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Hardware Security

This presentation aims at hardware security like hardware trojans, side-channel attacks, and their countermeasures.

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VINOTH RAJ R
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0% found this document useful (0 votes)
180 views22 pages

Hardware Security

This presentation aims at hardware security like hardware trojans, side-channel attacks, and their countermeasures.

Uploaded by

VINOTH RAJ R
Copyright
© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
Available Formats
Download as PPTX, PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd
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Hardware Security

05/10/2023 Hardware Security 1


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Glimpses of Hardware Trojans

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Hardware Trojans
 Possible attacks on the IC supply chain include maliciously
modifying ICs, copying of ICs to produce cloned devices, or
stealing intellectual property (IP). A malicious modification to
an IC is call
 Because the modification hides itself within the IC and possibly
even provides correct, useful functionality before it attacks,
much like its eponymous mythed a Trojan circuit or Hardware
Trojan
 Cloned or counterfeit ICs lead to lost revenue and may be less
reliable than the original, potentially affecting the reputation of
the original device manufacturer and the security of the end
user.
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IC supply Chain

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Testing of trojan circuits
• One approach to Trojan circuit detection is to look for
additions and modifications to an IC in a laboratory setting
prior to deploying the final product.
• Lab-based detection augments the test phase of the supply
chain with silicon design authentication, which verifies that an
IC contains only the designer’s intended functionality and
nothing else
• Silicon design authentication is difficult due to increasing IC
complexity, shrinking feature sizes, rarity of conditions for
activating malicious logic, and lack of knowledge about what
functionality has been added to the IC.

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Limitations of Testing
• Testing cannot capture the behavior of added functionality, so an
IC could contain all of the intended functionality while having
extra malicious logic that might not be activated or detected by
tests.
• Detection by physical inspection is insufficient due to the
complexity and size of modern ICs.
• Destructive approaches are too costly and cannot be applied to
every IC.
• Two promising directions that are active areas for research in the
area of Trojan circuit detection at the silicon design
authentication step are side-channel analysis and Trojan
activation.
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Example

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Example

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Countermeasures

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Dynamic power simulator framework

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Side Channel Attack(SCA)

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Power Attack

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Countermeasures

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