Postmodernism rejects the possibility of objective knowledge and is skeptical of truth, unity, and progress. It emerged as a reaction against modernism in various art forms and fields like architecture, literature, and philosophy in the late 20th century. Postmodernism questions cultural and historical narratives and is associated with concepts like deconstruction. It represents a break from modernity and a crisis of grand narratives that once legitimized systems of knowledge.
Postmodernism rejects the possibility of objective knowledge and is skeptical of truth, unity, and progress. It emerged as a reaction against modernism in various art forms and fields like architecture, literature, and philosophy in the late 20th century. Postmodernism questions cultural and historical narratives and is associated with concepts like deconstruction. It represents a break from modernity and a crisis of grand narratives that once legitimized systems of knowledge.
Postmodernism rejects the possibility of objective knowledge and is skeptical of truth, unity, and progress. It emerged as a reaction against modernism in various art forms and fields like architecture, literature, and philosophy in the late 20th century. Postmodernism questions cultural and historical narratives and is associated with concepts like deconstruction. It represents a break from modernity and a crisis of grand narratives that once legitimized systems of knowledge.
Postmodernism rejects the possibility of objective knowledge and is skeptical of truth, unity, and progress. It emerged as a reaction against modernism in various art forms and fields like architecture, literature, and philosophy in the late 20th century. Postmodernism questions cultural and historical narratives and is associated with concepts like deconstruction. It represents a break from modernity and a crisis of grand narratives that once legitimized systems of knowledge.
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POSTMODERNISM
Elimination of both Object and Subject!
Definition: According to Terry Eagleton, Postmodernism is “the contemporary movement of thought, which rejects the possibility of objective knowledge and is therefore ‘skeptical of truth, unity and progress’”. {After Theory- 2003} Postmodernism is a movement particularly in architecture that reacted against the modern school of thought by re-introducing classical (of relating to or characteristic of Greek and Roman antiquity) and traditional elements of style. Postmodernism is a late-20th century movement in the arts, architecture, and criticism that was a departure from modernism. Postmodernism includes skeptical interpretations of culture, literature, art, philosophy, history, economics, architecture, fiction and literary criticism. It is often associated with deconstruction and post-structuralism because its usage as a term gained significant popularity at the same time as 20 th century post-structuralist thought. Continue: The term postmodernism has been applied to a host of movements mainly in art, music and literature, that reacted against tendencies in modernism and are typically marked by revival of historical elements and techniques. History: Different usages of the term. 1870’s : First- John Watkins Chapman – A postmodern style of painting – Departure from French impressionism. 1914 : J. M. Thompson – Change in religious beliefs and attitudes. 1921 & 1925 : Postmodernism had been used to describe new forms of art and music. 1942 : H. R. Hays – New Literary form. However, as a general theory for a historical movement, it was first used in 1939 by Arnold J. Toynbee – “Our own postmodern age has been inaugurated by the general war of 1914-1918”. 1949 : Used to describe a dis-satisfaction with modern architectural movement known as international style. 1971 : Mel Buchner – Used the term in a lecture delivered at the Institute of Art, London. Continue: More recently, Walter Truett Anderson described postmodernism as belonging to one of the four typological world views, which he identifies as either: 1. Postmodern-Ironist: which sees truth as socially constructed. 2. Scientific-Rational: in which truth is found through methodical-disciplined enquiry. 3. Social-Traditional: in which truth is found in the heritage of American and Western civilization, and 4. Neo-Romantic: in which truth is found through attaining harmony with nature and/or spiritual exploration of inner self. Continue: Postmodernist ideas in philosophy and the analysis of culture and society expanded the importance of critical theory and has been the point of departure for works of literature, architecture and design, as well as being visible in marketing/business and the interpretation of history, law and culture, starting in the 20th century. Postmodernism has also been used interchangeably with the term post- structuralism, out of which postmodernism grew. A proper understanding of postmodernism or doing justice to the postmodernist thought demands an understanding of the post-structuralist movement and the ideas of its advocates. Lyotard’s Three Senses of the Term Postmodernism: In the writing of Lyotard, one of the foremost thinkers associated with postmodernism, we can identify at-least three analytically distinguishable senses of the term, even if they shade into each other at the edges. First Sense: Postmodernism as an Aesthetic Event! In many cases ‘postmodernism’ refers to a trend or movement in literature, cinema, art and architecture. This sense of postmodernism is often premised on a rupture between modern and postmodern styles where the later represents a questioning of modern conceptions of