The document provides an overview of game theory and Nash equilibrium. It discusses coordination games, Pareto optimality, and games with continuous strategy sets. It also proves the existence of Nash equilibrium in games where the strategy sets are compact and convex, and utilities are continuous and concave.
The document provides an overview of game theory and Nash equilibrium. It discusses coordination games, Pareto optimality, and games with continuous strategy sets. It also proves the existence of Nash equilibrium in games where the strategy sets are compact and convex, and utilities are continuous and concave.
The document provides an overview of game theory and Nash equilibrium. It discusses coordination games, Pareto optimality, and games with continuous strategy sets. It also proves the existence of Nash equilibrium in games where the strategy sets are compact and convex, and utilities are continuous and concave.
The document provides an overview of game theory and Nash equilibrium. It discusses coordination games, Pareto optimality, and games with continuous strategy sets. It also proves the existence of Nash equilibrium in games where the strategy sets are compact and convex, and utilities are continuous and concave.
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Game Theory
-- Lecture 2
1 Lecture 1 recap • Defined games in normal form • Defined dominance notion – Iterative deletion – Does not always give a solution • Defined best response and Nash equilibrium – Computed Nash equilibrium in some examples
➔ Are some Nash equilibria better than others?
➔ Can we always find a Nash equilibrium?
2 Outline 1. Coordination games and Pareto optimality 2. Games with continuous action sets – Equilibrium computation and existence theorem – Example: Cournot duopoly
3 Outline 1. Coordination games and Pareto optimality 2. Games with continuous action sets – Equilibrium computation and existence theorem – Example: Cournot duopoly
4 The Investment Game • The players: you • The strategies: each of you chooses between investing nothing in a class project ($0) or investing ($10) • Payoffs: – If you don’t invest your payoff is $0 – If you invest you make a net profit of $5 (gross profit = $15; investment $10) if more than 90% of the class chooses to invest. Otherwise, you lose $10
• Choose your action (no communication!)
5 Nash equilibrium • What are the Nash equilibria?
• Remark: to find Nash equilibria, we used a
“guess and check method” – Checking is easy, guessing can be hard 6 The Investment Game again • Recall that: – Players: you – Strategies: invest $0 or invest $10 – Payoffs: • If no invest ➔ $0 $5 net profit if ≥ 90% invest • If invest $10 ➔ -$10 net profit if < 90% invest
• Let’s play again! (no communication)
• We are heading toward an equilibrium
-+There are certain cases in which playing converges in a natural sense to an equilibrium 7 Pareto domination • Is one equilibrium better than the other?
Definition: Pareto domination
A strategy profile s Pareto dominates strategy profile s’ iif for all i, ui(s)≥ui(s’) and there exists j such that uj(s)>uj(s’); i.e., all players have at least as high payoffs and at least one player has strictly higher payoff. • In the investment game? 8 Convergence to equilibrium in the Investment Game • Why did we converge to the wrong NE? • Remember when we started playing – We were more or less 50 % investing • The starting point was already bad for the people who invested for them to lose confidence • Then we just tumbled down
• What would have happened if we started with
95% of the class investing?
9 Coordination game • This is a coordination game – We’d like everyone to coordinate their actions and invest • Many other examples of coordination games – Party in a Villa – On-line Web Sites – Establishment of technological monopolies (Microsoft, HDTV) – Bank runs • Unlike in prisoner’s dilemma, communication helps in coordination games ➔ scope for leadership – In prisoner’s dilemma, a trusted third party (TTP) would need to impose players to adopt a strictly dominated strategy – In coordination games, a TTP just leads the crowd towards a better NE point (there is no dominated strategy)
10 Battle of the sexes Player 2 Opera Soccer Opera 2,1 0,0 Player 1 Soccer 0,0 1,2
• Find the NE
• Is there a NE better than the other(s)?
11 Coordination Games • Pure coordination games: there is no conflict whether one NE is better than the other – E.g.: in the investment game, we all agreed that the NE with everyone investing was a “better” NE
• General coordination games: there is a source of
conflict as players would agree to coordinate, but one NE is “better” for a player and not for the other – E.g.: Battle of the Sexes
➔ Communication might fail in this case
12 Pareto optimality
Definition: Pareto optimality
A strategy profile s is Pareto optimal if there does not exist a strategy profile s’ that Pareto dominates s.
