake Protocol
 Two parties: client and server
 Negotiate version of the protocol and the set of
cryptographic algorithms to be used
• Interoperability between different implementations of
the protocol
 Authenticate client and server (optional)
• Use digital certificates to learn each other’s public keys
and verify each other’s identity
 Use public keys to establish a shared secret
Handshake Protocol Structure

ClientHello

ServerHello,
[Certificate],
[ServerKeyExchange],
[CertificateRequest],
ServerHelloDone

C [Certificate],
ClientKeyExchange,
S
[CertificateVerify]

switch to negotiated cipher

Finished

switch to negotiated cipher

Finished
Recall: Basic Cryptographic Concepts
 Encryption scheme
• functions to encrypt, decrypt data
• key generation algorithm
 Secret key vs. public key
• Public key: publishing key does not reveal key-1
• Secret key: more efficient, generally key = key-1
 Hash function, MAC
• Map input to short hash; ideally, no collisions
• MAC (keyed hash) used for message integrity
 Signature scheme
• Functions to sign data, verify signature
Use of cryptography
Version, Crypto choice, nonce

Version, Choice, nonce,

signed certificate
containing server’s
public key Ks

C Secret key K
encrypted with
S
server’s key Ks

switch to negotiated cipher

hash of sequence of messages

hash of sequence of messages
SSL/TLS Cryptography Summary
 Public-key encryption
• Key chosen secretly (handshake protocol)
• Key material sent encrypted with public key
 Symmetric encryption
• Shared (secret) key encryption of data packets
 Signature-based authentication
• Client can check signed server certificate
• And vice-versa, in principal
 Hash for integrity
• Client, server check hash of sequence of messages
• MAC used in data packets (record protocol)
Public-Key Infrastructure
Known public signature verification key Ka
Certificate
Certificate
Sign(Ka-1, Ks)
Ka Authority Ka, Ka-1
Ks

Client Sign(Ka-1, Ks) Server

Server certificate can be verified by any client that has CA verification key Ka
Certificate authority is “off line”
Another general idea in SSL
 Client, server communicate

 Compare hash of all messages

• Compute hash(hi,hello,howareyou?) locally
• Exchange hash values under encryption
 Abort if intervention detected

Hi
Hello
Client Server
How are you?
SSL/TLS in more detail …
ClientHello CS C, VerC, SuiteC, NC

ServerHello SC VerS, SuiteS, NS, signCA{ S, KS }

ClientVerify CS signCA{ C, VC }

{ VerC, SecretC } KS
signC { Hash( Master(NC, NS, SecretC) + Pad2 +
Hash(Msgs + C + Master(NC, NS, SecretC) + Pad1)) }
-------- Change to negotiated cipher --------------------------------------------------------------------
ServerFinished S  C { Hash( Master(NC, NS, SecretC) + Pad2 +
Hash( Msgs + S + Master(NC, NS, SecretC) + Pad1))
Master(NC, NS, SecretC)
}

ClientFinished C  S { Hash( Master(NC, NS, SecretC) + Pad2 +

Hash( Msgs
Master(N + C + Master(NC, NS, SecretC) + Pad1))
C, NS, SecretC)
Abbreviated Handshake
 The handshake protocol may be executed in an
abbreviated form to resume a previously
established session
• No authentication, key material not exchanged
• Session resumed from an old state
 For complete analysis, have to model both full
and abbreviated handshake protocol
• This is a common situation: many protocols have
several branches, subprotocols for error handling, etc.
Rational Reconstruction
 Begin with simple, intuitive protocol
• Ignore client authentication
• Ignore verification messages at the end of the
handshake protocol
• Model only essential parts of messages (e.g., ignore
padding)
 Execute the model checker and find a bug
 Add a piece of TLS to fix the bug and repeat
• Better understand the design of the protocol
Protocol Step by Step: ClientHello

ClientHello

Client announces (in plaintext):

• Protocol version she is running
• Cryptographic algorithms she supports

C S
ClientHello (RFC)
struct { Highest version of the protocol
supported by the client

ProtocolVersion client_version;
Random random; Session id (if the client wants to
resume an old session)

SessionID session_id; Cryptographic algorithms

supported by the client (e.g.,
CipherSuite cipher_suites; RSA or Diffie-Hellman)