Teleological Time and Euclidian Space, a predilection (an established preference for something) for diversity and difference over unity, for irony, self-reflection and self- refrentiality and a loss of faith in avant-grade (New and experimental ideas in art , music and literature) Generalizing to the extreme, we might say that postmodernism highlights and plays with the rules and limits of structuralism, formalism and orthodoxies of any kind. Continue: Second Sense: Postmodernism as a Social Condition! Perhaps the most common sense in which the term ‘postmodernism’ is used to signify the emergence of a new period or distinctive social condition. Postmodernity in this sense represents a break with the past, the arrival of ‘new times’, imputing a qualitative transformation to society or a shift in cultural sensibility which is characterized by the rise of information technologies. Knowledge changes in status as it becomes just another commodity in the circuity of post-industrial, postmodern capitalism. There emerges in postmodernity a ‘mercantilization of knowledge, which no longer asks, ‘Is it true?’ but ‘what use is it?’, ‘Is it saleable?’ and ‘Is it efficient?’ Knowledge is judged in terms of its utility and technical applicability. Knowledge in the postmodern era comes to be understood as an ‘informational commodity’ in the global network of power and wealth. Continue: Lyotard goes so far as to say that “It is conceivable that the nation-states will one day fight for control of information, just as they battled in the past for control of access to and exploitation of raw materials and cheap labor. Third Sense: Postmodernism as Crisis of Narratives! Apart from using the term ‘postmodernism’ to denote an ‘aesthetic event’ or the transformation in the ‘use value of knowledge’, Lyotard also uses it to denote the ‘general cultural context of nihilism’, in which this transformation takes place. Postmodernism in this sense evokes a ‘crisis of narratives’ or more specifically an ‘incredulity towards meta-narratives’, i.e., disbelief, doubt, skepticism, suspicion about any grand theory with foundational grounds. There is Lyotard perceives, a loss of confidence in the authority of the grand narratives, which function to legitimate the rules and procedures for making and judging knowledge claims. The grand narrative is thus an external support to which appeal is made, so as, to ground and legitimate knowledge claims. Continue: In more political terms, the importance of narrative is that it bears a legitimation function for knowledge claims. At the epistemological level, grand narratives serve as a ‘means of self- foundation’, while at the political level, they serve as a ‘means of self-assertion or self-legislation’. Central to each narrative is the subject who pursues self-foundation or self- legislation. The Operation of Grand Narratives in IR: One can see the operation of grand narratives in IR. The dominant narratives, realism and neorealism, legitimate their knowledge by reference to the state’s pursuit of power and security under conditions of anarchy. Knowledge claims are thus judged according to their usefulness for states under such conditions. One of the main alternative narratives, liberal internationalism, legitimates its knowledge by reference to humanity’s gradual achievement of universal freedom and perpetual peace by challenging the priority accorded to state defined interests and by overcoming the spurious (false, bogus, fake) moral boundaries policed by sovereign states. Each narrative places the epistemological and the political dimensions in a mutual embrace. Self-assertion grounds self-foundation and vice-versa. Finally each narrative marks the limits of what is possible in theory and in practice. Expression of Crisis of Narratives: One of the most significant expressions of the crisis of narrative is the de- legitimation of modernity and the West. Stories telling of the triumph of modernity and/or the West have increasingly come under critical scrutiny, not just by those positioned ‘outside’ the modern West, but by those ‘within’. The moral and political implications of such narratives, which legitimate the domination of a set of predominantly European values at the expense of alternatives have been amply documented by Arjun Appadurai, Chris Brown, Roxanne Doty, Rob Walker and Robert Young. 1. Postmodernism as a critical discourse here shades into postcolonialism as a critique of Euro- and ethnocentrism (Evaluation of other cultures according to preconceptions originating in the standards and customs of one's own culture). This provides an important context in which to interpret Lyotard’s call to ‘wage a war on totality’ and to be sensitive to difference. Continue: Postmodernism thus signifies a resistance against totalizing narratives of morality, culture and politics, that is, narratives which function to justify or legitimate the imposition of Western or modern norms on others. At the risk of oversimplifying, it might be said that postmodernism in this sense represents a resistance to totalization. In the language of Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, it is a form of thought opposed to modes of epistemological and political capture. It will be suggested that this sense of postmodernism, which is better called post-structuralism, echoes the efforts of Nietzsche. Nietzsche’s thought is an effort to avoid totalizing views of knowledge and politics, at the center of which is a critique of the subject. The deployment of Nietzschean or Post- structuralist form of Postmodernism in IR: After Grand Narratives: Nietzsche, Perspectivism and the Critique of