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Software Defects: Buffer Overflow Threats

The document discusses various software defects related to buffer overflows, memory protection, and covert channels. It provides definitions and examples of each type of defect and outlines countermeasures like implementing parameter checks, access control lists, and identifying and closing potential covert channels. It also covers several access control architecture models used to enforce security policies and maintain data integrity.

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LEE PEI YI YUKI
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63 views6 pages

Software Defects: Buffer Overflow Threats

The document discusses various software defects related to buffer overflows, memory protection, and covert channels. It provides definitions and examples of each type of defect and outlines countermeasures like implementing parameter checks, access control lists, and identifying and closing potential covert channels. It also covers several access control architecture models used to enforce security policies and maintain data integrity.

Uploaded by

LEE PEI YI YUKI
Copyright
© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
Available Formats
Download as PPTX, PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd
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Software Defects: Buffer Overflow Threats

• One of the oldest and most common problems to software.


• A buffer overflow occurs when a program or process tries to
store more data in a buffer (temporary data storage area)
than it was intended to hold.
• Vulnerability is caused by lack of parameter checking or
enforcement for accuracy and consistency by the software
application or OS.
• Countermeasure:
– Practice good SDLC process (code inspection &
walkthrough).
– Apply patches for OS & applications.
– If available, implement hardware states and controls for
memory protection. Buffer management for OS.
– Programmer implementing parameter checks and enforce
data rules.
Software Defects – Memory Protection Threats
• Memory protection is enforcement of access control and
privilege level to prevent unauthorized access to OS
memory.
• Countermeasures:
– Ensure all system-wide data structures and memory pools
used by kernel-mode system components can only be
accessed while in kernel mode.
– Separate software processes, protect private address
space from other processes.
– Hardware-controlled memory protection
– Use Access Control List (ACL) to protect shared memory
objects.
Software Defects – Covert Channel Threats*
• Covert channel is an un-controlled information flow (or
unauthorized information transfer) through hidden
communication path(s).
– Storage channel - writing data to a common storage area where another process
can read it. When assessing the security of software, be diligent for any process that
writes to any area of memory that another process can read.
– Timing channel - altering the performance of a system component or modifying a
resource’s timing in a predictable manner. Using a covert timing channel is generally a
method to secretly transfer data and is very difficult to detect.
• Countermeasure steps:
– Identify potential covert channel(s)
– Verify and validate existence of covert channel(s)
– Close the covert channel by install patch or packet-filtering
security mechanism.

* Note: The “classic” definition of covert channel is in the context of TCSEC (i.e., storage & timing channels).
Reference: NCSC-TG-30, A Guide To Understanding Covert Channel Analysis of Trusted System
Access Control Architecture Models (1 of 3)

• Illustrate access control implementations and can help


organizations quickly make improvements through
adaptation.
• Trusted computing base (TCB)
– Part of TCSEC Rainbow Series
– Used to enforce security policy (rules of system
configuration)
– Biggest challenges include covert channels
 Storage channels
 Timing channels
Access Control Architecture Models (2 of 3)

• ITSEC: An international set of criteria for evaluating


computer systems
– Compares Targets of Evaluation (ToE) to detailed security
function specifications
• The common criteria
– Considered successor to both TCSEC and ITSEC
• Bell-LaPadula confidentiality model
– State machine reference model
– Uses “no read up, no write down” principle
Access Control Architecture Models (3 of 3)

• Biba integrity model


– Designed to prevent corruption of higher integrity entities
– Based on “no write up, no read down” principle
• Clark-Wilson integrity model
– No changes by unauthorized subjects
– No unauthorized changes by authorized subjects
– Maintenance of internal and external consistency
• Graham-Denning access control model
– Composed of set of objects, set of subjects, and set of
rights

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