CompressionMethod compression_methods;
} ClientHello
ClientHello (Mur)
ruleset i: ClientId do
ruleset j: ServerId do
rule "Client sends ClientHello to server (new session)"
cli[i].state = M_SLEEP &
cli[i].resumeSession = false
==>
var
outM: Message; -- outgoing message
begin
outM.source := i;
outM.dest := j;
outM.session := 0;
outM.mType := M_CLIENT_HELLO;
outM.version := cli[i].version;
outM.suite := cli[i].suite;
outM.random := freshNonce();
multisetadd (outM, cliNet);
cli[i].state := M_SERVER_HELLO;
end; end; end;
ServerHello

C, Versionc, suitec, Nc

ServerHello

Server responds (in plaintext) with:

C
• Highest protocol version both client &
server support S
• Strongest cryptographic suite selected
from those offered by the client
ServerHello (Mur)
ruleset i: ServerId do
choose l: serNet do
rule “Server receives ServerHello (new session)"
ser[i].clients[0].state = M_CLIENT_HELLO &
serNet[l].dest = i &
serNet[l].session = 0
==>
var
inM: Message; -- incoming message
outM: Message; -- outgoing message
begin
inM := serNet[l]; -- receive message
if inM.mType = M_CLIENT_HELLO then
outM.source := i;
outM.dest := inM.source;
outM.session := freshSessionId();
outM.mType := M_SERVER_HELLO;
outM.version := ser[i].version;
outM.suite := ser[i].suite;
outM.random := freshNonce();
multisetadd (outM, serNet);
ser[i].state := M_SERVER_SEND_KEY;
end; end; end;
ServerKeyExchange

C, Versionc, suitec, Nc

Versions, suites, Ns,

ServerKeyExchange

C Server responds with his public-key

certificate containing either his RSA, or
S
his Diffie-Hellman public key
(depending on chosen crypto suite)
“Abstract” Cryptography
 We will use abstract data types to model
cryptographic operations
• Assumes that cryptography is perfect
• No details of the actual cryptographic schemes
• Ignores bit length of keys, random numbers, etc.
 Simple notation for encryption, signatures, hashes
• {M}k is message M encrypted with key k
• sigk(M) is message M digitally signed with key k
• hash(M) for the result of hashing message M with a
cryptographically strong hash function
ClientKeyExchange

C, Versionc, suitec, Nc

Versions, suites, Ns,

sigca(S,Ks),
“ServerHelloDone”

C ClientKeyExchange
S
Client generates some secret key material
and sends it to the server encrypted with
the server’s public key
ClientKeyExchange (RFC)
struct { Let’s model this as {Secret }
c Ks

select (KeyExchangeAlgorithm) {
case rsa: EncryptedPreMasterSecret;
case diffie_hellman: ClientDiffieHellmanPublic;
} exchange_keys
} ClientKeyExchange

struct {
ProtocolVersion client_version;
opaque random[46];
} PreMasterSecret
“Core” SSL

C, Versionc, suitec, Nc

Versions, suites, Ns,

sigca(S,Ks),
“ServerHelloDone”

C {Secretc}Ks
S
If the protocol is correct, C and S share
some secret key material secretc at this point