the Subject: Lyotard’s account of the de-legitimation of metanarratives can be read alongside Nietzsche’s Genealogy of morals insofar as it is concerned with responding to a condition of nihilism; that is, a condition where the highest values are devalued. According to both Nietzsche and Lyotard, humanity finds itself in a situation where it can no longer, if ever it could, identify a transcendent ground for knowledge claims. The idea that transcendent values, principles and reference-points might somehow ground knowledge claims has been rendered null and void under the aegis of postmodernism. There exists no overarching, transhistorical viewpoint from which judgements regarding epistemology or politics can be made. Continue: Nietzsche’s Perspectivism ‘God is dead’, it is declared, and no other reference-points has replaced Him which might function as a stable ground for knowledge claims. In the absence of a stable, universal frame of reference or grand narrative, we are left with a plurality of perspectives, or in Lyotard’s words, ‘little narratives’. As Nietzsche puts it: There is only a perspective “seeing”, only a perspective “knowing”. The modern idea or ideal of an objective or “all encompassing perspective” has been displaced by the Nietzschean recognition that there is always more than one perspective and that each perspective embodies a particular set of values. Moreover, these perspectives do not simply offer different views of the same ‘real world’. The very idea of the ‘real world’ has been ‘abolished’ in Nietzsche’s thought, leaving only perspectives, only interpretations of interpretations, or in Derrida’s terms, only ‘textuality’. Continue: The warp and weft of the ‘real world’ is woven out of perspectives, interpretations and little narratives, none of which can claim to correspond to ‘reality in-in-itself’, to be a ‘view from nowhere’, or to be exhaustive. To say that there is only a ‘perspective knowing’ does not mean, of course, that there can be no knowledge at all. Nietzsche and post-structuralists have never denied the possibility of knowledge, only the possibility of overcoming perspective or escaping textuality. Equally, they have never been seduced by relativism as an alternative to objectivism. Perspectivism does not confer equal authority on all perspectives, nor does it relinquish the possibility of discriminating between perspectives. It simply confers on all perspectives an equal right to claim authority. There is no overarching perspective, no transcendent point from which to pass judgement. Continue: No perspective can thus claim to stand on unshakable foundations. Or to repeat an earlier formulation, no perspective can claim to correspond to ‘reality-in-itself’, to be a ‘view from nowhere’, or to be exhaustive. Alternative criteria must thus be employed to judge between different perspectives, as claim to truth, objectivity or exhaustiveness are no longer tenable. Perspectivism thus acts as an alternative to the ‘unitarian epistemologies’, to use Paul Patton’s term, that dominate the social sciences and underpin grand narratives. Unitarian epistemologies assume that if a given theory provides some knowledge of the social or political world than alternative theories can make knowledge claims only insofar as they are consistent with the grand narrative which legitimates the extant theory. The extant theory acts as a benchmark or reference-point against which other theories are judged – as if it was somehow unproblematically placed to gain access to the ‘real world’. Continue: But perspectivism challenges Unitarian epistemologies by suggesting that no knowledge claim stands outside the struggle or contestation which takes place to impose authoritative interpretations. Every grand narrative is thus simply one among many little narratives, each of which is engaged in an epistemological battle to have its perspective win out. It is important to remember that Nietzsche’s perspectivism is internally related to his critique of subjectivity. Unitarian epistemologies are predicated upon an objective, universal knowing subject. Nietzsche however warns us to be on our guard against “the dangerous old conceptual fiction that posited a ‘pure, will-less, painless, timeless knowing subject”’. According to Nietzsche, the knowing subject is simply a fiction produced by grammatical habit. The subject-predicate distinction in language creates the ‘rude fetishism, as Nietzsche calls it in Twilight of the Idols, of the active, unified subject behind any action. Continue: The problem with this ‘rude fetishism’ as Nietzsche sees it, is twofold. Firstly, it ignores the situatedness of any knowing subject. Knowledge is always situated, it always marks and is embedded in a particular position. As Nietzsche so forcefully showed, the subject does not simply denote a perspective, but is constituted by it. A perspective thus always also posits a subject. Nietzsche thus suggests that knowledge and subjectivity are fundamentally entwined: knowledge is always embodied in a particular subject, simultaneously positing that subject. Knowledge, qua perspective, always posits or positions a subject, it is thus always linked to ways of being-in-the-world, and indeed is a part of the world, not somehow extraneous or removed. Secondly, the habit of grammar that leads us to separate subject and action, and to confuse the subject for a cause who ‘produces an effect’, fools us into believing that there is an a priori unified subject behind human knowing and doing. Continue: As Nietzsche explains, however, ‘‘there is no ‘being’ behind doing’’, effecting, becoming; the ‘doer’ is merely a