Hazard and Hazard Identification

• Hazard
• Hazard Identification
Definitions related to hazard identification
• Safety: The freedom of injury, damage, or loss of resources.
• Hazard: The condition that can result in or contribute to a
mishap. It is a potential to cause harm. Harm include ill health
and injury, damage to property, plant, products or the
environment, production losses or increased liabilities.
• Risk: Chance of occurrence of undesired event and severity of
the resulting consequences.
• Risk Assessment: The process of qualitative risk
categorization or quantitative risk estimation.
• Risk Management: The process of risk identification, risk
assessment, risk disposition, and risk tracking and control.
• Probability: The chance or likelihood of occurrence of an
event.
• Reliability: The probability that item will perform its
intended function for a specified mission profile.
• Mishap: An unintended event that can cause injuries,
damage, or loss of resources.
 Hazards
 Not always identified until an accident occurs.
Essential to identify the hazards and reduce the risk well in advance
of an accident.
For each process in a chemical plant the following questions must be
asked:
1. What are hazards?
2. What can go wrong and how?
3. What are chances?
4. What are the consequences.
 Hazards
• Acute Hazard: Having an immediate and obvious
impact
• Chronic Hazard: Having more hidden, cumulative or
long term impact.
Hazards generally fall into one of the six groups:
• Physical: Slippery floors, objects in walkways, excessive noise
• Chemical: Gases, dust, fumes, vapors and liquids
• Ergonomic: Poor design of equipment, workstation design, manual
handling
• Radiation: Microwave, infra–red, UV, X rays
• Psychological: Shift work, workload, harassment, threat of danger,
discrimination, constant low level noise, stress
• Biological: Infection by bacteria, virus, fungi or parasites through a
cut, insect bite or contact with infected persons or contaminated
objects.
Some of example of Electrical Hazards:
• Shock
• Burns
• Overheating
• Inadvertent activation
• Power outage
• Distribution backfeed
• Connector falls out
• Connector clocking
• Bent pin
Some of the example of Temperature related hazards
• Heat source/ sink
• Hot/cold surface burns
• Pressure elevation
• Confined gas/liquid (coal mine explosion)
• Elevated flammability, volatility, reactivity
• Freezing humidity/moisture
• Altered structural properties
Some of the pneumatic/ hydraulic hazards are:
• Over pressurization
• Pipe/ vessel/ duct rupture
• Tank burst
• Pressurant Leakage
• Mislocated relief devices
• Accidental cross connection
 Process Hazard Factors
• Exothermic chemical reaction, in this case there is strong possibility of
reaction getting out of control
• Endothermic reaction that could react due to an external heat source
such as fire or combustion of fuel
• Material handling and transfer, accounts for the hazards involved in
the handling, transfer/pumping and warehousing of the material
• Enclosed or indoor process units, accounts for the additional hazard
where the process units prevents dispersion of escaped vapors.
• Limited access for emergency equipments
• Drainage and spill control, inadequate design of drainage would cause
large spills of flammable material adjacent to process equipment
 Hazard Consequences
• Human Impacts: Consumer injuries, Community injuries,
On-site injuries, Loss of employment, Psychological effects
• Environmental Impacts: On site contamination and off-site
contamination (air, water and soil)
• Economic Impacts: Property damage, Inventory loss,
Production outage, lost market share, legal liability, negative
image
Examples of Hazards and their effects
Workplace hazard Example of hazard Example of harm caused
Thing Knife Cut
Substance Benzene Leukemia
Material Mycobacterium Tuberculosis
Tuberculosis
Source of Energy Electricity Shock, electrocution
Condition Wet floor Slips, fall
Process Welding Metal fume fever
Practice Hard rock mining Silicosis
Behaviour Bullying Anxiety, fear and
depression
Purpose of hazard identification and control
policy
The purpose of this procedure is
• To provide a procedure that, so far as is reasonably practicable,
integrates the identification, reporting & investigation of foreseeable
hazards related to work activities and, in consultation with workers,
the timely elimination or minimization of risks to health and safety
using the hierarchy of risk control
• To ensure there is a formal process for hazard identification and risk
assessment which will effectively manage the hazards that may occur
within the workplace.