• Battle of the sexes?
13 Outline 1. Coordination games and Pareto optimality 2. Games with continuous action sets – Equilibrium computation and existence theorem – Example: Cournot duopoly
14 The partnership game (see exercise sheet 2) • Two partners choose effort si in Si=[0, 4] • Share revenue and have quadratic costs u1(s1 , s2) = ½ [4 (s1 + s2 + b s1 s2)] - s12 u2(s1 , s2) = ½ [4 (s1 + s2 + b s1 s2)] - s22 ŝ1 = 1 + b s2 = BR1(s2) • Best responses: ŝ2 = 1 + b s1 = BR2(s1)
15 Finding the best response (with twice continuously differentiable utilities) u1 (s1, s2 ) 0 • First order condition (FOC) s1 2 u1 (s1, s2 ) • Second order condition (SOC) s1 2 0 • Remark: the SOC is automatically satisfied if ui(si,s-i) is concave in si for all s-i (very standard assumption) • Remark 2: be careful with the borders! – Example u1(s1, s2) = 10-(s1+s2)2 – S1=[0, 4], what is the BR to s2=2? – Solving the FOC, what do we get?
– When the FOC solution is outside Si, the BR is at the
Nash equilibrium graphically s2
4 BR1(s2)
2 BR2(s1)
0 s1 1 2 3 4 5
• NE is fixed point of (s1, s2) ➔ (BR(s2), BR(s1)) 17
Best response correspondence • Definition: ŝi is a BR to s-i if ŝi solves max ui(si , s-i) • The BR to s-i may not be unique! • BR(s-i): set of si that solve max ui(si , s-i) • The definition can be written: ŝi is a BR to s-i if sˆi BRi (si ) argmax ui (si, si ) si
• Best response correspondence of
i: s ➔ BR (s ) 18 Nash equilibrium as a fixed point
• Game N, S iN , u
i i • Let’s define S iN i S (set of strategy and the profiles) correspondence iN B:SS s B(s) iN BRi (si ) • For a given s, B(s) is the set of strategy profiles s’ such that si’ is a BR to s-i for all i. • A strategy profile s* is a Nash eq. iif s* B(s* ) (just a re-writing of the definition) 19 Kakutani’s fixed point theorem
Theorem: Kakutani’s fixed point theorem
Let X be a compact convex subset of Rn and let f : X X be a set-valued function for which: • for all x X , the set f (x) is nonempty convex; • the graph of f is closed. Then there exists x* X such that x* f (x* )
20 Closed graph (upper hemicontinuity) • Definition: f has closed graph if for all sequences (xn) and (yn) such that yn is in f(xn) for all n, xn➔x and yn➔y, y is in f(x) • Alternative definition: f has closed graph if for all x we have the following property: for any open neighborhood V of f(x), there exists a neighborhood U of x such that for all x in U, f(x) is a subset of V. • Examples:
21 Existence of (pure strategy) Nash equilibrium Theorem: Existence of pure strategy NE Suppose that the game N, Si iN , ui iN • The action set S i satisfies: of each player is a compact nonempty convex subset of R n
• The utility ui of each player is continuous
in s (on S ) and concave in si (on Si ) Then, there exists a (pure strategy) Nash equilibrium. 22 Proof • Define B as before. B satisfies the assumptions of Kakutani’s fixed point theorem • Therefore B has a fixed point which by definition is a Nash equilibrium!
• Now, we need to actually verify that B satisfies the
assumptions of Kakutani’s fixed point theorem!
23 Example: the partnership game • N = {1, 2} • S = [0,4]x[0,4] compact convex • Utilities are continuous and concave u1(s1 , s2) = ½ [4 (s1 + s2 + b s1 s2)] - s 12 u2(s1 , s2) = ½ [4 (s1 + s2 + b s1 s2)] - s 22 • Conclusion: there exists a NE!
• Ok, for this game, we already knew it!