fiction added to the deed – ‘the deed is everything’. The subject is not a pre-existent, noumenal entity, but is constituted by the doing. Nietzsche’s point here is, that the subject’s being is constituted by doing. Knowing constitutes the knower. Postmodernism qua perspectivism thus marks a suspicion towards, or a decentering of, epistemological totalization. This will force us to take a different perspective of perspective. It is no longer just a neutral gaze. Instead, it is a part of the world, even as it partakes in the constitution of the world. As Nietzsche already hints, there are important ontological implications that extends from this theoretical insight. At the heart of these implications is the knowing and acting subject. The contribution of these Nietzschean reflections, is to mistrust the will to totalize or essentialize, that is, to question the assumption that there is a priori essence to being or that any perspective can capture the essence or totality of the world. Continue: For postmodernism, totalization at the levels of epistemology and ontology is to be resisted. In fact, for postmodernism, totalization never actually takes place. There are attempts at totalization, and often appearances of totalization, but totalization is never achieved. Lyotard’s slogan ‘wage war on totality’ usefully captures the de-centering impulse that drives postmodernism in both its epistemological and political concerns. IR Theory, Perspectivism and De-centered States:
We have seen that postmodernism represents a generalized will to resist
totalization in both epistemological and ontological dimensions. Perspectivism also has found its expression in IR theory. Postmodernism’s revised conception of ontology also has its implications on the nature of the primary subject of international relations, that is , the sovereign state. A: Perspectivism in IR Theory: The will to resist epistemological totalization is evident in postmodernism’s suspicion towards grand narratives and its affirmation of perspective. David Campbell’s analysis of Bosnian war in National Deconstruction affirms this perspectivism. He reminds us that the same events can be represented in markedly different ways with significantly different effects. Indeed, the upshot of his analysis is that the Bosnian war can only be known through perspective; there is no over-arching perspective. Continue: For postmodernism, following Nietzsche, perspectives are integral to the constitution of the ‘real world’, not just because they are our only access to it, but because they are basic and essential elements of it. Perspectives are thus not to be thought of as simply optical devices for apprehending the ‘real world’, like a telescope or microscope, but also as the very fabric of that ‘real world’. Perspectives are thus component objects and events that go towards making up the ‘real world’. In fact we should say that there is no object or event outside or prior to perspective or narrative. As Campbell explains, after Hayden White, narrative is central, not just to understanding an event, but in constituting that event. This is what Campbell means by the ‘narrativization of reality’. According to such a conception events acquire the status of ‘real’ not because they occurred but because they are remembered and because they assume a place in narrative. Continue: Narrative is thus not simply a representation of a prior, but now past, presence, it is the means by which the status of reality is conferred on any presence. However, just as objects or events are constituted through narrative so too are subjects. Or as Campbell puts it, ‘the narrativizing of reality is integral to the performative constitution of identity’. To revert to the Nietzschean language used earlier, perspectives always posit a subject. Perspective and subjectivity are thus mutually entwined as we have already noted. The various actors in the Bosnian wars are performatively constituted through narrative. Campbell’s narrativism leads to a critique of subjectivity, just as Nietzsche’s perspectivism led him to a critique of subjectivity via a revised ontology. Continue: B: De-centering States. Postmodernism also has carried out a reconceptualization, or more specifically, a de- centering of the state. One attempt to bring postmodernism to bear a questions of ontology is undertaken by Costas Constantinou in his study, ‘On the Way to Diplomacy’. The main concern of his diplomatic theory as he calls it, is to expose the originary connection between theory and diplomacy as two political acts caught in the paradoxes of sending and receiving representations. The structure of diplomacy and theory, he says are integrated in the act of representation that is peculiar to Western metaphysical thought. His work registers a rethinking of both the concept of theory and diplomacy. This is a necessary corollary of his claim that both theory and diplomacy are predicated upon what Jacques Derrida has called ‘a metaphysics of presence’. Insofar as they both depend on assumptions of presence, both are expressed through a variety of sendings, paths, journeys, themes, spectacles, the sight or hour of God/truth and theorems, theory and diplomacy are thus governed by the same structural features. Continue: Moreover, Constantinou suggests that theory and, by necessity, diplomacy always harbor a particular conception of being. He demonstrates how the sender of an ambassador is not simply an adornment (decoration, ornamentation, beautification) of the state. The act of legation (delegation, deputation), that is the sending of diplomatic representation, is not simply an act undertaken by an