switch to key derived switch to key derived

from secretc from secretc
 Participants as Finite-State Machines

Mur rules define a finite-state machine for each protocol participant

Client state Server state

ClientHello
M_SLEEP M_CLIENT_HELLO

ServerHello

M_SERVER_HELLO M_SEND_KEY

ServerKeyExchange

M_SERVER_KEY M_CLIENT_KEY

M_SEND_KEY M_DONE
ClientKeyExchange
IntruderModel

Informal
Formal Intruder
Protocol
Protocol Model
Description

Mur code Mur code,

RFC similar for
all protocols

Analysis
Find error Tool
Intruder Can Intercept
 Store a message from the network in the data
structure modeling intruder’s “knowledge”
ruleset i: IntruderId do
choose l: cliNet do
rule "Intruder intercepts client's message"
cliNet[l].fromIntruder = false
==>
begin
alias msg: cliNet[l] do -- message from the net
…
alias known: int[i].messages do
if multisetcount(m: known,
msgEqual(known[m], msg)) = 0 then
multisetadd(msg, known);
end;
end;
end;
Intruder Can Decrypt if Knows Key
 If the key is stored in the data structure modeling
intruder’s “knowledge”, then read message
ruleset i: IntruderId do
choose l: cliNet do
rule "Intruder intercepts client's message"
cliNet[l].fromIntruder = false
==>
begin
alias msg: cliNet[l] do -- message from the net
…
if msg.mType = M_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE then
if keyEqual(msg.encKey, int[i].publicKey.key) then
alias sKeys: int[i].secretKeys do
if multisetcount(s: sKeys,
keyEqual(sKeys[s], msg.secretKey)) = 0 then
multisetadd(msg.secretKey, sKeys);
end;
end;
end;
Intruder Can Create New Messages
 Assemble pieces stored in the intruder’s
“knowledge” to form a message of the right format
ruleset i: IntruderId do
ruleset d: ClientId do
ruleset s: ValidSessionId do
choose n: int[i].nonces do
ruleset version: Versions do
rule "Intruder generates fake ServerHello"
cli[d].state = M_SERVER_HELLO
==>
var
outM: Message; -- outgoing message
begin
outM.source := i; outM.dest := d; outM.session := s;
outM.mType := M_SERVER_HELLO;
outM.version := version;
outM.random := int[i].nonces[n];
multisetadd (outM, cliNet);
end; end; end; end;
Intruder Model and Cryptography
 There is no actual cryptography in our model
• Messages are marked as “encrypted” or “signed”, and
the intruder rules respect these markers
 Our assumption that cryptography is perfect is
reflected in the absence of certain intruder rules
• There is no rule for creating a digital signature with a
key that is not known to the intruder
• There is no rule for reading the contents of a message
which is marked as “encrypted” with a certain key,
when this key is not known to the intruder
• There is no rule for reading the contents of a “hashed”
message
Running Mur Analysis

Informal
Formal Intruder
Protocol
Protocol Model
Description

Mur code Mur code,

RFC similar for
all protocols

Analysis
Find error Tool

Specify security
conditions and run Mur
Secrecy
 Intruder should not be able to learn the secret
generated by the client
ruleset i: ClientId do
ruleset j: IntruderId do
rule "Intruder has learned a client's secret"
cli[i].state = M_DONE &
multisetcount(s: int[j].secretKeys,
keyEqual(int[j].secretKeys[s], cli[i].secretKey)) > 0
==>
begin
error "Intruder has learned a client's secret"
end;
end;
end;
Shared Secret Consistency
 After the protocol has finished, client and server
should agree on their shared secret
ruleset i: ServerId do
ruleset s: SessionId do
rule "Server's shared secret is not the same as its client's"
ismember(ser[i].clients[s].client, ClientId) &
ser[i].clients[s].state = M_DONE &
cli[ser[i].clients[s].client].state = M_DONE &
!keyEqual(cli[ser[i].clients[s].client].secretKey,
ser[i].clients[s].secretKey)
==>
begin
error "S's secret is not the same as C's"
end;
end;
end;
Version and Crypto Suite Consistency
 Client and server should be running the highest
version of the protocol they both support
ruleset i: ServerId do
ruleset s: SessionId do
rule "Server has not learned the client's version or suite correctly"
!ismember(ser[i].clients[s].client, IntruderId) &
ser[i].clients[s].state = M_DONE &
cli[ser[i].clients[s].client].state = M_DONE &
(ser[i].clients[s].clientVersion != MaxVersion |
ser[i].clients[s].clientSuite.text != 0)
==>
begin
error "Server has not learned the client's version or suite correctly"
end;
end;
end;
Finite-State Verification

 Mur rules for protocol

participants and the intruder
define a nondeterministic state
transition graph
...  Mur will exhaustively
... enumerate all graph nodes
 Mur will verify whether
specified security conditions
hold in every reachable node
Correctness
 If not, the path to the violating
condition violated node will describe the attack
When Does MurFind a Violation?
 Bad abstraction
• Removed too much detail from the protocol when
constructing the abstract model
• Add the piece that fixes the bug and repeat
• This is part of the rational reconstruction process
 Genuine attack
• Yay! Hooray!
• Attacks found by formal analysis are usually quite
strong: independent of specific cryptographic
schemes, OS implementation, etc.
• Test an implementation of the protocol, if available
“Basic” SSL 3.0

C, Versionc=3.0, suitec

Versions=3.0, suites
sigca(S,Ks),
“ServerHelloDone”

C {Secretc}Ks
S
If the protocol is correct, C and S share
some secret key material secretc at this point

switch to key derived switch to key derived

from secretc from secretc
Version Consistency Fails!