 Hazard identification
• Hazard identification and risk assessment are combined into a
general category called hazard evaluation.
• Risk assessment is sometimes called hazard analysis
• Risk assessment procedure that determines probabilities is frequently
called probabilistic risk assessment (PRA), whereas a procedure that
determines probability and consequences is called quantitative risk
analysis (QRA).
• Hazard identification can be performed independent of risk
assessment.
 Hazard identification
• Probablistic risk assessment (PRA): Rigrous technical discipline that
has been used in countless complex technological applications (such
as airliner or a nuclear power plant) to reveal design, operation and
maintenance vulnerabilities , to enhance safety and to reduce cost.
• Risk in PRA is feasible detrimental outcome of an activity or action.
• Risk is characterized by two quantities:
• Mangnitude (severity) of possible adverse consequence(s)
• Likelihood (probability) of occurrence of each consequence.
 Hazard identification
Probabilistic Risk assessment (PRA) usually answers three basic
question:
• What can go wrong with the studied technological application, or what
are the undesirable starting events leading to adverse consequence(s)?
• What and how severe are the possible impairments, or the adverse
consequences that technological entity may be eventually subjected to
as a result of occurrence of the initiator?
• How likely to occur are these undesirable consequences, or what are
their probabilities or frequencies?
Probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) process is as follows:
• Objective of the risk assessment must be well defined
• Associated with the objective, unwanted consequences of
interest must be identified and selected, including items like
degrees of harm to humans or degrees of loss of a mission.
• Familiarization with system under analysis covering all
relevant design and operation information including
engineering & process drawings as well as operating and
emergency procedures.
• Next, complete set of important initiating events, trigger
event for each series of mishaps leading to end states, must
be identified.
• Uncertainty analyses are performed which evaluates the
degree of knowledge or confidence in calculated numerical
risks results. Monte carlo simulations are generally used.
• Sensitivity analyses are performed which indicates input
changes are the analysis results most sensitive to.
• After completion of PRA, special techniques are often used
to identify what lead contributors to risk in accident
sequences.
• Last but not least, it must be mentioned that various type of
data must be collected and processed for used throughout the
PRA process.
 Quantitative risk analysis (QRA)
• Formal and systematic approach to estimate the likelihood and
consequence of harmful procedures and expressing the results
quantitively as risk to people, environment or in business.
• Asses the robustness and validity of quantitative results, by identifying
critical assumptions and risk driving elements.
• Studies are typically required for construction and processing
facilities, high- pressure pipelines, and storage and important sites,
including liquified natural gas (LNG).
• Contributes to improved decision – making by highlighting the
accident scenarios that contribute most to overall risk.
 Objectives of Quantitative risk analysis
• To identify the hazards associated with a facility.
• To determine the potential frequencies and consequence of the
identified hazards.
• To determine the system availability of the protection systems.
• To quantify the risk associated with a facility (e.g. Risk Contours,
Individual Risk Per Annum (IRPA), Potential Loss of Life (PLL))
• To suggest recommendations in order to reduce the risk to human life,
assets, environment and business interruptions to as low as reasonably
practicable.
 Hazard Identification Strategies
• Before applying any strategies, one should always ask the following
questions.
1. When is one required?
2. How do I conduct one?
• Process and material characterization
• Identify the process hazards/ hazardous conditions
• Understand the consequences
• Reduce, eliminate, substitute, prevent or mitigate the hazard
• Document, train and manage change.
 Process Safety Information Related to
Hazard Identification
• Materials
• Potential Chemical interactions
• Chemistry for desired chemical reaction
• Process variables/operating conditions
1. Temperature (desired reaction and possible side/decomposition reactions
2. Pressure (gas and vapor)
3. Composition
4. pH
5. Identify upset conditions
 Identification of Chemical Reactive
Hazards
• Evaluate thermal stability
• Raw materials, additives, catalysts, intermediates products,
waste streams.
• Material compatibility
• Incident review
 How to Identify Hazrads?
• Examine similar existing systems.
• Review previous hazard analyses for similar systems
• Review hazard checklists and standards.
• Review operation specifications, and consider all environmental factors.
• Consider energy flow through the system.
• Consider inherently hazardous materials
• Consider interactions between system components
• Use brainstorming in teams
• Try small scale testing, and theoretical analysis.
