CHAPTER 11:

“Simple Apprehension
and the Concept”

Source: Introduction to Logic
by Andrew H. Bachhuber, SJ
 Simple Apprehension and the
Concept

 In Chapter 2 we spoke briefly of the term. In the
present chapter we shift our point of view from the
term itself to the mental operation by which we
grasp the meaning of a term and the concept, which
is immediately signified by the term.
 Content

I. Nature of simple apprehension and
the concept
II. Kinds of concepts
 
I. Nature of Simple Apprehension and
the Concept
 Definition of Simple Apprehension


 Simple Apprehension- is the operation by which we
grasp the meaning of a term.
ex: The term “Chiliagon”
which means “Thousand-sided figure”
And we avert to its meaning…..
 However…..
Simple Apprehension precedes our use of terms and
frequently we know what a thing is without being able
to call it a suitable term.
 
 Therefore…
it is better and more philosophical to define
Simple Apprehension without reference to terms.
 Without reference to terms:
Simple Apprehension is define as:
- the “operation of the mind” “by which we mentally
grasp” a thing, making it present in and to our minds
but without affirming or denying anything about it.
 “Operation of the Mind”

 This express the proximate genus of simple
apprehension, that is, what Simple Apprehension
has in common with the things that resembles it
most closely.
 These differentiate Simple Apprehension from
non-mental operations:
Which is: of the will and the sensory faculties.
 But not from judgment and reasoning, which are
mental operations.
 “By which we mentally grasp a thing”


 This express the specific difference of simple
apprehension, that is, what differentiate simple
apprehension from the things that resemble it most
closely.
 These differentiate simple apprehension from other
mental operations by expressing its special function,
which is merely: to lay hold of, seize, grasp,
reproduce, express, or represent the essences or
quiddities of the things.
 
 And so in brief, the definition of Simple
apprehension is:

“THE OPERATION BY WHICH WE GRASP

THE ESSENCES OF THINGS”
 The object of Simple Apprehension


 1.General notion of object:
An object, is a thing in as much as this thing is this
thing is the terminus of a cognitive or appetitive
faculty.

 A tendency to its being known ( at least potentially)

“ A thing is not an object; but on becoming known, it
becomes an object”
 
Philosophers distinguished between the
material object and the formal object. Which
important to our analysis of simple
apprehension and also in defining various
sciences.
 
 Material object- is the whole object just as it is in
itself, together with all its attributes and
relationships.
 Formal object- the special aspect of material object
that a faculty or operation grasps directly and
immediately
“ the formal object is the material object itself but only
insofar as the material object enters directly into
cognition.”
 
 2. Application to simple apprehension
Applying the notion of material and formal object to
simple apprehension.
 The object of simple apprehension is what we grasp by
simple apprehension.
 It is always something distinct from the mental
operations by which we grasp it and belongs either to
the real order of actual existence, to the imaginary order
of fiction and fairy tales, or the purely mental order.
 
 The material Object of Simple apprehension
- the “whole thing” that is known by simple
apprehension.
A thing in itself with ball attributes and relationships
It includes not only “ what we know about the thing
grasped by Simple Apprehension” but also to “all
else that is knowable in the thing.”
 
 The Formal Object of Simple Apprehension
The “essences” or “quiddities of things”
Simple apprehension does not grasp “whether a
thing is (which is judgment) but what a thing is.
 
 The object of simple apprehension is not merely the
sensible qualities of a thing and that simple
apprehension is not like taking a little photograph or
a sound-recording of a thing.
 Simple apprehension, rather, is an intellectual
grasping of what a thing is.
 The concept


 The mental expression of an essence or quiddity.

 It is product of simple apprehension produce within

the mind as a means of knowing the essences of
things.
 

II. Kinds of Concept

 
 Of the innumerable classifications of concepts, we
shall take only those that have some bearing on logic.
Carefully note the point of view from which each
classification is made.
 This point of view is called the basis of classification
or division. If you understand this basis it will be
very easy for you to understand and remember the
following definitions.
 First and Second intentions


 For medieval philosophers, “intention” signified an
act of the mind as representative of things.
 By a first act of the mind we merely grasp the
essence, or nature, of a thing; we do not avert to the
especial mode of existence that the thing has as it
exist on the mind and gets as a result of being
known.
 By a second, reflective act we become aware of the
attributes that an essence, or nature, has as it exist in
the mind but does not have in the real order.
 