C, Versionc=2.0, suitec

Server is fooled into thinking he Versions=2.0, suites

is communicating with a client
who supports only SSL 2.0 sigca(S,Ks),
“ServerHelloDone”

C {Secretc}Ks
S

C and S end up communicating using SSL 2.0

(weaker earlier version of the protocol)
A Case of Bad Abstraction
struct { Model this as {Version , Secret }
c c Ks

select (KeyExchangeAlgorithm) {
case rsa: EncryptedPreMasterSecret;
case diffie_hellman: ClientDiffieHellmanPublic;
} exchange_keys
} ClientKeyExchange
This piece matters! Need to add it to the model.
struct {
ProtocolVersion client_version;
opaque random[46];
} PreMasterSecret
Better “basic” SSL

C, Versionc=3.0, suitec

Versions=3.0, suites
sigca(S,Ks),
Prevents version “ServerHelloDone”
rollback attack

C {Versionc,Secretc}Ks
Add rule to check that received version
is equal to version in ClientHello S
If the protocol is correct, C and S share
some secret key material secretc at this point

switch to key derived switch to key derived

from secretc from secretc
Summary of Incremental Protocols

 A = Basic protocol
 B = A + version consistency check
 D = B + certificates for both public keys
– Authentication for client + Authentication for server
 E = D + verification (Finished) messages
– Prevention of version and crypto suite attacks
 F = E + nonces
– Prevention of replay attacks
 G = “Correct” subset of SSL
– Additional crypto considerations (black art) give SSL 3.0
Attack on Protocol B

VerC, SteC VerC, SteC

C VerS, SteS, KI I VerS, SteS, KS S

{ SecretC }
KI
{ SecretC }
KS

 Intruder in the middle

• Replaces server key by intruder’s key
• Intercepts secret from client
• Simulates client to server, server to client
Solution: Certificate Authority

VersionC, SuiteC

C VersionS, SuiteS, signCA{ S, KS } S

KS
{ SecretC }

 Defeats previous attack

• But client is not authenticated to the server ...
Replay Attacks
 Network eavesdropper can record messages
 If protocol is deterministic, then
• Eavesdropper can replay client messages to server, OR
• Eavesdropper can replay server message to client
 This is a problem
• In each session, each party should be guaranteed that the other
is a live participant in the session
 Solution
• Each run of each protocol should contain at least one new value
generated by each party, included in messages, and checked
before session is considered done
“Core” SSL Handshake with server auth (only)

Nonces to avoid replay

C, Versionc, suitec , Nc

Versions, suites, Ns
Server public key in
certificate signed by CA sigca(S,Ks),
“ServerHelloDone”

C {Versionc,Secretc}Ks S
switch to negotiated cipher

Hash of sequence of messages

Hash of sequence of messages

Hash messages to confirm
consistent views
Anomaly (Protocol F)

… SuiteC …

… SuiteS …
…

C Switch to negotiated cipher S

Finished Finished

data data
Anomaly (Protocol F)

o d ifCy…
… Suite
M
d i
S y
… Suite f…
M…o

C Switch to negotiated cipher S

X X
Finished Finished

data data
Protocol Resumption

SessionId, VerC= 3.0, NC, ...

VerS= 3.0, NS, ...

C Finished Finished S

data data
Version Rollback Attack

SessionId, VerC= 2.0, NC, ...

VerS= 2.0, NS, ...

C
X
Finished
{ NS } SecretKey
X
Finished
{ NC } SecretKey
S

data data

SSL 2.0 Finished messages do not include version numbers or cryptosuites

Basic Pattern for Doing Your Project
 Read and understand protocol specification
• Typically an RFC or a research paper
• We’ll put a few on the website: take a look!
 Choose a tool
• Mur by default, but we’ll describe many other tools
• Play with Mur now to get some experience
(installing, running simple models, etc.)
 Start with a simple (possibly flawed) model
• Rational reconstruction is a good way to go
 Give careful thought to security conditions
Background Reading on SSL 3.0
Optional, for deeper understanding of SSL / TLS

 D. Wagner and B. Schneier. “Analysis of the SSL 3.0 protocol.”

USENIX Electronic Commerce ’96.
• Nice study of an early proposal for SSL 3.0
 J.C. Mitchell, V. Shmatikov, U. Stern. “Finite-State Analysis of SSL
3.0”. USENIX Security ’98.
• Mur analysis of SSL 3.0 (similar to this lecture)
• Actual Mur model available
 D. Bleichenbacher. “Chosen Ciphertext Attacks against Protocols
Based on RSA Encryption Standard PKCS #1”. CRYPTO ’98.
• Cryptography is not perfect: this paper breaks SSL 3.0 by directly
attacking underlying implementation of RSA