 Common Sources of Hazards
• Sources & propagation of stored energy in electrical, chemical, or mechanical form
• Mechanical moving parts
• Material or system incompatibilities
• Nuclear radiation and electromagnetic radiations
• Collisions and subsequent problems of survival and escape
• Fire and explosion
• Toxic and corrosive liquid and gases escaping from containers or being generated as a result of
other incidents.
• Deterioration in long-term storage
• Noise and biological hazards
• Human error in the operating of the system
• Software error that cause accidents
 Hazard Identification
The Hazard identification methods include the
following:
1.Preliminary hazard analysis
2.Process Hazard checklist
3.Hazards surveys
4.Hazard and operability studies (HAZOP)
studies
5.Safety review
 Hazard Identification
1. Preliminary hazard analysis
It is semi-quantitative analysis that is performed to:
 Identify all potential hazards and accident events that may
lead to an accident.
Rank the identified accidental events according to the
severity.
Identify required hazard controls and follow up actions.
 Hazard Identification
1. Preliminary hazard analysis
 Often used to evaluate hazards early in life of a process.
 Generally applied during the conceptual design or R & D phase
of a process plant.
 Commonly used as a design review tool before a process P &
ID is developed.
P & ID (Piping & Instrumentation diagram) is a schematic
illustration of functional relationship of piping, instrumentation,
and system equipment components
 Hazard Identification
1. Preliminary hazard analysis
The benefit of PHA is:
• The final product must be safe
• PHA helps designer to identify and deal with hazards
• Modifications that are made in earlier design stages are less costly
and easier to implement than modifications that are made in the
later design stage
• Helps the designers to anticipate hazards, thereby reducing the
number of surprises that occur during the design process.
 Hazard Identification
1. Preliminary hazard analysis
 PHA prerequisites
 Hazard Identification
 Frequency and consequence estimation
 Risk ranking and follow-up actions
 Hazard Identification
1. Preliminary Hazard Analysis: Prerequisites
• Develop PHA team.
• Define and describe the system to be analyzed
System boundaries
System description (lay out drawing, process flow diagrams, block diagrams)
Use and storage of energy and hazardous material in the systems
Operational and environmental conditions to be considered.
System for detection and control of hazards and accidental events, emergency system,
and mitigation actions.
• Collect risk information from previous and similar system (from accident data bases).
 Example: for a fired heater

Subsystem / item Fired Heater Trigger event causing Burners ignite

potential accident explosively
Operating mode Normal operation Potential accident Explosion and/or fire
Hazardous elements Fuel supply Measures to prevent Provision of flame
failure
Detectors and alarms.
Trip system must be used
Trigger events which No flame on burners and
cause hazardous fuel valve open
situation
Hazardous condition Fuel enters heater and
accumulates
 Hazard Identification
2. Process hazards checklists
• Attempts to compensate for potential limits of hazard
recognition, human memory, and attention to specific details.
• Helps to ensure consistency and completeness in carrying out
a task from an individual, within a work group, or across an
institution.
• Two basic type of checklist:
Process –based and behaviour based
 Hazard Identification
2. Process hazards checklists: Process Based
• Address safety hazards associated with a specific, well-
defined work task.
• They establish a set of steps for the checklist user to
implement.
• To be successful, checklist developers must be able to
identify the critical workflow for which the hazard
assessment is based
• Relevant safety protocols are then established and explicitly
integrated into the checklist
 Hazard Identification
2. Process hazards checklists: Behaviour Based
• Designed to asses new or undefined tasks
• The “cause – and – effect” concept identifies potential high-
hazard, high risk work practices.
• To be successful, checklist developers must have knowledge
of the spectrum of hazards and the activities conducted in the
category of work area.
• An appropriate set of hazard assessment criteria are
established for evaluation in the checklist.
 Hazard Identification
2. Process hazards checklists: Combined Process & Behaviour
Based
• Checklists don’t have to be strictly process based or
behaviour-based. Sometimes, a process based checklist may
incorporate behaviour based check, and vice versa.
• Often, a behaviour based checklist may be conducted for a
higher level risk assessment. If activities are then identified
as Higher risk, a process – based checklist can be developed
to mitigate those risks.