• But the theorem is much more general and applies to games where finding the equilibrium is much more difficult 24 One more word on the partnership game before we move on • We have found (see exercises) that – At Nash equilibrium: s*1 = s*2 =1/(1-b) – To maximize the sum of utilities: sW 1 = sW =1/(1/2-b) > s* 2 1 • Sum of utilities called social welfare • Both partners would be better off if they worked sW1 (with social planner, contract) • Why do they work less than efficient?
25 Externality • At the margin, I bear the cost for the extra unit of effort I contribute, but I’m only reaping half of the induced profits, because of profit sharing
• This is known as an “externality”
➔ When I’m figuring out the effort I have to put I don’t take into account that other half of profit that goes to my partner ➔ In other words, my effort benefits my partner, not just me
• Externalities are omnipresent: public good problems,
free riding, etc. (see more in the netecon course) 26 Outline 1. Coordination games and Pareto optimality 2. Games with continuous action sets – Equilibrium computation and existence theorem – Example: Cournot duopoly
27 Cournot Duopoly • Example of application of games with continuous action set • This game lies between two extreme cases in economics, in situations where firms (e.g. two companies) are competing on the same market – Perfect competition – Monopoly • We’re interested in understanding what happens in the middle – The game analysis will give us interesting economic insights on the duopoly market
28 Cournot Duopoly: the game • The players: 2 Firms, e.g., Coke and Pepsi
• Strategies: quantities players produce of identical
products: qi, q-i – Products are perfect substitutes
• Cost of production: c * q – Simple model of constant marginal cost
• Prices: p = a – b (q1 + q2) = a – bQ
– Market-clearing price
29 Price in the Cournot duopoly
p Demand curve Slope: -b Tells the quantity a demanded for a given price
0 q1 + q2
30 Cournot Duopoly: payoffs • The payoffs: firms aim to maximize profit
u1(q1,q2) = p * q1 – c * q1 p = a – b (q1 + q2)
► u1(q1,q2) = a * q1 – b * q2 –b*q q –c*q 1 1 2 1
• The game is symmetric 31
Cournot Duopoly: best responses • First order condition a 2bq1 bq2 c 0 • Second order condition [ 2b 0 a c q2 ➔ ˆ q 1 BR1 (q2 ) 2b 2 1 qˆ2 BR2 (q1 ) a c q 2b 2 32 Cournot Duopoly: best response diagram and Nash equilibrium q2
a cb
BR1 a qCournot a c c2b 3 NE b BR2
0 a a q1 c2b cb 33 Best response at q2=0 p • BR1(q2=0) = (a-c)/(2b) • Interpretation: a Demand curve monopoly quantity Slope: -b ► marginal revenue = Marginal revenue marginal cost Slope: -2b
0 a a q1+q1 c2b cb If Firm 1 would produce more, the MONOPOLY PERFECT selling price would not cover her costs 35 COMPETITIO Cournot Duopoly: best response diagram and Nash equilibrium q2
a cb
BR1
Monopoly qCournot a c NE 3 b BR2
0 a q1 Perfect c2b competition 36 Strategic substitutes/complements • In Cournot duopoly: the more the other player does, the less I would do ➔ This is a game of strategic substitutes – Note: of course the goods were substitutes – We’re talking about strategies here • In the partnership game, it was the opposite: the more the other player would the more I would do ➔ This is a game of strategic complements 37 Cournot duopoly: Market perspective q2 • Total industry profit a maximized for cb monopoly BR1 Industry profits are maximized qCournot a c 3b BR2
0 a q1 c2b 38 Cartel, agreement q2 • How could the firms set an agreement to a cb increase profit? • What can the BR1 problems be Both firms qCournot a c with this produce half 3 of the monopoly b2 BR agreement ? quantity
0 a q1 39 c2b Cournot Duopoly: last observations • How do quantities and prices we’ve encountered so far compare?
a 2(a a cb c) 3 c2b b Perfect Cournot PRICES Monopoly Competition Quantity
40 Summary • Coordination games – Pareto optimal NE sometimes exist – Scope for communication / leadership • Games with continuous action sets (pure strategies) – Compute equilibrium with FOC, SOC – Equilibrium exists under concavity and continuity conditions – Cournot duopoly