already existent state. Constantinou here follows Nietzsche: there is no being (state) behind doing (legation), there is no presence before representation. While diplomacy may appear to be nothing more than a signifier of a prior signified (the state), Constantinou’s analysis leads us to recognize the state’s being as thoroughly bound up in, and constituted through diplomacy. As postmodernism has convincingly shown, every signified is but another signifier in a whole chain of signifiers. Or as Constantinou himself puts it, ‘the thing-word, signifier-signified binary opposition does not hold’. The implications of this analysis are distinctly Nietzschean. Habits of what we might call ‘IR grammar’ fool us into believing that the state (as a subject) lies behind diplomacy (as an action). Continue: But Constantinou demonstrates that the concept of the state as a prior, unified presence is little more than a fiction added to the deed of diplomacy. He thus exposes the dependence of the state on diplomacy in a particularly Nietzschean sense: the various practices of diplomacy are constitutive of states, not an added extra. Diplomacy, according to this logic, what Derrida calls the ‘strange economy of the supplement’, has a dual, ambivalent (unsure, undecided, uncertain) function: On the one hand it appears to add itself as a surplus or addition to the already present state, but on the other hand, it is integral to the state’s presence and thus acts as a sign of the lack or incompletion inherent to the state. So what appears a secondary aspect of the state (diplomacy) is actually an essential and necessary aspect. Indeed the sending of diplomatic representation functions to give presence to the state. Embassies thus function as ‘delegations of presence’ as Constantinou puts it. Continue: A similar argument is to be found in Cynthia Weber’s ‘Simulating Sovereignty’. Weber provides an account of how the meaning of state sovereignty is stabilized by theories and practices of intervention. Like any political concept or institution, sovereignty is an essentially contested and unstable one whose functions change over time. Her main concern is to map how changing conceptions of intervention effect a stabilization of the concept of sovereignty. By analyzing the different forms of intervention and modalities of punishment which have occurred over time, she seeks to trace the changing ways in which sovereignty has been constituted. Theories and practices of intervention are thus, in her account, indispensable indicators of how the sovereign state has been constituted and its meaning stabilized historically. She thus offers a critique of conventional understandings of sovereignty and intervention. Conventional accounts are premised on a ‘logic of representation’ as Weber calls it, following Richard Ashley. As Ashley explains, the ‘logic of representation’ is an expression of the ‘metaphysics of presence’. It disposes thought always to hark back to a prior, foundational presence as the source of meaning and authority. Continue: Conventional accounts tend to analyze intervention as an act of transgression carried out by one state against another. Both the transgressing and the transgressed state are conceived as prior and complete presences. Implicit in conventional accounts therefore is a supposition that the states referred to are already fully constituted as sovereign identities. But Weber too follows Nietzsche in mistrusting the grammatical habit which supposes the prior existence of a 'being' behind the 'doing'. The effect of her mistrust is to cast doubt on the idea of the sovereign state as a foundational referent. As Weber points out, to deploy the logic of representation is to suppose that a foundation or signified exists which can ground and stabilize political concepts and meanings. Her intention is to problematise the notion that state sovereignty can serve this foundational function. Indeed, as she explains, paradoxically, the concept of sovereignty depends fundamentally on the thing to which it appears antithetical, namely, intervention. Employing the theoretical insights of Jean Baudrillard, Weber suggests that the concept of sovereignty takes' on stable meaning by being placed in opposition to intervention.' [O]ne way to assert the existence of something (sovereignty) is to insist upon the existence of its opposite (intervention) '."States are constituted by the very acts and discourses surrounding their affirmation (sovereignty) and their negation (intervention). Continue: Employing the theoretical insights of Jean Baudrillard, Weber suggests that the concept of sovereignty takes' on stable meaning by being placed in opposition to intervention.’ [O]ne way to assert the existence of something (sovereignty) is to insist upon the existence of its opposite (intervention) '."States are constituted by the very acts and discourses surrounding their affirmation (sovereignty) and their negation (intervention). Sovereignty is nothing other than a sign of another sign, one which feigns the existence of something 'real’.” As such the concept of sovereignty cannot perform the stabilizing or grounding function it is expected to perform. We can no longer refer to the 'real itself, only to 'signs of the real'. This of course does not explain how it is that sovereign states have come to appear as if they were a 'real' and stable referent. Continue: The short explanation as to how states take on the appearance of being stable and complete entities is through performativity. This notion of performativity draws directly upon Nietzsche's claim that 'being' is constituted and sustained through 'doing'.