 Hazard Identification
2. Process hazards checklists
• List of possible problems and regions to be examined
• Questions are usually answered in Yes or No.
• Reminds the reviewer or operator of the potential problem
areas.
• Used during the design of the process to identify hazards, or
can be used before process operation.
 Hazard Identification
2. Process hazards checklists
• Design of the checklist depends on the intent.
• Different for use in the course of the initial design of the process
and for a process change.
• Applied only in preliminary stages of hazard identification and
should not be used as replacement at later stages of hazard
identification procedure.
• Most effective in identifying hazards arising from process design,
plant layout, storage of chemicals, electrical system, and so forth.
 Hazard Identification
2. Process hazards checklists: Advantages
• They can be used by non-system safety engineering experts.
• They are useful for practiced technologies and standard
designs.
• They capture wide range of previous knowledge and
experience.
• They ensure that common or obvious problems are not
overlooked .
 Hazard Identification
2. Process hazards checklists: Disadvantages
• They are of limited use for unprecedented technologies or
unique designs
• They can frame the process, leading to failing to recognize
that hazards also exist off the list and a failure to explore
what’s not on the checklist.
• According to definition, they will miss hazards that have not
been previously seen
 Hazard Identification
3. Hazards Surveys
• Should be guided by the facility safety committee in conjunction with the
facility safety coordinator (s).
• Inspections can be scheduled on a daily, weekly or monthly basis.
• Daily hazard surveys are normally completed by the operator or shift leader.
• Weekly hazard surveys are normally completed by the manager.
• Monthly hazard surveys are normally completed by the area safety inspector
or safety coordinator.
• Quarterly hazard surveys are typically completed by the facility safety
committee.
 Hazard Identification
3. Hazards Surveys
• Should be completed by including as many individual viewpoints as
possible.
• Each person on the hazard survey team should be familiar with the
process or operation and should have acquired insights concerning
problems, faults and situations that could cause accidents.
• Before completing a hazard survey, the inspection team should review
past near misses, accidents, employee complaints and written policies
that pertain to the area of inspection.
 Hazard Identification
3. Hazards Surveys
• Should be completed by including as many individual viewpoints as
possible.
• Each person on the hazard survey team should be familiar with the
process or operation and should have acquired insights concerning
problems, faults and situations that could cause accidents.
• Before completing a hazard survey, the inspection team should review
past near misses, accidents, employee complaints and written policies
that pertain to the area of inspection.
Example of Fire Safety Survey
 Hazard Identification
3. Hazards Surveys
• Very simple process.
• Formal systematized approaches using a rating form, similar to an
income tax form.
• Final rating number provides a relative ranking of the hazard
• Two popular forms of hazards survey are:
 Dow Fire and Explosion Index (F & EI)
 Dow – Chemical Exposure Index (CEI)
 Hazard Identification
3. Hazards Surveys: Dow Fire and Explosion Index (F & EI)
• A method (developed by Dow Chemical Company) for ranking the
relative fire and explosion risk associated with a process. Analysts
calculate various hazard and explosion indices using material
characteristics and process data.
• Designed for rating the relative hazards with the storage, handling,
and processing of explosive and flammable materials.
• Idea is to provide systematic approach, mostly independent of
judgmental factors, for determining the relative magnitude of
flammable hazards in a chemical plant.
 Hazard Identification
3. Hazards surveys: Dow Fire and Explosion Index
Procedure: Step 1:
Material factor, function of type of chemicals used, is adjusted for
general and special process hazards.
These adjustments or penalties are based on conditions such as storage
above the flash or boiling point, endo or exothermic reactions, and fired
heaters.
Credits for various safety systems and procedures are used for estimating
the consequences of the hazard, after the fire and explosion index (F &
EI) has been determined.
 Hazard Identification
3. Hazards surveys: Dow Fire and Explosion Index
Procedure: Step 2
Determination of general process hazards. Penalties are applied for
the following factors:
Exothermic reactions that might self-heat, or endothermic ones that
could react because of an external heat source such as a fire,
Enclosed process units preventing dispersion of escaped vapors,
Limited access for emergency equipment, and
Poor drainage of flammable materials away from the process unit.