 First Intention – is a concept by which we grasp what
a thing is according to its own proper being and
without our adverting to the especial mode of
existence of the thing has as it exist in the mind and
gets as a result of being known.
 Thus, when I say “Man is mortal” is a first intention,
because man is mortal as he exists or can exist in the
real order.
 “Man is mortal whether we think of him or not”
 
 Second Intention- is a concept in which, after
grasping what a thing is according to its own proper
being, we also advert to the special mode of
existence that the thing has as it exists in the mind.
 Thus when I say “Man is a universal concept,”
“Man” is a second intention, because man exists as a
universal concept only as a result of being thought of
man is not a universal concept as he exists in the real
order, but only as he exist in the mind.
 Concrete and Abstract Concepts


 Abstraction -consist in considering one aspect of a thing
while omitting other aspects. In one sense, all conceptual
knowledge is abstract because it expresses certain aspects of
its material object while leaving other aspects unexpressed.
 The Concept “Man” for instance, is abstract in the sense that
it expresses only the essence “MAN” and omits innumerable
differences like sex, race, weight, height and etc.
 But as opposed to abstract in the sense, terms like “this man”
and “oh Carlos” are concrete, since they stand for an
individual being and include all his attributes at least
indeterminately.
 
 But base on the classification we are about to take up
we shall determine a term concrete or abstract from a
different point of view:
 It is concrete- if it expresses a “subject” and a “form”
 And it is abstract- if it expresses a “form only and
omits the subject”
 For example:


Concrete Term Abstract Term
Animal: Animality:
If you have an animal, The concept of
that animal has Animality makes an
Animality. animal an animal
 
Concrete Concept- is the one that
represents to the mind a form as
inherent in a subject.
Abstract Concept- is one that presents
to the mind a form (perfection or
attribute) as separated from its subject.
 Absolute and Connotative Concept


Absolute Concept (As opposed to a
connotative concept) is one that presents its
object to the mind as an independent reality,
either as a substance or as though it were a
substance.
Connotative concept- is one that presents its
object to the mind as an accident actually
inhering in, and therefore implying a
substance.
 Positive and Negative Concepts


 Positive concept- presents a thing to the mind
according to what it is on what it has; for instance,
“being”, “man,” “rational”, “ Rationality,” and
“living”.
 Negative concept- presents a thing to the mind
according to what the thing is not or what the thing
lacks; for instance, “non-being”, “non-man”,
“irrational”, “irrationality”, and “dead”.
 Classifications based on
Mutual Relationships

Unconnected concepts- are so related
that the absence or presence on one of
the subject neither implies or excludes
the presence of the other in the same
subject; for instance; “Flat-footed”, and
“bald”, “tall” and “cold”.
 
 Connected concepts- are so related that the absence
or presence of one of them in a subject either implies
or excludes the presence of the other in the same
subject, and vice versa.
 In other words, connected concepts must either be,
or cannot be, simultaneously realized in the same
thing. They either include one another or exclude
one another.
 
 Concepts that include one Another- are either
convertible or non-convertible.
a) Convertible- have the same comprehension and
extension. For instance, a concept and its definition.
b) Non-convertible- are so related that one includes
the other in its comprehension but is not included in
it. A genus and species.
 
 Concepts that exclude one another- are related,
opposed in the strict sense, or disparate.
a) Relative concepts- mutually exclusive and so
related that neither of them can be thought of
without reference to the other.
b) Strictly Opposed Concepts- include contradictories,
privative concepts (as opposed to the perfections
whose absence they express), and two kinds of
contrary concepts.
 
 Contradictory Concepts- are so related that the one is
the simple negation of the other; for in stance, “man”
and “non-man”
 Privative concepts- include concepts like “dead” and
“blind”. A thing can only be deprived only of what it
has or ought to have.
 Contrary concepts- belongs to the same genus but
differ from one another as much as possible within
that genus. For instance; “hot” and “cold”.
 
Contrary concepts are IMMEDIATELY
OPPOSED if there is no middle ground
between them and if collectively they
embrace the entire extension of the
genus which they belong
Contrary concepts are MEDIATELY
OPPOSED if t6here is a middle ground
between them.
 
Disparate concepts- are compatible and
simple diverse. They are concepts of things
that bel0ong to the same genus but differ at
least specifically, yet not as contraries; for
instance, “Square” and “circle”.