 Hazard Identification
3. Hazards surveys: Dow Chemical Exposure Index (CEI)
A method, developed by the Dow Chemical Company, used to identify and
rank the relative acute health hazards associated with potential chemical
releases.
CEI is calculated from five factors:
A measure of toxicity;
Quantity of volatile material available for a release;
Distance to each area of concern;
Molecular weight of material being evaluated
Process variables that can affect the conditions of release such as temp,
pressure, reactivity.
Hazard Identification
3. Hazards surveys: Dow Chemical Exposure Index (CEI)
Procedure:
Begins with the definition of possible release incidents including release
from pipes, hoses, pressure relief devices relieving directly to the
atmosphere, vessels and tank overflows and spills.
Incidents are used with a number of simplified source models to
estimate the release rate of material.
Emergency Response Planning Guidelines (ERPGs) are used with a
simplified dispersion model to determine the CEI value and downwind
hazard distances resulting from the release.
 Hazard Identification
3. Hazards surveys: Dow Chemical Exposure Index (CEI)
Procedure:
Hazard surveys are suitable for identifying hazards associated
with equipment design, layout, material storage etc.
Not suitable for identifying hazards resulting from improper
operation or upset conditions.
Requires little experience, easy to apply, and provides a quick
result.
Hazards and operability (HAZOP) studies
4. Hazards and operability (HAZOP) studies
Definition: Structured and systematic examination of a
planned or existing process or operation in order to identify
and evaluate problems that may represent risk to personnel or
equipment, or prevent efficient operation.
Qualitative technique based on guidewords
Carried out by a multi-disciplinary team (HAZOP team)
during a set of meetings.
4. Hazards and operability (HAZOP) studies
Used for many years as a formal procedure to identify hazards in a
chemical process facility.
Systematic search for hazards which are defined as deviations within
these parameters that may have dangerous consequences.
Basic idea is to let the mind go free in a controlled fashion in order to
consider all the possible ways that process and operational failures can
occur.
Before study is started, detailed information on the process must be
available which includes up-to-date process flow diagrams, process and
instrumentation diagrams, detailed equipment specifications, materials of
construction, mass and energy balances.
4. Hazards and operability (HAZOP) studies
In the process industry, these deviations concern process parameters
such as flow, temperature, pressure etc.
HAZOP is a team approach, involving a team of people representing all
different functions in a plant. They identify all the deviations by ‘brain –
storming’ to set a guide words which are applied to all parts of the
system.
4. Hazards and operability (HAZOP) studies
Objectives of carrying out a HAZOP study:
To check a design.
To decide where and whether to build.
To decide whether to buy a piece of equipment.
To obtain a list of questions to put to a supplier.
To check running instructions.
To improve the safety of existing facilities
 4. Hazards and operability (HAZOP) studies
Team Composition
Team Leader, an expert in the HAZOP Technique
Technical Members, for example

New Design Existing Plant

Design or Project Engineer Process Supervisor
Process Engineer (Foreman)
Commissioning Manager Maintenance Engineer
Instrument Design Engineer Instrument Engineer
Chemist Technical Engineer
4. Hazards and operability (HAZOP) studies
The process is as follows:
System is divided into suitable parts or sub-systems, which are
then analyzed one at a time.
For each sub-system each parameter (flow, temperature, pressure,
volume, viscosity etc. ) that has an influence on it, is noted.
Guidewords are applied to each parameter in each subsystem.
The intention is to prompt creative discussion of deviations and
possible consequences.
For each significant deviation, possible causes are identified.
4. Hazards and operability (HAZOP) studies
The process is systematic and it is helpful to define the terms that are
used:
Study Nodes: The locations (on piping and instrumentation drawing
and procedure) at which the process parameters are investigated for
deviations.
Intention: The intention defines how the plant is expected to operate
in the absence of deviations at the study nodes. This can take a
number of forms and can either be descriptive or diagrammatic; e.g.
flowsheets, line diagrams, P&IDS.
Deviations: These are departures from the intention which are
discovered by systematically applying the guide words (e.g, “more
pressure”).
4. Hazards and operability (HAZOP) studies
The process is systematic and it is helpful to define the terms that are
used:
Causes: Reasons why deviations might occur. Once a deviation has
been shown to have a credible cause, it can be treated as a meaningful
deviation. These causes can be hardware failures, human errors, an
unanticipated process state (e.g., change of composition), external
disruptions (e.g., loss of power), etc.
Consequences: Results of deviations should they occur (e.g., release
of toxic materials).
Guide Words: Simple words which are used to qualify or quantify the
intention in order to guide and stimulate the brainstorming process
and so discover deviations.
 4. Hazards and operability (HAZOP) studies
Guideword
NO or NOT No part of the design intent occurs, such as no flow in a pipeline due to blockage

MORE or LESS A quantitative increase or decrease of some parameter, such as flow,

temperature etc.

AS WELL AS All the design intentions are fulfilled and something happens in addition
PART OF Only part of the design intention is fulfilled
REVERSE The logical opposite of the design intention occurs
OTHER THAN Something completely different than intended occurs
4. Hazards and operability (HAZOP) studies
Example:
Consider the simple process diagram below. It represents a plant where
substance A and B react with each other to form a new substance C. If
there is more B than A, there may be an explosion.
Guide words Deviation Possible causes Consequences
NO, NOT No A Tank containing Not enough A =
A is empty. V1 or V2 Explosion
is closed. Pump
doesnot work. Pipe
broken.
MORE Too much A Pump too high C contaminated by
capacity. Opening of A.
V1 or V2 is too large
LESS Not enough A V1, V2 or pipe are
partially blocked.
Pump gives low flow
Guide words Deviation Possible causes Consequences
AS WELL AS Other substance V3 open – air sucked Not enough A = Flow monitoring,
in. Explosion based on weight
REVERSE Liquid pumped Wrong connector to Not enough A = Flow monitoring
backwards motor Explosion, A is
contaminated
OTHER THAN A boils in pump Ttemperature too Not enough A = Temperature (and
high Explosion flow) monitoring
4. HAZOP : Process
The system is divided into functional blocks:
• Every part of the process is examined for possible deviations from the
design intention.
• Can the deviation cause any hazard or inconvenience?
• Each deviation is considered to decide how it could be caused and
what the consequence would be.
• Every phase of the process.
• Each system and person
• Questions formulated around guide words.
• For the hazards preventive/remedying actions are defined.
4. HAZOP: Review
4. HAZOP: Mistakes
• Failing to establish a “safe” environment for team members.
• Consequence of events not carried to conclusion.
• Taking unwarranted credit for safeguards.
• Too little credit given for safeguards.
• Failure to make recommendations as specific as possible.
• Poor record keeping of HAZOPS.
• Failure to HAZOP start-up and shut down procedures.
• P&IDs not up-dated or poorly constructed.
4. HAZOP: Benefits
• Built – in brainstorming, systematic & comprehensive methodology.
• More simple and intuitive than other commonly used risk
management tools.
• Its methodical approach ensures that deviations from design intent are
detected and acted upon.
• Creative, open-ended.
• Completeness: identifies all process hazards.
• Rigorous, structured, yet versatile.
• Identifies safety and operability issues.
4. HAZOP: Benefits
• Helpful when confronting hazards that are difficult to quantify:
• Methodology does not force to explicitly rate or measure deviation
probability of occurrence, severity of impact or ability to detect.
• Hazards that are difficult to detect, analyze, isolate, count, predict etc.
• Hazards rooted in human performance & behaviors.
4. HAZOP: Limitation
• Can be time consuming (e.g. includes operability)
• No means to asses hazards involving interactions between different
parts of system or process.
• No means to asses effectiveness of existing or proposed controls
(safeguards).
• HAZOP utilizes a team approach and hence can not be conducted by
a single analyst.
• Relies on having right people in the room
• No risk ranking or prioritization capability.
4. HAZOP: Limitation
• Team should be skilled and multidisciplinary with good knowledge of
the plant, its intended design and operation.
• Does not distinguish between low probability, high consequence
events (and vice versa).
References
• Crowl D>A> and Louvar J.F., Chemical Process Safety: Fundamentals
with Applications, Prentice Hall, third edition.
• Hazard identification, Risk Assesment and Control Procedure, Western
Sydney University.
• Hazard Identification and Risk Assesment, Geoff Wells, publisher
Institution of Chemical Engineers, 1996